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## BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 DOCKET NO. 971159-TP In the Matter of 5 Petition for approval of election of interconnection : agreement with GTB Florida Incorporated pursuant to Section 252(i) of the Telecommunications Not of 1996, by Sprint Communications Company Limited Partnership d/b/a sprint. 10 11 AGENDA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: ITEM NO. 16 12 13 CHAIRMAN JULIA L. JOHNSON BEFORE: COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON 14 COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA 15 (Teleconferencing from Miami) COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACORS, JR. 16 17 Tuesday, February 3, 1998 DATE: 18 Betty Easley Conference Center PLACE: 19 Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way 20 Tallahassee, Florida

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REPORTED BY:

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Chief, Bureau of Reporting

JOY KELLY, CSR, RPR

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1	PARTICIPATING:
2	DETH KRATING and MARTHA CARTER BROWN, FPSC
3	Division of Legal Services.
4	WATHE STAVAMJA and STAM GREER, FPSC Division
5	of Communications.
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## PROCEBDINGS

CHAIRNAN JOHNSON: Item 16.

MS. BROWN: Commissioners, Item 16 is
Staff's post-hearing recommendation on Sprint's
petition for approval to select an agreement other
than the agreement the Commission approved for it in
the arbitration proceeding.

The specific question in the case is whether a telecommunications company may choose another interconnection agreement with an incumbent LEC under the provisions of Section 252(i) of the 1996 Act after it has arbitrated an interconnection agreement with the Commission.

This is a case of first impression before the Commission, and while some other states have addressed the question, no Florida federal or state court has ruled on it.

As we said in the recommendation, this is a close case and we have, therefore, presented alternative recommendations for your consideration. Stan and I will present the primary and Beth and Wayne will present the alternative. We all think there's merit to both sides of this argument and before we got started we wanted to let you know that we believe either position is legally and logically supportable.

The primary recommendation proposes that sprint is precluded from taking another agreement under the provisions of Section 252(i), because the Commission has approved an agreement for Sprint and GTE that is the result of a binding arbitration proceeding that Sprint itself requested.

sprint's request to discard that binding agreement undermines the negotiation and arbitration process that is central to the interconnection provisions of the Act. Binding arbitrations conducted by a state Commission when negotiations fail can hardly be considered binding if a company can easily reject them and choose something else instead.

I won't elaborate too much more in this introduction. Our position is fully explained in the recommendation, except I did want to say that when one reads 252(i) in concert with the other provisions of Section 252, and one understands that the purpose of the Act is to encourage negotiations of workable, practical binding interconnection agreements, it doesn't appear to make much sense to then say that one party to those agreements can renege on them and pick another agreement and thus not really be bound by the agreement at all whenever it chooses.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Ms. Brown.

MS. KERTING: Commissioners, in the alternative Staff recommends that Sprint's petition be granted in accordance with the plain language in Section 252(i). Section 252(i) is not qualified in any way, and Staff believes that this interpretation best represents Congress's intent.

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The purpose of the Telecommunications Act is to open up competition in the telecommunications market. Whether or not a company can navigate the regulatory course in order to get to that competitive market shouldn't determine whether a carrier enters the market as a viable concern or not. Staff believes that only the market itself should determine whether a carrier survives. Section 252 is not part of the competitive arena, and I note that your interpretation of Section 252(i) is not going to affect just Sprint. If any carrier for one reason or another finds itself in an agreement that it believes hinders its ability to compete, and if it has no means of obtaining a more competitive agreement, that carrier may find itself out of the market before it even really enters it. The market, therefore, would be minus one competitor and the consumers would be without another choice.

Staff does not believe that that's what Congress intended, nor is that what the clear language

of Section 252(i) says.

CEATRIAN JOHNSON: Okay. Any questions,
Commissioners?

commissioner DEASON: I don't want to curtail discussion on it, but I'm willing to make a motion. I would move Staff's alternative.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There's a motion. Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I'll second.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There's a motion and second. Any further discussion?

commissioner CLARE: I just had the view it said it was a binding agreement, and I thought it should be binding for the terms that they agreed to. You know, the point is the Act is inconsistent. And we're supposed to sort of sort it out. And I just took the view that Sprint could have chosen to wait and see what developed. They chose to pursue their own agreement. I don't think it hinders competition in the sense that everybody pursues an agreement that they believe would be in their best interest.

commissioner DEASON: Well, you know, I don't disagree with what you're saying. It's one of these things like Martha said earlier on the presentation, there's very good arguments on both

sides.

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I tend to agree with the alternate because I read the plain meaning of the law that says the carriers have the option to do that. And we didn't write that; that's what is in the law, though. And I think the plain meaning of that would allow a carrier — even though they had gone through binding arbitration, if there was another agreement out there which was more attractive, that they would have the opportunity to choose that.

they can protect themselves. They can limit the length of their agreement so that they could do that if they needed to. I would only point out that I was persuaded by the notion that this is akin to the pick and choose that was struck down. I agree it's not completely, because pick and choose says you take the whole -- you can't just take elements, you have to take the whole thing. But I think some of the arguments are the same. You know, it doesn't cause me heartburn if the decision goes the other way.

me heartburn if it goes the other way.

commissioner Jacobs: I'm persuaded to the alternative analysis, but with a caveat. And it

really goes to these facts, where the company has -commissioner GARCIA: Leon Jacobs.

(Commissioner Garcia talking on phone)

option.

has negotiated the agreement, and it only -- my concern is only that if they are going to do this, we ought to be advancing the underlying principles of the Act. And so I would love for their patition to demonstrate how it either -- how it advances competition for them to be allowed to invoke this

I guess if they have this as a matter of right, I guess that doesn't make a difference. So I guess what my real issue is can someone who's already negotiated an agreement as a matter of right walk out of that agreement when there is no ramifications -- competitive issues raised by walking away from that agreement? I guess that's my real concern...

commissioner DEASON: Well, my thoughts on that -- you're concerned about the impacts on the market, on the competitive market, competitive aspects of allowing this?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yeah.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I tend to view it that it encourages competition in the sense that we have a

company here; and in this case it's Sprint, but it could have been any other company. When the market is opened up, I think they could have just sat back and said, "Well, we're going to wait and let somebody else negotiate something and then if we like that, then we're going to opt in." I think they were, you know, under an obligation to try to get into the market as quickly as they could, so I felt they had an obligation to try to go forward and negotiate and arbitrate their own and, hopefully -- and I'm sure it was their intent to try to get as much -- the best deal they could; what was most advantageous for them and their business plan in their particular place in the market. And they did that.

But, apparently, another negotiation or arbitration or decision was made they found more attractive. And I look at it -- I think it was Congress's intent that if a competitor, then, did not have the option to choose that, then they would be negatively impacted in the market. Not because of their quality of service or their prices or whatever, but just because of their negotiating ability and what they could get out of an arbitration process.

So I think that was part of Congress's -- as
I read it -- their intent to allow a company to do

this. I think it would be inappropriate for a company to be disadvantaged, for one area to have a more advantageous agreement and another carrier not be able to opt into it, because then they would be negatively impacted in the market.

That's the reason I'm comforted that what we're doing here I think is pro competition.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I would back
Commissioner Deason on that. I think it's pretty
clear from the reading. And beyond that, I think the
point that Susan clarified was that this is not a
question of picking and choosing separate parts of
different agreements, but it's simply coming to terms
with an overall agreement, which in some cases can
help very small carriers that can't get in there and
negotiate, but it should serve everyone equally. So,
again, I -- I don't know if it's been sitting to the
right of Commissioner Deason that's made me a convert
today but --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any further discussion?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I think I'm

Comfortable -- I understand the analysis and I'm okay
in going along with it. Let me toss one hypothetical
at you very quickly.

Let's say ALEC No. 1 came in -- and I think

you're right, Commissioner Deason, they should go into the market as quickly and forthright as possible.

They came in and got an agreement on an element such as collocation. And ALEC B comes in later and gets the more favorable. In my mind do you automatically say to ALEC B you guys got to fight it out for that space, that collocation terms and space? Or what do you do there? If in the event what we're saying ALEC No. 1 automatically walks into that agreement for collocation as ALEC No. 2?

commissioner DEASON: I don't understand your example. I guess I got a little confused.

commissioner JACOBS: ALEC No. 1 comes in early one, gives an agreement which includes terms for collocation. ALEC 2, comes later, gets a more favorable agreement for collocation.

commissioner darcia: Commissioner, I think your comments go to specifically what I think .

Commissioner Clark specified when we began. These are not about specific parts of overall agreements. It's all or nothing.

commissioner CLARK: Well, but I think the answer to that is whoever asks for it at a specific office first gets to go -- I mean, they get the better agreement, and they get to go first. The collocation

agreement is just the terms and conditions. And then
I understand they have to go out and ask for
particular central offices. And if they would elect
the new contract, they would get in under the new
contract terms, but who gets it depends on who asks
for it first for that particular central office.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay.

CHATRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Greer, did you have something you wanted to add?

point, but, Commissioners, there's very little on 252(i) in the Congressional record and whatever. And the Eight Circuit rule is that you can't read 252(i)'s language by itself; that you have to get the intent of Congress. That they thought the intent of Congress was to enter into binding agreements. And to me, if the alternative is approved, you don't have the binding agreements.

I've searched through the record of what I could find on 252(i). And, essentially, what I think the intent was, was to allow companies not to have to go through the negotiation and arbitration process to select an agreement. That's all I'll say about it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Greer.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is this likely to go

before Judge Hinkle as part of -- I mean, it's going to be resolved probably by someone other than us, 2 3 anyway. MS. BROWN: 4 Yes. Is it a part of an CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: 5 appeal? Is this issue a part of any of the appeals 6 that have been filed? 7 MR. GREER: It's my understanding that the 8 FCC has appealed the Eighth Circuit decision to the 9 10 Supremes, but I think there's also a federal district --11 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes, GTE has appealed 12 our arbitration decision in this case and it's --13 I'm not certain whether this is 14 a specific issue, but he did stay the process, that 15 case, until you all made the decision on this matter. 16 On this? 17 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: MS. BROWN: It may well -- this specific 18 issued may be raised before them. 19 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. There's a motion. 20 And I think there was a second from Joe. Any further 21 discussion? All those in favor signify by saying 22 "aye." 23 24 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: 25 COUMISSIONER DEASON:

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1	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.
2	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Opposed?
3	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Nay.
4	CHAIRNAN JOHNSON: Nay.
5	Show it approved on a 3-to-2 vote.
6	Item 16-A was withdrawn.
7	COMMISSIONER CLARE: Staff, if you would
8	just show a simple dissent indicating that I was
9	persuaded by the notion that these were supposed to be
10	binding but acknowledging both sides have merit.
11	MS. BROWN: Yes, Commissioner.
12	CHAIRMAN JOHNBON: Same here.
13	MS. BROWN: All right.
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STATE OF FLORIDA) 1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON 2 I, JOY KELLY, CSR, RPR, Chief, Bureau of 3 Reporting, Official Commission Reportar, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that Item 16, Docket No. 971159-TP of the 2-3-98 Agenda Conference was heard by 5 the Florida Public Service Commission at the time and place herein stated; it is further 6 CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported 7 the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript, consisting of 14 pages, constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings. 9 10 DATED this 10th day of February, 1998. 11 12 Chief, Bureau of Reporting 13 Official Commission Reporter (904) 413-6732 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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