

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In Re: Fuel and Purchased Power Cost)	DOCKET NO.	900001-EI
Recovery Clause and Generating)	ORDER NO.	23482
Performance Incentive Factor.)	ISSUED:	9-14-90
_____)			

ORDER ON FPC'S REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT OF PORTIONS OF ITS FEBRUARY, 1989 FORMS 423

SPECIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) requested specified confidential treatment of the following FPSC forms pursuant to 366.093, Florida Statutes, and Rule 25-22.006, Florida Administrative Code:

<u>MONTH/YEAR</u>	<u>FORM</u>	<u>DOCUMENT NO.</u>
February, 1989	423-1(a), 2(a), 2(b), 2(c)	3742-89

First, FPC argues that the information contained in column H, Invoice Price, of Form 423-1(a) identifies the basic component of the contract pricing mechanism. Disclosure of the invoice price, FPC contends, particularly in conjunction with information provided in other columns as discussed below, would enable suppliers to determine the pricing mechanisms of their competitors. A likely result would be greater price convergence in future bidding and a reduced ability on the part of a major purchaser, such as FPC, to bargain for price concessions since suppliers would be reluctant or unwilling to grant concessions that other potential purchasers would expect. FPC also argues that disclosure of column I, Invoice Amount, when divided by the figure available in column G, Volume, would also disclose the Invoice Price in column H.

FPC also argues that disclosure of column J, Discount, in conjunction with other information under columns K, Net Amount, L, Net Price, M, Quality Adjustment, or N, Effective Purchase Price, could also disclose the Invoice Price available in column H by mathematical deduction. In addition, FPC maintains, disclosure of discounts resulting from bargaining concessions would impair its ability to obtain such concessions in the future for the reasons discussed above. Information contained in column N is particularly sensitive, FPC argues, because it is usually the same as or only slightly different from the Invoice Price in column H.

FPC argues that disclosure of the information in column P, Additional Transport Charges, in conjunction with the information

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located in column Q, Other Charges, would also disclose the Effective Purchase Price in column N by subtracting them from the Delivered Price available in column R. FPC, therefore, concludes that the information contained in columns P and Q are entitled to confidential treatment.

FPC contends that disclosure of the Total Transportation Cost in column P on Form 423-2(b), when subtracted from the F.O.B. Mine Price in column I, would also disclose the Effective Purchase Price in column G.

FPC maintains that column F, F.O.B. Mine Price, of Form 423-2(a) is the current contract price of coal purchased from each supplier by EFC for delivery to FPC. Disclosure of this information, FPC maintains, would enable suppliers to determine the prices of their competitors which would likely result in greater price convergence in future bidding and a reduced ability on the part of a major purchaser, such as EFC, to bargain for price concessions on behalf of FPC since suppliers would be reluctant or unwilling to grant concessions that other potential purchasers would then expect.

Column H of the form, Original Invoice Price, FPC argues, is the same as in column F, F.O.B. Mine Price, except in rare instances when the supplier is willing and able to disclose its Shorthaul and Loading Charges in column G, if any, included in the contract price of coal. Disclosure, FPC argues, would be detrimental for the reasons identified for column F of this form. Column I, Retroactive Price Adjustment, FPC argues, are normally received well after the reporting month and are, therefore, included on Form 423-2(c) at that time, along with the resulting new price. Disclosure of this information, FPC contends, would, therefore, disclose the F.O.B. Mine Price.

FPC argues that column J, Base Price, is the same as the original Invoice Price in column H because Retroactive Price Adjustments available in column I are typically received after the reporting month and are included on Form 423-2(c) at that time. Disclosure, FPC contends, would, therefore, be detrimental for the reasons identified above as those that would result from disclosure of F.O.B. Mine Prices. FPC further argues that column K, Quality Adjustments, are typically received after the reporting month and are, therefore, also included on Form 423-2(c) at that time. These adjustments, FPC informs, are based on variations in coal quality characteristics, usually BTU content, between contract specifications and actual deliveries. Disclosure of this information, FPC concludes, would allow the

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F.O.B. Mine Price to be calculated using the associated tonnage and available contract BTU specifications. FPC also maintains that column L, the Effective Purchase Price, is the same as the Base Price in column J because quality adjustments are typically not reported in column K. Disclosure of the information therein, FPC concludes, would, therefore, disclose the F.O.B. Mine Prices.

FPC notes that the Effective Purchase Price is available in two places in Form 423: column L on Form 423-2(a) and column G on Form 423-2(b). FPC argues that in nearly every case, the Effective Purchase Price is the same as the F.O.B. Mine Price found under column F on FPSC Form 423-2(a), which is the current contract price of coal purchased from each supplier by Electric Fuels Corporation (EFC) for delivery to FPC. Disclosure of this information, FPC contends, would enable suppliers to determine the prices of their competitors which, again, would likely result in greater price convergence in future bidding and a reduced ability on the part of a major purchaser, such as EFC, to bargain for price concessions on behalf of FPC, since suppliers would be reluctant or unwilling to grant concessions that other potential purchasers would then expect. In addition, FPC contends that disclosure of the Effective Purchase Price would also disclose the Total Transportation Cost in column H by subtracting column G from the F.O.B. Plant Price in column I.

FPC additionally argues that column H, Additional Shorthaul & Loading Charges, of Form 423-2(b) are EFC's transportation rates to move coal purchased F.O.B. mine to a river loading dock for waterborne delivery to FPC. These short haul moves, FPC informs, are made by rail or truck, often with the alternative to use either. This provides EFC with the opportunity to play one alternative against the other to obtain bargaining leverage. Disclosure of these short haul rates, FPC concludes, would provide the rail and truck transportation suppliers with the prices of their competitors, and would severely limit EFC's bargaining leverage.

Column I, Rail Rate, of the form, FPC argues, is a function of EFC's contract rate with the railroad and the distance between each coal supplier and Crystal River. Because these distances are readily available, FPC maintains, disclosure of the Rail Rate would effectively disclose the contract rate. This would impair the ability of a high volume user, such as EFC, to obtain rate concessions since railroads would be reluctant to grant concessions that other rail users would then expect. FPC also argues that Column J, Other Rail Charges, of the form consists of EFC's railcar ownership cost. This cost, FPC contends, is

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internal trade secret information which is not available to any party with whom EFC contracts, railroads or otherwise. If this information were disclosed to the railroad, FPC concludes, their existing knowledge of EFC's Rail Rates would allow them to determine EFC's total rail cost and to better evaluate EFC's opportunity to economically use competing transportation alternatives.

Column K, River Barge Rate, of the form, FPC argues, is EFC's contract rate for barge transportation from up-river loading docks to the Gulf barge transloading facility at the mouth of the Mississippi. Disclosure of this information would enable other suppliers of river barge transportation to determine the prices of their competitors, which would likely result in greater price convergence in future bidding and a reduced ability on the part of a high volume user, such as EFC, to bargain for price concessions on behalf of FPC, since suppliers would be reluctant or unwilling to grant concessions that other potential purchasers would then expect. Column L, Transloading Rate, of the form, FPC argues, is EFC's contract rate for terminaling services at International Marine Terminals (IMT). Disclosure of this contract rate to other suppliers of terminaling services, FPC argues, would be harmful to EFC's ownership interest in IMT by placing IMT at a disadvantage in competing with those suppliers for business on the lower Mississippi.

Column M, Ocean Barge Rate, of the form, FPC argues, is EFC's contract rate for cross-barge transportation to Crystal River by Dixie