BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

IN RE: Application for rate increase in Brevard,

Charlotte/Lee, Citrus, Clay, Duval, Highlands, Lake, Marion, Martin, Nassau, Orange, Osceola, Pasco, Putnam, Seminole, Volusia, and Washington Counties by Southern States Utilities, Inc.; Collier County by Marco Shores Utilities (Deltona); Hernando County by Spring Hill Utilities (Deltona); and Volusia County by Deltona Lakes Utilities (Deltona).

DOCKET NO. 921099-WS

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER JULIA L. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER DIANE K. KIESLING COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA

PROCEEDING:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

DATE:

PLACE:

REPORTED BY

26(**)

Tuesday, September 12, 1995

The Betty Easley Conference Center Hearing Room 148 4075 Esplanade Tallahassee, Florida

JANE FAUROT Notary Public in and for the State of Florida at Large

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. 100 SALEM COURT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 (904) 878-2221

PARTICIPATING:

MS. SUSAN FOX, representing Sugarmill Woods Civic Association.

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MICHAEL B. TWOMEY, representing Sugarmill Woods Civic Association, Spring Hill Civic Association and Marco Island Civic Association.

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KENNETH HOFFMAN and BRIAN ARMSTRONG, representing Southern States Utilities.

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MARY ALICE PURITT, representing Hernando County

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STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS

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(**) Participation will be permitted if the recommendation in Issue 1 is approved.

in Issue 1 is approved.

Issue 1: Recommendation that parties be allowed to

participate in this proceeding, with participation limited to fifteen minutes for each side.

13 Issue 2: Recommendation that, in the absence of directions from the appellate court for the Commission to make an

additional finding or to reconsider its decision in light of the court's decision, the Commission should not reopen

15 proceedings to take additional evidence.

Alternative Recommendation: The Commission may reopen the record for the sole purpose of taking evidence on whether or not SSUs' facilities and land were functionally related

during the test year in Docket No. 920199-WS.

Issue 3: Recommendation that, if the Commission approves the alternative recommendation in Issue 2, the Commission should reopen the record. A hearing should be scheduled

immediately. SSU should have 20 days from the conference to file testimony on only the issues identified in the analysis

20 portion of Staff's memorandum dated August 31, 1995.

Parties should be allowed 14 days from the date the utility files its testimony to file their testimony on these issues.

All other dates should be established later by the

prehearing officer in a future order on procedure governing this proceeding. If the record is reopened, the rate

currently being charged should remain in effect pending the conclusion of the administrative hearing.

24 <u>Issue 4:</u> Recommendation that, if the Commission approves the primary recommendation in Issue 2, SSU's final rates

should be calculated based on a modified individual system basis, with the exception of Welaka and Sarasota Harbor,

1 Silver Lake Estates and Western Shores, Park Manor and Interlachen Lakes, and Rosemont and Rolling Green, which are combined for water ratemaking purposes. All other existing uniform rates should be unbundled. The rates should be 3 developed based on a water benchmark of \$30.00 and a wastewater benchmark of \$46.75 for a total bill of \$76.75. 4 These benchmarks should be calculated at 10,000 gallons of water usage. Revenue deficiencies caused by the staff-5 recommended benchmark should be recovered from each industry's customers. The recommended rates, before any adjustments for subsequent indexes and pass-throughs, are 6 shown on Attachment A of Staff's memorandum dated August 31, 7 1995, which contains Schedules 1 and 2. Since this decision was rendered, SSU has had two indexes and one pass-through approved by the Commission for the 127 service areas. 8 Therefore, SSU should make any necessary adjustments for indexes and pass-throughs and be required to recalculate and 9 submit the recommended rates within 7 calendar days of the 10 SSU should also be required to file the Agenda Conference. supporting documentation, as well as a computer disk in a format which may be converted to Lotus 1-2-3 by Staff. 11 utility should be required to file revised tariff sheets and 12 a proposed customer notice to reflect the appropriate rates. The approved rates should be effective for service rendered on or after the stamped approval date on the tariff sheets 13 pursuant to Rule 25-30.475(1), F.A.C., provided the customers have received notice. The rates may not be 14 implemented until proper notice has been received by the The utility should provide proof of the date 15 notice was given within 10 days after the date of the 16 Recommendation that no refunds are appropriate to Issue 5: 17 customers who receive a rate reduction because revenue requirement was not an issue on appeal. The rate changes should be made prospectively and no refunds should be 18 Further, no refund of interim revenues is required. 19 appropriate. There should be a refund to Alternate Recommendation: 20 customers who receive a rate reduction, in the event the Commission changes the uniform rates of SSU to another 21 alternative. Recommendation that, if the Commission requires Issue 6: 22 that refunds be made, SSU should submit, within 7 days of the date of the Agenda Conference, the information detailed 23 in Staff's memorandum for purposes of refunds. The refunds should cover the period between the initial effective date 24 of the uniform rate up to and including the date at which new rates are implemented. Any such refunds should be made 25 with interest pursuant to Rule 25-30.360, F.A.C., by crediting customers' bills over the same time period the

revenues were collected. SSU should be required to file refund reports pursuant to Rule 25-30.360($\bar{7}$), F.A.C. SSU should apply any unclaimed refunds as contributions-in-aidof-construction (CIAC) for the respective plants, pursuant to Rule 25-30.360(8), F.A.C. Issue 7: Recommendation that the issue of whether or not the joint petition for implementation of stand-alone water and wastewater rates for SSU and the immediate repayment of illegal overcharges with interest (filed by Springhill, Sugarmill Woods, and Citrus County) will be granted or to what degree will be determined by the Commission's decisions on the previous issues.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: We're going to call the agenda conference to order. We're on Item 26.

MS. JABER: Commissioners, Item Number 26 is Staff's recommendation addressing the remand by the First District Court of Appeal of Order Number 930423. In the recommendation, Staff has identified seven issues, the last five really revolve around your decision in Issue 2. For that reason, we recommend that you go issue-by-issue. Just for purposes of information and clarification, the joint petition that was filed by Mr. Twomey last week was filed on behalf of Sugarmill Woods, Spring Hill and Citrus County. It's important to bring out to your attention that Spring Hill is not a party to this docket, the response that was filed by the utility we received last night very late; and, of course, that's not incorporated into this recommendation. There are parties here that would wish to address the Commission.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: So, is it your recommendation we vote on Issue 1?

MS. JABER: Yes. Issue 1 is just allowing parties 15 minutes per side to participate.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move Staff.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Second.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Without objection, Staff's recommendation is approved. We will allow 15 minutes per side on the issue on the remand. Which party goes first, and what are they supposed to be addressing?

MS. JABER: We didn't specify what they would be addressing. What we left open would be, specifically, just the issues regarding the remand. It's my recommendation that you allow Mr. Twomey to proceed first and the utility last.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Twomey did file a petition, is that correct?

MS. JABER: That's correct.

MS. JABER: Right.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Twomey. Let me ask you, initially, are you going to be presenting -- as I understand the Staff, you have recommended per side?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there anyone beyond yourself who will be presenting viewpoints on the remand?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. In fact, Ms. Fox is going to go first. Okay?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. How are you going to split your time?

MR. TWOMEY: Oh, eight minutes for her, seven for me.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Anyone else?

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on behalf of Hernando County. And I'm not sure if this

MS. PURITTS: I'm Mary Alice Puritts, and I'm here

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is the appropriate time, or, you know, when I should

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say what I have to stay, but I just wish to address

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Issue Number 5.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: How much time do you need?

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MS. PURITTS: One minute.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioners, I would suggest we

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perhaps provide an extra five minutes for Hernando

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County, with the understanding that Ms. Fox will take

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eight minutes and Mr. Twomey seven, and then we will

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allow -- I'm sorry, your name again?

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MS. PURITTS: Mary Alice Puritts.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: Puritts. Ms. Puritts to also

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address the Commission.

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MS.MOORE: Madam Chairman, I don't believe

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Hernando County is a party to 920199.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Puritts?

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MR. TWOMEY: Madam Chairman, may I address something in that regard, and I will do it with respect to the Staff counsel's comment that Spring Hill was not a party to 920199. And the point I'd like to make to you is that the reason I filed the petition on behalf of Spring Hill, Commissioners, in addition to Sugarmill

Woods, is that if you determine that you're obliged by the mandate of the First District Court of Appeals to return stand-alone rates, as we submit you must in compliance with the mandate, you have to do so, not just for the parties to that case, but for everybody that was paying subsidies over and above the stand-alone rates. That includes the people at Spring Hill Civic Association, all customers served by the Spring Hill Civic Association -- or the Spring Hill plant of SSU. The same is true for Hernando County. Hernando County is the largest single bulk customer of the Utility. So, the point is, is you're going to make the return of the stand-alone rates and order refunds, you have to do it for everybody, notwithstanding what the Utility might --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Twomey, what about -- I don't know if there is anyone here, but I have had indication there are people who, under the stand-alone rates, will pay more, and they've asked to speak. And it's been the advice I've gotten from counsel that it should be limited to the parties.

MR. TWOMEY: Well, I personally wouldn't object to the people that are opposed to our position to speak, speaking as one attorney for one party here. I think there might be some people out here that may have

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traveled from the Jacksonville area today. Are there any Jacksonville people?

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MS. JABER: Madam Chairman, may I very briefly respond to Mr. Twomey? We have to go back to the intent of allowing the parties to participate in this Traditionally, you don't allow parties recommendation. to participate in a post-hearing decision, even on The only reason that Staff has recommended remand. here that you go away from that tradition is because in lieu of allowing them oral argument on a case of this nature and allowing them to file briefs, we thought this would be a shorter way of letting the parties address the Commission. And Hernando County is not a party to this docket. We shouldn't forget that their opportunity to present evidence was at the hearing, and they had plenty of opportunities to intervene. We are here for a very limited purpose, and that purpose is just to allow the parties to address the Commission.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you, Ms. Jaber. Thank you, Mr. Twomey. I understand your point with respect to the rate design. Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I have a question of Ms. Puritts. Are you here representing Hernando County as Hernando County being a customer or Hernando County being a legal governmental institution that has a

desire to represent viewpoints of its citizens?

MS. PURITTS: Well, I suppose it's both. I don't have arguments to make. I just have like a very brief comment about a Staff recommendation on Issue Number 5. And I was just under the impression that I would have the opportunity to speak. If that's not the case --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: This is more in the nature of oral argument limited to the parties in this proceeding, as I understand the recommendation of Staff.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me just say that I would be hesitant to not allow Hernando County an opportunity to, at least, address that one issue that they have a concern with. First of all, they are a customer of the utility, and even if their position goes beyond that, just being a customer, I think this Commission has always been very liberal in allowing persons to make comments before the Commission. And I don't know exactly where you would draw that line, but I think that Hernando County, being another governmental institution, we ought to allow them some latitude in addressing the Commission.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: The only concern I have about that, Commissioner, is there are other people who are customers that have come here, who would likewise might

want the opportunity to speak. And I feel that if we do allow it to other than -- if we expand it beyond just the parties, we would, likewise, need to provide them that opportunity. Would you be amenable to allowing them to speak, also?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can stay here as long as everybody else can. And if we want to open it up to the general public, I'm not opposed to that.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I just don't want to set any precedent that's going bring us down the road where we have chaos when things of this nature come back. Like Terry, I'm amenable to stay here forever if that is what it takes. I just want to make sure that our vote here today doesn't bring all sorts of consequences on a whole series of other things that have a lot of public interest.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I mean, this is a very special circumstance. This is a remand and something that doesn't happen every day. But in a case that does, we've gone to the time and expense to have 14 customer hearings to hear from customers in a rate case. I think it's good we hear from customers. Why is it we can't hear from customers on a remand case? Is there something that prevents that?

MS. JABER: I think that the rationale is you've heard from the customers at those 14 service hearings, and that was their opportunity. The other thing is, you have to remember that those customers are represented by counsel. OPC is a party in this case. Mr. Twomey has intervened on behalf of some of those customers, and they are represented. The only thing other than that I can add to you is there are some customers who are not here today and some people that are not here today because we told them that this was an agenda item that would be heard for a very limited purpose and would be limited to the parties.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I would still think that it would not violate anything to at least give Hernando County the opportunity to address the one issue in which they wish to address the Commission. I understand it's not going to take more than a minute.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Again, I don't disagree with you that Hernando County wouldn't take that much time. And if we want to open it up, and that's all right with the rest of the Commission, that's fine. But I just don't want to get ourselves in a position where I find Staff -- because I don't want to have to come back here for someone who says, "Listen, I didn't go because Staff told me that I couldn't speak," and so then we

will be back here in two weeks to --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And I think that will happen, because I know that we have gotten calls and the indication we have provided to them is that participation is limited to parties in this proceeding. And it's my feeling if we do want to hear from the public we should renotice it as something that we will hear from the public on. And with all due respect to you, Commissioner Deason, it seems to me the line is, "Are you a party to this docket? If you're a party we will hear from you as being on one side of the issue or another. If you are not a party, then since we are not going to hear from the public, because it has not been adequately noticed, that's all the public can hear."

We will not hear from Hernando County.

With that, Ms. Fox.

MS. FOX: Thank you. I'm Susan Fox from the Macfarlane, Ausley law firm in Tampa. I represent Sugarmill Woods Civic Association, formerly known as COVA in this docket. There are a number of them that have traveled four or five hours to be here today, and I believe you could recognize them in the audience, if they would stand. These are some of the people from Sugarmill Woods.

I would like to say also that I was not near a

microphone when the time limits were discussed, and I'm going to find it difficult to respond to a 40-page Staff recommendation in eight minutes. I don't represent the same parties as Mr. Twomey. don't have any formal agreement to divide anything up, and I'm going to get through my remarks as quickly as I And when you feel I've used up my time, I would can. ask you to cut me off.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: I'll let you know. Go ahead.

Okay. All right. I would like to begin MS. FOX: today by way of telling you about a quotation that hangs on a wall plaque in virtually every courtroom in Hillsborough County, which is where I come from. Ιt says, "We receive our statutory law from the Legislature and our decisional law from the courts, agreeing with some, disagreeing with some, but following all, for our bondage to the law is the price of our freedom."

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Fox, get real close to that microphone. We have been having trouble with that.

MS. FOX: All right. Did you hear the quotation that I read you? All right. This quotation was written by then chief judge of the Second District Court of Appeal in Lakeland. And the courts in my home district look at that as a reminder of their duty to

follow the law that is set by that court. The chief judge that wrote that popular quotation was Bob Mann, who went on to become a chairman of this body, and under whom I had the pleasure of serving as his executive assistant. However, the popularity of this particular saying is attributable, I think, to the sincerity of judges who wish to be faithful to their responsibilities. Many is the time in the courtroom when counsel makes an impassioned argument, perhaps even a compelling argument, and then the judge in Hillsborough County will turn to that saying on the wall and say, "I'm sorry, Counselor, but do you see this plaque, and this is what I'm going to follow." Then you know that he is about to tell the lawyer that his duty is to follow the law, no matter how difficult that sometimes seems.

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And today this is what you're going to have to tell your Staff. In this case, you function, more or less, identically to a lower court that has entered a judgment, an erroneous judgment, that has been overturned on appeal. This Commission is bound to follow the decision of the First District. The First District has said you don't have statutory authority to do what you did. And reversed (blank spot on tape) compliance with that order is quite simple. First, you

modify the terms of the final order that was entered in March of 1993, to do what the court said you could do, which was, essentially, not combine those systems for ratemaking purposes. Then, since money changed hands under the terms of an erroneous judgment, you order restitution to the parties who paid in error. Here that means you pay refunds to the parties who overpaid.

So, on Issue Number 2, getting straight to the point here, on Issue Number 2, we would agree with the primary recommendation of Staff that was written by, I believe, it was Chris Moore and seconded or approved by Mr. Pruitt in a memorandum that he sent around late last week.

The alternate recommendation raises a number of obvious problems. As I'm sure your own lawyers will tell you, when a court disposes of what it considers a dispositive issue, then it doesn't have to go and resolve all the other issues. On appeal there were about six issues, as I recall, most of which would still be relevant and still have to be resolved if the case were going to be decided on grounds that weren't dispositive in an overall blanket sense. But the Court said it didn't have to consider all of those other issues, because it was disposing of the case on grounds of statutory authority. There were, for example,

issues of notice and, of course, the customers having been notified that the rate request was a stand-alone rate request, questions of whether or not they were given an appropriate point of entry in the proceeding to challenge the uniform rate issue when it did arise. And, of course, those things the Court would have dealt with if it was sending it back for merely a further hearing on the same subject.

The Court also said that the evidence didn't support and wouldn't support a finding that the systems were functionally related. And in this regard, let me just cite you to a couple of statements in the Court's opinion. And I'm using the slip opinions, if there is a question about the pagination. Towards the bottom paragraph on the third page, they say, "We decline to address each issue separately because we reverse on the ground that the PSC exceeded its statutory authority when it approved uniform statewide rates for the 127 systems involved in this proceeding based on the evidence produced."

And on Page 5, the first full paragraph, "We find no competent, substantial evidence that the facilities and land comprising the 127 SSU systems are functionally related in a way permitting the PSC to require that the customers of all systems pay identical

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rates."

The first full paragraph on Page 6, "In reviewing an order of the PSC, this court must determine from the record whether it's supported by competent, substantial evidence."

The top of Page 7, and here we are getting to some of the critical statements made by the Court. "After reviewing the testimony, it is clear that this testimony does not constitute competent, substantial evidence to support the PSC's decision." And now, still quoting, "The systems are not functionally related as required by Section 367.021(11), their relationship being apparently confined to physical functions resulting from common ownerships." And they went onto describe some of the differences.

The next full paragraph, "The Commission's order must be reversed, based on our finding that Chapter 367, Florida Statutes, did not give the Commission authority to approve uniform statewide rates for these utility systems which are operationally unrelated in their delivery of utility service."

Now, the Court didn't have any question about those items, as you can see from reading their opinion.

I believe Chris Moore's recommendation does a pretty good job of pointing out the case law on this

particular issue. And I would just cite you to one additional case, which is a more recent First District Court of Appeal case, Vestico versus Prestige Properties. It's at 597 So.2d 356. It's a 1992 Florida First District case, which says that where there is evidence that's available to the parties and could have been presented in the first proceeding, then on remand they do not get a chance to present that evidence; their opportunity was at the time of the hearing that was held.

Also, as the primary Staff recommendation points out, there is an argument, I believe, in the alternate recommendation that this was a new issue that the Commission couldn't have anticipated. And as Chris Moore points out, the First District didn't treat this as a new issue. They treated it as something they had disposed of in Board versus Beard.

I'm going to move on here to one point on the alternate Staff recommendation. They say that even if you have the authority to conduct another hearing, that it would be discretionary. And that, clearly, you have discretion not to conduct that hearing, but to dispose of the case on the existing record. Now, I would cite you back to another statement in the First District's opinion, which is that when there is any reasonable

doubt about your authority to exercise a particular power, you should always resolve that doubt against yourself. Here there is plenty of doubt as to whether or not you have the right to hold such a hearing. And I would urge you not to go out on a limb again on this subject and exercise your discretion. In the event you think you have any, not to conduct such a hearing. If you do -- I don't know if I should go on and address some of the points about what would -- you know, projecting, what would happen if you do. But we would have some suggestions to make along those lines, obviously.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Fox, go ahead and do that. You're just about out of time, but I think you had better address those.

MS. FOX: All right. Well, if there were to be a further hearing, we would object to it being before this Commission and suggest that it be referred to a DOAH independent hearing officer, so that there would be basically an independent determination, and the result wouldn't necessarily be colored by the prior proceedings of which there have been many in front of this Commission. It will basically allow the parties to start in front of an independent hearing officer.

Let's see. Moving on to Issue Number 3, which I

believe I've already covered. That would be whether or not to exercise your discretion. So, I'm passing over that to Number 4, which is what rates you should implement under the Court's decision. It's our position that you should implement stand-alone rates. The systems can't be combined for ratemaking purposes under the Court's decision. So, really, you don't have the option of going to the capped rate structure unless and until they are combined for ratemaking purposes. So, essentially, you're left with stand-alone rates. That would be adjusted by any automatic pass-through type adjustments that have been approved in the meantime that would apply to all of those systems.

And, finally, on Issue Number 5, which is on the refund, we categorically disagree with the primary Staff recommendation, which, I believe, was written by someone who is not a lawyer. And with all due respect, this person doesn't know what they are talking about. The effect of the reversal of that order means that that order was invalid on the day it was adopted. It has no force and effect in the interim, and what you have to do now is go back and try to restore the parties to where they should have been all along.

Mr. Smith, the Director of your Appeals Division,
I believe, authored the alternate Staff recommendation

on the refund issue, and we feel that he has correctly presented the law to you in that regard. Likewise, Mr. Pruitt, in his memorandum to the Commissioners, I believe as Commission Counsel, states that there is absolutely no issue about it; there is no valid argument against making refunds. That this argument was anticipated by the Commission, or this action was anticipated in requiring a bond, and it's really just as simple as that.

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Just a little bit of case law. There is a Supreme Court case, Silverman versus Lichtman, L-I-C-H-T-M-A-N, 269 So.2d 495. It's a 1974 Supreme Court case. says that, "Following the reversal and remand of a judgment in which a party is paid sums pursuant to the judgment, he is entitled to restitution." And in that case, the trial court wanted to allow that party 180 days to make restitution. And the court ordered that restitution be made within ten days. A few other cases, I will just touch on them very briefly, Sheriff of Alachua County versus Hardy, 433 So.2d, Page 5. It's a Florida First District case, 1983. It discusses the party's right to restitution basically to be restored to the position that they held before the erroneous judgment was entered.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Fox, you need to wrap it up.

MS. FOX: Okay. Let's see. There is likely to be litigation against the surety, since there was a bond in effect in the event that this Commission doesn't order refunds. And also further proceedings in the First District in which there would have to be a discussion about the representations that were made by the Commission in the proceedings that were had there for review of your order lifting your automatic stay. There are representations that the customers were protected by the existence of the bond and the right to refund in the event that the decision was overturned.

And on Issue Number 6, I believe the appropriate period for making the refunds would be the same period over which customers have to pay their utility bill, which, I believe, is around 25 days.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you.

Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: First, that while we don't expect any ruling on this because of the late timeliness of it, the Citrus County, Sugarmill Woods and Spring Hill Civic Association are going to this afternoon move Commissioner Kiesling to recuse herself in this case and the other cases involving SSU and the uniform rate situation for the reasons stated therein. We'll file

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that. We don't expect any response now or any suggestion that she should not vote on this case today.

Let me read you a quick quote here, Commissioners. It says, "And if the courts say you cannot do what you have done, then you've got to go back to a system specific rate and revenue requirement." That's where you have to go. There is no other place to go. says. "If they have collected money they should not have collected, then it will have to be refunded." That's Chuck Hill. That's your Director of the Division of Water and Wastewater speaking -- I don't know where he is now -- speaking two years ago when he was trying to convince those of you that were here on voting on the lifting of the stay requested by Southern States. He stood up, came to the table and he said, "Don't worry about it, Commissioners, let's go ahead and put these uniform rates in. The customers will be protected by it. Don't worry about this silly argument the utility has that they won't have to make refunds." They will have to make refunds if you were reversed on the uniform rate issue. And the only place you can go back to is stand-alone rates." Chuck Hill, circa 1993. He was saying all of that kind of loud stuff when he was trying to convince you that everybody is protected, and it would be okay to put uniform rates into effect.

Notwithstanding the fact that we begged you, virtually, 1 not to put the rates into effect by lifting the stay, 2 3 because it would not only subject these people to immediate loss of their money, the time value of it, 4 and maybe permanently, but because it would put the 5 utility at risk, as well. Mr. Hoffman and Mr. 6 Armstrong moved, nonetheless, said don't worry about 7 it. They don't have much of a chance of winning on 8 appeal. Go ahead and lift the stay, we are good for 9 We've got \$70 million. That is the way I read the 10 11 transcript. He says, "We've got \$70 million equity. We are good for it." Whether they say they are good 12 for it or not is immaterial. If you go back and read 13 the transcript of that hearing, it is clear --14 Commissioner Deason was Chairman -- it is clear that 15 you all intended that they file a bond. They ended up 16 17 not filing a sufficient bond compared to what you intended, I think. But you intended that they file a 18 bond for purposes of refund, and that if you all were 19 reversed, the transcript reveals, in my opinion, that 20 you intended that there would be refunds made with 21 interest and that you go back to stand-alone rates. 22 think your order says exactly the same thing. Now, not 23 withstanding the statements of Mr. Hill, I see that his 24 name and his initials are on the front of this 25

recommendation your Staff has put to you which is entirely inconsistent with what he said two years ago. I don't understand it. I don't understand why he is not in here supporting what he said two years ago and why his subordinates with leave to disagree aren't saying the same thing.

Now, the Attorney General, through the person of Michael Gross, gave me the authority this morning to say on the Attorney General's behalf that the Attorney General would like to see for purposes of complying with the mandate of the First District Court of Appeals in this case, that you return to the stand-alone rates and that you issue the refunds to these customers that are deserving of them forthwith.

Now, I said before, they had the money. We had the stay. They could have gotten all of their money; that is, SSU, they could have gotten all of their money, all of their revenue risk-free under the stand-alone rates. That's where they would have been, no risk at all. They chose to go with uniform rates. They subjected themselves to risk.

Now, with respect to where we are now, we have got, as Ms. Fox said, we have got the notice issue; we have got the undue discriminatory issue. Before the First District Court of Appeal, we argued six different

issues that the Court didn't address because it reversed for the reasons that are stated. You've got to deal with those things if you try to go back and reopen the record. We agree with Ms. Moore, who was at the First District Court of Appeals. She is a fine lawyer. She's a fine appellate lawyer. She was given a rough time by the Court over there, not because she is a bad lawyer, but because she had to deal with the decision that was put over there in the form of a final order. We agree with her. We agree with Mr. Pruitt that you cannot reopen the record. I'm not going to go into all the additional reasons that Ms. Fox stated.

The rates, we disagree entirely with the Staff recommendation. The only rate that you can go back to is stand-alone. If you will recall in Schedules 5 and 6 of the Staff recommendation, February 3rd, 1993, there were essentially two types of rates you had there. Stand-alone rates, which are the traditional rates, which have never been departed from previously in a major case like this. Then you had the uniform rates and something in between. Mr. Hill told you two years ago you have to go back to stand-alone rates. Now, can you go back to this business that the Staff has cobbled together, going back picking and choosing through the record of the proceeding, which I assume,

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Commissioners, that none of you except Commissioner Clark, who voted on that case, are familiar with. I would suggest to you that unless you went back and read everything, you couldn't reopen that record anyway and vote on it, notwithstanding the objections Ms. Fox had about wanting to go to DOAH. They have cobbled together rates that they call modified stand-alone. And I want to put the emphasis on modified, not stand-alone, but modified, because they put a cap, and it is a low cap. And, Commissioners, if you're not familiar with the cap system, if you have a low cap, you cut people's rates off, everybody's rates off at a relatively low level and force subsidies to flow again. If you have a high cap, you make them pay a little bit more, everybody, and you have a lower level of subsidies. We have calculated that under the proposal of your Staff asking that 50 percent of all the water customers of the 127 systems would have identical or uniform rates, 50 percent. Under the sewer, the cap rate they have announced and proposed and cobbled together from the record would have 94 to 97 percent of all the sewer systems paying the identical rates. Uniform rates, you can't do it. You cannot do it. You would have people from Sugarmill Woods still paying under the Staff proposal subsidies well in excess of

\$300,000 a year. You cannot do it. It would be, on its face I would submit to you, a violation of the court order that you're supposed to be complying with.

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Now, refunds, David Smith is the head of your Appellate Section. He knows what he is talking about. Mr. Pruitt, obviously, knows what he is talking about. Mr. Pruitt says there is no doubt. Mr. Smith says there is no doubt. As pointed out by Ms. Fox, while Ms. Chase may be a fine rate analyst, she is not a It is a legal issue. She had no business, in my opinion, making a recommendation on that, no disrespect to her. But you have to make the refunds, and we would submit to you that you can't stretch this business out over two years. You have taken this money from these people in cash. A lot of these folks are elderly. Some of them are young working families, and They have got the money. They have got a You need to give the money back immediately, as soon as you can calculate the refunds and the interest, and they need to do it in one cash payment, period. might teach them a lesson next time about being so bold to go forward and taking a risk where none was required.

Now, one last thing. The ostensible purpose for this Commission in adopting uniform rates has changed

from case to case. The most recent pronouncement, as I recall, the emphasis was on affordability, okay? Affordability. We want to have affordable rates for everybody. And one of the things we have shown --Staff showed that the utility took advantage of it. The Commissioners, on occasion, because they were given this information by the Staff and the utility, played up the horror stories like das blein (phonetic). these people use 10,000 gallons of water per month, they are going to have rates of \$153 a month, okay. Nobody ever explained how Gospel Island people went from having a \$15 a month rate before these people took them over, to be in the position of having a \$153 rate. But notwithstanding that, there are a certain number of little horror story, red flag systems out there that your Staff will point to, that SSU will point to, and say, "You've got to take care of these people. can't afford to have stand-alone rates. Now, one of the things that Sugarmill Woods offered in the 930880 -- I'm almost finished -- case and that the Association of Spring Hill is willing to consider, as well, or is willing to go for is that you take a 5 percent -- they will stipulate to you all taking a 5 percent amount over and above the cost of service rates, that is the stand-alone rates, for Sugarmill Woods, Spring Hill

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Civic Association, which is a huge system. I would try and convince the other customers or other clients I might have before too much longer, that that's a wise thing to do. You could get hundreds of thousands of dollars -- I don't have the calculation, but you could get hundreds of thousands of dollars which you could use to supplement in some manner, like using the high cap rates that were proposed in the last rate case, supplement the rates of Gospel Island, Jungle Den and some of these little hard-pressed systems, and you could do it without uniform rates, you could make uniform rates affordable for those hard-pressed people, and you could do it without forcing our clients to pay subsidies to truck parks, industrial parks, country club communities, which they are doing right now, and vacht club and marina communities, which they are doing right now. Under the current system you're forcing them to pay subsidies to people that clearly have greater incomes. We would renew that offer on the 5 percent and would ask you to consider that.

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So, I appreciate the time, and I would hope that you would follow the mandate of the Court by reducing the rates to stand-alone, making the refunds with interest and doing so immediately. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you, Mr. Twomey.

(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I did allow Mr. Twomey and Ms. Fox a little more time. I will likewise allow Southern States a little bit more time. Go ahead, Mr. Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you, Madam Chairman,
Commissioners. My name is Ken Hoffman, with me is
Brian Armstrong, here this afternoon on behalf of
Southern States Utilities.

I would first want to address Issues 2, 3 and 4 of the Staff recommendation, which essentially deal with the issue of reopening the record and the issue of the approach rate structure for this company. And I will be brief on these issues.

We support a reopening of the record for the limited purpose of taking official recognition of this Commission's final order in the jurisdictional docket, Docket 930945, and the final order is PSC-95-0894, a final order that was issued on July 21, 1995. In that final order, the Commission held that all of Southern States' land and facilities constitute one system. That order has been appealed by the counties who were parties to the case. And because of that appeal, there is an automatic stay of the implementation of the order. However, the Commission's findings remain

intact and could be officially recognized in this docket, thereby satisfying the First DCA's test, legal test, for uniform rates.

Ms. Fox in her presentation cited to a case which discussed the issue of whether or not certain evidence was available at the time of the hearing. And I would submit to you that as a matter of fact the final order in the jurisdictional docket certainly was not available to the parties at the time that this docket went to hearing nor throughout the appeal. This is new evidence.

This Company continues to support uniform rates and believes that uniform rates should be applied in this docket through official recognition of the jurisdictional order.

Commissioners, now I want to move to the refund issue. First of all, Commissioners, what I want to do first is address the points that the joint petitioners have raised in their joint petition in here today. And there are essentially four points. And I think the first point maybe gives the best illustration of the weakness of their arguments and their legal position.

You have the joint petitioners filing a joint petition and emphasizing to you today, that was Mr. Twomey, some comments made by Mr. Hill at the oral

argument in November of 1993 concerning Southern
States' motion to vacate the automatic stay. And he
notes in his joint petition and he emphasizes to you
that it was Mr. Hill's opinion that the customers are
going to be protected and that there needs to be a
refund. Ms. Fox, on the other hand, comes before you
today and says respectfully, that if you're not a
lawyer, you don't know what you're talking about. I
think they have shot themselves in the foot, and I
think their position lacks credibility.

They also argue in their joint petition that counsel for SSU, at this same oral argument, acknowledged that the Company had an obligation to make refunds if the appeal of the uniform rates was reversed. That's a pure misstatement of the facts.

In their joint petition they, I think, inadvertently include some comments made by then Chairman Deason. Where Chairman Deason at that oral argument stated, and I quote, "And what Mr. Hoffman is saying, it's his opinion that the Company is not putting itself at risk. It does not have the liability to make the customers specific whole." There are other statements that I made during that oral argument which confirm that it was the Company's position that the appeal of the rate structure issue was a revenue

neutral issue, and that we had no obligation to make refunds.

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The joint petitioners also appear to rely on the order that you entered vacating the automatic stay, which contains two passages which essentially say that the utility may be required to bear a risk of loss in the event the rate structure was issued. I think the important word is "may," and I think that word speaks for itself.

But perhaps the best evidence of the fact that the bond that Southern States was required to post in order to secure the lifting of the stay was not a bond that was supposed to make individual customers whole, it was a bond that was designed to secure the lifting of the stay to protect ratepayers as a whole on a total revenue requirements basis. And I read to you the statements made by then Chairman Deason, who was the lone dissenter on that issue, from the transcript. I'm on Page 8 of 15 of Attachment B to your Staff recommendation, where after Commissioner Clark moved to grant Southern States' motion to vacate the automatic stay, and Commissioner Johnson seconded it, Chairman Deason stated, quote, "Let me state right now that I am going to vote against the motion," close quote. goes on to say, quote, "Even though there is going to

be a bond posted, it's not going to be for the purposes of making individual specific customers whole. It's going to be for the purpose of making customers as a total ratepaying body whole." So, we think that that is very strong and persuasive evidence that the intent of the bond was a revenue requirements bond to make the customers whole in the event that there was a modification of revenue requirements on appeal, not to provide refunds for individual customers.

The last point that is made in the joint petition in support of the refunds contains several references to the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal that reversed the Commission on the uniform rates that was issued in April of 1995. I would say to you, Commissioners, if you go back and look at that opinion, there is nothing in there which even remotely addresses the issue of refunds. Presumably, that is why Citrus County, after that opinion was issued, and in response to motions for rehearing filed by the PSC and by Southern States, made an affirmative expressed request to the Court in their response that the Court order refunds. The Court declined to do so.

Commissioners, I want to now move to the legal grounds which we believe support our position that a request for refunds must be denied. First of all, we

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point you to a principle known as the law of the case. That is a legal doctrine that is similar to the doctrine of res adjudicata and binds a lower tribunal, in this case the PSC, to decisions made by an appellate court in a former appeal on issues that were actually presented or could have been presented to the court. The decisions of the appellate court on those issues govern the lower court throughout all subsequent stages of the proceeding. The facts of this case demonstrate that Citrus County has come to this Commission and asked for refunds. They did that back in November, December, of 1993. They asked for a refund of the difference between the interim rates and the stand-alone -- excuse me, the interim stand-alone rates That motion was denied by and the final uniform rates. this Commission. Citrus County appealed that order. The First DCA affirmed the Commission. meantime, Citrus County filed a third direct request with the First DCA for the same type of refunds. third request was denied. As I have previously stated to you, Citrus County made a fourth request for refunds; this time asking for refunds of interim rates That request was not granted. and final rates. position is that the First DCA's three refusals to order the refunds that Citrus County has requested is

the law of the case and is binding on the Commission throughout the remainder of this proceeding.

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Moving to the merits, the first ground that we put before you in support of our position is that the Commission lacks the authority to treat the remand of this appeal as anything other than a total revenue requirements issue. Now, there is no dispute that the Company's total revenue requirements that the Commission ordered in March of 1993 was affirmed by the First DCA, notwithstanding an appeal of a revenue requirements issue by the Office of Public Counsel. Public Counsel did not prevail on that issue. County and Sugarmill Woods have acknowledged throughout this proceeding that their appeal is a revenue neutral We think that acknowledgment is inconsistent with now coming back to you and asking you to order Southern States to make refunds which would modify the revenue requirements. We believe that any action by the Commission to modify the court-affirmed total revenue requirements would be inconsistent with the First DCA's decision and their mandate. Simply put, we believe the Commission lacks the authority to modify the total revenue requirements that were affirmed by the Court.

Secondly, our position is that the granting of

refunds would constitute an unconstitutional taking of Southern State's property. You all know there are numerous decisions at the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court level which essentially say that the failure to allow a utility the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return violates the utility's right to due process, just compensation for taking of property, and the right to possess and protect In this case, the Commission lacks the statutory authority to place this Company in the position of where the Company's compliance with Chapter 367, with Commission rules, and with your orders, would effect an unconstitutional taking of the Company's property and deprive it of the opportunity to earn the revenue requirements that you ordered and were affirmed by the First DCA.

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Third, we believe that a refund requirement would violate the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking. On Page 9 of the Staff's recommendation, the Staff states, and I quote, "To apply new rates back to the beginning of the case would be an impermissible attempt to set rates to be effective in the past," close quote. We agree with the Staff, retroactive ratemaking results when new rates are applied to prior consumption. That is the Gulf Power Company versus Cresse case, 410 So.2d

492. In this case, a refund of final rates would entail the application of new stand-alone rates that the joint petitioners have requested, to customer consumption dating back to September of 1993, when Southern States' uniform rates were tariffed and effective. That application would violate the test of Gulf Power Corp versus Cresse. I must also emphasize to you that it is our position that any type of backbilling would violate the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking. Nonetheless, if you do it, it must be done across-the-board. Because in the decisions that we've analyzed that address retroactive ratemaking, there is no distinction made between backbilling for purposes of rate increases or rate decreases. Simply put, if you are going to go back and backbill, which we think is illegal, but if you do it, we think it has to be done on an even-handed basis across-the-board.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: I guess I don't understand that.

If you can't do it, how were there any cases that said,

if you do it, you've got to do it either way?

MR. HOFFMAN: The cases that I'm talking about,
Chairman Clark, that dealt with retroactive ratemaking
did not elucidate or articulate that you could only -that the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking

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only applied to a rate increase or rate decrease. That issue is simply not addressed in the cases.

Fourth, Commissioners, we believe that the refunds would impose a penalty on this Company not authorized by statute. In the order vacating the automatic stay, the Commission took time to make it very clear that this Company complied with all applicable statutes, rules, and orders in implementing the final uniform rates. The Company properly filed the rates, promptly moved to vacate the stay, properly filed a bond. The effect of a refund would be to penalize the Company for complying with all applicable law, and we think that would be unconstitutional.

I also need to point out to you and make sure that you understand that the Company implemented the only legally available rates at the time. I've mentioned it to you before when I have been before you on this case that Citrus County and Sugarmill Woods chose not to request a stay of the uniform rates when they moved for reconsideration. They could have done that, and in all likelihood it would have been granted, because Citrus County has that automatic stay when they file an appeal, but they didn't do it. On July 20th, when you denied their motions for reconsideration on the rate structure issue, this Company had the right to then

immediately file its uniform rate tariffs. The Company was in a deteriorating financial situation, it responded by filing its tariffs. The tariffs became effective in September of 1993. What I'm trying to emphasize to you is that when Citrus County filed their appeal, and got their automatic stay, it was too late because those final uniform rates had been tariffed already in September of 1993. There were no legally authorized interim rates on file. The interim rate statute says, "The Commission may authorize the collection of interim rates only until the effective date of the final order." That final order in this case was effectuated when the Company filed its tariffs, and those were the only rates we could implement while the appeal was pending. We also believe that ordering the Company to make refunds would violate the filed rate doctrine. That doctrine bars recovery by those who claim injury by virtue of having paid a filed rate. Here the filed rates have been the uniform rates. They have been in effect since September of '93, and we believe the filed rate doctrine applies to bar any request for refunds based on payment of the filed rates.

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Commissioners, I want to conclude by asking you to just stop and consider the precedent, the bad

precedent, in our judgment, which would come about by ordering refunds. If you assume for the purposes of this discussion that in this case, despite the Company's deteriorating earnings situation, that the Company had agreed to allow the interim stand-alone rates at lower revenue levels to stay in effect during the appeal, and that the uniform rates were affirmed, just assume that. Under this scenario, the economic risk would be placed on the customers who have lower rates under uniform rates, since there would be no means for them to recoup the difference between their higher stand-alone rates and the lower uniform rates while the appeal was pending. The customers who challenge the uniform rates would do so with no risk of economic loss. The joint petitioners essentially say to this Company, that you need to have a stand-alone rate structure in effect to avoid refunds. precedent, I submit to you, would encourage appeals of Commission-approved rate structures by customers who are dissatisfied with the Commission-approved rate structure with no risk to the appealing party. The risk -- in fact, the loss would be suffered by customers who would have lower rates under the Commission-approved rate structure, but who would pay higher rates while the appeal was pending with no

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recourse for refunds.

Thank you for your time, Commissioners. We respectfully request that you deny the joint petition for refunds and approve the primary recommendation on the refund issue.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Thank you, Mr. Hoffman.

Commissioners, are there any questions that you want to ask the parties? I know you were circumspect in not interrupting their arguments. You're free to ask them questions or ask Staff questions.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Could I ask a question in clarification? Before we do that, are we going to hear anything from Staff in support of their primary?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Absolutely. We should hear from Staff. We can go through the -- why don't you give us an overview, starting with Issue 1.

MS. JABER: Commissioners, Issue 2, I guess, is where you really want to start.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yes.

MS. JABER: Yes. Ms. Moore's recommendation is the primary recommendation, and she would tell you and, really, she should be the one that tells you, that we should not reopen the record. I think her analysis of the cases suggests that we should not reopen the

record. I support the alternative recommendation, I think that the cases are clear, that there is enough discretion for the Commission to reopen the record. And if I can skip ahead to Issue 3 -- and not only do I think you're legally entitled to reopen the record, I think you should reopen the record. And I would be glad to give you my standpoint if you would like to hear that first before going to Ms. Moore.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Let me ask Ms. Moore one thing.

Mr. Hoffman mentioned that one of the appellants had

requested that the Court specifically tell us to refund

monies in excess of stand-alone rates. Do you recall

that?

MS. MOORE: I recall it in a prayer for relief in the wherefore at the conclusion, but it was not an issue -- made an issue. The Court didn't rule on any of the merits, and I don't think the Court would have, absent it being made an issue, absent the Commission having dealt with it first.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Then it's your feeling that under no circumstances would a court have done that. They would have simply made their decision and remanded it back, expecting the lower court to carry out the directions of the court? They wouldn't have -- I guess it's your view they wouldn't have put it in there.

MS. MOORE: Not in this case.

MR. SMITH: If I may address that, I don't think the court would have assumed that function unless it was a very unusual case, that they would actually direct an agency to grant a specific form of relief. Especially -- I mean, obviously, it involves a technical issue determining how much the refund should be, and that sort of thing. So, they wouldn't have addressed it, anyway, in my opinion.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Could I get a clarification from, I guess, you, Mr. Hoffman? Was the request that you alluded to a separate and independent motion or was it just a sentence that was in a pleading that was otherwise not related?

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner Kiesling, there were three. And I will give you a quickie description of each. The first was filed directly with the Commission, and it was a motion, part of a motion, titled, "Citrus County's Motion for Reduced Interim Rates Pending Judicial Review for Recalculated Customer Bills, Refunds, and Imposition of Penalties for Violating Automatic Stay." That was the first one. The second one was a document filed directly with the First DCA, titled, "Emergency Motion of Appellant, Citrus County, to Enforce Automatic Stay and Suggestion

for Contempt," which contains a sentence in the prayer for relief asking for refunds. The third is in Citrus County's response to motions for rehearing, et cetera, and suggestion for motion to show cause why monetary and other sanctions should not be imposed.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: What court?

MR. HOFFMAN: Excuse me. Directly with the First DCA, and that pleading contains about three sentences toward the end where Citrus County respectfully requests, I'm quoting now, quote, "That the court make abundantly clear that it has reversed the uniform rates as being unlawful, that the stand-alone rates calculated by the PSC in its final order, are the correct and only lawful rates, and that the next action for the PSC to undertake is to order customer refunds to those individuals who have been unlawfully overcharged for 32 months now," period, close quote.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And just to get one other thing clear. It appears to me, having not seen some of those pleadings, that the prayers for relief that you have identified were not, I guess, material to the court ruling on the styled motion. They were just — I mean, there was no motion to the court on which the court would have had to rule yes or no to that request.

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner, I guess, I would

respectfully say in response to that, while I certainly can't put myself in the shoes of the judges, and so forth, it could depend on whether you view the title of a motion to be a primary indication of the relief sought or what is actually set forth in the body of the motion.

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COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I have a question of In Issue 2, on your primary recommendation, Page 7, you cite to the GTE case as supporting your analysis that we cannot look at this issue again. And in that, about the second paragraph, you state here that, "In its order on remand, the Commission stated that its general practice is to not conduct further evidentiary hearings on remand unless the record is insufficient or incomplete." And in that particular proceeding, we declined to conduct such a proceeding. But in this instance, do you see this as a complete record? Because, I guess, as I read the alternative recommendation, and as I sit and look at the issue, it appears as if the functional-relatedness issue is something that we didn't address. And to the extent that we didn't address it, and it wasn't before us, that the record is incomplete with respect to that issue. Could you respond to that and just help me better understand your analysis?

MS. MOORE: It could be viewed as incomplete to set uniform rates, but the record is not insufficient, I don't believe, to determine some other --

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I didn't hear the first part.

MS. MOORE: I don't think the record is insufficient to choose a rate structure. That's a decision the Commission has to make. But the record evidence to choose a rate structure is there; there is a record basis. I don't think that the record is -- the record could be viewed as insufficient to set uniform rates, yes, but not to make a decision.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Let me ask another question, then. And I guess this would go to both of our various Staff positions. On Page 2, the last sentence of the third full paragraph, it says, "The purpose of this recommendation is to bring to the Commission's attention all possible options in addressing the First District Court of Appeal's mandate." And I guess I'm a little concerned, because it seems to me that there are more options than just the two that we have. And, to me, one of the obvious options that I would like to consider would be we have lots of legal minds here, and they clearly are differing on how to interpret the Court's opinion. Why

don't we, or why have we not considered filing a motion for clarification with the Court and simply pointing out that in our attempt to implement the Court's opinion that, you know, there are divergent schools of thought on whether the defect which the Court identified is one which can be cured by reopening the record, or one for which we are precluded from taking any further evidence? I mean, was that manner of getting the Court to clarify what they want us to do considered?

MS. JABER: Commissioner, we did talk about that, but to tell you the truth, it really is an appellate function and an appellate decision, and I would defer to Mr. Smith.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Okay.

MR. SMITH: It has been discussed in the course of considering, you know, what we should do in this case. The time to have done that, I believe, would have properly been on rehearing or when we got the mandate from the Court. I'm not saying it's impossible at this point. We could certainly try it. I don't know that -- I don't know if we were aware of the ultimate dilemma we would be facing. So, you know, that's just hindsight, I guess. We should have maybe jumped on that issue, or could have, and maybe gotten some

clarification from the Court. On the other hand, I don't think, you know, anybody was particularly aware that we were going to find ourselves in this complicated position. So, basically, I think that is the reason we did not do that. Whether we can do it now, frankly, without looking at the rules and how the Court might respond to such a motion, I don't know.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: You know, I, at least, would like to consider that, because I have no problem with going to the Court, you know, hat in hand, so to speak, and saying, you know, "We took it up, and we discovered that there are such divergent opinions that we aren't comfortable with either answer. So, Court, you know, what did you mean?" I mean, I don't think that the Court want us to do something that's contrary to their orders simply because we are having divergent legal opinions on --

MR. SMITH: I'm certain the Court doesn't want such a thing.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And I can tell you, I don't want such a thing. I want to do what the Court ordered.

MR. SMITH: Obviously, we are faced with a dilemma because of the way the Court's opinion came down, and the way it's written. And we are really struggling

with it. And everybody wants, you know, a fair resolution in the light of that opinion and consistent with the Commission's law.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioners, it seems to me that one of the things that hasn't been factored in here is the fact that we have requested that the second proceeding come back to the Commission so that we can make that finding. And in my own mind, I sort of draw a line between what has gone on in the past and what we need to do now to make sure the rates going forward are correct. And as I understand what the Staff has done, we have asked for that to be remanded back to us, so that we can make the appropriate finding and on a going-forward basis we have the appropriate rates.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Which case was that in?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: It's not in this one. It's in the second case.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The generic investigation.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: The investigation?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Right.

MS. JABER: It's in the 880 docket.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Okay. I guess I wasn't aware of that. And how does that play into what we are doing here, then?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, it plays in this sense: As

I understand it, we have requested them to send it back, because in advance of that proceeding, we didn't know we had to make that finding. And if I'm not in error, I don't recall that anyone made the argument on the point the Court finally decided the case. I guess the basis on which they made their decision was a surprise to everyone. It was not a point argued even by appellants. Their primary points were noticed, as I recall.

MS. MOORE: That's correct, noticed, and several other things.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: So, what we have said to the Court is you have now told us that we needed to do something else, and we have asked for that subsequent case back. Is that the vehicle to correct the rates on a going-forward basis?

MS. MOORE: As opposed to attempting to do it in this docket before you, I think, yes.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And then we can say -- I guess what I'm saying is do we reopen this record or do we deal with it in the other case? And then with respect to this one, we ask the Court, "What are we supposed to do in terms of refunds?"

MS. MOORE: Commissioners, the reason we moved for rehearing, the appellate rules provide for 15 days to

move for clarification or a rehearing, or permit you to do that. And we moved for rehearing on the basis that it was not an issue, and that the issue of functional relationship should not play a part in the setting of rates. That motion was denied, but that was the course of action we took then, rather than a motion for clarification, because we didn't initially agree.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I think Ms. Fox was concerned about something. I asked for her response, and I would like to let you respond.

MS. FOX: The point I wanted to address was the idea that this wasn't something argued by the parties or was a surprise. I don't think that's accurate at all, and that has been presented to the First District. Now, that is an issue that has been directly presented to them. SSU took the tack, after the decision, of filing a motion to file brief upon which case was decided.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, let me ask you this. And clarify it for me, because you all would have been on the side arguing it. I didn't recall seeing an argument that the Commission had to make a finding that they were functionally and operationally related in order to implement uniform rates. Was that one of your arguments?

MS. FOX: Well, we argued that the Commission didn't have statutory authority under the ratemaking statute to adopt uniform rates. And encompassed within that is an argument that they should be made on a stand-alone basis.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I'm just trying to -- it came, frankly, as a surprise to me, because I thought that the purpose of making a determination of functionally and operationally related -- and I think I have those words correct -- is for jurisdictional purposes, not ratemaking. (TAPE CHANGE) -- not an argument made in the lower court.

MS. FOX: I believe SSU has, in fact, made that argument, and we have filed our brief where we vigorously opposed that, and I think we could give you pages of the briefs that discuss the definition of system, the definition of utility. These are the definitions that are incorporated into the ratemaking statute.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: So, you did make some distinction with respect to utility and with respect to system in the First DCA.

MS. FOX: Yes, that argument was made, and is encompassed within. And this is something on the law of the case that has been presented to the First

District. And, you know, they have rejected their position on this point.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: On the rehearing?

MS. FOX: Right, and issued their decision. They feel that this was distinctly a matter on appeal.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

MS. MOORE: Commissioner Clark, I want to mention that in the briefs, the only issue raised was in the ratemaking statute, and whether the statute gives the Commission authority to set rates for utilities. Never once did any of the parties raise the issue of the definition of system within which are the terms functionally related. And never once did any of the parties raise the case or discuss the case Board v. Beard.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I can look that up and just see how it goes. But I guess for my own purposes what I'm trying to do, is it seems to me that at this point it has been remanded to us. We have got to get the rates right on a going forward basis, and we have got to decide whether or not we have to do refunds. And I had understood that we have a case that has been decided. We had yet another case that was on appeal. And we have acknowledged to the Court we did not make that finding in that subsequent case. We would like that

case back to allow us to make or not make that finding, and set the rates on a going-forward basis. Is that what we should be doing here?

MS. JABER: Commissioner, the only thing I would suggest to you is from my understanding of talking to Ms. Moore and Mr. Smith is that there is no guarantee you're going to get that case back. That parties will --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, it may address what

Commissioner Kiesling is suggesting is that we file a

supplement that says, "We are in a dilemma here."

MS. JABER: That is the recourse that I would suggest to you, is that you do both. But to you say that you don't want to reopen the record here and to fix it, quote, unquote, "in the 880 docket," you may be remiss in doing that, because the Court may not relinquish jurisdiction back to you in the 880 docket. And then you haven't afforded the parties the opportunity to present evidence.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask another question, perhaps a little more practical. And that question is, as we all know, sitting here today, we are right now in the midst of another rate proceeding on top of all of this other that we are having to deal with, which I think is an unfortunate situation. But

we are not the agency that determines when these cases are filed. Nevertheless, we are going to have to make a decision on interim rates.

MS. JABER: That's right.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I believe that is scheduled for some time the first week of October.

MS. JABER: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And then sometime in the first part of 1996, we are going to have to make a decision on permanent rates on a going-forward basis.

MS. JABER: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And we are going to need to know what basis we can set rates upon, whether we need to do it on a stand-alone, on strictly stand-alone, some type of a uniform, some type of a capped rate. I don't know. And maybe there are some other alternatives out there that would be pursued during the hearing. But we do not have the luxury of saying, "We're going to put the rate case on hold until all of this can be resolved." And while we may want to petition the courts to give some clarification, or we my want to wait and see what the Court does as far as relinquishing jurisdiction for us to make some further findings, the fact of the matter is, there is an eight-month clock ticking right now as we speak on the

rate proceeding, and we are going to have to make a determination on rate structure for that case. How are we going to do that?

MS. JABER: That is precisely the concern that this Staff had in writing this recommendation, Commissioner. It is why we brought this to you when we did. It's not an easy situation. The new rate case complicates this tremendously. And one of the things that we have to consider in interim is even if we can bring you a recommendation on what the appropriate interim rate is, we don't know what to do yet.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think you're looking for some guidance from the decision that we made today, were you not?

MS. JABER: Yes, we were.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I assume that whatever decision we make today, given the track record of this case, it's probably going to be appealed.

MS. JABER: That's correct.

MR. HOFFMAN: Madam Chair, if I may?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Hoffman, I'll let you speak, but I will also give Ms. Fox or Mr. Twomey an opportunity to respond.

MR. HOFFMAN: Okay. The thing that I wanted to reiterate was in terms of the proposal to send it back

to the Court. I just wanted to reiterate again that Citrus County has raised that issue with the Court. They have said to the Court in response to the motions for rehearing, "Clarify that what you meant is stand-alone rates and refunds." Southern States filed a motion for leave to file a reply in a proposed reply. The Court did nothing. The Court did not grant that request of Citrus County.

MR. SMITH: Madam Chairman, could I make a comment here?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yes.

MR. SMITH: As far as I know, those motions were simply denied without opinion. The fact is we don't know why the Court decided what it did. And I don't think you can say that that establishes the law of the case. The law of the case is normally established by a court making a ruling, a finding, an opinion, which says, "We find that this issue is decided this way, and any further proceedings below will be carried out in accordance with that." And I think simply, "We deny your motion," just establishes that whatever was in that motion is the law of the case or not the law of the case.

MS. JABER: For practical purposes, can I throw -- CHAIRMAN CLARK: I promised Ms. Fox I would give

her an opportunity to --

MS. FOX: No, Mr. Smith is correct.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

MR. HOFFMAN: Madam chair, if I may briefly?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: No, Mr. Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: Okay.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Go ahead.

MS. JABER: For just practical purposes, to try and give you an idea of the dates that we've thought about for all of this, in the event that you do move the alternative and decide to reopen the record, we have reserved a date in November and a date in December to have a hearing. It would be in the nature of an emergency hearing. If you decide not to reopen the record, and you move Staff's proposal, which is the modified stand-alone version, that would be, I suppose, what we would have to use in the interim calculation, if that helps.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: You surely haven't run out of questions to ask. Why don't we take a break until 2:30, and we'll come back at 2:30.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: I call the agenda conference back to order. I do have one other question. Mr. Twomey, I have a question I wanted to ask you or Ms. Fox with

respect to stand-alone rates. As I understand the Staff recommendation, there were some rates that were not stand-alone rates to begin with, that they were, in fact, countywide rates. When you say stand-alone rates, are you suggesting that we go back to what the rates were prior to this case and just add an increment onto those rates?

MS. FOX: The systems that had already been combined for ratemaking purposes, that's water over the dam, I believe. And there must have some prior proceedings, I would assume, in which either that finding was made or there was --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Now, Ms. Fox, do you think that finding was made?

MS. FOX: Well --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: But, nonetheless, they were treated as one system, weren't they, for ratemaking?

My question is fairly simple. Do we disaggregate them, too, or do we treat them as a unit?

MS. FOX: I think there were instances in which that was never an issue. And maybe that is because they were close enough that it wasn't worth arguing about. But, you know, we are not interjecting ourselves to change them to a different rate structure than what they had coming into the '92 rate case.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: All right. Then let me be clear. Is it your position we should go back to, I guess, the breakout of how rates were figured prior to the case and add the increases onto that?

MR. TWOMEY: Let me respond to your first question, Commissioner. In an attempt to be consistent, I think, with the position we argued to you from the beginning, and the position we argued to the Court, and that is that we believe -- and unless the systems are interconnected and there is a basis for finding that service can flow from one to the other, and we are talking about water pipes and sewer collection pipes and not this other stuff -- that you have to base the rates for each system, unless they are interconnected, on the legitimate cost of service for that plant plus the reasonable allocation of common costs, okay? So, my answer to you is I don't know exactly how some of those previous systems got thrown together. I think one of the arguments we made in one of the cases, and it was probably the generic rate investigation, was that maybe, maybe those systems, if they were put together for purposes of uniform rates within a county, for example, maybe their costs were similar enough that it would be okay and wouldn't violate the undue discrimination. My answer to you is

I think that you ought to base the rates on costs with an allocation of common and general costs based upon whatever your reasonable methodology is, and do it for each and every system.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Your exception to that would be if they were treated as one entity in terms of getting uniform rates, that we could continue to treat them as one entity.

MR. TWOMEY: Well, the only caveat there is I think if it is Rosemont and Green-something --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Rolling Green.

MR. TWOMEY: -- Rolling Green, that were physically interconnected, sure, they would have common rates. But I'm suggesting to you that within a county if you have five systems, that for whatever reason, and in a proceeding say four years ago the Commission decided to set uniform rates, or maybe they took -- SSU bought these systems from a company that had uniform rates for whatever reason -- all these systems that we said all along are required to keep, I think still required to keep, individual system costs per the NARUC System of Accounts. You can ascertain what the costs of service are for each one of them. And I think you should go back and set them specifically --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. So, unless they are

interconnected, physically interconnected, you ought to go back. And even if they were treated as one entity prior to this rate case, you should disaggregate them and have stand-alone rates for even those.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Madam Chairman, I would like to make a motion and then make a comment with it, and then see where that takes us. And then perhaps we can move along, although I doubt it.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Oh, I should mention, I'm going to go ahead and cancel Internal Affairs. I have been informed that we can take up the one matter on it at a later date. And with respect to federal matters that are pending, we can take that up at a later date, too. I think it's pretty clear that we are going to need to spend time at this agenda.

MS. JABER: Madam Chairman, at the sake of interrupting Commissioner Garcia, I just wanted to tell you that Commissioner Kiesling asked us questions about interim, and Deason. And since Commissioner Garcia was going to make a motion, would you prefer that we wait to answer her after you make your motion?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: That's up to the Commissioners. If you want to answer them now, then

that's fine, too. Maybe we can touch on that because what I'm going to move for will probably move us in that direction, anyway, if it's all right with the Commissioners.

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My first motion is to move with primary on Issue Number 2. And I want to say that, first of all, all the arguments that have been made here have been wonderful reading. And although I think we are trying to get to a correct answer, I think what has happened is that we are out of sequence. And we are trying to fix something at the tail end, as opposed to looking at it in sequence. And the reason we find ourselves in that position is I think that this is the first shot we took at this, an exceedingly complex issue with very many different components to it, and I think tenacious opposition from those who this system was being imposed And many of the legal arguments that were needed to get to where we got have been clarified, I think, by the Court, but I think have been clarified on the tail In other words, out of sequence. And I find myself pretty convinced by Prentice's memo on the issue that I could not vote for the alternative. I think the logic holds there. And I think it puts us in a difficult position in the future if we do do this. Because we then have to look at things after we've

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finished. And in this particular case there are parts of it where I wasn't even here as a Commissioner when they were decided. It is for that reason that I am going to move primary on 1, and then make a suggestion. And I guess it's for discussion, because some of you are clearly more water experts than I. I think that then that forces us to go back to the rates we had before this whole process began, stand-alone rates. That doesn't, however, foreclose the possibility of uniform rates in some future time when we have these things as we have now completely clarified by the courts, and by the reasoning of this Commission, and then we begin from there this process, however complex it may be. I think the logic dictates from the decisions that we've made here reaching that conclusion, that whether SSU decides to do that or not, that's something completely different. I'm certainly not inviting them to come before us again. But, at least, I want the Commissioners to understand what my thinking is because I think in the last case we had on this, I found myself very torn because there were some basic tenets that I just didn't agree with or didn't completely appreciate the position that we had already been taken to, and so I had to come up with, I think, a compromise in my own decision.

If we do this, I don't think it forecloses what we have done in the past, and I think much of what we have done here will still be usable in terms of understanding and clearly has more refined the thought on what we are doing. But, I leave that to the Commissioners and maybe we can discuss it for a little while.

But with that, I move primary on 1 and nothing else for right now.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I think you mean 2.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I'm sorry, on 2.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: There has been a motion. Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I will second the motion.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there any further discussion?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: One of the things I just wanted to throw out for discussion purposes, I think in the alternative recommendation one of the issues that the alternative raised was that we could conclude that we have the discretion, but decide not to open the record. That was something that I wanted to discuss or get some feedback from the other Commissioners with respect to that issue and whether or not we were setting a precedent that we may not want to set with respect to that. Because, indeed, you know, as I read

the alternative analysis, I'm somewhat persuaded that perhaps we do have the discretion to do this, but I'm not so sure I want to reopen it.

MS. JABER: Can I explain the importance of why I really wanted to bring that to your attention? primary cites to the GTE case. And I don't think that's what you meant to say, or at least I don't think that is the precedent that you really wanted to set forth. And I would hate for you to find that legally you cannot reopen the record on a case where the Court has said for further disposition consistent herewith. I think that you have to leave that up to a case-by-case basis. I think you should find that legally you can reopen the record. And in Issue 3, if you don't want to reopen the record, that is, of course, up to you. But what you risk by saying you legally can't reopen the record is, just like the GTE case, this will be used again and again. And I don't know that that's really what you intend to do. mind the cases are clear. You can reopen the record when the Court has specifically said, as they do in the SSU opinion, you have not made a finding on functional relatedness.

And I wanted to address one of the questions that you asked Ms. Moore, "Did the Court find that there was

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insufficient evidence or a lack of evidence?" And I would disagree with Ms. Moore. They said, "absent a finding." There is no evidence on that issue. And there has to be a distinction between what the parties say in their brief and the record that was made here at the Commission. That issue was never identified, never litigated. No one ever had the opportunity to present evidence on it, nor could we have known. We had jurisdiction over the 127 systems. So, 367.171 never came into my mind, as it never came into the Commissioners' minds.

along those lines. I know a motion has been made, and I think I'm the one that seconded it, and I think it's the appropriate action we need to take. But just for the sake of argument, if the Commission were to decide that we can reopen the record and have further proceedings, and we do that, and for the sake of argument, let's assume that we make a finding that there is functional relatedness. Do we have any assurance whatsoever that the Court is going to agree that uniform rates was the appropriate decision? It seems to me that the order from this Court leaves much in doubt. In fact, there was references in the opinion as to the type of evidence that was taken, the lack of

evidence, but the evidence that was taken, that no one recommended in the hearing that there be a uniform rate structure. It did recognize that there were some benefits, but the order said that there was no evidence to support it. And then on top of that, the Court said statutorily you can't do it, anyway.

MS. JABER: Right.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So, I have a lot of doubt in my mind, given what the Court is saying in this order, if we were to take that route, we would have any assurance that we are going to rectify a problem anyway. The ultimate decision by the Court may still be the same.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I may agree with you on that point, but the issue that I was looking at was maybe we find that, yes, we do have the authority to do this. But in this case, maybe you're right, maybe the Court already gave us a big hint not to bring it back to them in that instance. And, you know, I may he sitate in saying that we don't have the authority to open this, but I may not he sitate on us deciding that we have the authority, it's within our discretion, but we decide not to review this issue.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, let me -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I was just going to say that I think that any time a decision of this magnitude, it's got to be based upon the situation that is before us at the time. We've got to look at the order from the Court. We have got to try to understand what the Court is trying to tell us. And we have to make a decision, do we think it is appropriate to reopen the record and take additional evidence. don't think that -- and maybe the clear wording of the issue in Issue 2, maybe is not really what I want to second. I can't really divorce Issue 3 from Issue 2. I am firmly convinced that we should not reopen the record in this case to take additional evidence to try to make a finding of functional relatedness to try to cure a defect in a prior decision. We should not do If we want to say we can't do that, I'm not so sure, but I think that it is wrong for this Commission to do it. And maybe we want to even avoid the question of whether legally we can or we cannot, but, just say, "Given this case, the order from the Court, the record that is before us, do we want to reopen the record?" I'd say emphatically no.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: I guess I would just say that I'm not sure that we want to make a policy decision as opposed to a legal decision. Because it seemed to me

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in the GTE case we did say that it was a general -- I 1 can't remember the distinction. They both fell into 2 the same category of being a general remand, right? Or 3 a specific remand. 4 5 MS. JABER: It's my recommendation that GTE was a specific mandate, and this, I believe, is a general. 6 CHAIRMAN CLARK: I was on both of them, and I'm 7 not sure I see the distinction between the two. 8 MS. JABER: Can I explain the distinction that I 9 10 see? CHAIRMAN CLARK: Let me hear from Ms. Moore, 11 12 first. 13 MS. MOORE: In GTE, it was a general remand for further actions consistent with this opinion. 14 15 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Right. And what is it in this 16 one? 17 MS. MOORE: A remand for disposition consistent herewith. 18 19 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Now, you say both of those 20 do not give authority to reopen the record. 21 MR. SMITH: May I respond to that? I don't think 22 that was the issue in the GTE case. I think there was a general remand, and you decided essentially, given 23 24 the Court's pronouncement, (a), that you misconceived 25 the test for approval of the affiliated expenses; and

(b), if you apply the test of this evidence, there is no way that you could support that finding. And in light of that conclusion by the Court, you said it would not be appropriate, or would not be worthwhile to reopen the record and take further evidence.

In this case, we're not saying in the primary recommendation that for all time, whenever a court opinion comes down with this direction, that you shall not open the record. Obviously, it's a case-by-case decision, and it should be based on the wording of the Court's opinion. That's all that we are saying. In this case, we believe that the Court's opinion does not support reopening the record.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, let me be clear. In the GTE, you said the Court indicated we misperceived the test.

MR. SMITH: That's right.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: That's a little -- that's similar to what we did here. We sort of misperceived the test.

MR. SMITH: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And the evidence in the docket, we concluded, would not support -- or they said the evidence in the docket would not meet the new test.

MR. SMITH: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And the Court said the same thing

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MR. SMITH: That's correct. That's where the analogy is.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: All right. Now, Ms. Jaber, what did you want to say?

The distinction that I see with the MS. JABER: GTE case, when I went back and read the order, the recommendation and some of the transcripts, what the Court, in my mind, said was that the record that was there was insufficient. And, I think, in my reading of the transcript, it was apparent that the utility did put on some evidence. I even went back and I read OPC's brief. OPC made the contention that you should reopen the record in GTE, because OPC and Staff never had the opportunity to present the evidence. Now, I think the Commission was correct in GTE in not reopening the record, because there was an opportunity to present evidence in GTE as evidenced by the fact that the utility did. The distinction in SSU is no one ever presented evidence on functional relatedness; not the utility, not the parties, not Staff. It's not that the evidence was insufficient, there was no evidence.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: May I make a comment? And that is, that I don't know why we have to take a final vote on Issue 2, up front.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I agree with you.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Because I may agree with the alternate recommendation that it is within our discretion to do it, but still on Issue 4, may be quite willing to vote and say, "But I don't want to do it here." And, to me, that is the issue that relates to this case, not, you know, some issue of a legal issue of statutory or interpretation of opinions, because I don't want us to lock ourselves into a position that would be that if a remand says this, then our official position is we can't reopen.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Commissioner Garcia, I think there may be some indication for support of an amended motion.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Correct. Commissioner

Deason, I think, stated it quite well a few moments

ago. I think maybe we should just not get there. I

mean, we may agree that we have the authority, but we

simply do not want to reopen the record in this

instance. And I don't know if I have to restate that

in some more arcane way, but --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Articulate way.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Sometimes it gets arcane, but --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Not arcane. For me, articulate.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: May I make a suggestion that you withdraw your first motion and move Issue 3, and thereby make Issue 2 no vote necessary, rather than deciding an issue that we don't have to decide.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I guess in a way it does decide the issue. It indicates we think on these -- that we can reopen it.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Yes, I guess that's true.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: The suggestion is, there seems to be sentiment for the notion that whether it's authorized in law or not, some of us may agree that it is, some of us may believe that it is not, but we all agree that we shouldn't reopen the record.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I think we all agree.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I'm saying that would be the motion. That the motion would be under the law we may -- it appears unclear as to whether or not we could reopen the record as a matter of law. But as a matter of policy in this case, we would vote not to reopen the record. Is that your motion?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Thank you for stating it more articulately.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a second, if I stated it well?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask Mr. Smith a

question. As I understood your explanation of the recommendation, the primary recommendation for Issue 2, you're basically saying that given the specifics of this case, the facts of the case, the order on remand, that it is your recommendation that we should not, legally we should not?

MR. SMITH: That's correct.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that was the basis for my second.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Is it "should not," or "cannot"?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, the recommendation is "should not."

MR. SMITH: Should not.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I think that -- I mean, I'm willing to support that. If this is going to move us along, and we are going to get to the same end point anyway; that is, that we are not going to reopen the record, I'm agreeable to doing that, also. But I just wanted to clarify the basis for my second was that it was my understanding that your primary recommendation was "should not," given the specifics of this case. It was not a blanket statement that if language XYZ appears in a remand order, you do X, and if other language, you do Y. It just that the sum total of this

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case, it's your recommendation that we should not?

MR. SMITH: Yes. Let me just say one more thing. I think ultimately you're correct in the approach you're taking, because it's what you do that counts, not how you decide this legal issue, per se. But the reason it's there is because if a lower tribunal or the Commission makes a decision to take further evidence that is inconsistent with the Court's remand, then that is a basis for being overturned again on appeal. we wanted to go in the right direction to begin with. And if you now decide that you will not reopen the record, then that is consistent with what we are recommending, whether or not you decide the first issue the way we formulated it. But the reason it's there is we didn't want to go in a direction that would lead us into another confrontation with the Court on the next appeal that derives out of this. Because it is the basis for remand again, a reversal again, if you do not act consistently with the Court's remand.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Let me clarify something. With the respect to the way the recommendation is issued, it says, "In the absence of directions from the appellate court for the Commission to make an additional finding or to reconsider its decision in light of the Court's decision," is your recommendation that in absence of

directions by the appellate court in this case, not the general statement --

MR. SMITH: That's correct. No, you could never say -- unless the court says, "You shall not conduct further proceedings." I mean, normally if the court wants you to do something, they will tell you. And you can look down the list of cases, some of them decided on Commission cases, if the court says, you know, "Go forth and take evidence on this issue," then that is what they want you to do. And so, you know --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I guess I'm concerned that we still have the latitude that where the facts are different and yet they use the same sort of ordering language --

MR. SMITH: Absolutely. We're not suggesting otherwise.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You made the motion, right?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Yes, I made the motion.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Your motion is, basically, we're just going to combine Issues 2 and 3 and just make a statement that we're not going to reopen the record. That's your motion.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: That's the motion.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, Mr. Smith, is that

sufficient for your basis? You mentioned the fact that 1 this order is going to be subject to potentially 2 another order from the Court. Does that meet your 3 needs as far as addressing Issues 2 and 3? 4 MR. SMITH: I think so. I don't think, you know, 5 the bare fact that you didn't specifically decide 6 Issue 1 in legal terms is going to be a basis for the 7 Court to, you know, reverse the Commission. It's what 8 you do on remand that's important. 9 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I will second the motion. 10 CHAIRMAN CLARK: All right. I just need to be 11 clear. And I'm sorry for belaboring the point. Is the 12 motion more simply stated, then, the Staff's 13 recommendation is modified on Number 2 to be, 14 15 "Recommendation that the Commission not reopen proceedings to take additional evidence in this case?" 16 COMMISSION GARCIA: Correct. 17 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is that sufficient? 18 19 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's sufficient with me. I'll second. 20 21 CHAIRMAN CLARK: There is a motion and second. 22 All those in favor, say aye. 23 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 24 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: 25 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.

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COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, nay. The motion passes.

MS. JABER: And you want the order to reflect that you did not make a decision on the legal authority, is that correct?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: That would be correct.
That disposes of Issue 3.

COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioners, Issue 4 is
Staff's recommendation in light of your vote on
Issues 2 and 3 on the appropriate rates on an ongoing
basis. Staff makes this recommendation based on its
review of the record and the evidence presented
therein. Staff is recommending to modify the
stand-alone rate schedule based on a cap, which is
based on the water and wastewater. This was a previous
recommendation that was made before the Commission in
the last rec.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask a question.

There was a discussion about some matters that were stipulated in this rate case, which is a '92 case. And one of the stipulations, as I recall, was an agreement that a gallonage rate would not be less than a dollar.

COMMISSION STAFF: That is correct. That was one of the stipulations that was approved prior to making

the recommendation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: All parties agreed to that?

COMMISSION STAFF: When we looked back at the record, the way that those rates -- I mean, those issues were not on appeal. So, those were voted on by the Commission, and those were never appealed, so that was one of the issues that we felt that was not at issue based on the appeal.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: My question is very simple. Did all parties in the docket stipulate to that?

MS. CHASE: No, Commissioner, they did not stipulate. That was just simply an aspect of the decision that was not on appeal. It was not the stipulation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Well, I misunderstood the recommendation. I read the recommendation to mean that all parties stipulated to the rate structure that no one would have to pay less than -- no one would pay less than a dollar, and that is not the case at all. You're just saying that that's not an issue that was appealed.

COMMISSION STAFF: And I apologize. When we looked back at the order, we picked out the issues that were not on appeal, and we made our recommendation based on that. And I apologize for inferencing that it

was a stipulation.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Could you respond to -- one of the arguments or statements made by Mr. Twomey was that he gave that 50 percent of the water customers will have uniform rates. And of the sewer customers, 94 to 97 percent would have uniform rates. And that, in fact, this modified stand-alone was really just uniform rates in drag.

COMMISSION STAFF: After reviewing the schedules, I did concede to those numbers. We are not referring to them as uniform rate, in the essence, in that we calculate the revenue requirement per system and then there is a subsidy based on a cap that was presented at the record. So, although it appears to be a uniform rate, those systems have the same rate. So, we do concede to those numbers, although we don't clarify them as uniform rates.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'm sorry, I didn't catch the last part.

COMMISSION STAFF: We don't clarify them as uniform rates in that we don't throw all the revenue requirements together and then spread them amongst the systems. We do them on a system-specific basis.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, part of the difficulty

I'm having is that while the remand order states that uniform rates are unlawful, it does not state that strict stand-alone rates are required. There is a distinction there. And what we are trying to do, is we have this remand order, and we are sitting here today trying to do what we think the Court wants us to do and what we think is fair, just, and reasonable, given our statutory requirements and authority from the Legislature. So, I do not read this order to say that we have to go to strict stand-alone. Perhaps that's an option, and perhaps that would be affirmed by the Court.

But my concern is that it's apparent to me from the remand order that the Court wants us to do something based upon evidence in the record, which is something we should be doing anyway. And they've made the finding that we could not utilize uniform rates, given the record that we have. But that same concern that I have expressed with strict stand-alone kind of goes to your capped rates, as well. You know, we are sitting here today trying to do what we think is just, fair, and reasonable, but your proposal certainly wasn't in the record, either. A variation was in the record, was it not? Okay. Not exactly what you're proposing.

My question is can we structure rates based upon a proposal that was in the record? I understand that the Company made a proposal for some capped rates. Their caps were much higher than what you're proposing here. Perhaps that would alleviate some of Mr. Twomey's concerns because he believes that what you're recommending here with your capped rates is just another form of uniform rates, because so many customers would be paying the same rate. I'm not necessarily buying into that argument, but, nevertheless, it's hard to argue against so many customers paying the same rate and then saying it's not basically a uniform rate. And, obviously, that argument has probably been made at the Court at some time.

Do we have the -- are our prospects of satisfying the Court better met by adopting a rate structure that was testified to by a competent witness at the hearing in this case? And can we structure rates based upon, for example, the company's proposed capped rate structure at caps which, I believe, were in excess of what you're recommending here, and they are in this recommendation, but we don't have them right at our fingertips. Is that something that we can do? And if we could, does it make sense that this is something we

should do?

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Commissioner, if I may address your MS. JABER: concern by also addressing what Mr. Twomey suggested. What is not in the record clearly is the notion of unbundling the systems that had county-wide rates and maybe even regional rates. There is nothing in the record that would support that. And I would suggest to you that you don't even consider that. The evidence in the record on the modified version of the stand-alone rates, we have cited to in the record. evidence in the record to support the Cresse proposal. And I think Mr. Pruitt can help me out, but there is case law -- there is a case, and I believe it's Bevis, that suggests that when there are extremes in testimony on rate structure, the Commission can make adjustments to that testimony and accept something in between. That is within your discretion. The only thing that Staff has done is change the cap, I believe, or what we have called the target benchmark. What the utility proposed was a higher benchmark. So, the very proposal of the Cresse rate is abundant in the record. I went back and I checked that myself.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But mathematically it would be true that if you adopted the caps as proposed by the Company -- and I have found them now. It's a cap of 52

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for water and 65 for wastewater -- that mathematically you would have fewer customers paying identical rates as is contained in your lower cap modified structure?

MR. WILLIS: Mathematically, that's correct. also like to point out that there is testimony in the record from Staff Witness Williams that points out that the actual caps presented by the Company are too high. So, there is evidence to support where Staff came from. And our recommendation itself, on the caps of \$30 for water and 43.75 for wastewater, actually was a recommendation presented to the Commissioners at the point in time in the 920199 docket when we came before the Commissioners at that time with that recommendation. It's nothing new that we dreamed up. We have gone back and resurrected the second choice at that point. And we basically have ranked our recommendations in that order. Since uniform rates, apparently, are something that the Court says we can't do in this case, then we have gone back and said, "Based on the evidence," which is the next best. And the next best at this point we believe would be Staff's modified version of the utility's cap. And if you don't wish to accept that, then we believe it would have to be the company's version of their capped rate structure. Other than that, I don't believe there is

any evidence in the record that says you ought to go to stand-alone. There is some evidence from Mr. Jones. There is about three pages of testimony, I believe, that I read, went back and reread. There isn't much there that supports it. He even says that he is not a rate structure specialist.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Clarify for me. In the record, who supported the modified version? Did Mr. Williams? What was his testimony?

MR. WILLIS: No, Mr. Williams did not sponsor the modified version. In cross examination, he was crossed on the utility's capped rate method, and asked whether or not he agreed with the method, and his answer to that was that the method apparently got the utility closer to a uniform rate in the future. It was a good step toward that. He agreed with it, but he did not agree with the size of the cap. The cap was definitely too high for both water and wastewater.

MS. JABER: It was not that a particular witness sponsored that testimony, at all. It was brought out through cross examination questions.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Let me make sure I clearly understand something. You're saying that this modified -- what we are calling modified stand-alone proposal was, indeed, presented. And at what stages -- you said

it was Mr. Cresse, or which one of our witnesses?

MR. WILSON: Mr. Cresse was the witness for the utility that presented the capped rate structure for the company, which Mr. Deason just pointed out was the \$52 for water and \$65 cap for wastewater.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay. I'm still confused, and I apologize for cutting you off. He was a witness for the company's proposal?

MR. WILLIS: That is correct.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Who presented the proposal that you all are presenting today? How did that --

MR. WILLIS: That proposal that we're presenting today was our version of looking at the testimony in the record and coming up with our best recommendation on what you should do with the company's proposal. As you are aware, in many cases, whether it be rate structure or other issues, accounting-wise, engineering-wise, we looked at the actual testimony in the record and come forward with our best recommendation on what to do with that. It may be a blend of witnesses' testimony.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay, I think I understand. So, it wasn't something that was affirmatively put forward, but it was something that could be gleaned from the testimony that was provided.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Because I have the same concern that -- I always want to call him Chairman Deason -- that Commissioner Deason stated with respect to was this just another way for us get around and institute uniform rates when, you know, the Court has determined that there wasn't, you know, whatever you want to call it, whether it was sufficient evidence, or whatever, in the record to do that. But to the extent that there was record evidence that you all could go back to and support the analysis and reach this conclusion of a modified stand-alone rate, then I feel more comfortable with that.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct. The major variance between what the company proposed and what Staff is proposing here deals directly with the cap itself. That is the major difference. And, of course, the Commission is free, naturally, to make any determination. You might think the caps ought to be lower or higher or somewhere in between.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: One last question. With respect to stand-alone rates, not modified, but some form of stand-alone, you're saying that there wouldn't be enough information for you all to go back to do an analysis and actually come up with stand-alone, kind of

as we know it.

MR. WILLIS: Well, Commissioners, the company in reaching their conclusion for the cap rates actually unbundled all the uniform rates that were presently in place. That's how they came up with their capped rate methodology. Every system was set on a stand-alone rate, and then each system was individually looked at to see whether or not they should be capped. So, you might say the information is there in 199 to make stand-alone calculations, just because of the unbundling. Now, stand-alone itself is not looked at --

commissioner deason: Let me interrupt you a second. I think it's extremely important. But, likewise, there was no one that testified in that hearing that the rate should be strictly stand-alone, totally on a separate system basis. Maybe the information was there --

MR. WILLIS: That's correct. I'm just saying -COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- but it was not testified
to. And there would be a deficiency in doing that,
just like the Court says there's a deficiency in doing
uniform, because they said that you didn't have
sufficient evidence to do the uniform.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct, except Mr. Jones did

have three pages of testimony which I alluded to before on a stand-alone. Now, it's true that what I'm referring to is only that the calculations were made in the MFRs. There was no testimony except for Mr. Jones' three pages of testimony that basically said you should go to stand-alone. The Company -- I imagine that the very last option you would have would be to leave the rate structure completely as it was. I don't agree with that idea or that option. But I think that is your very last option would be to just go ahead and leave everything --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Leaving it would be the safest, though, wouldn't it? I mean, we wouldn't run into problems of going back to court on this thing.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I don't think it --

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I don't think anything you do here is safe in this. In my opinion, I really don't. I think if you set strict stand-alone rates, you're not safe because somebody is not going to like that decision. If you go ahead and keep things as they were, the rate structure as they were prior to coming into that 199 case, they're not going to like that, either. The utility would probably take that one back to court.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: There was no testimony to support

that, just as there was no testimony on --

MR. WILLIS: Exactly. I think the safest bet you have is to go with a version of the capped rates, either the Staff's method or the utility method, because I believe those are the best supported in the record at this point, when you consider that the Court says uniform rates can't be done. I really think that's the best leg you have to stand on.

MS. JABER: Commissioners, safe is relative. You have to remember that there are some customers that regardless of what you do here, will have even a higher rate than the uniform rate.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I agree. And there are some, though, that have been receiving a subsidy.

MS. JABER: That's right.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: My question is of safe as if we're -- maybe I'm jumping ahead, but I think we are going to look at all of this again very soon.

But that said, what I want to try to do is avoid us being caught with ongoing litigation and move from here, where I think everything has already been defined much more clearly and start this process. And from that point, I think we run into less problems. I think part of the problem we have been running into with this case is that there is stuff going on defining what we

had already done. And in this case we have that before us. We have a road laid out for us, which we built, again, in an order that didn't work. We're out of sequence.

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And all I want to try to do is avoid the perception that we are still going through uniform rates, because to some degree -- again, I don't have the benefit of having participated in this docket. have read the transcripts and, clearly, I have a good understanding of what occurred. But it isn't as specific as some of the Commissioners who were there. And I think you get a little bit more by participating. My thinking is that if we were to go back -- and humor me here -- if we were to go back and go to the rates that existed before, and then begin this anew. Clearly, the company would have some very nasty revenue shortfalls, I would assume. So then we would have to probably approve some type of interim rates until we solved either stand-alone rates for each one of these companies, or went through the uniform process again. And all I want to get from you is, is that wrong? Is that calculation wrong?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, now, there would be no revenue deficiency on a going-forward basis. We would set the revenues at the same revenue requirement. And,

of course, the company would then be allowed to include their indexes and pass-throughs that they've gotten since this decision. So, they would be getting the same dollar revenue. It would just be the structure of the rates that would be different on a going-forward basis.

MR. WILLIS: Going forward. The problem here is the period in between.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Right.

MS. CHASE: Commissioners, since you have been discussing Mr. Cresse's proposal, I wanted to point out one other difference between the Staff proposal and Mr. Cresse's; and that is, that there was some sharing of wastewater deficiency over to the water side. So, you just need to be aware of that, also.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Which is not what you recommended?

MS. CHASE: Right. That was eliminated in the Staff proposal.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Any other questions, Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You know what I need to have clarified, I'm not clear after all of the discussion that we have had and some of the questions, Madam Chair, that you had asked Mr. Twomey as to

exactly what they are suggesting that we do with this issue. What are they recommending, what kind of rate structure?

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I think the basic problem is that in MS. FOX: order to go to the type of caps that the Staff is talking about, you have to combine the systems for ratemaking purposes. And that's what the First District said you shouldn't do. You can't combine the systems for ratemaking purposes until you find that they are functionally related. And that was the deficiency in the prior order. So, you could go back to the prior rate structure. And I think I can represent to you that none of the parties to this case would challenge you if you went to the capped rate structure that was presented as the Staff alternative in the prior rate case. And that, essentially, is a 5 percent difference to, I think, the Sugarmill Woods customers that would alleviate some of the severe problems and some of the other ones. Now, intellectually, that still -- you know, maybe it raises a question on the combining issue, but I can tell you that I don't think anyone here would appeal that further if that was what you did.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I think I'd like to hear that from Mr. Twomey, also.

MS. FOX: Okay.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. If I understood what Mr. Willis said, he said he thought -- I'm not sure that Ms. Fox has it right, that it's a Staff alternative necessarily, or the cap, the high cap testified to by Mr. Ludsen and the Company, the much higher cap. But there was a high cap testified to in that case, the first case before you now -- that, as I understand it and recall, it would not have resulted in any system's customers as a group paying more than about 5 percent. Okay. There may have been one that had about 9 percent, but on average, they were much less than 5 percent, and they maxed out at about 5.

I thought I heard Mr. Willis say that the way that the Company arrived at that was basically by taking the stand-alone rates for each system and figuring out which ones needed to be capped, so that they weren't viewed as excessive. Okay. Now, if you were to go to that and go to a system, as I suggested earlier, that didn't exceed a 5 percent above stand-alone subsidy, altruism, tax, or whatever you want to call it, above 5 percent, no one that I represent, I think I can say to you, would appeal that. I think that you have the authority, by and large, to do something within that range and have it not constitute undue discrimination.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What would the maximum 1 2 3 know what that would be? 4 5 information today. 6 7 8 9 10 structure. 11 12 13 14 identified with the Cresse approach. 15 16 17 that? 18 19 20 21 want to see anything else. 22 23

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subsidy be with the caps as proposed by the Company, that being \$52 for water and 65 for wastewater? Do we MS. CHASE: Commissioners, we don't have that MR. TWOMEY: I think we do, Commissioner. MS. FOX: Yes, we have an analysis of what it would be under Mr. Cresse's proposed capped rate COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, is this with sharing subsidies between water and wastewater, or is it nonsubsidies between water and wastewater. As I understand that's one of the deficiencies Staff has MS. FOX: Could you give us a minute to check on COMMISSIONER DEASON: And let me reiterate. are asking for information here, I'm only asking for information that is the record in this case. I don't COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And I completely agree with that. I mean, I want to know when we get

information that it does tie back to the record.

MS. FOX: This isn't a document that was in

920199, but it was a response to a request as to how you would make that calculation, based on the evidence in that docket, as I understand it. So --

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Whose response?

MS. FOX: The Staff's response to an interrogatory request in one of the others proceedings as to how you would make that calculation, based on the MFRs in that docket number. So that you could see what the effect would be under that capped rate proposal. And, you know, without getting -- that's all I can tell you about the origin of what we have. And we'll have it copied and passed out, if you want.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask you, you say it's an interrogatory response, was that interrogatory response entered into the record in this proceeding?

MS. FOX: I think so. Not in this proceeding, no. No, it was subsequent, obviously. And it's simply --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry, I mean --

MS. FOX: -- a compilation of the evidence that -- COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I'm sorry I can't take

the decision based upon the evidence in this case. And

a look at it because I don't want -- we've got to make

if we have the evidence to make the calculation based

25 upon the Cresse proposal at his caps, I guess then it

would just be a mathematical calculation to determine what the percentage subsidy is. And I understand the Staff doesn't have that now, but it's something that, I guess, could be done over a period of time. And what period of time, I don't know if it's hours or days or weeks, but --

MR. WILLIS: We may certainly have it, and it may be back over in the Gunter Building. I'm not quite sure, but we don't have that information here at this point.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Could I just clarify, did that interrogatory identify the Staff person who was responsible for it?

MS. CHASE: Commissioners, I think I might be of some help here. I believe that was something that was done in 930880, not in this docket, but in the rate structure investigation docket.

MS. FOX: It was accomplished and based on evidence from --

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, see I want to hear that from the person that did it. That's where my trouble comes in.

MS. JABER: Commissioner, without having to look at the document, and without looking at what we've got in the other building, I really can't answer your

question right now. Maybe this is a good time for a break or maybe you'd want us to come back.

MR. TWOMEY: Madam Chairman, Commissioner
Kiesling, we think, and we are not positive about this,
and perhaps your Staff can make an examination to
determine this -- but we think that the billing
determinants, that this information was made in the
second docket, the investigation docket, that the
billing determinants and all the data was taken from
the first case, we believe, which would mean that, in
fact, it was then taken from the record of the case now
before you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioners, let me ask you, what is -- we're on Issue 4, do you want to take a break or do you want to take a motion on Issue 4?

my thoughts. And I'm inclined to support a capped rate structure at the caps that were suggested by the Company through Witness Cresse. Mathematically, there would be -- that structure would less resemble a uniform structure than what Staff is recommending with their lower caps. It's just a mathematical function. And since those specific caps were testified to in the record, I think that we would have justification for using those caps. I understand that Staff thinks those

caps are too high, and that there is evidence in the record from Mr. Williams to justify a lower cap, but he did not specify a specific lower cap, did he? I don't think that he did.

MR. WILLIS: He did not specify a specific cap.

What he did say was that those rates proposed by the company, in his opinion, were not fair and reasonable. And if you were looking for fair and reasonable rates, they would have to be lower.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. But that's his opinion.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I regard his opinion very highly. There is also an opinion from another witness who I regard very highly, as well, saying that these are appropriate caps. And at this point, I think we need to make a decision, get on with this, do something we do think is just and fair and reasonable, and, also, is supported in the record. And, obviously, I think these caps are supported in the record. Reasonable people can disagree, but I think every reasonable person would agree that they are supported in the record.

MR. WILLIS: I agree.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And we can go on with this,

and using these higher caps, it would less resemble a uniform structure than that was recommended by Staff with the lower caps.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Let me ask two questions. Is it also your motion that we not have any sharing of revenues between water and wastewater?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Oh, I agree with that. I think that's a policy, and I think there is evidence in the record that that should not be done. Mr. Williams testified to that, is that correct, that there not be sharing between water and wastewater?

MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Now, one other thing. As I recall, those caps were based on what the utility had asked for in terms of the rates and the revenue requirement, is that right? It wasn't based on what was ultimately --

MR. WILLIS: That's correct. Their caps are based on having that \$1 million come over from water to wastewater. And it was the same Mr. Williams, I believe, who testified that --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: You misunderstood my question. I presume his testimony was based on what they asked for in revenue requirements. Did we give them everything they asked for in revenue requirements?

MR. WILLIS: No, we did not.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Have you adjusted the -is it appropriate to adjust those caps downward to
reflect the fact that they were based on a different
revenue requirement?

MR. WILLIS: I don't believe so, Commissioner.
CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

MR. WILLIS: If you choose -- those caps were set up to basically reflect what the Commission felt was the highest reasonable rate to give a customer at 10,000 gallons. That's what Mr. Cresse testified to. And if you follow through with his testimony and his idea that that would be the highest reasonable rate, then even if you lowered the revenue requirement, you wouldn't lower the cap. It should not have an effect on the cap.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that's what I would support, and that's what I'm leaning towards. But, I'm still open if there are other suggestions from other Commissioners. And I just simply asked the question if the calculation had already been done, what was the maximum subsidy percentage, just more out of curiosity to see if it satisfied Mr. Twomey's threshold. I would be ecstatic if it did. If it didn't, I'm not so sure

that there is anything more that we can do, given that this remand does not say, "Go to strict stand-alone rates." It does not say that. And I think that that would be a deficiency, as well, because there is no evidence in the record saying -- with the exception of three pages from a witness who describes himself as not a rate structure expert, there is no evidence indicating that we should utilize a strict stand-alone rate structure.

MR. WILLIS: I agree.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioner Deason, I take it from your comments that you don't feel that it's necessary to take a break to get that information.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No. If it was readily available, I would like to hear it, and it could, perhaps, stimulate some discussion about maybe doing something different with these caps. I'm amenable, but I do have some comfort in setting it at these caps, because these were specific numbers that were testified to by an expert witness and there is ample evidence in the record using these caps.

MS. JABER: Commissioners, if you could just give us two minutes. We're trying to discuss how much time we need to get you that information. And if --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I'm saying, you know,

it would be nice to have it, but it's not essential, not unless other Commissioners would like to see it.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I'm not sure that we have the information available at this point to calculate the exact rates using the Cresse cap. At that point, you not allowing the one million subsidy from water to wastewater with the new revenue requirement, that was not an actual proposal that we came forward with in the 920199. Maybe it would be a good idea to give us five minutes to group here and see if we believe we have the information available to do that, or if we are going to have to ask you to propose the company, or to order the company to come forward with those rate calculations for us.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We are not going to reopen the record. If we have the information to do it based upon the record, fine. If we don't --

MS. JABER: That's not what he is suggesting.

MR. WILLIS: You misunderstand me. I'm not talking about going out of the record. What I'm talking about is we may not have all the billing determinants and everything we need to make that calculation. They are probably there, but the company is best equipped computer-wise to make those calculations quicker than we are.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: We just took, I think -Commissioner Deason, I think we just took a huge step
in this case a few moments ago with our vote. If we
could give them this time, just to make sure that we
stay within the record. Because I would like to see
those. And that record is huge, and I went through it.
And I still --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioner Garcia and
Commissioner Deason, why don't we temporarily pass this
until 3:00 o'clock. But I would suggest that in
between that time we go back to the regular agenda.
I'm sorry, 4:00 o'clock. But that we utilize the time
between now and then to do our other agenda items.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have no objection.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: How about if we -- we will continue on agenda items until 4:00 o'clock. We'll take a ten-minute break and we'll come back with this item at 4:10.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: We'll reconvene the agenda conference.

Mr. Willis.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, first, I would like to take us back to one thing. There was one question that was asked earlier in the agenda as to the exact

differences between Staff's methodology that we proposed and the Cresse methodology. And I'd like to just quickly run over what those differences are.

I pointed out that the major difference was the cap itself, the \$52 for the Company versus our cap of 47.50 or 43.75, I believe, and wastewater, also.

The other differences that were reflected in our rate structure were the fact that for both water and wastewater we had a base-facility charge that was actually capped on the low end. We looked at the water system and said that on the base facility charge there should be no base facility charge less than \$4, which the Cresse proposal doesn't do. And for wastewater, the base facility low end was \$8. That there should not be a base facility charge less than \$8 for the wastewater systems. And the Cresse proposal did not do that, either. As was also pointed out in another discussion, the Staff also eliminated the \$1 million subsidy, which I believe was also brought up, too.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Between water and wastewater?

MR. WILLIS: Right, from water to wastewater.

Now, we have gone back and looked to see if we could find any information available to us to quickly tell you what that subsidy would be as a term of percentage or a quick calculation of those rates, and I

am here to tell you we cannot do that. We do not have the information available to quickly do that. It wasn't calculated back in 920199, basically because there were several things that it did not take into account. One, it didn't take into account that the Commission voted to have a conservation minimum for the water system for the gallonage charge of one dollar. That's something we mentioned earlier. It wasn't a stipulation, but it was a separate vote of the Commission that didn't deal strictly with the rate structure itself. The Commission decided for conservation effects there should not be a gallonage charge of less than one dollar for any system.

The Cresse proposal —

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You're saying that that was not appealed by any party?

MR. WILLIS: That was not appealed. The rate structure itself was appealed on uniform rates, but not the idea of having a one dollar minimum gallonage charge for conservation purposes. That was one thing the Commission looked at. We had several issues on conservation. There was testimony taken on conservation and the need for it and what Commission should do in this case. And Staff at the time of bringing that to the Commission, recommended in this

case that for conservation purposes there should not be 1 a gallonage charge in water of less than one dollar. 2 The Commission agreed with that recommendation. 3 one we do not believe is in -- or actually was not 4 appealed to the Court as far as rate structure, because 5 it's not actually in a design for a rate structure. It 6 actually goes to whether or not you should have a 7 conservation rate or not. And with that being there, 8 we actually don't have the ability right now to quickly 9 10 turn around a rate structure for you. That would take 11 reprogramming and a program to actually run the billing 12 determinants and everything. And to have that checked 13 out, we are talking a good period of time for 127 14 systems.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What period of time?

MR. WILLIS: We are talking probably about seven days to run all of this. The original rates were done by Mr. Berg, and they were actually done by hand. Believe it or not, they were done by hand. There were many hours spent by him. If you remember Mr. Berg, Mr. Berg was not really fond of computers and --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But we do have it on computer now, do we?

MR. WILLIS: We have the ability to put it on computer right now. At this point it's going to take a

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while to run the program to do that, plug all the 1 different factors in, test check the numbers going into it to make sure it's all right. 3 COMMISSION STAFF: There was one additional, the utility's proposal had that cap of the wastewater of 5 10,000, and the Commission voted on the 6,000 cap, 6 also. 7 MR. WILLIS: That's true. 8 COMMISSION STAFF: One small difference. 9 MR. WILLIS: But the cap isn't an issue in this 10 11 proceeding, either. Now, the Company -- as in our position before, 12 13 we've recommended that the Company actually make the 14 calculations at this point and turn those around to us within seven days, which we think is ultimately fair. 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But those calculations would 16 17 be based upon evidence that's --That's exactly right. 18 MR. WILLIS: 19 COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- provided in this docket. That's correct. And those 20 MR. WILLIS: calculations would be determined on factors that you 21 22 give the utility today at this agenda. 23 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Would it also be based on 24 the two items, or maybe three, that you identified that

were not appealed? One of which was the minimum of a

dollar per thousand for water, the minimum of a \$4 base facility charge and \$8 base facility charge for wastewater, and the elimination of the cross-subsidy between water and wastewater? Was there one I missed?

MR. WILLIS: At this point, it would only include the \$1 million subsidy removal, because I believe somebody indicated that you wouldn't want that to be done. And you would have to tell the Company you didn't want that. That's not something that has been voted on. That is part of the rate structure itself. As far as the minimums on the base facility charge, that's something that you would also have to decide if you wanted them to do that. That is not part of the Cresse proposal. The only thing it would include would be the 10,000 gallon cap for wastewater. And it would also --

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: You mean 6,000.

MR. WILLIS: 6,000 gallon cap for wastewater, excuse me. And it would include the one dollar conservation minimum for water. Those are the only two factors at this point that the Cresse proposal would include. You would have to basically tell the Company -- if you don't desire to have that \$1 million subsidy from water to wastewater, you would have to tell them that. If you desire to have minimum caps for base

facility charges, you would have to tell them that, also. Any modification other than including the 6,000 gallon wastewater cap, usage cap, and the one dollar low end on the gallonage charge for water, you would have to tell the Company and vote on those changes to the Cresse proposal.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Commissioners, I'm in a quandary. I mean, I don't feel like, even from reading the record, that I have the information that I need to make this decision. I don't know how we can do this.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask the question. Could we decide these issues and have this calculation made and then brought back to us to look at those rates, and then make a decision if we think that is a fair and reasonable rate structure?

MS. JABER: What we're talking about,

Commissioner, is when the next agenda is, and whether

or not we can do everything in time to prepare a

recommendation and bring it back to you. And I don't

see why not.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Okay. I think maybe I misunderstood what Commissioner Deason said, but I didn't think that it was to come back with a complete recommendation. It was we were going to decide today the parameters that we thought we wanted.

MS. JABER: I see.

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COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And then have you come back and show us what those rates would be.

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MS. JABER: I see.

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COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Because I don't feel like we can go solely with the Cresse one in that it is contrary to at least two issues that were decided and were never appealed for one reason, and the

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million-dollar subsidy for another.

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indicated at this point, what I'm inclined to endorse,

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realizing that the calculation has not been done, and

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I think I've already

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we don't know what the rates would be, and I think there should be some type of a final review of those

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specific rates to make sure there is not some

endorsed by Witness Cresse, with some changes.

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abnormality or something that we didn't foresee. But I

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would be inclined to go to a capped rate structure, as

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would use his proposed caps, which are in excess of the

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Staff recommended caps, and that you have that. I

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believe it's 52 for water and 65 for wastewater?

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MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. That there would not be a subsidy between water and wastewater, that there

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would be a one dollar per 1,000-gallon minimum for

water, because that was voted in the previous case, and 1 that was not appealed. Likewise, the use of a 2 6,000-gallon cap for wastewater was an issue that was 3 voted by the -- in the previous decision and that, likewise, was not appealed. So, with those three 5 modifications, I'd like to see a rate using the Cresse 6 approach with those three modifications. 7 CHAIRMAN CLARK: I would like further 8 clarification. You mentioned something about a base g 10 facilities charge.

> MR. WILLIS: That's correct. I was talking about the differences between Staff proposal in this case versus Cresse's proposal. And in those proposals, we had recommended a minimum base facility charge in water of \$4 and a minimum in wastewater of \$8.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That was recommended -- I know you're recommending that --

MR. WILLIS: That was a modification of the Staff's.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Right. But that was not voted out before.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, I'm not including that in my suggestion.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: What you're suggesting, then, is that rather than vote on Issue 4 at this time, that Staff get the calculations given with the capped rate with those parameters? That's what you're suggesting.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, yes, because I had an indication, at least from one Commissioner, and perhaps from two Commissioners, and I would like to see the rates, too. But I am at the point to where if to get this case going and to meet other statutory deadlines, i.e., interim rates in October, and all of these other things that are upon us, we have got to make a decision today. To me, this is the best approach to take, but it would be doing it halfway in the blind because we don't have the final rates calculated. I would prefer to see the final rates calculated, and if we have the luxury of getting that calculation and bringing it back and not violating some other time requirement in some other case, so be it. But if we are going to violate something somewhere else, I need for Staff to let us know, and then we'll have to make a decision what we are going to do.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I would like to also, while you're cogitating on that, let you know that I am interested in seeing perhaps more than one calculation. And that would be what it would be under the Cresse

caps with what has occurred in the prior case that wasn't appealed, including the elimination of the million-dollar cross-subsidy. But I also would like to know what it would be under, for example, the Cresse --well, let me ask you this. Is there record evidence to support the cap that you mentioned on the base facility charge, or is that just one of those where, you know, there was evidence on this end and there was evidence on this end, and it is just somewhere in between?

MR. WILLIS: Are you talking about the low end caps?

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Four and eight, yes.

MR. WILLIS: Yes, I believe so. We believe there was evidence in the record to support that.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Okay. Then I would like to also see what that would do to the calculation.

MS. JABER: And what I'll also do, Commissioners, is go back and make sure that there was evidence to support that, because my memory doesn't serve.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Yes, I want to know that there was specific evidence, not just that it falls somewhere in this nebulous range of where we think we can do it. I want evidence.

MS. JABER: Right. Commissioner, what we were just talking about was if you don't vote on Issue 4

now, and we bring it back to you at the next agenda, 1 what my concern was the recommendation for interim 2 would be filed before the next agenda. So, we still 3 would be in the same problem with knowing what to use 4 for --5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: See, I thought that was the 6 7 problem. CHAIRMAN CLARK: When is the recommendation on the 8 interims due? 9 10 MS. JABER: The agenda is October 6th, so it would be 12 days before that. I don't have my calendar. 11 The 12 26th, maybe, yes. The 28th, I believe. 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: MS. JABER: I think the agenda is like the 29th. 14 15 It could be that the dates are reversed. It could be that the agenda is the --16 CHAIRMAN CLARK: No, it's two days in between. 17 MR. WILLIS: The agenda is October 6th. 18 19 CHAIRMAN CLARK: The agenda is what, the 26th, and 20 so it's probably due the 28th. Isn't it the Thursday before? 21 22 MS. JABER: Right, but we have a special --23 CHAIRMAN CLARK: We have two days after it's done. MS. JABER: But it's a special agenda, so I don't 24 25 know if that rec day falls on a Thursday or not.

MR. WILLIS: The interim agenda is on a special agenda on October 6th, so we have to back up ten days. And I think the due date is on a Friday. I don't have a calendar before me.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: So, would it be Friday the 29th?

MR. WILLIS: I think it's the 29th. To me it rings a bell that September 29th is the due date.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Let me tell you one of my concerns. I mean, I understand that the Company made their filing in the current rate case when they did.

But I am not going to feel comfortable making a decision in this case that we have before us right now on rates just so that we can meet a deadline on interim. I mean, that, to me, means the Company is driving our decisions and not us. And I have to feel sure that there is evidence to support a decision, and that, you know, the possibilities have been explored. So, you know, in some ways I'm mindful that there is this interim decision out there somewhere, but I'm not willing to have that force me into a decision prematurely without all the information here.

MS. JABER: Right. This is a good opportunity to address your concerns earlier about interim. What we were going to say to you is we do have options in

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deciding what to do with the interim. We could give them something with the understanding that whatever happens may warrant a refund, or we could deny interim on the basis that what the utility has filed doesn't allow the Commission to make a decision on interim.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I think Commissioner Kiesling is right. I think we need to get this satisfied and be sure that the rates that we think are appropriate on a going-forward basis are rates that we think are supported in this case. And I think if I understand correctly what Commissioner Deason and Commissioner Kiesling are indicating, they would like to defer Item 4 until the next agenda, and they would like to have calculation of rates based on the parameters given. And as I understand it, the difference between what Commission Deason would like to see and what Commission Kiesling would like to see has to do with another variation to the rate calculation. What she would like to see done is that there would be a minute of a \$4 base facility charge for water and an \$8 base facility charge for wastewater. And that is the two things that we would like to see presented at the next agenda.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And that is because the calculations that we have in here based on Staff's

proposal at this time includes that, and I would like to see what that number is compared to the Cresse caps.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: But as I understand it, the caps will be those recommended by Witness Cresse.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

MR. WILLIS: We can have those calculations in probably a week. The reason why I said that we would like to have the Company prepare those calculations is they are going to have to after this case is decided in 199, turn it around and make those calculations again, including the indexes that have occurred since, the change that took place in the 880 docket, because of the Hernando County bulk rate, and, also, they are going to have to supply the end calculations as of the present day with all that taking effect, so they can be used for interim. And that was my ulterior motive for having the Company supply those calculations, as well.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Do you want clarification from us directing the Company to make those calculations with those parameters and that you would review them?

MR. WILLIS: I think it would be easier for them to make those calculations at this point, because they are going to have to make them anyway. And we can review those things, review the calculations

1 themselves.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Can you can make those calculations?

MR. WILLIS: Yes, we can.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

MR. WILLIS: We can make the calculations probably about the same time the Company can.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I think I would be more comfortable you having made them with the request that they sort of do it themselves, and then it's a sanity check. But I would like to know that our Staff has done it.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I mean, that's my view, too, because at least we know if we input the information into our computer system, we will be inputting information that is based on the record from 199.

MR. WILLIS: Correct.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And I'm not suggesting the Company would do otherwise, but it would avoid there having to be another whole check behind the Company to make sure that we verify every one of their variables.

MR. WILLIS: That's fine. We can do that.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a motion?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me just -- I'm not

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opposed to getting the information Commission Kiesling is also seeking, just so we are sure what we are Is that if you'll look, if you have the \$4 minimum base facility on water and a dollar minimum on gallonage, you've already got most of -- that's already the top rate for most of the subsidy that's already being created under Staff's recommended cap of \$30 for If you'll look at certain systems like Silver Lake Estates, that has a subsidy of \$133,000, they are already at four and one dollar. Spring Hill Utilities, a subsidy of \$330,000, they are already at four and Sugarmill Woods, a subsidy of \$128,000, they are one. already at four and one. So, I'm not so sure we are going to see a big difference, maybe not, I don't know. But I'm not opposed to getting the information. just going to be a lot of calculations.

MR. WILLIS: There may not be a big difference.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. Is there a motion?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I would move that we basically defer a decision on Issue 4, and that we get additional specific rate structure calculation based upon two different scenarios. And I'm basically incorporating what Commissioner Kiesling is seeking.

One rate scenario would be capped rates at \$52 for water and 65 for wastewater with no subsidy between

water and wastewater, with a one dollar per 1,000 1 gallon minimum for water as the gallonage rate, and a 2 6,000-gallon cap for the wastewater calculation. 3 would be one scenario. The second scenario would be 4 like the first, but it would also include a base 5 facility charge low end cap of \$4 for water and \$8 for 6 wastewater. Is that clear? 7 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is that a motion? 8 9 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I think that was one. 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And does the Staff -- I 11 mean, does the Company understand that? Because, as I 12 understand it, our Staff is going to make that 13 calculation, but there is also going to be -- there is 14 not going to be a request to have the Company provide 15 that? 16 MS. JABER: No, I think what we were talking about 17 is they are going to have to do it eventually, anyway. 18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: All right. As long as our 19 Staff understands, that's the motion. 20 CHAIRMAN CLARK: There is no prohibition that they 21 make it themselves, but you're --22 MR. WILLIS: No, there is no prohibition. 23 CHAIRMAN CLARK: There's a motion. 24 MS. FOX: I have an objection I need to place on

the record, if you'd give me leave to do that.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I guess I'm confused. I've given you the opportunity to address these items. We are in the posture of taking a vote. I mean, I don't know what procedurally --

MS. FOX: It just concerns the one dollar gallonage charge, which has just come up in this discussion, and I've been sitting here for quite sometime waiting to have the opportunity to do this.

commissioner deason: Well, Chairman Clark, let me say this. It's a question that I had. That's why when this whole initial discussion started, I raised the question about whether it was a stipulation that all parties signed off to or exactly the nature of it. And we are so deep into this already, if a party has something to add, I would like to have it clarified now instead of it being subject to some future litigation.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Go ahead and clarify, Ms. Fox.

MS. FOX: It will only take a few seconds.

There shouldn't be an inference here that the parties either agreed to or didn't object to the caps. They simply weren't relevant to your decision, because the rates that were adopted were in excess of those. And, you know, I think you can go back and look at that, but it would be erroneous to proceed on the assumption that those are a given and that those

wouldn't be the subject of further -- in other words, Sugarmill Woods did not agree to those caps. None of the parties that appealed, the one dollar gallonage --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I think that was clarified, that they said that there was no stipulation on that, that it simply was not appealed.

MS. FOX: And I think the inference that it wasn't appealed is erroneous in the sense that we did appeal the rates that were adopted. These weren't adopted, and the gallonage charges that were adopted were in excess of these. So, it was a moot point. I mean, we couldn't have appealed it.

MR. TWOMEY: And the shame of it is, Madam
Chairman, is I think we were very close to an agreement
whereby that Commission Deason's motion without the
dollar cap would have been something that everybody
could have lived with. Whereas, with the inclusion of
it, notwithstanding the fact that we didn't agree to it
and didn't even think of appealing it could throw
things out.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Are you saying that you think it was subsumed within the appeal on uniform rates, and it wasn't specifically addressed because by uniform rates all of the uniform rate was in excess of one dollar per 1,000 gallons?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir. Yes, sir, they are so much higher that it wasn't a material issue.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But, see, what I'm having my Staff telling me is that the nature of that decision at that time was it was a dollar per 1,000 gallons that was established not for any type of uniform versus stand-alone rate structure debate, but for conservation purposes. And that was a finding by that panel. That decision was not -- that specific decision was not appealed based upon conservation purposes. And now you're asking me to second-guess a decision that was made by that panel based upon the record that was taken at that time. And I think I assumed there was evidence in the record that it was good to do that for conservation purposes, and I just can't second-guess that.

MR. TWOMEY: Well, I'm not asking you to second-guess. What I'm suggesting to you is that I don't recall how much evidence there was in the record to support the dollar. My recollection, although it's limited, is there was about as much evidence, competent substantial evidence to support the dollar notion as there was to support the uniform rates. But that's not my point. My point is that unless the Company is locked into this dollar business for some reason, which

they shouldn't be because they can -- we are willing to see them get their revenue, every penny of it that you authorized them two years ago through a modified cap type arrangement. Not the Staff's, but Mr. Cresse's, as modified by most of what your motion was. I'm saying I think we are ready to say we don't care about the dollar stuff; we want it out. If the Company is opposed to it and is agreeable to doing that, and nobody else cares, I'm suggesting to you let's examine trying to cut a deal somehow and not have it trip up on some dollar thing that is not of really any significance.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask, I know we are on a short time frame, but there is nothing that prevents the parties, the two principal litigants here to get together and present a stipulation to resolve this issue, is there? And we could take that up.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I was thinking the same thing. I mean, I think that's still available.

MR. TWOMEY: Well, we are always for that, certainly.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Right now, I feel like a decision was made. I assume it was based upon competent evidence. And that decision for a dollar was made for conservation purposes, as I understand, and

didn't have anything to do with uniform versus 1 stand-alone. And the nature of the appeal was uniform 2 rates. 3 MS. JABER: Commissioner, can I offer this? Why 4 don't you in the process of giving us the time to 5 calculate the rates, let me go back and check what that 6 7 dollar was for exactly, and even offer the calculation without the dollar included. So, that would make three 8 calculations. 9 That sounds good to me. COMMISSIONER KIESLING: 10 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: What are you going to be doing on your Saturdays and Sundays? 12 MS. JABER: What I do now. 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. I'm certainly 14 agreeable to getting that third calculation, because as 15 16 I indicated earlier, most of the entities or systems 17 that are contributing the most subsidy are already at 18 the \$4 and the \$1 anyway. 19 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. 20 MR. TWOMEY: Thank you. 21 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Now, there has been a motion and 22 a second. All those in favor say aye. 23 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Ave. 24 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye. 25

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.

1 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, nay.

Issue Number 5.

MS. CHASE: Commissioners, Issue Number 5 has to do with whether or not there should be a refund now that the rate structure is going to be changed. Their primary recommendation is that no refunds are appropriate because the revenue requirements was not at There is an alternative recommendation supported by Mr. Smith, who is here to defend that, that a refund is appropriate from the inception of the uniform rate up to the date of the order in Docket 930880. I think it probably would be good just to simply give you the options that you have here. they are, number one, that you could refund to those customer that paid too much and back bill those that have underpaid under the uniform rate structure. again, we don't know the amount of the refund until we know the final rates. But in all of these there will be some that are going to have paid too much and some that would have paid too little.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: How can we back bill?

MS. CHASE: We have always heard that that was not a feasible way to go, where it was retroactive

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ratemaking. However, in Mr. Pruitt's memo, he does say that it is his opinion that SSU should be allowed to recover from customers who paid less under the uniform rate structure than they would have paid under the old stand-alone. We are not recommending that, but -- we don't think it's really a feasible option, but that is an option that you have out there.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: It's a legally -- it's a viable option. Legally, we can do that. Is that what you're saying?

MS. JABER: Well, there is a difference of opinion. My recommendation initially was that you should not order the Company to back bill. You shouldn't allow them to back bill. I think Mr. Hoffman even acknowledged that in his presentation. But Mr. Pruitt's memo does suggest than you can back bill. There is no authority cited for it.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Is there any authority cited for the proposition that we can't?

MS. JABER: Well, retroactive ratemaking is the theory that you can't go back and apply a new rate to prior consumption. And to allow the utility to bill customers a new rate for consumption that they had fits within the definition. And I think that Mr. Hoffman is absolutely correct, the cases don't make a distinction

between decreases or increases.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So, you're saying we couldn't do it either way.

MS. JABER: I don't think so.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, we declined to do it in the GTE case, did we not?

MS. JABER: I think you did. Yes, you made that decision on a going-forward basis.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: How does the Company recover its expenses?

MS. JABER: It doesn't. That's the problem we have, and that's why we're recommending that a refund isn't appropriate, either. If you're going to keep a balance, you shouldn't let them refund and you shouldn't allow them to back bill. What Ms. Chase, I think, is suggesting is if you make them refund, you should let them back bill.

MS. CHASE: Actually, all I was trying to do was list your options. And that has been mentioned as an option, refund those and back bill others.

The other option, of course, is to refund those that have overpaid. And you have heard arguments today, that that would be taking away revenue that was not at issue and that the Commission did grant the utility. There are arguments there that that would be

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confiscatory to the utility.

The other option that we are recommending as a primary is that there be no refund, that you're changing the rate structure on a going-forward basis and you leave the Company whole that way.

We heard some discussion this morning, I think from the bench, that perhaps there is another option which is to ask the Court for clarification on what they really wanted or meant on this issue.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I didn't raise that in connection with this. I raised it in connection with whether we could reopen the record.

MS. CHASE: Okay. I'm sorry. I think, anyway, those are your options, at least the three. And the primary recommendation is that there be no refund.

I think Mr. Smith would probably like to comment on the alternative recommendation.

MR. SMITH: Yes. The alternative recommendation is simply that the Court determined that that rate order establishing uniform rates was invalid from the beginning; therefore, you didn't have a valid rate in effect. The normal process or the normal way of viewing that situation is that the rates revert back, during that interim period, to the rates that were lawfully approved prior to the issuance of the invalid

order. And based on the --

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: What about the revenue requirement? The rates prior to that order --

The revenue requirement would stay the MR. SMITH: And that raises a difficult question. have a revenue requirement which is unchallenged and remains the same, does the fact that you have a change in the rate structure amount to retroactive ratemaking? In my opinion, changing the rate structure would also amount to retroactive ratemaking for the simple reason that if you're charging customers a certain rate based on a certain rate structure, then after a decision by the Court declaring that invalid, you say, "Well, we've decided that another rate structure should have been in effect during that interim period; therefore, we are going to charge you different rates based on that." Now, the revenue requirement might be the same, but you're asking people to pay, effectively, different rates during that interim period. And I think that is retroactive ratemaking.

MR. PRUITT: Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yes, Mr. Pruitt.

MR. PRUITT: I have to defend my little recommendation a little bit. Somebody said that I didn't have any authority to say that the --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: We would like to hear the authority.

MR. PRUITT: All right. It is universally held that a public utility or common carrier is not only permitted, but is required to collect undercharges from established rates whether they result from its own negligence or even from a specific contractual undertaking to charge a lower rate. That's a Florida case, Third District Court of Appeal, Corporation Degestiance, STE, whatever that means, Foy versus Florida Power and Light Company, 385 So.2d 124, 1980.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Pruitt, let me ask you the question. Did that have to do with when the filed rates were say \$100 per thousand kilowatt hours, and for some reason they were mistakenly charging 95, but the rate said 100, they could go back and get that? Does that apply when the filed rate said 100, they were collecting 100, but later on the courts have said that that's the wrong rate?

MR. PRUITT: You gave me two examples. I don't think I followed one of them.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Give me more background on that FP&L case.

MR. PRUITT: Well, I don't have the case with me.
I can get it right quick, but I don't have it with me,

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and I don't recall the factual circumstances.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: All right. Maybe you can give it to me later.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Commissioners, I have a problem on this one. Reading the Staff recommendation, I know that they, at least the primary, summarized the discussion that occurred between, then Chairman Deason and now Chairman Clark and myself with respect to how we would handle this issue. And my recollection is similar to Mr. Twomey's recollection. And that certainly I thought that we did discuss the refund And in my mind, I interpreted Staff to state that we did have the ability to require these refunds. And I read back over the transcript, and it was just refreshing my recollection, and I distinctly recall that the Company at that point in time, after Chairman Deason stated, "Well, this risk is going to be on the Company," the Company kind of emphatically said, "No, no, no, we don't want to bear that risk." And we asked Staff again, "Well, you know, can we require this type of refund to occur?" And I thought that the answer was yes, and that is where I found some comfort, so that if we did get to this point, that we would, indeed, be in a position and that we had the legal authority to then go back and say, "Well, we were wrong, now let's go

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back and refund that money." And the problem that I have now is that now I'm hearing that we don't have the legal authority to do that. And I don't know what we can do, because at this point in time when we made this decision, I was under the impression that we had the authority to go back and require these refunds. in fact, when we stated -- I remember saying, "Oh, no. I know what the Company thinks, but I've been assured by Staff that we do have this authority." And perhaps we should see that in the order. And by doing that, I thought, well, if the Company disagrees, maybe they can appeal that order or maybe they can bring that up, ask for reconsideration or something, and that never happened. So, I felt that there was some degree of comfort. And now I feel very uncomfortable with where we are going and the position that we are in. simply -- I just don't have the answer. And I wanted to see if perhaps -- that's why I went to the issue of what can we legally do? And I know Mr. Pruitt is saying that we can. Indeed, we have the authority to require refunds on both sides, those that get refunds and those that actually will have to be back billed. And I wanted to pursue that, and for us to reach some conclusion as to what our legal authority was.

MS. JABER: Let me try and -- I understand the

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confusion. A first reading of transcript, especially when you have different people giving you the excerpts of the transcripts that is appropriate for their position, you understand why there is confusion. The transcript that we've attached to the recommendation is the entire transcript related to that very issue.

When I went back and I read that entire transcript, it is clear that Mr. Hill did say a refund would be required. It is clear that the utility said a refund would not be required. And let me tell you where they were each coming from. The utility has always maintained a refund wasn't going to be necessary because they were under the impression that revenue requirement was not going to be appealed. What I think Mr. Hill was saying, not that it matters, because Staff isn't the one that makes the decision, it's the Commission. What he was trying to say was if revenue requirement does get appealed, and revenue requirement does get overturned, there will be a refund that's generated. It's the difference in the revenue requirement that is going to create a refund.

Now, what Commissioner Clark and then Chairman Deason recognized was that it would be the difference of the revenues, and I think that's clear in the transcript.

What the utility is also saying to you today is that to make them refund would be a taking of their property, and I understand that view, as well. They are afforded an opportunity to earn a fair rate of return. If you make them refund, then they really haven't earned their fair rate of return anymore.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Unless you also allow them to back bill.

MS. JABER: Unless you allow them to back bill.

Now, I will say here today and tell you that I don't

think you should let them back bill. But by the same

time, to keep an equal balance, you shouldn't let them

refund.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Let me ask a question. Was there any thought given to creating a regulatory asset for the monies that were not collected? And that over time it would be collected from the appropriate people? Is that an option? I mean, I'm concerned about going back and rebilling for that consumption. I don't think we should do that. I think we should refund, but I also think we should seek a way to recognize that they are entitled to earn that amount, and haven't we created regulatory assets for other purposes?

MR. WILLIS: We have created regulatory assets for other purposes. This would be very unique as a

regulatory asset. It would be basically creating an asset for revenue that we were -- actually, earnings that we were removing from the Company and requiring to be refunded. I would have to go back and research that one. You know, there is a point in time where the FASB opinions state that certain regulatory -- you know, you can only go so far in making regulatory assets, that the Commission isn't free just to make regulatory assets at free will.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, here is my concern. I
think the reason you don't allow retroactive ratemaking
is so people can make the choice. They know how much
it's going to cost them, and they can regulate their
consumption based on that. And that is my concern with
going back and billing them for it. There is no
opportunity for them to regulate their consumption.
But if you create a regulatory asset and recover it
over time, they can regulate their consumption. And I
agree with the notion that it's sort of an
out-of-period expense, but don't we do that when we
have an underrecovery with respect to depreciation? We
have allowed recovery.

MR. WILLIS: That's true.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And there are some inequities in the system as it is.

MR. WILLIS: The other thing in creating a regulatory asset is if you do that, and you properly apply it, you're going to be having everyone in the system paying for recovery of that regulatory asset, uniformly. I mean, everyone is going to get a piece of it through an allocation. So, you're back to giving it back to those customers that you took it away from or you're taking it away from the customers you're getting it back from, partially.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Well, that's what happened with this whole case, isn't it? I mean, the cost of litigating this to this point and everything that has gone on is clearly going to be passed on to all the customers at one point or another, correct?

MR. WILLIS: At one point, but if you actually make refunds on one side and don't collect on the other side, and allow for no recovery, they will not get that money. You have actually put the Company into an underearnings posture at that point and have not allowed them a fair rate of return.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think we need to go back, and we were having this discussion at the time that there was a motion to vacate the stay. And my recollection is more akin to that of Commissioner Johnson, and that's why I asked the questions that I

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did. I wanted to understand specifically what the Company's position was, because they were the ones that were seeking the vacation of the stay. And it took several attempts, but I think it finally became clear that they were saying that they were not -- it's their opinion that they would not be subject to make specific customers whole, i.e., those customers who paid more under the uniform rate, if uniform rates were found to be inappropriate. That they didn't feel like they would have go to back and refund to those specific customers, that their only liability was on a company whole basis and a customer base basis; that is, only if revenue requirements were to change. And that being the case, that's why I voted in the minority to not grant their motion to vacate the stay. I said that we needed to keep the status quo, because they were on the record saying they were not willing to accept that risk. And I was not willing to put that risk upon them, but that was not the decision. The decision was to vacate the stay. With that decision being made, I agreed with Commissioner Johnson that there was a representation that the Company would be at risk. I think the Company realized fully, even though they didn't think -- they were saying they are not at risk, they realized that this Commission had question and

concern about that and felt like there would be 1 potentially -- one day, that they may have to address a 2 3 court decision which would find uniform rates to be inappropriate. And that they made the decision by 4 implementing uniform rates, in my opinion, to accept 5 that risk. And they may have felt that the day would 6 never come that they would have to face it. Maybe they 7 were confident that uniform rates were going to be 8 They took that risk, 9 But they were wrong. they implemented the rates, the Court made its 10 decision, the Court said it was wrong. They are at 11 risk. And I, for one, am not going to vote to 12 retroactively bill customers who have base consumption 13 upon -- their consumption based upon rates that were 14 adequately noticed to them. And I am not going to vote 15 to not refund money to customers who appealed this 16 case, and I thought -- and it was represented to them 17 that they were being protected. And that may be unfair 18 to the Company, but I think that the Company is not 19 blameless in this, that they fully understood what the 20 potential consequences were. And I tried to fully 21 explore that with them. And I think that they are 22 partly to blame for the situation that they find 23 themselves in at this time. 24

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I was just going to say,

Commissioner, that that's consistent with what was put in the order. I mean, if you look at Page 31, what Commission Deason has said is what is in the order.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And even during that agenda conference and that discussion, one of the things that we stated after Staff made their presentation, we stated that that language needed to be in the order, so that the Company -- so that if they needed to appeal, then they could appeal that, if they needed a reconsideration of that. But it was clear in my mind that they would be in position where they would be required to refund those customers. And I thought it was clear in the transcript and maybe not as clear it should have been in the order, but I thought it was -- it put the Company on notice in the order.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, let me throw in my two cents here. Since I wasn't a part of that decision, and Commissioner Garcia was not, all I had to go back to was to read the transcripts and then the order that came out of it. And having read those, I came to the conclusion that what I thought was the most logical reading of them is consistent with what Commissioner Deason just said. I did not have the understanding that -- well, I don't understand the transcript and the order the way the others are reading

it. I just don't understand it that way. I mean, my reading of it was that there would be a refund, and that there would not be back billing. And the purpose of the bond was to hold the general body of ratepayers harmless for that. And I think it says it right here.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And the order makes it clear, that, "Since the utility has implemented a final rates and asked to have the stay lifted, we find the utility has made the choice to bear the risk of loss that may be associated with implementing the final rates pending the resolution of appeal." I mean, that's consistent with what I thought came out of that agenda conference, notwithstanding the fact that Commissioner Deason disagreed. My feeling was we needed the bond to address the fact that some people may be due refunds.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me make it clear. I dissented not because of the wording in that order. I think the Company did put themselves at risk. I was not willing to grant them -- they were the petitioning party wanting the stay, but they were not willing to step forward and say, "We are going to make everybody whole, customer specific." And if they weren't willing to say that, I was not going to vote to grant them the stay that they were seeking.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And I voted that way because I

felt that by asking for the stay, they put themselves at risk. That was what Staff put in the order, which was consistent with what was said. We may find out if we were wrong. But my recollection is consistent with what Commissioner Johnson has just stated, is that the reason for having the bond was that there was some risk that refunds needed to be made to some customers.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, if there is no further CHAIRMAN CLARK: And they started the paragraph,
"We are concerned the utility may not be afforded the
statutory opportunity to earn the fair rate of return."

By that phrase we were specifically addressing the
notion that having to refund part of the rates will
affect the rate of return.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask this question before we dispose of this issue. If there is to be a refund; that is, if the Commission votes to support the alternative recommendation on Issue 5, on what basis is a refund to be calculated?

MS. CHASE: The refund would be under the rates as you're going to approve them at the next agenda and the uniform rate.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That difference --

MS. CHASE: That difference.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- for those customers that paid more would be entitled to a refund based upon that calculation.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: With the appropriate adjustments during the interim period.

MS. CHASE: Yes. I think we're probably getting into Issue 6 a little bit, but, yes, with the appropriate indexes, and so forth.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But the reason -- that was my understanding. But I thought somewhere along today's discussion, and we've discussed a lot of things today, I thought somebody said there was going to be a difference between the original rates before this rate case and the rates the customers were charged.

MS. CHASE: There is kind of two issues here.

That does bring up the point of there was a petition for a further refund of interim. I thought we would probably just finish the discussion on the final, and then talk about whether more interim needs to be made.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You confirmed what my belief was, and that it is going to be difference between whatever rates that we determined in Issue 4, which we deferred, and the rates that were in effect, the uniform rates that were in effect during this period of time.

MS. CHASE: That's correct. 1 2 COMMISSIONER DEASON: With the necessary adjustments for pass-throughs, et cetera. 3 MS. CHASE: Right. 4 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a motion? 5 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I move alternate 6 7 recommendation on Issue 5, subject to the discussion we just had about how that amount will be calculated. 8 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second. 9 CHAIRMAN CLARK: All those in favor, say aye. 10 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Aye. 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 12 13 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye. COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye. 14 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: 15 Aye. CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, nay. 16 17 Issue Number 6. MS. CHASE: Commissioners, excuse me. Before we 18 go on to Issue Number 6, there is the matter of refund 19 of interim that you need to decide. And that 20 21 discussion is on Page 34 of the recommendation, but 22 there was a petition of Sugarmill Woods, et cetera, that are requesting a refund of the interim rates to 23 24 the extent that the uniform rate would be greater than

-- excuse me, to the degree that the rate that's

approved in Issue 4 would be less than the interim rate that was in effect. Now, our recommendation here is that there be no refund of the interim. There was one refund of the interim that had to do with the revenue requirement. This is another request by them that they probably would like to address today. But my understanding of their request is that the way the interim rate was done in this case is that the interim revenue requirements for all the systems were added together, and there was a uniform dollar amount given to each system. So, there was an interim increase given to each system, but the rates for all the systems Ιt stayed different, however they came into the case. was just the interim part of it that was a uniform dollar amount added to gallons and added to the base charge.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: And it's your recommendation that there be no additional refund.

MS. CHASE: No additional refund of interim.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: As a general rule, though, if we go to interim rates, aren't they usually refundable?

MS. CASE: Yes, they are, and there was a refund here on interim rates based on the calculation of the revenue requirement. And that is how an interim is

usually -- they are held subject to refund based on the 1 final revenue requirement. And there was a refund in 2 this case based on that. What they are asking for is a 3 refund of the interim based on the ultimate rate 4 structure decision that was made. 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: A customer specific refund, 6 7 not a revenue requirement refund. 8 MS. CHASE: Customer specific, that's correct, very similar to the other refund that we have been 9 10 talking about. CHAIRMAN CLARK: So, the rates for interim were on 11 a completely different basis? 12 MS. CHASE: Yes, they were. The rates for 13 interim, like I was explaining, they were --14 CHAIRMAN CLARK: And there was no appeal that that 15 was the wrong rate structure for interim? 16 MS. CHASE: That's true. The interim rate 17 increase was not an issue on appeal. 18 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a motion on -- well, 19 wait a minute. Is that something we have to take up 20 in --21 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I think the Company should 22 23 at least --MS. CHASE: It was discussed in Issue 5, and 24

mentioned in my primary recommendation. It's not

really mentioned in the alternative at all. So, I think you need to address it, since you voted for the alternative.

MR. TWOMEY: Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And there should be a specific -- we should vote specifically on whether a refund of the interim is due.

MS. JABER: Right. You need to make a finding on that. It was included in the primary analysis, but not included in the alternative. So, if you move the alternative, you have to make a separate finding on whether or not a refund of interim is appropriate.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay.

Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am, just briefly, so you —

I'm not sure everybody understands what happened. When
you approved the interim rate increases for the 127

systems that were involved in this case, as I'm sure
you will recall, Commissioner Clark, because you voted
against it. I don't know if you recall this. You
voted against this. And I recall now, you wrote a
dissent. I wish I had it here to read it to you, but
you said something to the effect that you voted —

CHAIRMAN CLARK: That it hadn't been proven.

MR. TWOMEY: Not only did you say it hadn't been

proven, but you said it wasn't being -- it was because 1 it wasn't on a system specific bases. I recall that 2 distinctly.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: That's right. I said we needed to look at whether or not statewide rates were appropriate. And until we did -- and I felt we did in the case, the Court said we didn't.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. I'm not -- I started to say I'm not criticizing that final vote, but --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I'd like to point out to you that I thought there was consistency in what I voted for, even though you're trying to illustrate that there wasn't.

MR. TWOMEY: My point is this: You recognized when you voted against the interim rate increase, that it wasn't on a system specific basis, and you voted against the increase for that reason. And you were right, because as you all know -- I assume you all know, if you have had any of these cases, these small cases -- now, your typical practice, and you're only practice that I'm aware of, until the interim rates in this case, was that you took a -- when there was more than one system, you took the percentage and applied it to each, okay. And what I've maintained, what you did here and why you voted against it, Commissioner Clark,

is because they took a uniform dollar amount and 1 applied it to each system. We would suggest to you 2 what they did on the interim rates is they gave 3 increases to some systems that didn't even require a 5 revenue increase on a stand-alone basis, okay, by putting this uniform rate dollar amount on it. And 6 what I've maintained all along is that the Staff was 7 telegraphing their intention to recommend uniform rates 8 later in the case. Whether you accept that or not, the 9 10 uniform rate increase, because it was not system 11 specific, as you noted, was therefore, uniform in 12 nature. And, therefore, under the First District Court 13 of Appeal's decision, was wrong. And we are suggesting 14 to you that what you should do is you should approve 15 refunds for interim between the basis -- whatever you come out with on Commissioner Deason's motion on what 16 17 the stand-alone -- I mean, the new rates would be and 18 whatever the interim rates were during that period. 19 That's our argument.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Hoffman.

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MR. HOFFMAN: Madam Chairman, Commissioners, with respect to the interim rate refund issue, they never appealed that rate structure. That never came up until they requested this Commission to make the very type of refund that they are now asking you to make again, and

you said no. So, I mean, they have made that request before. They have made it, actually, three or four times. And it has been denied every time.

Secondly, the way that interim rates are set up by statute, the statute assures the ratepayers that there will be a refund from the standpoint of revenue requirements, if the final rates that the Commission determines to be appropriate are less than the interim rates. So, I think you're talking about a separate animal.

And, third, I just don't logically and factually
-- I'm not able to put together, you know, how or why
you could make a refund on interim rates that were
instituted in September of 1992 as against a final
uniform rate structure that was instituted in September
of 1993. So, for those reasons, you know, we believe
that the request for refunds on interim should be
denied.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The interim rate structure was not appealed and the Court did not address it.

MS. JABER: No, not at all.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a motion on interim rates, the refund of interim rates?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move there be no additional -- there already was a refund on interim.

That's right. 1 MS. JABER: COMMISSIONER DEASON: I would move that there be 2 no additional refund of interim based upon a different 3 rate structure. 5 CHAIRMAN CLARK: There has been a motion. there a second? б COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Second. 7 CHAIRMAN CLARK: All those in favor say aye. 8 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: 9 Aye. 10 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye. COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye. 11 12 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 13 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye. 14 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, no. COMMISSIONER DEASON: We still need address the 15 16 question of the timing of the refund, or is that a different issue? 17 18 CHAIRMAN CLARK: I think we're on issue -- now we 19 are on Issue 6. That was something we had to add to 20 Issue 5. COMMISSION STAFF: Issue 6 addresses Staff's 21 22 recommendation of the methodology and the time period 23 and the interest for the refunds. Staff is 24 recommending that the refunds be applied consistent

with Rule 25-30.360, Florida Administrative Code, with

the exception of the time period. The rule has a time period of 90 days, unless otherwise specified by the Commission. The Staff is recommending that the refunds be made over the same period that the revenues were collected.

The recommendation also addresses the fact that the information is not available to Staff as much as it's calculated on the actual consumption during that two-year period. So, we also recommend that this information be provided to Staff within seven days. However, it's going to have to be seven days after we vote on Issue 4, which is the appropriate rates. The methodology is also explained.

It should be pointed out that the plants in Staff's analysis may or may not change, depending on the new rates, also.

There are some other inferences to interest that were also brought out in the joint petition that will need to be voted on and the length of time for the refund.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioners, I agree with Staff's recommendation, with the exception for the period of time in which to conclude the refund. I understand that if it were to be extended over a period of time, it would be with interest, which would,

perhaps, make customers whole. But I think that for those customers who have paid in excess of what they should have, according to the Court's remand, that they should get that money back as quickly as possible, and whatever is reasonable to do that. But I don't think it needs to be protracted over the period of time that the funds were collected. CHAIRMAN CLARK: When you say that, are you saying two years? COMMISSION STAFF: We were saying two years.

COMMISSION STAFF: We were saying two years. It's actually whenever the new rates will be implemented, so it would be up to that point. That was something that we --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I think you did mention a concern about financial viability, right?

COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Are you saying two years is needed for that purpose?

COMMISSION STAFF: That was based on an analysis by the Division of Auditing and Financial Analysis. So, we picked a two-year as a arbitrary period. It could be anywhere between the 90 days and up to the two-year period. Mr. Lester could address the Commissioners on that fact.

MR. LESTER: I'm not saying that it needs to be --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: You need to get close to your microphone.

MR. LESTER: I'm not saying that it needed to be over a two-year period, I tried to report that the company's current financial ratios are -- they are somewhat weak, and that if it was stretched out over a period of time, that would smooth out the situation for them. But I'm not making a specific recommendation regarding the time.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, Staff has a concern—not that the customers shouldn't get their money back immediately. I mean, in any refund a customer ought to get their money back immediately. I don't want to see the customers be harmed in the future because the Company's ability to attract debt capital, that the cost of attracting that goes up because of this refund. That's what I'm worried about. I'm worried about the overall financial posture of the Company. I know they can make the refunds. They are financially able to make the refunds. But there are other aspects you have to consider.

If you make a company go back and make a refund of some magnitude -- and I'm not sure what this is going to turn out to be. It may be as much as 5 million, who knows? That can have an impact upon the loan

institutions and the rate in which those loan institutions are willing loan money to Southern States. That in itself will reflect in the future rates that these customers are going to have to pay. And Staff's recommendation, basically, saying let the Company give it back to the customers over the same period of time they collected it, was to basically reduce that effect. Give the customers back their refund with interest over the whole period of time, and that would reduce the effect that the Company may have with the financial loan institutions in the future. Whether it will or not, we're not sure, but it certainly would reduce the effect of it. That's the basis of the Staff's recommendation. And the two years is basically not really pulled out of the air; the two years was basically set there because that was the time period in which they collected it.

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COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, let me ask you this.

Do we in these kinds of circumstances have any
expectation that if Southern States' ability to borrow
at favorable rates is damaged, that their parent
company can't come in and prop them up or co-sign in
order to continue to get those kinds of favorable
rates?

MR. WILLIS: I couldn't tell you that. I don't

know the -- at this point in time I don't know what kind of relationship Southern States has with Topeka's parent, Minnesota Power, as far as their willingness to co-sign or infuse additional capital into this company.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, I have trouble with two years. I mean, if there was something in between, something beyond 90 days. But, certainly, two years just seems too long to me.

MR. WILLIS: Well, certainly the Commission can come up with anything in between; six months, one year, nine months.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, I'd prefer that it be based on something besides just a number in between two numbers.

MR. WILLIS: I understand.

MS. JABER: That's why we came up with the two years. It was the period of time in which it took them to collect the rates. It was not a magic number. The rule says 90 days. We thought that was not enough time. If we want to split the baby, so to speak, you could do a year.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, doesn't the Company -if it is truly going to severely handicap their ability
and impact their financial standing in the investment
community, can't they always petition the Commission to

change that, and then they would have the burden to 1 demonstrate how their financial ratios are in such weak condition that they cannot come forward with a refund

MR. WILLIS: Yes, they could.

MS. JABER: Yes.

under a short time period?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Sometimes a financial committee looks at things like it's better to take your medicine, swallow it and get on with business and get this behind you and get on. And if you do it over a period of time, it's like a constant reminder of something that went awry. I don't know. All I know is that customers have overpaid, the Company has the money now and it should be refunded as quickly as possible. Our standard refund rule requires it to be completed within 90 days?

MS. JABER: 90 days. You have to remember that is usually for a shorter period of refund, and it's not usually this great.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a motion on Issue 6? Any further discussion?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move Staff on Issue 6, with the exception that the standard refund policy apply, which is 90 days, and give the option to the Company if they want to come forward with a petition

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demonstrating that 90 days would severely impact their financial position to the detriment of both the Company and it's ratepayers, that they would have the leave to

CHAIRMAN CLARK: There has been a motion. Is there a second?

make such a filing, and that we would consider it.

MS. JABER: Could I just clarify it for the order and for the motion? You're talking about a credit to the bill, 90 days of the date of the order?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say this. Yes, it needs to be completed within 90 days. It may be that three months worth of credits is not going to be enough for some customers. They may even have to actually cut a check to some customers. And if that is the case, so be it.

MR. SMITH: Madam Chairman, Commissioners, I have another question. This issue actually has some subissues. And you are voting on one issue, namely, how long a period is going to be utilized to make the refund. There are other issues, namely, the length of time for the refund. And if you recall, in Issue 5 in the alternate, I suggested you might want to make a refund only up to the time you issued the order in the investigation docket, because they have asked for it back from the Court, and have said that it is possible

that the Court would allow us to make a finding and institute uniform rates for that period.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: You mean the refund would be up to that period of time?

MR. SMITH: Right. And the recommendation in Issue 6 on that point, on Page 38, the length of time for the refunds -- I'm sorry. Maybe I'm getting the wrong one. On Page 37, the refund period, the recommendation is that the refund period or the revenues calculation should be up to the time the Commission now sets rates on a going-forward basis. In other words, all the way from back at the beginning of the case until now, all the revenues that were collected in excess back to that point when the Commission made the decision that it should be refunded. Am I making myself clear?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, here is the concern I have, it seems to me what you're suggesting is a variation on this issue which should have been in an alternative recommendation. Because as I understand this, this requires refunds from the date of the agenda conference. And what you're suggesting is because we have asked for the other proceeding back, that there is a different date other than the agenda conference today.

MR. SMITH: That's right. And that's what is in the alternative in 5. And, you know, I'm sorry if it is confusing. I didn't address it in this issue, but I'm just telling you it is out there and was part of the consideration. And, frankly, I believe that the more viable alternative is what is in Issue 6 now, that you just consider the whole period up to now. Because, A-number one, I don't know what the Court is actually going to do. I don't know if they would approve implementation of those uniform rates back to the beginning of the 880 proceeding, or whether they would say only from this point in the future, which will be sometime after this decision will those rates be valid or based on that determination, which leads to another complication that you're already into the next rate case.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: Well, I understand the motion of Commission Deason to be that he is moving Staff on Issue 6 with the exception that the period of time for refund will be according to our rules, and that is 90 days, and that there may be a situation where instead of a credit, there will be a check. But it's with the understanding that the Company can come in and suggest a different period of time for refund based on financial need. That's what I understand the motion to

be.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: If I understood what Mr. Smith was saying, though, he was talking about in calculating the amount of the refund, between what dates are we deeming that they are entitled to the refund. And I thought that was settled in Issue 5.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And it's also settled in 6. It says from -- it's the cutoff date, it's the ending date that we are worried about. And it says the date of the agenda conference.

MR. SMITH: That's right, but that is contrary to --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Have I read this wrong? When are you suggesting the cutoff be in terms of determining when the refund is due? I presume it's when the new rates go into effect, and anything back from there is refunded.

COMMISSION STAFF: That's what Staff is suggesting or recommending in Issue 6. And we base this on the fact that -- and I may be corrected by Legal Staff -- that if we bring 880 back, then the final decision was not made. So, therefore, the new rates that are going to be implemented here, the refund should go back to the uniform rates up to these new rates, which will be voted on presumably at the next agenda conference.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Well, then, I'm confused, because the alternate rec on 5 that I thought was what we moved and essentially voted on, had that the refund would cover the period from the final order in 199 through the entry of the final order in 880.

MS. JABER: Right. I understand the confusion now. Mr. Smith did include what he just suggested to you in Issue 5. In moving the alternative Staff analysis, you, in effect, moved that. But I don't think that all of the Commissioners realized that they were also voting to the period of the refund. When we worded --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: That's not what is in the recommendation. The recommendation speaks only to a refund.

MS. JABER: Exactly. That's right. And when -- CHAIRMAN CLARK: Issue 6 speaks to the period of time.

MS. JABER: Our intent -- our intent was that the refund period would be voted on in Issue 6. And in retrospect, we should have taken out what was in Issue 5. And Mr. Smith's opinion with respect to the refund period should have been put into Issue 6. What I would suggest to you is that you move 5, the alternative, with the understanding that you haven't

done anything with the refund period. And in Issue 6 right now we can go ahead and discuss everything we need to discuss on the refund period.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I'd be happy to modify it.

I think I made the motion. I'd be happy to modify my
motion. I mean, when I made the motion, I made it
having read the Staff recommendation that included that
the time period we were discussing was from the final
order in 199 to the final order in 880.

MS. JABER: Right.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And if the other

Commissioners didn't know that, I'd be happy to modify

my motion and let us discuss that in Issue 6.

MS. JABER: The alternative recommendation in Issue 5 just answers the question in Issue 5 in the affirmative. It's not until you get to the analysis that you realize --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Yes, and that is all we voted on is that we'll have a refund. And I don't think there is any reason to go back and deal with Issue 5. We will deal with it in Issue 6. What is the appropriate period for the refund to apply, not the period over which the refund will be given.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I asked the question about the period, and you all said, "Well, that's going

1	to be addressed in Issue 6."
2	MS. JABER: That's exactly right. It is our
3	recommendation that it should have been addressed in
4	Issue 6. I didn't realize it was part of the analysis.
5	I apologize.
6	CHAIRMAN CLARK: We are going to make the vote in
7	Issue 6.
8	MS. JABER: That's correct. It is our
9	recommendation in Issue 6 that the refund period should
10	go up to the time that the new rates are implemented,
11	and I guess that Mr. Smith's recommendation is that it
12	should only go up to the point of the final order in
13	the 880 docket.
14	MS. CHASE: That date, by the way, is February
15	7th, '94, just so you have a feel for the time period.
16	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: No. 880 wasn't February
17	7th, '94.
18	MS. CHASE: That's what is in this recommendation.
19	I'm just reading the
20	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: That's not so. That's
21	before we even held all of those customer hearings in
22	the investigative docket.
23	MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner Kiesling, September of
24	'9 4 .
25	MS. CHASE: September. It was September of '94.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Yes.

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CHAIRMAN CLARK: A year ago.

MR. HOFFMAN: Madam Chairman, may I be heard briefly on this issue?

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Hoffman, go ahead.

MR. HOFFMAN: Very briefly. I would say with respect to the starting point, that it would appear that the only place that one could start with respect to a refund would be when the final rates were That would not be when the final order implemented. was issued. The final order was issued in March of 1993, but the rates themselves, pursuant to the final order were implemented in September of 1993. So, I would say that in terms of a beginning point, the beginning point could not occur before September of '93, particularly because you have already ruled that there should be no refund for interim. Interim was in . effect between March of '93 and September of '93.

With respect to the cutoff point, if you accept the rationale that the cutoff point is when new rates went into effect, new rates went into effect in December of 1993 when the Commission approved a price index for this company. So, with respect to looking at this from the viewpoint of only the record in this docket and making a refund based on the rates in this

docket, and not with respect to new rates, then the cutoff point would be December of 1993.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Hold on just a second.

You're saying because you got some type of a

pass-through or index that was added to these rates,

then the deficiency in these rates disappear and the

refund is only going to be for three months?

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner, I'm saying two things. That if you limit your decision to the record in this docket, and the record in this docket contains rates that remained in effect from September of 1993 through December of 1993. That's all I'm saying. And if you accept the Staff's rationale that the refund point ought to terminate when new rates went into effect — and I'm not saying whether you will or if you won't. I'm telling you as a matter of fact that new rates went into effect in December of '93.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: But those rates were calculated based on the rate structure that has been overturned. I mean, we are talking about rate structure here and not when there was an index.

MR. HOFFMAN: No question about it, the rates were indexed to the uniform rate structure on the one hand. On the other hand, there was no challenge taken to the indexing of those uniform rates.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Ms. Fox, did you want to say 1 something? 2 MS. FOX: No, I think the point is obvious, and 3 Commissioner Kiesling is making it. CHAIRMAN CLARK: Now, we did have a motion, but we 5 6 had no second on that motion. COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's true. I made a 7 motion and it was not seconded. 8 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Would you care to restate that 9 10 motion, because we have a --11 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: May I just ask for a point of inquiry? It would make a difference to me on 12 Commission Deason's motion whether we determine the 13 period of time to be covered by the refund, because 14 that impacts on the magnitude of the refund and then, 15 16 therefore, impacts on what a reasonable amount of time 17 is. COMMISSIONER DEASON: We can vote on it 18 19 separately. 20 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I mean, that's where my 21 problem is. 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I would move, as far 23 as the refund period, that it would begin when the 24 rates went into effect. September of '93? 25 COMMISSIONER KIESLING:

COMMISSIONER DEASON: September of '93, according to Mr. Hoffman. And that it would terminate when new rates went into effect as a result of what we're doing here today. Granted, it's going to delayed a little while, because Issue 4 has not yet been determined. But when that issue is determined and those rates become effective, that would constitute the refund period. That's what I would move as the first part of Issue 6.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. With that clarification, is there a second? Is there another motion?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Terry, let me ask you something. Is it essential for your motion that they be -- I guess you have given the Company a way out by coming before us if it causes --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, I'm not setting the time period. I mean, a time period to actually accomplish the refund. It's just the period of time upon which the difference in rates will be calculated to determine the amount to be refunded. And that would be from the implementation of the uniform rates, which is being represented as September of '93, up until the point that a new rate structure is implemented as a result of this recommendation and what we are considering. And that is going to be delayed just a little while because

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we need some rate structure calculations as a result of some discussions on Issue 4. But whenever those new rates are implemented, that would be the refund period.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And if I understand --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I can second that, yes.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Could I just hear from Mr. Smith, since his recommendation was different than that, and I still am not clear on the basis for your recommendation.

MR. SMITH: Okay. We have asked for the investigation now to be remanded or relinquished back to the Commission. We've asked for that relinquishment based on the idea that we now know that we should have made a finding. Let us make a finding, hold a proceeding, and determine whether or not uniform rates should be implemented during that period and whether the utility was functionally related during that time. If we did that, there would be a possibility that the Court would say, "Well, this is just like a continuation of the original proceeding, so whatever decision you made originally in that docket stands, and the uniform rates are in effect for that period." Now, if that were the result, then the Court would be -- or the Commission would determine and the Court presumably would sanction that the uniform rates were only invalid for that period of time up until you made a finding in the investigation docket. So, therefore, you wouldn't want to refund money past the time when you might possibly determine that uniform rates were, in fact, valid. But now that is a problematical situation. It may be that the Court would say, "No, you can't make a finding now in that docket and have it apply all the way back to the beginning of that proceeding," namely, back into September of '94.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Smith --

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MR. SMITH: I mean, I give you that option with, you know, not a great deal of enthusiasm because I think it's problematical.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I would like to point out that --

CHAIRMAN CLARK: And it seems to me that if we filed that, what we will do is then make a decision that the rates we're deciding on today are not the ones that should be in effect, because we have made a finding — if we make a finding that they are functionally related, then we'll change the rates again, as I understood it. So, it seems to me that to advocate that position, we should be saying we should not change the rates until we have the opportunity to open the record in the later case and either make or

not make the finding with respect to functional relatedness.

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COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And let me just say, as a preface to voting on the motion, that that just doesn't I mean, everything that -- all make any sense to me. of the conditions precedent that you're setting out for us are all speculative, because the Court hasn't made a decision on the request to relinquish jurisdiction. And if, in fact, at some point in the future the Court does relinquish jurisdiction to allow us to correct the 880 order by making a functionally related determination, then that would be enough changed circumstances for someone to come back in and say, "Now, the amount that you ordered us to refund is not the correct amount." But until something has happened, I'm not willing to, you know, hope or second-quess that the Court is going to do that. And for that reason, I'm going to support the motion that was made and seconded.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: All those in favor say aye.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Aye.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.

1	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, nay.
2	Issue 7. Is there a motion?
3	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Wait, wait. There's
4	something still missing. We just voted on the period
5	of time
6	CHAIRMAN CLARK: That's right. Now, what is the
7	period of time over which the refund is to be made?
8	Commissioner Deason, do you have a motion?
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, my motion is that it
10	would be according to our rule, which is 90 days. and
11	that is with the understanding that if that creates an
12	inordinate burden on the Company as far as their
13	financial position that they would be free to file a
14	motion seeking an extension of that time.
15	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a second?
16	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I'm going to second it.
17	CHAIRMAN CLARK: There's a motion and a second.
18	All those in favor say aye.
19	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
20	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye.
21	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.
22	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.
23	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, nay.
24	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Nay.
25	CHAIRMAN CLARK: Commissioner Garcia, did you vote

1 in --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: No, I voted in favor.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Okay. That passes on a 4-to-1

vote.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: I just want to make it clear. My vote is not that, you know, that they ought to have two years. I mean, that's not my vote. It's just that I think that 90 days, considering that it is such a long period, just is not sufficient. And I think that putting the requirement on the Company to come in and affirmatively prove that it is going to affect their position is just too high of a burden for this amount of money. And I would have preferred something longer than 90 days, but certainly way less than two years.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: All right. Issue 7. Is there a motion?

MS. JABER: Commissioners, I think to some degree you probably don't even need to vote on this issue. I will leave that up to you.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I think we should move to deny the motion. Don't we have to dispose of a motion or a petition?

MS. JABER: Or you could find it moot.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: I don't know that we can arque

with respect in the legal sense to say it's moot. 1 MS. JABER: My point was in the sense of you have really disposed of most of the issues that are 3 surrounding it in this petition. 4 COMMISSIONER DEASON: It seems to me like we have 5 granted it in part and denied it in part. 6 MS. JABER: Right. 7 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Yes. 8 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a motion on Issue 7? q COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move that we find that we 10 have granted the motion in part and denied it in part, 11 consistent with the votes on Issues 2 through 6, 12 realizing that we still have to vote on Issue 4. 13 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Is there a second? 14 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Second. 15 16 CHAIRMAN CLARK: All those in favor, say aye. COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye. 17 COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Aye. 18 19 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Aye. 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 21 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye. 22 CHAIRMAN CLARK: Opposed, nay. 23 That disposes of Item 26. 24 MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, there may be one more 25 matter. I'm not sure if there is or not, but there is

a bond requirement on the Company that expires next month, and I think they are obligated to extend that until this matter is completed. And maybe the Company can clarify that. But if not, they need to be ordered to extend that bond.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Armstrong, it's Staff's

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Armstrong, it's Staff's understanding that the bond expires next month. Do we need to have that bond extended?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think the Commission would probably order us to have that bond extended at this point in time. I mean, we would assume that we have to extend it until final disposition of this matter.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Willis, do we need to order them to extend the bond until final disposition of this matter?

MR. WILLIS: We might as well, because I thought they were already under those conditions, but we might as well to be safe.

COMMISSIONER KIESLING: If we need to clarify it, I so move that the bond be extended until the final resolution.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Without objection.

MR. TWOMEY: Madam Chairman, I want to say thank you. But could I make one comment on the bond, and that is you originally ordered a \$5.8 million bond for

these folks, and they have 3. You gave them a choice of 5.8 and 3. I think it was a mistake in the order, and they took the choice of 3. But you may want to just consider that.

CHAIRMAN CLARK: Mr. Willis, if you will check and make sure the bond is sufficient. And if it is not, bring that back to our attention.

MR. WILLIS: We will, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But before we leave this item, just let me say that I want to congratulate the Staff on an extremely thorough analysis, where all of the issues were described and all the positions were presented, and even though there were -- any time you have primary and alternative positions, one position is going to prevail and the other is not. But I think the Staff did an admirable job in doing that. It made it better for the Commission to have the pros and cons of the various issues presented.

And, Ms. Chase, even though you're not an attorney, and I disagree with your position, I considered the fact that you were not an attorney to add to your credibility, not take away from it.

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 1 2 STATE OF FLORIDA) 3 COUNTY OF LEON I, JANE FAUROT, Court Reporter, do hereby certify 4 that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the 5 6 time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter translated under my supervision; and the 7 8 foregoing pages numbered 1 through 183 are a true and correct record of the proceedings. 9 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, 10 11 employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or 12 financially interested in the foregoing action. 13 DATED THIS 26th day of September, 1995. 14 15 16 17 **JANE** 18 100 Salem Court 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 19 (904) 878-2221 20 21 22 23 24 25