BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 4 : DOCKET NO. 981834-TP 5 In the Matter of PETITION OF COMPETITIVE CARRIERS : 6 FOR COMMISSION ACTION TO SUPPORT : 7 LOCAL COMPETITION IN BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.'S SERVICE TERRITORY. 8 PETITION OF ACI CORP. D/B/A : DOCKET NO. 990321-TP ACCELERATED CONNECTIONS, INC. FOR: GENERIC INVESTIGATION TO ENSURE : 10 THAT BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS,: INC., SPRINT-FLORIDA, INCORPORATED: 11 AND GTE FLORIDA, INCORPORATED : 12 COMPLY WITH OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE : ALTERNATIVE LOCAL EXCHANGE : CARRIERS WITH FLEXIBLE, TIMELY, 13 AND COST-EFFICIENT PHYSICAL 14 COLLOCATION. 15 16 17 18 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT 19 THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING AND DO NOT INCLUDE PREFILED TESTIMONY. 20 21 22 23 PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE ITEM NO. 23 24 25

1	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.
2		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3		
4	DATE:	Tuesday, August 1, 2000
5		
6		
7	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
8		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
9		Tallahassee, Florida
10		
11	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR
12	naromias si.	FPSC Division of Records & Reporting Chief, Bureau of Reporting
13		(850) 413-6732
14		
15		
16		·
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
	i e	

1	1
1	PARTICIPATING:
2	BETH KEATING, FPSC Division of Legal Services.
3	LENNIE FULWOOD, FPSC Division of Economic
4	Regulation.
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18 19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 PROCEEDINGS

б

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Item 23.

MS. KEATING: Commissioners, Item 23 is staff's recommendation on the motions for reconsideration filed with regard to the Commission's post-hearing decision in the collocation proceeding and Sprint's request for oral argument.

In Issue 1 staff recommends that Sprint's request for oral argument be denied.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Hold on just a second. I believe this is just Commissioner Jacobs and myself, correct?

MS. KEATING: That is correct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioner Jacobs, I just have questions on a few of the items in Issue 2. I don't know, you may want to hear staff's explanation for all 13; if you do, that is great. But if it is all right with you, we can just concentrate on the ones we have questions on. Okay.

I have questions on -- as it pertains to Issue 2 on Items 2, 3, 4, and 8.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If I can have a page with a number. Mine only had to do with Number 4, Item 4.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Item 4 on Issue 2?

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes.

5

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. See, we have already narrowed it down a lot. Okay. You can go ahead and describe Item 2 under Issue 2.

MS. KEATING: Two is with regard to the conversion of virtual to physical collocation. Staff is recommending that BellSouth and GTE-Florida's motions for reconsideration on this point be granted. In view of the fact that the federal court has now rendered an interpretation of federal law that is directly contrary to this Commission's interpretation on this point, we believe the Commission decision could be considered in error.

Therefore, in conformance with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's ruling, the Commission should determine that the ILEC rather than the ALEC may determine where the ALEC's physical collocation equipment should be placed within a central office even in situations where the ALEC is converting from virtual to physical collocation.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. The question that I have pertains to this particular item as well as it is kind of a recurring theme, so to speak, and it is evident within this particular recommendation. The federal court has made a decision. That decision has overturned some of the FCC's decisions in one form or another. We have had a hearing in this state. We have taken evidence and we have

| |

4 5

made a decision. That decision is consistent with what the -- in some of these issues -- is consistent with what the FCC had done within their rule.

Now a federal court has said those rules are wrong. But does that mean that we are wrong? And it raises -- and if you say yes, it does, then it raises another question. And I'm going to go ahead and pose the question, you maybe can address it, too. If we in this state under our own statutory authority and whatever authority we have under the federal act, if we go to all the trouble, time and expense of having a hearing, getting all of these parties to participate, take testimony, have cross-examination, have briefs filed, staff make a recommendation, we deliberate on it, we make a decision, why do we do that if every time the federal court does something we just say, "Well, we have got to change our decision."

Why don't we just say no decisions from this state until the federal court rules. Because every time we come before you all say the federal court has done something, and I'm sorry, Commission, sorry you took all the time to take the evidence and make a decision, the court has said something different. So why do we even bother to have a hearing in this state? That is my question.

MS. KEATING: Okay. First off, going back to the point of whether you could make a decision separate and apart from what the FCC had done based on your own record. I believe that you could. The problem is that with regard to these specific issues there wasn't much of a record beyond what the FCC had done. The vast majority of testimony and evidence presented was discussion of the FCC's decision.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me interrupt you a second. I agree. If this Commission, if we were to just say we default and we are just going to do whatever the FCC says, and then the FCC is overturned, I agree with you, we don't have a leg to stand on. If we are going to defer to the FCC to begin with, that's fine. But when we take evidence -- and I'm looking at your own recommendation on Page 15, you state, "Although there is a significant amount of testimony in the record that supports the Commission's decision, the D.C. Circuit has specifically rejected similar rationale used by the FCC."

MS. KEATING: I understand your point. But on two of the points, the cross-connects and conversion of virtual to physical collocation, I think the problem there is that the court did specifically state that it disagreed with the exact same rationale that the Commission was going with in its decision.

and said, well, you have state authority to do this now.

But in the original hearing that wasn't the approach that

was taken. This hearing was done mostly under the auspices of the Telecom Act.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, did the FCC take evidence and make a decision and the court said that their decision-making was faulty and --

MS. KEATING: And they said that their rationale was faulty, as well.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Uh-huh.

MS. KEATING: Like, for instance, with cross-connects, the court specifically said that the act doesn't reach the issue of cross-connecting between ALECs, that it only addresses the issue of interconnection and collocation between an ILEC --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: We have a statute in this state, though, that promotes competition. Do we have the authority under Chapter 364 to make the decision that we made?

MS. KEATING: I believe that we could do that,
Commissioner. But when we went to hearing on these
issues, I believe that the issues as they were approached
and addressed by the parties were addressed more from the
perspective of the Telecom Act versus state authority.

Now parties have come back in on reconsideration

law.

law?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So if we have a hearing in this state and people just come in and tell us why the FCC is right or wrong, we can just kick them out and say tell us why we are right or wrong under our state act? I mean, this is a very -- this to me is a very important point. A very important point. And in all honesty, I am tired of the federal government and the FCC telling us what we can and can't do when we have got some provisions under our own act and we have got to promote competition the way we see fit.

MS. KEATING: Well, if we came in under state authority any appeals wouldn't go to that same federal court, so the likelihood that you might get a different decision. Our concern was that this is something that has been done, like I said, under the auspices of the Telecom Act. And a federal court has specifically said that the rationale that the Commission based its decision on is just wrong.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: They are saying that we cannot require interconnects in a central office between collocators, we cannot require that?

MS. KEATING: That is correct under the federal

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Can we require it under state

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Under your rationale the proceeding where we adopted collocation should have been more appropriately called implementation of FCC rule number, whatever rule got vacated here. Is that what we did?

MR. FULWOOD: In part, basically when it came down to this proceeding it was based on --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: No, no, no. There is a little subtle distinction there. A little lawyer's trick.

Did we actually implement an FCC rule pursuant to jurisdiction they gave us, ala, number conservation?

MS. KEATING: We weren't actually implementing.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I agree. So if that is the case, why then should the vacation of an FCC rule disrupt our decision?

MS. KEATING: Because the entire basis of the analysis --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: In a court decision.

MS. KEATING: -- in the Commission's decision in this record was based on the FCC's decision.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yet and still we weren't implementing that rule.

MS. KEATING: No, we weren't. But like I said, the vast majority of the testimony relied on portions of the order that were vacated. And when the Commission --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: But there has to be a reason for witnesses to come here and say this is the appropriate way to promote competition, or to facilitate interconnection, or whatever the goals we are trying to accomplish other than just saying this is what the FCC said. If that is all the testimony that we have in these proceedings, there is no reason to have witnesses come in. All we have got to do is read what the FCC said.

MS. KEATING: And maybe that is the answer.

Maybe in the future we do need to broaden the scope of how we look at these things and perhaps see if we can get testimony that relates more to the state act as opposed to the federal act. But the problem was in this case that the parties came in and that was the tack they were taking. They were presenting evidence based on the Telecom Act and that is what you have in the record.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I will have to trust your recollection of the proceeding because I, quite frankly, can't remember back. I did remember, however, a discussion by some witness, and I'm sorry if I can't remember, but about the diseconomies that occurred when they are sitting there in place and all that has to be done is some rewiring. And there is this need, according to the proposal that was given by the ILECs, of actually taking their equipment out of there, putting it into a

different rack, totally new wiring. I thought we had some 2 witness testimony on that. 3 MS. KEATING: I believe you did. 4 CHAIRMAN DEASON: It is an efficient way to 5 promote interconnection between competitors, wasn't there 6 testimony to that regard? 7 MR. FULWOOD: What he was just speaking on, I 8 think, was converting virtual. 9 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Oh, okay. 10 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Converting virtual to 11 physical, which was this item, right? That is 12 Commissioner Deason's --13 MR. FULWOOD: I think Commissioner Deason is 14 speaking on three different issues, which is --15 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Right now we are on Issue 2, and I think that has to do with interconnections between 16 collocators. 17 MS. KEATING: That is cross-connects. 18 MR. FULWOOD: That is cross-connects. 19 two is the conversion of virtual to physical collocation. 20 CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'm sorry, I'm getting ahead 21 22 of myself. 23 MR. FULWOOD: They did have testimony on that 24 issue, and the efficiencies of that issue. But what we based our decision on and the testimony that was given as 25

far as converting in place is we are not disagreeing with converting virtual to physical collocation. The essence is converting virtual to physical collocation in place means the ALEC can choose to keep their equipment in the same location, and the reason -- the foundation upon our decision to allow them to keep their equipment in place was the advanced services order. I think it was Paragraph 42 that said they can put -- they are allowed, ALECs are allowed to choose to put their equipment anywhere in the central office if there is space available.

Now that does not mean that this staff
necessarily agreed with that, but posed with the FCC rule
or order that said this is what you have to allow, I don't
believe we can do less than that. We can do more than
that, but we can't turn around and do less. So even if we
did not agree with that for the State of Florida, the FCC
would supersede the state.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I guess it goes back to the same question of Commissioner Jacobs. Are we just a field office for the FCC, subservient to their rules, and we just implement their rules? We are the ones that sit in here for hours on end and hear all the evidence just to implement their rules, is that our function? Are we relegated to that?

MS. KEATING: I really wouldn't take it that

far. I think Mr. Fulwood has got a good point. We can't really do less than what they require. But if we think there are additional requirements that are consistent with the act and not inconsistent with what the FCC is doing, we can do that. The problem is is that with these three points that the court specifically addressed --

commissioner Jacobs: Now you take me to the exact point that I think is really important here. What you are saying is that we have to act consistent with the act. The language in the statute says -- on this point says what?

MS. KEATING: Are you talking of virtual?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: On collocation, 251(c)(6).

I have it here, I will read it. You don't have to search for it. 251(c)(6) says the duty -- this is a section that imposes duties on -- for interconnection on the ILECs. It says, "The duty to provide rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory for physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier, except that the carrier may provide for virtual collocation if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to the state commission that physical collocation is not practical for technical purposes or because of space limitations."

MS. KEATING: But that gets to the issue of space or technical feasibility, not --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It has to do with standard of proof and to who.

MS. KEATING: That I think --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Help me here, because the words say something to me.

MS. KEATING: I think what you are reading there, that gets to the issue of whether or not they have to provide physical collocation versus virtual collocation. It doesn't get to the issue of converting virtual collocation to physical collocation or the placement of the equipment within the office.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Why?

MS. KEATING: Because all you are talking about here, all the language is talking about is that they have the duty to provide physical collocation and access.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I thought the only way we got to talk about conversion was pursuant to this provision. I wasn't aware of another provision that directed us to address conversions from physical to -- from virtual to physical or vice versa. Help me understand what the statute says where there is another grant of authority that allows us to look at conversion.

MR. FULWOOD: We are in no way saying that they

cannot -- there is no, that I can recall, statute about converting --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So we are still talking about this grant of authority?

MR. FULWOOD: Right. But we are not saying they cannot convert virtual to physical.

agree with -- I understand what you are saying. You are saying that they can convert, but in doing so they must adhere to the provisions in the FCC rule. And when we adopted our provisions, we sought to confine our deliberations to the boundaries of the FCC rule. That is what I hear your argument saying.

MR. FULWOOD: Whether they can choose where equipment goes into a central office.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: No, no, no. Let me step back for a minute. I want to be real clear about this. Because what I hear your argument saying is because the FCC rule is vacated, we can't look at our independent deliberations to determine what criteria should apply as to conversions from virtual to physical. If that is the case --

MS. KEATING: I think I see where you are going.

I think that we probably could as long as it doesn't

conflict with what the FCC has done or with the act. The

3

4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

problem is is that there has now been an interpretation of the act by a federal court.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: As to the FCC's actions.

MS. KEATING: Right. But the rationale behind those actions as well, which was that the ILEC should have the ability to decide where in a central office the ALEC's equipment should go rather than the ALEC. And I think even if we are not preempted by what the FCC does, I think you run into a problem taking that same rationale and applying it even under state law.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I get exactly the opposite result. The only thing that could have happened to us in the FCC rule is we could have been preempted. And what you are telling me is that a court just said to the FCC what you did doesn't stand.

What that says to me is that whatever preemption there was or possibly was no longer exists, and the language in this statute should be more guiding than an FCC rule. I go the exact opposite way. Help me understand why that is not the case.

MR. FULWOOD: As staff we agree with what the court said is what it comes down to. They said that letting the ALEC choose where their equipment was going to go was basically giving them landlord control. And as staff, we agree that that is giving the ALEC landlord

control.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And understand what I'm saying is exactly consistent with what you are saying.

What you are saying is that the court looked at the FCC's implementation of this statute and determined that what the FCC did was too broad.

Now, what I am saying is that -- and what I hear you say also was that our direction is what we should have done should have come from the rule. I am questioning that. Understand what I'm saying. I am questioning whether or not we should be looking at what the statute says and then determine whether or not the FCC's actions have served to preempt what we have done.

The only way that could have happened is if they had done a rule. They did a rule, we thought we were consistent with that rule. Now that rule is out the window. So any standard that would have preempted us, i.e., some FCC rule, is not there. So we, in my mind, stand on equal footing now to interpret and apply this statute, which I thought we took evidence to do.

MR. FULWOOD: But what we had in place before this proceeding did take into account that statute.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right.

MR. FULWOOD: Now, when the FCC comes out with an advanced services order or a remand order, the ALECs

3 4

5

6 7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

say, okay, now we can have this, now we can have that, because the FCC said so. So your --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That is the point of divergence, where we go from. If that were the case, then Commissioner Deason's characterization would be exactly correct. We should not make a move and do anything regarding this statute until the FCC says so. If that were the case, that is exactly where our function should serve.

I don't read the statute to say that. In fact, what I read the statute to say is, companies, come show your state commission how you want to implement this and they will approve it. Help me.

MR. FULWOOD: And we wouldn't approve the conversion in place without the FCC making it a rule or an order. So when they made it an order the testimony refers to that order, and we will turn around and follow that order.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: You are saying our decision was because it is an FCC rule, that is what we are going to do.

CHAIRMAN DEASON:

MS. KEATING: Essentially, yes, Commissioner. That's our fault.

MS. KEATING: And that brings us back to the point that this is a motion for reconsideration. And the

standard is whether or not they have pointed out a mistake of fact or law. And it looks like it is a mistake of law now.

if we are going to go to all the time, trouble, and expense of having an evidentiary hearing, the only thing we do is say the FCC said it, that is what we are going to do. We should not be in that position or else we shouldn't even be trying the case.

MS. KEATING: But remember you are doing it, you are making your decision based upon what evidence the parties present to you. If that is all they are presenting to you, that is what you have to base your decision on. I mean, this whole proceeding was instituted based on the Telecom Act, not based on state --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: No, no, that is not what you just told me. What you just told me is this proceeding was implemented because of an FCC rule.

MS. KEATING: That comes from the Telecom Act.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. Then if that is the case, why in the world then are we preempted to act with -- the recommendation here is that we are preempted from acting because an FCC rule was vacated.

MS. KEATING: I don't think we are saying that you are preempted from acting. What we are saying is that

the motions for reconsideration on conversion of virtual to physical, on cross-connects between collocators, and the equipment -- a motion should be granted on those points because your decision was based upon portions of the FCC's order that have now been vacated.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. I am prepared to make a motion now.

MS. KEATING: Whether or not the Commission could have made another decision under state law or taken evidence under state law is beyond the point, frankly.

Because what you have -- the standard that you are faced with is whether or not there is a mistake of fact or law in rendering your decision. The mistake of law has now been pointed out by the federal court and the entire basis for your decision is gone.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm prepared to make a motion.

MS. KEATING: You know, I hate to oversimplify, but at least that is staff's perspective.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, what exactly is our role?

MS. KEATING: A lot of people have asked that question. There are provisions in the act that give the state commissions specific direction.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: This one doesn't apply,

though. This Subsection 6 doesn't apply, though, does it?

MS. KEATING: I think, you know, with regard to collocation --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm being cynical. Please forgive me, I'm probably cynical.

MS. KEATING: One of the things that we are doing now with regard to collocation is we -- this

Commission hears petitions for waiver for the requirements to provide physical collocation because of space. You have heard several of them. You have already developed collocation guidelines that direct companies on how to file those petitions for waiver. I mean, you have been considering those, there have been several that have already come before the Commission.

With regard to any further rules, essentially our view is that what the FCC doesn't cover, or isn't clear on, that is where the state commission steps in and that is where we were going in this docket.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So it is what the FCC doesn't cover or is unclear on, that is our role?

MS. KEATING: Essentially, yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So why do these hearings last so long if that is all that we do?

MS. KEATING: There is a lot that the FCC isn't clear on.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If that is the case, why isn't the record from our hearings transmitted to the FCC for them to implement their rule?

MS. KEATING: Because it is not -- our record isn't necessary for them to implement their rule. We only -- the record is only necessary here for purposes of developing whatever additional requirements this Commission may promulgate.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I agree. I'm ready to make a motion, if you want me to.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Please do.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I think there is a mistake of fact, I'm sorry, a mistake of law. And it is that we have relied solely on the rule. I think we have independent jurisdiction to hear evidence and make decisions pursuant to the federal statutes that does guide our decisions, and where the FCC has preempted us clearly I think we have to abide by that.

In this instance whatever preemption there may have been in my mind, even if we are bound, and we didn't get into all the legal issues here about whether or not we are bound by a circuit decision and all those sorts of things, but even if we are bound by that decision, at best where we are is that a FCC rule that might have preempted us has been vacated.

And I see no indication here that the vacation of that rule automatically preempts us absent some court decision saying such. And I see no reason why we should stand back from our decision automatically because of a court decision indicating that the FCC didn't have sufficient evidence in promulgating its rule. That is what in large part that court decision says.

If, in my mind, we had sufficient evidence to support our decision, and that is what I have not heard, that is the most disturbing thing I have heard today here is that we went through a -- I don't know how long it was, and we didn't come up with enough evidence to support our decision. And we walked away from that proceeding and simply said because the FCC said so, we -- and I understand the implications of that. It said that you heard all of that testimony and you disregarded it. You didn't do that. You are too smart for that. We are too smart for that.

We heard evidence to implement this statute, not to implement an FCC rule. The FCC rule gave us guidance. It did not give us authority. The federal statute gave us authority expressly by its terms. And absent that authority being taken away by a court, I think we have authority to issue our decision.

There are uncertainties, but the only way to get

to those uncertainties is to get a court to speak up and be very clear. And I may be grossly mistaken, but I believe that we have the jurisdiction to stand by our original decision, at least until this decision is finalized. At minimum until the Eighth Circuit decision is finalized. I would argue, even in the face of that decision, we have jurisdiction to stand by our original decision, and that would be my motion to deny staff.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, I have a question. It goes back, I guess, to the first question that I asked, and what triggered my initial question was the statement in staff's recommendation that there is a significant amount of testimony in the record that supports our decision.

Now, I think staff has backed away from that some and indicated that, well, perhaps what we did was just defer to the FCC and this is what the parties did in their testimony. And I guess that is where I am hung up. We are on reconsideration. And we are not retrying this of whether this is good policy or bad policy, whatever reason we made the decision. And I guess my concern is if we based it upon competent substantial evidence as to the merits of this policy one way or the other and we made a decision, that should -- it is my opinion it should stand, regardless of what the court said about the FCC rule.

Now, if staff is interpreting the court decision that it wasn't just invalidating the FCC rule, it is that the court's decision is that under no circumstances, states or FCC, can you under the federal act order this to take place, well, that is one thing. And I'm not sure that that is what the federal court said.

MS. KEATING: I don't think -- on at least two of these points, I don't think they were just invalidating an FCC rule. I mean, to the extent that they did give their opinion of what the act says. And in their opinion with regard to placement of equipment in a central office, which goes to the issue of converting virtual to physical collocation, they said --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Two questions. Did they overturn the statute?

MS. KEATING: No, they didn't, Commissioner.

But let me point out that they did specifically say that
the ILEC should be in control of where the ALEC's
equipment goes in a central office. They went beyond just
saying the FCC's rule --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: At best that may be standing in the Eighth Circuit for somebody to come and challenge our order.

MS. KEATING: Well, they are challenging your order.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm sure that somebody But at best that is what we have is somebody in the Eighth Circuit coming and challenging our order. Or taking that Eighth Circuit decision and asking for it to be applied here.

MS. BEDELL: Commissioner, if I might suggest, I would prefer that we defer this so that our staff can do a little bit more research on the actual points related to the federal jurisdiction and our obligation to follow federal court decisions and come back to you at the next agenda, if you don't mind.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Any objection?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: No.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Item 23 is deferred to the next agenda.

STATE OF FLORIDA) 1 2 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON 3 4 I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, FPSC Bureau of Reporting 5 FPSC Commission Reporter, do hereby certify that Agenda Item 23 in Docket Nos. 981834-TP and 990321-TP was heard by Chairman J. Terry Deason and Commissioner E. Leon 6 Jacobs at the time and place herein stated. 7 It is further certified that I stenographically 8 reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this 9 transcript, consisting of 24 pages, constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings. 10 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, 11 attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially 12 interested in the action. 13 DATED this 4th day of August, 2000. 14 15 16 FPSC Division of Records & Reporting Chief, Bureau of Reporting 17 (850) 413-6732 18 19 20 21

22

23

24

25