

Petition for temporary waiver : DOCKET NO. 981250-TL
of physical collocation :
requirements set forth in the :
1996 Telecommunications Act and: the FCC's first report and : order, for the Lake Mary main : central office, by Bellsouth : Telecommunications, Inc. :
$\qquad$

PROCEEDINGS: ORAL ARGUMENT

BEFORE: $\quad \begin{aligned} & \text { COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK } \\ & \\ & \\ & \text { Prehearing Officer }\end{aligned}$

DATE: Wednesday, March 17, 1997
TIME: Commenced at 1:30 p.m.
Concluded at 2:35 p.m.
Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148
4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY: KIMBERLY K. BERENS, CSR, RPR FPSC Commission Reporter

## APPEARANCES:

MONICA BARONE, Sprint Communications Company Limited Partnership, 3100 Cumberland Circle, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, appearing on behalf of sprint Communications Company and Limited Partnership.

PHILLIP J. CARVER, BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 4300 Southern Bell Center, 675 West Peachtree Street, Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia 30375-0001, appearing on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

RICHARD D. MELSON, Hopping Green Sams and Smith, Post Office Box 6526, Tallahassee, Florida 32314, appearing on behalf of ACI Corporation.

NORMAN H. HORTON, JR., Messer, Caparello, \& Self 215 South Monroe Street, Post Office Box 1876, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876, appearing on behalf of e.spire Communications Company.

PATRICK WIGGINS, Wiggins \& Villacorta, P. A., Post Office Drawer 1657, 2145 Delta Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32302 , appearing on behalf of Intermedia Communications.

JOHN ELLIS, Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell and Hoffman, P. O. Box 551, 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551, appearing on behalf of TCG South Florida.

DAVID V. DIMLICH, 2620 S. W. 27 th Avenue, Miami, Florida, appearing on behalf of Supra Telecommunications and Information systems, Inc.

FLOYD R. SELF, Messer, Caparello \& Self 215
South Monroe Street, Post Office Box 1876, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876, appearing on behalf of Worldcom Technologies.
barbara auger, Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell \& Dunbar, 215 South Monroe Street, 2nd Floor, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, appearing on behalf of Time Warner Telecom.

BETH KEATING, Florida Public Service Commission, Division of Legal Services, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, appearing on behalf of the Commission staff.

PROCEED I NG S
(Hearing convened at 1:30 p.m.)
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Would you please read the Notice.

MS. Reating: By Notice issued March 2, 1999, this time and place has been set for emergency oral argument in the consolidated dockets regarding BellSouth's petitions for waiver of the physical collocation requirements.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: We'll take appearances. I'm sorry. I thought everyone was here.

MR. CARVER: Phillip Carver on behalf of BellSouth. 675 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia.

COMMISSIONER CLARR: Must have been that I saw some of your people earlier that I thought you were here and I apologize and I --

MR. CARVER: No problem.
MR. ELLIS: John Ellis, for Teleport Communications Group, TCG South Florida.

MR. MELSON: Richard Melson of Hopping Green Sams and Smith, on behalf of ACI Corp and with me is Gabriel Nietto from my firm.

MR. DIMLICH: David Dimlich on behalf of Supra Telecommunications.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm sorry. Give me your name again.

MR. DIMLICH: David Dimlich.
COMMISSIONER CLARR: Do I have that spelled somewhere?

MR. DIMLICH: D-I-M-L-I-C-H.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Thank you.
MS. BARONE: Monica Barone representing
Sprint Communications Company and Limited Partnership, 3100 Cumberland Circle, Atlanta, Georgia.

MR. SELF: Floyd Self of the Messer,
Caparello \& Self law firm, 215 South Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida, representing WorldCom Technologies, Inc.

MR. HORTON: Norman H. Horton, Jr., of Messer, Caparello \& Self, 215 South Monroe Street, representing e.spire communications.

MS. AUGER: Barbara Auger with the law firm of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell \& Dunbar, 215 South Monroe, 2nd Floor, Tallahassee, Florida, representing Time Warner Telecom.

MS. KEATING: And Beth Keating appearing for Commission Staff.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Beth, will you tell me what -- we're here for an oral argument on whether or
not to include specific language in an issue?
MS. KEATING: That's correct. It's Issue 2 on the list of issues that were identified in the order establishing procedure.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
MS. KEATING: There's a specific phrase that is currently in contention. It's the parenthetical phrase "and/or alternative physical collocation arrangement."

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. So it is
Bellsouth that objects to the inclusion of that language, so would it be your view that we should start with BellSouth?

MS. KEATING: I believe that would be appropriate.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Anything else we have to do first?

MS. KEATING: That's it.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: How long did we give for oral argument?

MS. KEATING: We didn't establish any time frame.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: How long do people
need?
MR. CARVER: I anticipate that on behalf of

BellSouth I will need somewhere in the five-to-ten minute range.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. All right.
MR. CARVER: What I would like to request, though, is that $I$ have the opportunity to make a brief rebuttal. I think this is basically BellSouth against everyone else.

COMMISSIONER CLARR: Okay. I think that would be in order. And who's going to start off the arguments for the opposing side? Mr. Melson?

MR. MELSON: I'll start.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay, And then, I will afford the opportunity for others to speak, but to the extent it's covered, please don't feel a need of repeating.

I should indicate to you, I was -- Staff has talked to me about this issue and we talked about the need to have oral argument, but, Mr. Carver, if you would take the time to orient me to the facts. And I guess what $I$ should say is, since it's been a while since $I$ looked at this, assume $I$ haven't read your pleading and take it from there.

MR. CARVER: Okay. Thank you.

Essentially, the issue in each of these cases or in the consolidated case, is whether there
should be a waiver of the collocation requirement, and the fundamental question that it comes down to is whether or not there is space in each respective central office for collocation. And the issue without the language that is in dispute, we think, captures that. The difficulty is that in this particular issue, it says "what factors," and then we begin the part that's a problem, quote, "and/or alternative physical collocation arrangements," quote, "should be considered."

Our view is that alternative physical collocation arrangements are essentially a different issue than the question of whether there is space for physical collocation. In effect, physical collocation is one thing that's been defined by the Federal Act and by the FCC and by prior orders of this Commission to some extent. Alternatives to that are a different matter.

And essentially, we don't believe that alternatives should become a part of this hearing and certainly not the focus of this hearing for three different reasons. And I will go through each of these at some length, but for now I just want to sort of lay out our three reasons right up front.

The first one is, is that dealing with this
prospectively and generically, we believe, is fundamentally at odds with the structure of the Act and with the intention of the Act.

Secondly, we are opposed to it because we believe that opening the door for any party to essentially make a proposal for alternative physical collocation in the context of this docket will hopelessly complicate the docket and will raise a very wide variety of issues that really don't have to do with the central issue.

And the third reason that we're opposed is because, in effect, parties would have the opportunity under this language to make generic proposals for alternatives to physical collocation. And we believe that generic proposals should be considered in the generic docket, not in one that is very specific and it is based on specific facts and it is for a fundamentally different purpose.

Now, before turning to each of those three arguments, what $I$ would like to do briefly is just talk through the way that BellSouth believes that this process should work.
Basically, the waiver comes down to a
question of whether the Commission believes that there is space in the central office for collocation. And
that determination is to be made according to a number of factors.

About six weeks ago we had a final order entered in the most recent collocation case and the Commission set forth, very thoroughly and in great length, the type of factors that should be considered and how they apply.

Rather than go through that entire analysis, though, I'll say that it really comes down to just three things.

First of all, what is BellSouth doing with the existing space? Is it an efficient use? Could some other use be better? Is it an appropriate use?

Secondly, what are the projections for the space that is not currently occupied? What does BellSouth intend to do with it in the future, and whether the Commission deems that to be acceptable and appropriate.

And the third is any legal requirements that may apply. For example, if there is, say, a regulatory requirement, a State Fire Code, a Health Code, a Safety Code, something that requires that space be made available or that there be particular exits or something that has to do with the configuration of the central office, that should also
be considered.

The task of the commission in these cases is really to take those three factors that the commission has already promulgated and, of course, any additional ones the Commission wants to consider or any additional ones the parties may raise, and decide whether there is space for collocation or not.

If you decide that there is no space for collocation and you grant the waivers, then to some extent, that really preempts everything else because there's not -- there's not a lot of point in discussing what someone would do with collocation space if there is no space to collocate.

Now, some parties may argue that you may decide there's no space for physical collocation in the traditional sense that has been defined, but that there may be space for alternate arrangements. And if that's the case, that's something that could be argued. But again, for reasons I'll detail, I don't believe that this is the place to make that argument.

The other possibility is that you would look at the waiver application and decide that there is space for physical collocation. And we anticipate that, much as you did in the previous order, you would tell us how much space there is.

And at that point -- let's say, for example, the Commission decides that there are 300 feet available. Then at that point, using the "first come first serve" principles that apply, we would go back to each central office and we would go back to the party that has requested collocation in those particular central offices, and we would ask them, you know, if they want the space and what they intend to do with it. And we would try to negotiate with them, basically, a suitable arrangement.

If there is that much space, if there's, you know, 300, 400, 500 feet, I think it's reasonable to anticipate that, for the most part, parties are going to want traditional collocation arrangements where their equipment is separated, where it's enclosed by walls, where it's not mixed up with BellSouth's or any other carrier's, and in that case, a lot of these issues about alternatives won't come up.

Now, let's say, on the other hand, you make a determination that the space is very limited in a central office. Let's say it's only 50 feet. Well, whoever is in line first for that space still has the opportunity to come to BellSouth and to try to negotiate what would be done with that 50 feet.

If that negotiation doesn't work, then I
think, under the Act, the appropriate time at that point -- excuse me. The appropriate time would be then to bring the dispute back to the Commission and to have an arbitration to determine what's the appropriate thing to do.

I believe that's the procedure that applies under the Act because the Act, again and again and again, stresses the importance of having parties to attempt to negotiate arrangements. Whether it's collocation, whether it's interconnection, whether it's the terms and conditions of UNEs or resale, the Act is very clear that parties are to negotiate first and then the Commission should get involved in trying to sort things out later.

I think some parties in this docket, and in other dockets, have made a strategic decision to try to bring things to the Commission and to have the Commission, in effect, sort of prejudge what should be done before there's been any opportunity to talk about it.

I don't believe that's appropriate. I don't think the Commission should do that, and I also think it's unnecessary. And my support for that is that the general history of the interconnection agreements.

At this point in Florida we have more than

100 approved interconnection agreements. We've had, I believe, somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 or 12 arbitrations between BellSouth and ALECs over the last three years. So what that means is about $90 \%$ of the agreements are arrived at by negotiation between the parties, and we believe that that's what the Act contemplates and we believe that that process should be allowed to play out.

The second problem -- assuming that you don't accept that, and that you decide that it is appropriate to have parties make proposals for alternate arrangements here, our fear is that it's essentially just going to overwhelm the docket. Because again, the question is, basically is BellSouth making a use of this space that is appropriate and is there any space left.

If you shift the focus from that to, what could someone do with any space that may be available or is there something that's a suitable alternative to physical collocation, then you're really no longer talking about the types of things that you consider in a waiver application. Instead now you're considering about proposals for alternatives to collocation and that's a different matter.

Now, in terms of the concern that that's
going to complicate and perhaps overwhelm the entire docket, there are, I believe by my count, eight or nine intervenors in this case. If they each have simply one proposal for an alternative, then you're going to have eight or nine different things that are alternatives to collocation that you're going to have to consider in terms of technical feasibility, practicality, safety, and all of the other things that apply. If each party has multiple ones, and I think it's fair to assume they will, because no one's really going to want to put all their eggs in one basket, then you could very easily end up with 15 or 20 different proposals for alternatives.

What's going to happen is that the bulk of the time in the docket will be shifted to that analysis that's essentially irrelevant.

Our view is that there is really no great need to do a generic proceeding. That's it's better to allow the negotiation route to play out. But if that's the Commission's desire to do a generic proceeding, then that's what you should have. And that's the third problem with this.

This is not a generic proceeding. This is a proceeding with BellSouth on the one side and potential collocators on the other, and we're talking
about very specific circumstances and specific BellSouth central offices. I don't think it's appropriate to take the facts that have to do with those waiver applications and extrapolate and make some general determination about the feasibility of some alternative to physical collocation based on that.

Moreover, if that's your intention, then this needs to be a generic proceeding and all of the parties that have a stake in this, which is essentially every ILEC and every ALEC in the state, should be allowed to participate.

So my third point really goes to the fact that if you allow a generic issue to become the focus of a nongeneric docket, then I think there is some potential legal problems with any decision that might be made.

And that concludes my comments. I'd be happy to answer any questions you might have.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I don't have any questions right now, Mr. Carver. Thank you very much. Mr. Melson.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Clark, I represent
ACI Corp. and we believe that alternative physical collocation arrangements or -- let me put another name
on it perhaps -- physical collocation options are fair game in this proceeding.

Bell has an obligation under section 251(c)(6) of the Federal Telecommunications Act and the FCC's rules, to provide physical collocation at its premises except if it demonstrates that that is not practical because of technical considerations or space limitations.

We're essentially here in six separate dockets where BellSouth has applied, as it must under the federal law, to the State Commission for a determination that collocation -- physical collocation in six specific central offices is not practical because of space limitations.

So the ultimate issue you, as a Commission, are going to have to decide in this case is, is there space available in each of these central offices for physical collocation.

Mr. Carver framed his argument in terms of, if there is a lot of space available then he assumes collocators will want the traditional defined collocation arrangement, which consists of a separate area for collocators and cages or walls around collocation spaces.

I point out to you, that is not, in our
view, a standard definition of physical collocation in any way. That is the way BellSouth has chosen to implement physical collocation in its central offices, but there are a variety of options available that would allow for more efficient use of space that may be available.

Some options are what is called -- what we call cageless collocation, where you may still locate -- put all of the collocators in a single area, but not necessarily surround them with cages or walls, subject, of course, to that being permissible under local building codes.

Another alternative is what we call common collocation, where collocators are not physically segregated from BellSouth's equipment, but where collocators' equipment could be interspersed with BellSouth's equipment in available space.

Another option is what my client calls parking lot collocation. The Act provides for collocation at the premises of the local exchange company. And the FCC's rule implementing that talks about the space within or on the premises.

We don't believe that physical collocation necessarily needs to be within the four walls of the existing central office. It would be possible if
you've got -- if there is an adjacent parking lot, an adjacent picnic area that is part of the Bellsouth premises, that a physical collocation option could be offered on those premises in compliance with the Act and with the FCC's rules.

Another option which, in fact, is in use in California, is what my client calls adjacent collocation where, essentially, if there is no room at the inn, they lease office space in a nearby building --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Who leases it?
MR. MELSON: My client.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
MR. MELSON: -- and interconnects with
BellSouth at that point. I've essentially asked BellSouth to extend loop facilities out of the central office into this adjacent space.

I think the first -- I think there probably is more of a question as to whether that is on the BellSouth premises, obviously, than any of the others, but the other options I mentioned are all what we consider to be physical collocation options that would comply with the letter of the Telecom Act and the rules.

BellSouth tells you that you shouldn't
consider those first, $I$ guess, because it's got a notion that there's only really one form of physical collocation, which is the segregated area with the cage. And also because that would turn this into a generic docket and you'd be deciding generic issues that would involve a lot of other parties.

Well, Commissioner, every time you consider an issue for the first time in a fact-specific case you end up making decisions that do have precedential effect. You've been through at least one collocation complaint and in that identified a number of factors that are considered in determining whether space is available. As Mr. Carver said, parties in this docket will be able to suggest additional factors, but there's already a base of factors that are set out as things the Commission may want to consider.

If you were to consider collocation options in this docket in the context of these six specific end offices, you might find that there are two or three options that are suitable and that should be considered. That would not bind the parties in future proceedings, but in the same way that you've identified factors that have some precedential value, you'd be identifying options that have some precedential value.

The bottom line is that collocation space is an essential input to a lot of the competitors. It is also a scarce resource. Bellsouth wants you to look at traditional Bellsouth planning criteria to determine what space is available, and to assume the space is going to have to be constructed and configured in a particular way that is not necessarily the most efficient.

If you don't consider options, you're potentially -- if you determine, for example, there were 200 square feet of space available in the central office, but that the only option you're going to consider is a segregated caged collocation, you may be providing space for one or two competitors. Whereas, if you consider physical collocation options, you might be able to accommodate a much greater number of competitors in that central office.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, Mr. Melson, let me ask you why it can't work like this: That we use the notion of traditional collocation, at least to deal with these waivers, in the sense that what we're presented as evidence on what has been -- similar evidence to what we had in the supra case in terms of parties indicating how much space they needed. And we make a determination of whether it's needed or not
with respect to a specific -- that specific type of collocation. But we make it clear that we may come out and say, "we see this much room available, and therefore, you don't have a waiver," or, "we see this much room available, you don't have a waiver," and then, you all know sort of the parameters and then you can negotiate. And when you can't agree, you can come back and then you can explore interspersed collocation, cageless collocation.

MR. MELSON: I guess, Commissioner, the problem with that is two-fold. First, it sort of accepts as a going-in assumption that Bell's definition of traditional segregated caged-in location is the appropriate starting point.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sure.

MR. MELSON: And if you were, for example, to determine there is 100 square feet available in a central office, and assume my client was first in line for that central office, at that point I may be perfectly happy to accept that traditional caged-in collocation because it means none of my other competitors are going to be able to find space in that office. I think leaving it to negotiation --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, that's the idea of first in time, though. I mean --

MR. MELSON: First in time to use the available space and the available -- I believe you've got the responsibility and the ability to decide parameters for the use of space to ensure that it is used in the most efficient manner possible. And if you don't do that up-front in this proceeding, you're running the risk that you then get one or two collocators using very traditional options, occupying the entire available space, and shutting out two or three other entrants who could have shared in that space if you'd given the direction that the parties had to consider options.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess, here's my concern. I sat through that supra. It's hard enough as Commissioners to look at those floor plans and try to decide just how much is available. Let alone, going into details about whether a particular type of collocation, such as cageless, is available. I mean, do we have to then look at the local codes and things like that? And with respect to intersperse, then we look at what are some of the concerns about interspersed in terms of securities for both the companies' equipment.

Let me be very frank. I'm not looking forward to that kind of proceeding. I'd rather see it
negotiated first. I kind of would like to say, "here's the amount of square footage we think is available in these offices. They've either made their case or haven't made their case that they need it currently, they need it prospectively or they need it to meet some other legal requirements." We kind of say, "here's what is out there. Now you guys go back, and starting with the first person who came in, start negotiating."

And I appreciate the notion that if you're first in line you may have the ability to use all the space when it could have been used for others. But I don't see that as something that we're supposed to get into at this point. It's supposed to be negotiation and the FCC said, or the law said first in time. I mean, that's -- that's the sequence of events.

I guess I'm concerned about us getting into the -- arbitrating what is the most efficient way to accomplish this.

MR. MELSON: And I guess, Commissioner, I'm concerned that unless you address that at least at a level to say that cageless collocation is or is not an option, common collocation is or is not an option, that you're really creating a situation in which space can be and likely will be used inefficiently. And
yes, first in time, first in right. But if $I$ negotiate with Bell that because of my security concerns I want to put 10 -foot concrete block walls in the central office and they say, "gosh, that's a good idea," that is not an appropriate use of space.

So, I understand your concern that it will make the proceeding more difficult. I think it will make it slightly more difficult. $I$ don't think, as Mr. Carver suggested, that each party would have two or three different suggestions. There are ultimately only so many ways you can put equipment in space and $I$ think I've touched probably on most or all of them. It would make your job a little tougher, but $I$ think it's a job that you need to do if you want to encourage competition in Florida.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Mr. Dimlich. Did I pronounce it correct?

MR. DIMLICH: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Go ahead.

MR. DIMLICH: Good afternoon. David Dimlich on behalf of Supra Telecom. We would like to include the words, "alternative physical collocation arrangements."

By contesting the use of the words, "alternative physical collocation arrangements,"

BellSouth has ignored logic, previous Commission orders, and the words in their very own collocation handbook.

First, I would like to address the clear logic beyond the Staffs' inclusion of the words "alternative physical collocation arrangements." on a very basic level, in this docket the Commission is trying to match up needs and availability. Collocators need space. Bell South has space at issue. Obviously, a threshold issue to be determined is, what is the minimum amount of space needed for physical collocation.

To determine the minimum amount of space needed for physical collocation the Commission must acknowledge and take into account the fact that physical collocation can be achieved through alternative combinations of equipment. Some alternatives requiring more space; some alternatives requiring less.

Second, I would like to point out how a previous Commission order supports inclusion of the words, "alternative physical collocation arrangements."

In Order 990060, where the Commission required BellSouth to allocate office space to Supra,
the language of the order clearly indicates that the Commission took alternative arrangements into consideration. Super identified 970 square feet in the Golden Glades central office. But it also identified an alternative arrangement that would use 795 square feet, a second alternative, as well as a third alternative arrangement that would use divided locations on the first and second floor of the central office.

Based on these and other considerations, the Commission required BellSouth to allocate space to Supra. By doing so the commission established precedence that when determining the availability of central office space for collocation the Commission will consider evidence and arguments related to alternative physical collocation arrangements. By bringing us here today, BellSouth is ignoring this established precedence.

Third, I would like to point out how BellSouth's position contradicts the very language in their own collocation handbook. In BellSouth's letter to the Commission stating their position on this issue, Ms. Nancy White writes, "There are two forms of collocation: Physical and virtual." This is imprecise. There might be only two distinct varieties
of collocation, physical and virtual, however, within the physical variety, collocation can take many forms.

One only need look at BellSouth's own collocation handbook to support that proposition. In Chapter One, Service Descriptions, there is a page titled "Physical Collocation." And I will read from it the sentence. "The equipment complement may include transmission equipment, terminating equipment, switching equipment, power and battery equipment, PCs and test access modems."

According to this statement, collocation can be achieved through any combination of this equipment. For example, physical collocation can be achieved with or without switching equipment. In other words, there are alternative methods of physical collocation to be considered by the Commission.

Before I conclude, I would like to address another statement written by Ms. White in BellSouth's letter to the Commission. She writes, "If the Commission agrees with BellSouth that no space is available for collocation, it is irrelevant what collocation arrangements are desired by an ALEC."

Ms. White fails to explore the logical contrapositive of her statement, which would be, if the Commission does not know whether it agrees with

BellSouth that no space is available, it is entirely relevant to examine physical -- alternative physical collocation arrangement potential. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Ms. Barone, you're not --

MR. SELF: I'm going to go next and then Ms. Barone will follow me.

Commissioner Clark, I want to return to the question that you posed Mr . Melson. And I think part of your problem is, is that we may be skipping the first step in the process. Fundamentally you can't determine -- no pun intended -- but you can't determine whether space is available in a vacuum. You have to look at the use to which the space is going to be applied.

If you take, for example, the area between the bench where you're sitting and the table where we're sitting, that area that's there may be perfectly suitable for the, quote, "traditional" physical collocation-type arrangement that Mr. Carver talked about in terms of building fire-rated walls and those sorts of things.

But what do you do if the -- and let's say, just for argument's sake, that that's 100 square feet. And so you would follow through, as Mr . Melson has
suggested, in terms of going to the first person in line and seeing how that space might be dealt with and it would be, as Mr. Melson said, they may decide to build fire-rated walls and that's the end of it, and there is no more space.

But what do you do if the only space that's available in the office corresponds to the area of this table and the one that the Staff is sitting at? Let's say that also is 100 square feet.

Now, clearly, if you have what amounts to an aisle here, you can't build fire-rated walls around that. You can't segregate that space in the way that a lot of the physical collocation arrangements have been segregated in some of the offices that we've visited. But nevertheless, there's this 100 square feet that's represented by this table here that's perfectly suitable for a rack which two or five or ten different carriers may be able to utilize.

If you look just at that traditional
definition of caged fire-rated walls collocation that BellSouth wants you to accept, you would say, in the office the only thing that's available is this floor space represented by this table, there is zero square footage available for physical collocation. When, in fact, you could put a rack down this table or this
aisle and indeed serve one or two or five or however many ALECs would get into that office. And indeed, to the extent that you're building a rack here, you would, as Mr. Melson suggested, go first in line and maybe the first ALEC only wants to put a box that's 2 X 2.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: What if the first ALEC wants the fire walls, wants it segregated --

MR. SELF: Well, and in the example that I'm posing by this -- the area represented by this table, you can't do that. You couldn't build fire-rated walls. You couldn't get in this space. This is only 24 or 30 inches wide.

COMMISSIONER CLARR: What I'm getting to is, do we determine the space and let the first in line -first in line and BellSouth negotiate. Are you suggesting that we should say, "here's this space and here's how we think it should be utilized and the first in line can't have all of it"?

MR. SELF: No, I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is, in order to get to the very first question, how many square feet of available space exists in each of the six offices, you have to not be restrained by a single definition of physical collocation.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me put it this way. Isn't our task to determine what they need currently and what they need in the future, identify the square foot and say, "have at it. Here it is. You guys decide how you're going to do it. First in line negotiates."

MR. SELF: Yes. That's true. But what I'm saying is --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So why do we have to get into deciding what kind of collocation takes place?

MR. SELF: Because that's going to determine whether there's any space that's available. That is the threshold problem. Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm not going to determine what you need for collocation.

MR. SELF: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm just going to say what the square footage is available.

MR. SELF: But my point is, is if Bellsouth says to you, in the Lake Mary office there is zero square feet available -- that is, of course, their position.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: What is that going to be based on? That's going to be based on what they
need to meet their current and future needs. That's the estimate we're gonna make.

MR. SELF: And it's also based upon their definition of physical collocation, which is this caged --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: NO. I'm not even going to consider that. I'm just going to say, "here's what I think you need now and in the reasonable future and here's the square footage. Start with your first person."

MR. SELF: I concur with the start with the first person. But I'm saying, you can't get to that question unless you know how -- what kind of space exists and the kind of use that it can be put to.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, what I'm suggesting to you, Mr. Self, is I don't need to concern myself with the way you want to use it. I just want to be concerned with how they're using it, if it's efficient, what they need in the future. And then I take the whole building and I say, "Here's what you need. I subtract out what you don't need and here's what you guys can negotiate on."

MR. SELF: And all I'm suggesting is, is with the language that we want to retain in here, my witness, for example, wants to be able to say,
"There's 'x' number of square feet in this corner that's available for some kind of physical collocation arrangement." And I want to help you get to that point, but $I$ can only do that if I'm -- if I'm allowed to say, "This area over here might be susceptible to this kind of physical collocation arrangement only."

This big area here might be susceptible to three or four different kinds of collocation. I don't know. And $I$ don't want you to resolve specific uses of it. All I'm trying to say is in order for me to convince you that there is, indeed, space left in the office, $I$ have to be able to tell you that $I$ can put a rack here and that fulfills the requirements of the Act.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Thank you,
Mr. Self.

MR. SELF: Thank you.
MS. BARONE: Monica Barone, representing

Sprint.
Commissioner Clark, I just would point out that the FCC's First Report and Order at Paragraph 585 indicates that state Commission's will determine whether sufficient space is available for physical collocation. And $I$ don't know if this is a matter of terminology or just the way we're viewing this, but it
appears that BellSouth believes the Commission should only consider how much space is available. But the inquiry does not end there. The commission is first to determine how much space is available, and then the second inquiry is, is there sufficient space for physical collocation.

So the inquiry doesn't just end with how much space there is. The Commission is to take the second step and determine whether there is sufficient space for physical collocation.

And when you get to the second step, this will lead to analysis of the different types of physical collocation arrangements available. And then consideration of alternative physical collocation arrangements may, in fact, lead to a different conclusion as to whether there is space available, and therefore, should be part of the consideration.

As such, we did do not believe that parties should be prevented from putting on the evidence to demonstrate that there's sufficient space and I would encourage the Commission to keep that language in the issue. This is going to allow the Commission to develop the record it needs in order to determine whether space is available for physical collocation.

We've talked about 100 square feet. We've
talked about 200 square feet. Mr. Self has just discussed what if you're in a situation where you've got a limited amount of space and we only look at a traditional collocation arrangement, then the inquiry is, no -- the answer to the question is no, there is not space, when, in fact, there could be. And we, too, have a witness that is going to get on the stand and demonstrate to you that there is space in all six central offices and we want that opportunity to do that.

Should there be concerns -- BellSouth has concerns, it can raise those concerns in the context of this proceeding. But I'm real concerned that it would be too limited by excluding this language. And I think the Commission's inquiry should be extended to not only how much space is available, but is there sufficient space for physical collocation and an analysis should extend further.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Thank you.
MR. HORTON: Commissioner, I think on behalf of e.spire we support including the language in the issue, but comments that I would have made have already been made so we'll adopt those.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Ms. Auger. MS. AUGER: We're also supportive of the
comments that have previously been made and I'd like to -- I have one concern in relation to the questions that you've asked the other parties. And it seems to me that one direction that at least you're headed is, if we're going to determine raw space and you all go back and negotiate, my concern about that is Issue No. 3, that has been agreed upon and is not in dispute is, should these petitions for waiver be granted? And you're -- that issue is there. You're going to have to get to that. And I guess, how can we determine if it can be granted? What's going to be the threshold? How much space is available or not available to meet the threshold for Issue No. 3?

So I just reemphasize that same position.
And I think that the alternative arrangements need to be considered, or the collocation options, however we want to label them, need to be considered in determining whether or not you can grant the petitions for waiver after you've made the determination of there is this many raw square feet available in this space. Other than that, I won't reiterate what's been said.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Wiggins.
MR. WIGGINS: Yes. I'd like to make an appearance, too, and apologize for not being here for
the normal way.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: I didn't even notice. It must just -- I mean, I noticed you were here. I didn't really notice that --

MR. WIGGINS: I'm so sorry I mentioned it. I would like to make just two simple points.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Who are you representing?

MR. WIGGINS: Intermedia Communications.
COMMISSIONER CLARR: Okay.
MR. WIGGINS: First of all, for example, it's my understanding that Bellsouth will not let Intermedia share collocation space, for example, with e.spire. That it has to be either with BellSouth or not. So if we want to say to you, "we would like you to share -- consider sharing arrangements in a space," and you said, "we're not going to consider that," then the answer to the waiver could possibly be yes, there is not space for -- there is only space for one, but there's not space for more. Or it could be no, there is space for -- collocation space for two people.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I don't see us doing that. I see us saying, if what we need to do -- if we need to grant or deny the waiver, Ms. Auger is saying that not only -- that we have to go through that
two-step process Ms. Barone suggests, but how that is used is something subject to negotiation. And it strikes me if Intermedia wants to share, you've got to find out who is first in line and see if they want to share with you.

MR. WIGGINS: That actually goes to my second point and I will come back to my first in a moment. That has to do with the process. I can well understand how this Commission and BellSouth and, actually, I think us, would not like this to be a proceeding where you say, "okay, Intermedia, you get this corner over here and e.spire, you get this and I want you guys to run the jumper cable here." I don't think anyone is saying that. What I do think is true as a matter of process is that this is kind of like the "fram man." The Commission is going to have to pay --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: The what?
MR. WIGGINS: The "fram man." You know, you pay him now or you pay him later.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Oh, the "fram man."
MR. WIGGINS: In terms of -- because from my perspective, if, let's say -- I'll use e.spire because we've cooperated in the past -- comes in and negotiates a -- is first in line and negotiates an
inefficient use of the space so that Intermedia's precluded from using it, I would advise my client to file a petition here with the Commission and a complaint in order for you to address that and establish that, in fact, since it is a scarce resource, I think as Mr. Melson was talking about, that there is an obligation under the Act to use this sparse resource in an efficient way.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Where does the Act say that? What does it say specifically in that vein?

MR. WIGGINS: It says, "The duty to provide on rates, terms, conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory." And I interpret the word, "reasonable" off the top of my head is requiring an efficient use in order to promote competition in the three ways of entering competition in the market: resell, unbundled --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
MR. WIGGINS: Back to my point about the process is that I think from our perspective what we're saying is, that when you look at this case for waiver that says we don't have space to collocate, that you can look at that in terms of, okay, here are the finite kinds of collocations that would occur, then you can make a ruling about that. And that
ruling will, in fact, help the negotiation process and will, in fact, help this be resolved on a bilateral and multilateral negotiation basis. But if you ignore it and just take this as a light switch, on or off kind of thing, then in fact, what is happening is you're sowing the seeds of future litigation and Commission proceedings, and we would all like to avoid that. That is essentially my point.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Ellis, I sort of skipped over you. I'm sorry. Did you have anything to add?

MR. ELLIS: John Ellis on behalf of TCG South Florida. We would join in the comments of the carriers who support including the language in Issue 2 which would allow the Commission to consider alternative physical collocation arrangements.

I would just add one comment. Unlike the first two cases involving Supra, it seems that in these six cases, at some point the Commission will come to the point where there will be insufficient space for carriers who seek it and will not be able to simply say, "We find 'x' space available between BellSouth and one other carrier, negotiate a way to use it."

Such that if there is this situation, now is
the time for the commission to consider whether, as Mr. Melson's client proposes, parking lot space or adjacent office lease space is reasonable. For that reason, we believe the language should remain in the issue. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CLARR: Mr. Carver, I -- you're free to -- is there anyone else who needs to make any comments?

MR. DIMLICH: One question, if I could. David Dimlich on behalf of Supra. You mentioned in response to -- I forget your name, sir.

MR. WIGGINS: Wiggins.
MR. DIMLICH: I don't think $I$ was talking about you.

COMMISSIONER CLARR: MS. Auger.

MR. SELF: Mr. Self.

MR. DIMLICH: Mr. Self. Floyd Self. Yes. Excuse me. You mentioned that the procedure you're going to go through, you're going to take the amount of space that BellSouth has, you're going to subtract and you're going to come up with a space to be negotiated. Say you come up with one square foot. Are you going to tell us to negotiate over that? I mean --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, you know, I was
going to ask Mr. Carver to respond to the notion of what Ms. Auger suggested that, well, that won't answer the question as to whether you're going to grant or deny the certificate. You've got to decide if there's, you know, 200 square feet, is that enough to collocate, so you have to reach the issue.

And, I guess, Mr. Carver, you're going to have to answer that and you're going to have to answer a sort of policy question. Wouldn't it be beneficial to you to have our view as to what we think is acceptable physical collocation and what is not?

I mean, for instance, with respect to the parking lot. If we said, "Look, you don't have to worry about that. We're not going to consider that as physical collocation. Here are the kinds of things we think you do have to deal with." And it may save time and effort in the negotiations. It will not avoid the negotiations.

So those are the two things that I think you should respond to, but, of course, you're free to respond to what you want to.

MR. CARVER: I'm sorry. What was the first thing again?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: The notion that we cannot determine whether we should grant or deny the
certificate unless we go through the second step. We first determine how much space is available and then we've got to decide is that sufficient for collocation. And the only way you can decide that is, what are factors and appropriate -- whatever the language is -- what are the factors and what's alternative collocation. How do we get there without making that determination?

MR. CARVER: I think we have kind of a wording problem in terms of the issue. Because the way it's framed is, what factors or alternative physical collocations should be considered. And I think what that suggests, and the basis upon which, I think, BellSouth has been proceeding, is that there is a traditional fairly well accepted notion of what it means to have physical collocation.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask it a different way. Can we break this up into two questions like Ms. Barone suggests? How much space is available that is not currently needed or in the foreseeable future needed by BellSouth.

And the second question is, is that sufficient for collocation, and then you get to the notion of what kind of collocation is possible.

MR. CARVER: Well, and I think --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Can we do that? Are you going to agree to that?

MR. CARVER: No, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
MR. CARVER: I agree with the first part of it. I think the question of how much space is available is the critical issue. If you look at it -and there's going to be, I think, a fairly full factual record in the case to base your determination on. And if you decide that there's no space available at all, you know, nothing large enough even to put a piece of equipment in, then you don't need to reach all of this. If you decide --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I would agree. If -well, $I$ don't know.

MR. CARVER: If you decide --
COMMISSIONER CLARR: I guess the argument could be made one square foot is possible. But --

MR. CARVER: Could be made, but I don't think that's a very plausible argument, to be candid. I guess the other --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: GO ahead.
MR. CARVER: I'm sorry.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: GO ahead.
MR. CARVER: Okay. So that's a possibility.

The other possibility is that you might determine that there is so much space available that whoever is first in line has plenty of room to collocate the
traditional sort of way. And I've heard about all these alternate arrangements. Some of them may request and some of them may be feasible. But I have to presume that all things considered, if someone had the opportunity to go into a central office and to have their equipment separate from the equipment of other carriers, and to have fire walls and to have it placed where no one else could have access to it and there's a door going to it, that's what they would want. I can't imagine why anybody would choose to have their equipment --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But you have to give it to them. And in that sense, wouldn't it be better to have sort of direction from us that says you don't have to give it to them. You can require them to -you can negotiate and say, well, the Commission has indicated that's too much and you can collocate other ways and that way it can be used more efficiently.

MR. CARVER: Well, the problem with that is all the things that I mentioned before. I mean, what you're really getting into is a generic proceeding on every possible collocation arrangement and how much
space it takes. And, you know, the devil is in the details. And as you know from the last case, this is a very fact-intensive and fact-specific process that has to be gone through.

Here's my concern. Let's say that you make a determination that there are 100 feet and you say, "We don't know if that's enough or not, so, you know, go look at whatever the first person in line wants to do and make a determination, but you should consider cageless collocation."

Well, cageless collocation means a lot of different things. I mean, if someone who's talking about an enclosed collocation, then we probably would agree to it. If they're talking about taking equipment and commingling it with open people's equipment on a single rack, we might not agree to it. So -- in fact, we probably wouldn't because we wouldn't view that as being practical or secure.

So, it would be great if we could have a policy determination. But my concern is that anything general enough to be appropriate on the factual record that you're going to have, based on these particular central offices and on what the parties are going to say, is not going to be very useful. And anything specific enough to be truly useful is not going to be
appropriate in the context of this docket because you have parties who aren't necessarily first in line and you haven't made a determination about how much space.

But people are going to come in with all of these different proposals. And I'm really at a loss to know how you would sort it out and say, "There are, you know, 15 different types of collocation that have been proposed and we find that five of them will work if you have 50 feet of space and three will work if you have 25, and one takes 500." I mean, that's really incredibly expanding the scope of this proceeding and $I$ think it's going to be complicated enough as it is.

So $I$ think the difficulty is, is that, again, anything that you can do that will be general is not going to be much help, and anything that is specific is not really appropriate in the context of where we are right now.

One other thing $I$ want to say is that the question here about collocation, I mean, Mr. Self raised the issue of having basically equipment put on a particular bay and not begin segregated. I mean, that's what we typically view as being virtual of collocation. So if someone wanted to virtually collocate because the physical space is exhausted,
they certainly have the option of doing that. And that's one of the problems as I've heard people talk is, they're taking the line between physical and the line between virtual and sort of blurring it and turning the inquiry to sort of, is there any space anywhere and can we possibly stuff something into that space.

And again, $I$ think that's more than you need to determine here. I think the question in this docket should simply be, is there space available? And to the extent you determine that there is space available, then whoever is first up in that central office can make whatever proposal they deem appropriate. If you say that there are three feet and they look at it and say, "we can't do anything with three feet," then I guess the next person would have that option.

But it seems to me, I mean, to go back to Mr. Wiggins' pay now or pay later, I guess I categorize it as decide now or decide later. It seems to me like to the extent you have to look at alternate proposals, it's better to wait until you have a specific collocator who has a right to collocate, who has a proposal, and in which you're dealing with space and you know how much and where. I mean, I think
that's going to be incredibly difficult to decide in a vacuum, again, with a degree of factual specificity that would be helpful in negotiations.

So while it would be great to have a policy statement if we could, $I$ just don't see how it can appropriately come out of this docket.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Anything else?
MR. CARVER: No, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Staff, do you have -- I take it you want the language in because it was what you had recommended?

MS. KeAtING: Well, actually, no, but let me explain.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
MS. REATING: First let me back up a little bit and explain how it got in there in the first place.

We originally had something similar in the issues that we proposed in our first workshop with regard to these dockets and we had hoped to take it out because we thought it was unnecessary to have that specific language. We thought that it could just be what factors should be considered. But BellSouth had indicated -- counsel for BellSouth had indicated that any testimony that was presented regarding the space
necessary for alternative arrangements, they would move to strike that testimony. And so after discussions regarding that, that language was reinserted and that's how we got back here, is the dispute over the language.

Staff would actually prefer that it be taken out, but we would like to see some clarification from you that any -- that any testimony regarding alternative arrangements or the space necessary for alternative arrangements would be allowed.

One of the things that we think is real
important, and I know --
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you this question. Could we phrase it the way Ms. Barone indicated is, how much space is available and is it sufficient for collocation? Isn't that what we have to decide?

MS. KEATING: That is essentially the main question that needs to be reached.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And if we did two -- if we broke those up into two issues, how much space is available and is it sufficient for collocation, then you're going to have to take testimony on what kind of collocation can be done and how much area it takes to do it.

MS. KEATING: I think you can get to the answers that you need to reach either way.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm persuaded that we need to do the two-step process. Let me tell you that.

MS. KEATING: Okay. Either way I think you get to the same thing, and that is, a dispute over whether testimony can be presented regarding the space necessary for alternative arrangements.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I appreciate the concern you have, Mr . Carver, and I have that same concern. But we are going to have to look at the facts for each of the offices and it may be that it develops that in a particular office one type of collocation is available and another is not.

But we will have -- and I don't think it will be generic in the sense that this is entirely a generic process. It's sort of developing what may be a generic policy statement on what kind of collocation is authorized. But we're in the very sort of beginnings of trying to determine what physical collocation can mean. And it strikes me that we -- in order to either grant or deny your waiver, we're going to have to look at how much space is available and is it sufficient for collocation.

I don't -- you know, I'm not sure if this language is what we need to do, but I'm inclined that we do need to do that process and I think you agree with that. Staff agrees with that.

MS. KEATING: We do agree with that. I just wanted to add that Staff doesn't really foresee the Commission coming down and making some pronouncement as to which arrangements are appropriate and which offices.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: No. But we have to grant or deny the waiver.
ms. Reating: Right. And it has to be a waiver from the requirement to provide physical collocation.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.
MR. CARVER: May I say one thing?
COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes, you may.
MR. CARVER: I don't really see how, if you're going to consider alternate arrangements and basically take the stance that you can't grant a waiver of physical collocation if alternatives to physical collocation are available --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: NO. NO. NO. FOCus on the fact that I think you have to go through a two-step process. You have to decide what's
available. What you don't need. And then you got to say, "Is that enough for collocation?" And what's being suggested is you can't make that determination until you know how you might accomplish that.

MR. CARVER: And I think the problem with that is, let's say, for example, you determine that there are 25 feet available and someone says, well, that's enough to -- well, as Mr. Melson suggested, to run, you know, a cable out to some kind of mobile vehicle parked in the parking lot.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.

MR. CARVER: You're necessarily going to have to look at running a cable out to the parking lot and then determine not only is that a form of collocation, but is it a technically feasible form, is it a safe form.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But don't we have to do that to grant or deny your waiver?

MR. CARVER: Well, I think in part it's going to depend on the first fact finding. If you find that there is no space at all then you can grant it. I think basically -- and part of the problem is, is that waiver is, you know, yes or no. I mean, there's no gray on that. It's black and white. And I think what we would be comfortable with is that if you
basically said, "You know, there is very limited space available. It's not adequate for collocation as BellSouth conceives it. But whoever is first in line can make proposals to them and that should be negotiated."

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let be back you up. You said as BellSouth conceives it.

MR. CARVER: Right.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: It strikes me that we've got to decide what physical collocation is. It's not up to you to say --

MR. CARVER: Right.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: -- it's this and nothing more.

MR. CARVER: Well, and I was just suggesting that based on the facts you could look at it and say there's not enough here to do it the way BellSouth thinks it should be done. But -- and it's a very important but -- whoever is up first is free to try to negotiate something with BellSouth. And like, for example, someone made the comment that we won't consider sharing arrangements. That's not true. I mean, there are certain circumstances under which we would consider sharing, assuming we had the consent of both the parties. And I think fundamentally what you
get down to is a question of whether we are going to follow the procedure that's appropriate under the Act and let parties negotiate that, or whether before the fact you're going to prejudge what kind of alternative arrangements are appropriate.

And I'm just suggesting that once you've made that determination as to how much space is available, I think your work is really done for now and at that point it should be up to the collocator and BellSouth, whoever it is, to try to work it out. And if they can work it out, fine. If they can't, the issue may come back up.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So what we could do is say if there's four feet of space available, you're not getting your waiver. And then let you work it out.

MR. CARVER: I think that's a possibility. I mean, I hate to advocate denying our waiver, but it seems to me like if it's in that gray area that's basically what would happen. You'd make that determination and then you would say, "Okay. Whoever is up first, if you think you can do something with four feet try, to negotiate it."

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Briefly from
somebody. I know, Monica, you wanted to say
something. I will hear from you briefly, but I'm ready to conclude this oral argument.

MS. BARONE: I'll make it real quick. I just wanted to point out that the burden is on BellSouth to demonstrate that there isn't sufficient space. And $I$ was concerned that if the issue remained the way that Bellsouth wanted it, that it would be bent to their view on what physical collocation arrangement is appropriate and then we'd be back here before you again.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you a question. When is this hearing?

MS. KEATING: It is May -- hang on. COMMISSIONER CLARK: When did you think -MS. KEATING: June 9th through l1th.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: All right. When does the decision have to be made on this? I know the sooner the better, but --

MS. KEATING: Testimony is not due until -MR. SELF: April 5th.

MS. KEATING: I would suggest within the week.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: This week or a week?

MS. KEATING: A week.

COMMISSIONER CLARR: Okay. Anything else
that we need to take up?
MR. SELF: Commissioner Clark, if I may, I think the consensus at the table is if you wanted to split and have a separate issue, something to the effect of how much space is available and is it sufficient for collocation, I think all of the ALEC parties would agree to that.

MR. DIMLICH: I just have one consideration. The first question, how much space is available, this is going to be answered by the Commission in terms of numbers, not yes or no; is that correct? If so, then I have no problem with it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. I don't know. You know, I mean that's certainly something to think about, and I guess, Staff, you'll need to come see me.

MR. CARVER: If I may add one thing? If it's going to be a "how much" kind of question, I would think you would have to come up with a particular number as sort of the predicate to consider whether that's enough for anything.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, let me ask it this way. If you're faced with this -- the way it's worded now or the way it's worded, how much is available and is it sufficient -- another issue is, is it sufficient -- which one would you rather have?

MR. CARVER: If those are our only choices, I would prefer the second.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
MS. KEATING: Can $I$ just get a feeling from the parties? Would that be in addition to the "what factors should be considered?" Because it seems to me that there may be factors other than just whether there is space or not to consider and whether these petitions should be granted.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: What would that be?
MR. CARVER: Yes.

MS. KEATING: There may be local ordinances.
COMMISSIONER CLARK: That all goes to space.
If the requirements of the ordinance affects space, it goes to space.

MS. KEATING: That's true. I guess that's just the reason we had framed it as "what factors."

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Thank you all very much. The oral argument is adjourned.
(Thereupon, the hearing concluded at

2:35 p.m.)

STATE OF FLORIDA)
COUNTY OF LEON )
I, KIMBERLY K. BERENS, CSR, RPR, Official Commission Reporter,

DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Oral Argument in Docket No. 980496-TL was heard by the Prehearing Officer at the time and place herein stated; it is further

CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed by me; and that this transcript, consisting of 60 pages, constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.

DATED this March 22, 1999.

Kimberly \&. Bench
Florida Public Service Commission Official Commission Reporter


## CERTIPIED 61/7

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