

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE:

DOCKET NO. 000685-EI - Petition of Tampa Electric Company for approval of a new environmental program for cost recovery through the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause.

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON

COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ

PROCEEDINGS:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

33**PAA

DATE:

Tuesday, September 5, 2000

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY:

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PARTICIPANTS:

JAMES BEASLEY, Ausley & McMullen, on behalf of Tampa Electric Company.

JIM BREMAN, Commission Staff.

NOREEN DAVIS, on behalf of the Commission Staff. BOB ELIAS, on behalf of the Commission Staff.

VICKI GORDON KAUFMAN, McWhirter Reeves, on behalf of FIPUG.

MAUREEN STERN, on behalf of the Commission Staff.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

<u>Issue 1</u>: Is Tampa Electric Company's Big Bend 1, 2, and 3 Flue Gas Desulfurization System Optimization and Utilization Program eligible for cost recovery through the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause?

<u>Recommendation</u>: Yes.

Issue 2: Should costs incurred prior to June 2, 2000, the date TECO filed its petition, be recovered through the ECRC, pursuant to Order No. PSC-94-1207-FOF-EI? Recommendation: No. Section 366.8255(2), Florida Statutes, only allows for recovery of prospective costs. In addition, TECO was not subjected to extraordinary circumstances as defined in Order No. PSC-94-1207-FOF-EI. However, TECO may include the costs incurred prior to June 2, 2000, in its surveillance reports.

<u>Issue 3</u>: Should this docket be closed?
<u>Recommendation</u>: Yes. This docket should be closed upon issuance of a consummating order unless a person whose substantial interests are affected by the Commission's decision files a protest within 21 days of the issuance of the proposed agency action order.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Item 33.

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COMMISSIONER JABER: I have one question. Mr. Chairman, on Item 33. It's really just a clarification for my education. Did the TECO settlement with DEP -- was any part of the settlement agreement contingent on cost recovery here?

MR. BREMAN: Paragraph O of the DEP settlement was contingent on that.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Is that how -- forgive my ignorance on this issue. Is that normally how the consent final judgments work? That settlement agreement was executed between DEP and TECO without consultation from the PSC; right?

MS. STERN: As far as I know, there was no consultation with the Public Service Commission.

I don't think that we've seen too many requests to recover under --- you know, pursuant to a settlement agreement. The agreement that TECO had with EPA didn't have any kind of recovery contingent on passing through the ECRC, so I don't -- based on -- I don't really know if it's standard or not. I don't think we've seen enough to say there is a standard.

Speaking, in situations like this, whether they have occurred in the past or will occur in the future, let's say the PSC finds that no cost recovery — that the utility isn't entitled to any cost recovery because of their own inactions. And this is hypothetical, because I don't necessarily have a problem with this recommendation. But what does that do to the settlement agreement when there's a clause contingent on cost recovery? Does it go back to DEP?

MS. STERN: I think under this settlement agreement with DEP, it sounds like it would go back to DEP, that if TECO could not recover through the ECRC, then part of that settlement agreement was not reached. You know, it sounds like it would mean TECO wouldn't have to do some of the stuff in that settlement agreement. But I can't -- on the other hand, I find that situation sort of unrealistic. I think, you know, DEP would find something to --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, I guess if that were to happen, then it would be between TECO and DEP to sort that out, it seems to me.

MS. STERN: Right, right.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Either TECO would go ahead with their obligation regardless of cost recovery, or if they felt like that it was an inordinate burden on them to go forward without cost recovery, that would have to be worked out between TECO and DEP.

MS. STERN: Yes, I think that's correct.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The question that comes to me is similar, but not directly the same. It's my understanding that the company was engaging in an acceptable program of emissions control, and we acknowledged and approved of its recognized program. What I understood the contention to be with regard to the EPA was whether or not that was enough and whether or not they should have undertaken more dramatic emission control programming, specifically whether or not they should have gone to either newer plant technology or dispensed with the old plant altogether.

It would occur to me that the question is to what extent they were required by this consent to incur some expense beyond what they would have normally incurred in their normal ongoing emissions control program. Do you understand?

MR. BREMAN: Yes, sir. The settlement with the DEP is nonspecific. It would be very difficult to tell the full extent of what costs that agreement might have occurred. In --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Can we tell the difference --

MR. BREMAN: In this case, the program that is specifically identified -- I think it's paragraph 31 of the consent decree with EPA -- is very specific. It has time lines, dates. It has specific activities at specific plants. So I don't think there's very much ambiguity as to what exactly TECO has to achieve.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I understand, but can we tell whether or not the provisions of that agreement are exceeding what we would have expected TECO to have done? And I think it's important to note that under the prior program, what they were achieving in terms of emissions control was within legal bounds. Is that correct?

MR. BREMAN: I think the answer is yes. This is more than what they were.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So they were on a course to achieving emissions control within legal bounds, and then the consent decree comes and ratchets up the cost considerably, and to meet new -- arguably, these revised legal bounds, but we won't get into that. But to achieve a new place of compliance. And so the issue here is to what extent that difference was legally required. Is that a fair statement?

MR. BREMAN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And can we tell what the difference is, is my question. Do we know what the difference there is in what TECO would have been doing under this former program?

MR. BREMAN: It would be very difficult to answer the question a year from now as to what the costs would be for the path not chosen, because as time goes by, there's going to be certain economic options that were built into the long-term plans of the Company that are no longer available, particularly SO2 allowance market participation. The economic benefits of that program were one of the heart and key programs of the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause through phase 1, through the end of

1999. But on a going-forward basis, Tampa Electric Company will not be able to use allowances or bank them. They just simply have to use whatever they use in that year and then retire them. So there's no value beyond -- I think it's 2004 for SO2 allowances.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm sorry. Whereas previously they would have had value.

MR. BREMAN: Previously they would have had value. So in the long term, I don't know that we will ever be able to evaluate the cost of the path not chosen, because it's simply not an option anymore.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Beasley?

MR. BEASLEY: Thank you, Commissioners.

James D. Beasley with the Ausley & McMullen law firm in Tallahassee for Tampa Electric Company.

Also with me is Ms. Karen Zwolak, manager of energy issues with the Regulatory Affairs

Department of Tampa Electric, and seated behind me is Ms. Dee Brown, the director of electric regulatory affairs for Tampa Electric.

Commissioners, we agree with your
Commission staff on Issue 1 that Tampa Electric
Company's Big Bend 1, 2, and 3 FGD optimization

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and utilization program complies with your standards for environmental cost recovery and should be approved. The staff recommendation recites your standards in that regard and explains how this program meets them.

We respectfully disagree, however, Commissioners, with the staff on Issue 2. That issue is whether Tampa Electric should be allowed to recover the costs which it occurred in connection with this program in implementing it prior to the date when we filed our petition for environmental cost recovery. While we agree with staff that under normal circumstances, environmental costs should be approved prospectively -- that is, absent extraordinary circumstances, a utility should petition for cost recovery in advance of including it or incurring the cost to be recovered. Electric has always attempted to follow this course of action with respect to all of its environmental projects.

However, as the staff points out in its recommendations, and as you have observed, you have the discretion to make exceptions to this requirement on a case-by-case basis where a

utility demonstrates that extraordinary circumstances required that costs be occurred prior to the petition being filed.

We think that when you look at the situation that Tampa Electric faced when it made the decision and had to make the call to expend funds in pursuit of this program, you should agree that extraordinary circumstances indeed compelled the Company to incur those costs before a meaningful petition could be prepared and submitted to the Commission.

As a bit of background, in 1999 and then carrying over into the year 2000, Tampa Electric was involved in litigation with the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection. The DEP case was settled through the entry of a consent final judgment as of December 16, 1999. The EPA lawsuit continued into this year, and the parties were involved in continuing confidential negotiations up until the very end of that session. Finally, on February 29, 2000, Tampa Electric and EPA signed a settlement agreement in the form of a consent decree that was lodged on the same day.

That consent decree required Tampa Electric to maximize the availability of its FGD or scrubber systems for Big Bend Units 1, 2, and 3 within the tight time frame, time schedule that was set forth in that consent decree. Tampa Electric was required to meet new increased removal standards by the entry date of the consent decree.

The work that needed to be performed in order to comply with that decree involved the installation of essential upgrades for the FGD systems. Tampa Electric also knew it would need to perform a more detailed evaluation to determine what else might be required in order to fully comply with the consent decree's emission limitations once the system was down and those evaluations could be performed.

Under the federal procedural schedule, a 60-day period for input followed the entry or the lodging of the consent decree, and Tampa Electric reasonably expected that the consent decree would be entered at the expiration of that time frame, which would mean that Tampa Electric would have to meet the increased standards by the end of April or the first part

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of May of this year.

Extraordinary circumstances did exist in this situation. After the consent decree was finalized, Tampa Electric faced a last-minute decision of whether to try to accomplish this work required to upgrade the Big Bend Unit 3 FGD system during a major planned maintenance outage of the unit which would begin some ten days later on March 11 and which would end as early as April 21 of this year, or the Company's option was to study its options and decide later what course of action to pursue. In other words, the Company faced the option of seizing an opportunity to commence the required upgrades and evaluations during the impending scheduled outage or to schedule another planned outage at a later time and at obvious additional cost to its ratepayers.

Two facts were clearly evident at that First, there was no time to prepare and file a meaningful petition for ECRC cost recovery prior to commencement of the March 11 scheduled outage, because there was incomplete information at that time on the scope of the work or the cost of the work for the required

upgrades and further evaluations. A petition
for some sort of blank check authority from this
Commission clearly to us did not seem likely to
succeed. Secondly, there was every reason to
believe that if the Company didn't act promptly,
it would find itself soon in violation of the
consent decree, which was expected to be two

months away at that time.

Clearly, Tampa Electric was operating in an emergency mode. It was in a rock and hard place type of situation that justified the Company's decision to take immediate action for the benefit of its ratepayers and to request cost recovery at a later time.

Now, significant benefits inured to Tampa Electric's customers as a result of the Company's prompt action. By using the impending planned outage of Big Bend Unit 3 to perform these essential upgrades and further evaluations, Tampa Electric avoided the prospects of finding itself unable to run the Big Bend units during the beginning of this year's peak summer season. This could have left Tampa Electric short of capacity and could put the state's reliability at issue as well. with

an outage of just one of the FGD systems at Big Bend Station, the Company could have lost over 900 megawatts of generating capacity.

If the Company had waited until a meaningful petition could have been completed and filed with the Commission, a later planned outage would have been needed and could have impacted the reliability of Tampa Electric's system, as well as Peninsular Florida, not to mention the cost of the additional planned outage to Tampa Electric's customers.

As your staff has agreed, Tampa Electric acted prudently and swiftly, taking advantage of the planned March 11 outage to take steps to comply with the consent decree rather than waiting and exposing its customers to higher costs and the potential threat to reliability that we saw.

We respectfully urge that you recognize that Tampa Electric indeed was operating in an emergency mode and acted prudently under the circumstances for the benefit of its customers. This Commission has a policy of encouraging the utilities it regulates to take advantage of cost saving opportunities where and when they arise

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and to put substance over form when it comes to

-- the interests of the utility customers are at
stake. That is what Tampa Electric did under
these circumstances.

We urge you not to penalize Tampa Electric for having seized an opportunity. This would send the wrong message to the companies that you regulate. This isn't a situation where Tampa Electric sat back and just through neglect failed to prepare and submit a petition that it had information with which to do that. This is not a situation where the Company could or should have known what the costs and the scope of the work was prior to taking action to commence that work on March 11 when the planned outage started.

Under these particular circumstances,
Commissioners, we sincerely believe that you should exercise your discretion to allow Tampa Electric to recover all of the costs it prudently incurred in implementing this important program commencing with the March 11, 2000 planned outage of Big Bend Unit 3.

And we're available to answer questions if you have them.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Ms. Kaufman?

MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Chairman Deason.

Vicki Gordon Kaufman of the McWhirter Reeves law

firm. I'm here on behalf of the Florida

Industrial Power Users Group. And I'm here only

to address Issue Number 2, and I'm here to

support the staff's recommendation to you on

that.

I think that the staff has done the correct analysis. And if you read their recommendation, you'll see that the very first thing they quote to you is the statute, which is where the authority for the ECRC program comes from to begin with. The statute is very plain. It's very clear. It talks about proposed compliance activities and projected environmental costs.

Now, staff also pointed out to you that in one of your orders interpreting this statutory section, you have said that you might make an exception if there were extraordinary circumstances. I question whether that's the case or not, whether you have the authority to make an exception. But nonetheless, even assuming that you do have that authority, I

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don't think that there are extraordinary circumstances before you. I don't think that the fact that Tampa Electric was in negotiations for a settlement with another agency is an extraordinary circumstance that either requires you to or either should encourage you to make an exception. The statute says that a company may come to you and submit a program for environmental cost recovery of certain types of programs and that recovery is on a projected basis. And I don't think there's any dispute that that has not happened here.

Mr. Beasley gave you a lengthy history of the negotiations of Tampa Electric with some of the other agencies involved in environmental compliance. And what TECO chooses to do or what settlements it chooses to enter into with other agencies is perhaps its own business, but those costs should not be visited on the ratepayers in contravention of the statute. I would suggest to you that a statute like this is one that you should give strict construction to. And Tampa Electric has not complied with the statute, and therefore, they are not entitled to incur costs before — I believe the date is before June 2nd.

staff.

So we would urge you to adopt your staff's recommendation on Issue Number 2. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Questions, Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER JABER: I can actually move staff. The only reason I raised the question about the contingency related to cost recovery is, you know, the overall concern I've had with many items we have with respect to DEP. I would want them to always take into account that their actions result in costs to the retail ratepayers. You know, we've offered to go over and talk to DEP about things like that and making us part of their process. But I can move

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, let me -- I have just a few questions, and then we'll get to the motion.

I'm looking at page 3 of the recommendation, and I want to just -- first of all, I'm trying to understand just as a matter of information. Staff, do you have any idea why it was a requirement imposed by the environmental agencies that TECO would not -- could not bank SO2 allowances and market those? I thought that was the whole idea of that law,

was to let the market determine what is the most cost-effective compliance, and it appears that that's going contrary to that policy.

MR. BREMAN: Well, I would agree with you, Commissioner. And like Tampa Electric Company said earlier in its own comments, it had confidential negotiations with EPA, and in order to settle, they agreed to those terms. Why they agreed to them, Commissioner, I don't know.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. There's not a cost that you can just point to and identify as a cost associated with that, because you just can't really tell what the market would have been or what would have happened. We just know that it's a restriction on what TECO otherwise would have been able to have legally done; correct?

MR. BREMAN: Well, we can look at papers, and there are publications that track and project SO2 allowance costs. And the green pricing program, for example, is deriving some of those costs from that location. So there is a way to allocate a cost. But on a going-forward basis, the zero-based allowances will have zero cost.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: The other question I have has -- also I'm referring to page 3. There's a requirement to pay \$2 million into the Tampa Bay Estuary Program, and then in one of the other settlements there's a 3.5 million one-time civil penalty. Now, none of those costs are being reflected in the -- I'm trying to ascertain, are any of those costs included in what is being proposed for recovery through the environmental clause?

MR. BREMAN: None of those costs are being proposed for recovery at this stage.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. I guess the other question I have has to do with Issue 2. And I'm trying to understand — I know Ms. Kaufman raised a legal question as to whether we have the authority to say that there are extraordinary circumstances, but just ignoring that for right now, assuming we have that authority, why is it that staff believes that this is not an extraordinary circumstance, given the timing of the outage, the planned outage during the springtime and the advantages of trying to utilize that outage for as much of the compliance as possible so as to avoid a future

planned outage?

MS. STERN: Well, in the order where the Commission established the extraordinary circumstances exception, they defined -- extraordinary circumstances was defined as whether the utility could reasonably have anticipated the changes in environmental regulations and the costs. And in the recommendation we explained that we thought TECO could have anticipated the changes, because they went through this whole negotiation process that was sort of a long-term process. So I think they -- and they had input into it. It wasn't

something just strictly imposed on them by the

regulatory agencies. So I think it's something

they could have anticipated.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, let's back up for just a second. You're saying that while they were negotiating, they should have been able to figure out what the end result of the negotiation was going to be and come before this agency and say, "Even though we're still negotiating, Commission, we think this is going to be the outcome of the negotiation, so we're filing our compliance plan with you now so we

can go ahead and get cost recovery"?

MR. BREMAN: Excuse me. I think the time line is a little messed up. The agreement was struck, and then it went through due process. The company is talented and very -- I assume very aware of what due process through the EPA and public notice is. So there's a time line of due process where the public comments are going to be received. The Company wasn't surprised by the decision. It knew what the decision was.

And we're not disputing that doing what they did was smart. It was smart. But there's nothing to show that there would absolutely beyond a reasonable doubt have been additional cost incurred. There could have been —

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, I --

MR. BREMAN: There's another outage probably going to occur in the spring of next year.

So there is flexibility and reasonableness at EPA, according to some people, and according to others, you know, there's another opinion.

MS. STERN: I also want to add that I think they could have submitted a petition to cover their costs from April -- March through

June. They wouldn't have had to submit a

petition to cover the whole year. They wouldn't

have had to do all that analysis. We're talking

about a petition to cover two months. The

petition I believe could have been held in

abeyance until all the noticing requirements

were met.

Furthermore, they never even sent us a letter saying we're having this emergency. There was no indication to us that TECO was thinking in terms of following the cost recovery statute, because they never contacted the staff to say, you know, we're having this emergency situation, you know, can we submit a petition that's maybe not 100% up to par and get it covered.

And I also want to note that other utilities have been in situations where they've incurred environmental costs before they filed their petition for the year, and they have just not asked for those costs that have been incurred. That's part of the reason why the issue hasn't come up yet. Sometimes — it's my understanding that staff in the past has made the utilities aware of the prospective

requirement, and they just voluntarily say,
"We're just not going to include it then." So
this is --

COMMISSIONER JABER: In the order that acknowledges there might been situations where we would find extraordinary circumstances, what authority is cited in that order for -- is there any authority cited for the notion that we might be able to find extraordinary circumstances to the prospective recovery?

MS. STERN: There's no authority for -- there's no authority cited in the order.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And staff is not saying that the costs are not prudently incurred. You're just saying that the clause might not be the appropriate mechanism for recovering those costs.

MR. BREMAN: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'm trying to ascertain then, what would staff had -- what would you have required TECO to have done, and at what time period, so that there would have been 100% recovery of these costs? What would have been required?

MS. STERN: They would have had to submit a

petition before they incurred the costs, and in the petition they would have --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let's back up just a second. Okay. Before they incurred any costs. When were the first costs incurred?

MS. STERN: I believe they were incurred in April.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: In April.

MR. BREMAN: March.

MS. STERN: March. Okay.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: They were incurred in March. Okay. So they should have filed a petition requesting recovery, and the petition should have been filed March or earlier. Did TECO know what the costs were in March?

MR. BREMAN: I don't know what they knew in March. They did know that they were going to do something on Big Bend Unit 3. They decided what to do, and they did it. A utility has a requirement to be careful about how it spends its money, so it already did some level of internal review before it incurred the costs to do the Big Bend 3 activities.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. So there should have been a petition filed, and there should

have been -- to the extent they could have identified any costs, they should have identified those.

MR. BREMAN: Correct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Mr. Beasley, why didn't you do that?

MR. BEASLEY: Commissioner, the settlement resulted just prior to this planned outage. It was a confidentially negotiated settlement. We didn't know at that point in time what the costs were. That would have to be turned over to the engineers and the cost estimators and other folks involved in actually doing the work. They set about to do that as quickly as they could and pulled it together as quickly as they could.

But we were in a dual mode. We were trying to take advantage of the March 10 -- excuse me, March 11 outage, and to get that in operation so we wouldn't miss that opportunity. And we didn't have the information about what further examinations of the unit once it was down would produce as far as additional costs. We had to do those further evaluations after the unit was brought down.

But our first goal was to take advantage of

that outage before it got away, and then we followed along pretty promptly with our petition after that.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.

MR. BEASLEY: And these are costs, again, of a program which the staff has said that we were prudent to do, that we are to be congratulated for taking advantage of that planned outage. So we feel that they're costs that should be recovered with that program.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I have a concern, and I guess I'll address this to staff. My concern is this. I understand the way the law reads, but at the same time, it seems to me a negotiated settlement of this type may rise to the level of what at least I personally consider to be extraordinary.

And the reason I say that is because it seems to me that to be engaged in meaningful negotiation such that each party is able to cut the best deal, so to speak, there has to be some flexibility involved. And to the extent that a utility has one hand tied behind their back, in the sense that they have to have everything finalized to be able to file for cost recovery,

if that's the message we're going to send to them, it's like don't bother to negotiate, just let DEP mandate to you what they're going to require you to do, and then you can come to the Commission, and regardless of what the cost is, by law, we have to pass it through. So we're perhaps taking away an incentive for the utilities to be perhaps forward-looking and negotiate hard and try to cut the best deal and try to take advantage of planned outages so as to minimize impacts on the system, both from a reliability and a cost perspective.

That's my concern. Is that the message we're sending to companies who are involved in these type negotiations? And it's possible there's going to be more and more of these type negotiations with the environmental agencies. That's the concern.

MR. BREMAN: Commissioner, staff debated this issue amongst itself for a long time, and in fact, it's at the heart of why we deferred this recommendation once. It boils down to a legal argument, Commissioner, not a question of prudence.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.

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MS. STERN: Could I just add something? If I understood your question properly, you're wondering -- you're thinking that it's ultimately harmful to everyone involved if we don't consider this situation extraordinary, that it doesn't create the right incentives to get the best deal.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'm concerned that it sends the wrong signal to utilities, don't try to be innovative or look at time lines. The only thing you should be concerned about is just making sure that whatever the costs are, just make sure that we don't incur any costs until we have something filed. And if that's going to be the requirement, then that may hinder them from being able to negotiate what is in the best interests of their customers.

MS. STERN: Well, the statute is pretty clear that the costs have to be prospective, so that's -- part of the problem stems from the statute. The only thing -- and I can understand the problem that you're explaining. The order, the Commission's order identifies an exception, extraordinary circumstances.

The Commission, as I'm sure you know, has

some discretion when it implements statutes, you know, some liberties that it can take. And to keep taking more and more liberties, you raise the question of are you exceeding your discretion, because the statute is pretty straightforward and clear, and you also just start down that sort of slippery slope of, well, this thing we thought -- you know, in this case, it was a settlement agreement, and we think that might be extraordinary. Well, nothing like a settlement agreement was identified as extraordinary in the --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Do we have rules implementing this statute?

MS. STERN: No. That's just a word of caution.

MR. ELIAS: And again, Commissioner Jaber, this is a cost recovery clause pursuant to Chapter 366, which is specifically exempted from the rulemaking requirements.

COMMISSIONER JABER: So I go back to the question then. When you issued the order that said that there might be an exception for extraordinary circumstances, what statutory authority did you cite?

1	MS. STERN: There wasn't any cited. But
2	agencies do have some discretion in interpreting
3	their statutes. We didn't look at the question
4	of, in that order, did the
5	COMMISSIONER JABER: But an agency can't
6	read more into a statute than is there;
7	correct?
8	MS. STERN: Yes.
9	COMMISSIONER JABER: Issue by issue?
10	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. We can go issue
11	by issue. Issue 1.
12	COMMISSIONER JABER: I can move Issue 1.
13	CHAIRMAN DEASON: It's been moved. Is
14	there a second?
15	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Second.
16	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Moved and seconded. All
17	in favor say "aye."
18	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye.
19	COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye.
20	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I want to
21	MS. DAVIS: Chairman Deason, if I may
22	interrupt, I think I might have an answer to
23	Commissioner Jaber's question.
24	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Before we do that,
25	can I as to Issue 1 you're going as to

Issue 2; right?

MS. DAVIS: Yes, sir.

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COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It somewhat ties in, but I think it's really important that we be clear here. This is a troubling case because of how the legal requirement came to be. And it sets bad precedent, in my mind, when the legal requirement that we now have to consider did not anticipate economic ramifications. In fact, on the front end of this, the prediction was of significant and dramatic economic impact from this.

while there's no discussion or debate that the environmental issues are pertinent and relevant and important, I think it's important for us to acknowledge that a balancing has to occur, and the best time for that balancing to occur is on the front end. We're now faced with the unenviable task of trying to do that balancing on the back end, and that makes this a really onerous decision in my mind. So with that caveat, I think we basically can only do it with hindsight.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. I think we did -- we voted on Issue 1.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: We did.

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CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Issue 2.

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MS. DAVIS: Commissioners, I don't recall the discussion in 1994 that the Commission held that resulted in the language in the order that Ms. Stern quoted that said, you know, there may be an exception for extraordinary circumstances, but I just wanted to bring to your attention that in Chapter 366, subsection .01, there is language that says, "All the provisions hereof," referring to Chapter 366, "shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of that purpose."

I don't know if that was part of the discussion back then, but that's the only thing that came to mind that perhaps could have supported that kind of a statement.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, let me say this. You know, it seems to me that the reason that the Legislature adopted this provision was to have a mechanism for legitimate costs to be recovered, which has the effect on the utilities of complying with environmental law. they wouldn't otherwise, but I guess if there an is a recovery mechanism for these requirements,

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I think it expedites the process in which compliance is achieved. And I think that's a good policy to have, a good policy goal to have.

And I think it was envisioned that it would be a situation that there would be perhaps some new environmental program or compliance or requirement, and that there may be some type of a rulemaking process or whatever at the environmental agency, and there would be a decision made, and it would be of a prospective nature, and the utility would say, well, we've got to meet X standard for a certain pollutant, or a certain emissions standard, or whatever it is, and they could come forward and say, what's the most cost-effective way to comply? Well, we think it's program A, and we're going to submit to the Commission that here's the requirement, here's the best way to comply, and here are the costs, and it's going to be implemented -- we have to start implementing it June 1st of next It's all done on a very forward-looking basis, planned out. Everybody knows where they are and what the requirements are, and an engineer is going to look at it and say this is the least cost way to meet the requirements. And

this is the way that the statute was written, envisioning that type of a situation, which I think would be the more normal situation.

What we have in front of us now is not what we would consider the normal situation, particularly when you've got the utility and the regulator negotiating as to what the compliance is going to be. And then to require that the utility have to come forward in the middle of negotiations or shortly thereafter, come forward with a detailed compliance, saying that this is the least cost option and, Commission, we want you to approve this on a going-forward basis, I just don't think the two mesh too well.

And if there's an overriding policy as to

-- what signals do we send our utilities when
they're engaged in these type negotiations? It
would be -- the extreme interpretation could be,
utilities, don't negotiate, and just let DEP
require you to do something, and just make them
require you to do it sometime in the future so
that you can put together your plan. And it
might cost twice as much as if you had
negotiated, but at least they get 100% recovery.
I don't think that serves our ratepayers, and

1 that's what my concern is.

customers?

So I'm willing to take a motion on Issue 2.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Staff, did OPC

participate in the negotiations, or any

MR. BREMAN: To the best of our knowledge, the only participants were TECO and EPA.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, I realize there is not a clear-cut answer to the question, and that there are --

COMMISSIONER JABER: No, there's not.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: The legal basis upon which we try to establish extraordinary circumstances is certainly not clear.

having is there's only one regulator at the negotiation table, and the people that are most affected by DEP's or EPA's actions are not at the negotiation table. But you're absolutely right. And consistent with everything I've said and my philosophical beliefs, Chairman Deason, I do not want to discourage companies from entering into negotiations, but I think with good negotiations, you have everyone at the table that's going to be affected. That's the

difficulty I'm having. I can't make a motion on this.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, we can punt it to Braulio.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I'm punting.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I begin with the legal statement from my prior order. And you could argue with how that decision came to the conclusion that there would be exceptions to this, but it's clear that we recognized that there could be an exception. And so I come to the point of trying to square this circumstance with what we recognize to be an exception.

Staff suggests that the first question that you have to ask is whether the Company could have reasonably anticipated the changes and the costs that it incurred. It's a tough call.

On the one hand, the Company had been in negotiations prior to this action, is my understanding. Prior to the EPA action, there had been ongoing discussions with the regulator as to this issue. On the other hand, those discussions involved an honest, legitimate dispute over the interpretation of the prevailing law.

And so if we take one approach here, i.e., that the Company should have been aware, we essentially say that the Company should have anticipated that it would lose in its arguments as to the prevailing interpretation of the law. On the other hand, if we say that it could not have anticipated these costs, we say that the Company should have anticipated that its interpretation of the law would have prevailed, in view of the fact that the regulator who has responsibility for that law sees differently.

I don't end it there. I look beyond just the dispute and what was going on. I look at the idea that -- what was happening with regard to the overall environmental endeavors of the company.

I look at the fact that while this dispute had a history, it was a clear escalation of this difference of opinion that occurred at this point in time, i.e., while there had been this difference of interpretation, this was a clear escalation from the regulator as to their aggressiveness in pursuing the avenues of the law. I don't know or can't recall, but I do not think the Company could have anticipated that

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the agency was -- that the EPA was going to escalate its effort to enforce its views of the law.

I look at the idea that when this came about, there were two agencies that became immediately involved, the federal agency and the state agency. There was negotiation with the state agency that occurred and negotiation with the federal agency that occurred, which they wound up not being that different, but there were differences.

I look at the fact that this company in fact had undergone some other efforts. And I come to the conclusion that this gets very close to being extraordinary circumstances. Again, it's a very tough call.

I would have expected the Company to take some action here at the time -- immediately when it saw that the EPA was going to take this more aggressive stance. And I'll be honest with you, you can't -- this is hindsight, and I have to say that up front. But when I see where the Company was, i.e., caught in the cross-hairs between two governmental agencies in a very serious turf battle, I would have expected the

Company to take some kind of action to give itself some flexibility. That is what I don't see that troubles me the most here.

Now, I remember that there was some effort by the Company to do something here, and that, quite frankly, gives me some comfort that there was an effort to do something that was withdrawn. But I would have expected some action to be taken here.

However, I go back to my original statement. When I put all that together, it begins to reach what I would view to be extraordinary circumstances that the Company faced.

I would add, however, that -- we've said that we didn't have very much to provide guidance as to what we meant in our first order. And when we announced this exception of extraordinary circumstances, I would put this to be about the outer limit. This, in my mind, would be about as much as I would be willing to accept in terms of defining what extraordinary circumstances are.

Again, I would have expected some more affirmative action at the point in time when the

Company recognized that the EPA was escalating their stance on this issue. And I believe at that point we should have had some discussion here, somehow, some way, so that we could have come here and balanced the economic impacts versus what the regulatory hurdles were, the new regulatory hurdles that the Company perceived itself to be faced with.

But having gone all that route and come to that conclusion, then I guess I would come to the point of saying that this seems — these circumstances seem, about as much as I can imagine, to be extraordinary circumstances that would meet the exception that we announced to the requirement that a petition be filed in advance of any costs being incurred. And I still — it's tough for me to get there, but I have to be honest in looking at what the circumstances were.

So, Mr. Chairman, with that, I'll move to deny staff on Issue 2.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: There's a motion to deny staff on Issue 2. Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Second.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Moved and seconded. All

in favor say "aye." COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Aye. All opposed, "nay" COMMISSIONER JABER: Nay. CHAIRMAN DEASON: The motion carries on a three-to-one vote. And that addresses Issues 1 and 2. Issue 3. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Move it. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Without objection, show staff's recommendation on Issue 3 is approved. Thank you all. That concludes Item 33. (Conclusion of consideration of Item 33.)

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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4 STATE OF FLORIDA)

5 COUNTY OF LEON)

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I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 42 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 12th day of September, 2000.

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100 Salem Court

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