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DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

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1		BEFORE THE
2	FLORI	DA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
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4	In the Way	: tter of : DOCKET NO. 980435-TI
		:
5	Initiation of single proceedings again	
6	Telecommunication Corporation for	
7	FCC universal s	ervice :
8	toll calls.	inclastate
9		
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11	DDOGEEDINGS.	WEDDING
12	PROCEEDINGS:	REARING
13	BEFORE:	COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK
14		COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.
15	D. 100	Walmardan Vameh 2 1000
16	DATE:	Wednesday, March 3, 1999
17	TIME:	Commenced at 1:00 p.m. Concluded at 2:15 p.m.
18	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
19		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
20		Tallahassee, Florida
21	REPORTED BY:	KIMBERLY K. BERENS, CSR, RPR
22		FPSC Commission Reporter
23		
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25		

#### APPEARANCES:

RICHARD D. MELSON, Hopping Green Sams and Smith, Post Office Box 6526, Tallahassee, Florida 32314, appearing on behalf of MCI Telecommunications.

MARY L. BROWN, 1801 Pennsylvania Avenue,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, appearing on behalf of
MCI WorldCom, Inc.

CATHERINE BEDELL, Florida Public Service Commission,
Division of Legal Services, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870, appearing on behalf of the
Commission Staff.

RICHARD BELLAK, Florida Public Service Commission,
Division of Appeals, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee,
Florida 32399, appearing on behalf of the Commission.

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#### PROCEEDINGS

#### (Hearing convened at 1:00 p.m.)

commissioner deason: Call this hearing to order. Can I have the Notice read, please.

MR. BELLAK: Pursuant to Notice, this
hearing at this time and place was announced in the
matter of Docket 980435-TI, initiation of show cause
proceedings against MCI Telecommunications
Corporation, for charging FCC universal service
assessments on intrastate toll calls for the purpose
of hearing oral argument and possible bench decision.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. Take appearances.

MR. MELSON: Richard Melson of the law firm of Hopping Green Sams and Smith, P.A., Post Office Box 6526, Tallahassee, on behalf of MCI Telecommunications Corporation. Here today and handling the argument is Mary L. Brown of MCI WorldCom, Inc., 1801 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

MS. BEDELL: Catherine Bedell representing Commission Staff.

MR. BELLAK: Richard Bellak representing the Commission.

commissioner deason: As the prehearing order indicates, all factual matters have been

1	stipulated, agreed to, whatever, is that correct?
2	MS. BEDELL: There are no factual matters in
3	dispute so we're proceeding as of 120.17 hearing and
4	each party filed a memorandum of law and we are here
5	just to present our arguments.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And Ms. Bedell, you're
7	going to go first; is that correct?
8	MS. BEDELL: Yes, sir.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Is there a time
10	limit that's been established for these arguments?
11	MS. BEDELL: No.
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: How much time do you
13	anticipate you shall require?
14	MS. BEDELL: I would like to have at least
15	15 minutes and I'd like to reserve five minutes for
16	rebuttal.
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. Brown, is 15
18	minutes okay with you?
19	MS. BROWN: That's fine with me.
20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. We'll set the
21	time limit at 15 minutes per side, and Ms. Bedell,
22	you've requested five of those 15 in rebuttal.
23	MS. BEDELL: Yes, sir.
24	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Please proceed.
25	Ms. BEDELL: This proceeding was initiated

when Staff discovered that MCI was charging universal service and national access fee assessments based on customers' total toll bills, including intrastate toll calls. Staff believes that MCI was without authority to assess these charges against intrastate toll services.

Staff is asking the Commission to order MCI to refund amounts collected based on intrastate toll calls. Staff is no longer seeking an order against MCI to cease charging universal service fees and national access fees based on intrastate services because MCI has stopped using the objectionable methodology.

Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act, which addresses universal service, specifically assigns a dual role for states and the FCC and does not preempt the states with regard to intrastate services.

Section 254 (D) gives the FCC responsibility over contributions for universal service by carriers providing interstate services.

Section 254 (F) gives states responsibility for contributions by carriers for intrastate services. Nothing in the universal service order, FCC order No. 97-1457, establishes preemption of the states'

overcharges assessed for universal service based on intrastate services.

The FCC has made no pronouncements that would purport to preempt the states. And MCI's filing of a tariff, in and of itself, cannot preempt states in this regard. Preemption cannot be inferred. And particularly cannot be inferred by MCI.

Staff agrees with MCI that the Federal State
Joint Board on Universal Service recommended, and the
FCC ordered, that contributions by interstate service
providers would be assessed by the FCC based on total
revenues. The FCC also ordered that contributions
should be recovered on interstate services only.

The method the FCC uses to assess carriers' contributions is not in question in this proceeding. This is an important point because we do not want to confuse the FCC's authority for assessing contributions based on total revenues with MCI's authority regarding the collection of the contributions.

It is MCI's methodology of collection based on intrastate calls that Staff believes was unlawful.

MCI also relies on its FCC tariff to establish the validity of the charges against intrastate toll calls. Staff believes that not only is the FCC without

authority to authorize charges based on intrastate calls, but also that MCI's tariff did not specifically authorize MCI to charge assessments based on intrastate calls. MCI has failed to demonstrate where the tariff, the FCC tariff, specifically authorizes charges based on intrastate calls. The tariff was very general in this regard.

Staff is not challenging the lawfulness of the FCC tariff. Staff believes that MCI erred in assessing charges that unquestionably were not authorized by the FCC or the tariff.

As was discussed more fully when MCI's motion to dismiss was before you, the Virginia Federal District Court decision is not controlled -- is not controlling precedent in Florida. Staff believes that the Virginia decision is misguided on the matter of preemption.

In conclusion, Staff believes that MCI was not authorized to charge and collect universal service and national access fees based on intrastate toll calls. Therefore, the Commission -- we are requesting that the Commission order MCI to refund to Florida customers those funds collected based on intrastate toll services for the periods of time that the tariffs in question were being applied. Thank you.

1 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have a question.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Surely.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: MCI cites a number of cases that stand for the proposition that a properly filed tariff becomes the equivalent of an FCC regulation.

MS. BEDELL: And has the force of federal law.

commissioner clark: Right. Are any of those -- were any of those cases cited? Did they involve factual circumstances similar to this?

MS. BEDELL: I don't believe so. I read through those last night. They are -- there are a lot of them that are carrier -- general carrier kinds of cases. And, you know, the case that is closest to ours would be the Louisiana decision that I think we discussed when we were doing the motion to dismiss. But, you know, one of the cases was a Blue Cross Blue Shield case, I believe. I'm not real sure exactly which ones you're looking at. And the --

commissioner clark: None of them had to do with a notion of whether or not the tariff invaded the jurisdiction of the State Commission.

MS. BEDELL: I don't believe so.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Thanks.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. Brown.

MS. BROWN: Good afternoon. The issue at question today involves historical practice of two interstate charges that MCI established in its interstate tariff effective January 1, 1998. One of those charges, the National Access Fee, was in effect for approximately three months during 1998 and applied to our small business customers. And the issue as to that National Access Fee is whether or not we collected intrastate based charges as part of the National Access Fee because small business National Access Fee was applied to our small business customers' total revenues. That practice ceased in April of 1998.

Similarly, the federal universal service fee was charged for the first six months of 1998 against our business customers. So the issue there is did we inappropriately collect the intrastate portion since our fee was applied against the customers' total revenues. In both cases, the set of customers we were applying these fees to were interstate customers.

Okay. The issues that I would like to focus on --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you a

question about that. Does -- in that case then, does
discrimination result because those people who are
also interstate customers are assessed on their
intrastate revenues, whereas those customers who only
make intrastate calls don't get assessed at all
according to your scheme? So you discriminate against
those customers.

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MS. BROWN: We believe it would have been improper to charge our intrastate-only customers in both these cases for the limitations that the FCC created in the federal universal service order in the Spring of '97 and because we would believe that if we were going to charge our intrastate customers in the case of the NAF, we would have had to have filed a federal -- state tariff.

commissioner clark: Well, from the standpoint of a customer who makes the same intrastate call, one is going to be charged the rate and the other isn't. Isn't that discrimination to those customers?

MS. BROWN: In our view, no, because both of these fees recover interstate costs that were being imposed upon us. So these are the result of federal decisionmaking to create a federal universal service plan or federal decisionmaking going to the access

charge recovery questions, which is the subject of the national access fee. That's an access created or flow through of an access charge.

the same call or the same business, suppose Customer X makes 25 intrastate calls. Makes no international or interexchange customers. You won't bill them -- under the old program, you aren't going to bill them. But if the customer -- Customer B made the same number of calls intrastate and one interstate call, they would be charged a different rate?

MS. BROWN: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. And that's not discriminatory?

MS. BROWN: Not in our view.

**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** Okay.

commissioner JACOBS: How does one add to
your costs and the other doesn't?

MS. BROWN: Well, in the case of the national access fee, we are flowing through an access charge that we have to pay by virtue of the FCC's decision to create an access charge structure that the ILECs use to bill us, and that is interstate only and that is appropriately flowed through only to the interstate customer.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: My point goes back to -- sort of in the line of the prior question. If your approach here is to recover the costs that have been imposed on you --

In the case of the federal universal service

system the FCC created, pursuant to its jurisdiction,

a universal service cost that essentially gets passed

respectfully disagree with the Staff -- we believe the

FCC did give us the authority to design a charge based

on total revenues. But it is an FCC decision and a

jurisdiction the universal service cost that gets

on to us. And in that order, we believe and

matter for the FCC to decide based on their

MS. BROWN: Right.

applied to an interstate customer.

commissioner Jacobs: -- and in one instance where you have an intrastate-only customer who doesn't -- is not surcharged for this and another who is, how does one add to your costs and the other does not?

MS. BROWN: Simply by virtue of the costs imposed on us by virtue of doing business in the interstate jurisdiction. Let me flip it around. Suppose Florida were to create a universal service system that imposed costs on the long distance

industry for state purposes. We would, if we were going to recover those costs, tariff that in the state jurisdiction and recover that from intrastate customers. We would not be recovering that in our federal tariff.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think the

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think the

Commissioner is right, though, that in this sense --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioner --

collects from you is based on your total revenues,
both intrastate and interstate. So the customer who
only makes intrastate calls will be part of that
revenue although he will not be paying for it in the
form of your NAF or F -- so how is that fair? How is
that not discriminatory?

MS. BROWN: That's a good question. I suppose we ought -- you know, if you want an answer, we can go to the FCC and ask them. I -- we are simply in the position of responding to a federal cost that's been imposed to us by virtue of an FCC decision --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right. But that --

Ms. BROWN: -- tariffing it in the
intrastate jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But the imposition of that cost didn't mandate that you tariff it the way

you did, and in fact, you could have simply raised your rates to cover it. You could have done nothing.

MS. BROWN: That is certainly true. We could have simply raised our rates. We chose, however, as every other long distance company did, to create a line item recovery, and indeed, there is some language in the FCC decision that indicates their expectation was that some form of line charge would occur generally in the industry. Ours was structured differently than some other long distance companies, at least for this initial six-month period.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Wasn't -- weren't these two charges the ones some Commissioner said were likely to be competed away?

MS. BROWN: I believe some federal commissioners did make that observation.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. So they anticipated perhaps it would not even appear as a line item anywhere?

MS. BROWN: They personally may not have anticipated that, but the order clearly -- it has language included in it that discusses the long distance industry passing through these charges to customers, and in fact, makes reference to the fact that as a result of its decision to impose these

costs, things like contracts with our business
customers, would need to be overridden, if you will,
by virtue of their decision. So they clearly
contemplated it would be passed on. You're correct
that they did not mandate exactly how that would

I would like to, if I could, focus on the three issues that I think are the subject of dispute today.

One of which is, of course, the authority and the basis for the charges and Commissioner Clark many of the questions you've just raised go right to that point.

As you have correctly noted, our view is that the Commission specifically stated and created a universal service structure whereby we contribute to universal service on the basis of total revenues. And the FCC said, at paragraph 821 of its decision, that when it is assessing contributions based on total revenues, the Commission is, quote, "merely calculating a federal charge based on both interstate and intrastate revenues which is distinct from regulating the rates and conditions of intrastate service."

Our view is that if that is the mechanism

happen.

that they set up for universal service contribution, then our structure, our tariff structure, during the first six months of '98 simply mirrors that. We were not seeking to create a state charge against intrastate-only customers. We created an interstate charge that applied to our interstate customers and it applied, of course, to their total revenues. And we think what we did is perfectly consistent with the order, and indeed, have filed a petition for declaratory ruling, asking the FCC to find that in our favor.

that. You're saying that, on the one hand, you argue that this isn't rate setting with respect to intrastate, therefore, it's not within our jurisdiction. Yet, when you challenge our -- when you challenge the notion that we could -- that we have -- we don't have jurisdiction, you base it on the fact that it would be interfering with the federal rate setting scheme with respect to interstate charges. How is it a rate setting scheme with respect to interstate charges?

MS. BROWN: Under federal law, when we establish a tariff at the FCC and that tariff becomes effective, it has the force of federal law. We've

cited a number of cases in our brief to that effect.

In our view, if there is a concern by a state that the charge that we've established somehow unlawfully applies to State Commissioners or State -- excuse me -- state customers, then the way to challenge that rate is to go to the FCC and to make the challenge there by way of tariff review or a complaint proceeding. But at that point you have a tariff that has the effect of federal law and that has to be adjudicated at the FCC.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, let me ask it a different way perhaps. Suppose you filed a tariff with the FCC and all your tariff did was raise rates by one cent a minute for every long distance call.

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You make no distinction of it being interstate, international or intrastate?

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You make no tariff filing here at the Commission. Are you saying that we cannot issue a show cause and demand you stop charging them on intrastate and we have to go to the FCC and ask them to exercise that jurisdiction?

MS. BROWN: Well, I guess my response, if I understand your hypothetical correctly, it's adding a

penny a minute to every call.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's right.

MS. BROWN: The only -- if we were to simply add a penny a minute in the federal tariff, the only minutes we could affect are interstate, international minutes because that's all that's tariffed there. If we were going to add a penny a minute to in-state calls we would have to go to each state jurisdiction and tariff that penny a minute.

commissioner clark: So why aren't you required to tariff it when you're going to charge it on intrastate long distance costs? Why isn't it still rate setting, I guess?

MS. BROWN: Because it only applies to interstate customers pursuant to that federal tariff and is in full compliance with the Commission's structure set up in the universal service situation.

commissioner clark: Well, then what you're saying, it depends on the customer, not the nature of the call.

MS. BROWN: Depends on the customer. It certainly is significant and I think it's critical in this case that all MCI was attempting to do at the time was to establish a charge on interstate customers.

**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** Okay.

MS. BROWN: But I don't know -- in the state -- in the example you raised I think we would -- if we were going to add a penny, we would have to visit each of the state commissions and try to add that penny that way.

commissioner clark: Well, and if you didn't, what would our recourse be? We could only go to the FCC or we could demand that you come before us and show cause and demand refund of that if you hadn't filed the tariff?

MS. BROWN: We would -- what we would have to do I suppose is file at the FCC an in-state tariff that --

what you have to do. If you did that, what would be our recourse? Are you saying that we could not take action and hold a proceeding here, but we would have to go to the FCC?

MS. BROWN: I can't imagine a circumstance in which the FCC would accept a tariff for in-state purposes, but assuming they were to take leave of their senses, then the answer is yes, under the filed rate doctrine you would have to go to the FCC.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: What if one of your 1 customers chooses, or I guess it wouldn't totally 2 3 achieve the point I'm making, but let's follow it. Let's say one of your customers presubscribes to 4 another carrier for intraLATA toll. What happens to 5 your charge then? 6 They only get charged for MCI 7 MS. BROWN: charges, not for other carrier charges. 8 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So, in essence, that 9 customer opts out of this charge as well for 10 interstate purposes? 11 MS. BROWN: They opt -- they don't opt out 12 of the charge. There is probably, if you put them 13 next to a customer who was MCI only for all services, 14 would probably end up paying something and they were 15 equivalent purchasers of telecommunication services. 16 If you compared those two cases, the person who's 17 opted for someone else in the in-state pick would 18 probably pay less. 19 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And yet -- so your 20 argument is that you set no rate for intrastate, 21 22 right? MS. BROWN: Right. 23 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But your rate 24

automatically -- your rate changes by that person

25

choosing another intraLATA carrier?

MS. BROWN: The rate changes by customer usage as well. It's a percentage of usage for MCI services so it changes by any usage.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But yet still it varies according to that intrastate usage?

MS. BROWN: And interstate usage, yes. But you have to have -- you have to be an interstate customer and have interstate usage for the charge to apply.

how that's not applying some charge based on your intrastate usage. I mean, I understand that the incurrence of the charge is by incidence of your doing intrastate traffic. I have no problem with your statement on that. But it will vary by the level of your intrastate usage. Because if this customer opts out, his charges dramatically -- can dramatically change if he's primarily intraLATA customer.

MS. BROWN: Right. And my only answer to that is yes, that is, in fact, what happens here and my understanding of MCI tariffs and long distance tariffs generally, whether you're looking at the federal tariff or the state tariff, is this is not unusual. There are volume discounts built into

tariffs, particularly on the business side, that vary by total usage. I have not examined our Florida tariff or the Florida tariffs of the other IXCs. I know in other state tariffs that we have, we have those volume discount usages. We have them in the federal tariff as well. This is not a new or surprising feature of our tariff.

customer who's presubscribed to you for both, you would give them discounts based on only intraLATA?

MS. BROWN: No. It would be based on your total usage. You might qualify for a steeper discount based on your total usage and that might be -- that is definitely a feature of our FCC tariff. It may be a feature of many of our state tariffs. I have not examined our Florida tariff.

commissioner Jacobs: Okay.

MS. BROWN: But that is something that is commonplace in the industry.

commissioner deason: Are you indicating you have tariffs on file with the FCC which, in effect, give a discount on intrastate tariffs which are not filed with the state?

MS. BROWN: That I'm not saying. I just haven't examined the Florida tariff to know what's

there. I do know in the case of Virginia we have tariffs on file in both places that give volume discounts on total usage. So if you were a Virginia customer and you had intrastate volumes you might qualify for an additional step in your volume discount based on your total usage, which would include interstate. Similarly, in the FCC, the opposite applies.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Are you saying that tariff wouldn't also be filed in Virginia?

MS. BROWN: No. The tariff is filed in Virginia. I'm just saying I haven't examined the Florida one. I don't know.

would be that if there is a total discount to all calls, that the tariff would be filed both places?

MS. BROWN: The tariff is filed -- yes. But in the FCC's case, we're establishing an interstate discount based on total usage. In Virginia, we're establishing an intrastate discount based on total usage. It's the same thing. Okay. We're applying total usage discounts in each jurisdiction independently.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But you filed tariffs in both jurisdictions?

1 Ms. BROWN:

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

Yes.

commissioner Jacobs: If the rationale -- if you were to follow the same rationale as you argue for here, you wouldn't need to do that, would you? I mean because they only want to get the discount in one place. They really only want to logically get it in one place. Or you want to give it -- or no -- you would want to only logically give it in one place, wouldn't you?

MS. BROWN: The Florida Commission had not established a universal service cost structure that required us to do any kind of universal service cost recovery similar to what we had to do at the FCC. There is no reason to file a universal service cost recovery mechanism like the one we filed at the federal level. We were only seeking at the federal level to recover our costs from our interstate customers.

I wanted to raise one other issue on the jurisdiction, if I could, which is, we mentioned the Louisiana case earlier and I think our position on that is very clear. The Louisiana case, if it stands for anything, stands for the theory that if it's impossible for a carrier to comply with both sets of

regulations, that is federal and state at the same time, federal can preempt.

And I think our view is that if we were forced to try to simultaneously tariff our FUSF charge or NAF charge around the country at state jurisdictions, we would essentially be in a position where we would have some states that would let us do it and some states that wouldn't. And we would be in the impossible position of having a federal tariff on file that applies to our interstate customers with State Commissions essentially being able to reach different decisions.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Would you agree that the impossibility is only created because you chose to tariff it the way you did?

MS. BROWN: No, I would not because it is a federal charge which is established and has the effect of federal law. If we tried to tariff that in the state jurisdictions, we may quite easily be put in the situation where it is impossible for us to comply with both the decisions of State Commissions and the federal tariff, which has the effect of law.

commissioner clark: How are you doing it
now?

MS. BROWN: How are we doing it now? We are

applying a charge, FUSF, against interstate and international revenues only, and that has been the case since July 1, 1998.

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commissioner clark: So it appears to me
it's not an impossibility.

MS. BROWN: It's not an impossibility to have the charge structured that way. What would have been an impossibility during that six-month period is to have a federal charge on file structured the way we had it, which is applied to total revenues, and then have State Commissions simultaneously disallowing our ability to charge against the state portion of the revenues. That would have been an impossibility.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: The way you tariffed it made it an impossibility, not the FCC order.

MS. BROWN: The way we tariffed it? I guess I respectfully disagree with that. We tariffed it the way we did because we thought we were in the compliance with the FCC's order, and we're seeking clarification of that. Having done so, it then becomes impossible for us to comply simultaneously with a different opinion from the State Commissions concerning whether our tariff is lawful.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is it currently impossible for you to comply with the FCC order on --

MS. BROWN: Oh, no. And we're not making that argument. We have simply -- we've simply changed our rate structure and we're now proceeding in a different way than we had in the past.

the FCC order charging you based on total revenues?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So it's not impossible to comply with the mandate of the FCC order?

MS. BROWN: And we've never argued that.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

tariff, as it was originally filed, required you to assess the collection on both interstate and intrastate revenue? What in the tariff required you to do that?

Ms. BROWN: Why didn't -- why did the tariff
require us to assess on both?

commissioner deason: What in the tariff -our Staff indicated to me in their argument that the
tariff in question did not specifically authorize
charges on intrastate.

MS. BROWN: Okay. That's a difference of opinion about whether or not the tariff language that we tariffed is vague. Our contention is that it simply refers to customer usage. That's unambiguous in our view.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So the language of the 1 2 FCC tariff refers to customer usage? 3 MS. BROWN: Uh-huh. COMMISSIONER DEASON: And so -- and when you 4 filed that, are your tariffs presumptively valid at 5 6 FCC? MS. BROWN: Yes. They are presumptively 7 valid. 8 9 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. So there was no review by anyone at the FCC which indicated that they 10 also interpreted customer usage to mean all types of 11 usage, that being inter, intra and international? 12 There has been no ruling to MS. BROWN: 13 date. My understanding is that the --14 I'm talking about 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: No. 16 when you filed the tariff did you get approval from 17 your tariff that said, "Oh, by the way, when we approve this tariff, we want you to interpret customer 18 usage to mean all types of usage." 19 MS. BROWN: No, there's no --20 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That was your 22 interpretation? MS. BROWN: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And there is nothing 24 at the FCC that said that was their interpretation at 25

the time that you filed the tariff?

ms. BROWN: That's correct. There is a pending issue in the Virginia complaint on that question, as I understand the Virginia complaint.

commissioner deason: Does the -- if the FCC had flat out ordered you to collect these fees based upon all sources of revenue, did they have the authority to do that?

Ms. BROWN: Did they have the authority to do that? They certainly indicated they had a broad range of authority. I'm not sure -- I'm not sure I have an opinion or my company has an opinion on whether or not they've exceeded their bounds here.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, you've indicated that the approval of a tariff has the force of law.

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And so by this tariff that you filed, it was presumtively valid. I don't know what review it got at the FCC. My guess is that since it's presumtively valid there probably was not a great deal of review.

MS. BROWN: That's correct.

commissioner deason: But nevertheless, by you filing the tariff that's presumptively valid it has the force of law. I guess my next question is,

1	does the FCC by law have the authority to do to
2	have ordered you to do what, in effect, you did by
3	filing your tariff the way you filed it?
4	MS. BROWN: Could they have ordered could
5	they have mandated the rate structure that we chose?
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes.
7	MS. BROWN: Yes, that's our position. They
8	could have if they wanted to.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Does Staff agree with
10	that?
11	MS. BEDELL: If they chose to announce that
12	they were preempting us, they could.
13	COMMISSIONER DEASON: They've not done that,
14	though?
15	MS. BEDELL: No.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. I'm sorry. You
17	may continue.
18	MS. BROWN: Well, my time is relatively
19	short, so let me turn to the
20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Your time has expired
21	but I'm letting you continue due to the level of the
22	questions that you've received.
23	MS. BROWN: Okay. Well, I would just like
24	to conclude with the following points, which is the
25	issues here involve tariffs that were in effect for a

relatively short period of time. These issues are now done, finished, and we're simply evaluating a three-month period in case of the NAF and a six-month period in the case of the FUSF.

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If, as I understand the Florida Staff view, if the Commission decides against us on the question of jurisdiction, there is a separate issue about whether or not refunds should be ordered. I simply want to point out that the practical effect of that is that what we would be doing is ordering refunds as to some subset of interstate customers. So in effect, we'd be removing some obligation that was paid by interstate -- MCI WorldCom's interstate customers during this period and giving them refunds. company at that point, of course, would have to assess what it needs to do with the charges overall, but this is a question about whether or not interstate customers should have different obligations than what the company imposed on them pursuant to the federal tariff.

In light of that, we would argue that refunds are not required in this case even if the Commission finds that we have violated its jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess I don't

understand that. Would you just repeat that argument?

MS. BROWN: Well, the charges applied only to interstate customers. They applied, if I understand the Staff's argument correctly --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But interstate customers who are also intrastate customers.

anyone who had interstate usage got this charge applied to them. If you were an interstate customer who had lots and lots of intrastate usage at that time, the effect of the Florida Commission order, if you were to order refunds, would be to have MCI WorldCom refund money to that subset of interstate customers. In effect, those who had intrastate usage would get a refund.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And what's wrong with that?

MS. BROWN: What was -- what I simply am pointing out to you is that we're talking about reallocating money among interstate customers of MCI WorldCom. That's the effect of the order.

Those interstate customers who had intrastate usage, would get a refund, presumably those who had high usage. There might be some subset to whom that was meaningful. But we are not talking

about a lot of money in any event, and we're talking only about that subset who had intrastate usage during that time. So we'd essentially be changing -- shifting the burdens among interstate customers.

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So what we're saying is simply if you find that you have jurisdiction in this case, which we don't agree with, but you could find that you had jurisdiction in this case, we would simply point out as to the refund question, we're not talking about a refund involving intrastate customers. We're talking about shifting money among interstate customers.

**COMMISSIONER DEASON:** When you use the term --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Who are also intrastate customers.

MS. BROWN: Yes. Yes, they are.

"shifting money", I think you use the term

"reallocate". Are you indicating that if there is a

refund, then you would, in essence, surcharge those

interstate customers who made no intrastate calls and

basically make up the difference from those customers?

MS. BROWN: No. But we certainly would not surcharge the customers for that period of time, the interstate-only customers for that period it time. I

don't think that would be possible in the competitive environment that we're in. But it certainly would leave us with a further shortfall. We are in a position with both these charges where we are underrecovering and have underrecovered our costs to a degree, and this would simply add to the underrecovery of those costs. We'd have to refund money to the intrastate side. What the business would decide to do in the future with respect to what would now be a larger underrecovery, I don't know, but I simply point that out as an issue.

point here. And it dawns on me that -- and correct me if I'm wrong. When the discussion of the method of contribution came about, wasn't that primarily an allocative discussion, i.e., the FCC had determined a pot of money that was necessary for universal service support, and when we come to this discussion, it's about how do we allocate that pot amongst all the companies, right?

MS. BROWN: That's correct.

commissioner Jacobs: And the idea of looking at all revenues is simply how you stack up in the queque more so than a cost causation issue. And so now, I come back to the -- I guess I'm posing again

the question that Commissioner Clark posed. Isn't it because you viewed it as a cost causation issue and determined that it had to go through both jurisdictions as opposed to simply a cost that you had to recover from wherever, and most reasonably, you know, from the place where it came which is interstate jurisdiction? Isn't that what got you here? That you decided that you wanted to make sure that both jurisdictions covered this cost as opposed to, here is a cost that came from an intrastate jurisdiction and you simply had to recover that cold cost from that area of your business?

MS. BROWN: What we simply decided to do on the FUSF was to mirror what the FCC was doing to us. They were collecting from us based on total revenues. We collected from our interstate customers on the same basis. That's basically what we were after.

commissioner Jacobs: I guess that

collecting from you based on total revenues sounds

like they imposed a cost on you and what -- and I

guess that is true, but it wasn't that they looked and

said, okay, because you imposed this kind of traffic

on the interstate level and you imposed this kind of

traffic on the intrastate level, we determined that

those costs add up and this is what you ought to be

incurred. I didn't take that to be the rationale.

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The rationale I'm taking is that there was a cost that came from this whole pie and you were simply ranked in what portion you would take out of that pie because of the level of revenues, albeit, that came from both jurisdictions. It wasn't that, in my mind, that FCC looked at the intrastate jurisdiction and said, okay, because you have incurred these level of costs or you have imposed these level of costs, we deem that you ought to have to pay this much into this fund. It was simply that the fund had this level of support necessary and here's how you came up on the ladder. You follow me?

with you and if there is anything that I said that indicated I was in disagreement -- I mean, that is how, as I understand it, how the FCC came to its determination. It simply rank ordered the companies by total revenues and said here's your share.

**COMMISSIONER JACOBS:** But in your analysis that automatically correlates to a right of recovery from those intrastate customers.

MS. BROWN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And I guess that's where the line becomes, because arguably that cost was

totally imposed from your obligations under this federal support mechanism. And the whole issue of the intrastate only came in when you were being ranked as to what portion you would pay out of that federal support mechanism.

MS. BROWN: That's where the issue comes from.

commissioner Jacobs: Right. Okay.

MS. BROWN: That's exactly where the issue comes from. I think the only caveat I would apply to your summation of it, is that we weren't going after intrastate customers. We were going after interstate customers who had both inter and intrastate usage.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I got you.

commissioner CLARK: You know, if you followed that logic, then the FCC has jurisdiction over virtually everyone because they make interstate calls, if they make interstate calls.

MS. BROWN: I don't -- I wouldn't go that far. I think universal service is a pretty unique section of the statute about which there is much to be said about where the jurisdictional line will finally get drawn there and, as you know, it's the subject of a separate court appeal. I don't know that generally I would agree that they have broad jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. Bedell, you have five minutes.

MS. BEDELL: I think you all have asked -had answered some of the questions that Staff would
have addressed in rebuttal, but I would like to just
reemphasize that MCI did have some discretion in
determining how to recoup the universal service fees.
And they chose a methodology which we believe ended up
impacting on intrastate toll calls that was not
lawful, quite simply.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Are you saying that it had the effect of adding a charge?

MS. BEDELL: Yes.

**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** Okay.

MS. BEDELL: And as we have already addressed, you know, it may perhaps have been impossible for them to comply with the tariff in the fashion that we were asking, but the fact was, that was their choice, and furthermore, you know, their choice to set up the charges in the manner that they did. It was their choice and it was presumptively valid the day after it was filed at the FCC.

And that puts us in a very awkward position if we were to accept that argument if as, Commissioner Clark, you suggested, they just simply filed a tariff

that said, you know, every customer in Florida will pay it, you know, it makes -- they could do it blatantly, you know, that said, every customer, every MCI customer in Florida would be charged a dollar on every intrastate call. The day after it was filed it would be presumptively valid. It would be a federal law. We would not be able to take any action at all. This is absurd. I mean, it's not the way -- I know it's not the argument that they're making, but it's the end result of that argument if you take it the next step.

And I do agree with MCI that they probably did just mirror the setup that the FCC was using for determining what their pot of the fund would be, but I don't think that that makes it okay for them to then affect intrastate calls.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. Ms. Brown,

I do have another question. Did MCI give notification
to customers of the methodology they were going to
employ to recover these fees?

MS. BROWN: We had sought from the FCC an ability to do so and had given the FCC the deadlines by which we could have announced these in advance. But because of the timing of their decisions on USF implementation and access charge implementation we

were not able to get prenotification. We did do 1 simultaneous notification with invoices and I believe 2 filed tariffs on December 17th, about two weeks in 3 4 advance of the effective date. So they got 5 simultaneous invoice notice. The tariff was filed 6 early. 7 COMMISSIONER DEASON: So customers received 8 their first notification when they received their 9 first bill with the charges appearing thereon? 10

MS. BROWN: That would be correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Did the notification explain that it was a percentage factor applied to all revenue or all charges?

> MS. BROWN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Did it indicate that it was subject to the charges only if the customer made at least one interstate or international call?

MS. BROWN: I don't believe we used that language. It indicated that there was a new interstate charge appearing on the bill.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: An interstate charge, but you didn't indicate that it was triggered by placing an interstate or international call?

> MS. BROWN: No.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if they had known

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you were charging that way and one of your competitors were charging a different way, and if a customer assessed their situation and realized they made very few interstate calls but perhaps averaged one a month, and they made thousands of intrastate calls and they would be better off to go with a competitor who collected these fees in a different manner, they would not have had that information to have made that decision in the marketplace; is that correct?

MS. BROWN: I don't have the invoice language in front of me to know to what extent a customer would have been put on notice as to the specific question you asked.

indicated earlier that there was no need for a refund and that you couldn't make these monies up because the market wouldn't let you. I guess my question is, were these customers notified so that they could have exercised their ability to exercise their choices in the market to have avoided these? And I'm hearing your answer is no, they did not.

MS. BROWN: Unfortunately the FCC did not get around to making its decision in time for us to do prenotification, which was our strong preference and has always been our strong preference.

1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But you were not required to tariff at the same time. In fact, some 2 3 companies didn't, did they? 4 MS. BROWN: Some companies waited several 5 months before they imposed line charges, yes. We felt 6 we had new costs being imposed upon us and chose to 7 tariff right away. COMMISSIONER CLARK: It was a business 8 9 decision, not one forced by the FCC. That's correct. 10 MS. BROWN: COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioners, any 11 final questions? I take it then the oral argument is 12 concluded. Are there any other matters? I know that 13 14 there is the possibility of a bench decision. there anything else to come before the Commission 15 before we even entertain the question as to whether 1.6 17 there is to be a bench decision? Any other matters? 18 MS. BEDELL: No, sir. 19 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioners, what's 20 your pleasure? 21 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I am prepared to make a decision. 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioner Jacobs? 23 24 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I am as well.

Okay.

Well, then we

COMMISSIONER DEASON:

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can discuss the matter or if a motion is --

commissioner Jacobs: I'm sorry. There was one question that -- I am sorry. I mean to ask earlier. Do we know if anybody complained to the FCC about how their piece of the pie was developed? Did anybody come back and say, "I was charged too much," in essence?

MS. BEDELL: Are you talking about the companies or about customers?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The companies.

MS. BROWN: Is your question whether or not business customers complained?

commissioner Jacobs: No. Whether any telco came back to FCC after these -- this allocution -- the contribution levels were determined and complained that they were charged too much, they were given too big a piece of the pie?

MS. BROWN: There are a number of petitions for reconsideration pending. There is also a court appeal. The issues touch virtually every aspect of the universal service decision. Without having examined that right before coming in I couldn't tell you if their mechanism is definitely one of the recon issues, but given the breath of recon and appeal issues, I feel comfortable that we could assume that

virtually everything is under reconsideration or appeal.

MS. BEDELL: We would disagree with that.

commissioner Jacobs: Okay. Now, if -let's say that's -- on somebody's reconsideration the
pot was reallocated. Okay. And you came out with a
lower number. Are you going to come back and adjust
this number downward that you now -- that your
contribution -- I'm sorry -- your charge? You going
to come downward I would assume?

MS. BROWN: You're asking if we got a lower assessment on universal service at this point would we lower the charge?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right.

MS. BROWN: That would be a business decision. We would evaluate our position in the marketplace relative to other carriers and also the extent to which we are in an underrecovery position today. And the extent to which the amount of money or the amount of cost imposed on us did go down. So there would be a mix of factors affecting the decision. I don't think sitting here today I could tell you.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: All right.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I do have one further

question for our Staff. Have we determined, if there 1 2 is to be a refund, the total dollar amount and the total number of customers involved and the 3 administrative cost of actually determining those 4 5 amounts and actually having a refund? 6 MS. BEDELL: No, we haven't. 7 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Has the company made any attempt to determine that? 8 MS. BROWN: Not at this time. 9 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Further questions or a motion? 11 12 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: You want a recommendation? I suggest we make one. 13 14 MS. BEDELL: The recommendation has to come 15 from --COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Bellak would have 16 17 to make a recommendation if you're seeking a 18 recommendation. 19 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm ready to -- and I 20 suppose we can go issue by issue. With respect to Issue 1, I guess I would have stated the issue a 21 22 little bit differently. It says, did MCI bill customers for the NAF and the FUSF based on intrastate 23

It appears to me that they did and it

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charges.

appears to me that what, in fact, it is, is an interstate charge over which we have jurisdiction. It is an additional rate for an intrastate service.

I know they've raised the issue of -- I believe it is within our jurisdiction to decide this issue because we are responsible for intrastate charges and what we are enforcing, and it is our responsibility to determine that jurisdiction, not the FCC's. And I don't think we have invaded their jurisdiction in the sense that this was not an ordered method of charging by the FCC.

I think Commissioner Jacobs made a very good point that this was an allocation among the carriers. It was a way to determine your share. It was not an authorization to impose a charge on intrastate service.

So to that extent I don't think it's an issue that is more properly taken up with the FCC. I think it is proper to do it here. That's my motion. I move Staff on Issue 1.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I second.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Moved and seconded without objection. Show then that that motion is approved on Issue 1.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well -- and with

1	respect to Issue 2, I would because it is an
2	intrastate charge it needed to be tariffed here. And
3	I would indicate moreover, I don't think I think
4	it's questionable as to whether they can point to
5	their FCC tariff as being a protection, in effect, for
6	that charge because, as you indicated, Commissioner
7	Deason, that it's not clear in the federal tariff that
8	it was to be on intrastate usage. Perhaps if it had
9	been clearer it would have been caught. So I move
10	Staff on Issue 2.
11	COMMISSIONER DEASON: There's been a motion.
12	Is there a second?
13	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'll second that.
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: It's been moved and
15	seconded without objection. Show then that that
16	motion carries and disposes of Issue 2. Issue 3.
17	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Move Staff.
18	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: This speaks to our
19	authority, correct?
20	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.
21	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Second.
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Show then without
23	objection that issue motion on Issue 3 is approved.
24	Issue 4.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, we don't have to

do this now, right, because they've ceased collecting 1 2 it? 3 MS. BEDELL: That's correct. COMMISSIONER CLARK: It's moot. 4 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: There is no need for a 6 vote on this issue? It's moot? Is that correct? 7 MS. BEDELL: That question really should be directed to Mr. Bellak. 8 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Bellak, is this a 9 moot issue at this point or do we need to take a vote? 10 MR. BELLAK: I'm sorry. I don't have the --11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: You don't have those 12 issues? 13 MR. BELLAK: -- the issue in front of me 14 right at this point. 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Question is, if we 16 have authority, should we prohibit this practice, and 17 basically MCI has already changed their billing 18 methodology so it's no longer at issue, at least on a 19 20 going-forward basis. It appears to be a moot issue. 21 MR. BELLAK: 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. COMMISSIONER CLARK: With respect to Issue 23 5, I believe they should be ordered to make a refund 24

with interest and let me just state the rationale for

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that.

I think it was an unauthorized charge.

Whether it's an overcharge or not, in my view, based on what we've decided, you were not authorized to charge it, and as a result the customers are entitled to a refund. And I would say that there is even more reason to do that, because as Commissioner Deason pointed out, customers did not have the opportunity to change their service or make some other arrangements so they would not be charged in that way.

In effect, you chose to impact their revenues as opposed to your revenues and you made a business decision that they were -- they did not have the ability to respond to.

I have one other thing to say that is not -I don't know how to say it. It's not personal to you
all. But it is something I have seen MCI do before.
And that is the notion of blaming some other person or
order or entity for what they did. And it recalls to
me the fact that we had another case before you all,
where -- you had a case before us where you filed a
tariff that the charges were inappropriate and we
didn't catch it and I think one of your rationales was
well, you didn't catch it either. This has that same
flavor.

You're saying it was impossible for you to do something because you didn't get the information from the ILECs. Well, you could have done it a different way. And it's not persuasive to argue that it's not entirely your fault. It was a decision your company made. And having made that decision, since it was unauthorized and no notice, I think the customers are entitled to a refund. That's my motion.

commissioner deason: Okay. Let me first make an observation and perhaps a friendly amendment and it may not be friendly, and if it's not let me know.

First of all, I agree with everything that you said, except that my vote on this matter has no bearing whatsoever about perhaps a previous tariff filing that was filed and it was approved apparently or something was --

friendly amendment and it's not really part of that, but I want to convey that message to you all. I'm sure, Mr. Melson, you have heard it before. The notion that, you know, we hold you responsible for your business decisions. I understand the fact that it may not have been -- you may not have been able to get that information. But you could have just charged

your interstate customers. You should -- you could have just put it on your interstate charges.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. With that clarification then, maybe there is another friendly amendment coming and I don't know if this will be friendly or not.

You've made the motion to order the refund.

My concern is that this record is -- we have no
understanding of the amount of money that potentially
could be refunded, amount per customer, the amount of
administrative cost involved in making the
identification and actually carrying through with a
refund. My concern -- that's my concern. I certainly
don't want to be in a position of imposing \$10 worth
of cost to refund \$1. I don't think that's a good
thing to do.

So, I think generally a refund is in order. However, I would indicate to MCI that if there is a cheaper alternative, and I would also provide that if it's determined that it would be more palatable and more efficient to perhaps pay a fine as opposed to requiring a refund, that's something that we can considering at that point. But my -- not having the information, but my intuition tells me we're talking about small amounts per customers but you're talking

about huge administrative costs per customer to effectuate this and I want to avoid that. And so if that can be considered a friendly amendment to have that, I would appreciate it.

commissioner clark: How would we phrase that though? That we would withhold a decision on the refund until we have information from MCI and the Staff as to the amount and the cost?

commissioner deason: I would put the burden back on MCI to indicate that we're ordering a refund, but that during the course of them doing the necessary research to determine the amounts and the amounts per customers, it is determined that it is not a feasible way and if there is another alternative, that they would be free to bring that to us at that time, and I guess they always would be free to do that.

But I just want it understood that we're trying to -- first of all, we believe that there should be a refund but we want it done in a cost-effective way. And if there are some other alternatives out there, and personally I would think that, you know, perhaps some type of a payment of a fine or something in lieu of a refund, because it's something that could be considered, once we get information concerning the administrative cost of

actually going through with a refund.

commissioner clark: I consider that a
friendly amendment.

commissioner Jacobs: The only concern I have is that we not get too far removed from the consumers. That might be a reasonable option. By the same token, credits to consumers could be looked at as options, you know. I think a focus on them would be of great use.

it's determined that one free day of calling or something as opposed to actually having to identify each customer, recompute their bills, determine that this customer is due a three-cent refund and they have to send -- you know, a three-cent check doesn't make sense. Sending them the notice, perhaps the postage on the notice.

There may be a better way to actually get this achieved so that customers benefit and certainly so that the company does not benefit; that they bear the burden of -- and I'm sure that they disagree with this finding and it there may be a legal challenge -- but in the event that there is to be a refund of some sort, I think it needs to be done in a cost-effective manner, and that we should -- that we should give the

company some flexibility or at least present some alternatives if they find themselves in that situation.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I can go along with that.

**COMMISSIONER DEASON:** Okay. We have a motion with that clarification.

guess add briefly that I think the thing that gives me a lot of clarity on this is the pot of money from which these charges were derived came purely from a federal decision on support of a federal mechanism. The whole issue of intrastate came about as the determination was made about how to allocate that pot of money to the companies and how they should pay for that federal fund. I cannot see how that translates into a right of recovery from intrastate customers, whether they happen to engage in interstate traffic or not. I do not see how that translates into a right of recovery based on their intrastate activity.

So for that reason, I view this charge as highly suspect and I will second the motion.

commissioner deason: Okay. Motion is seconded without objection. Show then that motion carries and I think Issue 5 is the last issue and that

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should dispose of this matter for today. Thank you
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      all. This hearing is adjourned.
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                 (Thereupon, the hearing concluded at
      2:15 p.m.)
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA)  : CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	COUNTY OF LEON )
3	I, KIMBERLY K. BERENS, CSR, RPR, Official Commission Reporter,
4	DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Hearing in Docket
5	No. 980435-TI was heard by the Florida Public Service Commission at the time and place herein stated; it is further
6	
7	CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed by me; and that this transcript,
	consisting of 56 pages, constitutes a true
9	transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
10	DATED this March 3, 1999.
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13	Limborly of Rorens
14	KIMBERLY K. BERENS, CSR, RPR Florida Public Service Commission
15	Official Commission Reporter
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