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3	In th	e Matter of	DOCKET	NO.	990696-W	S
4	APPLICATION FO	R ORIGINAL O OPERATE WATER AND	:			
5	WASTEWATER UTI	LITY IN DUVAL AND	:			
6	ST. JOHNS COUNTIES BY NOCATEE : UTILITY CORPORATION :					
7		CERTIFICATES TO : AND WASTEWATER : DO		OCKET NO 992040-WS		
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16	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN JOE GARCIA				
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19	DATE:	Monday, June 19, 20	00			
20	TIME:	Commenced at 9:30 a				
21		Concluded at 1:55 p				
22	PLACE:	Betty Easley Confer Room 148	ence Cente	r		
23		4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florid	.a			
24	REPORTED BY:	KORETTA E. STANFORD				000
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

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PARTICIPATING:

SUZANNE BROWNLESS, 1311-B Paul Russell Road,
Suite 202, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf
of St. Johns Counties.

MICHAEL TWOMEY, P.O. Box 5256, Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5256, appearing on behalf of Collier County and Citrus County.

DONALD R. ODOM, Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 1110, Tampa, Florida 33701, appearing on behalf of Hillsborough County.

KATHLEEN F. SCHNEIDER, Sarasota County Attorney's Office, 1660 Ringling Blvd., Sarasota, Florida 34236, appearing on behalf of Sarasota County.

JOHN L. WHARTON, Rose, Sundstrom & Bentley, LLP, 2548 Blairstone Pines Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of Intercoastal Utilities, Inc.

RICK MELSON, Hopping Law Firm, P.O. Box 6526,
Tallahassee, Florida 32314, appearing on behalf of Nocatee
Utility Corporation.

KENNETH HOFFMAN, Ruttledge, Ecenia, Underwood,
Purnell & Hoffman, PA, P.O. Box 551, Tallahassee, Florida
32302, appearing on behalf of Jacksonville Electric
Authority.

SAMANTHA CIBULA and TYLER VANLEUVEN, FPSC Division of Legal Services.

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Good morning. We're going to bring this hearing to order.

Let me give you some parameters. Susan Clark is leaving at 11:00. That means the rest of us are leaving at 11:00. Therefore, you should conduct yourself appropriately so that we can finish this hearing on time and this agenda on time.

Staff?

MS. CIBULA: At the May 16th agenda conference the Commission deferred consideration of the motions to dismiss filed by Nocatee Utility Corporation in St. Johns County in order to hear oral arguments pertaining to the Commission's jurisdiction over Nocatee Utilities and Intercoastal applications and the petitions for intervention filed in these dockets.

After the May 16th agenda conference, Nocatee
Utility withdrew its motion to dismiss. Also, after the
recommendation for the special agenda conference was
filed, St. Johns County withdrew the portion of its motion
to dismiss pertaining to res judicata and collateral
estoppel.

Thus, the portion of St. Johns County's motion to dismiss found in issue three of Staff's recommendation pertaining to res judicata collateral estoppel is no

longer an issue and need not be considered by the Commission at this time. However, the portion of St. Johns County's motion to dismiss arguing lack of jurisdiction under Section 3671717 remains.

Issue one in our recommendation, Staff is recommending that the Commission has jurisdiction to consider Nocatee Utilities and Intercoastal's applications based on the plain meaning of Section 367171 Florida statutes and the definition of utility found in Section 36702112 Florida statute, which includes proposed construction of a system and those proposing to ride service. Staff recommends that the Commission hear oral arguments on this issue first, as Staff believes that this is a threshold issue.

Staff suggests that each party and interested person be allowed five minutes to speak on this issue.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very good. And if there's no objection, we'll take Staff's recommended allotment of five minutes apiece.

Who wants to go first? Sure.

MS. BROWNLESS: Hi --

MR. WHARTON: I have a preliminary matter,
Commissioner Garcia -- Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Go ahead.

MR. WHARTON: We're here in the motion hearing

in a litigation. What I'm seeing on the board behind you Intercoastal objects to. It's not the law, so it must be facts. And if it's facts, it's evidence. If you need evidence to support the motion, the motion is premature. It's been handed out to all of you.

I guess, I could have hired a guy with a sandwich board to walk back and forth with something I thought was favorable to my case, but it's evidence. It shouldn't be part of this argument. It shouldn't be up on the board.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. It's been noted. Go ahead and leave it up on the board. That's neither here nor there. We're not a jury here or anything like that.

Go ahead.

MS. BROWNLESS: Due to the nature of this application, I don't know that five minutes for my presentation would be adequate. I have presented it so that I can or worked on it so that I can present it in 13.6 minutes -- 13 minutes, and I'd like to be allowed my 13 minutes.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is this the entirety of your argument?

MS. BROWNLESS: That's the whole enchilada right there. I mean, we are the party who filed the motion on

the subject matter jurisdiction. I just don't think five minutes is going to take me an adequate time to make my presentation.

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CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Who are you representing here?

MS. BROWNLESS: St. Johns County. And perhaps
we should also enter appearances.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Hang on one second. Maybe we can be generous here.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, Mike Twomey on behalf of the Board of County Commissioners of Collier County, Citrus County. I would echo Ms. Brownless's comments on the five minutes. We assume that she's going to be allowed to go first. She's the party.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Yes, sir.

MR. TWOMEY: It's her motion. I would suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, that this is, as your Staff's recognized, the matter of first impression. It's a highly important issue, there are five counties here to address you. I would urge you, let her go first. We will commit to trying to be as brief as possible following up on Ms. Brownless, but not to constrain us as to five minutes per se.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Gentlemen, what kind of time do you need?

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Garcia, frankly, it

depends on the arguments they make. I had thought 10 minutes would be sufficient. I have a concern, frankly, about Staff's proposal to take the issues in the order that they've enumerated.

We've got St. Johns County, which has been granted party status to this proceeding. We've got four other counties represented by three other counsel who have filed motion to intervene -- motions to intervene, that have not been ruled on. We have argued in our response they do not have standing and should not be permitted intervenor status.

I guess, it's my understanding that the

Commission probably intends to hear from them today, at

least as amicus, but it seems to me their status, as

parties or nonparties, is a threshold question that I had

thought the Commission would resolve first.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Staff -- hang on. Staff?

MS. CIBULA: Staff believes that the threshold issue is the jurisdiction issue. And if the Commission decides it doesn't have jurisdiction, then all the other issues with the petitions for intervention and the motion to dismiss would become moot. Therefore, we thought that was the threshold issue.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Furthermore,

you had said in your order that we would have the chance 1 2 to speak. Your Staff, in addition, is recommending that we would be heard, if for no other reason, as amicus. So, 3 I envision that we'll be allowed to be heard. 4 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: You envisioned correctly. 5 MR. TWOMEY: I would urge you to go ahead and 6 7 bring that up at the end whether we have party status or not. 8 9 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: It just strikes me --10 Mr. Wharton, you wanted to say something? 11 MR. WHARTON: Chairman Garcia, just to surprise you, I think five minutes is adequate. We've got a 12 13 50-page Staff recommendation and five counties singing 14 from the same song. 15 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I would agree, Mr. Twomey. I'm hoping that the counties aren't going to do a choral 16 17 presentation of the same material. So let's do this, if all of the Commissioners 18 19 are all right with it, let's give each person that's a 20 party or trying to be a party here 15 minutes. I expect 21 you not to be repetitive. If you're going to be 2.2 repetitive, I'm going to cut you off. 23 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask a question, 24 Mr. Chairman. Are you saying 15 minutes --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Total.

25

COMMISSIONER CLARK: -- per side. You mean per 1 2 side, not per party. 3 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: No, I can't do that, because I think there's a third side here to some degree. There's 4 one party that's been granted intervention, the party 5 that's seeking intervention, and then the parties before 6 7 us. And if --8 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think there are two sides 9 to the issue, though. 10 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Yeah, but -- you wanted to say 11 something? MS. SCHNEIDER: Yes, Mr. Chairman, Kathleen 12 Schneider of Sarasota County. 13 14 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Yes. 15 MS. SCHNEIDER: I believe there are two issues in this case; one is, obviously, the motion to dismiss and 16 17 the other is the petition to intervene. And the counties 18 have worked together to not be redundant. 19 However, five minutes per party may work out, because we have decided which person is going to speak. 20 21 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Well, good. I'll hold you to 22 that. 23 MS. SCHNEIDER: But we would request that we 24 have 15 minutes per issue. 25 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I think we can handle this

side here with 15 minutes. You've got 11.3, did you say, 1 2 13.2? MS. BROWNLESS: 13.2. 3 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: And then, total here we've got 4 5 15 minutes over here, because I don't think you're going 6 to take anymore. Mr. Twomey is known for being succinct. 7 So him leading off and whatever he misses, which is rarely, does Mr. Twomey leave any argument on the table. 8 So I think that's fine. Okay? Very good. You're first 9 10 up? MS. BROWNLESS: Yes, sir. 11 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Go right ahead. 12 13 MS. BROWNLESS: I hope I'm being heard. Am I? CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Yes. 14 15 MS. BROWNLESS: Okay, thank you. Suzanne Brownless, appearing on behalf of St. 16 17 Johns County. 18 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Suzanne, you changed the tone of your voice when you began. You need to speak up a 19 little bit. 20 21 MS. BROWNLESS: Okay. Suzanne Brownless, 22 appearing on behalf of St. Johns County. 23 What I want to do, briefly, with these maps is 24 just show exactly what is at issue here, which are 25 original applications for original certificates for water

and sewer service.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Before -- I want to make sure that there's no mistake here. This is 15 minutes per group, period. We're not going to come back. You're not going to argue issue two, issue three, issue four. This is it, all right? So work your arguments accordingly. Some of you have to be very specific about intervention, some of you do not. Okay? Is that all right? We all got it?

MS. BROWNLESS: Thank you.

And just to show, this is Nocatee's application.

This is based upon the legal description that they filed with the Commission. And the area that makes this a jurisdictional case is this little area right up in here, which is Duval County, okay?

Developed from their application, their legal description filed with the PSC, this is Intercoastal's requested service territory from the Commission. Again, you can see the same area here in Duval County. And there's a lot of additional service territory being requested for by ICU that is not being requested by Nocatee. This area right here is the area that Intercoastal currently provides service in St. Johns County.

And just for purposes of illustration, this is

the service area that Intercoastal requested from St.

Johns County Water and Sewer Authority in which the authority denied them. And you can see, obviously, that it does not include that portion in Duval County.

I think, I would start with what we all agree on. What we all agree on is that the applicable law is 3671177, which is the exception to the regulatory scheme that is found in 367171. It is a very simple regulatory scheme. Either the Public Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over water and sewer utilities or the county has exclusive jurisdiction over water and sewer utilities.

The sovereignty of the PSC to grant a certificate is no greater than the sovereignty of a county to do so. The sovereignty and the power of the PSC to regulate water and sewer utilities is no greater or no less than that of the county to do the same.

It is the interaction of your ability to regulate with your ability to issue an original certificate, which is the crux of this matter. And it all comes down to the exception or exemption language in 3671717. And that language is as follows, or at least the relevant part: Utility systems whose service transverses county boundaries.

Now, we interpret this language on its

plain-face meaning, utility systems whose service transverses county barriers as being existing utility systems, existing facilities, whose existing pipes physically cross county boundaries. Or in the alternative, systems who are existing, who are functionally related. And those relationships and those definitions are based upon the Beard case cited by all parties and the Hillsborough County case.

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I would suggest to you that if you just read this sentence, all the verbs are in the present tense and it implies that these systems are existing. Your Staff says that's not the case, and they point to one word in this phrase, which is utility. And they say since the definition of utility includes a proposed system, then you have jurisdiction over proposed systems as well.

Anyway, jurisdiction to grant an original certificate for appearably proposed system. And I would suggest to you, first of all, that that's not a plain reading of the statute. And second of all, that every phrase that's been interpreted by the district courts has been interpreted to apply to an existing system.

I think this is not clear on its face and, therefore, want you to go legislative intent. Your Staff has argued the GDU case, a 1990 decision on your part, for legislative intent. I would make a couple comments about

that.

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First of all, legislative intent has to be language that was actually developed by the legislature. And obviously, the GDU order is your order. It was not written by the legislature. It's not a Staff report, it's not a legislative tape, it's not a legislative or Staff recommendation, but it does indicate what you believe the legislature felt the intent of this exception was an exception, which under statutory construction must be narrowly construed, not liberally construed.

You listed a series of things -- a series of evils that you believed this exception was intended to prevent. And this series of evils had to do with similar customers in different counties being charged different rates for the same service, duplicative economic regulation in that there would be different service availability charges, different connection fees for the same existing system in different counties.

In other words, different regulatory policies being applied to an existing utility, which just happened to be located in several counties. If you look at the exact details of that case, it's very apparent there, because you had Charlotte County, Sarasota County, and Hillsborough County all attempting to regulate GDU system, a system that had treatment facilities in one county,

customers in another county.

So the economic harm, the economic duplication, inherent in that type of scenario is not inherent here in the grant of an original certificate for a proposed utility. What are we suggesting that you should do? We are suggesting --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Ms. Brownless, why would there not be harm, because the system is not yet constructed?

MS. BROWNLESS: Because the system is not yet constructed. And the harm that the legislature intended to prevent was desperate rates. In other words, they were intending to prevent ongoing regulatory differences between jurisdiction. And the examples that you cite in your GDU order are all concerned with differing rates for the same type of service, administrative inefficiencies, because of allocations between systems. These are, if you will, post-certificate concerns.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But isn't it true that it's conceivable that the most efficient way to provide service to a group of customers is a system that crosses a county line?

MS. BROWNLESS: I do believe that is a concern, but I would suggest to you that what is at issue here is when your jurisdiction attaches. And I would suggest to

you that you cannot give the full faith and credit to the current regulatory scheme, unless you let the nonjurisdictional county make that initial determination of service territory, and that is what we are suggesting be allowed here.

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In other words, we are suggesting that, in this case, one would have to go to St. Johns County, ask for this service territory, and St. Johns County either grants it to you or doesn't grant it to you. If they grant it to you that this Commission would treat that service territory as a grandfathered territory, it would simply come in and then they would apply here, get their certificate, make their case, get their rate set, et cetera, and proceed forward.

And I -- obviously, the reason we're in this case is because that's exactly what Intercoastal did.

They came to St. Johns County, they asked for the service territory, and they were denied. And clearly, our position is that that denial should be honored.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: In the event that we find -- not in the event; we're here now. Aren't some of those very same concerns that you say the legislature was focused on now at play in this dispute?

MS. BROWNLESS: Not at all. There's been no -- St. Johns County didn't set rates for anybody.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But these customers -it's clear now that St. Johns County is not agreeing to
one company, one system serving all of these territories
and that is --

MS. BROWNLESS: No. We have taken -- we are here for the purpose, the sole purpose, of raising this jurisdictional issue. That's what we intervened in this case to do, because we believe -- and we're not arguing the res judicata collateral estoppel issue today. We're focused purely on the jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. I'll lay that aside for now, but you would argue that this development would not have to deal with the same concern that the legislature was focused on when it developed the statute.

MS. BROWNLESS: Yes, because this has nothing to do with ongoing regulation. This is the initial decision, the initial grant of service territory in a nonjurisdictional county. And I would point out that the bulk of the territory being requested here is in St. Johns County.

My time is running out. I just want to shortly, briefly, talk about three cases that were cited by Mr. Wharton as dispositive of this issue. One is the United Water case. And, in my opinion, that included the definition of a system. We are not contesting that actual

pipes across the county line does not constitute a system for purpose of invoking your jurisdiction.

One is the St. Johns services case. That can be distinguished, because it was a bulk water sale and a bulk wastewater sale, and there were no customers to be served in Duval County in that case.

The case that has the potential to be most dispositive and the best precedent is the Lake Suzy case in which an existing utility applied for an original certificate based on serving a small area in a jurisdictional county.

And I would distinguish that case as being precedent in support of our position, because in that case you determined, you accepted the settlement agreement, which allowed Desoto County to award territory to Florida City's water. And that award was done during the pendency of the case; in other words, after Lake Suzy filed an application with you, and you allowed Charlotte County to provide sewer service. And that was also done after Lake Suzy filed their application and, under your staff's analysis, invoked your jurisdiction.

So the settlement agreement that you ultimately accepted can be read as sanctioning the idea that Desoto County, a nonjurisdictional county, had continuing jurisdiction to award the service territory to somebody

else, because you approved it. And that Charlotte County had the ability to serve in the jurisdictional county, because you, ultimately, approved that settlement, too.

So I guess, to bring this to a close what I would say is if St. Johns County had granted Intercoastal the right to serve the service territory, how would you be treating that decision? My suggestion is that you would honor it.

However, because St. Johns County has denied that -- Intercoastal that ability, the current position you're taking, you're not honoring that decision of the county. And we would tell you that in order for jurisdiction to be properly applied, the decisions of the county must be honored in both circumstances.

Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Chairman, I've got a series of questions for St. Johns County. I think it makes sense to ask them here.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Absolutely. Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ms. Brownless, in response to questions that Commissioner Deason asked you, it seems like your suggestion for us is that we start with a decision that St. Johns County has already made, honor that, as you say, and then decide on the Duval County piece. Is my understanding correct?

MS. BROWNLESS: Well, you'd start with that and then decide on the Duval County piece, yes, ma'am. But you have jurisdiction in Duval County; notwithstanding, that's your jurisdictional county.

COMMISSIONER JABER: What is it we have jurisdiction over when a facility crosses county boundaries?

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MS. BROWNLESS: I think once the pipes actually get in the ground, you have jurisdiction over everything that you would normally have jurisdiction over; rates, service, quality, et cetera.

COMMISSIONER JABER: For the pipes to be in the ground -- you're not -- you make a distinction between a proposed system and an existing system.

MS. BROWNLESS: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If either utility went forward and created the system, put the pipes in the ground, would you agree that that facility would be in violation of our statute which says that utilities can't serve outside their approved territory?

MS. BROWNLESS: I would say that until the utility gets a certificate from the PSC, they cannot put the pipes in the ground. And that if pipes were put in the ground prior to your approval, which is essentially what happened in Lake Suzy, that the jurisdiction is not

-- that one cannot bootstrap a jurisdiction in that way, 1 2 that they would have to have gone to the PSC first. 3 COMMISSIONER JABER: And isn't that what Nocatee 4 and Intercoastal are doing now? Aren't they coming to the PSC first? 5 6 MS. BROWNLESS: That is what Nocatee is doing 7 now. 8 COMMISSIONER JABER: That's interesting you 9 should say that. Explain to me the difference in 10 philosophy, the county's position with respect to Nocatee 11 and why it should be different with respect to 12 Intercoastal. 13 MS. BROWNLESS: Well, first of all, Nocatee 14 didn't come to St. Johns County and request this service 15 territory in St. Johns County and get denied; that's one. 16 Second, Nocatee is not seeking to serve service 17 territories that St. Johns County is currently attempting 18 to serve; that's two. 19 COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. 20 MS. BROWNLESS: So those are very significant 21 differences from our point of view. 22 COMMISSIONER JABER: Intercoastal is trying to 23 serve territory that St. Johns County itself wants to 24 serve. 25 MS. BROWNLESS: And is in the process of putting

pipes in the ground to serve.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Nocatee has worked with you all on areas that you don't want to serve.

MS. BROWNLESS: Nocatee's application, if I understand it, before this PSC does not include those areas that St. Johns County has contractually committed to serve.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. From a jurisdiction standpoint, why aren't the utilities in the same position? They're both crossing county -- they both will cross county boundaries. What difference does it make whether Nocatee has worked out a solution with you and Intercoastal has not? It's the same jurisdictional question, isn't it?

MS. BROWNLESS: Well, Intercoastal is an existing utility, and Nocatee is a totally proposed utility. And that, in our point of view, is a significant difference.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Nocatee is proposing to construct the facility that will cross county boundaries, correct?

MS. BROWNLESS: Mm-hmm.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And the PSC has jurisdiction over that. You agree with that.

MS. BROWNLESS: I agree that the PSC has

jurisdiction once the pipes are in the ground. We are not talking about the definition of -- this is not one of those cases where you have functionally-related systems that have no physical facilities that transverse county boundaries. It's clear that there are going to be pipes that transverse county boundaries here.

So, all those cases that had to do with functionally-related systems are really not applicable in this instance. We're talking about the procedure that needs to be engaged in, in order to give full faith and credit to the jurisdiction of the counties prior to the installation of the facilities.

And what we're saying is the counties need to be consulted first. And whatever decision the counties make with regard to the service territory in our jurisdictional county needs to be given faith and credit by the --

MR. WHARTON: Commissioner Jaber -- Mr. Chairman, this is the res judicata argument.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Wharton, you'll let the Commissioner ask whatever questions she wants to ask. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ms. Brownless, with respect to both utilities are you advocating that they go ahead and construct whatever it is they're able to construct and then come back to the PSC?

MS. BROWNLESS: No, ma'am. We are advocating exactly the process that Intercoastal did. They came to St. Johns County, they asked for the service territory in our county, and that was denied. If they had come to our county and asked for the service territory and been granted that territory, I assume, you would have honored that, and then we would have -- then, they should have come to the PSC and requested their little piece in Duval County and said, okay, Duval County is a jurisdictional county, but it really doesn't matter whether Duval County is jurisdictional or not. Then, they should go, come here, and you guys make the decision about the entire -- their ability to serve the entire area.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If the Commission were to somehow agree today to start from the point St. Johns County left off and just rule on the application as it relates to the Duval County area, would St. Johns County have any problem with that?

MS. BROWNLESS: No, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Let me make sure I haven't left any questions out here.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And would St. Johns County recognize our decision and look at it as the most economic way, then, would be to allow that utility, whatever utility it would be, then to go over and serve those

customers in St. Johns County?

MS. BROWNLESS: I need to qualify this, I think.

With regard to ICU, we are asking that the Commission acknowledge the decision of St. Johns County, okay? And that decision is a negative decision, obviously. With regard to Nocatee, we are asking -- well, we are taking no position at this time with regard to Nocatee.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, what you're saying is because Intercoastal went to St. Johns County first, and you're saying that if St. Johns County had granted that, then you felt like then the Commission would honor that and then we would also grant the territory in Duval County.

MS. BROWNLESS: Well, you might have granted it or not. Then, it would have been appropriate for you to consider the entire area.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, what would have happened if Intercoastal had come to the Commission first and asked for Duval County. And then would St. Johns be obligated to recognize we had granted that territory in Duval? And since this is going to be one economic entity, as far as the customers that live in this development, then they'd be obligated to -- does it work both ways? That's my question.

MS. BROWNLESS: If ICU had gone to Duval County first and you'd given them that little piece in Duval County, then they would have still had to come to St. Johns County initially and get the piece in St. Johns County.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Isn't that dual regulation?

And isn't that exactly what the statute is designed to protect?

MS. BROWNLESS: No. Because dual regulation is regulation of rates, regulation of service. We are limiting this totally and distinctly to service territory.

COMMISSIONER JABER: With counties that we have jurisdiction of now, when a county takes back jurisdiction, you have utilities within that county that cross county boundaries. That doesn't present a problem for St. -- United Water, for example. We regulate United Water, because the utility crosses county boundaries.

MS. BROWNLESS: Well, you regulate United Water, because you have interpreted their system as having related systems that are functionally related, even though in some -- even though I don't think United Water actually physically transverses county boundaries.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Regardless, we have regulation, jurisdiction regulation, over United Water. That coexists with St. Johns County's regulation of the

other utilities that are within the county. How is that situation different from what Intercoastal and/or Nocatee are presenting today?

MS. BROWNLESS: Because those are existing utilities, and these are proposed utilities. This is an original certificate.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. So that goes back to the notion that these utilities should violate our statute, put lines in the ground, and then come back to us.

MS. BROWNLESS: No. They should come to the county first and ask for the territory within the nonjurisdictional county.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Intercoastal, why did you deny their application?

MS. BROWNLESS: Because the plan of service that they put forward was not an effective plan of service. It was a plan of service that was essentially made up as they went along.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have a question. Are you saying that -- has United Water ever come to us and asked for more territories in St. Johns County, and have we taken the position that we have authority to grant that territory?

MS. BROWNLESS: They've come one time, and

that's in the United Water case, that's the Sunray case that was cited. That is an existing utility over which you had already pronounced jurisdiction.

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My belief is that United Water came back and specifically requested what was essentially a declaratory statement on that issue, because of the functionally-related aspect of the definitional system.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me just be clear. This is when they were asking for the authority to serve in a new territory within St. Johns County.

MS. BROWNLESS: No -- well, that's true, but they were asking to acknowledge a purchase of Sunray Utilities, an existing utility, that they went to the St. Johns County Commission --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: All right, I appreciate that. What I want to know is have they ever wanted to serve additional territory and come to us to ask for that territory rather than St. Johns?

MS. BROWNLESS: No, ma'am. They went to St. Johns County first.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question. As I understand the scenario you're laying out, it would be that -- it would be a utility which is proposing to serve a development and that development crosses county lines,

that it would be requirement of that utility to go to the regulatory authority in each individual county -- assume both counties are nonjurisdictional --

MS. BROWNLESS: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- to go to each county's regulatory authority and to demonstrate, based upon that county's regulation, that they are the best choice in the public interest for that utility to provide service, but that county can only look at that piece which is physically within its county to make that determination, correct?

MS. BROWNLESS: Yes, mm-hmm.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So, what about the public policy that there should be some entity which looks at the whole of the development, regardless of whether it crosses the county line, to determine what is the most economic way for service to be provided to this development which crosses county lines?

MS. BROWNLESS: They would not be precluded from making that argument; and I'm sure, in fact, would make it. And as far as I'm concerned, that would be a consideration in evaluating their request.

But obviously, a county only has jurisdiction over the area that it controls. And a county authority cannot control another area. But do I think that would be

a point that should be raised and a consideration that should be taken into account? Sure, obviously.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But then, it would be the burden of the utility seeking the certificate to make two filings and make two showings and hope that both counties are forward-looking and look at the integrated whole development and determine that it's the economic choice.

MS. BROWNLESS: In the worst-case scenario where both were nonjurisdictional counties. In this scenario, there would be only one such filing, and that would be with St. Johns County, because Duval County is jurisdictional.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So there would be two filings; one with St. John and one with Duval or one with us.

MS. BROWNLESS: But there would only be one county filing is my --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So, what would we make of Intercoastal's filing with us now in the wake of your decision?

MS. BROWNLESS: Well, I know what I would have you make of it. In other words, I would have you honor the county's previous decision, just as if we had granted the territory, I assume you would have honored that.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So Intercoastal amends its application with us to take away what you would argue is nonjurisdictional territory?

MS. BROWNLESS: I would argue that the county had already ruled on that and that the Commission should honor that request, but that is the res judicata collateral estoppel issue that is not really before us today.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But let me step aside from that for a moment. I think it goes to the very heart of what we have to understand about this whole debate.

If that is the posture that we find ourselves in, what about jurisdiction? Your argument is that their application should have never been made here with that territory.

MS. BROWNLESS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Forget about the resjudicata. They should have never applied to us for that territory.

MS. BROWNLESS: They should not be able to come, right.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Procedurally, do we take administrative notice of your decision? How do we honor your decision?

MS. BROWNLESS: In either case, you mean?

1	COMMISSIONER JABER: Mm-hmm.				
2	MS. BROWNLESS: I would assume you would take				
3	judicial notice of it.				
4	COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Have you required				
5	Nocatee? Has the county required Nocatee to apply for				
6	certificate of territory case for the St. Johns County				
7	area?				
8	MS. BROWNLESS: No, ma'am. That would be a				
9	decision of the Water and Sewer Authority.				
10	COMMISSIONER JABER: Have they required Nocatee				
11	to make that filing?				
12	MS. BROWNLESS: No, ma'am, not to date.				
13	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very good. Mr. Twomey?				
14	MR. TWOMEY: This is not evidence. In fact,				
15	it's not very well done.				
16	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I was pushing the envelope of				
17	technology is always good to see here at the Commission.				
18	MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir. The Army would call this				
19	eyewash. It's always good to have some eyewash to				
20	distract from the you can't see it?				
21	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That's why it's called				
22	eyewash.				
23	MR. TWOMEY: Commissioners, Mike Twomey. I made				
24	that because I want to focus on the two key elements, I				
25	think, in this case. One is that I'm sorry, you either				

have the jurisdiction here or you don't. As you're well aware, you're not here to decide whether Nocatee is best situated to serve this development or Intercoastal. That comes later, if you have the jurisdiction.

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Either you have the jurisdiction or you don't.

If our motion to dismiss is deficient for some reason, you can't get jurisdiction by default or waiver. You have it or you don't. When -- as you're well aware, it's been pointed out before many times, your jurisdiction, as a creature of statute, has to be explicit or necessarily implicit in the language thereof.

Tie ball games, as you all know, go against you in the exercise of authority. If it's close, if it's reasonably debatable about whether you have the jurisdiction or not, you don't do it. That's not me saying that, it's the Florida Supreme Court and the other courts, repeatedly.

The most recent example has Chairman Garcia's name on it. Ya'll decided to do the merchant plants.

Supreme Court said you didn't have the authority. When it's doubtful, you don't do it.

Now, your staff says here that it's clear that you have authority to consider under 367171 paren 7 the authority to go ahead and grant either Nocatee's application or Intercoastal's application.

We say at the county that you don't have any authority whatsoever to do that. It's not clear, it's doubtful, it's debatable. And when you look at it closely, it should come down against the exercise of authority.

Commissioner Jaber says to Ms. Brownless, "Is there any difference between Nocatee and Intercoastal's application?" My answer to you, Commissioner, is not one wit, okay? I'm not here to speak for St. Johns County or attempt to, but there's no difference. They protest Intercoastal's -- their objections, her objections, in a very well-written motion, in my opinion, are every bit as applicable against Nocatee. We say both of them can't be considered.

Now, the history -- very briefly, the history of this jurisdictional service territory thing between the counties and the PSC; historically, the legislature, all of it statutory, the legislature has given the initial decision to the counties to make on whether they want to do it themselves, nonjurisdictional county self-regulation, or if they want to give it over to the Public Service Commission.

The decision, as ya'll know, is with the county, it's not yours. They want to opt in, they give it to ya'll. They want to opt out after 10 years, they bail

out, they take everything with them.

Until 1989, the sunset reviews of all the Commission statutes comes the language that's now in 367171 paren 7, transverses county boundaries. Your staff would, apparently, have you believe that that's clear, that it's noncontroversial, and we all know that's the furthest thing from the truth. If there's any section that ya'll have jurisdiction over, any utility industry that is giving you more trouble than that one section in the last decade, I'm not aware of what it is, okay?

First case that came up, pointed out by

Ms. Brownless, was the GDU case. I suggest to you, in my
motion, that was the case that was the basis for the
change in the statute. We don't have any legislative
intent, as Ms. Brownless pointed out, in terms of tapes
and so forth. There was a lot of stuff going on in '89
and '90, and the Commission statutes, the sunset reviews,
she points out --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me just -- you're saying that the statute was changed to address GDU?

MR. TWOMEY: I'm suggesting to you that it was.

I can't tell you that -- I can't testify to you that I

know what's going on, but you were general counsel at that

time, I think.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Oh, I can say that's

consistent with my recollection was that was the case we had, sort of, before us that let us -- maybe Mr. Melson can help us out on that.

MR. TWOMEY: Okay, when it's his turn, but I think you're right, Commissioner Clark, you had that case. The legislation came up, bam, they come in the door, you take jurisdiction, as Ms. Brownless pointed out. It's kind of the tail wagging the dog, because --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: We didn't propose that, did we, do you know? Did the Commission ask for it?

MR. TWOMEY: Do you want me to tell you who proposed it?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yeah.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Melson can tell you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. TWOMEY: You didn't propose it. It was proposed by a third-party industry group.

Anyways, they come in, the tail wags the dog kind of thing where the Commission takes jurisdiction over that whole utility, which was an existing utility, as Ms. Brownless points out, extant, in the ground, lines already crossing the county boundaries. You take jurisdiction of it, I think you only had about 8% or 10% of the jurisdictional customers from revenue. You get the whole thing, and it goes on.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Twomey? 1 MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. 2 COMMISSIONER JABER: You were on the house 3 committee? 4 MR. TWOMEY: I was senior counsel to the house 5 committee. 6 7 COMMISSIONER JABER: Do you remember if the proposed system was discussed at all? Do you know if the 8 9 legislative history or the legislative write-up contemplated a facility that would be created that would 10 11 result in crossing of county boundaries? MR. TWOMEY: I'm sorry, say that again. 12 13 COMMISSIONER JABER: The proposed system, the 14 notion that a utility can propose a facility, propose to 15 construct a facility that would result in the crossing of 16 county boundaries. 17 MR. TWOMEY: Is it my recollection whether that 18 was considered in that change in the law? 19 COMMISSIONER JABER: Mm-hmm. 20 MR. TWOMEY: I don't recall that it was. I may 21 be mistaken. I don't recall that it was. The fact of the 22 matter is that it was, in my opinion when I was there, it 23 was to address that GDU situation, which was an existing 24 system. 25 What the legislature -- members of the

committee, and the legislature in its entirety intended, I don't know, okay?

Now, existing system -- can we go from that same section, we go to the Beard case in St. Johns again. The Beard case, arguably, has been implicitly reversed. We don't know, but you have the requirement filing from Hernando where we want to look at existing facilities from the ground. Commissioner Deason wrote an excellent dissent in that case, the order leading to that case, we want to have existing pipes in the ground. That still doesn't address the proposed system.

Now, what I've set up here is there's doubt, okay? I'll say more about it very quickly in a minute, but to be clear, what I'm suggesting to you on behalf of my two counties, and I think the other two counties as well, is that we're saying to you either you've got the jurisdiction or you don't and the jurisdiction to go ahead and do regulation of quality of service, expansion of service territories within the jurisdictional counties that you have.

Two, if you have existing utilities with facilities that are crossing county boundaries as of the -- as of the time that the statute was passed, that's clearly your jurisdiction. Do you have, and I forget if Commissioner Deason or Jaber, who asked it, do you have

authority, in our opinion, to go ahead and grant expansions of service territory for a utility that crosses county boundaries within the nonjurisdictional county?

No, ma'am; no, sir, you don't, not in our opinion.

The right to grant service territory expansions, the dirt in those counties within those political boundaries, is inviolate. The counties have that power solely, okay? Now, we go through and you ask yourselves, okay, is there some kind of inefficiency or some kind of lack of economy here, Commissioner Deason. I'll have you to go in two different groups, okay? My response to you is maybe, maybe not.

Even if there is -- perhaps, if it's your desire for efficiency, in our view, doesn't trump whether you have jurisdiction or not, okay? We say to you the jurisdiction is not clear, there's doubt in this whole thing, you should hold off on that.

Now, how do we see that this should be perceived, okay? In the instant case, as Ms. Brownless pointed out, both of these utilities want some 22,000 acres, not a small amount of territory, 22,000 acres, approximately, in St. Johns' nonjurisdictional county. They want substantially less than Duval.

How would I have them proceed to harmonize the relationship between the Commission's power in 3671717 and

the rights of the five counties and the other 25 or so that are nonjurisdictional -- I'll be brief -- that how do you harmonize that so the two work together? They have the ability to plan for their own systems, governmental systems, to allocate for investor-owned in those counties. How do you make them harmonize? What you do is you have any property that a utility wants to be assigned territory and nonjurisdictional, that utility goes to that county first and asks for it, okay?

In the case of St. Johns, St. Johns may have given Nocatee all the properties they wanted. They may have given them half of it, they may have said the same as they said to Intercoastal, no, you don't get any of it.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Twomey, why can't we harmonize the statutes by allowing the county to fully participate in our process and allow the county to tell us what is and is not, you know, good for the county?

MR. TWOMEY: Because -- I don't mean any offense here -- because you presume too much by that. Either you have the jurisdiction to do this proceeding or you don't. And if you don't have it, it's not right to make the counties come in and be supplicants before you, okay?

COMMISSIONER JABER: On nonjurisdiction, how do you reconcile everything you just said with 367011 sub 2?

MR. TWOMEY: Which is the --

COMMISSIONER JABER: It's overall legislative intent on jurisdiction. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over each utility with respect to authority, service, and writs.

MR. TWOMEY: Very simply. You don't get to that point, under my theory of harmonization, until you get to who got control of the dirt. Once you get the dirt -- and you don't get it, you don't get the territory until the counties decide that they're going to give it to a utility with full knowledge that that utility is going to have something on the other side, which that county or any of them, when they grant it, they know full well that they will be voluntarily giving up authority over that acreage, okay?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That argues against the wording in 1717. I would expect in the normal course of events, if that were to happen, there would be some formal documentation or execution of that; i.e., the county would do something formally. They wouldn't just give it away, they would do something. And this statute anticipates that.

It says that if you had an interlocal agreement in effect at the time the statute went into effect that you would -- that dirt would stay under that same jurisdiction. But if you didn't, the county couldn't

change those scenarios. The county can't divest -- it couldn't divest the Commission of jurisdiction over dirt by an interlocal agreement, according to the expressed words of the statute. What you're saying is that it could do it by vote of the County Commission.

MR. TWOMEY: What I'm saying is you don't get jurisdiction until the pipes cross the county boundary.

And that can't happen until the authorities, the agencies on both sides of the boundary, give them permission to do it, okay?

And let me raise this to you, and I'll stop. I don't want to take too much of their time, but if you've got a situation right now where Nocatee and Intercoastal are both asking for this property, okay, let's say you grant it to them and what if they don't build? What if they don't build pipes and service across the county boundary? Then, you have given away territory on both sides. And the reality that would give you the jurisdiction by the agreed upon interpretation of the statutes would not have occurred, okay? You must go ahead and get the territory on both sides.

And lastly, the GDU case, your own interpretation of the statutory interpretation intent was economic regulation. That's what it says, economic regulation.

I thank you for your time, and I think Mr. Odom will go next.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I've got one quick question for you, Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Under your scenario, in a situation where there's an existing utility with existing lines to cross county boundaries where the PSC has jurisdiction, if that existing utility wishes to add territory to its system and the territory is in a nonjurisdictional county, to which regulatory authority do they go to seek that additional territory?

MR. TWOMEY: Very clearly, Commissioner Deason, they would go to the nonjurisdictional, and let me tell you why. In the case of St. Johns, if you grant Nocatee or Intercoastal what they've asked for, they get roughly 22,000 acres in the nonjurisdictional county, contrary to the wishes of the county government. That's a big foot in the door. That's a big camel nose in the tent.

Then you're saying -- and your staff, as I read the recommendation, is fully in accord with the notion that once that camel's nose is in there, it's Katie bar the door on how much else you can take away from that county that's not nailed down so long as presumably it's contiguous to the nose already in there.

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

And what you do, if you accept that,

Commissioners, is you gut entirely the ability of counties
to control their own destiny, which was the original basis
for them having the right to opt in and out.

You gut the ability of them to control how much money their going to spend in their budgets on infrastructure planning for county systems and so forth. And you gut the ability for them to decide whether those systems that are investor-owned and, clearly within their sole jurisdiction, whether they can expand or not or how they will allocate that territory.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Twomey, on that issue though, on the growth and gutting the county's opportunity to figure out where the utilities should go, just because the Commission grants a certificate, which I remind you, that's not where we are --

MR. TWOMEY: Right.

COMMISSIONER JABER: -- but just because the Commission grants a certificate doesn't mean that the county can't slow the entire process down with the permitting? And there are other options that the county has to control growth.

MR. TWOMEY: Well, the -- I'm not going to go into what county should or shouldn't do in terms of permitting. And I think people, if they get a certificate

from the county government or they get a certificate from the Public Service Commission, they should be able to expect equal protection and due process and fair play in 3 the permitting, and no one should stand in their way for 4 the wrong reasons. But, again, go back to your earlier 5 question, I don't think it's incumbent upon the counties 6 7 to have to try and maneuver this way to control their own destiny. 8

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

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MR. ODOM: Don Odom representing the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners.

Let me say at the outset that I'm not going to address the intervention issue at all. Ms. Schneider will do that on behalf of the three counties here. And any time that I have remaining, I'd like for it to go to Ms. Schneider. The two previous speakers have pretty much covered all of the relevant issues, so I'll try to be very brief.

I'd like, on behalf of my county, to ask you to consider the issue that's before you in a very, very careful and serious manner in that this decision, if you grant these applications, has the potential for turning the regulation of water and wastewater systems within Florida on its head.

Under the interpretation of the statutes that's

being put forth by the applicants, all of that would be necessary to divest nonjurisdictional counties of their ability to regulate water and wastewater utilities would be to just set up shop in a county across state lines and make a proposal to put in a system. And by that very act, they imply that the counties would necessarily lose jurisdiction.

Hillsborough County is aware that there is language in 367021.12 that suggests that these proposed systems or the mere proposal of a system is sufficient to trigger your jurisdiction. However, I would respectfully suggest to you that such an interpretation is inconsistent with other law, including the language in 367.171, which clearly gives the -- requires the counties to make an affirmative action to give up their jurisdiction to the Public Service Commission.

It would be inconsistent with Article 8 of the Florida Constitution, which grants our charter counties home rule powers. It certainly would be inconsistent with chapter 12501k, which gives the county specific authority to regulate water and wastewater utility activities within their counties. And lastly, it would be inconsistent with chapter 153 of the Florida statutes.

The only way to harmonize all of these provisions is to interpret the requirements in 367 to

mean, as Mr. Twomey and Ms. Brownless have indicated, that there must we some permission given initially by a nonjurisdictional county before the Commission could usurp the county's authority.

All of the cases that have been cited, GDU, the Beard case, have all dealt with cases of economic convenience, and none of them have really turned on the threshold issue of the granting of the jurisdiction of the ability of the Commission to wrest jurisdiction away. And I think that that's an important distinction between all those cases and this case where here we're talking about your ability to even have jurisdiction.

There are many practical problems associated with what the applicants are suggesting. First of all, what if this proposed system is not time to go? Does the jurisdiction automatically revert back to the nonjurisdictional county? If so, when would that happen?

This could wreak havoc with financial plans of nonjurisdictional counties, it could affect their ability to serve their citizens, it could affect the rights of bondholders, if they don't have control over the provision of water and wastewater service within their jurisdiction. In some instances, this scenario could even result in defaulting on certain bonds, if the situation gets critical enough.

The certificate or the application or in the case of ICU, in my view, is particularly disturbing, given the facts that have been recited previously by

Ms. Brownless, where they initially applied for a certificate with the proper regulatory agency, St. Johns County. They were denied, and so now they forum shop trying to find a more friendly forum.

We don't think that this is efficient. We don't think that systems should be able to go to one authority and get a denial and then be able to shop around until they find a more friendly forum for their goals.

The other fact, I think, that makes this particular application so disturbing is that such a small percentage of, as Mr. Twomey put it, dirt that they propose to serve is located in the county that has the -- in the jurisdictional county. Only 8% of the service area is located in Duval as opposed to 92% of the proposed service area being located in St. Johns County.

Surely, the legislature did not intend to divest the county of its jurisdiction that it conferred upon the counties under the previous statutes and constitutional provisions that I have previously cited.

The first district court of appeal in the case of Hernando County versus the Florida Public Service Commission, which is at 685 So.2d 48, which I cited in my

brief, stated in citing the Cape Coral case, any reasonable doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular power that is being exercised by the Commission must be resolved against an exercise, thereof, and the further exercise of that power should be arrested.

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I would contend that the counties jointly have raised reasonable doubt regarding your authority to invoke your jurisdiction within St. Johns County. Therefore, I respectfully request that pursuant to the holding in the Cape Coral case that you not grant the requested certificates in this docket.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Ms. Schneider.

MS. SCHNEIDER: Mr. Commissioner, is it your pleasure that I address the intervention issue now or after the other side has an opportunity?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: You've got three minutes left to address the issue that you have to address.

MS. SCHNEIDER: Okay. Basically, Commissioners, I would say that the question before this Commission today is whether the PSC can obtain jurisdiction by granting the request or if it must first have the jurisdiction before it grants the request.

And the issue before us today is whether the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction to consider an application by a utility to provide service in a

nonjurisdictional county. There is nothing in section 3671717 that grants the Commission the right to divide up a territory in a nonjurisdictional county. The right to determine who provides service and when is expressly reserved to the counties and is a legislative discretion action.

Rule 2522039 of the Florida Administrative Code requires that an intervenor have a substantial interest in this proceeding. As the petitioning parties, the counties must demonstrate that they will suffer a real and present injury, in fact, as a result of the proceeding and that the nature of the injury is the one under the protection of the relevant statutes.

Counties meet both of these requirements. Each of these counties, as well as every other nonjurisdictional county in this state, has a vested right to regulate water and sewer utilities within its respective geographic boundaries. In Sarasota County, that right was granted by special act in 1967.

Section 3670114, provides that the chapter shall not impair or take away vested rights other than procedural rights or benefits. Clearly, the regulatory jurisdiction of the counties is that -- contrary to the -- I'm sorry. Clearly, the regulatory jurisdiction of the

counties is under a protection of Section 367. That's the first prong of the two-part test.

Second, contrary to the arguments of Nocatee and Intercoastal, the counties will suffer a real and present injury, in fact, if the Commission determines that it has jurisdiction to grant utilities a service area nonjurisdictional counties.

If the interpretation of 3671717, proposed by Nocatee and Intercoastal and recommended by Staff, is adopted by the Commission, the vested right of the nonjurisdictional counties to regulate the provision of water and sewer service within its geographical boundaries is immediately impaired.

There is nothing speculative or hypothetical about it. It is the interpretation of a statutory provision that goes to the very core of a county's legislative right to govern the provision of water and sewer service.

Nocatee and Intercoastal argue that the counties are not significantly impacted until a utility applies to the PSC for a certificate of service in that county, and that precedent, established in the current proceeding, is not enough to amount to a substantial interest.

Interestingly, both Nocatee and Intercoastal, in making this argument against precedent, rely on PSC

precedent in support of their position. The counties submit, if our vested right to regulate is going to be at jeopardy by precedent, we should have been granted -- we should be granted the due process right to protect that vested right, which is recognized by Section 367.

Moreover, anyone who has appeared before the body, this administrative body or any other administrative body or judicial body, knows the value of precedent.

Collier, Citrus, Hillsborough County know firsthand the value of that precedent.

As many of you probably remember, along with Hernando County, we intervened in the 1994 PSC investigation of jurisdiction under 367171 with respect to Southern States Utilities, now Florida Water.

Interestingly, the SSU jurisdiction investigation commenced as a request for declaratory statement by SSU with respect to only Hillsborough and Polk County.

However, the Commission recognized that the issue under 3671717 had statewide impact and converted it to --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Ms. Schneider, let me ask you a question on that. Did you have systems in your county that that decision would have applied to?

MS. SCHNEIDER: Sarasota did not. Sarasota County had purchased the SSU system.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: At the time that --

MS. SCHNEIDER: At the time that the original case was initiated, we did have an SSU system. Later on during the proceeding we bought it. The issue was raised by Ken Hoffman, I guess, who represented SSU at the time, and he said that under Agrico we didn't have jurisdiction, because we no longer had a system, and the PSC said that Agrico didn't apply and that we did have jurisdiction to proceed, and we did. And we remained in the proceeding throughout.

As I said, the Commission, in that case, recognizing that potential impact of 3671717, converted that into an investigation. All nonjurisdictional counties were noticed, and Collier, Hillsborough, Sarasota, and Hernando were granted leave to intervene.

The impact of the Commission's decision in the current proceeding regarding its jurisdiction under 3671717 has no less an impact on nonjurisdictional counties than that issue in the SSU investigation.

In the SSU investigation, the counties had a major obstacle to overcome, and that was precedent established in the Beard case, which has already been discussed in this -- earlier today. And the Beard case involved St. Johns County declaratory statement by St. Johns County. And in the St. Johns County case, none of the counties took -- bothered to intervene in that case.

Why should they? St. Johns County, oh, it's so far away. They couldn't possibly have any impact on Sarasota, Hillsborough, or anybody else. Well, low and behold, a few years later, SSU, armed with the Beard decision, comes before this Commission and says, we want systems to be under your jurisdiction statewide.

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Well, then, finally then, the counties get to participate in the proceeding after they have Beard to overcome, where if they had even thought about the issue of coming before the Commission, the outcome would likely have been different.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ms. Schneider, that is not the issue in this case, would you agree with me, because with both of these utilities there will be physical delivery. So, am I correct in thinking that that issue doesn't exist in this case?

MS. SCHNEIDER: Well, the issue -- the reason we think the issue before this case is similar is because the counties or the utilities, rather, are going to have the opportunity under 3671717 to simply say, "I want a utility in these two counties; therefore, I'm going to the PSC," that Nocatee or any other utility in this state could enter into discussions with a developer in Sarasota County and a developer in Desoto County and enter into developer agreements with them and say, "Hey, let's have a

development that crosses county lines." And as soon as they agree to that, then they say the jurisdiction goes to the PSC. The counties, the nonjurisdictional counties, both of them are nonjurisdictional counties, would have nothing to say about this.

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CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Ms. Schneider, you're out of time, unless you've got -- unless you quickly, because I gave you three minutes, and you're at about 10 now.

MS. SCHNEIDER: I would just like to distinguish the Agrico case that was relied on for intervention by the utilities. And in Florida Medical Association, Inc. versus the Department of Professional Regulation, the first DCA distinguished the Agrico case from a case where the lawful exercise of authority was being challenged. That was a third-party permitting case.

Similar to the Florida Medical Association case, in this proceeding today, the county's allegation is that the granting of service by the PSC to Nocatee and Intercoastal within the geographical boundaries of nonjurisdictional counties is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. It's well recognized by the courts that the local governments have the discretion, legislative authority, to grant franchises and to regulate utilities within their own boundaries.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you very much.

MS. SCHNEIDER: Thank you.

MR. WHARTON: Mr. Chairman, very quickly, first of all, I want to make clear that it was not the Commissioner's question earlier. The Commissioner was asking the 64,000 dollar question, what's the county's unstated agenda in moving to dismiss us on a jurisdictional argument? We're both applying for a development that's 12,000 acres of St. Johns and about 2,000 in Duval.

Commissioner Deason got to the meat of the issue when he said, "How will this apply to the real world?"

Well, we don't need to go very far for an example. That case is a great example. You might be surprised that the authority found Intercoastal had the managerial, operational, and technical ability to provide service and could initially finance --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Wharton, you need to slow down.

MR. WHARTON: I'm sorry -- and that Intercoastal could initially finance the project.

But they also found Intercoastal failed to demonstrate it can commit service to Nocatee in a time frame and quantity that meets the needs of the developer due to the multi-county nature of phase I of Nocatee, Intercoastal cannot provide service under its application

to the entire area that has one of the most immediate needs for service.

So -- and understand that Nocatee development wasn't announced until after Intercoastal filed its application. So what you had there was St. Johns County saying we just can't get past the fact that you can't serve the Duval portion.

Let's say that in the real world we file at the PSC and Duval and at St. Johns. They're both going to be looking at each other and saying, "Well, it doesn't make sense to grant this unless St. Johns grants that." That's exactly what's going to happen. That's the exact kind of --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Can't they do it at the same time? Can't they just -- if they want to serve that kind of territory, can't they put an application in Duval, which would be to us, and then in St. Johns? And isn't that the way you would -- they have to do it if it crossed county lines when they were nonjurisdictional?

MR. WHARTON: Certainly. If the argument of the counties is accepted, that is what you will have to do.

The question is whether --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you, if they are both nonjurisdictional, isn't that what you have to do?

MR. WHARTON: I would assume so. Well, no.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: If you have a county that's 1 not under our jurisdiction, and you have another county 2 that's not under our jurisdiction --3 MR. WHARTON: Right. 4 COMMISSIONER CLARK: -- and it's a proposal to 5 cross boun-- that will cross boundary lines, don't they 6 7 have to go to each separate county to get --8 MR. WHARTON: No, ma'am. That application would be filed with this Commission per the clear dictates of 9 the statute. 10 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Under what? 11 MR. WHARTON: Under 367171, whether the counties 12 involved are jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. 13 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But to get the original 14 15 certificate, they would come here. 16 MR. WHARTON: I believe they would, ma'am, I 17 believe they would. And I think that's --COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Wharton, you were 18 outlining for us the decision made at the county, which 19 I'm very interested in. You said that they found that you 20 all had managerial, technical, and financial ability. 21 why -- again, help me understand why your application was 22 denied. 23

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

MR. WHARTON: I really want to leave some of my

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time for Mr. Melson.

Setting aside the fact that the county was a party opponent who filed a petition saying our application should be denied and the county was the judge, which we filed two motions to recuse them, and they were denied, the county -- the Nocatee's case was they can't serve phase I. That's in Duval County. And the authority member sat up there and said it really bothers us that they can't serve the part that's in Duval County.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Where did the order leave it? Did the order or the decision then say you need to apply with the PSC for the remainder?

MR. WHARTON: It just says that it's denied, and it's a very long order. And it says we don't like your plan of service. It says quite a bit. I wouldn't want to mischaracterize it. No, it didn't go into that.

Let me go very quickly. Again, Mr. Twomey has really swung for the fence. For him to say that if you've got pipes in the ground across the county line, but you still don't have jurisdiction over further extensions, to me, just flies in the face of the statute. What could the legislature have said in that provision that would have made that more clear?

Under Ms. Brownless's argument, which doesn't say you don't have any jurisdiction, even after pipes are in the ground, she said once pipes are in the ground,

traversing county boundaries, you have jurisdiction for all purposes, and that's the only party in this case.

Think about the reality of that. Did the legislature really mean that you would have jurisdiction from that nanosecond over conditions of service and rates and service availability charges and deletions and extensions?

I might come to you the next day and file an application to extend the territory to the same thing the county had denied. And you might decide it didn't make sense what the county did, because you would have jurisdiction for all purposes.

COMMISSIONER JABER: What precautions are there in place to prevent a utility from forum shopping?

MR. WHARTON: Well, I think you could make a proper res judicata argument. You couldn't do it on an application that had a \$2.5 million cost and a \$10 million cost in this case or that proposes to serve part of Duval County in this case and not in the last one.

COMMISSIONER JABER: So you would pick and choose our application of --

MR. WHARTON: Well, certainly, if there was a proper res judicata argument, I believe, they might be able to come before you and you might look at that county decision and say that's everything we would have looked at, otherwise.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: In your scenario, however, it leaves open the idea that someone could forum shop, simply by the conduct. You say, if two nonjurisdictional counties chose to look at a development that crossed their boundaries they'd be violating the law.

MR. WHARTON: Well, I don't believe there would be forum shopping in that case, because I think if the utility knew in advance the proposed service traversed county boundaries, the only place the application would be filed was here. Here, the development was announced in midcase. We had no knowledge that phase I of Nocatee would be in Duval County and then, if we would have originally filed the application here.

To conclude, what you're being asked to believe is that when the legislature said notwithstanding anything to the contrary, and there is nothing, but notwithstanding anything to the contrary --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Anything in this section.

MR. WHARTON: I'm reading 171 -- that you shall have exclusive jurisdiction; not just jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, whether the counties involved are jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. What they meant when they put that was, well, nonjurisdictional counties will have initial jurisdiction to establish service territories and then ya'll will take it from there.

Or in the case of Mr. Twomey, you won't ever have jurisdiction over service territories. They could have easily said that, if that's what they meant. The statute says nothing like that, doesn't intimate anything like that. 367 often goes on proposals. Do you propose service? Then, you're jurisdictional. Do you propose a rate increase? You're jurisdictional.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Melson.

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MR. MELSON: Commissioner Clark, does the Commission have to finish its deliberations by 11:00?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Why don't you go ahead and finish, and we'll see where we're at.

MR. MELSON: All right. I think the Commission has read the statute and thought about it. I think that's obvious from your questions. I think I'd -- rather than do any sort of structured argument, I'm going to try to respond to several points that were made during the prior arguments or several questions the Commission asked.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I just want to be clear.

Mr. Wharton, you represent whom?

MR. WHARTON: Intercoastal.

MR. MELSON: I represent Nocatee Utility
Corporation, which is a subsidiary of DDI. DDI is
proposing a multi-county land development with land in
Duval and St. Johns County and has organized Nocatee

Utility Corporation as a proposed provider of service to that development and only to that development.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Hoffman?

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner Clark, I represent the JEA.

MR. MELSON: Two things, procedurally. First, the only motion that we think has any vitality in this case is St. Johns County's motion which is directed to Intercoastal's application, not to Nocatee's.

I recognize that, as Commissioner Jaber said earlier, I think the same legal question applies to both.

And to the extent you're considering jurisdiction, I think you can consider jurisdiction over Nocatee's application on your own motion.

But at this point we don't believe there's a viable motion to dismiss against our application raised by any party because, as I'll deal with very briefly at the end, we don't think that Collier, Sarasota, Hillsborough, Citrus Counties have standing or are in a position to file a motion to dismiss.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Do you think Nocatee should file an application with St. Johns County first?

MR. MELSON: No, I don't, because we'll, from the outset, provide service across the county line. And as we read the statute and continue to read the statute,

you have exclusive jurisdiction over systems whose service crosses county boundaries.

And contrary to Mr. Twomey's suggestion that even if lines were in the ground, you would get in some sort of shared jurisdiction situation where the county still had jurisdiction over the dirt. 3670112 says pretty plainly you have jurisdiction over authority, which means the dirt to be served, service, and rates.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But you don't have an existing facility either.

MR. MELSON: No.

COMMISSIONER JABER: So how is your scenario different than Intercoastal?

MR. MELSON: I don't think it really is.

Procedurally, there's a motion to dismiss in Intercoastal.

Procedurally, there is no motion to dismiss us. But in terms of applying the standards, whatever you decide the rule is, probably applies equally to either of us, unless I get really creative on appeal.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: What if we were looking at a different scenario. What if phase I were totally within St. Johns and we were looking at an expansion of phase II into Duval, how would you deal with that?

MR. MELSON: I think that would be like your Lake Suzy case where you had an existing utility serving

in Desoto County and you said we have the jurisdiction to determine when they can cross that county line and go into Charlotte. And while you eventually did not show cause them, you considered show causing them for providing service to a single connection in Charlotte County before they got your permission.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So, in other words, we'd have jurisdiction there as well?

MR. MELSON: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I may want to have him respond to that, if I can, Mr. Chairman.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Deason, I think you asked a question, why did the county say there was no harm of the type that the GDU case said the statute was designed to prevent? There is harm in this case.

For one thing, ordinarily, the Commission sets rates as part of grant answer to a particular application. Nocatee asked for a waiver of that. Our waiver was denied. We're going forward to set rates for this small county system.

If we were in front of both the Commission on the Duval County piece and St. Johns County on the St. Johns County piece, we could potentially be doing cost to service allocations, studies resulting in different rates for two parts of a system that once both certificates have

been granted the county's concede would be a single system and would be subject to your jurisdiction. That's the type of duplication that we believe 3671717 was designed to prevent.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Couldn't you prevent that by saying, you know, we're proposing something crossing county bounds, we're waiting -- we want to wait to do that to see if we get a certificate that allows us to serve that area that is in the nonjurisdictional county?

MR. MELSON: Commissioner, if the statute required two applications, that's certainly what we'd do, but the statute doesn't require it. The statute says --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. MELSON: -- you know, when you've got a multi-county system -- the word existing, Ms. Brownless says existing is implied throughout 367171. Well, it certainly doesn't appear. The only place existing or proposed really appears is in the definition of a utility.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I appreciate that.

MR. MELSON: All right.

The counties also talk about their ability -about a Commission decision do take jurisdiction of this
case stepping on their ability to do land-planning
decisions. The Nocatee development, in this case, is a
development of regional impact. The county is looking at

the impacts of that development.

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The fact that the Commission has jurisdiction over the granting of the water and wastewater certificate doesn't do anything to undercut the county's authority under that process to consider the growth management aspects, the transportation infrastructure impacts, all the other impacts of the decision.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And that's correct as it relates to Intercoastal as well.

MR. MELSON: Yes. The two counties, Duval
County and St. Johns County, will both look at the Nocatee
development, regardless of who ultimately serves it.

You were posed with a hypothetical by one of the counties of a utility that forum shops, essentially, by finding a single customer or, you know, a small group of customers in an adjacent county and suddenly coming to the Commission for jurisdiction.

Commissioners, that's the kind of thing that could be addressed at the time of the case. If you decided that a proposal would cross the county line was simply a sham to get Commission jurisdiction, there was not a need for service, this utility was not the best utility to be serving that entire service territory, you could, on factual grounds, decline to grant the certificate. I don't think on legal grounds you could

decline to consider it. And that's what the counties are telling you is you don't have the jurisdiction here, even to consider.

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Ms. Brownless also pointed out to you that the judicial decisions to date have all dealt with the existing systems. That's because the facts that were in front of the Commission to date have all involved existing systems. We don't believe there is anything in either the language or the logic of those decisions, though that says you do not have jurisdiction from the outset over a utility that legitimately proposes it to cross county boundaries.

Finally, let me speak just briefly to the standing of the counties. You have heard argument from them today as though they have full standing to participate in this case. So to the extent due process demands that you hear from them, you have satisfied that. And the Florida Supreme Court in Ameristeel sort of noted approvingly that even when a party doesn't have standing you, on occasion, still hear from them.

The standard in Agrico does apply. That's been affirmed recently by the Supreme Court, approved in the Ameristeel case. And the question is, is there an immediate injury impact, and is it the type of injury that the statute is designed to protect against?

From your decision in this case there is no immediate injury, in fact, to any county other than, potentially, St. Johns County. You will grant or deny a certificate that includes property in St. Johns County. You will not grant or deny a certificate that has any impact in any of the other counties.

Yes, it will be precedent, but every decision you make and every decision a court makes is potential precedent. And courts don't allow Rick Melson to intervene in a malpractice case, because he's concerned that some time in the future he may be a victim of malpractice.

Your decision here, as the court said in one of the cases cited in Mr. Odom's memorandum, your decision here would be stare decisis, not res judicata. The distinction there is that in a future case it would be persuasive authority that you have jurisdiction. Someone would have to distinguish it, but they are not legally bound by that decision and have the right to challenge it if and when there's a case that does immediately affect them.

I'd be happy to answer questions.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Melson, if we interpret the statute, regardless of how we interpret it, the counties cannot appeal our decision, unless they're

parties?

MR. MELSON: That's correct. A nonparty cannot appeal. And, frankly, one of the practical problems of granting that intervention, when intervention is not warranted, is it would give them standing to appeal. They'd then have an automatic stay, and it slows down the process of planning for service to a development that is moving forward, even as we speak in its permitting process.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Mr. Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, my name is Ken Hoffman. I represent the JEA. I will be very brief.

Let me begin by saying that the JEA adopts and supports the positions that have been taken by Nocatee Utility Corporation and the responses to the petitions to intervene and the motions to dismiss that have been filed in this proceeding. Beyond that, I would just address two additional points.

First, Commissioner Jaber asked Mr. Melson whether there's any difference between Intercoastal and Nocatee Utility Corporation, and I believe Mr. Melson stated that there is none, and I would point out there is a difference between Nocatee and Intercoastal in that Intercoastal has filed an application with the St. Johns

County Water and Sewer Authority for territory in St.

Johns County, and that application has been denied. And that is the same territory in St. Johns County that

Intercoastal seeks in this case. That raises the issue of res judicata collateral estoppel. And that issue is not before you today, but I wanted to make that point.

Secondly, Commissioner Jaber, you asked a question concerning whether or not nonjurisdictional counties could appeal this decision. And again, Mr. Melson answered that question. And I think he's right, as nonparties they could not appeal.

However, I would point out from the standpoint of practicality that Ms. Brownless's client, St. Johns County Utility Department, is a party. As a party, I presume, if she wished, she could appeal. And these nonjurisdictional counties who have appeared before you today could file a motion with the appellate court to appear as an amicus.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Hoffman, in representing JEA, I know you all are -- you're providing the service to Nocatee, who is going to provide the ultimate utility service. You're a reseller.

MR. HOFFMAN: Correct. We have a letter of intent in that regard with Nocatee Utility Corporation and DDI.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Why isn't JEA providing service directly to the development?

MR. HOFFMAN: That's a matter of negotiations between Nocatee Utility Corporation and JEA, Commissioner Jaber. At this point, there is a letter of intent that addresses the terms and conditions and provision of bulk service to Nocatee Utility Corporation by the JEA, and that is the arrangement.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay? All right.

Commissioner Clark is going to fully listen, if not read, the transcript from 11:00 on, and then we will take this up again at 1:30. I'm, obviously, losing my touch. I had hoped to finish this by now, but we'll take it up at 1:30, and will be finished by 2:00 all right? So, have a good lunch.

(Recess taken)

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. Well, Commissioner Clark listened to the discussion at the end of the hearing. That only leaves us with discussion amongst ourselves or if Commissioners have any questions for the parties.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Can I ask Staff a question?

I have -- I want to refresh my memory about the two cases

on -- when we have jurisdiction for utilities crossing

boundaries. And I know we had the Beard decision, and then we had the Southern States decision.

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MS. CIBULA: Yeah, the Hernando County case.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Hernando, thank you. But we have subsequently had a case where the Court has indicated its willingness to revisit the notion that there has to be physical interconnection. Are you aware of that case?

MS. GERVASI: That was another SSU case. The most recent one that you're referring to where I think the Court stopped short of saying that you need to have physical interconnections. So, we're kind of left with how much is enough in terms of functional-relatedness.

MS. CIBULA: Yeah, the Court said it was an issue in that case, so they never addressed it.

invited us to come back. And here is my concern. Would your suggestion on jurisdiction be the same if the Court came back and said, you know, we were wrong, you don't have to have physical pipes crossing county lines, that where there is functional relatedness; as in the Beard case, you can have a situation where they're applying for two territories that are not contiguous. Would you still say we have jurisdiction, because we regulate in one county and not in the other?

MS. CIBULA: Well, I think in the Hernando and Beard cases, that was dealing with functional relatedness. And in this case that's not really an issue, because the lines are going to transverse county boundaries from the outset.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: But if we conclude that we have jurisdiction because of 171, and if the Court backs away from the notion of physical interconnection, could you have a situation where we would have jurisdiction over an area in a county that was nonjurisdictional, simply because we have jurisdiction in another county and they are incorporated in part of the same business operation?

MS. GERVASI: I think in that type of a scenario, which is what we have going on here today, the Commission would have to reach a conclusion based on functional relatedness and whether or not those particular circumstances were such that the utility was a single system.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And in that case we would also have jurisdiction over the territory.

MS. GERVASI: Yes.

MS. CIBULA: Yes.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay? Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Staff, tell me about the St. Johns County decision that's pending on appeal. And

that's the entire order that's pending on appeal?

MS. CIBULA: Yes, but it only includes the area in St. Johns County that they requested, not -- they didn't request territory in Duval.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I don't know, is this an appropriate time to share some of my concerns and comments or should we wait for other questions?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Commissioner Deason and

Commissioner Jacobs, do you have any questions? You might
as well tell your rationale, if you've got some thinking,
unless Commissioner --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I don't have any questions.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JABER: My concern -- there are a couple of concerns, obviously. It gives me great pause that St. Johns County has not required Nocatee to go through some of the same hoops that Intercoastal has.

It gives me great concern that the statute, whether intentionally or not, can result in forum shopping. I don't think, and it's not that we can point to anything in the statute that says this or legislative intent because I've looked, but I don't think the design of the statute was to encourage forum shopping.

Saying that, there's nothing that prohibits it.

And I think to the degree that the counties have a concern about whether 367171 encourages forum shopping, there are statutory fixes for them.

I think that absent that clarification, the statute is the statute. And we must go back, in my opinion, to the definition of utility, which includes proposing to construct a system.

I think that the PSC does have jurisdiction over this application. That doesn't mean that we will grant the application. And I'm very careful about that, because I want to every step of the way, and I don't know who the prehearing officer is with this case, but every step of the way I want to hear from St. Johns County, if we go forward with this application.

I say that for our own staff, too, because if there isn't testimony from St. Johns County, I hope that you all regroup and work with the prehearing officer, because I want to see testimony from St. Johns County.

I think that's a way to harmonize the processes, not necessarily that the county has to come to us,

Mr. Twomey, but that we all have to work together. I

think that the statute is designed for the agency and

counties to work together, and there is a way to do that.

The way to do it is to hear from the counties on need for service, on duplication of service, on geographic

proximity. There are many, many ways under comprehensive plan. It's my understanding that counties still have to go to the Department of Community Affairs to amend their comprehensive plan. So even if we go forward with this application because we find we have jurisdiction, it doesn't mean that either application will get granted. And I think that that's an opportunity for the county to make its concerns known.

Saying that, where I don't know what to do,

Commissioners, and I'll need your insight and your input,

is I think that Nocatee has not gone through the same

hoops that Intercoastal has. And in a way, Ms. Brownless
says to us that Intercoastal did it right, and we should
honor her opinion.

And by the way, I think that that's a good starting place. I would like to encourage that we take judicial notice of what the county has already done, but you're not requiring Nocatee to do the same thing. So that gives me a lot of pause.

MR. MELSON: Mr. Chairman, could I respond briefly to a concern to give her a perspective on what happened in St. Johns County?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Only if she asks you to.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I'd like that, actually.

MR. MELSON: Commissioner Jaber, I don't think

the county has required anybody to go through any hoops. Intercoastal chose, initially, to file a single county application that did not include Duval County. Nocatee chose initially to file a multi-county application, which we had to come here. We participated in six days of hearings in front of St. Johns County on the Intercoastal application for the St. Johns County piece of our project. The PSC application, multi-county application, that we had filed was put into that record by Intercoastal as an exhibit.

The county never indicated to us that they thought they had jurisdiction over a multi-county system. I think, we were operating on the same wavelength of the authority that if it was multi-county it would come here in the first instance. Outside of the res judicata and collateral estoppel, which we're not here on today, I'm not sure why the county chose to file one motion to dismiss and not the other, but I guess I'm grateful.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Yeah. The dynamics of whatever you all have going on, I can't quite get my hands around, but saying that, I'm ready to move issue one, Mr. Chair, but I would like to hear from legal on whether we can take judicial notice of the actions that St. Johns County has already made --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right.

1	COMMISSIONER JABER: and, if it's
2	appropriate, right now.
3	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Do we have a second?
4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I will second the motion.
5	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very good. Legal?
6	MS. CIBULA: At the hearing, we would probably
7	determine whether to take judicial notice of the St. Johns
8	County order.
9	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I don't see I mean, it's
10	an order of the county duly rendered. I don't see why we
11	wouldn't take it according to the evidence code.
12	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very good. We have a motion
13	and a second. All of those in favor signify by saying
14	aye.
15	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Aye.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
17	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye.
18	COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye.
19	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Opposed?
20	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Nay.
21	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If I could make one
22	brief
23	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yeah, you know, this sort
24	of happened quickly, and I just I don't believe the
25	statute ever intended for us to be able to usurp the

ability to set the territory. And I would point out that, you know, that counties and the Commission, or perhaps it was the city, granted a franchise that those two authorities coexisted. And I don't see why they can't coexist here.

And it seems to me I wouldn't grant the motion to dismiss, because I think we clearly have jurisdiction over the Duval County piece, but I understand that you would have to coordinate with the county. But that, in my mind, I don't believe the statute was ever intended to address that. And I think I was general counsel when the GDU case came up on the discussions, and there was never any discussions, as I recall, that it would in any way usurp the authority to set territories.

I do think that once it's in existence, and I think you have the situation where you'd have to apply two places for the territory. And hopefully, there would be some coordination and understanding that, you know, this makes sense to do it -- it makes sense to grant the certificate covering this whole territory.

And I'm particularly concerned about -- I think the Hernando case is wrong with respect to when jurisdiction attaches. I think it attaches when you have an entity that provides service as a single functional entity. And if we make this decision and that case is

reversed, I think you will have a situation where we will have jurisdiction over territories that are not interconnected in any way. And I don't think that was ever the intention of the statutes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Commissioner Clark, that's a very good point, if I can maybe just -- because you

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stated most of the rationalities on why I voted the other way. The reason my vote is we're here on jurisdiction.

And the arguments are that as a matter of law, we don't even get the chance to look at it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You know, Commissioner, you're absolutely right. I think we do have the jurisdiction to hear it, at least with respect to the Duval portion of it. So maybe I need to --

MR. WHARTON: May I ask a question of clarification. Would your understanding of that,

Commissioner Clark, dismiss just our application or both?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: We're not voting on

dismissal. We're just on jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Jurisdiction.

MR. WHARTON: So it would be both? They couldn't come to you for the 12,000 acres in St. Johns County?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: No, I -- they have filed for a piece, including Duval County. And to the extent

they have filed that, I think we have jurisdiction. With respect to your piece, if you have only filed for -- the filing you've made before us now is both.

MR. WHARTON: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Then, I think we do have jurisdiction, but we would only have jurisdiction with respect to that piece in Duval County.

MR. WHARTON: As to both applications?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes, it would be with regard to both. So I have probably been in error, and I

don't think we can -- I think we still have jurisdiction,

 \parallel but for different reasons.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: So you're concurring with the majority.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But for different reasons. I think we clearly can hear the case.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If I could -- maybe just before -- very brief point, Mr. Chairman.

The idea that we would not have an opportunity even to look at an application, I think, is what I find objectionable. I am absolutely clear that I don't think the statute intended that we usurp the authority of a nonjurisdictional county.

It does not -- it's not clear as to how we

resolve this issue, except what helped persuade me is when I look back at the certification statute, 367045, and it gave me guidance that in there it provides the opportunity for counties to come in and challenge a certificate of application, which would lead me to conclude that that may be the avenue that unless you anticipated that, if you see an application which encroaches upon your -- the nonjurisdictional, and I don't want to begin to prejudge here, but it led me down a different path of resolution as opposed to simply, we don't even get a chance to look at it.

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In fact, I think that statute would argue that we, indeed, do look at it and you, indeed, do get a chance to raise your concerns. And we can resolve those within the context of the certification proceeding.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay? Do we have a motion on item two, on issue two?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Chairman, do I have to ask for reconsideration so I can vote in the affirmative for different reasons?

No, I don't think so. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I think you clarified, but if you want -- you voted with the majority, but you concurred for a different reason, and Blanca is telling me that's quite all right.

> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

1 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Issue two, is there a motion? 2 COMMISSIONER JABER: Do we have to vote on issue 3 Let me think here. Staff, do we --4 MS. CIBULA: Yes, because we still have the pending --5 6 COMMISSIONER JABER: Oh, this intervention for 7 Sarasota and Hillsborough Counties? MS. CIBULA: Yes, and then on the motions to 8 9 dismiss, we're recommending denial of those. 10 COMMISSIONER JABER: Do you agree that counties cannot appeal issue one, if they're not granted 11 intervention? 12 13 MS. CIBULA: Yes, I agree with that. They can appeal the intervention portion, but not the jurisdiction 14 15 portion, if they aren't granted intervention. COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Chairman, I can move 16 Staff on issue two, but I want to clarify that their 17 participation at the special agenda, in my view, was as 18 amicus curiae. And it was under the second recommendation 19 20 that they be allowed to participate in that capacity that I was willing to hear from them. 21 So I want to make it clear that --22 23 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Does this also mean that going forward? 24 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have no problem with them 25

appearing as amicus. I want to make it clear, however,
that -COMMISSIONER JABER: Staff needs to clarify for

COMMISSIONER CLARK: They could file legal briefs the same way that it happens in the courts.

me that going forward, what would they do as amicus?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Now, I don't know what the issues are going forward. I don't know what the prehearing statements have been, but we -- as of today's vote, we'll dispose of the jurisdiction issue.

MS. CIBULA: Correct.

COMMISSIONER JABER: So, what really --

MS. CIBULA: But someone could, I guess, raise the jurisdiction issue again somewhere along the line, even though we've already made a determination.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I would -- they might pursue the issue that our jurisdiction only extends to Duval County and we can't grant it in St. Johns County.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Or they don't have to take up the offer of amicus and not do anything.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's true. That's true, but I agree with Staff that they wouldn't be able to file motions to dismiss or raise new issues. It's up to the parties to raise those, and they can participate as friends of the court on those things that they feel are

important.

That is the basis on which I think they are allowed to participate here, because I do not think we want the precedent of just because it's an agenda that anyone can participate, because we have previously not allowed people to participate when they couldn't show an interest.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I believe I might can second the motion, but I need something clarified, something that troubles me a little.

I believe Staff answered that the counties can continue to participate as an amicus for purposes of whatever, even when arguing jurisdiction, and I don't think that's appropriate. We decided that issue today.

MS. CIBULA: Yeah, only if the issue is raised again by one of the parties.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry.

MS. CIBULA: Only if the issue were to be raised again by one of the parties. The amicus couldn't raise the issue themselves. So, if the issue was raised by one of the parties, then --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I would anticipate that the prehearing officer would not allow an issue that's already been decided to be raised again.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I happen to know the prehearing officer's pretty stern about issues that have already been discussed.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second on that.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me get clarification from Staff, I'm sorry. I thought you were recommending parties participation today because we haven't gone to hearing and that, in fact, we have done before.

MS. CIBULA: I don't understand.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: That was the reason for my clarification is because I'm not sure that we have been consistent. But I think people have come to agenda, and they haven't been parties, they haven't intervened or they haven't shown the requisite interest to intervene, and we have not heard from them. And I think that is the appropriate standard to apply.

And in this case, I think, having them participate as amicus is and was appropriate. And that would be the basis on which I think we should deny their intervention, but allow them to participate, both in this oral presentation and further as amicus.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Does the amicus give them appellate rights, Staff?

1 MS. CIBULA: No. 2 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. There is a motion and a second. All of those in favor signify by saying 3 4 aye. 5 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Aye. 6 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. 7 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye. 8 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye. 9 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Opposed? 10 COMMISSIONER JABER: Nay. 11 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Do you want to tell us why? COMMISSIONER JABER: Yeah, not with respect to 12 13 going forward with the amicus I would have granted intervention. That's the purpose of my dissent. 14 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. I ask because if not, 15 Mr. Wharton might ask you, and you might have to clarify 16 your position for him. 17 COMMISSIONER JABER: No, it's good to clarify it 18 19 for the order, too. 20 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very good. 21 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move Staff on issue three. 22 23 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is there a second? COMMISSIONER JABER: Second. 24 25 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. All those in favor, FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	signify by	saying aye.
2		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Aye.
3		COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye.
4		COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.
5		COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye.
6		COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye.
7		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All Opposed? You were for it,
8	right?	
9		COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm sorry, I said aye.
10		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Yes, okay. All right. Issue
11	four.	
12		MS. CIBULA: Issue four we won't have to address
13	because of	issue two, you denied intervention.
14		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: And issue five.
15		COMMISSIONER DEASON: Move Staff.
16		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is there a second?
17		COMMISSIONER JABER: Second.
18		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All those in favor, signify
19	by saying	aye.
20		(Simultaneous affirmative response)
21		CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Opposed? 5-0. Thank you very
22	much.	
23		(Special Agenda concluded at 1:55 p.m.)
24		
25		

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2	STATE OF FLORIDA) : CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON)
4	I, KORETTA E. STANFORD, RPR, Official Commission Reporter,
5	
	DO MEDERN CERTEN + hat the Consider Asserts
6	DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Special Agenda conference in dockets 990696-WS and 992040-WS was
7	conducted by the Florida Public Service Commission at the time and place herein stated.
8	
9	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been
10	transcribed by me; and that this transcript, consisting of 89 pages, constitutes a true transcription of my
11	notes of said proceedings.
12	
13	DATED this 22nd day of June, 2000.
14	Variable Control
15	KORETTA E. STANFORD, RPR
16	Official Commission Reporter FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
17	850) 413-6734
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