

ORIGINAL

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June 29, 2000



Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director Division of Records & Reporting Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 990649-TP Investigation into Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Please find enclosed for filing in the above matter an original and fifteen copies of the Rebuttal Testimonies of Gregory D. Jacobson, Allen E. Sovereign, and Dennis B. Trimble on behalf of GTE Florida Incorporated. Service has been made as indicated on the Certificate of Service. If there are any questions regarding this filing, please contact me at (813) 483-2617.


Sincerely,

Kimberly Caswell

KC:tas Enclosures

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APP CAF -BUREAU OF RECORDS CMP COM CTR MOONTIAM ECR C :11 1 PAL RGO SEC NUMPEREDATE SER A part of GTE Corporation OTH JUN 29 8 FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that copies of the Rebuttal Testimonies of Gregory D. Jacobson, Allen E. Sovereign and Dennis B. Trimble on behalf of GTE Florida Incorporated in Docket No. 990649-TP were sent via U.S. mail on June 29, 2000 to the parties on the attached list.

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION



In Re: Investigation into Pricing) Unbundled Network Elements, Phase II)

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Docket 990649-TP

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

)

GREGORY D. JACOBSON

On Behalf of

GTE FLORIDA INCORPORATED

SUBJECT: COST OF CAPITAL

June 29, 2000



1		REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF GREGORY D. JACOBSON
2		
3		INTRODUCTION
4		
5	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION, AND BUSINESS
6		ADDRESS.
7	Α.	My name is Gregory D. Jacobson, and I am Vice President and
8		Treasurer of each of the GTE Telephone Operating Companies,
9		including GTE Florida Incorporated ("GTE Florida" or "Company"). My
10		business address is 1255 Corporate Dr., Irving, Texas.
11		
12	Q.	ARE YOU THE SAME GREGORY D. JACOBSON WHO
13		PREVIOUSLY FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING
14		ON MAY 1, 2000?
15	Α.	Yes, I am.
16		
17	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
18		PROCEEDING?
19	Α.	The purpose of my testimony is to discuss certain issues included in
20		the direct testimony of John I. Hirshleifer, a witness on behalf of AT&T
21		and MCI Worldcom. Mr. Hirshleifer has made certain arbitrary
22		assumptions and modifications to the application of the Discounted
23		Cash Flow Model (DCF), Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and
24		capital structure that are inconsistent with prevailing economic theory
25		and which individually and collectively bias his results and understate

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the forward-looking cost of capital for GTE Florida.

- 1 2
- Q. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS MADE BY MR. HIRSHLEIFER
 DO YOU FEEL ARE UNSUPPORTED OR INAPPROPRIATE?

5 Α. My testimony will address specifically Mr. Hirshleifer's inappropriate 6 reliance on a group of seven Telephone Holding Companies ("THCs") 7 as a proxy to determine the cost of capital for GTE Florida, the 8 incorporation of book values into the capital structure rather than 9 using the market capital structures appropriately used by investors, 10 the use of an arbitrary three-stage DCF model, the use of an annual 11 rather than guarterly DCF model, the failure to recognize flotation 12 costs, and Mr. Hirshleifer's application of beta and risk premium in the 13 CAPM.

14

15 My analysis and testimony will show that Mr. Hirshleifer's assumptions 16 and application of the models invalidate his results and therefore his 17 conclusions cannot be relied upon.

19

18

PROXY GROUP

20 Q. WHAT COMPANIES DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER CHOOSE AS HIS 21 RISK PROXY FOR GTE FLORIDA?

A. Mr. Hirshleifer selected a group of seven THCs as a proxy to
determine the cost of capital for GTE Florida, including Bell Atlantic,
BellSouth, SBC Communications, U.S. West, Alltel, CenturyTel, and
GTE.

1	Q.	DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER PROVIDE ANY ANALYTICAL OR
2		OTHER SUPPORT FOR HIS CONCLUSION THAT THE SELECTED
3		THCs ARE COMPARABLE IN RISK TO GTE FLORIDA?
4	A.	No. Mr. Hirshleifer simply observes that the THCs "were derived from
5		the list of Telephone Operating Companies in Standard and Poor's
6		Industry Survey". (Hirschleifer DT, p. 6)
7		
8	Q.	DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S GROUP OF THCs REPRESENT A
9		REASONABLE PROXY FOR GTE FLORIDA?
10	Α.	No. As was discussed in my direct testimony, the local exchange
11		carrier holding companies ("LECHCs") are not an appropriate risk
12		proxy for estimating the recommended return on equity for GTE
13		Florida. The market size, dominance, and concentration of the
14		Regional Bell Holding Companies ("RBHCs") local exchange
15		businesses differentiate them from GTE Florida. Even after the GTE
16		Corporation/Bell Atlantic merger is complete, GTE Florida's
17		operational size will remain unchanged and will be dwarfed by Bell
18		South in the state of Florida.
19		
20		As a facilities-based provider, GTE Florida must invest very large
21		sums of capital in rapidly changing technologies in order to provide
22		wireline services in Florida. Although the THCs have a similar

wireline investment risk, they can mitigate their overall risk by also
investing in wireless telecommunications technologies. In addition,
as compared to GTE Florida, the THCs can diversify geographically,

1 offer a wider variety of products and services, and can achieve 2 economies of scale associated with greater size and financial 3 strength. Thus, it is actually less risky to provide a bundle of national 4 or international telecommunications services than to provide only local 5 service in a limited geographical territory. GTE Corporation and the 6 RBHCs also provide other services with different risks, such as 7 wireless, internet, and international services, that GTE Florida does 8 not. Even though the THCs share some industry risk characteristics 9 with GTE Florida, the DCF Model currently does not provide accurate 10 estimates of the cost of equity for the THCs.

11

Q. WHAT ARE THE REASONS THE DCF MODEL FAILS TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF EQUITY FOR THE THCs?

A. First, from a statistical standpoint I consider the size of Mr.
Hirshleifer's seven THCs to be too small and homogeneous to
represent a good proxy group for determining the cost of equity for
GTE Florida. An aberration in the data for one of the companies or
the industry as a whole can bias the DCF and CAPM results.

20

Second, the DCF model relies on stock price and dividend growth
forecasts that must be in sync to produce accurate results. However,
investor reaction to the radical restructuring that is occurring among
the LECHCs has caused disproportionate movements in the stock
prices relative to expected earnings. A detailed discussion of the

1 industry restructuring is included in my direct testimony filed on May 2 1, 2000. Although the financial community expects the restructured 3 companies to achieve significant earnings growth as a result of their 4 merger and restructuring activities, the projected earnings growth 5 associated with prospective merger and restructuring activities has 6 not yet been reflected in the analysts' earnings growth forecasts. As 7 a practice, these analysts do not update forecasts for mergers and 8 restructuring activities until after they have been completed. 9 However, the expected earnings growth associated with the 10 prospective merger and restructuring activities is necessarily included 11 in the companies' stock prices. Therefore, a DCF model that includes 12 only LECHCs will currently produce a downwardly-biased estimate of 13 the cost of equity. This is true for rumored, as well as actual, merger 14 and restructuring activities. In general, if it is believed that two 15 companies are merger candidates, investors will bid up the stock price 16 for the company being acquired and bid down the stock price for the 17 surviving company in anticipation of merger-related revenue and cost 18 saving opportunities.

19

20Q.WHAT EVIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT ANALYST GROWTH21FORECASTS DO NOT REFLECT THE IMPACT OF ANTICIPATED22MERGERS AND RESTRUCTURINGS?

A. This can be seen by reviewing IBES earnings growth forecast data for
the LECHCs involved in mergers that have already been completed.
As shown on Rebuttal Exhibit GDJ-1, the IBES growth rate forecast

1 prior to the merger of SBC and Pacific Telesis were 9.50% and 2 3.54%, respectively. The market weighted average of these forecasts 3 is 7.89%. The post-merger growth rate forecast for SBC after the 4 merger was 10.31%, which is higher than the pre-merger rates of both 5 companies. The same is true of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX. SBC/SNET. 6 and SBC/Ameritech mergers. The average increase in growth rates 7 for these four deals is 1.65%. An increase in growth rate of this 8 magnitude for any of the other pending or anticipated mergers of 9 companies included in Mr. Hirshleifer's narrowly defined proxy group 10 would substantially increase the cost of equity determined in his DCF 11 analysis.

Aswath Damodaran, Associate Professor of Finance at New York
University, states the following concerning the effect of takeover
announcements on target-firm values:

12

The stockholders of target firms are the clear winners in 16 17 takeovers. They earn significant excess returns not only around the announcement of the acquisitions, but also in the 18 weeks leading up to it. Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed 19 20 13 studies that look at abnormal returns around takeover 21 announcements and reported an average excess return of 30% to target stockholders in successful tender offers and 22 23 20% to target stockholders in successful mergers. Jarrell, 24 Brickly, and Netter (1988) reviewed the results of 663 tender offers covering the period from 1962 to 1985 and note that 25

1	premiums averaged 19% in the 1960s, 35% in the 1970s, and
2	30% for the period from 1980 to 1985. Many of the studies
3	report a run-up in the stock price prior to the takeover
4	announcement, suggesting either a very perceptive financial
5	market or leakage of information about perspective deals.
6	(Aswarth Damodaran, Damodaran on Valuation, John Wiley &
7	Sons, Inc., 1994, page 286.)
8	
9	He goes on to state the following concerning the effect of takeover
10	announcements on bidder-firm values:
11	The effect of takeover announcements on bidder-firm stock
12	prices is not as clear-cut. Jensen and Ruback (1983) reported
13	abnormal returns of 4% for bidding-firm stockholders around
14	tender offers and no abnormal returns around mergers.
15	Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), in their examination of
16	tender offers from 1962 to 1985, noted a decline in abnormal
17	returns to bidding-firm stockholders from 4.4% in the 1960s to
18	2% in the 1970s to -1% in the 1980s. Other studies indicate
19	that approximately half of all bidding firms earn negative
20	abnormal returns around the announcement of takeovers,
21	suggesting that shareholders are skeptical about the perceived
22	value of the takeover in a significant number of cases. (Ibid,
23	pages 286-287.)
24	

1		COST OF EQUITY
2	Q.	HOW WAS THE COST OF EQUITY DETERMINED IN THE
3		COMPANY'S COST STUDY?
4	Α.	As discussed in my direct testimony, the cost of equity was based on
5		the average quarterly DCF model results applied to the S&P
6		Industrials.
7		
8		DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL
9	Q.	HOW DO THE RESULTS OF THE COMPANY'S DCF MODEL
10		COMPARE TO THOSE FOR MR. HIRSHLEIFER?
11	Α.	The Company's DCF model resulted in a 14.36% cost of equity for
12		GTE Florida compared with Mr. Hirshleifer's 8.72% cost of equity
13		estimate.
14		
15	Q.	WHAT ASSUMPTIONS DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER MAKE IN THE
16		APPLICATION OF THE DCF MODEL TO ESTIMATE GTE
17		FLORIDA'S COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL THAT ACCOUNT FOR
18		THE DIFFERENCE IN RESULTS?
19	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer used a three-stage annual DCF model to estimate GTE
20		Florida's cost of equity capital, whereas the Company used a single-
21		stage quarterly DCF model. Mr. Hirshleifer's three-stage Annual DCF
22		Model is based on the assumptions that: 1) growth in dividends,
23		earnings, and stock prices will occur in three stages; 2) dividends are
24		paid annually at the end of each year; and 3) no flotation costs are
25		incurred when new equity is issued.

1	Q.	ARE THE ASSUMPTIONS USED BY MR. HIRSHLEIFER
2		CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED APPLICATION
3		OF THE DCF MODEL?
4	Α.	No. I will discuss each of these assumptions below.
5		
6		GROWTH RATE
7	Q.	HOW DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER ESTIMATE THE THREE GROWTH
8		COMPONENTS OF HIS THREE-STAGE ANNUAL DCF MODEL?
9	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer employs a three-stage DCF model in which his proxy
10		companies' earnings are expected to grow in line with analysts'
11		earnings growth expectations for only the first five. Mr. Hirshleifer
12		then arbitrarily assumes that his proxy companies' earnings growth
13		will linearly decline over a 15-year period to his current 5.14 percent
14		expected growth in the GNP, and then grow at 5.14 percent forever.
15		Mr. Hirshleifer, however, incorrectly omits applying any dividend
16		growth during the first year of his DCF analysis. Mr. Hirshleifer's
17		basic growth assumptions are not only arbitrary, but also inconsistent
18		with evidence that a company's earnings can grow at analysts'
19		expected growth rates for many years and causes him to significantly
20		underestimate GTE Florida's cost of equity.
21		
22	Q.	WHY DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER EMPLOY A THREE-STAGE, RATHER
23		THAN A ONE-STAGE, DCF MODEL?
24	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer employs a three-stage DCF Model because he
25		allegedly finds it unreasonable to assume that a company's earnings

1 can grow at a rate greater than the growth in GNP forever. 2 3 Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT A COMPANY'S EARNINGS CANNOT 4 **GROW FOREVER AT A RATE GREATER THAN THAT FOR THE** 5 **GNP**? 6 Α. Yes. If a company were to grow at a rate greater than the growth in 7 the GNP forever, at some date far in the future, it would represent 8 most of the economy. 9 10 Q. DOES THE FACT THAT COMPANIES MAY NOT BE ABLE TO 11 SUSTAIN GROWTH RATES GREATER THAN THAT OF THE GNP 12 FAR INTO THE FUTURE PRECLUDE THE USE OF A SINGLE-13 STAGE DCF MODEL? 14 Α. No. Mr. Hirshleifer fails to recognize that (1) companies do not have 15 to grow at the same rate forever for the single-stage DCF Model to be 16 a reasonable approximation of how prices are determined in capital 17 markets: (2) it is common for companies to grow at rates 18 significantly greater than the rate of growth in GNP for long periods 19 of time; (3) the 10.53 percent average I/B/E/S growth rate for Mr. 20 Hirshleifer's proxy group of THCs is easily achievable for a period 21 longer than five years, especially in an industry such as 22 telecommunications, which is growing significantly faster than the 23 economy as a whole; and (4) evidence suggests that investors 24 expect the THCs to grow at a rate significantly greater than 5.14 25 percent in the long run. Consequently, the Commission should

- reject Mr. Hirshleifer's three-stage DCF Model to estimate GTE
 Florida's cost of equity.
- 3

4Q.WHY IS THE SINGLE-STAGE DCF MODEL A REASONABLE5APPROXIMATION OF REALITY EVEN THOUGH FIRMS CANNOT6GROW AT RATES IN EXCESS OF GNP GROWTH FOREVER?

- The DCF Model assumes that the price of a company's stock is equal 7 Α. to the discounted value of its future stream of dividends. Because 8 future dividends are discounted in the DCF Model, dividends beyond 9 a specific finite period, such as 40 or 50 years, have very little impact 10 in determining a firm's stock price. Thus, the validity of the single-11 stage DCF Model depends only on whether firms can grow at a 12 constant growth rate in excess of GNP for 40 or 50 years, not on 13 whether firms can grow at a constant growth rate in excess of GNP 14 (Using Mr. Hirshleifer's DCF cost of equity for GTE 15 forever. Corporation, for example, and his 3-stage growth rates, the first 40 16 years of dividends account for 77 percent of the stock price.) 17
- 18

19Q.WHAT EVIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT A COMPANY CAN GROW20AT A RATE GREATER THAN THE GNP OVER LONG TIME21PERIODS?

A. A review of companies, which comprise the S&P Industrials from 1979
to 1996, indicates that 135 companies had average growth rates
greater than the GNP for the 17 years from 1979 to 1996. This
represents 56% of the S&P Industrial companies for which data was

1available during this period. It is also common for companies to grow2at rates far greater than the average 5-year growth rate of 10.04%3that Mr. Hirshleifer used in his DCF model. Eighty-six (86) or 36% of4the S&P Industrial companies sustained growth rates equal to or5greater than 150% of the average growth rate for the GNP during the617 years from 1979 to 1996.

8 I also determined, that depending on the company, it would take 9 anywhere from 1,266 to 13,018,530 years for these companies to 10 become 100% of the economy if they were to maintain their historical 11 revenue growth rate as compared to the GNP. The average and 12 median number of years for the companies was 243,267 and 54,482, 13 respectively. These time periods are clearly beyond any practical and 14 relevant investment horizon. Therefore, an arbitrary assumption to 15 reduce analysts' growth rates beginning with year six and replace them with Mr. Hirshleifer's own growth estimates is unreasonable. 16

17

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18 Q. DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT HIS PROXY

19 COMPANIES CAN GROW AT 10.53% FOR ONLY FIVE YEARS?

- 20 A. Mr. Hirshleifer provides no evidence to support this arbitrary
 21 assumption.
- 22 23
- 24 Q. DO YOU HAVE EVIDENCE THAT INVESTORS EXPECT THE THCs 25 TO GROW AT A RATE HIGHER THAN 10.53% FOR A PERIOD

GREATER THAN FIVE YEARS?

2 Yes. Value Line publishes an estimate of each company's long-run Α. 3 growth from internal sources beyond the period 2003-2005. Growth 4 from internal sources is measured by the product of the company's 5 forecasted rate of return on equity and its forecasted retention ratio 6 and is an indicator of expected growth beyond the forecasted 5-year 7 period. As shown on Rebuttal Schedule GDJ-2, Value Line's long-run 8 internal growth rate for the THCs is 16.6%, indicating that Value Line 9 expects the THCs to grow at rates higher than the average IBES 5vear growth rate of 10.53% for a period greater than five years. 10

11

12Q.MR. HIRSHLEIFER JUSTIFIES HIS USE OF THE THREE-STAGE13GROWTH MODEL ON PAGE 12 OF HIS TESTIMONY WITH A14QUOTE BY ASWATH DAMODARAN. WHAT ARE THE15CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MR. DAMODARAN INDICATES USE16OF A MULTI-STAGE DCF MODEL MAY BE USEFUL?

A. Mr. Damodaran indicates that a multi-stage DCF model "may be the
more appropriate model to use for a firm whose earnings are growing
at very high rates". He goes on to say that "growth rates over 25%
would qualify as very high". None of the company's included in Mr.
Hirshleifer's THC proxy group nor the Company's S&P Industrials
group have growth rates greater than 25%. Mr. Damodaran points
out a further weakness to the multi-stage model when he states:

24 It requires a much larger number of inputs: year-specific
25 payout ratios, growth rates, and betas. For firms in which

1		there is substantial noise in the estimation process, the
2		errors in these inputs can overwhelm any benefits that
3		accrue from the additional flexibility in the model.
4		(Damodaran, Aswath, Damodaran on Valuation: Security
5		Analysis for Investment and Corporate Finance, John Wiley
6		& Sons, New York, 1994, pp. 118-119.)
7		
8		Such "noise" would include the previously discussed merger and
9		restructuring activities that the THCs are currently undergoing.
10		
11		DIVIDEND FREQUENCY
12	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S USE OF THE
13		ANNUAL DCF MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY FOR
14		COMPANIES THAT PAY DIVIDENDS QUARTERLY?
15	Α.	No. Financial theory suggests that the present value of a stream of
16		dividends depends on both the magnitude and the timing of the
17		dividend payments. Common sense would tell us the same. Since
18		dividends are, in fact, paid quarterly, Mr. Hirshleifer should have used
19		a DCF Model that assumes quarterly dividend payments. The
20		Quarterly DCF Model provides the most accurate basis for valuing the
21		dividend stream expected by the investor.
22		
23		
24	Q.	WOULD AN INVESTOR USE AN ANNUAL DCF MODEL TO VALUE
25		BONDS WHEN INTEREST IS PAID SEMI-ANNUALLY?

- A. No. That would be irrational. Bond investors recognize that prices
 depend on both the timing and the magnitude of the cash flows
 related to their investments. Since bond cash flows (interest
 payments) occur semi-annually, bond investors use a semi-annual
 DCF Model to value bond investments.
- 6

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7Q.WOULD A BANK OR MORTGAGE BROKER USE AN ANNUAL8DCF MODEL WHEN VALUING MORTGAGE LOANS?

- 9 A. No. Banks and mortgage brokers recognize that mortgage interest
 10 and principal payments are made monthly. Therefore, they use a
 11 monthly DCF model to evaluate investments in mortgage loans.
- 12

13 Q. MR. HIRSHLEIFER, ON PAGE 44 OF HIS TESTIMONY, INDICATES

14THAT QUARTERLY COMPOUNDING IS UNNECESSARY15BECAUSE THE THCs ARE ABLE TO REINVEST THEIR CASH16FLOWS ON A MONTHLY BASIS. IS THIS POINT RELEVANT TO17THE APPLICATION OF THE DCF MODEL?

No. The DCF Model is designed to model the cash flows received by 18 Α. investors, not the cash flows received by the company. Most all 19 20 companies have stable cash flows that they are able to reinvest on a 21 monthly basis. This, however, is irrelevant to investors. Investors are 22 only interested in the cash flows associated with their investments. By 23 definition the DCF recognizes these cash flows to be the stock 24 purchase price, dividends, and the stock selling price. As is the case 25 with most publicly traded companies, dividends are paid quarterly.

Since investors receive quarterly dividends, the Quarterly DCF Model
 is the most accurate model for estimating the company's cost of
 equity.

4

5Q.DOESMR.HIRSHLEIFER'SCOLLEAGUE,PROFESSOR6CORNELL, SUPPORT THE USE OF A QUARTERLY DCF MODEL7FOR A COMPANY THAT PAYS DIVIDENDS QUARTERLY?

A. Yes. In his book (Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation, The
 McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1993, page 198.) Professor Cornell
 presents a quarterly DCF analysis that incorporates the quarterly
 payment of dividends to estimate Apple Computer's cost of equity.

12

13Q.WHAT IS MR.HIRSHLEIFER'SRELATIONSHIPWITH14PROFESSOR CORNELL?

Mr. Hirshleifer and Professor Cornell currently work together at 15 Α. 16 Charles River Associates, Inc. In addition, Mr. Hirshleifer was employed at FinEcon from 1990-1999, during which time Professor 17 Mr. Hirshleifer has also 18 Cornell was President of FinEcon. collaborated on at least one article with Professor Cornell entitled 19 "Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital" for the Contemporary Finance 20 21 Digest in September 1977. Mr. Hirshleifer first appeared as a witness 22 in a GTE rate proceeding in Kentucky Administrative Case No. 360, 23 where he adopted the direct testimony of Professor Cornell. Mr. Hirshleifer's testimony has mirrored Professor Cornell's Kentucky 24 testimony during numerous GTE regulatory proceedings in which he 25

1		has appeared as a cost of capital witness on behalf of AT&T and/or
2		MCI.
3		
4		FLOTATION COSTS
5	Q.	DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER RECOGNIZE FLOTATION COSTS IN HIS
6		DCF MODEL?
7	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer does not recognize flotation costs in his DCF model,
8		even though all securities sold in the capital markets incur flotation
9		costs, such as underwriters' commissions, registration fees, legal and
10		audit fees, and printing expenses. These items typically cost from
11		3%-5% of the stock price [see Clifford W. Smith, "Alternative Methods
12		for Raising Capital, Journal of Financial Economics 5 (1977) 273
13		307]. In addition, there is likely to be a decline in price associated
14		with the issuance of new shares. This cost has been estimated to be
15		2%-3% of the stock price. [see Richard H. Pettway "The Effects of
16		New Equity Sales Upon Utility Share Prices," Public Utilities
17		Fortnightly, May 10, 1984, 3539].
18		
19		Based on these factors, total flotation costs, including both issuance
20		expenses and market pressure, range between 5%-8% of the stock
21		price. A conservative 5% was used in the Company's quarterly DCF
22		model.
23		
24	Q.	MR. HIRSHLEIFER STATES ON PAGE 45 OF HIS TESTIMONY
25		THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE FLOTATION COSTS

1IN THE DCF MODEL "BECAUSE THE PRICE OF THE2COMPANIES' STOCK HAS ACCOUNTED FOR FLOTATION3COSTS ALREADY". DO YOU AGREE?

4 Α. No. Flotation costs are no different than any other forward-looking 5 cost of doing business. They must be included in the cost model 6 somewhere. It just happens that these costs are accounted for in the 7 cost of capital rather than listed as a separate financing cost. If Mr. 8 Hirshleifer's argument was true, there would be no requirement to 9 include any other forward-looking expenses, such as the cost of 10 services and sales or general and administrative costs in GTE's 11 forward-looking cost study, because these expenses are also 12 reflected in GTE's stock price. Mr. Hirshleifer has also lost sight of a 13 key principle in the development of the cost model in this proceeding 14 - the model is to assume that the network is to be built from scratch. 15 Given this assumption, it follows that the capital utilized to fund its 16 construction would be newly issued and would indeed incur flotation 17 cost.

18

19Q.WHAT RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY IS PRODUCED FOR THE20THCsAFTERCORRECTINGFORTHEARBITRARY21ASSUMPTIONS IN MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S DCF MODELS?

A After correcting for the deficiencies discussed above, the DCF model produces a 12.84% return on equity for the THCs as shown on Rebuttal Schedule GDJ-3. The remaining difference from the Company's proposed 14.36% return on equity is primarily due to the

1		use of an inappropriate proxy group.
2		
3		CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
4	Q.	WAS A CAPM USED BY THE COMPANY TO CALCULATE A
5		RETURN ON EQUITY FOR GTE FLORIDA IN THIS PROCEEDING?
6	Α.	No.
7		
8	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH THE ASSUMPTIONS THAT MR.
9		HIRSHLEIFER USED TO DEVELOP HIS CAPM?
10	Α.	No. I disagree with the assumptions that Mr. Hirshleifer used for the
11		beta and risk premium in his CAPM. I will discuss each of these
12		assumptions below.
13		
14		BETA
15	Q.	HOW DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER ESTIMATE THE BETA
16		COMPONENTS OF HIS CAPM?
17	۸	
	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer estimates the beta component of his CAPM analysis in
18	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer estimates the beta component of his CAPM analysis in four steps. First, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates raw betas for each company
18 19	A.	
	A.	four steps. First, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates raw betas for each company
19	A .	four steps. First, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates raw betas for each company by regressing the monthly return on each company's stock against the
19 20	A .	four steps. First, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates raw betas for each company by regressing the monthly return on each company's stock against the monthly return on the S&P 500 over the five-year period ending
19 20 21	A.	four steps. First, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates raw betas for each company by regressing the monthly return on each company's stock against the monthly return on the S&P 500 over the five-year period ending September 30, 1999. Second, Mr. Hirshleifer calculates an unlevered
19 20 21 22	Α.	four steps. First, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates raw betas for each company by regressing the monthly return on each company's stock against the monthly return on the S&P 500 over the five-year period ending September 30, 1999. Second, Mr. Hirshleifer calculates an unlevered beta for each company using a theoretical equation relating the

Hirshleifer calculates the average unlevered beta for all companies in
 his telecommunications sample. Fourth, Mr. Hirshleifer estimates the
 levered beta for GTE Corporation by re-levering the average
 unlevered beta for all companies using Corporation's market value
 debt-to-equity ratio.

Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT USE OF THESE HISTORICAL BETAS WILL
 RESULT IN A FORWARD-LOOKING COST OF EQUITY FOR GTE
 FLORIDA?

6

A. No. Mr. Hirshleifer's average historical beta of 0.67 significantly
 underestimates the future business risk of the THCs relative to the
 market. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed all barriers to
 entry to GTE's local exchange business. As a result of this
 legislation, the risk of investing in the THCs has increased
 significantly. Forward-looking betas for the THCs are undoubtedly
 greater than the five-year historical betas estimated by Mr. Hirshleifer.

1718Q.DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S USE OF RAW BETAS19BASED ON FIVE YEARS OF HISTORICAL DATA TO ESTIMATE20THE FORWARD-LOOKING COST OF CAPITAL FOR USE IN21FORWARD-LOOKING COST STUDIES?

A. No. Mr. Hirshleifer fails to adjust his raw betas for the well-known
tendency of raw betas to converge over time to the overall mean beta
of 1.0. Consequently, the betas that Mr. Hirshleifer uses would not
be considered forward-looking in nature.

- 1Q.WHAT EVIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT RAW BETAS TEND TO2CONVERGE OVER TIME TO THE OVERALL MEAN BETA OF 1.03FOR ALL COMPANIES?
- A. The evidence that raw betas tend to converge over time to the overall
 mean beta of 1.0 for all companies was first presented by Marshall
 Blume: (1971) "On the Assessment of Risk," *Journal of Finance* 26,
 1-10; (1975) "Betas and Their Regression Tendencies," *Journal of Finance* 30, 785-795; and (1979) "Betas and Their Regression
 Tendencies: Some Further Evidence," *Journal of Finance* 34, 265267.
- 11
- 12Q.DOES THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY ADJUST THEIR BETA13CALCULATIONS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE TENDENCY OF RAW14BETAS TO CONVERGE OVER TIME TO THE MEAN BETA OF 1.0?15A.16A.16Account for the tendency of raw betas to converge over time to the17mean beta of 1.0.
- 18

19Q.HOW DO THE VALUE LINE BETAS COMPARE TO MR.20HIRSHLEIFER'S RAW BETAS FOR THE THCs?

- A. As shown on Rebuttal Exhibit GDJ-4, Value Line's average forwardlooking beta is .82 as compared to Mr. Hirshleifer's average raw beta
 calculation of .67 for the THCs.
- 24
- 25

1		RISK PREMIUM
2	Q	WHAT RISK PREMIUM DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER USE IN HIS CAPM?
3	A.	Mr. Hirshleifer's estimated risk premiums over one-month Treasury
4		Bills and over 20-year Treasury Bonds to be 7.5% and 5.5%,
5		respectively.
6		
7	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT?
8	Α.	No. I believe a 7.47% risk premium, which is the arithmetic average
9		of the difference between the total return of the S&P 500 and Long-
10		term Government Bonds for the period 1926 to 1998 is a fairer proxy
11		for the risk premium.
12		
13	Q.	HOW DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER ESTIMATE THE RISK PREMIUM
14		FOR HIS CAPM?
15	Α.	Mr. Hirshleifer uses a wide array of methodologies to estimate the
16		market risk premium, including a DCF methodology and both
17		arithmetic and geometric average premiums over four different
18		historical time periods, and using both the one-month Treasury Bills
19		and 20-year Treasury Bonds as surrogates for the risk-free rate of
20		return. This arbitrary selection of time periods and model
21		assumptions again result in a significant downward bias in his
22		estimation of the cost of equity for GTE Florida. Additional portions
23		of this section address specific instances where Mr. Hirshleifer has
24		used arbitrary or inconsistent methods or time frames in estimating
25		the risk premium to be used in his CAPM.

1 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S DCF METHOD OF 2 ESTIMATING THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM?

A. No. In his DCF method, Mr. Hirshleifer's determines the market return
utilizing the same three-stage DCF Model that I previously discussed.
As noted above, his DCF Model is based on the arbitrary and
incorrect assumption that companies can not sustain IBES growth
rates for more than five years. In addition, his DCF Model ignores the
fact that companies pay dividends on a quarterly basis and ignores
the existence of flotation costs.

10

11 Q. HOW DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER DEVELOP HIS ESTIMATES OF 12 HISTORICAL RISK PREMIUMS?

A. As shown on his Attachment JH-8, Mr. Hirshleifer calculates both
arithmetic mean and geometric mean risk premium results for four
different periods: 1802-1998, 1926-1998, 1951-1998, and 1971-1998
using data compiled by Jeremy J. Siegel and Ibbotson Associates.
The risk premium results based on the arithmetic mean are
significantly higher than those based on the geometric mean in every
time period utilized by Mr. Hirshleifer.

- 20
- 21

22 Q. DOES IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES ADVOCATE USING THE 23 ARITHMETIC OR GEOMETRIC MEAN IN ESTIMATING THE COST 24 OF CAPITAL?

A. Ibbotson Associates recommends that a risk premium based on the

arithmetic mean is the "correct rate for forecasting, discounting, and
 estimating the cost of capital" (See Ibbotson's *1997 Yearbook*). They
 further state:

The geometric mean is backward-looking, measuring the change in wealth over more than one period. On the other hand, the arithmetic mean better represents a typical performance over single periods and serves as the correct rate for forecasting, discounting, and estimating the cost of capital.

9

10 The arithmetic mean is correct because an investment with 11 uncertain returns will have a higher expected ending wealth 12 value than an investment that earns, with certainty, its 13 compound or geometric rate of return every year. (SBBI 1997 14 Yearbook, p. 104 and 155.)

15

Q. HAS MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S COLLEAGUE, PROFESSOR CORNELL,
 EXPRESSED AN OPINION ON WHETHER THE ARITHMETIC
 MEAN OR GEOMETRIC MEAN PROVIDES A BETTER ESTIMATE
 OF THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM?

A. Yes. In his book (Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation, The McGrawHill Companies, Inc., 1993, page 217.), Mr. Cornell states, "As shown
by Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, the best estimate of expected returns
over a given future holding period is the arithmetic average of past
returns over the same holding period." Mr. Cornell also stated in
cross-examination in Pennsylvania in Docket No. A-310203F0002,

1		"Personally, I think the arithmetic average was a better choice."
2		[Transcript at page 791.]
3		
4	Q.	DOES IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES ADVOCATE USING ANY
5		PARTICULAR TIME PERIOD FOR ESTIMATING THE MARKET
6		RISK PREMIUM?
7	Α.	Yes. They advocate using the 1926 to the present time period for
8		estimating the market risk premium.
9		
10	Q.	HAS MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S COLLEAGUE, PROFESSOR CORNELL,
11		EVER EXPRESSED AN OPINION ON WHICH TIME PERIOD IS
12		MOST APPROPRIATE TO USE IN A RISK PREMIUM STUDY?
13	Α.	Yes. In his book, (Ibid, pages 212-213.)
14		Professor Cornell states:
15		Before an average can be calculated, the sample period
16		must be determined. The longest period for which
17		reliable stock price data are readily available is January
18		1926 to the present Given the significant variation in
19		the risk premium, altering the sample period when
20		calculating the average is hazardous because it can
21		greatly affect the estimate. To avoid data mining, a
22		reasonable solution is to use the entire period from
23		1926 to the present, or as a substitute, the postwar
24		period from 1945 to the present. Finer partitioning of the
25		sample data, even if done with the best intentions,

,

.

raises the specter of introducing bias.

1 2

3	Q.	HOW DO THE RISK PREMIUMS COMPUTED BY MR.
4		HIRSHLEIFER FOR THE PERIOD 1926 TO THE PRESENT
5		COMPARE TO THOSE USED IN HIS CAPM?

- A. As shown on Mr. Hirshleifer's Attachment JH-8, the arithmetic mean
 risk premium for the period 1926 to 1998 is 9.35% over one-month
 Treasury Bills and 7.48% over Long-term Treasury Bonds. These risk
 premiums are 185 and 198 basis points, respectively, higher than
 those used by Mr. Hirshleifer in his CAPM.
- 11

Q. HOW DOES THE RISK PREMIUM FOR THE PERIOD 1802 TO THE PRESENT COMPARE TO THAT FOR THE PERIOD 1926 TO THE PRESENT?

- A. The arithmetic mean risk premium for the period 1802 to 1998 as
 computed by Mr. Hirshleifer is 5.58% over one-month Treasury Bills
 and 4.78% over Long-term Treasury Bonds. These risk premiums are
 192 and 72 basis points, respectively, lower than those for the period
 1926 to 1998.
- 20

21Q.IS THE PERIOD 1802 TO THE PRESENT A REPRESENTATIVE22TIME PERIOD FOR ESTIMATING THE RISK PREMIUM IN THIS23PROCEEDING?

A. No. As Professor Cornell indicates, the period 1926 to the present is
the longest period for which reliable data are available. During the

1 19th century, the stock market was comprised of very few stocks, mainly the stocks of banks, railroads, and a few insurance companies 2 located in the Northeast. These stocks were narrowly traded. In 3 addition, a rough estimate of dividends for these stocks was made 4 because dividend data was not available. Furthermore, stock prices 5 for the period generally were based on averages of high and low bids. 6 not prices at which trades actually occurred. For these and many 7 other reasons, the historical returns on these stocks are simply not 8 indicative of returns investors expect to receive on stock investments 9 today. (Siegel's study relies on data obtained from G. William 10 Schwert, "Indexes of U.S. Stock Prices from 1802 to 1987," Journal 11 of Business, 1990. Vol. 63, no. 3. Schwert discusses the many 12 13 problems with stock return data prior to 1926.)

14

15Q.DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS REGARDING MR.16HIRSHLEIFER'S APPLICATION OF THE CAPM?

Yes. The development of Mr. Hirshleifer's CAPM is based on a wide 17 Α array of inconsistent variables that conflict with conventional practice 18 and with positions taken in the book written by his firm's principal, 19 Bradford Cornell. Considering this, it would appear that the CAPM he 20 used in this proceeding was constructed in a manner solely for the 21 purpose of minimizing the return on equity. After correcting for the 22 23 deficiencies discussed above (i.e. beta and risk premium development), Mr. Hirshleifer's CAPM produces a 12.85% return on 24 25 equity for the THCs as shown on Rebuttal Schedule GDJ-4 as

1		compared to his 10.17% CAPM estimate for GTE.
2		
3		CAPITAL STRUCTURE
4	Q.	HOW WERE THE PERCENTAGES OF DEBT AND EQUITY
5		DEFINED IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY FOR DETERMING GTE
6		FLORIDA'S WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL?
7	Α.	My calculations were based on the market values of the debt and
8		equity for the S&P Industrials. The use of a market value capital
9		structure in determining a company's weighted average cost of capital
10		is aligned with that used by economists and investors. (See, for
11		example, Copeland/Weston, Chapter 13, Financial Theory and
12		Corporate Policy, Third Edition, 1988, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.;
13		Brealey/Myers, Chapter 9, page 190, Principles of Corporate Finance,
14		Fourth Edition, 1991, McGraw-Hill; and Robert C. Higgins, Chapter 8,
15		Analysis for Financial Management, Fourth Edition, 1995, Fourth
16		Edition, Irwin.)
17		
18	Q.	WHY WAS THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE MEASURED IN TERMS OF
19		THE MARKET VALUES OF ITS DEBT AND EQUITY?
20	Α.	Economists measure a firm's capital structure in terms of the market
21		values of its debt and equity because that is the best measure of the
22		amounts of debt and equity that investors have invested in the
23		company on a going-forward basis. Measuring a firm's capital
24		structure in terms of market value allows its managers to choose a
25		financing strategy that maximizes the value of the firm, where the

1		value of the firm is the sum of the market value of the firm's debt and
2		equity.
3		
4	Q.	WHAT METHODOLOGY WAS USED IN GTE FLORIDA'S COST
5		STUDY FOR MEASURING THE MARKET-BASED PERCENTAGES
6		OF DEBT AND EQUITY IN THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

- A. As discussed in my direct testimony, the market capital structure of
 the S&P Industrials, a composite of large competitive companies in
 the United States, was used to calculate the average market-based
 percentages of debt and equity. The average market-based capital
 structure of the S&P Industrials at December 31, 1998 contained
 22.17 percent debt and 77.83 percent equity.
- 13
- 14Q.HOW DOES THE AVERAGE MARKET-BASED CAPITAL15STRUCTURE OF THESE COMPETITIVE FIRMS COMPARE TO16THE AVERAGE MARKET-BASED CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE17RBHCs AND GTE?

A. As shown in Rebuttal Schedule GDJ-5, the weighted average marketbased capital structure of Mr. Hirshleifer's THCs contains 20.63%
debt and 79.37% equity, which is comparable to the average marketbased capital structure of the S&P Industrials. As also can be
determined from the schedule, the equity percentages of the RBHCs
and GTE are lower than GTE's potential competitors for local services
(i.e. AT&T, Frontier, MCI WorldCom, and Sprint).

25

1Q.WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE DID MR. HIRSHLEIFER USE IN2COMPUTING THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL FOR3GTE FLORIDA?

Α. Although Mr. Hirshleifer recognizes the appropriateness of a market 4 capital structure in his analysis, the 8.66% midpoint of Mr. Hirshleifer's 5 cost of capital range is based on a 50%/50% average of GTE 6 7 Corporations' book and market capital structures. Again, it appears that Mr. Hirshleifer arbitrarily made an adjustment to produce an 8 artificially low weighted average cost of capital estimate. The use of 9 a historical accounting-based (book) capital structure is inconsistent 10 11 with the forward-looking competitive assumptions in the investment and expense components of GTE Florida's cost studies. Contrary to 12 Mr. Hirshleifer's assertion on page 33 of his testimony, there is no 13 "debate among academics, practitioners, and forensic experts 14 regarding the choice between book and market weights" in 15 determining a companies weighted average cost of capital. 16 Mr. Hirshleifer cites no academic evidence for his assertion that investors 17 measure returns on their investments relative to the booked capital 18 structure of a company. Indeed, they are only concerned with the risk 19 and returns they receive on the money they have invested in their 20 21 investment portfolios using market value weights because they purchase a company's stocks and bonds at market price, not at book 22 23 value.

24

25

1Q.DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S STATEMENT ON2PAGE 33 OF HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY THAT "IN TRADITIONAL3RATE OF RETURN HEARINGS, CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS4TYPICALLY PRESENTED IN TERMS OF BOOK VALUE5WEIGHTS"?

6 Α. Yes, I do. However, as I explain on pages 25-30 of my Direct 7 Testimony, the utilization of a book-based capital structure by 8 regulators is based on the assumption that the market value and book 9 value of common equity are approximately the same. This 10 assumption was developed on market conditions prevalent in the 11 early to late 1980s that no longer hold true. Consequently, the current 12 use of a book-based capital structure in determining a company's weighted average cost of capital thus has no basis in economic or 13 14 financial theory. Additionally, the cost of service in this proceeding will be measured on the basis of forward-looking economic costs not 15 16 historical accounting costs. Therefore, Mr. Hirshleifer's book value 17 capital structures are also not consistent with the use of forward-18 looking economic costs.

19

20 Q. WHY HAVE THE BOOK-VALUE AND MARKET-VALUE CAPITAL 21 STRUCTURES OF THE THCS BECOME SO DRAMATICALLY 22 DIFFERENT IN RECENT YEARS?

A. For two reasons. First, there has been a tremendous surge in equity
 prices in the market place during the last 10 to 15 years. This surge
 has impacted the capital markets generally across all business

1 Also, because the THCs have taken very large segments. 2 extraordinary accounting write-offs in recent years as they prepared 3 for a fully competitive telecommunications market-place. As shown on 4 Rebuttal Exhibit GDJ-6, the equity in the book value capital structure 5 of Mr. Hirshleifer's THCs has been reduced by at least \$28.8 billion as a result of the discontinuation of regulatory accounting principles 6 7 established in Financial Accounting Standard 71 ("FAS 71") and for 8 write-offs for Other Post Employment Benefits ("OPEB"). These write-9 offs represent more than 52 percent of the total equity in Mr. 10 Hirshleifer's THCs' book-based capital structures. Since extraordinary 11 write-offs, by definition, are infrequent and unusual, capital structures 12 that include these write-offs cannot be representative of his firms' long-run target capital structures. Thus, Mr. Hirshleifer has clearly 13 erred in using his THCs' book value capital structures for the purpose 14 of estimating GTE Florida's forward-looking economic cost of capital. 15 The THCs' book value capital structures are neither forward looking 16 17 nor economic. 18

19Q.DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S COLLEAGUE, PROFESSOR20CORNELL, MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS IN HIS BOOK21REGARDING THE CORRECT CAPITAL STRUCTURE FOR USE IN22MEASURING A COMPANY'S WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF23CAPITAL?

A. Yes. Professor Cornell clearly recommends the use of a firm's target
market value capital structure, not its book value capital structure. On

1page 224 of his book (Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation, The2McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1993.) he states, "The appropriate3weights to use are the firm's *long-run target weights stated in terms*4of market value [original emphasis]." On page 225, Professor Cornell5writes,

It is also possible to avoid the circularity by estimating the long-6 run target weights directly. For example, the appraiser may 7 assume that all the comparable firms have the same target 8 capital structures. Given this assumption, the best estimate of 9 the target capital structure is the average capital structure 10 across the comparable firms. If the comparable firms are 11 publicly traded, their market value weights can be 12 calculated directly and averaged [emphasis added]. (lbid.) 13

14

15 Finally, on pages 228-229 of his book, he provides an example of the 16 correct way to calculate the weighted average cost of capital:

17Table 7-8 puts all the pieces together and calculates FERC's18weighted average cost of capital using the target financing19weights chosen by management. Notice that the target20weight of equity is significantly greater than the book21value weight. This reflects management's realization that22the market value of equity is much greater than the book23value" [emphasis added]. (Ibid.)

24

25 Q. ON PAGE 13 OF HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY, MR. HIRSHLEIFER

1 ALSO CITES A BOOK BY COPELAND, KOLLER, AND MURRIN, 2 ENTITLED, VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE 3 VALUE OF COMPANIES, AND BY DAMODARAN, ENTITLED, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION: SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR 4 INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE FINANCE. DO COPELAND, 5 KOLLER, AND MURRIN AND DAMODARAN MAKE ANY 6 7 **RECOMMENDATIONS IN THEIR BOOKS REGARDING THE** 8 CORRECT CAPITAL STRUCTURE TO USE IN MEASURING A COMPANY'S WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL? 9

Yes. Copeland, Koller, and Murrin clearly recommend the use of 10 Α. 11 market value capital structure weights to calculate the weighted 12 average cost of capital. Specifically, they state at page 240 that one 13 must "employ market value weights for each financing element, because market values reflect the true economic claim of each type 14 of financing outstanding, whereas book values usually do not." 15 16 Damodaran, at page 41 in the section titled, "Calculating the Weights 17 of Debt and Equity Components, Market-Value versus Book-Value Weights," states: 18

19The weights assigned to equity and debt in calculating20the weighted average cost of capital have to be based21upon market value, not book value. The rationale rests22on the fact that the cost of capital measures the cost of23issuing securities, stocks as well as bonds, to finance24projects and that these securities are issued at market25value, not at book value.

1Q.DOES MR. HIRSHLEIFER EXPLAIN WHY HE USED BOTH BOOK2AND MARKET VALUE CAPITAL STRUCTURE WEIGHTS TO3CALCULATE GTE FLORIDA'S WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF4CAPITAL, WHEN ACADEMIC EXPERTS UNANIMOUSLY5RECOMMEND THE USE OF MARKET VALUE CAPITAL6STRUCTURE WEIGHTS ALONE?

7 Α. Yes. On pages 40-41 of his direct testimony, Mr. Hirshleifer argues 8 that: (1) the network element leasing business is less risky than the 9 THCs' other businesses; and (2) the network element leasing 10 business should thus have more leverage than the THCs' other 11 businesses. He then speculates that the "higher debt weight [in the 12 THCs' average book value capital structure] may be more 13 representative of the target capital structure for the low-risk network 14 element leasing business."

15

16 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S OPINION THAT HIS 17 TELEPHONE HOLDING COMPANIES ARE MORE RISKY THAN

18 GTE FLORIDA'S NETWORK ELEMENT LEASING BUSINESS?

A. No. Even if GTE Florida's network element leasing business were less
risky than each of Mr. Hirshleifer's THCs' other businesses, it does
not follow that the network element leasing business is less risky than
the THCs as a whole. As was discussed earlier, GTE Florida must
invest very large sums of capital in rapidly changing technologies in
order to provide wireline services in Florida. Although the THCs have
a similar wireline investment risk, they can mitigate their overall risk

1 by also investing in wireless telecommunications technologies. In 2 addition, as compared to GTE Florida, the THCs can diversify 3 geographically, offer a wider variety of products and services, and can 4 achieve economies of scale associated with greater size and financial 5 strength. Thus, it is actually less risky to provide a bundle of national 6 or international telecommunications services than to provide only local 7 service in a limited geographical territory. 8 9 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER THAT THE NETWORK 10 **ELEMENT LEASING BUSINESS SHOULD HAVE A MORE HIGHLY** 11 LEVERAGED MARKET VALUE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THAN THE 12 THCs? 13 Α. No. Since the network element leasing business is at least as risky as 14 Mr. Hirshleifer's THCs, it should have a market value capital structure 15 that contains at least as much equity as the THCs' average market 16 value capital structure. 17 18 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S STATEMENT ON PAGE 40 THAT THE "HIGHER DEBT WEIGHT [IN THE BOOK 19 STRUCTURE] MAY BE MORE 20 VALUE CAPITAL

, a

- 21 **REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE" OF**
- 22 GTE FLORIDA'S NETWORK ELEMENT LEASING BUSINESS?

A. No. Since book value capital structures are inherently backward
looking, they can provide no useful information on the target market
value capital structure of GTE Florida's network element leasing

business.

3 Second, Mr. Hirshleifer simply asserts that the reported book value 4 capital structures of his THCs "may be" representative of the target 5 market value capital structure of GTE Florida's network leasing 6 business. He provides no evidence or studies to support his 7 conjecture. If the book value capital structures are not representative 8 of the target market value capital structure of GTE Florida's network 9 element leasing business, they should not be used in cost studies that 10 estimate the forward-looking cost of unbundled network elements.

11 12

13

14

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Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF MR. HIRSHLEIFER'S USE OF BOOK VALUE CAPITAL STRUCTURE WEIGHTS ON HIS COST OF CAPITAL RECOMMENDATION?

15 Mr. Hirshleifer obtained a 9.09 percent estimate of GTE Florida's Α. 16 weighted average cost of capital using market value capital structure 17 weights and an 8.24 percent estimate of GTE Florida's cost of capital 18 using book value capital structure weights. Mr. Hirshleifer's final 19 recommended 8.66 percent cost of capital gives equal weight to book 20 and market value capital structures. Thus, Mr. Hirshleifer's use of 21 book value capital structure weights by itself reduced his estimate of 22 GTE Florida's overall cost of capital by 42 basis points.

24

23

CONCLUSION

25 Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE

APPROPRIATE COST OF CAPITAL TO BE USED FOR GTE
 FLORIDA IN THIS PROCEEDING?
 A. I believe the appropriate cost of capital to be used for GTE Florida in
 this proceeding is 12.74%, reflecting a 7.03% cost of debt and a

5 14.36% cost of equity, and based on a capital structure containing
6 22.17% debt and 77.83% equity.

7

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR OVERALL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING MR. 9 HIRSHLEIFER'S WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 10 RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS PROCEEDING?

11 A Mr. Hirshleifer's selection of THCs as comparable proxies for GTE 12 Florida combined with the arbitrary assumptions and application of the 13 DCF model and CAPM have systematically resulted in a selective 14 downward bias of his cost of capital estimates for GTE Florida. Since 15 there is no basis of support for these assumptions, the Commission 16 should not accept Mr. Hirshleifer's recommendations in this 17 proceeding.

18

19

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

- 20 A. Yes.
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

IMPACT OF MERGERS ON EXPECTED EARNINGS GROWTH RATE

			IBES Mean Forecast Growth Rate				
Merged Companies	Date Merger Announced	Closed	1 Month Before Announced Date	1 Month Before Closed Date	l Month After Closed Date	(1) Increase	Current
SBC Pacific Telesis Market Value Weighted Average	4/1/96	4/1/97	9.50% 3.54% 7.89%	9.95% 4.82% 8.21%	10.31%	2.42%	12.37%
Bell Atlantic NYNEX Market Value Weighted Average	4/22/96	8/14/97	7.66% 6.62% 7.20%	8.06% 6.82% 7.52%	8.15%	0.95%	11.16%
SBC SNET Market Value Weighted Average	1/5/98	10/26/98	9.75% 6.50% 9.61%	10.50% 7.50% 10.32%	10.68%	1.07%	12.37%
SBC Ameritech Market Value Weighted Average	5/11/98	10/8/99	11.05% 8.39% 9.99%	11.96% 8.95% 10.69%	12.13%	2.14%	12.37%

Average - All Mergers

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1.65%

(1) IBES Mean Forecast Growth Rate 1 month after close less 1 month prior to announcement.

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TELEPHONE HOLDING COMPANIES LONG-RUN EARNING GROWTH RATES

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Company	Long-run Internal Growth Estimate
Bell Atlantic BellSouth SBC U.S. West ALLTEL CenturyTel GTE	16.00% 20.00% 14.50% 27.00% 14.00% 14.00% 15.50%
Market Weighted Average	16.60%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey, April 7, 2000.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDING COMPANIES QUARTERLY DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL

				Mean			
				IBES			
		Average		Annual			Weighted
		Stock	Current	Long-Term	Cost		Cost
		Price	Quarterly	Growth	of	Market	of
Ticker	Comparable Firm	Apr 1999	Dividend	Forecasts	Equity	Weight	Equity
BEL	BELL ATLANTIC CORP	\$55.375	\$0.385	9.413%	12.65%	18.2433%	2.31%
BLS	BELLSOUTH CORP	\$42.594	\$0.180	9.606%	11.57%	18.6954%	2.16%
SBC	SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC	\$52.500	\$0.231	11.571%	13.65%	35.7431%	4.88%
USW	US WEST INC	\$54.406	\$0.535	6.018%	10.48%	6.8646%	0.72%
AT	ALLTEL CORP	\$67.406	\$0.294	12.880%	14.97%	3.1806%	0.48%
CTL	CENTURYTEL	\$39.562	\$0.043	13.610%	14.13%	1.0325%	0.15%
GTE	GTE CORP	\$64.125	\$0.470	9.723%	13.15%	16.2405%	2.14%
	Average			10.40%	1 2.94%	100.0000%	12.84%

Note: Flotation cost factor is assumed to be 5%. Average stock price is average of high and low closing prices for April 1999. Source: Bloomberg database, May 28, 1999.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDING COMPANIES CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

Ticker	Comparable Firm	(1) Beta	(2) Risk Free Rate of Return	(3) Risk Premium	Cost of Equity	Market Weight	Weighted Cost of Equity
BÊL	BELL ATLANTIC CORP	0.90	6.47%	7.47%	13.19%	18.2433%	2.41%
BLS	BELLSOUTH CORP	0.85	6.47%	7.47%	12.82%	18.6954%	2.40%
SBC	SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC	0.85	6.47%	7.47%	12.82%	35.7431%	4.58%
USW	US WEST INC	0.75	6.47%	7.47%	12.07%	6.8646%	0.83%
AT	ALLTEL CORP	0.65	6.47%	7.47%	11.33%	3.1806%	0.36%
CTL	CENTURYTEL	0.82	6.47%	7.47%	12.60%	1.0325%	0.13%
GTE	GTE CORP	0.90	6.47%	7.47%	13.19%	16.2405%	2.14%
	Average	0.82			12.57%	100.0000%	1 2.85%

(1) Source: Value Line Investment Survey, October 8, 1999.

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(2) Source: Exhibit JH-7, long-term Treasury Bond Yield for September 1999.

(3) Source: Risk free rate plus risk premium from the Ibbotson SBBI database May 28, 1999 for the period 1926 to 1998.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE COMPARISON TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDING COMPANIES DECEMBER 31, 1994 - DECEMBER 31, 1998

(Millions of Dollars)

			Average		
			Common		
			Equity		
		Average	Market	Debt	Equity
Ticker	Comparable Firm	Debt	Value	Ratio	Ratio
Local Exchan	ge Holding Companies:				
BEL	BELL ATLANTIC CORP	\$15,128.580	\$51,396.685	22.74%	77.26%
BLS	BELLSOUTH CORP	\$10,758.360	\$52,670.380	16.96%	83.04%
SBC	SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC	\$19,858.039	\$100,698.474	16.47%	83.53%
USW	US WEST INC	\$7,002.000	\$19,339.464	26.58%	73.42%
АТ	ALLTEL CORP	\$2,557.010	\$8,960.661	22.20%	77.80%
CTL	CENTURYTEL	\$1,452.676	\$2,908.917	33.31%	66.69%
GTE	GTE CORP	\$16,454.000	\$45,754.227	26.45%	73.55%
	Total Telecommunictions Holding Companies	\$73,210.665	\$281,728.808	20.63%	79.37%
Interexchange	e Carriers:				
T	A T & T CORP	\$14,948.600	\$86,688.003	14.71%	85.29%
FRO	FRONTIER CORP	\$853.410	\$4,288.782	16.60%	83.40%
FON	SPRINT CORP (FON GROUP)	\$4,498.180	\$18,310.877	19.72%	80.28%
WCOM	MCI WORLDCOM INC	\$7,278.148	\$38,505.153	15.90%	84.10%
	Total Interexchange Carriers	\$27,578.338	\$147,792.815	15.73%	84.27%

Source: Bloomberg database, May 28, 1999.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDING COMPANIES IMPACT OF EXTRAORDINARY WRITE-OFFS ON BOOK EQUITY (Millions of Dollars)

Company	1993-1995 Write-offs	1995 Book Equity	Percent of Equity
BELL ATLANTIC CORP	5,069.4	12,762.8	39.7%
BELLSOUTH CORP	2,718.0	11,825.0	23.0%
SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC	13,215.8	15,813.2	83.6%
US WEST INC	3,123.0	7,948.0	39.3%
GTE CORP	4,682.0	6,871.0	68.1%
Total	28,808.2	55,220.0	52.2%

(1) This is a conservative estimate of the impact of extraordinary one-time write-offs for these telecommunications companies, since this estimate includes only write-offs for discontinuance of regulatory accounting and OPEB taken during 1993, 1994, and 1995, and does not include the large extraordinary write-offs taken for OPEB prior to 1993 by Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, U S West, and GTE.

Source: Data is taken from Company Annual Reports.