## BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 3 4 In the Matter of DOCKET NO. 981834-TP 5 Petition of Competitive Carriers for Commission Action to support local 6 competition in BellSouth 7 Telecommunications, Inc.'s service territory. 8 Petition of ACI Corp. d/b/a 9 Accelerated Connections, Inc.: DOCKET NO. 990321-TP for generic investigation to : 10 ensure the BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 11 Sprint-Florida Incorporated and GTE Florida Incorporated: comply with obligation to 12 provide alternative local 13 exchange carriers with flexible, timely, and cost-efficient physical 14 15 16 17 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT 18 THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING AND DO NOT INCLUDE PREFILED TESTIMONY. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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FPSC-RECORDS/REPORT

1	PROCEEDINGS:	HEARING
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3	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.
4		COMMISSIONER E. DEON DACOBS, DR.
5	DATE:	Monday, September 25, 2000
6	TIME:	Commenced at 2:45 p.m. Concluded at 4:50 p.m.
7	PLACE	Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
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9		Tallahassee, Florida
10	REPORTED BY:	KORETTA E. STANFORD, RPR Official Commission Reporter Division of Records & Reporting
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## APPEARANCES:

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1 NANCY B. WHITE, BellSouth 2 Telecommunications, Inc., c/o Nancy Sims, 150 South 3 Monroe Street, Suite 400, Tallahassee, Florida 4 32301, appearing on behalf of BellSouth 5 Telecommunications, Inc. 6 KIMBERLY CASWELL, Post Office Box 110, 7 8 FLTC0007, Tampa, Florida 33601-0110, appearing on 9 behalf of GTE Florida, Incorporated. 10. SUSAN S. MASTERTON and CHARLES REHWINKEL, Post Office Box 2214, Tallahassee, Florida 32316, 11 12 appearing on behalf of Sprint-Florida Incorporated 13 and Sprint Communications Company Limited 14 Partnership. 15 JEREMY D. MARCUS, Blumenfeld & Cohen, 16 Suite 300, 1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington 17 D.C. 20036, appearing on behalf of Rhythms Links. 18 VICKI GORDON KAUFMAN, McWhirter, Reeves, 19 McGlothlin, Davidson, Dekker, Kaufman, Arnold & 20 Steen, 117 South Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, 21 Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of the Florida 22 Competitive Carriers Association. 23 MICHAEL A. GROSS, Florida Cable Telecommunications Association, Inc., 310 North 24

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Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing

on behalf of Florida Cable Telecommunications Association. BETH KEATING, Florida Public Service Commission, Division of Legal Services, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0870, appearing on behalf of the Commission Staff. 

## PROCEEDINGS 1 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Call the oral argument to order. 2 Can I have the notice read, please? 3 MS. KEATING: By notice issued September 11th, 4 2000, this time and place have been set for a motion 5 hearing in dockets numbers 981834 and 990321. The purpose 6 is as set forth in the notice. 7 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Take appearances. 8 MS. WHITE: Nancy White for BellSouth 9 Telecommunications. 10 11 MS. MASTERTON: Susan Masterton for Sprint, and 12 also Charles Rehwinkel for Sprint. MS. KAUFMAN: Vicki Gordon Kaufman of the 13 McWhirter, Reeves law firm on behalf of the Florida 14 Competitive Carriers Association. 15 MR. MARCUS: Jeremy Marcus with the law firm of 16 17 Blumenfeld & Cohen on behalf of Rhythms Links, Inc. MR. GROSS: Michael Gross on behalf of the FCTA. 18 19 MS. KEATING: And Beth Keating appearing for 20 Commission Staff. 21 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Ms. Keating, you have a 22 suggested procedure we follow?

MS. KEATING: I just suggest that we begin with the movants in this case. There were only three issues that were indicated for discussion. Those were the

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conversion of virtual to physical collocation, cross connects between collocators and equipment. And I would suggest, perhaps, that Ms. White start us off.

issue.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Very good. Ms. White?

MS. WHITE: Since I'm the only movant here.

BellSouth moved for reconsideration on only two of those three issues, the conversion of virtual to physical collocation and the issue of cross connects. We did not move for reconsideration on the issue of what equipment can be collocated and, therefore, I will not discuss that

I think, we need to start out with what the statute says. Section 251 C 6 of the Telecommunications Act requires incumbent local exchange companies to provide physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at the premesis of the ILEC on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.

In the first report and order of the FCC, order number 96-325 issued in 1997, the FCC specifically stated that national rules should be adopted to implement the collocation requirements of the Telecommunications Act. Congress, specifically, delegated to the FCC authority to issue regulations implementing the collocation section of the Act.

The FCC has said there are two exceptions to federal preemption of collocation. One is that states can adopt additional collocation requirements, only if they are consistent with the 1996 Act and consistent with the FCC's implementing regulations.

The second exception to federal preemption on collocation that the FCC has addressed is in their newest order, the order on reconsideration and second and fifth notice of proposed rulemaking that was released on August 10th, 2000, in order number 00-297.

In that order they stated that if the states have already set provisioning intervals or standards prior to October 10th, 2000, which is the effective date of that order, then those standards will govern. If not, then, the FCC sets forth national standards for collocation provisioning. So, those are the two situations in which a state has authority to act in accordance with what the FCC has done.

Now, in this case, the dockets that we're concerned with here today and the order that the Commission issued on those dockets on May 11th 2000, order number PSC-00-0941, on these two issues, the Commission based its decision on the FCC advanced services order that was rendered in March of 1999, that's order 99-48.

With regard to conversion of virtual to

physical, they said that the ALEC's equipment may remain in place, even if it is in the ILEC's equipment line-up when the conversion occurs; and that the ILEC cannot require an ALEC's equipment -- excuse me, a collocation arrangement to be put in a segregated area.

They said that to require relocation would be unduly burdensome and costly. That is the same exact rationale that the FCC used in their advanced services order decision where they said, essentially, the same thing.

With regard to cross connects, this Commission found that the FCC, in the advanced services order, had provided sufficient guidance in its rules and orders concerning cross connects. This Commission decided that the ILEC must follow those recommendations.

The problem is in the GTE versus the FCC case, 205 F3rd 416 issued on March 7th, 2000, the Court held that the FCC's -- that these FCC -- strike that. Let me start again.

In that order, the Court held that these two issues that have been decided by the FCC in the advanced services order were not based on what the statute said -- on what the Telecommunications Act said.

They said that the FCC's definition of necessary was too broad, that neither one of these requirements had

a basis in the statute; therefore, they vacated these two regulations of the FCC and remanded the issues back to the FCC in order to look at it again. In other words, they sent the FCC back to the drawing board on these two issues.

And since then, the FCC has come out with a second notice of proposed rulemaking. It's effective October 10th. It came out on October -- I'm mean, sorry, August 10th in order number 00-297. And the FCC is seeking comment on the very issues involved in this docket.

They're seeking comment about the process by which space is assigned, on where the space is to be located, on how a collocator accesses that space, on the criteria an ILEC should employ in selecting the space, on whether the statute, the Telecommunications Act, encompasses cross connects between collocators. The very issues that we're concerned with in this Florida docket are being looked at again by the FCC on order of the District Court -- the D.C. Circuit.

The bottom line here is that the federal court

-- excuse me, that this Commission has adopted FCC -- what

the FCC said about these two issues on the same basis that

the FCC did. The federal court has said these bases are

insufficient, are overly broad, and do not conform with

the Telecommunications Act. This Commission cannot implement a rule that has been vacated by a federal court, a rule based on the same reasoning that the Court decided was insufficient.

The FCC has not appealed the D.C. Circuit's order. Instead, they have said they have gone back to the drawing board and are accepting further comments on the issue. Once again, this Commission can only adopt regulations that are consistent with the Act. That is not here.

The District D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has already said that these regulations that this Commission adopted are not consistent with the Act. The only other way that they can adopt regulations is if they're consistent with the FCC's implementing regulations.

Here, they're identical. And the D.C. Circuit

Court of Appeals has already said those implementing

regulations do not have sufficient basis in fact or on the

statute in order to let them go forward.

Therefore, I would say that the Commission does not have the jurisdiction on which to promulgate these particular regulations and that they should just keep status quo until we see where the FCC goes in their second notice of proposed rulemaking.

Thank you.

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COMMISSIONER JACOBS: You argue that we hold no

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CHAIRMAN DEASON: And what is the status quo? MS. WHITE: The status quo -- well, I can tell you what the status quo is for BellSouth. BellSouth has written the FCC after the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals order came out and, essentially, said we are not going to go back and renegotiate agreements because of what the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has done. We will let the agreements that are in place right now, what they say about these issues, go forward until we see what happens in the FCC's arena.

So, what about the decision in CHAIRMAN DEASON: the docket that we're here on, what is the status quo for it?

MS. WHITE: Well, the status quo for it -- I can tell you that in all practical purposes, BellSouth is not going into these. When somebody comes in and says I want to convert from virtual to physical, it is not BellSouth's practice to go in and say well, you're getting out of this spot, you have to go into that spot. It is definitely looked at on a case-by-case basis. And usually, the only time anything is requested to be moved or we say relocating is necessary is if we're talking about opposite a space exhaustion situation, and there's no other opportunity.

MS. WHITE: Just these two, the ones on cross connects and the ones on conversion of virtual to physical, because your decision was based on the same rationale that the FCC used, and the Court has said that rationale is not sufficient.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Now, what does our authority to act on this issue, what is it derived from, in your opinion?

MS. WHITE: Your authority to act on this issue is derived from the FCC.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So, you don't think
Section 252 of the Act has any relevance here, prevalence?

MS. WHITE: No, I think, it does. What the FCC has said is the Telecommunications Act on collocation, the FCC has said we have complete jurisdiction over collocation, except in two instances: One is that you can do additional regulations, if they're consistent with the Act and consistent with the implementing regulations of the FCC.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That's an interesting point. It's particularly interesting since the Court is questioning the FCC's interpretation of that section on the whole. But as a matter of how the FCC envisions

implementation of that Act, if I'm not mistaken, the Act says specifically the state Commissions are to approve these provisions; is that correct?

MS. WHITE: I'm not aware. I mean, the state
Commission has to approve collocation agreements that
comport with the Act and with the FCC's rules and this
Commission's rules. I think that what we're talking about
here are two issues that are specifically under
consideration by the FCC. We're not talking about an
issue where the FCC hasn't spoken, where the FCC has said,
okay, we're not going to worry ourselves with this issue.
That's an issue for the states.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Understood. Where I'm hoping to focus the discussion is where Congress has spoken. And then, of course, the FCC has come in and interpreted what Congress said, I agree. But if Congress said in the statute that the state Commission should approve these provisions and true enough, the FCC comes in and says we now specify how states' Commissions should view collocation requirements and now we have the Court saying that what the FCC said isn't proper, for whatever reason --

MS. WHITE: Right.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: -- what should we do with regard to our obligations under the statute?

MS. WHITE: Well, I think, if you want to go back and look and say we think these are still good regulations, you definitely cannot -- well, I'm not even sure you could do that, because the D.C. Circuit has gone beyond saying that the FCC just didn't have enough reasoning behind their decision.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If you take that reading in the statute, hasn't the D.C. Circuit really overturned the statute? Because it says we can't act now. It says state Commissions can't act anymore to approve these provisions.

MS. WHITE: No, I disagree with that. All I'm saying is if you're talking about a provision where the FCC hasn't acted, yes, you've got authority to do that. If you're talking about an additional requirement that's consistent with the Act or consistent with the FCC, yes, you can do that. What I'm saying is these two particular provisions are not consistent with the Act or with what the FCC has done.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So, you would hold to the view that our obligations on the Act did not convey any authority for state Commissions to interpret the Act.

That is the sole purview of the FCC.

MS. WHITE: As far as collocation is concerned, yes, because that's what the FCC has said is that we

preempt, we have control over this, but here are the specific incidents, the specific scenarios, in which a state Commission can act.

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The problem is you're asking a very broad question when, I guess, I'm looking at it from a very narrow focus of these particular two issues. So, it's hard -- the broad answer may not be the same as the answer for these particular two issues.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I agree.

MS. WHITE: That's the problem.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I've been honing in on this point and feeling as if I've been hitting my head against the wall. And I saw this case the other day. And it's not on point, I'll say that up front. This is talking about reciprocal comp. But what interests me is this is the Eighth Circuit speaking in it, and it's in the Southwestern Bell, and it has to do with reciprocal comp decision. I think, I have the Lexis cite, 200 US APP Lexis 22931.

And what the Court says is we have the jurisdiction to go and review a state Commission's decision on these provisions, okay? Now, it could be that our authority over reciprocal comp approval -- approval of reciprocal comp provisions could be different than our authority to review collocation.

MS. WHITE: And I would say that part of that is correct, because the FCC has -- I mean, they've spoken halfway on the reciprocal comp, but not the other way.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And here's my point. By the Court indicating -- and I want your view on this. By the Court indicating that it wants to assert jurisdiction to review a state Commission's ruling on this, how, then, could it be that we have to wait for the FCC to act, if the Court -- because the Court would then, I would think, say if the FCC hadn't acted, you don't even get into the courthouse door.

MS. WHITE: And two, I would say for two reasons: One is that under the Act, state decisions -- state Commission decisions that are based on the Telecommunications Act are reviewable by federal court.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Understood. But I'm speaking to jurisdiction now.

MS. WHITE: Right. And the second reason I would say for why that court has jurisdiction to review your case is because of the specific issue involved. As I said, reciprocal comp is -- I mean, that's up in the air big time.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I understand, but you would agree with me that the FCC clearly has not stated -- in other words, they've spoken, but they haven't spoken

clearly on reciprocal comp.

MS. WHITE: Well, it would depend on the case I'm in. If I'm in a reciprocal comp case, I'm going to argue that they've said this traffic is interstate, but they haven't said it very clear, I will agree to that.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: We're not operating off clear law from what you see as the reciprocal comp.

MS. WHITE: Right.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And if I follow your rationale as it pertains to collocation, state Commissions have no real ability to act on reciprocal comp, because the FCC hasn't really given a clear indication.

Now, as soon as I say that, I recognize that they did a caveat in their order, and I understand that. So, if -- you can buy off on that. But this is a matter of jurisdiction, and the FCC can't grant jurisdiction by their own rule. Do you understand my point?

MS. WHITE: I do. I do. But what, I guess,
I'm saying is that with regard to collocation, if we were
talking about an issue that hasn't been thought up by
anybody, looked at by anybody, okay, let's look at this.

If somebody was complaining that BellSouth or GTE or an ILEC was assigning them space, only because it was going to cost them more money to be put in that space, and it would take longer to be put in that space, then I

would say there's no regulation that I'm aware of from the FCC.

And it would seem to me that this Commission could come in and say, BellSouth, GTE, you cannot assign space on the basis just to make it more expensive and just to make it take longer and just to make them go through more hoops. The problem is what we're dealing with here today is two very, very specific issues.

One is whether the statute that says that an ILEC has to provide collocation at its premesis for an ALEC, whether that encompasses the issue of the ILEC has to allow collocators to cross connect between each other. And as the Court said, the statute is more concerned with getting new entrants connected to the ILEC's network. And that's what their problem was. It doesn't talk about new entrants connecting between each other. So, that's a very, very specific issue.

The other specific issue they're talking about is when you've come in and you've decided you want virtual collocation, and you've had that for some time, and then you decide you want to go to physical. The whole issue on that is who controls the central office space?

Can an ALEC come in and say, well, I don't like where you put me. I just don't like the looks of it, you know. If it has nothing to do with the amount of money it

costs or the amount of time it takes to have collocation, if they can come into the ILEC's building, which the ILEC owns and says, no, I've decided I want my collocation arrangement in the middle of the building where it's totally inconvenient for everybody. So, the issue is who controls the space in that building.

That's a very, very specific issue. And those two specific issues are the ones that the FCC has put out regulations on and, I think, where this Commission is more limited in what they can do than if we were talking about something else.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: My question is are we preempted because we simply adopted an FCC position and that FCC rule was overturned or are we just preempted because the Court has -- on anything dealing with this subject matter, regardless of whether we've had an evidentiary hearing or not, we're preempted.

MS. WHITE: Well, I would say that you're more preempted, because you did what the FCC and you based it on what the FCC based it on. If this Commission --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you this question.

Is your opinion that for purposes of this hearing and the record that we develop for these two issues that we didn't develop any record, the only thing we said was if it's

good enough for the FCC, it's good enough for us?

MS. WHITE: Yes. I have gone back, and I have looked at the record. And every line of reasoning, every argument that I can see from the transcript where people argued about these two issues were the same rationale, the same reasoning, the same basis on which the FCC made their decision and which the circuit court vacated and remanded and said that reasoning, that rationale is not good enough. So, the answer to your question would be yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, for the purpose of these two issues it's really, in your opinion, it's moot as to whether we develop any rationale beyond the FCC's rationale, because we didn't do it.

MS. WHITE: Because you didn't do it. If you had, I think, I might -- I'm not sure what my answer would have been.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, if we had developed more rationale and we had identified another reason the FCC had never even considered and we had a record basis that said this is an important reason and for this reason you should adopt this policy, then, it would be another question as to whether we're preempted?

MS. WHITE: I think so. I think, it would be a different issue.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.

MS. WHITE: GTE may disagree with me, but -CHAIRMAN DEASON: Ms. Caswell, you may want to
make an appearance.

MS. CASWELL: I'm sorry, for being late. I'm Kim Caswell with Verizon Florida, Inc.

Commissioners, the starting point for the legal analysis you've requested is a basic understanding of the effect of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In litigation after that Act was passed, there was much debate about how the Act had changed the federal state regulatory dynamic. In general, up until that point, the FCC made rules affecting the interstate jurisdiction and the states retained jurisdiction over intrastate telecommunications matters.

The state Commissions and the ILECs, including Verizon, argued that the Act had not changed the fundamental scheme and that the states had primary authority to implement the local competition provisions of the Act. The FCC, on the other side, argued that it had jurisdiction to implement those provisions.

Unfortunately, the FCC won that battle. In the Iowa Utilities Board decision in January of 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that there was no real issue as to whether the Act had limited state control over local regulation.

1 It said, quote, "The question in this case is not whether the federal government has taken the 2 3 regulation of local telecommunications competition away 4 from the states. With regard to the matters addressed by 5 the 1996 Act, it unquestionably has, " end quote. 6 The state's participation in the new regime is 7 thus guided by the federal agency rules implementing the 8 Act. As for collocation, specifically, Verizon and other ILECs have already --9 10 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Excuse me. First of all, you 11 need to slow down. MS. CASWELL: Sorry. 12 13 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Then, I have a question. 14 MS. CASWELL: Okay. 15 CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, you're saying that 16 according to the United States Supreme Court, the state's 17 invitation to participate in telecommunications regulation is limited to what the FCC says? 18 19 MS. CASWELL: For matters under the Act, such as The FCC has --20 collocation. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, for matters under the 21 22 Well, that's everything, right? I mean, what does the Act --23 MS. CASWELL: As Ms. White said, you need to 24 25 make rules consistent with the Act. That's right in the

1	Act itself. And if the FCC implements the Act in a		
2	certain manner, then, unfortunately, you've got to follow		
3	the FCC. And we have argued, you know, long and hard that		
4	you don't need to, but we've lost.		
5	CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, if the FCC adopts a rule		
6	on anything pertaining to the Act, we're obligated to		
7	follow that rule.		
8	MS. CASWELL: I believe that's true.		
9	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.		
LO	MS. CASWELL: I believe that's true.		
1	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So, in areas where the FCC		
12	has not spoken, you would agree we can interpret the Act,		
L3	can't we?		
L <b>4</b>	MS. CASWELL: I'm sorry, you said you can		
L5	interpret the Act?		
16	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right.		
L7	MS. CASWELL: Yes. I think, all your rules have		
L8	to be consistent with the Act, as well as the FCC's		
١9	provisions.		
20	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, if the FCC adopts a rule,		
21	are we as a state regulatory body, can we go beyond		
22	what the FCC has adopted?		
23	MS. CASWELL: Yes, you can adopt additional		
24	rules, as long as they're consistent with the FCC's.		
25	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. I'm sorry. You may		

continue.

MS. CASWELL: Thank you.

As for collocation specifically, as I said,
Verizon and other ILECs have argued that national rules
are unnecessary and impractical, but the FCC has mostly
rejected these arguments. And as the federal courts have
confirmed, there is no debate about the FCC's ability to
adopt national collocation standards.

To be sure the states do retain a good degree of authority over collocation and other local matters, but the critical constraint on that authority is that it must be exercised in a way that's consistent with the Act.

That's clearly stated in Section 251 D 3 of the Act, and it's something the FCC has repeatedly recognized in its own orders. Indeed, the parties' testimony in this case was framed in terms of what the FCC and the Act require, and that's the framework you've used for some time.

The question, then, for this case, is whether the particular collocation rulings at issue are consistent with the Act. To answer that question, we need to look at the D.C. Circuit's rulings on each of these issues. We can't look to the FCC's implementing regulations, of course, because those regulations have been invalidated. The first issue is equipment placement.

Is it the ILECs or the ALECs that have the right to determine where the ALEC's equipment will be located on the ILEC's premesis? As I believe, Ms. White went over, your decision, and the FCC's decision gives that right to the ALECs in the sense that an ILEC can't require segregation of the ALEC's collocation arrangements. But the D.C. Circuit indicated that the ILECs can, in fact, require such segregation areas for physical collocation.

In particular, the Court rejected rationale that both the FCC and this Commission used that allowing equipment segregation may raise the ALEC's cost. The Court stated that delay and higher costs for new entrants cannot be used to overcome the statutory terms of the Act. Because the Court has found that allowing ALECs to determine equipment placement contravenes the Act, your ruling to the contrary, must follow just as the FCC's did.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Excuse me. So, you're saying that the fact that it may cost more, it may delay the actual implementation of the collocation arrangement, that this still is not sufficient; we don't have the authority to require it, because the FCC rules have been overturned, and that was the basis for the FCC rule?

MS. CASWELL: Under the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the Eighth Circuit said that those were not sufficient reasons to implement that sort of policy, that that's not

what the Act says, so it's tied to the statutory terms of the Act. And if your decision has to be consistent with the Act and their decision -- their same decision was not, then your decision has to be reversed as well, I believe.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Well, let me ask you this. And just for the sake of argument, I'm not really sure what the record of evidence is. And we may hear that from some of the other parties, but just for the sake of argument, say we took no evidence whatsoever in our docket other than to say this is the FCC rule, this is what it requires, we agree, we're going to adopt this.

MS. CASWELL: Right.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: All right. You're saying under that scenario it's very clear that, according to the Court's decision, we have to change our decision.

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Correct?

MS. CASWELL: I believe so.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, what if, in this record, we had taken evidence and there was another reason beyond cost or delay and someone expressed an opinion for some other reason that this was the correct policy, then, we have no choice but to reverse our decision because of the Court's decision or do we have record evidence which supports a different outcome?

MS. CASWELL: I think that's a slightly more difficult question, because first of all, I don't think there is such evidence in the record.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'm just -- for the sake of just assuming.

MS. CASWELL: Right, for the sake of argument. If there were another reason that didn't fall within the criticisms that the Eighth Circuit had made, you could perhaps adopt that in the interim. But if the FCC, again, comes back and says, no, the ILECs have the right to choose, you've got to reverse your decision again. You've got to change your decision again.

And I'm not even sure about that opinion as to whether you could even do it. But for the sake of argument, assuming you could, you need to change your decision again once the FCC has spoken to the extent that that decision is inconsistent with yours.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, you're saying that if we do have evidence, that at least for interim we could do something, but then once the FCC adopts the final rule, we've got to conform to whatever the FCC says.

MS. CASWELL: Yes. And I would have to do some more thinking about the first part, about the interim part. Frankly, I haven't considered it, because I didn't see any evidence, other than evidence going to the

rationale that the Eighth Circuit had used.

another question, and it's just hypothetical, because -well, just hypothetically, let's say that there was some
other reason that we had record evidence on, and we said,
well, with all due respect to the Court, the Court didn't
hear the evidence that we heard, and they're not familiar
with the facts as they exist in Florida. And since we do
have a record which supports our position, we're just -we're not going to reconsider this vote, and we're just
going to let it stand. Now, what happens? Does the
federal court come down here and issue some injunction
against us or what happens?

MS. CASWELL: No. I think, someone would have to challenge that. Perhaps --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, you would go to the federal court?

MS. CASWELL: I'm not saying I would do it or my company would do it. I'm not going to make that commitment now, but I'm saying that's very possible. To the extent that you do something that's considered inconsistent with the Act, either under the FCC's rules or under the federal court ruling, until the FCC has valid rules, I think, you're very vulnerable to challenge there under the principles that the U.S. Supreme Court laid out

in the Iowa Utilities Board decision, no matter what your record says and no matter what your state statutes say.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Why do we go to the trouble of taking record evidence in these proceedings? It takes your time, it takes my time --

MS. CASWELL: Right, and I agree. And we went with you to support that view before the Supreme Court, and we lost.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Oh, I know that, we've lost.

So, why, from now on, do we take record evidence in each of these proceedings?

MS. CASWELL: Well, I think, in each case, you've got to make an assessment of perhaps where the FCC is on these matters, whether it's spoken to these matters, what's going on, on appeal. And, I think, you've got to make a decision about timing, like we're doing now in the reciprocal compensation case, like we've done in the cost study case. I mean, I think, unavoidably, that's going to be the drill for the future, and it's regrettable. It wastes all of our time, but I think that's the situation you're in.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, what you're saying is while we may be slow, we move faster than the federal government, so we can make some interim decisions until they decide ultimately what the rules are going to be.

MS. CASWELL: Often, you do move faster than the federal government. At times, you know, I'd say you'd be better --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Because we could just tell you we're closing down business, just take to it the FCC and get your answers once and for all and don't bother us, but I don't think that's the right thing to do. That's really going to slow things down.

MS. CASWELL: Right. And yeah, and I would say in particular cases, no, you certainly can't do that. But in others, you'd want to make --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'll go to the federal court and get a declaratory decision or whatever. I mean, if they're going -- I mean, these are kind of absurd things I'm saying, but I think you kind of can tell the amount of frustration that we have here.

MS. CASWELL: Sure. Because we feel the same frustration. I mean, we've gone through and submitted testimony and cost studies and everything and, you know, only to be, you know, sort of frustrated by the federal courts. And it's happening in the reciprocal comp cases.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Because, see, it seems to me that, you know, I've always believed that hearings and taking evidence is paramount and that's what's important and that's what should drive good decisionmaking. But it

seems it's just the reverse of this situation. You've got policymakers in Washington and federal courts, they're saying, well, we're looking at it at a national level, and we think the policy should be X, Y, or Z. Now states, you conform, and we don't care if you took record evidence or not.

MS. CASWELL: And that's true. I mean, that's the fundamental paradigm shift. The U.S. Congress has enacted regulations that govern local competition. And it's given the FCC the authority to implement those regulations. So, for better or for worse, the FCC has much more jurisdiction over the local sector than it ever had before.

And, you know, everytime one of these issues comes up I go back and read that 1999 case, the Supreme Court case, Iowa Utilities Board. And I would advise, you know, everyone involved in this issue to go back and do the same thing, because I think that was the first case that really set out, from a federal court perspective, what the Act did and what the new regime was.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Let me ask you another question. Does the FCC take record evidence? Do they have evidentiary hearings?

MS. CASWELL: They, typically, have a paper record in these rulemaking proceedings.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And how is that different from ours? They don't swear in witnesses?

MS. CASWELL: They don't have any oral testimony. They submit comments and reply comments.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, they kind of sit in a sterile environment and just listen to everything and make these broad determinations on what the policy's going to be.

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And all the states are supposed to comply. And it doesn't matter what states do, what evidence they take, we just have to comply.

MS. CASWELL: That seems to be the case. In some circumstances, now, where the FCC does make rules, and in other cases, the FCC might say, for instance, okay, states, where you've acted we're going to leave your rules in place. But, like, now in the further notice of proposed rulemaking, implementation intervals, for instance, you are one of, you know, a handful of states who have spoken about implementation intervals.

The FCC earlier said, look, we're not going to touch that. We're going to leave that to the states. We don't think we need national rules on that. It's now reversed itself and said, well, maybe now we do need national rules on that. But to the extent that states

have acted and you've got an order or you're enforcing a tariff, we're going to leave that in place. But it could have just as easily said we're going to overrule everybody, and we're going to implement our new rules.

I mean, that's the sort of environment you work in. The FCC does something or doesn't do something and then changes its mind as to whether something needs to be done on a national level or not and then, you know, you sort of get dragged along with it.

I think, it's trying to be sensitive to state actions and, I think, it does consider the states to be helping them further the goals of the Act in cases like implementation intervals. But, in some cases, I mean, the results are just unpredictable, you know, as in this case where they've become overturned. And, I think, they try in the recip comp case, which is very confusing, to respect the state's decisions as well, but it only ended up making a mess in that situation.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I have a question, a hypothetical. What if we had before us an interconnection agreement that had been approved and what we now have is a dispute as to whether or not these provisions that are now in question have been appropriately executed under that agreement, okay, what do we do?

MS. CASWELL: Well, does the interconnection

1	agreement under that hypothetical, does it include I
2	mean, does it include these terms that you've like
3	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes. It would include
4	terms that are based on the provisions that you say we
5	don't have the jurisdiction to entertain now.
6	MS. CASWELL: Well, if you decide to implement
7	your rules or your rulings and everybody's got to
8	incorporate them into interconnection agreements and then
9	somehow that goes to arbitration or whatever you know,
10	I don't think it would get that far, to tell you the
11	truth.
12	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: What I'm focused on is do
13	we have enforcement authority?
14	MS. CASWELL: I don't think you can enforce
15	these provisions. I don't think you can enforce these
16	rulings that are contrary to the Act. I don't think you
17	can enforce any provisions that are contrary to the Act.
18	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But if it were consistent
19	with the Act, then you
20	MS. CASWELL: If it were consistent, yes, you
21	could. If you decide
22	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And you base that on
23	MS. CASWELL: I base it, in this instance, on
24	what the Court has said, what the D.C. Circuit has said is
25	inconsistent or consistent with the Act. And in this

case, these particular provisions are inconsistent with the Act as the Eighth Circuit sees them.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. If I can walk you through that, so I can understand it, where the FCC has spoken -- has given its guidance in rule, and our order follows the FCC's rule, then, we have authority to enforce our order.

MS. CASWELL: Yes. Yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That sounds rather obtuse to me that we don't have authority to enforce our order, unless and until -- and understand now, what we have here is a provision that is now questionable, legally.

So, now what we have before us is a dispute that we don't know whether or not we have the jurisdiction to enforce. So, what do we do, vacate our order now? That would be our only recourse?

MS. CASWELL: Well, I mean, I think so. I think, you have to hold off implementing that order.

See, the problem is that the rules have been invalidated. If the rules had stayed where they were and if they'd been validated, there would be no problem here. You could enforce those rules, because they'd be lawful.

But right now, we're sort of in limbo where the Court has said look, those rules are no good, we think they're inconsistent with the Act. So, instead of

guidance from the FCC, what you've got is guidance from a court decision and then the FCC's rules need to implement that decision, and you don't know what they're going to look like.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And under your views, there are no ramifications under federal law, because when I see the federal statute says that by my order, by this Commission's order, we are to implement those provisions. And then, when I see a dispute come that bring those provisions before us in dispute and I can't -- because of the tendency of what the rules say, I can't resolve the issue that is in this order, then it sounds to me like I can't effectuate actions under these federal provisions. It sounds to me like the federal law now becomes moot, because these FCC rules are in dispute.

MS. CASWELL: No, I don't think the federal law has become moot.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I can't enforce those provisions.

MS. CASWELL: Well, say, if I company had agreed to do cross connects, for instance, had agreed to let, you know, some CLEC cross connect with another CLEC and that was somehow an interconnect agreement, yeah, I think, you probably could enforce that, because it's voluntarily entered, and it's your job to enforce that agreement. But

if the provisions are in the interconnection agreement only because of your ruling here and that ruling is inconsistent with federal law, then, you can't enforce them.

If I'm forced to do it -- because these interconnection agreements, I mean, if they're arbitrated, often they're not really voluntarily. And if I'm forced to put that provision in, then I don't think you can enforce it.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask this question, perhaps, in a little bit different terminology. Let's take cross connects for example. The FCC had a rule which required cross connects; is that correct?

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: That provision was struck down by the Court, correct? Okay. Now, in striking that down, did they say that -- the Court, did it say that cross connects violate federal law period or did they say FCC, your rule did not substantiate to our satisfaction that cross connects should be required under the Act. Go back and redo it and see if you can convince us the next time around.

MS. CASWELL: What the Court said is that the cross connect requirement had no basis in the statute and that the Act was focused solely on connecting new

competitors to the LEC's network, not connecting CLECs to CLECs.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, the Court said FCC, and states, too, under no conceivable way can you, as regulatory entities, regardless of whether you're state or federal, require cross connects because it violates federal law; is that what the Court says?

MS. CASWELL: I think, there may be a fine distinction there. What it says is it has no basis in the statute. Now, if the FCC somehow it gets this point on remand. I guess, it's possible that they could somehow justify it to the satisfaction of the federal courts and --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: All right. Now, let me interrupt. If the FCC can do that, why can't we? Because we can read federal law just as easily as they can.

MS. CASWELL: Okay. If you implement this now, if you say -- well, one, I think, the Eighth Circuit does forbid a cross connect requirement right now, because there's no basis for it in the Act. But even if you disagree with that and implement something, you have the practical consideration of having to potentially change it later and having to have these cross connects come out or not be modified. So, there's a legal consideration, there's also a practical consideration. Eventually,

you're going to have to follow what the FCC does. It may or may not be consistent with what you're doing.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, why don't we just tell you all go, get it worked out at the FCC, and then come see us. We don't do anything here that has any meaning -- perhaps we can do something in the interim, but then as soon as the FCC either changes what they did that we followed or else they decide what we did was wrong, well, then, it goes away.

MS. CASWELL: In areas where the FCC has done implementing rules. There are several areas in the collocation, your collocation orders, that no one has challenged and that aren't inconsistent with the FCC rules, and those will remain. But it's always kind of a crapshoot guessing what the FCC's going to do and where it's going to act next.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Oh, tell me about it.

MS. CASWELL: So, you know, again, we understand the frustration. But, you know, that's the environment we operate in now. But there are -- many of your provisions are still there, you know, like the implementation intervals.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, as I said earlier today, tell us what our jurisdiction is and if it's clear and it's our job, we'll do it. The problem is, is when nobody

1	knows what a jurisdiction is and when we try to do our
2	job, we've got people telling us we're doing it wrong and
3	what you did has to be changed. It is extremely
4	frustrating.
5	MS. CASWELL: I think, Ms. White's probably gone
6	over cross connects, and that's the same sort of issue
7	here, that there's no basis for it in the statute.
8	I don't think she's probably addressed
9	equipment, because that was in our filing alone. And,
10	again, your decision mirrors the FCC's existing rule that
11	we need to put in equipment consistent with the FCC's
12	rule. In fact, your order recognized the parties had
13	CHAIRMAN DEASON: You're talking about the issue
14	about what type equipment?
15	MS. CASWELL: Yeah, what type equipment needs to
16	be collocated.
17	CHAIRMAN DEASON: And whether it's necessary
18	MS. CASWELL: Or used and useful or simply used
19	and useful. And, I think, there may not really be a
20	debate on this point as to what you should do. I think,
21	the Staff has suggested you clarify your order to indicate
22	that to the extent that it relies on provisions that were
23	just vacated, then, it doesn't apply.
24	But you can go back to preexisting FCC rules,

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which were okay, and make determinations, perhaps on a

case-by-case basis, as to whether something is necessary or indispensable, which is the current standard. It's not used and useful. And I think that probably AT&T and FCCA agree that the Commission can resolve these disputes on a case-by-case basis.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, what do you want us to do?

MS. CASWELL: I think, we just need a

clarification that to the extent your decision relies upon

the vacated rules, then it's no longer good. You can say

it relies -- you can say to the extent that your decision

relies on the FCC's rules that were preexisting that,

then, it's okay.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And the preexisting rules, it was a necessary standard?

MS. CASWELL: Yeah, necessary, rather than the used or useful standard they used.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.

MS. CASWELL: And Sprint has also suggested that you should draw up a list that can be collocated. They've presented this as sort of another option, but I think that presents a problem in terms of the record here. And as the Staff pointed out, there's little basis in the record to identify specific equipment since parties, basically, relied on the FCC's orders. So, in terms of state administrative law, that approach would not be acceptable

nor would it be feasible or practical, as the Staff also pointed out.

And, I think, I mentioned earlier that it's possible the FCC, on remand, may issue the same rules that it did before and that these may be upheld. And while anything's possible, given the Court's strong language, it's probably unlikely that the rules will survive in the same form.

So, to the extent the ALECs urge you to keep rules in place because we don't know what the FCC will do, I think that's a bad decision from both a legal and a practical perspective. The legal perspective, as I've said, the Commission can't lawfully leave in place rules that are deemed inconsistent with the Act, which is the case here.

And second, if the Commission implements its new rulings now, it will only have to change them later when the FCC adopts its new rules. And that means possible disruption or removal of equipment in collocation arrangements. And this is a wasteful and inefficient result, which will surely lead to disputes about who will pick up the costs of changing the arrangements that are already in place.

And I really don't think that any party here would seriously claim that you don't have to conform your

rules to the FCC's once they're issued, but what Sprint says, for example, is that it's premature for you to change your decision. Aside from the legal problems with that view, I would say it's premature to implement your decision, because it's easier and less disruptive to move from the status quo to the eventual FCC rules than to move from the status quo to invalid FCC rules to the valid FCC rules.

And once again, Verizon understands the Commission's frustration at conducting a hearing and making a decision on the record only to have that decision overturned by the FCC or the federal courts. Verizon is in a somewhat awkward position here, because it supported the state's rights in collocations in other areas under the Act.

But in terms under a strict legal analysis, I'm afraid that the federal courts have left you little choice, but to revise your collocation rulings to conform to the Act as the D.C. Circuit has interpreted it. So, in that regard, we urge you to accept your Staff's recommendations on these items.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay, thank you.
Ms. Masterton.

MS. MASTERTON: Susan Masterton representing Sprint.

1 As I understand the scope of oral argument 2 today, we're to address specifically the Commission's 3 authority to prescribe guidelines for collocation on the 4 state level when certain federal communications rules are in limbo due to a D.C. circuit court decision vacating 5 6 them --7 CHAIRMAN DEASON: You need to slow down. 8 MS. MASTERTON: Okay -- vacating them and 9 remanding them to the FCC for additional action. 10 First of all, Sprint disagrees with BellSouth 11 and GTE's interpretation of the impact of the D.C. Circuit 12 decision. While, it questions the FCC's authority based on principles of administrative law to adopt certain rules 13 14 pursuant to the federal act, it does not address the state 15 Commission's ability to independently adopt collocation 16 requirements as long as they are consistent with the 17 federal act and FCC regulations. Section 2--18 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, how do we do that if FCC 19 regulations have been struck down and what we've ordered 20 is consistent with FCC regulation? MS. MASTERTON: Well, I think that the 21 22

MS. MASTERTON: Well, I think that the

Commission has independent state authority to adopt

collocation guidelines. And I'm going to go into what I

think the statutory basis for that is.

23

24

25

And I do believe 251 D 3 of the federal act

recognizes that the states can take actions that are in
addition to what's allowed in the federal act, as long as
they are consistent with the federal act and with FCC
rules.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. How can it be
consistent with the federal act, if you've got a federal
court that says it's not?

MS. MASTERTON: Well, now, what I think the

Court said is the FCC did not have the authority under the

Act to adopt those rules. That doesn't mean that the

state Commission might not have the authority under its

own laws to adopt similar rules, as long as they're

consistent with the Act. You see what I'm saying? In

administrative law, the agencies are limited by the

statutory authority. And what they've said is you've gone

beyond the statute, FCC, but if the state -- if you as a

state --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, the statute for the FCC is the federal act.

MS. MASTERTON: Exactly.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And that's what we're implementing, the federal act, correct?

MS. MASTERTON: I think that you have the ability to implement collocation guidelines pursuant to provisions in the state law as well that would not

necessarily contain --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Is that what you argued during the hearing? I don't remember anyone in that hearing ever bringing up Chapter 364.

MS. MASTERTON: No, it's true. That was not raised during the hearing, but I had thought that you had wanted to hear those arguments today.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I do. I want to hear that.

But, you know, it seems to me that if, for purposes, we're going to make decisions relying upon Chapter 364, it shouldn't be now we're going to talk about it, because a Commissioner asked a question about it.

If you sincerely believe that Chapter 364 gives us the authority, you should lay that out as an issue at the very beginning and say, Commission, pursuant to Chapter 364, Section blah, blah, blah, this is what you need to do, but you didn't do it.

MS. MASTERTON: That's true. And I agree, that was an oversight. But for the purposes of today, I do believe the state has independent authority under state law to enact the collocation guidelines.

I think that if you look at Sections 364.16, 161, and 162 of the Florida statutes, they provide the Commission the authority to establish the terms and conditions for interconnection and access to unbundled

network elements by competitive carriers and that this includes collocation requirements.

In addition, Section 364.01 directs the

Commission to exercise this authority in a manner that
encourages local competition and prevents anticompetitive
behavior. And I think that that's what the guidelines
that the Commission adopted do. I believe, these sections
of the Florida law are sufficient to provide the

Commission authority notwithstanding the fact --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Ms. Masterton, just slow down.
You're not under a clock.

MS. MASTERTON: Oh, I thought I was under a 10-minute clock.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, I'm running this. And when I say slow down, I'll give you the time to complete, okay? My ears are tired.

MS. MASTERTON: I think, these statutory sections are sufficient authority, notwithstanding the status of the FCC rules or the D.C. Circuit decision. In addition, Commission precedence supports the Commission's authority to adopt generic collocation principles.

In the expanded interconnection docket, the Commission examined its statutory authority to adopt collocation requirements in that environment and found its authority, generally, expressed in Sections 364.01 and

364.16 of the Florida statute.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: When did we do that?

MS. MASTERTON: That was in '95.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Before the federal act was adopted?

MS. MASTERTON: That was before the federal act.

And that was pursuant to those sections as they then
existed. And they were subsequently amended, those
sections, and Section 364.161 and 162 were added to the
statutes. But I believe that those amendments sustained
the Commission's authority to adopt collocation policies
to further local competition.

And I don't think the adoption of the federal act -- in other words, I don't think that acting under those statutes are inconsistent with the federal act or the FCC rules. It may go beyond that authority, but it's not inconsistent with it. And I really believe that's the situation that 251 D 3 was contemplating.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: You're saying 364 is not inconsistent with the federal act.

MS. MASTERTON: Right. Well, in this regard,
I'm saying the authority that the Commission has to act
under 364 may allow it to go beyond what the D.C. Circuit
said that the FCC could do under the federal act and that
that would not be inconsistent with the federal act.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Question?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: No, she actually answered.

MS. MASTERTON: In addition, 251 C 6 of the federal act authorized -- gives state Commissions independent jurisdiction to determine the practicality of various collocation arrangements. And I think that that gives some independent authority to interpret the Act different from the FCC and go, perhaps, beyond the FCC's regulations.

The idea that the Commission does have the authority to adopt these collocation guidelines or collocation guidelines that aren't necessarily identical to the FCC regulation, which I think is what BellSouth and GTE are saying, what the Commission must do is act only -- in order to be consistent, it has to be identical. And I think that is not a correct reading of the status of the law.

Sprint thinks that it's appropriate to address now how the Commission should act under its authority. We support the actions that were taken by the Commission in its original May 11th order. And unlike GTE and BellSouth, Sprint feels that there's adequate evidence in the record, outside the FCC rules, to support and provide a factual basis for the Commission to readopt those recommendations pursuant to its authority under state law

and its independent authority under federal law.

The ALECs presented evidence as to the anticompetitive and costly burdens --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you a question.

Just ignore, for the moment, Chapter 364, and let's just assume that we're acting strictly under the federal act.

You're saying that if there is sufficient record evidence in our proceeding that we can make a decision, for example, to require cross connects, given the language in the D.C. decision?

MS. MASTERTON: I think that -- yes, I think, a record could be developed, yes. That the D.C. Circuit's opinion was based a lot on the FCC not really doing a very in-depth analysis of the rationale behind what they were recommending and how that was supported in the Act.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, you're saying the D.C.

Circuit opinion was that FCC -- you did not substantiate

your policy statement or your rule which says cross

connects should be required. That's your saying. That's

was the Court said. The Court did not say that cross

connects are inconsistent with federal law. Is that the

standard, Ms. Caswell? You used more terminology than she

used.

MS. CASWELL: Well, I can find it in the order so we don't have to interpret it.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'll ask you that question in a moment. I'm sorry, Ms. Masterton.

MS. MASTERTON: Well, no, I can't deny that the language of the decision says that the problem with the rule is that it imposes an obligation that has no apparent basis in the statute. But they go on to say the Commission does not even attempt to show the cross connects are, in any sense, necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements.

Rather, the Commission is almost cavalier in suggesting the cross connects are efficient and, therefore, justified under 25-- which implies that had the Commission taken more time and consideration in explaining how cross connects were necessary, that perhaps the D.C. Circuit Court would not have come to the same conclusion.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Well, what meaning, then, do you give to the terminology -- this is what I was looking for -- no basis in law?

MS. MASTERTON: No apparent basis in the statute. I mean, you know, you can interpret it as they are, which means that there's no way to show that they are necessary or you could just say that you need to do a little bit more detailed analysis of how they are necessary for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements.

1 CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, no apparent basis in law means you've got to work it a little harder, if you want 2 3 to convince us. 4 MS. MASTERTON: That's what I believe the Court 5 was saying and how the FCC may respond to that. And, I 6 believe, there is evidence in the record that was 7 developed here that would support the Commission's recommendations outside of the reliance on the FCC's 8 9 rules. 10 Although it is true that there was an extensive 11 discussion of the FCC rules in the testimony, such 12 evidence may be found -- and I can give you citations of 13 the testimony. I don't know if you want me to do that or 14 just generally there was testimony on --15 CHAIRMAN DEASON: You can give it to me, if you'll slow down. 16 MS. MASTERTON: Okay. Well, I didn't know how 17 18 far in-depth, but for the virtual conversion of virtual to 19 physical collocation there was evidence to support the Commission's recommendation, specifically, in witness 20 Williams' testimony on pages 780 to 784 and witness 21 22 Gillan's testimony on pages 1,041 to 1,048. 23 CHAIRMAN DEASON: And what do they say? Do you 24 know? 25 They explained the MS. MASTERTON:

anticompetitive effects of requiring relocation for conversions from virtual to cageless collocation and the unnecessary -- the unnecessariness of it, that it would not necessarily be a benefit to the ILEC, but a detriment to the ALEC and would be costly and require disruptions in service to ALEC customers in an anticompetitive manner.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, you're saying the fact that they declared it anticompetitive and that it could cause disruptions in service to customers, that that goes beyond just the arguments about delaying cost and that that is a record of evidence to do something different?

MS. MASTERTON: Well, I think, it goes beyond just arbitrary reference to delaying cost. It gives actual explanations of the impact on ALECs. I mean, it didn't have numbers or dollars associated with it, but it was more than just, well, it's going to be costly and cause delays. It was an explanation of --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I guess, that's my question.

Is anticompetitive and disruptions in service just synonyms for costly and delay. I mean, it seems to me, if you're going to have a record basis that you maybe need to come in and say, well, if this happens, we anticipate that we're going to have this number of disruptions, which will affect this number of customers or whatever. And that may be fairly subjective, but at least it provides the record

basis that the FCC's certainly not going to take the time to do.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And then, we have to balance that against the intrusion and to the assent seal?

MS. MASTERTON: But I don't think that was the point of the ALEC testimony, that there was no evidence of the detrimental effect on the ILECs when you had virtual collocation arrangements and the space requirements would be the same, yet it would have a detrimental effect on the ALECs. And I did want to say that the rejection of the costly and delay standard was for the regulations based on the FCC -- on the federal act and not on actions that you might take under your authority in the state act.

There was testimony on equipment by witness Levy on pages 913 and 932, witness Jackson, for witness Strow on page 1,115 and by witness Nilson on page 985; and that testimony goes to the nature of the continuing change in the types of equipment that are available and the need to have a flexible standard to facilitate the deployment of equipment by ALECs.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, how does that differ from what the FCC considers that the Court said was not good enough?

MS. MASTERTON: Well, it isn't directly different. It would say that, because the Court did make

the differentiation between necessary and used and useful.

And I wouldn't say that this testimony went directly to

that issue, but it does support the types of equipment

that the Commission recommended.

And I wanted to clarify. What Sprint had really been recommending is the way the order came out. It just said we, basically, adopt the FCC rules and Sprint was recommending that rather than do that, the Commission should use the verbiage of the FCC rules and adopt it as its own. And I believe that that testimony supports doing that.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: What's the difference between adopting a rule and adopting the verbiage of a rule?

MS. MASTERTON: Well, it's sort of incorporating it by reference. And if it doesn't exist, then there's nothing there. But if you adopt the verbiage, then it's not dependent on the existence of the rule, it's your language, even though it came from the FCC rule. And therefore, the vacation of the FCC rule would not invalidate it.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: But the basis for why it was invalidated would still exist. So, You're hanging your hat, again, on Chapter 364 as opposed to the federal act?

MS. MASTERTON: Well, Chapter 364, and also the ability for the state Commission to do a better job than

1	the rec did of explaining why it adopted the standards
2	that it did under the federal act.
3	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If we follow the logic
4	that our ability to act under 252 has to be guided by the
5	FCC's rule, what, then, is the status why that rule is in
6	limbo? What do we do while the rule is in limbo?
7	And I understand that you don't follow that
8	view. But for a moment, if we feel that that was an
9	attempt to preempt state interpretation of the Act and
10	that preemption now is in limbo, what do we do?
11	MS. MASTERTON: Well and assuming that you
12	don't have independent authority under the state law to
13	act, that your only authority to
14	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Let's set that aside for a
15	moment.
16	MS. MASTERTON: If you're saying that you can
17	only act when there is an FCC rule in place that is valid
18	or hasn't been?
19	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, I'm wondering how
20	you would guide us through the law. What I'm
21	understanding the rationale to be is that we were
22	preempted by the FCC's statement and its rule, but
23	whatever the context of that preemption is, is now in
24	limbo.

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So, if we -- well, let me stand back for a

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moment. You said independent state authority, right? If I understood your argument earlier, we also have independent authority to act under 252; is that correct? Was that your argument?

MS. MASTERTON: And 251, right.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. So, given that authority but without a blueprint to guide us as to how to interpret the statute because the FCC's rule is no longer there, how would you guide us through the law, then?

MS. MASTERTON: Well, if the FCC rule doesn't exist, then we don't have to worry about being consistent or inconsistent with it. We only need to worry about being consistent with the federal act.

And I do think that the FCC has, in many occasions, both in the first report and order and in the advanced services order, independent of the portions that were vacated, recognized states authority to go beyond their rules and adopt additional collocation requirements and does not perceive the additional requirements as being inconsistent with their requirements, if they don't go as far.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Thank you.

MS. MASTERTON: In conclusion, Sprint believes that the Commission -- that the policies in the Commission's original order are appropriate to ensure that

ALECs make collocated ILEC premesis in a manner that will facilitate competition. And Sprint believes that the Commission has sufficient independent authority to take these actions, as well as an ample evidentiary record, regardless of the status of the FCC rules.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Ms. Kaufman.

MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Chairman Deason. My name is Vicki Gordon Kaufman. I'm of the McWhirter, Reeves law firm, and I'm here on behalf of the Florida Competitive Carriers Association.

And as I understand the issue that you all would like addressed today, it's the authority of this Commission to set standards for collocation in light of the federal district court for the D.C. Circuit's vacation of certain specific collocation rules.

Just to give you a heads-up here, it's the FCCA's position here that you have authority to take the action that you took in your May order and that the order need not be reconsidered.

As a preliminary matter, and Ms. Masterton already discussed this with you a bit, we think that you do have independent state authority to act. And to maybe preempt Chairman Deason's question, I will say it's also true that that was not the focus of the hearing.

However, I think that it might be helpful to

step back and look at how we got to this hearing in the first place. And the way we got to it was the collocation proceeding we're in now actually began at the end of 1998 when the FCCA and other parties asked this Commission to take a number of actions to support local competition. Then, there were various dockets that sort of spun off; one of them was the UNE pricing docket, one of them was this docket on collocation.

If you go back to the petition that began this docket, you'll see that our request was made pursuant to Florida law, was not made pursuant to federal law; and specifically, was made pursuant to Chapter 364.01 paren 4, I know that you're both familiar with that, sending out the legislature's intent that local markets in Florida be open to competition. So, that's how we got to the hearing phase.

I know you also will remember that we had a three-day hearing in this docket, that you took sworn testimony under the Florida APA from some 13 witnesses who were subject to cross examination, briefs were filed and then, eventually, your May order was issued that we're here to talk about today.

And then, in that same time frame, the district court looked at some of the FCC rules related to collocation and they vacated some of those rules. And

we've heard a lot of discussion already this afternoon about that court opinion. And, I think, it's important to look at what that opinion did, even more importantly what it did not do.

What that opinion did was remand certain of the FCC's rules back to the FCC for further consideration, further explanation, if you will, have the FCC flesh them out further. That opinion does not say, FCC, you cannot enact these rules; FCC, you don't have authority to enact these rules.

I think, Chairman Deason may have mentioned this earlier. What it says is that as to some of these rules, we don't think you did, perhaps, the best job you could in explaining to us what your rationale might have been and how those rules are related to the statute that you're trying to implement. That's sort of the same question that you're struggling with overlaid with your state law and the process that went on here in January with the record evidence.

Now, the three issues, the cross connect, the conversion, and the equipment issue, were all addressed in the hearing. And, I think, what's important to remember is as I said, you have state law authority under 364.01, 364.161 as well as the provisions of Chapter 364 that require you to prohibit, if you will, anticompetitive

behavior.

And as to each of these issues, you took
evidence and sworn testimony, and you heard from the
witnesses. Ms. Masterton has somewhat taken the wind out
of some of my argument because I, too, had gone back to
the record and reviewed the witnesses' testimony. And
there is testimony on all of these issues. Yes, some of
it relates to what the FCC did or didn't do, but that is
by no means the bulk of the evidence in the record here.

For example, on the conversion issue, there were a lot of witnesses who testified in regard to that issue. And as Ms. Masterton said, one of them was the FCCA's witness, Mr. Gillan. And I just want to quote from your order, and this is towards the end of your analysis of the conversion issue; and you say in the order, quote, "Furthermore, regarding relocation of equipment, the record supports that the ALEC's equipment may remain in place, even if it is in the ILEC's equipment line-up when converting from virtual to cageless physical collocation. It appears that to require the relocation of equipment, under these circumstances, would be unduly burdensome and costly to the ALEC without any benefit," closed quote.

That's what you said in your order based on the evidence that you heard. And even your Staff told you, in their recommendation on reconsideration on that issue,

quote, "There's a significant amount of testimony in the record that supports the Commission's decision." That being the case, I'd say to you there is nothing in the Court's order that would require you to vacate that decision and sit, I guess, and wait for the FCC which, I think, is what's being suggested to you by the ILECs.

Similarly, on the cross connect issue, there is

testimony. This is not testimony where the witness has simply said the FCC rule says A, B, C. And also, on the equipment issue that was discussed earlier and which is of critical importance to opening local markets to competition, of necessity, you've got to look at that issue on a fact-specific case-by-case basis. And the ALEC witnesses presented you with evidence in that regard.

So, I think, you have all of the record evidence in the hearing that was held before you, and you have all the legal authority that you need in both the state and federal law to sustain your decision. Now --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you, if we make that determination, and we say there is sufficient record evidence and someone disagrees then what, they appeal our decision to where?

MS. KAUFMAN: I believe, they would appeal it to the federal district court.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. And then, the federal FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

district court would make the determination as to whether we'll just flat out preempt it or whether we have the ability to take our own record evidence, and if we do, whether that's sufficient to adopt the policy that we adopted?

MS. KAUFMAN: Yes. I mean, I certainly think in any case you hear or any party who feels aggrieved has the right to take an appeal and attempt to make their case.

The burden is on the appellant in that regard. But yes, I think those would be some issues the Court would look at, if your decision was appealed.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Which court would it go to?

MS. KAUFMAN: I think, it would go to the

federal district court here in the northern district of

Tallahassee.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And the first thing they're going to do is raise the decision in the Eighth Circuit. What do we have to do to distinguish that the Eighth Circuit's ruling -- well, I guess you just argued it though, didn't you? Your argument was that the Eighth Circuit didn't take away our ability to interpret the statute. In fact, it didn't even take away the ability of the FCC to interpret the statute. It simply said the FCC didn't do a good enough job of substantiating this interpretation.

MS. KAUFMAN: Yes, I think, that's right. And I think, you know, if you just look at some of the language that's in the opinion, for example -- let's see, this is on the equipment issue, and they talk about the fact that they would require a better explanation from the FCC in regard to that rule; and, of course, this is the point of a remand. As I said, they're sending it back to the FCC. They're not -- if these rules were illegal, and the FCC could not enact them, I think that the opinion would have so stated.

And, I think, it's also important to note, and I believe Chairman Deason brought this up as well, the FCC makes its determinations based on a paper record. They don't hear live testimony. The witnesses or the submitters or commenters are not subject to cross examination. And, I think, those are important distinctions between what you do in Florida and the way the FCC conducts their business.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you another question. If we do not reconsider our decision on these issues and then that matter is appealed, will the federal court consider our authority under Chapter 364 or that is not something the federal court would consider at all since it's a state statute?

MS. KAUFMAN: Well, I mean, I kind of hesitate FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

to predict what a federal court is going to do, but certainly I think that the parties would argue the applicability of your state authority, as well as the federal authority and be hopeful that the Court would take that into consideration. I don't think they're precluded from looking at it, if that's what you're suggesting.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, I guess, that's my question; not predicting what they would do, but it is permissible to argue state authority in a federal court?

MS. KAUFMAN: Yes, I think, it is.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.

MS. KAUFMAN: What I was about to say was that after you look at the evidentiary record and you look at the state law and then you look at the court decision, I don't think that you come to the sweeping conclusion that the ILECs want to attribute to it and that you can take the actions that you have taken.

And as I've already discussed, basically, the FCC needs to flesh out the requirements that it set forth. And the Court found that there was a -- if you will, almost a lack of an evidentiary basis for some of the actions that the FCC was trying to take. The FCC has not preempted you, the district court opinion has not preempted you on the issues that are before you today.

And so, I would suggest to you that you

shouldn't sit back and you shouldn't wait for the FCC. do agree with one thing, at least, I believe, that Ms. Caswell and Ms. White said, and that is that you can't view anything that is inconsistent or in contravention of the federal law, but I don't think that that is the situation that you find yourself in today.

What you find is that there are some FCC rules that, basically, are not on the books anymore. They're sent back to the FCC for a further look. And here we are in Florida trying to open the local markets to competition. So, what should you do? Should you sit and, you know, wait and see what the FCC does?

No. I think that you have an obligation under state law, and you have an obligation under the Telecommunications Act as well to make the best decision that you can based on the record you have, based on the state of the law, the point and time where we find ourselves.

As long as you don't do anything that is in contravention of the federal law, I think, you have all the authority that you need to move forward. And, I think, you have all the authority and the factual evidence in this case to sustain your order. And we would suggest that reconsideration should be denied.

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Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Marcus.

MR. MARCUS: Thank you, Chairman. My name is Jeremy Marcus. I'm with Blumenfeld & Cohen representing Rhythms Links here.

As I understand it, the main purpose of this proceeding today is to discuss the authority of this Commission in light of the D.C. Circuit's decision, and I'd like to address that in three areas; first, the D.C. Circuit's decision's impact itself; second, the independent authority of this Commission under both federal and state law; and third, whether the Commission has a sufficient record to sustain its order on these three issues.

First, with regard to the D.C. Circuit decision's impact, nothing in that decision requires this Commission to reverse itself. The D.C. Circuit simply rejected the FCC rules as not sufficiently justified for virtual to physical and for the carrier-to-carrier cross connect. And for the rule interprets of the equipment types that ALECs can place, the D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's rule as not based on the proper legal standard.

It's important to note that the D.C. Circuit did not state that the FCC rules violated the '96 Act.

Rather, it remanded these three issues to the FCC for further reconsideration, and comments are currently being

taken. Had the D.C. Circuit intended to out and out say that the FCC was just flat wrong as a matter of law, we believe that the D.C. Circuit would have done so and that these matters would not be the subject of comment currently at the FCC.

In relying on the D.C. Circuit decision,

BellSouth and GTE are either claiming that the Commission

must reverse itself here because the FCC will subsequently

reverse itself, and there is no evidence to support that

conclusion at this time; or they must be claiming that the

vacation and remand of these rules will lead to an

automatic reversal of the now vacated rules, at least

until the FCC speaks otherwise. This, also, is not the

case; rather, federal regulations are simply silent

currently. Silence does not mean that ILECs have any

unilateral right to interpret what the law is until the

FCC speaks.

Second point is the independent authority of this Commission. Rhythms believes that this Commission has independent authority, both under Florida state law, Section 364.01 as some other parties have talked about already and in a section of the federal act that I don't believe anybody has spoken to yet today and that is Section 261 C.

That section states, and I quote, nothing in FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

this part precludes a state from imposing requirements on a telecommunications carrier for intrastate services that are necessary to further competition in the provision of telephone exchange or exchange access as long as the state's requirements are not inconsistent with this part or the Commission's implementation of this part," end quote.

Thus, Congress, in enacting Section 261, clearly contemplated that states would establish their own regulations, so long as those regulations did not conflict with any minimum federal standard established by the FCC.

And, I think, it's important to look at FCC regulations in their right context. When the FCC establishes national rules, those rules are minimum standards. States are free to promulgate rules and regulations that go beyond the FCC's rules.

In addition, other states have looked at collocation matters and have implemented their own rules and regulations relying, in part, upon federal rules and, in part, upon their own state authority. For example, in September of 1998, Washington state promulgated some of its own collocation rules, and those were based both under the Telecom Act, FCC rules at the time, and the Commission's own rules.

There's nothing that prevents this Commission
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from doing the same thing from adopting collocation rules based, in part, under the federal act and, in part, on its own rules to further competition within the state of Florida.

Final point I'd like to discuss is whether the Commission has a sufficient record to sustain its order in this proceeding. There are three issues, and I'd like to go through them in order, beginning with virtual to physical conversion.

We believe that there is sufficient testimony in the record. I believe, Ms. Masterton has cited you all to certain specific locations, several witnesses have testified as to the increased costs that would be incurred and the service outages that would incur if an ILEC could require the relocation of equipment in moving from a virtual to a physical environment, particularly, when the equipment may be the same. The only difference would be the location in the central office.

This Commission recognized that there was a sufficient order in its own order when it said, quote, "Regarding relocation of equipment, the record supports that ALECs' equipment may remain in place, even if it is in the ILECs' equipment line-up when converting from virtual to cageless physical collocation. It appears that to require relocation of equipment under these

circumstances would be unduly burdensome and costly to the ALEC without any benefit.

I don't think any party disputes that there is a record in this case on this matter. Indeed, the Staff, in its recommendation on reconsideration, did state that, quote, "There is a significant amount of testimony in the record that supports the Commission's decision." Thus, we believe there is sufficient evidence here to support this Commission's decision determination requiring virtual to physical collocation conversion in place.

Second issue, carrier-to-carrier cross connects. As pointed out by other parties here. The D.C. Circuit chastised the FCC because it did, quote, "not even attempt to show that cross connects are, in any extent, necessary for interconnection." Thus, the FCC simply did not make a sufficient showing to justify its own rule. The issue is back before the FCC, and will presumably act on this issue and, hopefully, with more justification.

However, this Commission conducted its own evaluation on this issue, and this Commission's evaluation went beyond what the FCC was evaluating to the point of even evaluating the FCC's own rule itself. The FCC's rule carved out an exception, quote, subject only to reasonable safety limitations.

This Commission, in reviewing that rule, found FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

that exception, quote, "somewhat vague and little specific guidance on this matter," end quote; therefore, this Commission went on to provide additional guidance. This is exactly the type of authority this Commission has to provide, additional guidance above and beyond what the FCC has done. And in this case, there was silence at the federal level, so there's plenty of room for this Commission to act.

Further, I'd like to point out that parties in this case, and in particular, BellSouth, has been permitting carrier-to-carrier cross connections since before the FCC's advanced services order was ever promulgated and before the FCC's rule that was vacated by the D.C. Circuit was ever promulgated.

This is evidenced by interconnection agreements that have been approved by this Commission, and clearly being that between my client, Rhythms, and BellSouth.

There is no reason provided by any party here today as to why the Commission should reverse this longstanding policy.

Finally, with regard to equipment types, I would concede that the record is not nearly as robust, in terms of equipment types that can be placed in a collocation arrangement as it is on the other two issues before this Commission. I would suggest, however, that should this

Commission decide there is an insufficient record, this matter can be decided as a matter of law and that this Commission can decide that multifunctional equipment can be placed as a matter of law in a collocation arrangement.

ILECs are permitted to place this type of equipment in their own central offices. To allow ILECs to use this type of equipment without allowing ALECs to use this type of multifunctional equipment would be anticompetitive and would give a distinct advantage to incumbents over ALECs.

However, even if the Commission were to not accept this line of reasoning, the Commission should, at the very least, maintain the status quo awaiting further FCC action. By this, I mean that ALECs must be allowed to continue to place the types of equipment they have been placing to date in ILEC central offices and that ILECs must not be permitted to refuse to permit types of equipment without first receiving Commission approval, for this refusal in such a manner neither ILECs nor ALECs would be disadvantaged until the FCC provides further quidance.

Thus, in sum, Rhythms believes that this

Commission has sufficient independent authority to support

its decision and that the D.C. Circuit does not mandate

reconsideration on any of these three issues.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you a question on that last point.

You say the status quo would be to allow ALECs to continue to locate this type equipment; is that correct?

MR. MARCUS: I believe so, yes. In particular, there are terms in existing interconnection agreements that govern this. And, I believe, this Commission has spoken to the types of equipment in prior arbitration decisions. There's no reason that any of that should be undermined while awaiting potential future action from the FCC.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, you say that you should be allowed to continue to locate this equipment if it is according to an existing agreement?

MR. MARCUS: Yes. Basically, equipment that the incumbents have been allowing, even if the Commission were to go back and vacate this portion of its order, this Commission must not allow the ILECs, then, to have a unilateral right to make determinations as to what type of equipment can be placed in collocation arrangements.

Clients such as Rhythms, collocation is a key part of our business plan. We obtain unbundled loops and cross connects and to equipment in our central offices.

If all of a sudden the type of equipment that we could place in our central office, if what that equipment is thrown into significant doubt or an ILEC in Florida were to come along and say, you're not allowed to have what we've previously been allowing, that would have a significant and detrimental effect on our business and our ability to serve Florida consumers.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, is there any impact on equipment you have already located? Do you have to take it out?

MR. MARCUS: Let me back up a second. We're not aware of any equipment that should be effected by the D.C. Circuit's decision either way, but what we would say is that -- or what we would request is that this Commission not permit an incumbent to require an ALEC to remove equipment that is currently in place without this Commission first okaying the action of the ILEC.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. On a going-forward basis, if the Commission decides not to reconsider this issue, and you continue to locate this type equipment, are you placing yourself in jeopardy in that if the FCC does not prevail, and their rule, the final rule that comes out does not allow this, are you then required to go back and remove this equipment that was placed in the interim period?

I think, there was an allegation that this would be disruptive. If I'm not mistaken, the incumbents indicated that that may be required and that it would be disruptive. Let me ask. Ms. Caswell, didn't you indicate that would be the case?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, I did. I mean, if you have a regulation now that says, okay, you can do cross connects and okay, ALECs, you can choose where you go in the central office, and then you come back with a federal rule that says, no, you don't do those things, ILECs, you have the right to determine where they go, and you don't need to permit cross connects, then we're in a situation where we need to remove equipment, we need to disconnect things. And I can assure you we're going to have arguments about who picks up the cost for those, you know, as well as probably some other arguments.

So, I mean, I think, it's -- again, the practical issue, is it more difficult to move -- to stay with the status quo which, I think, you know, I agree with Mr. Marcus that we're okay with the status quo right now. I don't think we're going to go removing CLECs equipment.

You know, is it better to go from that to the eventual rules or is it better to go from that to an intermediary step you don't know whether it will last and then to go to the ultimate FCC rules? So, then, again,

you've got to think about what would cause you least frustration.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Do you think you're subject to having equipment removed, regardless of what the final outcome is at the federal level, if we do not reconsider our decision?

MR. MARCUS: If you do not reconsider your decision, the only way that I could envision us being subject to having equipment removed would be if the FCC came back and came out with their rule that limited the equipment we could put in, and it turned out that that FCC rule was so limiting that it did not permit us to place equipment that we are now placing.

And then in conjunction with that, an incumbent were to come back and say we don't have to allow you to put that equipment, and we're not going to anymore, so take it out. I suppose, in that situation, the FCC would be telling us we can't do it, and our beef, then, would be with the FCC.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, you're saying that there would have to be a decision as to whether you actually would have to remove it and that you may or may not have to remove it. I guess, that would be a fight for another day?

MR. MARCUS: I think that would be a fight for FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

another day, yes. It's not necessarily a fight we envision needing to have. Rhythms has not had, that I'm aware of, situations where incumbents question the equipment we were putting in, our collocation arrangements. I don't claim to be aware of every situation, but I'm not aware of one.

I just think we need to err on the side of caution and make sure that whatever is being -- whatever types of equipment are being placed in collocation arrangements can continue to be placed in them, unless and until somebody else comes up with a requirement to the contrary.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'm sorry, are you finished?

MR. MARCUS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Gross?

MR. MARCUS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: No? Okay. Is there anyone else wishing to make an argument? Staff? You can make an argument, too, if you'd like.

MS. KEATING: Well, I don't really have much of an additional argument to make, because I don't want to rehash what the parties have already said, but it sounds to me like really the main question is whether or not you can adopt these requirements, even though the FCC's rules have been vacated. And honestly, Commissioners, I really

don't think that you can, either using state law or a different rationale or interpretation of the Act.

I think, you are preempted with regard to these three areas, because the FCC's demonstrated a desire to act with regard to these points. And, I think, I disagree with Mr. Marcus. I think, a federal court has said that the Act doesn't allow what the FCC proposed to require.

As such --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Hold it. The federal court said that the federal act does not allow it to do what they've propose. Does that automatically mean then that the Florida Public Service Commission cannot do what it's proposed to do based upon a record of evidence?

MS. KEATING: I believe, it does, because you're acting under the Act. I mean, you are implementing the Telecommunications Act. And a federal court has said the Act doesn't contemplate this. And therefore, you can't --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Is that what the Court's saying? Or does the Court say, FCC, you did not do a good enough job justifying the rules under the Act?

MS. KEATING: My reading of it is a little bit stronger of it than, I think, Mr. Marcus' reading. I mean, the Court says this is -- well, let's see. One of the comments that they make is, "A court will not uphold an interpretation that diverges from any realistic meaning

of the statute." I mean, they include quotes like that in there. I think, they've got a little bit --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Say that again, now, they said what?

MS. KEATING: One of the quotes that the Court uses in rendering its decision is a quote from a -- I believe, this is a Massachusetts versus Department of Transportation case out of the same circuit. And they said, "A court will not uphold an interpretation that diverges from any realistic meaning of the statute."

And to me, that entails that they really did not believe that what the FCC had proposed in these rules is really a realistic interpretation of the statute. But that being said --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The passage that was quoted contrasts that, the other passage, which says that the FCC should have done a better job justifying what it was interpreting. How do you contrast -- how do you distinguish that?

MS. KEATING: Actually, what they say is, let's see. They say that it is apparently contrary to the Act. Now, they do use the word "apparently" in there, but within the context of the full discussion in the order, it sounds more to me like they're not really saying apparently, they're saying go back and come up with

something else.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Let me ask you a question about the preemption. So, your view is that Section 252 does not convey any authority on state Commissions to interpret the Act outside of some guiding or enabling regulation from the FCC.

MS. KEATING: You can interpret the Act, but you cannot interpret it contrary to stated federal law or contrary to any FCC rules that are currently in place.

Right now there is a federal court decision that says, at least in my mind, that what the FCC proposed in these rules is contrary to the Act. Therefore, I don't believe that you can promulgate guidelines that are contrary to what the federal court has said.

Under the Act in the utilities board case that Ms. Caswell referred to, you can't do anything that's contrary to the Act or FCC rules with regards to matters that are covered by the Act. And collocation is covered by the Act.

If you require the cross connects or conversion in place or equipment that's under the used and useful standard, you'll be acting in a manner that a federal court's determined is contrary to the Act. There are provisions in your state statute that --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I think, what it boils down to

is our reading of what the federal court meant when they remanded the rule, whether that meant that what was proposed is contrary to the Act or whether the Court was saying, FCC, you did not justify your rules consistent with the Act, go back and try again. And in the meantime, what our responsibility is if whether we can independently interpret the federal act when there are no FCC rules in effect.

MS. KEATING: My reading of the decision is that what they said is that it is contrary to the Act.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Why do they remand it, then? Why did they remand it to the FCC? Why didn't they just say, FCC, these rules are no good, we strike them down; said, done, finished.

MS. KEATING: Well, the FCC could come up with variations on the rules that perhaps the Court doesn't think are contrary to the Act.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, can't we come up with interpretations of the Act which we think can be supported by a record of evidence?

MS. KEATING: And they didn't, specifically, say when they were remanded to the FCC. They didn't say go back and try again with regard to cross connects or go back and try again with regard to maintaining equipment wherever the ALEC wants the equipment to be.

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I mean, there are things in here, like equipment, like the specific kinds of equipment, that are addressed within the order. I mean, they didn't give specifics as to what they thought the FCC could come up with that was in compliance with the Act.

I mean, it could be that whatever they come back with, with regard to cross connects or particularly locating equipment within a central office. I mean, I think that if they come back with rules that address those, I think, you're going to end up with the same result.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: All right. When the FCC finally adopts a rule, I guess -- I think, everybody agrees that we're bound by those rules. Do you agree with that?

MS. KEATING: I'm afraid so.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: All right. What happens in the meantime? There are no rules out there. Does the Court decision, does that mean then that if they strike down a rule that we have to do the opposite of what the rule said before it was struck down? It just means there are no rules out there.

MS. KEATING: Well, essentially, you're correct.

But remember, there are a number of rules out there that

are governing collocation. You're only looking at three

1	points. You're just looking at cross connects requiring
2	conversion in place is appropriate and whether the FCC's
3	rules, with regard to equipment, are applicable. So, I
4	mean, it's not that everything with regard to collocation
5	is going away.
6	CHAIRMAN DEASON: The fact of the matter is that
7	collocation has to continue in the meantime.
8	MS. KEATING: That's correct. And I don't
9	believe that reconsideration on these three points is
10	going to impair collocation or interconnection in any way.
11	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, why did we make the
12	decisions we did to start with?
13	MS. KEATING: These were issues that were
14	presented for decision in this proceeding. And the
15	Commission can make decisions can make requirements
16	CHAIRMAN DEASON: If it was good policy that
17	this is the best way to promote competition, why do we no
18	longer believe that?
19	MS. KEATING: I don't know that we necessarily
20	believe that
21	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Is that changing your mind as
22	to what is good policy?
23	MS. KEATING: No, sir. I don't think that's
24	what it comes down to.
25	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay.
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MS. KEATING: It's not an issue of whether the state Commission thinks it's good policy or not. I think, you're in a position that it really, frankly, doesn't matter.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: What we think. It doesn't matter what we think. Say it. It doesn't matter what the Florida Public Service Commission thinks.

MS. KEATING: I was getting there, but trying to be a little more delicate.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I mean, be blunt.

MS. KEATING: But, essentially, I think, that's what it is. I think, with regard to these three points, we're out of it.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: You know, and it doesn't bother me. If we had known in the beginning going in, Florida Public Service Commission, it doesn't matter what you think, I'd have been happy, and I'd have been able to go home and would not have sat through these hearings and wasted my time.

MS. KEATING: Well, but let me point out, it doesn't matter what you think about these three things, because what you propose to do looks like it's contrary to the Act, but you could have gone further than what the FCC required. If those FCC rules had stayed in place, if you wanted to put some additional requirements in place that

were not contrary to what the FCC was doing, you could have done that. So that's --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The whole point is what the FCC thought it was doing, it didn't do. We thought we were being consistent. And now that we understand that that is in limbo, we have to retract everything we did, because we followed them off the cliff.

MS. KEATING: Well, I don't know that you're really retracting everything that you did. I mean, bear in mind, at that hearing there were a whole lot of other points that were addressed that aren't up on reconsideration that are going to go into effect.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Let me ask you this.

Given the Court's ruling, okay, which casts doubt on the sufficiency of the FCC's proof here, but what I understand you to say did not categorically overturn the idea that

-- let's narrow in on the conversions -- did not categorically overturn the idea that there can be an option for conversion from physical -- from virtual to physical collocation, okay?

As I understand your interpretation of the Court's ruling, while they said that what the FCC attempted to do was out there, they didn't categorically overturn the idea that some version of conversion from virtual to physical collocation would be adequate, okay?

MS. KEATING: Well, let me just be clear. 1 not talking about whether or not conversion from virtual 2 to physical collocation is allowed. What Staff addressed 3 in its recommendation was whether or not the ILEC could 4 require the ALEC to move its equipment when it was 5 converting to physical collocation. And what the --6 7 CHAIRMAN DEASON: And we made the finding that 8 there's no benefit in having the incumbent LEC require 9 that that equipment be moved. We made that finding; did 10 we not? Isn't that the language in the order? 11 MS. KEATING: That's correct. 12 CHAIRMAN DEASON: No benefit. And now, we're 13 saying, well, we've got to change our mind because of a 14 D.C. Circuit Court decision, right? Now, we're saying there is a benefit? 15 16 MS. KEATING: No, we're not saying anything. We're simply --17 18 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And the logic is --19 MS. KEATING: What I'm suggesting is that you don't do anything on these points. 20 21 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: The logic escapes me. we were saying that it is now illegal or irrational to 22 allow conversion from virtual to physical because that is 23 24 outside of the scope of federal law, I would be a lot more

at ease with the conclusion you suggest, because then it

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says this conduct is outside of the scope of this statute.

But what I'm understanding you to say is that to allow it to be done in this way, which was suggested by the agency with particular expertise, but to allow it to be done this way is outside of the scope of the federal statute. Now, that's the Court's bailiwick. It gets to make that call.

But it said we were the ones to approve these agreements which define these methods and these matters. And if that is the case, if the idea is that this federal agency has to prescribe the exact manner, then has to go before a federal court and it has to prescribe -- it has the stamp, a seal of approval, we have absolutely no business approving these agreements until that process has run its course.

I can't understand why we would be engaged in approving these -- in attempting to enforce these agreements until that process has absolutely run its course, because all we have is a shifting landscape. The FCC would do a rule, it will go to a federal court, they get bounced back, they'll make a decision, and we're sitting here in an effort to carry out the law.

It would be absolutely illogical for us to be attempting to approve and, most certainly, enforce any of these interconnections -- well, let's step back. Let's

1	not be that radical at least agreements which deal with
2	collocation. How could we?
3	MS. KEATING: Well, I think, maybe you're going
4	a step too far.
5	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm overstating it a bit,
6	but
7	MS. KEATING: Because bear in mind, these are
8	areas that the FCC has already indicated it's going to act
9	and that the Act has made, you know specifically,
10	discusses collocation. So I mean, I don't know that you
11	have to make the additional leap to say that, well,
12	because collocation is currently in dispute, then we
13	shouldn't do anything with any of these agreements.
14	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: See, that's the basis of
15	your argument is that because the FCC statement I take
16	that back. Let me be clear. Unless there is an FCC
17	statement as to this, then, we have no real basis upon
18	which to move our authority under this statute. Is that
19	what you're saying?
20	MS. KEATING: I'm saying that unless if there
21	is a statement, a federal law, saying that these
22	provisions are contrary, then you can't adopt guidelines.
23	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: There was and, I think, we
24	retracted. The Court retracted it, didn't it?
25	MS. KEATING: I think, maybe I'm not quite
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getting --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: There was a statement, but it's no longer there, okay? That's the efforts of vacating the rule, isn't it? The verbiage is there, but it has no binding legal effect. Is that what vacation of a rule does?

MS. KEATING: As far as the FCC rule, yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. Now, here's the essence of my point. If you follow the logic that you've given us, unless that binding effect is there, we have no ability to carry out the substantive provision, okay?

MS. KEATING: Oh, you're saying that unless there's an FCC rule, the Commission can't do anything?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right.

MS. KEATING: No, that's not what I'm saying.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That's the argument that I understood.

MS. KEATING: No, sir. That's not what I'm saying at all. What I'm saying is you have got a federal court interpretation of the Act. And I'm saying regardless of your state law authority and regardless of whether or not you had relied on the FCC rule or if you had come up with your own rationale under the Act --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It would have to stand the test of the federal court's interpretation.

1 MS. KEATING: Right.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I understand.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you this question.

Under Staff recommendation that we consider, if we follow that recommendation, what is the effect of that? Is the effect of that -- for example, in cross connects, is the effect of that is there shall be, under no circumstances, cross connects allowed or the effect of that decision is we're not saying anything about cross connects?

MS. KEATING: We're recommending that you're not saying anything about cross connects.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Then, what position does that put the parties in when there is an ALEC that wants -- two ALECs that want to be able to cross connect?

MS. KEATING: They negotiate it, like they do everything else that's not addressed in rules.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: They negotiate it.

MS. KEATING: That's correct. And you don't even have to go back necessarily and look at this, because if the FCC ultimately comes up with rules that withstand federal court scrutiny that address these issues, they apply to ILECs that are operating in Florida. I mean, you don't necessarily ever have to revisit these, unless you determine --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Supply on a going-forward FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

basis, right? 1 MS. KEATING: Right. 2 3 4 that withstand challenge? 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

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CHAIRMAN DEASON: The question is what's going to happen in the meantime until the FCC gets some rules

MS. KEATING: The parties will have to negotiate between themselves and determine whether or not cross connects are something they want to agree to.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, if there's no basis in law for cross connects, how can BellSouth allow there to be -they'd be violating the law, then. Or are you saying the federal law is if they want to do it they can, but you can't make them.

> MS. KEATING: Exactly.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: That's the law.

I mean, there may be some reason MS. KEATING: that they're willing to agree to cross connects. may be some benefit that they can reap within the context of the agreement, particularly a negotiated agreement.

Now, I don't think that you could require it in an arbitration, but if they're willing to agree to it within the context of a negotiated agreement, I think, you know, they're entitled to do that.

Chairman Deason, could I respond MS. KAUFMAN: to that? Would that be appropriate?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Sure, go ahead.

MS. KAUFMAN: I think that there will be no cross connects. I mean, I think that what will happen is if you don't take action on these issues that are remaining in this docket, you know, I can't imagine what would move the ILECs to voluntarily say, okay, we'll allow you to cross connect. And that's the problem, that if you don't do anything, then it becomes an impediment to competition.

You know, I won't rehash yours. There was a disagreement, as you've said, over what the district court did and what meaning ought to be attributed to it, but I would stand on my earlier statement that the district court did not say to the FCC you may not have any rules about cross connects. And as you said, if that had been their view, there would be no reason to remand it to the FCC for further consideration.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask this question.

I'll throw this to Staff. If we do not reconsider the decision and, for example, on cross connects what is the effect of not -- our decision would stand and that would stand for the proposition that if an ALEC -- two ALECs wish to cross connect, well, then, the incumbent has to allow it? I know they can challenge it, but I'm just ignoring that. Just assume they didn't want to challenge

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MS. KEATING: That's correct. That's how it would be.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Then, the ALEC would be able to go to BellSouth and say, according to FPSC decision, we want to cross connect, and you've got to do it. That would be the effect?

MS. KEATING: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, if that's the situation and, say, there is a challenge and we get overturned or in the meantime, say, there's no challenge and the FCC adopts a rule which does not contemplate that, do those cross connects then have to be removed when the issue is finally settled or once they're in they're in? Or is that up -- again, that's up to the incumbent to do what they want?

MS. KEATING: I believe, at that point, if you had contradictory rules, the FCC rules say you cannot require cross connects and the state order says you are required to do cross connects. The FCC rule outweighs the state order, but --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I realize that. What happens in the meantime?

MS. KEATING: But if they want to agree to that, then, I believe that they could do that. I mean, I don't think you're going to see a rule that -- and this again,

_	is my own opinion, but I don't think you're going to see a
2	rule that comes out and says
3	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Take out cross connects?
4	MS. KEATING: Right. You're not going to see
5	that. And you're not going to see a rule that says,
6	ILECs, don't do cross connects. If you see anything, it
7	would be can't be required or are not required. Or
8	actually, there wouldn't even be a rule on it.
9	CHAIRMAN DEASON: It would just be up to the
LO	parties to negotiate it.
L1	MS. KEATING: But when there's a conflict, I
12	mean, the FCC rule wins out. But if they want to agree to
13	it, that's up to them.
L4	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Any other questions? Did we
15	contemplate making a decision today or are we just going
16	to put it on a future agenda?
17	MS. KEATING: The notice is not specifically
18	indicated for a decision, but it is indicated as a
19	continuation of the discussion at agenda.
20	CHAIRMAN DEASON: So, if we wanted to make a
21	decision, we could?
22	MS. KEATING: I believe that you can.
23	CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioner Jacobs, what's
24	your desire?
25	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: On the one hand, I'd like
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to move this on as quickly as possible, but I think I want to go back and review both the Court decision and the items in the record that were cited. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay, that's fine. probably need to consult with Commissioner Jacobs and myself. Maybe we'll just put off a decision until we get FCC rules, how about that? MS. KEATING: You could wait until I come back from maternity leave. That'd be probably about the same time. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Thank you all for your participation. It's been enlightening. I don't say that the decision's any easier, but at least it's been enlightening. This motion hearing is concluded. Thank you all. (Hearing concluded at 4:55 p.m.) 

1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	
4	COUNTY OF LEON )
5	I, KORETTA E. STANFORD, RPR, Official FPSC Commission Reporter, do hereby certify that the Emergency Scheduling
6 7	Conference in Docket Numbers 982845-TP and 990321-TP was heard by Commissioners Deason and Jacobs at the time and place herein stated.
8	It is further certified that I stenographically
9	reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript, consisting of 96 pages, constitutes a true
10	transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
11	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a
12	relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially
13	interested in the action.
14	DATED this 27th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2000
15	
16	KONTA E. STANFORD, PR
17	FPSC Official Commission Reporter (850) 413-6734
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