# 1 BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 In the Matter of 4 DOCKET NO. 971065-8U 5 Application for rate increase in Pinellas County by Mid-County 6 Services, Inc. 7 8 VOLUME 1 9 Pages 1 through 110 10 11 PROCEEDINGS: HEARING 12 13 BEFORE: COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON 14 COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER JULIA L. JOHNSON 15 16 Monday, June 21, 1999 DATE: 17 TIME: Commenced at 10:00 a.m. 18 PLACE: Dunedin City Hall City Commission Chambers 19 542 Main Street Dunedin, Florida 20 21 REPORTED BY: H. RUTHE POTAMI, CSR, RPR 22 KIMBERLY K. BERENS, CSR, RPR FPSC Commission Reporters 23 24 25

**APPEARANCES:** 

RICHARD D. MELSON, Hopping Green Sams and Smith, Post Office Box 6526, Tallahassee, Florida 32314, appearing on behalf of Mid-County Services, Inc.

STEPHEN C. BURGESS, Office of Public Counsel, 111 West Madison Street, Room 812, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400, appearing on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida.

JENNIFER BRUBAKER, Florida Public Service Commission, Division of Legal Services, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870, appearing on behalf of the Commission Staff.

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## PROCEEDINGS

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(Hearing convened at 10:05 a.m.)

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Call the hearing -this microphone on? Okay. Very well. Call the hearing to order. We will begin by having the Notice read.

MS. BRUBAKER: Pursuant to Notice, this time and place has been designated for hearing in Docket No. 971065-SU, Application for Rate Increase in Pinellas County by Mid-County Services Incorporated.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. appearances.

MR. MELSON: Richard Melson of the law firm of Hopping Green Sams & Smith, P.A., P.O. Box 6526, Tallahassee, Florida, appearing on behalf of the utility, Mid-County Services Inc.

MR. BURGESS: Steve Burgess for the Office of Public Counsel, 111 West Madison Street, Tallahassee, appearing for the Citizens of the State of Florida.

MS. BRUBAKER: Jennifer Brubaker, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida, appearing on behalf of the Commission Staff.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. Let me take this opportunity first to introduce myself. My name is Terry Deason. I'm a member of the Public Service Commission. I will be chairing the hearing today and tomorrow. Seated to my immediate left is Commissioner Susan Clark, and seated to my immediate right is Commissioner Julia Johnson. We constitute a panel of Commissioners that will be hearing and deciding this matter.

Let me welcome everyone out to the hearing.

First of all, let me -- in case there are members of
the public who didn't realize who was speaking
earlier, let me take just a moment to identify those
persons.

Mr. Melson is the attorney. He made an appearance. He's representing the utility company in this proceeding. Mr. Burgess is representing the public. He is employed by the Office of the Public Counsel and is the attorney designated by the Legislature to represent consumer interest in matters before the Public Service Commission.

Seated here at the -- in front to my far

left are members of the Staff of Public Service

Commission. Ms. Brubaker introduced herself. She is
the Staff attorney. She works for the Public Service

Commission. She will be participating in the hearing,
conducting cross examination and assisting the

Commission in this matter.

Mr. Willis is seated to Ms. Brubaker's right. He also is a member of the Staff of Public Service Commission.

We have other members of the Staff of the Commission that are in the audience and you also were greeted by members of the Staff of the Public Service Commission as you entered the hearing room today.

As you entered the hearing room you should have been presented a special report that was printed on blue paper. It has all of the background information concerning the history and status of this proceedings and why we are here today. I would encourage you to review this information.

Also, the last page of this report is designed to be detached. It is for those members of the public who did not wish to make a formal statement here today, but who do wish to make comments to the Commission. You may detach this page, write your comments to the Commission and fold it and mail it to the Public Service Commission.

You also may reach the Commission via telephone as well as through Internet and things of that nature and that information is on the front page of the blue special report.

We are here today to hear from members of the public, which is going to be the first order of business. After we do that, we're going to proceed into what we refer to as the technical phase of the hearing where there will be expert witnesses presented by the utility company, by Public Counsel's Office and by the Staff of the Public Service Commission. There will be cross examination of those witnesses. Members of the public are welcome and invited to stay and participate and view that part of the proceeding as well.

There also will be a customer hearing this evening. I believe it begins at 6:00 p.m. And we do that to afford an opportunity for members of the public who may have conflicts during business hours so that they can come in the evening time and also participate in our proceedings.

I know there are some preliminary matters
that we need to attend to, but most likely it would be
better to do those after the conclusion of the
customer testimony unless there are some preliminary
matters which need to be addressed at this particular
time. Are there any such matters? (No response.)

Okay. Are there any introductory matters which I failed to address? (No response.) Very well.

Mr. Melson.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Deason, I believe the customer meeting for this evening was scheduled for 6:30 rather than 6:00.

commissioner deason: Okay. Let me correct that and I appreciate you bringing that to my attention. It's 6:30 this evening, not 6:00. I appreciate that correction. I think I was given some wrong information somewhere.

Okay. Members of the public who wish to testify, it's going to be necessary for us to swear you in. This is part of the normal procedure of the Public Service Commission. This is so that your testimony can become part of the official record of this proceeding. We have a court reporter with us today who is recording this proceeding. Your testimony, as I indicated, will become part of the official record.

After all witnesses are sworn in,

Mr. Burgess will call members of the public to come
forward. We ask that you come forward to the
microphone directly in front of the Commissioners and
begin by giving us your name and your address. If you
think it would be helpful to the court reporter you
may wish to spell your name so that it will be

recorded accurately in the record.

We ask then that you proceed with your statement, and to tell the Commission your thoughts on this pending rate increase, as well as your experience with the quality of service that is being provided by this utility company and any other relevant matters which you think could be useful to the Commission as we deliberate on this matter.

After you conclude your remarks we ask that you stay for just a moment because there may be some clarifying questions, either from the Commissioners, our Staff, or the Public Counsel's Office, or from the utility company.

And with that, I'm going to ask all members of the public -- let me ask this. Are all the expert witnesses in attendance here at this time as well? We can go ahead and swear in everybody at one time.

MR. MELSON: Ours are.

commissioner DEASON: I'm going to ask, members of the public that wish to testify, as well as all of the expert witnesses who will be testifying today and tomorrow, please stand and raise your right hands.

(Witnesses collectively sworn.)

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. Please be

seated. Mr. Burgess.

MR. BURGESS: Commissioners, first on my list is John Lomaka.

WITNESS LOMAKA: My name is John Lomaka, L-O-M-A-K-A. I live at 2555 Northfield. That's in Clearwater, 33761.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Sir, were you sworn in with the other witnesses? Let me go ahead and do that now.

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### JOHN LOMAKA

appeared as a witness and testified as follows:

## DIRECT STATEMENT

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you. Please proceed.

WITNESS LOMAKA: I appeared here before this group a year ago when there was a meeting like this and I had asked at that particular time for one of these Staff PAA recommendations. I filled it out and turned it in, but unfortunately I guess somewhere my I never received an request fell in the cracks. answer to it. But when I received this letter a couple days ago about this meeting I thought I would appear again.

I have gone through trouble and I went

through this trouble a year ago, and I stated at that time, I live in a building, six units in one building. There are 12 people that live in this building.

That's adults and children in six units.

In those six units we pay over \$300 every two months for service. And it's ironic that over four years we have paid \$200 for water, which is, I guess, a cheap commodity. But to get rid of that water it costs us almost \$900.

I have copies of my bills where the bills have increased from \$30 a month every two months to now \$50 every two months.

I don't really feel that the public is getting a fair shake out of this whole deal. Number 1, the federal government has told me anything over 1.8% in my pension is inflationary. I don't want to disturb the economy of the country so I live along with my 1.8% which is recommended by the federal government, and my railroad pension because anything over -- beyond that would be inflationary and would destroy the economy of the country. So we don't want that.

I came here a year ago asking what justified a 28% increase in a sewer bill. I really never got an honest answer and I get this letter today, this

special report, that tells me that their last increase was granted November of '93. And in the meantime, my sewer bill has gone from 30-some dollars to 50-some dollars every two months, so I gather I must not be reading very well or somewhere I'm missing the point.

Now, the young lady explained to me earlier that it was interim, but then I see on the same thing in this report that's given to us that the Commission recommended \$1.60 for 1,000 gallons and then our so-called PSC has recommended approved \$1.93. So, obviously, they feel -- maybe they don't agree with the 1.8% being inflationary, so it appears that anybody appearing here is wasting his time because it appears that our Public Service Commission is not really there to represent the people. They're to represent these people out of Illinois.

Now, I asked at that time, and I'd like to ask again, how do we buy into this company? If they can make that kind of money, I want to be a part of the action. Now, all I'd like to know is who are they; are they -- can people like me and little people like me to live in Northfield buy into this outfit? And I never got an answer then. I still -- and I would like to hear from somebody because to make that kind of money is better than my pension. I would love

to buy into that company because it's obviously making more money than Hillary can make. And I don't think it's an unreasonable request.

let me take just a moment and explain the -- what happened is, you're correct. We granted an interim increase, which is provided by Florida statute. Part of the normal course of processing these cases.

Interim increases, as you are aware, are subject to refund. And there may or may not be a refund later on. It depends on how this case is processed.

We issued a Proposed Agency Action Order which was what we as a Commission felt was a fair increase. The company disagreed with that and protested that saying that that was not enough. That was the \$1.60 which you referred to earlier. So we are here now to hear from the company as well as Public Counsel's Office.

The final amount could be greater or could be less than what the \$1.60 which we determined earlier to be a fair rate. That was without the benefit of a hearing. It was a proposed action. And there was a protest to that.

As far as whether this company is publicly traded, I'm not sure. Mr. Melson, is this company

publicly traded?

MR. MELSON: No, it is not.

witness LOMAKA: I wouldn't think so. To make that kind of money, no way.

commissioner deason: So that answers your
question then. It's not a publicly traded company.

witness LOMAKA: Well, the only question I have, Commissioner Deason, is it says here these revenues exceeded the test year by 28 -- 29%. And they have the nerve to come and ask for more.

I mean, Hillary turned 1,000 into 100,000 in 24 hours. These people are trying to exceed that. And I would like to be a part of that. And I think it's a reasonable request. And I think we should be allowed to buy into that outfit. If we want to support it, fine. And maybe the Commission can furnish us with the information as to how we can do it. Because there's too much money being made there and it should be shared by more than one little group.

mentioned earlier that you participated in this process earlier and that you requested some information. I assume that was the -- you requested a copy of the PAA order and you never received that; is that correct?

WITNESS LOMAKA: That's correct.

you. If we cannot provide that to you today, I'm sure that we can send it to you when we get back to Tallahassee. That provides information as to the rationale and the calculations which came up with the \$1.60 which you referred to earlier. But understand that was a preliminary decision and it was protested.

So it really -- it will be just a coincidence if the same result came out of this proceeding because basically we are here to take all of the evidence to determine if the amount should be less or greater than the \$1.60.

But we'll be happy to provide that to you and I'm sure that we probably can then provide you with the final order, which would be the result after this hearing and after we get back to Tallahassee and clear this matter up, which is scheduled for the end of August.

witness Lomaka: I would appreciate that because where I live it appears that we are one-third of the residential customers that they serve. And maybe I can wake up our so-called board that we have there because I've been talking to them, but I have nothing in writing to back me up when I talk to them.

And it appears that they need a little bit in writing
to wake them people up and give them numbers that they
can see and visualize because it appears that that is
why the board itself is -
COMMISSIONER DEASON: The PAA order would
have information concerning the company's investment;
changes in that investment since the last rate

have information concerning the company's investment; changes in that investment since the last rate proceeding; the level of their operating and maintenance expenses; their allowed return on their investment; things of that nature which probably would be useful to you. But realizing, again, that was a proposed action and we're going to be -- I'm sure there will be changes to that as we go through this process this time.

WITNESS LOMAKA: Okay. Thank you very much.

MS. BRUBAKER: Commissioner, I happen to have an additional copy. Mr. Lomaka, if you'd like to go ahead and take that.

WITNESS LOMAKA: Okay. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Burgess.

MR. BURGESS: Norman Phillips.

MR. PHILLIPS: Here.

commissioner deason: Sir, do you wish to come forward and make a statement to the Commission?

MR. PHILLIPS: No. I checked that in case I

had any questions. Seeing how the proceedings go, I 1 might have questions later. I have no formal 2 statement. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you, sir. 4 5 MR. BURGESS: James Crumley. 6 JAMES CRUMLEY 7 appeared as a witness and testified as follows: 8 9 DIRECT STATEMENT WITNESS CRUMLEY: Good morning. Good 10 morning ladies and gentlemen. How are you all this 11 morning? 12 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Sir, were you sworn 14 earlier? WITNESS CRUMLEY: Yes, I did stand and take 15 the oath. 16 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Very good. Thank you. WITNESS CRUMLEY: Okay. I have some 18 statements and some questions, both. And time goes by 19 so quickly, I just wanted to confirm some things on 20 the front of the sheet. 21 We started in September of '94 with the 22 first or the last request for a rate increase with 23 Mid-County Services; is that correct? And at that 24

time they were granted an interim increase from

roughly -- from -- I'm looking at numbers here; 1 roughly \$9 million -- \$900,000 to \$1.2 million. Is 2 that an interim increase that we're talking about? 3 And that increase has been in place since September of 4 '97; is that correct? 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: If you don't mind, can 6 7 we turn to Page 3 of that report? It may be a little 8 more useful. This is not --9 WITNESS CRUMLEY: I have it. COMMISSIONER DEASON: These are not total 10 revenue dollars. These are the rates that are being 11 charged to customers. 12 WITNESS CRUMLEY: Right. Okay. I have them 13 right in front of me. Let's take residential rate has 14 been or was \$1.51 per 1,000 gallons; is that correct? 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's correct. 16 it's my understanding that was the final rates -- that 17 was the rate before this filing and that --18 WITNESS CRUMLEY: Okay. What was -- the 19 interim they've been receiving \$1.93 per 1,000; is 20 that correct? 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's correct. 22 WITNESS CRUMLEY: They've been receiving 23 that for what period of time? 24

It would have been

COMMISSIONER DEASON:

after the September filing. I'm not exactly sure when it was implemented. Staff --

witness crumLey: So we're going on something like 16 months. Does that sound about right?

MS. BRUBAKER: Yes. December of '97.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So, yes, it's been well over a year.

WITNESS CRUMLEY: Well over a year. Okay.

All right. And it normally takes this long? And, of course, now we have a recommendation to go to a final, which is less than the interim. If that passes then they're going to have to rebate their customers what they've received then in excess funds during that interim period; is that correct?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. If the final decision is less than the interim, then there will be a refund.

first thing I have is a service issue. And I brought this up at the last hearing in 1997. I own 22 rental properties all on Park Lane which constitute eight buildings. We have had a continuing odor problem with our sewer, particularly on the corner of Park Lane. It was addressed at the last meeting. I was promised

by the utility that some things would be done and I haven't heard from anybody. Okay.

**COMMISSIONER DEASON:** The utility company did not contact you?

witness crumLey: Not a thing. And I've had the engineer here. I've had engineer drawings of what they were going to do with the manhole problem and it's basically, not a step was taken. So if you consider that reasonable service, maybe that's something that you can deal with.

The other problem that I have -- and I think the gentleman here will admit to the fact that we've been discussing this problem for a long, long period of time.

I do have some general questions even on the rate changes. In my particular case I'm effected by the general services/multiple family category. So, in my category my rate increase -- first of all, I'm 30 cents per 1,000 gallons above residential use. I'd like to know why.

I would like to know why I pay more per treatment of water than a residential customer. And if the reason is because of sprinkling systems, I have an underground sprinkling system. I have a deep well. All of my units are done, so we don't use a dime of

that. I do not allow my tenants to wash their cars using this water. If you go through per family, we use less gallonage than the average residential customers.

I'd like to know why I'm being penalized to the amount of 30 cents -- I'm not being penalized in the base rate, but I'm being penalized in the gallonage. If it's being done for political reasons, let's address that. If it's because you want less stress from less people, let's address that. But is it legal, fair and just? I don't think so.

The other issue I have is, I noticed the mobile home parks were at \$1,595.45 flat rate. Every other group in here is recommended by the Commission to have an increase and yet mobile parks are looking at almost a 40% decrease. I'd like to know the logic of that one. I'm just using your numbers. I just looked at this five minutes ago.

And, of course, the other problem I have is the return on investment figure. I've never really found out what the initial investment was by this firm. This utility was bought from Dyna Flow Services, I believe. I've never been able to find out what the purchase price was.

I also know they did make some improvements

to the utility. But I always questioned the profitability of those improvements. I'd like to know who made the improvements; are they subcompanies of this utility that made the improvements; and are those subcompanies making a profit on the improvements, inflating the dollar value of the improvements, and then looking a return investment on that inflated amount?

Basically it is not unfair for any company to ask for an increase in operating expenditure, as long as it's justified. The problem is with this process, it's almost impossible to find that out. It is so difficult and so cumbersome and so complex sometimes.

The other problem we have as general citizens we don't normally have the time to invest in this that the professionals do. Obviously, the utilities have attorneys and specialists who are there to continually ask for rate increases. That seems to be the modus operandi.

You know, we just continually ask for a rate increase and the minute that we don't get that, we ask for another one and the minute we get another one we put another one in and I don't quite understand the system.

But could anyone -- I'll stop at this moment. And the questions just -- that I just asked, can anyone address some of those for me and help me a little bit with those?

commissioner deason: I will start with the last question, and that being; the level of investment, changes in that, and who made the improvements associated with that.

Those are issues which the Commission will be addressing during this proceeding. Any time the Commission changes rates it has to make a determination of the amount of rate base, which is the prudently invested capital of the company and its employees providing services to customers.

We look to see if there are any affiliated transactions involved in that investment. If there are affiliated transactions, it is -- we apply a test to that and the standard is that it should be no more than what would be required from the arms-length transaction. That requires audit and sometimes assessment by our engineers. But those are issues which we normally look at during the course of these types of proceedings.

witness crumLey: May I stop you for a second, Mr. Deason? At the preliminary hearings -- I

guess we call them those -- in 1997, we did have -actually I went to the utility's office and got a copy
of their operating expense sheet, their P&L. We went
through that. All of those items were addressed by
myself and other members. I think there was people
from Spanish Oaks subdivision that did a very, very
fine job of going through the P&L.

Is that part of what you're going to be -part of the problem I have is the time lapse. This
was a hot fresh item a year and a half ago. Now,
it's, you know -- apparently we're starting over again
and we're doing so because the utility's unwilling to
take the rate increase that you're recommending. Is
that the information that you're going to be
re-reviewing today? Is that part of this procedure
or --

you a definitive statement. Part of the problem that we're dealing with, and one of the preliminary matters that we're going to get to after the conclusion of customer testimony, is actually the type and number of issues which we're going to address in this proceeding.

It's been presented by the utility company that only those issues which were protested are

legitimate to be taken up at this point. I don't 1 think they're trying to limit the Commissioners from 2 delving into these areas, but I think they're trying 3 to limit Public Counsel from raising additional 4 5 issues. Public Counsel's position is that any issue 6 that they want to raise should be addressed by the 7 8 Commission. So we're at the stage where we've already had the PAA. And so I don't want to be accused of 9 prejudging exactly what all of the issues are going to 10 11 be. I would encourage you to stay and 12 participate. We're going to get into that oral 13 argument stage in this proceeding shortly and that may 14 15 give some enlightenment on how we're going to proceed further. 16 WITNESS CRUMLEY: Is Public Counsel here 17 today, by the way? 18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's Mr. Burgess. 19 From Jack Shreve's WITNESS CRUMLEY: Okay. 20 office? 21 MR. BURGESS: That's correct. 22 23 WITNESS CRUMLEY: Okay. Thank you very much 24 on that.

Now, as far as the

COMMISSIONER DEASON:

rate structure issue --

WITNESS CRUMLEY: Yes, sir.

commissioner deason: -- those are certainly very legitimate questions. I don't have an immediate response to you on those. If our Staff has some information they want to share, I will allow them to do that at this time.

But those are certainly legitimate questions and if it was not going to be gone into before, it certainly will now. Either I will ask the questions or my fellow Commissioners or our Staff will ask these questions to make sure that the rate structure is fair and reasonable.

thing, too, while I'm thinking about it that I could use your help on. When I built these buildings, as a contractor back in the early 70's, then the logical thing to do was to build a unit with a single water meter. So we have some units where we have three residences with one water meter.

In an effort to save money, conserve water and all the other right things, I've already contacted Pinellas County about putting three water meters on the building.

My problem is, that Pinellas County supplies

Mid-County provides the water treatment. my water. We have vacancy situations so we've already -- we've run into some problems at the county level with paying charges for water conservation, not because we're not conserving, but because we have a vacancy which throws or average gallonage all over the place. If you have a unit that has two vacancies for two months, the gallonage drops. When you put people back in it goes way up and it goes off the specter so I get paid --I'm penalized even though -- it's the system. Trust 11 me.

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So in an effort to do that, we are considering individually metering each unit, which would be the great way to get people to conserve. don't mind paying the expense to do that.

But the other problem I have is how to handle vacancies. If someone moves out right now, I pay the water. But there is a situation where you continue to pay sewer charges even if the unit's vacant.

So what I need to do is to see how that would be effected by Mid-County's policies. I don't know where that is. In other words, I would like to conserve water for the state of Florida. I have some policies that are keeping me from doing that

financially. And that's something I need to have addressed.

Also, one final statement, then I'll let you go. I understand that any company has a right to make a return on its investment. I'm not here saying that our services should be free. I'm not here saying that this company should not receive a fair return on its investment. I think they should. We need private companies like this to operate in the public sector. Not opposed to that at all.

I just want to be absolutely sure that this company is being run as efficiently as possible; that I'm not subsidizing mismanagement and that I'm paying basically for the best service that I can get. And that's where I need your help. Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Before you leave -I'm sorry.

MS. BRUBAKER: I was going to ask,

Mr. Crumley, you said earlier at the customer meeting
in '97 you spoke with an engineer. Was that a utility
engineer or a Staff engineer? Can you recall his
name?

witness crumLey: That was an engineer from the utility company. I met with some of the people from the utility company after the meeting and I'm --

excuse me for not knowing. I don't remember who exactly -- I think you chaired that meeting.

MR. WILLIS: Yes, I did.

witness crumLey: And I think we had conversation on this. The problem I have is we have an unusual design.

When this system was originally designed it started in the subdivision that I own property. It was added to. We took a mobile home park and added a mobile home park to it, and of course, it uses a lift station to do that. So the problem is, from various times of the day, the lift station pumps a huge amount of effluent -- if that's the right word -- into the system. It comes down to a rather shallow manhole, on which I own a number of properties on that corner and has to make a 90 degree turn.

The problem is, the liquids make the turn; the odors do not. So I have continuing problems with complaints on odor. The utility has looked at the problem. The utility has tried to make some efforts to take care of it. I'm afraid it's a major design flaw that needs to be corrected. We talked about bypassing the manhole, doing this kind of stuff. I even offered to contribute to repairing the concrete that had to be torn up, and basically it's a dead

issue with them. They've done nothing about it.

To be honest with you, I should have probably pushed more, but I didn't. But this has been -- I mean, if I had a dime for every time this has been gone over with this company I'd be a wealthy man. Does that answer your question?

MS. BRUBAKER: Yes. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Further questions?

You raised a question about the possibility of having the City install individual metering, but you're unsure how would that affect your wastewater billing?

Do you want some information on that so you can make an informed decision?

went through this. I'll try to give you the logic.

We went through an impact fee in Pinellas County and that made it financially impractical to add individual meters, if you pay the impact fees.

The bottom line was that my point of view with Pinellas County was that by me adding metering, I'm going to use less of a utility. I'm going to use less water. Why should I pay an impact fee? I'm going to use less.

They said, "Well, that's the rules." So I said, "Fine, I'll give you a bond. I'll put up a bond

for all the impact fees. You study it for a year. If I use less water in that year, period, you give me my bond back."

Finally, they came around to realizing that they were having a policy that was detrimental to what they wanted to accomplish. So they've agreed to install the meters at basic meter charges, which is fine. I've agreed to pay the plumbing costs to re-plumb the buildings.

My problem is, if I have a vacancy, which occurs in our business quite frequently, now I'm receiving no revenue, I'm not using any water nor sewer, is there going to be a minimum monthly rate that I'll be paying just to have the availability of the service and that could make it financially impractical for me to make this move?

So I've guess the point I'm making is, everybody in the state of Florida keeps talking about conserving water. But nobody seems to be looking at the policies in different local governments and state governments that make that a financial impracticability.

commissioner deason: Let me provide you some initial information and you may want to meet with our staff and maybe they can provide you some

additional information.

But if you'll, once again, refer to Page 3 of our report and the rate structure there, you will see that there is an amount identified as a base facility charge.

WITNESS CRUMLEY: Yes.

commissioner deason: It's my understanding
that that charge is assessed every month --

WITNESS CRUMLEY: That's correct.

commissioner DEASON: -- regardless of usage. So that if you do have a vacancy and that -- that charge would continue. There would be no gallonage charge. There would be no gallonage --

WITNESS CRUMLEY: Right.

commissioner deason: -- incentive, but it
would be the basis --

witness crumLey: Right. Well see, and the problem is at this point I supply the service. So I pay the base fee in my operating expense. And there -- whether there is a vacancy or not doesn't really matter because I'm supplying it to two other units or one other of the three units.

If I go ahead and put individual metering in, now we're going to take the base charge for the same triplex, from 30 -- well, let's take your

recommended final rate, \$29.31. That's going to go to roughly almost \$90.

The problem is, if the tenant -- even though the tenant is going to be the end user, if the tenant, who has now gone to Michigan, doesn't pay the bill, it gets billed back to the homeowner or property owner. That's me. So I see the potential of being billed back for base charges. Okay. That's not a practical reason for me to make this change.

so that's -- these are the little things. I understand that you have basic systems. But if water conservation is what we're all about, we need to look at some of these things and come up with some ways that -- because I'm one of a million small property owners in this state who are in this same situation.

We can't live with our tenants. We can't tell them, don't take a long shower, turn the water off when you're shaving. We try to instruct them, we try to limit them. But the best way to get people to conserve is to make them pay for the resource, bottom line. There are some policies like this that are keeping us from being able to do that. I think everybody losses from that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask you one further question. Do you have a 5/8ths by 3/4ths inch

1	meter now
2	WITNESS CRUMLEY: Yes.
3	COMMISSIONER DEASON: for all three
4	units?
5	witness crumLey: That's correct.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Just one?
7	WITNESS CRUMLEY: Uh-huh. Which works fine.
8	Services them.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. All right.
10	Thank you.
11	WITNESS CRUMLEY: Thank you so much.
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Burgess.
13	MR. BURGESS: Commissioner, Mr. Crumley was
14	the last customer listed on for those who signed
15	up.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, sir. Please come
17	forward. Come to the microphone and identify yourself
18	for the record.
19	MR. RUTHERTON: Bob Rutherton. I'm a
20	customer of the system and I have not been sworn. Do
21	you need to do that?
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, sir, I do. If
23	you would please raise your right hand.
24	

#### BOB RUTHERTON

appeared as a witness and testified as follows:

#### DIRECT STATEMENT

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Please proceed.

WITNESS RUTHERTON: My address is 2192

Marketa Drive in Spanish Acres subdivision. I am a customer of the system. I'm also the Director of Public Works and Utilities for the City of Dunedin, where you are today, and which is somewhat unique.

I'm familiar with the City of Dunedin's wastewater rates that we charge here and I've looked at the rates that are being proposed for this area immediately adjacent to our city.

I would like to say that looking at the calculations, they charge slightly differently; that they charge a big base charge and a small rate charge. We charge a small base charge and a high rate charge. However, when you look at the average consumption, the rates between the two utilities are very similar based on what they're proposing for their rates. So I, as a customer, would support their proposed rate increase. I think it is fair.

Also understand that when you operate a smaller utility, it's difficult to operate with the --

it cost you a little bit more to operate a smaller utility as it does a large utility. So I think they're doing a very good job based on the rates that I see.

I would also like to say that although they are transferring about 9.5% to their profit, if you will, the City of Dunedin transfers about 15% to their general fund for administrative expense. So while we don't call it profit, we do transfer it to offset the cost of our taxes. So I think it's a pretty fair rate increase that's been proposed and I would support it as a customer.

My office is right around the corner here if you need any input about what we do in Dunedin. I'm here all day. My office is right around the corner. Thank you.

commissioner DEASON: We need to ask you a question. You indicated that the city -- that the City of Dunedin rates are comparable, but they're weighted more towards gallonage and less on based facility.

WITNESS RUTHERTON: Yes. That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Could you just explain
why that is your policy.

WITNESS RUTHERTON: I think that the reason

we've done our rates that way over the years I think is towards water conservation and trying to get people to conserve, not only because we control your drinking water and your sewage, as your consumption goes up, so does your bill.

In fact, our water rates are a true block water conservation rate system where the more you use the more you pay per 1,000 gallons.

Pinellas County's water rate system is not really truly a block water conservation rate structure. But we're very concerned about water conservation in Dunedin. In fact, we restrict either one day a week watering in our city, where the county allows you two days a week watering.

So we have -- like to encourage water conservation so we have kept the heavy cost, if you will, in the gallonage charge to get those that conserve the ability to conserve through the rate structure. And I think that's a good way to do it.

However, I understand on a small utility you have to probably heavily weigh it. To make sure you have a good base income for your utility, you have to really probably weigh it more towards the block charge to make sure you're revenues are pretty constant.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Questions? Thank you,

sir. Let me ask, are there any more members of the public who wish to testify? (No hands)

Let the record reflect that there are no other members of the public present who wish to testify at this point.

Let me state again that there will be a customer hearing this evening at 6:30 and we will hear additional comments from the public at that time.

Let me just, at this point, request of the utility that if there is any information available concerning the odor problem which was mentioned earlier, whichever witness would be appropriate to do that, to address that, assuming there is no objection from Public Counsel, we'll entertain any information you may have on that situation and bring us up-to-date on that.

MR. MELSON: Yes, sir. That may be a person who is not scheduled to testify, but who is here today and we will put him on the stand to answer that question when we get to the appropriate time.

commissioner deason: Please remind me when would be a good time for that. That concludes the customer testimony phase of this proceeding. We will proceed now to the technical phase of the hearing.

(Whereupon, the service hearing ended at

10:40 a.m. and the technical hearing commenced at 10:41 a.m.)

the technical phase of the hearing. There are some preliminary matters which I mentioned earlier which we need to attend to at the beginning of this phase of the hearing. And so, I propose that we go ahead and at least do the preliminary matters, and after we conclude the preliminary matters we will probably have a break before we actually begin with expert testimony. So we're at the stage now to address the preliminary matters.

MS. BRUBAKER: Commissioner, there are several preliminary matters. If either of the parties have any preference as to the order, Staff doesn't particularly. Otherwise, I will just go ahead and proceed.

The first matter that I had was with regard to official recognition. The Staff would like to request that the Commission take official recognition of several documents and we've distributed to the Commissioners a memorandum which lists those documents and also to the parties.

Normally copies of documents would be provided along with a memorandum. Unfortunately,

those documents are in Tallahassee at the moment, and 1 with the Commission's discretion and the parties' 2 allowance, they will be provided upon the return to 3 Tallahassee. 4 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is there any 5 objection? 6 There appears no objection, and 7 MR. MELSON: in fact, they are all Commissioner orders so we don't 8 need to receive copies of them. We will save a tree 9 or two. 10 MR. BURGESS: We have copies and we have no 11 objection. 12 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Very well. MS. BRUBAKER: But I'd like to ask then that 14 the special Staff memorandum as to those items be 15 entered into the record at this time. 16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: We will identify this 17 list as Exhibit No. 1 and without objection it will be 18 19 admitted into the record. 20 (Exhibit 1 marked for identification and 21 received in evidence.) 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okav. Other preliminary matters? 23 MS. BRUBAKER: There are several proposed 24

stipulations, four of which are addressed in the

25

Prehearing Order. I can read them into the record if you like or we can refer to them by reference.

There is also an additional stipulation which was raised pursuant to a deposition at Staff's request of Mr. Carl Wenz, utility witness, on June 7th.

That stipulation is, the parties stipulate to the 1996 insurance expense amounts, allocation rate and debit and credit amounts shown at the bottom of Page 2 of 6 of Exhibit HYS-1. That is an exhibit to Staff witness Hillary Sweeney's testimony. With the understanding, however, that the parties are stipulating as to the correct dollar amounts, and not as to their appropriate ratemaking treatment.

commissioner DEASON: And that's the only other additional stipulation, other than the ones that are already listed in the Prehearing Order; is that correct?

MS. BRUBAKER: That's correct.

commissioner DEASON: Okay. Commissioners, what is your preference as far as addressing the stipulation? Are you prepared to move forward then at this time?

commissioner clark: I would move approval of the stipulation.

**COMMISSIONER JOHNSON:** Second.

commissioner DEASON: It's been moved and seconded. Show then that without objection the stipulations listed in the Prehearing Order, as well as the stipulation which Staff counsel just addressed, are approved.

matter of clarification, the stipulations addressed in the Prehearing Order have to do with stipulating to two witnesses, Charles Winston for Staff and Don Rasmussen for the utility. Just as a matter of clarification, that cross examination is waived and that we'll insert their testimony into the record at the appropriate times.

commissioner DEASON: Right, and we will address that at that time, and insert that testimony with the understanding that cross examination is waived.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Deason, just for the record, at the prehearing conference, there was some verbal discussion of the stipulations and of the limited nature of a couple of them is that we were not stipulating to some collateral implications that they might have. That's reflected in the transcript of the prehearing conference. I just wanted to make sure

that those stipulations are accepted with the clarification that was made at the prehearing conference.

MS. BRUBAKER: Those clarifications are included in the Prehearing Order itself. If Mr. Melson doesn't have a copy, I would be happy to read them directly into the record.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. As I recall -MR. MELSON: Actually, I withdraw that. I
had not sat here and read the stipulations as they
were written. I'm sorry.

really addressed in a factual situation and it was understood that it didn't address particular policy or ratemaking treatment, that those acts would or would not provide.

matter, at the prehearing, the prehearing officer requested that the parties prepare and file briefs discussing Issues A, B and C in the Prehearing Order. Ten minutes were allocated to each party to present their arguments before this panel as a preliminary matter. If you'd like to proceed with that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. We will proceed with that. Which party is to proceed first?

1 MR. MELSON: I suspect I am. 2 MR. BURGESS: Actually, it would probably 3 depend on the issue. With regard to Issue A, it's --Mr. Melson has come forward. With regard to Issue B, 4 we came forward. So it would seem like it would 5 depend on the issue. 6 7 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask this question. Mr. Melson, is your oral argument broken up 8 between the various issues or is it just one complete 9 10 package? MR. MELSON: It can be broken up if that's 11 12 the easiest way to handle it. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Very well. We will 13 address then -- we will begin with Issue A, and 14 Mr. Melson, you may proceed. 15 MR. MELSON: Commissioner, if the basic --16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Before -- could you --17 I will ask Staff counsel. For members of the public, 18 could you state what Issue A is so they'll know what 19 20 is being argued here. I alluded to it here, but Ms. Brubaker can explain. 21 MS. BRUBAKER: Issue A reads as follows: 22 "What issues are considered to be 'in dispute' for the 23

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You should probably

purpose of Section 120.80(13)(b), Florida Statutes."

24

25

read the statute.

MS. BRUBAKER: Okay. That Section

120.80(13)(b), Florida Statutes provides that

"notwithstanding Sections 120.569 and 120.57, a

hearing on an objection to proposed action of the

Florida Public Service Commission may only address the

issues in dispute. Issues in the proposed action

which are not in dispute are deemed stipulated."

commissioner deason: And just let me offer this. In layman's terms what we're trying to determine here are what issues are going to be addressed by the Commission.

There was a Proposed Agency Action issued by the Commission. The company timely protested some of those issues within that determination. Clearly those issues are before the Commission. There is a dispute at this point as to whether additional issues which have been raised by Public Counsel's Office are fair to be considered by the Commission, and that's what we're here on argument today. Mr. Melson.

MR. MELSON: Thank you, Commissioner Deason. Members of the Commission, the issue really is what is the meaning of an issue in dispute for purposes of 120.80(13)(b).

We believe that the fairest reading of that

statute is to read it that it relates to issues that are raised in a timely protest, proposed agency action order. That's the way, in a PAA process, that a party puts issues in dispute. If no protest is made to an order, than by operation of that, the law of that order becomes final at the expiration of the protest period.

We believe that the -- one of the purposes of that statute was to, I guess, address a concern as to whether when there is a protest, does the entire order become a nullity and you have to go back and relitigate every issue in the order, or are you limited to hearing -- the matters actually are put into dispute.

We believe when you read that in conjunction with your existing rules on protest, which require that issues be identified -- issues and material facts that are in dispute be identified, that you read that all together and it sets out a scheme where you don't spend your time and effort, and the parties don't spend their time and effort, unless somebody has cared enough about what is in a PAA order to make a protest and put it in dispute.

Public Counsel has the right, as you know, under the statute to appear in any utility case.

Public Counsel had the right to protest the order and had they protested it, they would have defined issues in dispute. And the utility, had it also filed a protest, would have added some issues to that. If Public Counsel had filed the only protest, those would be the only issues that we'd be here on today.

I don't believe this is an issue that you would ever squarely address in the context of limiting issues in a manner that got as far as this one has got and got to the hearing stage.

There are several decisions though, that you've entered that have, I believe, make it clear to me that my -- the utility's interpretation of the statute is the interpretation that various panels of this Commission, and the full Commission, has given to it in a number of cases since the statute was adopted. We cite four of them in our memorandum.

One was another case involving a sister company of this utility, the Lucy case. That case had a very complex procedural background that I don't intend to try to relate here. The bottom line is that when that case was proceeding to hearing on Public Counsel's protest of a second PAA order, this Commission issued an order that essentially laid out what issues were in dispute and what were not, and

said, in effect, that some of the issues that Public Counsel even had raised in it's protest were not fair game because they had not been protested in an earlier PAA order; and therefore, the resolution of those issues had been deemed stipulated throughout the course of that proceeding and Public Counsel's filing of a second protest to a second PAA order could not even open them up and revive them.

The next case --

commissioner Deason: Mr. Melson, you would agree that was a pretty unique factual situation with the way that course -- that particular proceeding occurred with the various protests and withdrawals and PAAs that were issued.

would also agree that your legal staff probably devoted more attention to the analysis of the issue in that order than they have in any other because they were trying to decide what to recommend to you about the issues in dispute. They made a recommendation.

That recommendation was adopted and we believe it's -- it not only set out the ground rules, but set out appropriate ground rules.

The second case we cite is a Florida Power Corporation case, which was on a motion to dismiss.

The statement in that case I think is dicta, because it did arise in a different context.

But in that case the Commission said we believe that Section 120.80(13)(b) Florida Statutes can be interpreted to effectively preclude a party from addressing at hearing any disputed issue in the PAA order that was not raised in that party's petition on proposed agency actions.

The utility in this case carefully crafted its protest to limit the amount of effort it was going to have to put into this case and to identify only issues that were in dispute.

Third order cited in my memorandum, a payphone deregulation order. Commissioner Clark, I believe you were the prehearing officer in that case and you ruled -- that case was a little unique, too.

MCI had protested an order and had filed a limited protest. The PAA order that was protested had a provision in it that left the docket open to consider some implementation matters, and what Commissioner Clark's ruling was, in essence, we can hold our hearing on those unresolved implementation matters at the same time we hold the hearing on MCI's protest. We don't have to say that the hearing is going to be limited to just what MCI raised because

there were other issues that had affirmatively been left open.

That's not the case here today. The only issues that are open are ones that the utility opened by its protest.

The final case we cite is a Florida Power -
COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Melson, before you

leave that one, and I believe I'm referring -- I have
a copy of your filing.

MR. MELSON: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I'm looking at Page 9 of that.

MR. MELSON: Yes.

commissioner deason: The bottom paragraph there, it indicates that the -- it says first Section 120.80(13)(b) limits parties to litigating the issues that were raised by a timely protest.

And I guess my question is, do you interpret that to mean that if there is a specific issue raised and addressed by the PAA order, that if that particular issue is protested, that only that issue can be litigated even though there may be some peripheral issues associated with that, that were not protested?

MR. MELSON: I think in content -- I think

it depends, frankly, exactly on the context. And the reason I say that, in a ratemaking proceeding we recognize that when you change, for example, the amount of plan and service you may change depreciation, you may change accumulated depreciation. And I believe to the extent that there are truly, what I would say fall-out issues, that where every -- you know, every bit of information you need to decide and flows from the issue that's protested, that those are appropriate.

In fact, our protest in this case listed half a dozen issues and then listed as a seventh issue any fall-out issues. We gave those as a couple of examples, to the extent they are effected by the matters that were affirmatively protested. In a nonrate case, Commissioner, I have difficulty thinking as I sit here of what would be a collateral issue within the meaning of that approach.

commissioner deason: Let me raise this question. We all know that the bottom line result of a rate proceeding is to set rates. It seems to me that, in essence -- and there are certainly nuances in every rate proceeding and some unique character in just about every rate proceeding. But, in essence, there are two fundamental issues in any rate

proceeding.

One, what is the revenue requirement of the company. Two, what rates do we establish to generate that revenue requirement. And there can be many, many subissues under those two general ones, but you're going to have those two issues in every rate proceeding.

In this particular case, you protested some issues which dealt with the revenue requirement. That is, how much revenue should this company be allowed to collect from its customers to afford the company an opportunity to earn a reasonable rate of return. You protested some of those specific issues.

I guess my question is, since you protested some of those issues which go into the overall formula of calculating a revenue requirement, does that make then every issue which affects a revenue requirement fair game?

MR. MELSON: No, sir, it doesn't. To take that approach would read 120.80(13) out of the statute. It would say, even though you have limited your protest, for example, to a rate base adjustment and the revenue requirement consequence of that adjustment, that operating expense items, which the utility did not believe were in dispute, which no

other party raised and put in dispute, would be open
and fair game, and I think you'd be undercutting the
whole purpose of that statute, which was to enable the

Commission and the parties to narrow the proceedings.

analysis -- does your analysis apply to the Commission itself? I know you've been saying when you referred back to the dicta and some of the opinions of the Commission, we talked about the parties. Would your analysis and your interpretation of this issue relate to the Commission? That is to say, you raised seven issues, and during the course, the Staff discovers something else they wanted to be addressed and Staff tried to add another issue.

MR. MELSON: Commissioners, let me give you two answers. First answer is, I think the rule applies to prevent the Commission or the Staff from introducing issues that were not protested.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: The law? You think the law?

MR. MELSON: Yes. You took your position, you made your preliminary decision at that PAA stage.

The second thing I have to say, though, is that's -- I think that is a tougher question and it's one you don't have to decide to make your ruling today

because the issues that are on the table that we contend are subject to that rule, are issues that were raised by Public Counsel. They're not issues that were raised by the Commission or by the Staff.

And as a matter of judicial restraint, I am not looking for you to give a broad ruling. I'm looking for you to give a ruling as to issues raised by parties.

we're interrupting -- and we're going to give you ample time because there is several questions on this issue. So I know we -- originally you were given ten minutes, but you're getting a lot of questions so I'm not going to hold that against you.

Now, I don't mean to be going ahead, but perhaps now is a good time for you to address this. In Public Counsel's filing they raise kind of a fundamental fairness issue and concerning the process which you were proposing today is the only issues that are specifically identified and protested are legitimate to be litigated at this phase of the hearing.

That, in essence, their argument is that if we follow that, we're going to have a proliferation of protests because everyone is going to protest to

preserve their position. In other words, the argument is, is that while we issue a PAA and the bottom line revenue increase may be fair and reasonable, there may by some issues concerning rate base that perhaps they disagree with, but they really agree with a lot of the issues concerning expenses. But on the whole, they kind of counterbalance each other and they can live with the bottom line numbering so they don't file a protest. And then perhaps to preserve the ability to litigate those issues they're going to file a protest even though they consider the bottom line revenue increase to be fair and reasonable. How do you respond to that?

MR. MELSON: I think any interpretation you give to this statute is going to have consequences for how your procedure is run. I think Mr. Burgess has raised a fair point there. I think that if you agree with me as to how the statute should be interpreted, parties are going to think very carefully about the necessity of filing protests in order to sort of protect themselves from what the other side might do.

I also suggest to you, though, that if I was advising a private client I might very well advise them to prepare to file a protest. And if one is -- you know, if a protest is not filed by the other

party, don't file. Or if one is not filed by the party, turn around the next day and withdraw it. I'm not sure you can do anything that minimizes the burden, that short of -- I mean, there are procedures on petitions for reconsideration, for petitions and cross petitions. There are procedures on appeal for appeals and cross appeals. It is possible that through rulemaking you could adopt those kinds of procedures under this statute, but given -- I think without a rulemaking, that to do that on an ad hoc case-by-case basis stretches the statutory language pretty far.

me to my next question, and you raised the point about the procedural process and appeals and reconsideration that basically a party has the ability to cross appeal or to file a cross motion for reconsideration and that's not part of the process here. And you suggested that perhaps we could, through rulemaking, allow for a cross protest, if that is the correct terminology. Do you think that we have the -- under current statutory language, the ability to adopt a rule which allows that?

MR. MELSON: Commissioner, I can't give you a top of the head answer to that. I haven't really

focused on that aspect of the issue. In a way, it's an approach that has some intuitive appeal, I think, and would have some intuitive appeal to many of the folks who practice before you and it might be something that nobody would ever question whether they would point to a precise place that gave you that authority.

commissioner clark: Mr. Melson, that is going to be a procedural rule and how are we going to be able to do a procedural rule when we're required, as I understand it, from the model rules, and I don't think we have much of an ability to vary from those.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Clark, because 120.80(13)(b) applies only to the Commission, and to the extent that rule is imposing different requirements on this agency than are applied on other agencies, it would seem to me it would be an appropriate case for an exception from the uniform rules. I know you've got some of them.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Don't we have to go to the -- it won't be our call finally as to whether we can have that rule or not; is that correct?

MR. MELSON: That's correct.

**COMMISSIONER CLARK:** We have to go to -- I forget what it was.

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MR. MELSON: I think you go to the Governor and Cabinet, but I'm not sure.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think we do, too. So in order to implement that we have to go to them?

MR. MELSON: I believe that's correct.

commissioner Johnson: Mr. Melson, in your opening statements you kind of went to the purpose of the statute, and I guess it's a relatively new statute, and you talked about administrative finality and efficiencies as being one of the purposes of the change in the language here.

Given the point that Chairman Deason made with respect to what is this really, if we go down the road that you'd like, it's going to cause even your client to maybe file something that they may later have to withdraw or for Public Counsel to always file a protest. How does that lead to efficiency and finality, and how has that, in fact, then meet the purposes of the statute?

MR. MELSON: I guess I can't tell you that makes it a very efficient process. I think there are inefficiencies, in essence, no matter which way you interpret it. And it just seems to me, the more logical reading of the statute and the reading that this Commission or panel have given every time you

looked at it, is a reading that gives effect to what I think is pretty much the plain meaning.

commissioner clark: Mr. Melson, let me ask you one other thing. Was the Lucy case a panel?

MR. MELSON: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: What about the Power Corp. case?

MR. MELSON: Yes. Lucy was a panel, I believe with you and Commissioner Deason and I forget who the third one was. Here it is. It's in -- I think I've indicated the panels in the footnotes.

The Lucy case was Commissioner Deason,

Commissioner Clark and Commissioner Jacobs. The Power

Corp. case was you, Commissioner Clark; and

Commissioners Kiesling and Garcia. The payphone order

case that I referred to was you as prehearing officer,

and then the Florida Power & Light case, which I

haven't talked about, was the entire Commission, but

it was while Commissioner Kiesling was still on the

Commission before Commissioner Jacobs had joined.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You want to direct back to your case now since we interrupted you?

MR. MELSON: Yes. And I will address it very briefly. Again, a strange procedural context so I don't think it's directly controlling. But what

you've cited in that case is when an order is cited, one and only one issue, that a protest went to the entire order. I think, as I suggested to you earlier, that's distinguishable from a rate case where you decide many issues and they are, in large part, several. Thank you.

anticipated my next question. And that is, that
the -- you stated at the bottom of Page 10, and I will
quote that. It says, "because there was only one
substantive action in the PAA order and that action
was protested, the Commission ruled that the entire
PAA order was put in dispute."

And that was a fairly unique case. It was basically a question of whether we were going to continue with an earnings protection plan basically for the benefit of the customers and for the company. And we came out with a plan. We issued that as a PAA and there was a protest of that.

Now, that plan had various parts or segments of the various procedures that were going to be following if certain earnings levels were achieved and there were certain actions that were prescribed concerning depreciation and other matters, if my memory serves me correctly.

So they were many things that entered into the determination and that's what we were going to proceed with if there were no protests. But we did have a protest and we determined that, in essence, there was only one key issue, and that is, were we going to continue with this earnings plan for protection of the company and its customers.

And we determined that everything is in dispute because that was the one substantive determination. I guess I asked the question before about really in a rate case you only have two substantive determinations. One is level of revenue, and the second one being, what are the rates which would generate that revenue.

And it's your position that even though those are the ultimate decisions, since the order addresses and enumerates specific issues, that is what the key question is and if only one of those specific enumerated issues is specifically protested, only then does it become in dispute for purposes of Florida Statutes?

MR. MELSON: Yes, sir. And I was not involved in the Florida Power & Light case. It sounded to me, from reading the Commission's order, as though you essentially had voted on one issue; do we

continue the plan or don't we continue the plan.

The PAA stated in this docket, I mentioned it, said you voted on 20-some odd issues. And the Commission essentially, in the way it approaches these cases, recognizes those as several.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is there any legislative history to this provision?

MR. MELSON: I don't know. My legislative person was on vacation all of last week and I was, therefore, unable to complete my research.

asked for this. That we asked for this provision because we were struggling with the idea that a protest puts the entire case in dispute and there was no reason to do this and that it was intended to say, you know, here's the PAA. Now, if you got any problems you better say something, and those are the only things that we're going to look at.

MR. MELSON: I'm glad you had that legislative history because I think it supports my position.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, you know, that is sort of my recollection. I've been wrong before.

MR. MELSON: And I was not involved in that.

And, as I say, I have been unable to find anything.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Do you remember what 1 Susan, is that the --2 year it was?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I can say, it was -- I think since you have been on the Commission. When was it was enacted, Rick? Can you tell me?

> MR. MELSON: 1996.

MR. MELSON:

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Does that conclude --Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thanks, Mr. Melson. Mr. Burgess.

MR. BURGESS: Thank you, Commissioners. Ι think we need to start with the statutory language and I have -- as I have put it in my prehearing brief.

The beginning point is, the statute doesn't say what Mr. Melson would like the interpretation to It says that an objection to a hearing on an objection to a proposed agency action shall address only those issues that are in dispute.

You've got two different orders there, two different terms. You've got "an objection" and you've got "in dispute". You have to make those two equal in order to arrive at the interpretation that Mr. Melson would have. And I don't think it linguistically makes sense because if the Legislature had intended or if the Commission had intended with its request of

language saying -- sending over to the Legislature to restrict it to those which are in the objection, it would simply say, shall be -- the Commission may hear, may address only the issues raised in the initial objection.

In other words, if it had wanted that to be the interpretation, it simply would have said so. And the fact that it doesn't, I don't think -- I'm not up here to tell that you that it raises without any possibility to the contrary that the two are different, but it certainly raises the inference. So then we look at some of the procedural results of interpretation.

commissioner Johnson: May I ask you a question before you get to the procedural results? Then what does this provision add or change? What does it -- under your interpretation, would we be doing it any differently than we do before this Commission's act?

MR. BURGESS: Absolutely. I think it does two things and gets back to the question that Commissioner Clark addressed. I think the reason for it is two points; very interrelated but neither one having to do with the issue that we're talking about here.

The first being that you start off with the administrative process that says anything involving substantial interest shall be governed by 120.569 and 57. Those require certain things before a Commission decision can be reached. An appellate court will look for certain things to underpin a Commission decision; evidence in the record; application of a rule; nonrule policy, although that is in a little bit of flux right now; but all of these things of which a proposed agency action is not one of them.

A proposed agency action cannot underpin a Commission determination on an issue involving substantial interests of a party. So this says, notwithstanding 120.569 and 120.57, a proposed agency action will support a Commission decision. So it takes it out of the framework, the restrictive framework of 569 and 57.

The other point is --

commissioner Deason: Mr. Burgess, before you look at that, can you explain that again? I'm not really following the point you're trying to make in all honesty.

MR. BURGESS: 120.569 and 120.57 are what determine what the administrative process is for dealing with an issue that affects a substantial

interest of a party. There are certain things -- if you do have not certain things in the record in arriving at your decision then that decision cannot be upheld.

One of the things, of course, is the easiest thing is evidence of record. The other is whether you have simply taken oral argument and it's not and it's not an issue that involves a disputed issue of material fact.

The other is, as I say, you've got the means of -- right now that we're dealing with in a little bit of flux of the nonrule policy; applying policy.

The other is applying a direct rule.

All of these things can support a Commission decision. All of these things are applicable under 120.57, 120.569.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That doesn't apply for a PAA.

MR. BURGESS: A PAA is not one of those things. So if you are relying simply on a PAA, if a PAA is all you've got, it does not meet the model of 120.569 and 120.57. So this is saying, notwithstanding those two requirements, if it's a PAA, that does meet the requirement. Now, a record that includes only a PAA, that's all there is, that now

does meet the requirement.

And the second point is similar. It's exempting it from 569 and 57. But, it is filtered through a decision by the Supreme Court and this involves the South Florida natural gas case. And I'm not sure, Commissioner Clark, whether you were counsel on it or not. I see that Mr. Balinky argued it for the Commission, but you perhaps worked on it nevertheless.

This is the case wherein, if you'll recall, the utility said basically we filed something, nobody objected to it, therefore, there is no hearing to be had on the issues, and therefore, the Commission cannot put us to the requirement of meeting a burden of proof when nobody objected to it. And a court rejected that approach saying basically this. And again, I'll read some of the language.

This is -- 534 Southern 2nd and I'm reading at 695. This is the Supreme Court reading the position or reciting the position of the company at this point. "Further, because no evidence was presented by the Commission, no material issues exist, thus, precluding the Commission from a formal proceeding."

Their statement responds to that. "We

reject this contention. The act of filing creates issues of material fact for all factors comprising the justification for the increase."

Okay. With that being the filter through which 57 has to be interpreted, that means that the entirety of the filing is then subject to putting the company on proof. This is, again -- this particular statute is, again, exempting this from that strict process.

It's saying, under a PAA, notwithstanding that interpretation of 120.57, a company does not have to be put -- have to put on proof on all of those. If it's an issue that is not put in dispute, then even without the company putting on a case on that, the record nevertheless will stand to underpin the decisions in a PAA. Once again, the point being, simply to remove this from the process of 120.57 and is 120.569.

But, none of those points, none of those reasons have anything to do with changing the process under which issues are brought into dispute. Issues are brought in dispute through the Commission's deliberate process of the prehearing access.

And that, just like Mr. Melson said, yes, the model rules require that somebody filing a

petition can include all issues of material fact. But in that, the case is not limited to the issues of material -- to the issues brought up in the initial pleading. The case goes on, on all the issues that are defined, as the parties bring them through the deliberate prehearing process. And there's no reason to make that distinction here.

So I think that's the basic legislative history. That's why we're here where we are with this particular language and none of it calls for this restriction that it be tied to the original protest.

commissioner clark: Mr. Burgess, I need you to -- if we made a decision today agreeing with you, how could we reconcile it with our decision in the Lucy case?

MR. BURGESS: That's a difficult question,
Commissioner. It is a difficult situation because I
will agree with this.

Even though I don't think there's anything absolutely definitive or binding at this point, it does appear, as I look at the case, that the Commission's direction on this has been as Mr. Melson asserts. And so this will be contrary to that. You have a legitimate record upon which to base it and I think you clearly can, and simply say, this is the

proper interpretation. But it is -- yes, it does appear to be contrary to the direction the Commission is going and that's part of what is vexing me through -- excuse me.

commissioner clark: It is vexing to me too, because I would like to have a process that, you know, the parties kind of weigh what they want to do. That if nobody else protests they're going to be happy and it goes away. But if somebody else protests, well, it ought to be the same thing as a cross thing. If they're going to take it up you want to make sure that those things that you didn't agree with are taken up too, and I think the answer to it is to do what Mr. Melson said, is to establish the ability to cross protest in a very limited period of time.

MR. BURGESS: If I may address that. The only problem with that is if you adopt a rule within the statute that says, yes, you may cross protest, and you establish some procedure for it, I agree that that is a reasonable basis to do it. The problem is, if you do that, assuming the rule is not contrary to the statute, then that rule would be adopting an interpretation that "in dispute" does not mean relating back to the original objection. And if that's the case, if that's the interpretation, then

there is no reason to go through that at all because that's all we're saying at this point is to go through the Commission's normal prehearing process for identifying issues.

commissioner clark: Yeah, but I think what we're saying is to put it in dispute, you've got to protest it and -- but we're going to put up -- we're going to establish a two-step protest.

MR. BURGESS: I think that's fine. I just say that that is contrary to what Mr. Melson is saying that "in dispute" means in the original protest.

commissioner clark: Well, I don't think it's contrary if you don't say original protest, you say protest.

MR. BURGESS: Yes. You're right. You're right. If you say protest. I'm just not sure, if that's your interpretation, that it's then necessary to apply this as a shackle that it appears is driving this whole thing right now. Because to me, quite frankly, it appears that this very inadequate process from the standpoint of efficiency is being forced by this interpretation that is not necessary. I mean, even as we discuss this, what we're saying is, well, let's make some distinctions here. And so that's what troubles me.

And I guess, the only other issue on the -Mr. Deason -- Commissioner Deason covered the issues
that we would have with regard to the inefficiency of
the process.

The only other one that I would add to it is that it's not only offensive strategy, it's also defensive strategy. In other words, not only do I think in terms of, "well, I can raise these and I don't have to worry about the other side," also I have to worry about, "am I going to be --" there are two sides to this. One is, am I going to be able to raise the issues that I want to raise. The other is, right now, as I sit and try to decide whether to protest something or whether to take an appeal or whether to take a reconsideration, even if I've got a valid basis, one of the things that goes through my mind is, all right, I've got validity on Issues A, B and C, but as I read the overall result, the other side can raise D, E and F, and I'm worried about those.

So, I may be circumspect about raising the issues that concern me because I'm afraid of what the other side can bring forward.

Well, under this circumstance, not only do I not worry about the other side, if I come forward and have a protest, if the other side has already

protested, then I've got to protest these to get them in, and if they haven't protested, there is no reason not to. There is not that negative side. There's not that concern that the other side can hurt me more than I can hurt them.

commissioner clark: That's the beauty of the cross -- allowing the cross appeal.

MR. BURGESS: Exactly. That's exactly right. I agree 100%. And if it were set up to where there were some duration for which identification of issues is required, that's not something that I would necessarily object to. But I think once again, that does demonstrate that this statute does not strictly say that in dispute means only those which have been raised in the initial protest.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you this.

What is the language that allows for a PAA to begin
with? Is there a statute that allows for that? Is it
in 367 perhaps?

MR. BURGESS: I better not -- I don't know.

I will say this. That the term PAA is that -- my
recollection of the general term of art is not
proposed agency action, but intended agency action or
something along those lines, but I can't answer you
specifically.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I agree with you.

That's in 120. Notice of intended action is something an agency can give. But I think in our statutes we have -- we use proposed agency action. And my question is, is the language describing a proposed agency action require that all disputed issues be -- do they use that terminology "disputed issues" in the statute?

MR. BURGESS: Commissioner, it would be improper for me to try to answer that. I don't know. As I looked through the statutes to try to determine the other usages of "in dispute", I did not see it in there. I saw it in other areas where "in dispute" clearly meant -- as it's being practiced -- clearly meant those issues that are brought up in the course of the -- of normal prehearing process, just like in 120.57(1); it says "issues in dispute". And, of course, the Commission's interpreted that to be issues that come up in the course of the prehearing process.

I'd like to, if I could, just address a couple of other issues that you've already dealt with in discussion with Mr. Melson.

This is what I would say with regard to how it would bind the Commission or if it would bind the Commission Staff with regard to issues. We need

something definitive on this to know where it's going to be. This is by no means a threat. I'm just using this as an example.

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If you rule against us, if you rule with the interpretation that Mr. Melson has, and as a result of our needing to know definitively what the answer is, we take this up with the District Court, and the District Court sides with the Commission and with Mr. Melson and says, "yes, issues in dispute do mean issues that are raised in the objection," well, then I would argue that if that is the interpretation, then there is no room to say it applies to the parties, it restricts the parties, but it does not restrict the Commission. Because what it says is, "a hearing may only address the issues in dispute." That's all of That's not restricted to the issues that I wanted -- restricting the issues I want to raise or restricting the issues a utility wants to raise. That is a hearing.

And if that is the grounds for which -under which it restricts us in this case, that is,
that an issue in dispute is that which objected to,
what the language says is a hearing may only address
that. And I would suggest at that point that it would
bind the Commission, the Commission Staff, as well as

any of the parties.

Again, a result that -- I mean, sometimes we as parties are concerned when the Commission raises something that is outside of us, but we recognize that it's the Commission attempting to fulfill its responsibility to come up with overall reasonable rates and addressing everything, even if a party is not -- we recognize that. But I would say this. If this is read that way, the way it's instructed, it applies to all authorities in this and not just the parties.

commissioner Johnson: Could you address for me -- I was sort of like Chairman Deason with respect to when I first read your brief; really trying to understand your interpretation of this language and I think I get it now.

But the operative words here would be the, "notwithstanding 120.569 and 120.57," because you're saying, under those two statutes you could have an objection and raise other issues. But under -- because of this new statute, you can only -- no, you got to --

MR. BURGESS: There are two points. This is doing two things as I understand it. First, it is adding legitimacy to a proposed order just of itself

as supportive of a Commission decision without anything else. Whereas, before you get this, if you're dealing with just straight 120.57 and 569, there was the concern of, well, the PAA is really nothing. It's really nothing that otherwise exists in the Administrative Procedure Act that otherwise legitimizes decisions by the agency.

So the first thing is to create something that says a proposed agency action is itself the record evidence necessary to support it. And the second is to -- I assume, to prevent the application of 120.57(1) as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in South Florida Natural Gas, which basically said, every item that is the underpinning of a rate increase is the subject of a hearing. And this is saying, "No, not so. Only those items that are in dispute." And so it exempts it from that requirement. And that's what I understand the point of it being, the administrative point of this being, to make certain that exists.

Now, the argument could have been made that the process -- and the arguments were made -- that the process, as it existed before, could work. That is, the parties get together and they -- everything that they don't want to put on they stipulate, just like

you do in a conventional final suspend rate case. But I think there was a concern that what exactly it meant when you had a proposed action, which is defined elsewhere, and you had an objection to it that created a de novo hearing, what happens to the balance of the proposed action that parties don't want to dispute.

commissioner clark: But, you know, I don't think in you're first argument that it's so -- the PAA order itself can support a decision is accurate as one of the reasons it was done because 120 is already a provider for agencies to put out a notice of what they intended to do, and unless anyone protested it, it would be binding. So that has been legitimate since 120 was enacted.

MR. BURGESS: Except my understanding was, what was always complicating that situation -- that factual situation is, you put out a proposed agency action and somebody protests. Does that then -- and that causes a de novo hearing. Does it put you back to a de novo hearing on every aspect of that which is included in the proposed agency action, or only those parts of the proposed agency action that were not protested?

In other words, what happens to the balance of it? Is the status quo -- on those issues in which

nobody addressed, is the status quo what it was, what was last approved in the previous Commission order?

Or is it 120 -- or is it the proposed agency action?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, what was previously done was, was it in their petition or was it what the Commission did in the PAA?

MR. BURGESS: Yes. And this defines that.

This says --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. BURGESS: -- a reasonable record is that portion of the PAA which has not been brought in dispute.

In conclusion, I again, will recognize that it appears that the Commission has been going in this direction. And I simply say, I think this is a very, very problematic procedural result and the Commission clearly has it in its discretion to reevaluate this. The Commission is not bound by the statutory language to consider "in dispute" to be those items brought in the original protest. And so I recommend that the Commission allow issues that are raised in the normal prehearing process for which we already have a model to proceed. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Let me ask you one other question. If we decide that you're wrong,

that because you didn't protest it you have no ability to take them up, are you asking us to, nonetheless, take that evidence so you can preserve that on appeal?

MR. BURGESS: I had intended -- basically if you rule that way, I intended to make proffer of the evidence at the time Mr. Melson moves to strike that which we prefiled and to preserve it in that fashion.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. BURGESS: That doesn't do that much for me because for us to get something definitive it really seems like the Commission has to --

commissioner clark: In order to go up and get it decided -- and if it's decided one way, here's what it is, and if it's decided another way, here's what it is. It doesn't appear that we can avoid it. If they decide contrary to what we did, it would come back down to us for us to take some action.

would suggest is that if a party decides that they need to take it up because it's contrary to their interests in a particular case, and they think they got a good case, that it be sent up with the most logical interpretation which I think is the interpretation that parties can bring something into dispute during the course of the process that has been

used for every other case. There's no reason that that process has to be scrapped in light of the statutory language.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Deason, if I might respond for about 30 seconds on one point.

Mr. Burgess said in his memo and he said a couple times this morning, that in deciding what is in dispute you can look to 120.57(1) and see what the Commission's normal procedures are for defining issues in dispute.

I think Commissioner Johnson was starting down the right track when she pointed out that the statute starts with, notwithstanding 120.57, this is the rule. So I submit that the normal procedures under 120.57 are simply not a consideration.

MR. BURGESS: May I address that?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, you may.

MR. BURGESS: I agree with what he's saying that this says "notwithstanding", and it differentiates from that. And my only point is, it differentiates from that for the purposes for which I have spoken, not for the purposes of redefining the term "in dispute".

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Further questions?

Does Staff wish to add anything at this point?

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MS. BRUBAKER: I suppose it would be simply, Commissioner, to say that the PAA process is itself a unique animal. It's meant to streamline the administrative process, which is sometimes cumbersome, even at best.

It seems to me that it is distinguishable in the statute from a typical 120.57 hearing. Although I haven't done any exhaustive legislative history, my understanding has been that the statute was passed essentially to help further promote that efficient process and to keep away from re-litigating issues which were approved through the PAA process and were not protested.

commissioner Johnson: On the procedural point, I guess that's where this is a bit confusing because I can look at the statute and on it's face I'm more convinced by the arguments put forth by the utility. But when you say the purpose of the statute is to promote the efficiency and finality, policy arguments raised by Public Counsel make more sense.

It's like, if this is what we intended if we were the ones that brought forth this language, the Legislature intended for us to have a process that's more efficient and provide a finality, it strikes me that this language doesn't necessarily get us there,

unless we do maybe the next step of some cross appeal.

It's like we need to take one more step to get us

there because this isn't getting us there.

always been cross appeals. It used to be, I'm sorry to say, by the time I was practicing when it was -- you didn't have cross appeals and you went and stood to see if the other party was going to file. And you didn't file if they didn't file, but if they did, you put yours in right in behind them. And that was the strategy you had to watch, and that was clearly available to the Public Counsel in this instance.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Now, will we have the authority to do that in this instance? It's kind of to the issue that you raised, Susan, do we have -- are we bound by some model rule? And I know you addressed that somewhat, Mr. Melson. But if we interpret this the way that you did, you could then later argue that the law didn't give us the authority to do the cross appeal rule.

MR. MELSON: I think Commissioner Clark suggested the right analysis a little earlier, which is, statute talks about an objection to a proposed action. Today the only objection provided for in your rules is a protest. If you amended your rules to

provide that an objection can be a protest or a cross

protest, I think that would resolve some of the, you

know, concerns that you're expressing and would appear

to me that it would be consistent with the statutory

At this point, though, since you don't have that rule, the only objection in this case is the original protest, so we're a little different factual situation.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So just to be clear, the rule that we would adopt would go to kind of define the objection as the initial --

MR. MELSON: A timely protest or a cross protest filed within ten days, for example, like your reconsideration rules.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I see. Okay.

MS. BRUBAKER: Just as a point of clarification, Section 120.5475 Florida Statutes provides that an agency may petition for variance from the Uniform Rules. It would go before the Administrative Commission, the Legislature for approval.

Another point I'd like to raise is simply to make -- I think there is a distinguishing factor between a party who protests at the outset of the

language.

case, as in this case the utility did, and an intervenor, which OPC is in this case. Intervenor's legal precedent simply provides that they are, essentially, parties with a limited status in that they take the case as they find it. Our rules specifically provide for that. It may not be a perfect process, given the interpretation of the rule, but I think it is what was intended under the statute.

commissioner CLARK: So you're saying that because they're simply an intervenor and at the time they intervened the only thing in dispute was what is in the protest, they cannot now put anything at issue?

ms. BRUBAKER: For this type of case, yes,
that is my interpretation.

commissioner deason: And explain that further. You're saying regardless of whether or how we define the term "in dispute" in the statute, Public Counsel, by the fact that they intervened at the time that they did, that they're precluded from raising any additional issues?

MS. BRUBAKER: Well, it's really part and parcel with this particular statute, Commissioner. With the 120.57 hearing, I believe initially intervenors are allowed to raise certain issues in the prehearing process even though, once again, a rule was

provided that they take the case as they find it. I believe that in the context of this kind of situation, that means subject to 120.80, which means the issues are those that are raised in the timely protest.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But if we did the rule and they were -- did a cross appeal or cross petition, whatever we end up calling that, then they wouldn't be intervenors, it would be --

would be, in essence, a party in the way that somebody who files a cross appeal or a cross -- well, you wouldn't get party transfer, but party cross petition for reconsideration -- but it would put them on a party footing.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Uh-huh, got you.

commissioner deason: Commissioners, we've addressed Issues A. We still have two other preliminary issues that need to be addressed. Would your preference be to hear argument on those or make a determination on Issue A?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: To make a decision on

A. I think they can be bifurcated.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. We ought to make a decision. Staff has a recommendation on this,

right?

MS. BRUBAKER: Staff provided the Commissioners with an informal memorandum of recommendation, yes. Our recommendation is to adopt the utility's position that the issues of speed are those raised in the timely protest.

commissioner Johnson: I can move that, that issues in dispute for purposes of 80(1) -- 120.80(1) and 31(b) are those raised by they utility's protest and that means that Issues 5, 6, 9 and 10 shouldn't be addressed at the hearing. But, I would like to limit it and I think it was written in such a way that, just to ensure that we were ruling as it relates to the parties and that we weren't addressing the global issue.

And also that we look into setting up a rule to determine that cross appeal process, because though I read the statute on its face to be consistent with what Mr. Melson has argued, I don't believe it ultimately gets us where we need to be so that we would need to have a secondary process to allow parties to react in such a way that we will have the finality hopefully and the efficiency that I believe the Legislature intended.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I will second that

motion. I would point out that at the time this came up I believe parties who might have protested this were well aware of the decision and the implications of not protesting an issue.

motion to decide. Before we take a vote, let me just indicate my position on this, so that it doesn't catch anyone by surprise.

I'm going to disagree with the motion and going to vote against it. I'm persuaded by Public Counsel's argument that the terminology "in dispute" does not equate to a protest.

Now, I also understand that this is an area where there is some ambiguity and it certainly is an area where we need clarification, and I think the parties have indicated that this is probably going to be -- there's probably going to be clarification sought from the court regardless of what we do, and that's fine.

I'm also -- my vote against the motion, though, should not be interpreted as a vote against that portion of the motion which encourages or directs Staff to pursue a rulemaking remedy to allow for a procedure that would incorporate some type of a cross protest. I think that that would achieve the

efficiencies which we are trying to achieve by this particular statute.

Let me also say that I'm somewhat disturbed by the action that by issuing a PAA, that that and the motion's interpretation of "in dispute", somehow is limiting a party's ability to raise issues and perhaps infringes upon, in this case, Public Counsel's ability to properly represent customers before this agency.

I do realize and agree that there were other remedies available. Public Counsel could have filed protests within the period of time. But I think that is the inefficient way of conducting this.

So, with that clarification, the motion has been made. It's been properly seconded. All in favor say "Aye".

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: All opposed say,

19 | "Nay." Nay.

The motion is adopted. And that Issue A has been decided. And as was part of that motion, the issues identified will not be part of this proceeding, and at some time I assume that Public Counsel will attempt to make a proffer on that and we will do that at the appropriate time.

We can now proceed to Issue B. Mr. Burgess, 1 is this your issue to proceed or is this --2 MR. BURGESS: No, sir. This is not our 3 issue. We did not raise this issue. 4 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Melson. 5 MR. MELSON: He didn't raise Issue B. 6 raised Issue C, and I believe they should travel 7 together. It might be most appropriate to hear our --8 I would prefer to argue Issues B and C together. 9 **COMMISSIONER DEASON:** Is there any objection 10 to arguing Issues B and C together? 11 MR. BURGESS: I don't have any objection. Ι 12 just want it clear that I don't have anything to say 13 about Issue B. It's something that Mr. Melson raised 14 and if he's got a concern with the Commission's 15 authority then --16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: We will allow 17 Mr. Melson -- there doesn't seem to be a lot of 18 19 dispute on Issue B if you interpret it -- never mind. I will let Mr. Melson explain Issue B and you can also 20 address Issue C, and then we'll allow Mr. Burgess to 21 address Issue C. 22 Commissioners, the issue 23 MR. MELSON: Mr. Burgess raised is whether the Commission should 24

take evidence on a protested issue when the PAA

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granted the utility all the remedy that was sought on that issue.

I wanted to make sure that the Commission regarded that as a policy decision and not as a decision on their legal authority. But I think clearly you have the legal authority and, in fact, under 120.80(13) we just talked about the obligation to hear matters that are in dispute that had been raised by a timely objection.

Essentially, the utility in this case is suggesting a pro forma adjustment for some construction projects that were completed in 1997, shortly after the close of the test year, and the issue is how much of a pro forma adjustment. In the MFRs, the utility included a pro forma adjustment at an average balance. That was a mistake on the utility's part. The utility should have included a pro forma adjustment for the full balance.

In the PAA Order the way the Commission
Staff went through the mathematics of making the
adjustment pointed out to us the oversight in the
MFRs, because they said, we're going to give you the
entire amount of the project and then ended up with an
order which showed a negative balance in a
construction work in progress account, and therefore,

an offset, if you will, to what they had given us.

We raised that in our protest. And Public Counsel frames the issue as when a utility gets every dollar it wants -- every dollar that was identified in the MFRs as related to a specific issue, can it then protest.

I believe the Commission's precedent, and the correct policy, is that a utility's rate request is limited by the dollar amount of revenues that are requested. If there is a change in cost of capita, for example, up or down, prior to the time a final decision is made, that can affect the revenues awarded with the only restriction being you can't give the utility more dollars than it asked for.

The Commission has a long history of correcting oversights in MRFs; some up, some down, and so long as the case we put on, including the correct inclusion of that full amount of CWIP, does not cause us to exceed revenues that we originally requested, I think you got -- I think you got probably a legal obligation here. You clearly have the authority to hear it and hearing it would be consistent with your past practice. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Burgess.

MR. BURGESS: Yes. Commissioners, I start

off by citing to a previous decision where we've decided that only issues in dispute can be heard and I just want you to realize that what we're dealing with here is a situation where the issue is the utility's disputing the utility. Mr. Melson cites precedent as the Commission --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Excuse me, Mr.

Burgess. I hate to interrupt, but there is a noise and it is distracting. It seems to be some type of a beeper. (Brief pause. Beeping stopped.)

Okay. You may want to start over because it was distracting.

the Commission's authority to address this. I'm not questioning the Commission's legal authority. It's just a question of propriety in this case. We've got a situation where the Commission -- (telephone ringing) -- he's doing this, isn't he? Where the Commission -- where the company came in and they asked for a post test year, CWIP. CWIP a lot of times isn't even allowed a test year. Now, a post test year, CWIP and the depreciation expense on it. And the Commission gave it to them. And the company came back in and said, "No, we dispute that. That's what we want to put in dispute, that which we asked for and

you gave us."

It strikes me that this is something that as a matter of policy the Commission should not allow something to be in dispute when it's merely a matter of the company disputing itself.

Mr. Melson cites two things. He cites precedent to conventional rate cases. Well, we have earlier decided the conventional rate cases, the precedent for those don't have application here.

so, I don't think that's a valuable precedent to rely on and I simply ask you to consider, in light of the fact of two ancillary issues, that that is -- that rate case expense is being sought on the initial filing on the deliberation as to whether to protest this where the Commission gave it all it asked for, and now, on the protest itself of the issue for which the Commission made a determination, I think it's altogether improper for that to be allowed.

And the second point is, on its effect on the interim rates. The company sought interim rates on its initial filing. The PAA determined the amount of interim rates that were excessive based on the initial filing and now the company comes back in and protests the PAA, changing not a mistake; not an addition error; not something that everybody knows

would have been asked a certain way, but changing the regulatory philosophy under which they're seeking rates.

There's nothing unusual about the seeking of average balance CWIP, especially when it's based on post test year CWIP. And now to come in and say, "no no, we didn't want average balance and that was a mistake, and therefore, give us all of the mistaken amount and the new amount and the cost it takes us to correct the mistake," I think it is improper public policy.

question. We might correct it, but could we -- even if we corrected it, could we say, "well, you know, because you had to bring it to hearing and take a crack at it, the responsibility is yours and we're not going to allow rates case expense pursuant to that, and furthermore, we're not going to -- it's going to remain as part uncorrected in the interim because you should have brought it, but from this point forward we want to correct it"? Could we bifurcate it in that way?

MR. BURGESS: You could do both of those, and yes, you are correct. That would satisfy the peripheral objections that I raise. I think still, as

a matter of public policy, it's improper to allow in a protest of a proposed agency action, a complete shift in regulatory philosophy. It's like changing the test year.

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commissioner clark: Just so I'm clear, are
they asking for year end?

MR. BURGESS: It's not clear to me precisely what they're asking for. I will say this, and not intending to use denigrating terms, but it's sort of a hodgepodge of various projects; some of which took place; some of which were going on in the test year; some of which were going on in the post test year and the year following the test year. And there was an aggregate balance for all of these projects, I assume, when they were completed some point in the year after the test year. And they're asking for that ending balance to be in there and I don't think it's exactly a year end. And I don't think they exactly ask for They used a conventional short cut average balance. method for coming up with an average balance to expenditure items.

commissioner DEASON: You're not protesting the Commission's authority to address the issue? It's a question of whether it should be -- the adjustment should be allowed as a matter of policy?

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MR. BURGESS: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: So we can take evidence

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on it.

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I'm arguing against it. MR. BURGESS: think -- I think the regulatory treatment of its own, forgetting the procedural means through which the

company is seeking it, setting that aside, I think it is wrong regulatory philosophy. And I also say, though, that the procedural means by which it's seeking this, that is, changing its test year in a protest of a PAA wherein the PAA gave it what it asked for in the initial pleading, is simply something that the Commission should say, "no, we're not going to allow you to come in, ask for something and get that,

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Melson, I have a question for you.

Now that I've got this and have no jeopardy there, let

and say, well, that was easy. Let me ask for more.

Yes, sir. MR. MELSON:

me ask for more." I think that is improper.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And this relates to Page 13 of your filing, at the very bottom of the page, and again, for purposes of my question, I'll just quote what you say there. Beginning on the third line of that last paragraph at the bottom, you

indicate, "a utility's obligation for a rate increase
requests that the overall amount of revenues based on
test year conditions with any of the appropriate pro
forma adjustments. It does not request a specific
amount of revenues associated with each component or

subcomponent of rate base and expenses."

Mr. Melson, I find that totally inconsistent with your argument on Issue 1. I'm sorry. On Issue A. When I asked you about, isn't the -- in essence, the issue before the Commission the appropriate amount of revenue requirements. And if there is a protest to that, all of the subcomponents of that become fair game. You indicated no. That each issue stands on its own, each issue is -- can be litigated and decided in and of itself with no impact, except for fall-out issues, which I understand that.

But here for purposes of this argument, you seem to be taking the opposite position in that you indicate an application for a rate increase is an overall amount of revenue. And it's not the specific issues or the specific revenues of each component which is relevant. Can you clarify that?

MR. MELSON: I will try. The amount of revenues associated with this post test year adjustment is a severable issue. You can decide that

in isolation from all of the other issues in the case.

The question was, as a matter of policy should you alllow the utility to change its position on that issue in the context of a protest. And my only point here was that your precedent is that the cap on what a utility can recover is the total amount of revenues requested. There may be puts and takes within the subissues but you apply as an absolute limit the original request, and we're not seeking to change that approach or that policy. We're willing to live that as a cap. We believe below that cap you can deal separate with individual issues. I hope that was responsive.

your request, it is a dollar amount that you're requesting and you substantiated that request by various positions on the various subcomponents that go into that calculation. And that you're free to change your positions or your argument on any of those subcomponents just so long as those changed positions or arguments do not cause you to exceed the total dollar amount that you originally requested?

MR. MELSON: Yes. And let me give an overly simplistic example. Assume a situation in which the company came in and justified everything in the MFRs

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with two exceptions. One exception was a cost of capital because the Commission in the interim had adopted a new leverage graph that reduced the cost of capital.

The other change was, that the rate case expense prudently and actually incurred, exceeded what the utility estimated at the outset. And assume those two exactly balanced each other. The utility could still get the full revenue requirement that it requested in its application, despite the fact that the components of that revenue requirement have changed and that was my only point.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Any further questions? Staff.

MS. BRUBAKER: I don't have anything to add.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioners, any
final questions or a motion?

commissioner Johnson: I'm having a problem with -- based upon something Commission Clark said a little earlier. Perhaps because you raised some alternatives that we might have, I think that we do have the authority to hear this, and perhaps we should hear it. But in terms of what we do, maybe we should defer that until a final vote.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Absolutely. I think

the fact that we have the legal authority to take evidence on protested issues, if there is agreement on that, then it seems we may have to take the evidence if there's -- if we don't have the legal authority to say no. But what we do with that evidence is another matter and the implications of that and this --

MR. BURGESS: Commissioner, may I say this?
This has nothing to do with readdressing the issue,
but what Commissioner Clark said, I need to clarify
for the record. We are not stipulating affirmatively
that the Commission does have legal authority for
this. I want to preserve the opportunity in some
future case perhaps as the factual circumstances
perhaps change from this one, to argue that. I'm
simply saying, it's not an issue for us in this
particular case.

I just want to make sure that the record reflects that. That we are not affirmatively agreeing to the Commission's authority. We are simply not taking issue with the issue that Mr. Melson raised in this case.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. With that clarification --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We need a little bit

of clarification. Because as I read Issue B in conjunction with Issue C, there is a slight difference there. Issue B, of course, is legal authority, and I understand Public Counsel's position that they're not questioning that at this point, but they're preserving

that at some point if they wish to pursue it then.

Issue C, though, it goes to more -- Issue C is more like Issue A in that it's, should the Commission take evidence. I mean, on Issue A the utility was arguing that, no, you shouldn't allow Public Counsel to present evidence, and we've made that decision that we're not going to have that evidence.

Issue C says, should we even take evidence on this particular issue because of the factual situation that the company has granted all that they requested for that issue initially.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I just want to be clear that I think Issue A was not whether or not we could allow it. It's, what does the statute allow. It was a legal question as well as -- and as I understand it you're not taking issue at this point in this case, and if you don't take it now you won't be able to take it in this case with respect to that issue.

MR. BURGESS: For the record, I have no intention through the processing of this case at all to raise that issue.

commissioner clark: So it strikes me that it appears that we don't have the legal authority to say no to Mr. Melson; that you can't present this evidence because he protested. But what we do with that, we are not bound in any way to not take the action he's requested in protest.

to me can be read, is -- since we've taken a very narrow definition of what constitutes a protest to an issue within a PAA order, does the fact that you protest -- you say, "well, Commission we agree with what you did but we made the mistake, and therefore, we are protesting what you did because even though you did what we asked you to do, we didn't ask you the right thing." Is that a proper protest and does that meet the definition of "in dispute" for purposes of the statute?

commissioner CLARK: There is no party that is saying it doesn't. But that is what Mr. Burgess wants to preserve for another day.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And let me ask

Mr. Melson then. You believe that the terminology "in

dispute" in the statute means that "in dispute" means not finding fault or error in the Commission's decision, but finding fault or error in the filing?

MR. MELSON: If it means finding error in the Commission's decision, even if in this case it's an error that was, in part, the result of what the utility did, yes, sir.

MS. BRUBAKER: Commissioners, if I may.

Issue C speaks to Issues 1 and 1-A and with special specificity to Issue 1, which is, how should CWIP be treated in this case. Just as kind of a general statement, the Commission has in past cases looked to errors and oversights and made adjustments where appropriate, provided, however, that the total requested revenue does not go up. So there is some, I think, precedent for our ability to do that. It is --

commissioner Johnson: Specifically as the facts were presented to us today? By that I mean, where the utility got what they requested and then they determined that they made a mistake? Have we addressed that issue on its face?

MS. BRUBAKER: If I remember correctly the case I'm thinking of had an error in one of the schedules, but I'm afraid I can't tell you off the top of my head. That is right on point. But I know

corrections to filing MFRs have been made.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: It strikes me that Public Counsel, they aren't really objecting to those kind of errors. They're making this a special case and that these facts kind of stand alone because it was the utility's request. They got what they requested and Mr. Melson said that it was a mistake and now they're raising that as --

MS. BRUBAKER: I suppose, in part, it is a distinction. A utility is saying that an error was made. Public Counsel, I believe, is -- please correct me if I'm misinterpreting anyone's comments -- is saying that this is really just a shift of policy being made after the fact.

MR. BURGESS: If I may take that invitation, that the distinction is that in all the circumstances that I'm familiar with, that you're speaking of, that the company is speaking of correcting errors, it is within the case as it was filed and the distinction I'm saying is we've got a proposed -- we've got the Commission acting. This is after the Commission has acted on what the company filed and I don't know of any circumstance where a company has been granted something in full in a proposed agency action, come back and changed its philosophy from what it was

seeking and the Commission's entertaining evidence as to why that should be changed.

I understand. I've dealt any number of times with differences in numbers that come in in MRFs and that type of thing within the case, within a 120.57 proceeding. But I never encountered it and this particular type of thing that we have said is exempted from 120.57 type of process and has its own circumstances and its own proceedings where a company has come in and changed basically what it's seeking in test year.

purposes of moving this along, I'm going to move that we go ahead and take the evidence. I don't think -- I think we may have to do that. But with respect to whether we allow it or not, I think we have a clear policy decision we may want to make on this because there have been -- there are cases in -- where we went to a full rate proceeding and the utility was -- I think it was United Telephone, was continually updating their information. And the court said to us, at some point, you can tell them no more. We're not going to take it.

And as a matter of policy we may want to say, "once that PAA is issued, that's it. You're not

going to get -- you can have no further opportunity to correct it." We may want to say that. We may want to do it in this case, but we need to do it now.

commissioner DEASON: That's fine. I have no problem taking the evidence and we can proceed on with just one question, and perhaps the parties can think about it anyway.

What would have happened if Public Counsel had filed a protest in this case and the company had not filed a protest whatsoever and we now find ourselves in this phase of the hearing and you find a mistake and since you didn't file a protest, and consistent with your argument on Issue A, then are you free to come in and say, "this is not a protest. We made a mistake. Now we want to change our filing"?

MR. MELSON: No, sir, I cannot. And, in fact, the situation in the Lucy case in the second protest, Public Counsel had not protested rate case expense. We were faced with going to a hearing where we could not claim any rate case expense beyond that in the PAA. That was a result we weren't happy with, but that's what the statute required and we lived with it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: All right.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Second.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It's been moved and 1 seconded. Without objection show the motion is 2 3 adopted. Okay. That addresses the preliminary 4 5 issues. MR. BURGESS: Commissioner, may I raise 6 7 another preliminary issue that I was not anticipating? 8 COMMISSIONER DEASON: 9 MR. BURGESS: It is a motion that the Commission take notice of the Public Service 10 Commission order. That I apologize. I do not have 11 the order number and will provide it before this 12 hearing ends. But take official notice of the Public 13 14 Service Commission order establishing the current leverage formula for the purpose of establishing water 15 and wastewater return on equity. 16 MR. MELSON: We got no objection to that. 17 **COMMISSIONER DEASON:** No objection. 18 Commission will take notice of that order. 19 Okay. Other preliminary matters. 20 MS. BRUBAKER: One more from Staff, 21 Staff would like to make an oral 22 Commissioner. request that the Commission strike certain portions of 23 the prefiled rebuttal testimony of the utility of Mr. 24

Frank Seidman. I provided a page to the parties and

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Commissioners outlining those particular pages and 1 lines which we are requesting be stricken, and we're 2 requesting that they be stricken essentially for 3 hearsay purposes. And I can walk you through the 4 particular examples if you like. 5 MR. MELSON: Commissioner Deason, I would 6 7 suggest that we perhaps deal with this when we get to 8 Mr. Seidman's rebuttal testimony. That will give us an opportunity to look at it and respond to it in real 9 time. 10 MS. BRUBAKER: I think that would be 11 appropriate. 12 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: All right. We will take that up at that point. 14 MR. MELSON: Commissioner, I got some other 15 16 preliminary matters, but it's essentially in the form of identifying the MFRs as an exhibit and official 17 recognition list. It might be more convenient to do 18 that after a short break because I could pass some of 19 those things out. 20 Okay. Mr. Burgess, do 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: you have anything else for this matter? 22 MR. BURGESS: Did we take more than our 10 23 24 minutes?

I think that the

COMMISSIONER DEASON:

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questions prolonged the ten minutes considerably. Given that it's almost 20 after 12:00, let me say something. Let me ask a question. Are there places to eat close by? How long do we need for lunch, I guess, is my basic question. COMMISSIONER CLARK: That are places within walking distance. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Would 45 minutes be sufficient? I tell you what, let's go ahead and we'll reconvene at 1:15. (Thereupon, lunch recess was taken at 12:15 p.m.) (Transcript continues in sequence in Volume 2.) 

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