BEFORE THE
FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: DOCKET NO. OOO442-EI - Petition for determination of need for the Osprey Energy Center by Calpine Construction Finance Company, L.P.

| BEFORE: | COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR. COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ |
| :---: | :---: |
| PROCEEDINGS: | AGENDA CONFERENCE |
| ITEM NUMBER: | 49** |
| DATE: | Tuesday, October 17, 2000 |
| PLACE: | 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148 Tallahassee, Florida |
| REPORTED BY: | MARY ALLEN NEEL Registered Professional Reporter |

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS 100 SALEM COURT
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 (850) 878-2221

## BUREAU OF REPORTING

RECEIVED $10-31-00$

PARTICIPANTS:

ROBERT ELIAS, FPSC, on behalf of the commission Staff

CHARLES GUYTON, Stee1, Hector \& Davis, on behalf of Florida Power \& Light Company.

RACHAEL ISAAC, FPSC, on behalf of the Commission Staff.

GARY SASSO, Carlton Fields, on behalf of Florida Power Corporation.

ROBERT SCHEFFEL WRIGHT, Landers \& Parsons, on behalf of Calpine Construction Finance Company L.P.

## STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Issue 1: should the Commission grant calpine's request for oral argument? Recommendation: Yes. The commission should grant Calpine's request for oral argument.

Issue 2: should the Commission grant FPL's emergency motion to hold this matter in abeyance?
Recommendation: No. FPL's motion should be denied.
Issue 3: should the commission grant calpine's petition for a determination that Ru7e 25-22.082(2), Florida Administrative Code, does not apply to Calpine, or grant calpine's alternative request for waiver of Ru7e 25-22.082(2), Florida Administrative Code?
Recommendation: The commission should grant Calpine's petition for a determination that rule 25-22.082(2), F1orida Administrative Code, does not apply to Calpine.

Issue 4: Should the Commission grant Florida Power \& Light Company's (FPL's) motion to dismiss Calpine's Petition for Determination of Need for an Electrical Power Plant?
Recommendation: No. Calpine's petition for need determination states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted because it alleges al7 of the required elements. At the time calpine files its information concerning contractual commitments, it shal7 file all the information required by Rule 25-122.081, F1orida Administrative Code.

Issue 5: Should the Commission grant Florida Power Corporation's motion to dismiss calpine Construction Finance Company L.P.'s petition for determination of need for an electrical power plant?
Recommendation: No calpine's petition states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted because it alleges all of the required elements.

Issue 6: Should this docket be closed? Recommendation: No. This docket should remain open for the hearing.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Item 49.
MS. ISAAC: Commissioners, Item 49 is staff's recommendation on some procedural matters in the calpine need determination case, and the parties are here to address the Commission.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. Who's up first? We may need to take appearances here. Should we start with Mr. Guyton or --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Chairman, one of the things $I$ had a question for staff on was the order of the issues we should consider. I know we need to rule on oral argument, but it seems to make sense that after we deal with that, we should deal with the motions to dismiss before we get to any other issue.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Staff? I'm sorry. It's not your motion. It's Calpine's motion. I was about to go out of order. But before we do that, go ahead and -- staff, do you have a recommendation on the order of issues?

MS. ISAAC: Yes. I would go ahead with the oral argument issue, and then --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Go right ahead.
MR. ELIAS: You could take -- we debated,
or at least I did, whether or not to put the motions to dismiss first or the motion to hold in abeyance first. You know, my thought was that if you decide to hold it in abeyance, you don't need to reach the motions to dismiss. And on the other hand, if you decide to dismiss it, you don't need to reach the motion to hold it in abeyance. So it's really six of one, half a dozen of another how you proceed.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Let's do this. Let's take up the motion for oral argument first, and then let's go to the motion to dismiss, I think, because that -- if we do the motion to dismiss, we don't have a motion for abeyance, and that would be the case. But let's do the motion for oral argument and then go to the motion to dismiss.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I can move Issue 1, Mr . Chairman.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Second.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It has been moved and seconded to move staff on Issue 1 , which means we'11 have oral argument.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ten minutes per side it looks like staff is recommending. Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Yes.
MR. GUYTON: Commissioner, may we be heard briefly on the extent of that? This is a significant motion. The last time we had occasion to argue a motion to dismiss on a case like this, it took eight hours. I don't think that anybody plans that, but $I$ have about a seven-minute presentation, and I think Mr. Sasso has something akin to that. I would very much like to be able to go through my entire presentation. And we're only talking about a few additional minutes. we would ask that we not be limited just to ten minutes a side.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, we do have some restrictions. Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER JABER: we don't want hours.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I know. I'm --
MR. GUYTON: Agreed. I'm talking seven, eight minutes instead of five.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It sounds like 15 minutes per side.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes, that was my thought, 15 minutes per side. So we' 17 go 15 minutes per side. And $I$ guess you're up.

MR. GUYTON: Commissioners, my name is

Charles Guyton. I'm with the law firm of steel, Hector \& Davis, and I represent Florida Power \& Light Company in this proceeding.

Calpine has filed a petition for a determination of need in which it acknowledges that it does not have either a contract or a co-applicant. Calpine's petition also fails to make utility-specific allegations regarding the statutory need criteria. They don't even identify the purchasing utility. Instead, they ask you to presume that they will meet those utility-specific requirements later when and if they sign a contract.

Allegations of a contract, a purchasing utility, a co-applicant, and that the statutory criteria of section 403.519 are met from the perspective of a purchasing utility are necessary elements of a cause of action in a need case by a wholesale power plant developer such as calpine. Therefore, Calpine's petition fails to state a cause of action and should be dismissed.

Now, there are four critical errors in the staff recommendation that's before you. one, it fails to follow the legal principle that the

[^0]petitioner must allege all of the elements necessary to state a cause of action. And we just covered the missing elements.

Two, it asks you to rely on matters outside the petition, assurances that Calpine has provided to staff that Calpine will file the necessary missing information at a later date.

Third, it acknowledges that the petition fails to meet your minimum pleading requirement under Rule 25-22.081, but it inexplicably fails to recommend dismissal.

And fourth, it fails to discuss the case law that states when an action is premature, the case cannot be cured by supplemental pleadings; it must be dismissed.

Now, if you follow the case law that staff has cited in its staff recommendation, you will ignore staff's repeated statements that Calpine has provided assurance to staff that it will provide necessary supplemental information. You will also disregard any supplemental information that calpine may offer today regarding a potential Memorandum of Understanding with Seminole. We appreciate the courtesy that seminole extended us yesterday by informing us
that they were going to present a Memorandum of Understanding today at the agenda conference. But that matter is outside the petition and must be disregarded by the Commission.

Under the case law that the staff cites to you, it was improper for staff to mention the assurances that it has received, and it would be improper for you to consider other things that Calpine may offer today. The motion to dismiss must be decided solely on the petition before you.

Now, staff acknowledges in its
recommendation that the petition is defective.
COMMISSIONER JABER: You need to clarify for me the --

MR. GUYTON: All right.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: -- Memorandum of
Understanding point before you move on. seminole has entered into a Memorandum of understanding with whom?

MR. GUYTON: with calpine. There's a document that we were provided a few hours ago that purports to be a Memorandum of understanding between Calpine and Seminole. we understand it has been filed with the

Commission. I expect it to be discussed later in argument today.

We would respectfully submit that whatever it states -- and I will say that $I$ have not done a lengthy or detailed review of it -- it is outside the pleading, and under the case law cited by you must be disregarded in terms of the consideration of a motion to dismiss.

Now, staff acknowledges in their
recommendation that the petition is defective under Rule 25-22.081. They do that at page 20 of the recommendation when they ask you to consider that supplemental information will be provided, and I quote, to cure the present defect, end quote. Staff recognizes that this petition is defective under that minimum pleading requirement rule, and that's grounds for dismissal.

But most importantly, Commissioners, it is grounds for dismissal when a cause of action that has been filed is premature. Calpine has not alleged all the elements necessary for it to state a cause of action have occurred. Instead, Calpine alleges that they may occur in the future, they may secure a contract, they may
secure a co-applicant, they may amend their pleading to make utility-specific allegations. In such a case where all the necessary elements of a cause of action do not exist when the case is filed, the case is premature, and it should be dismissed without leave to amend.

Now, I want to quote to you from Trawick, Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure, a well recognized authority, for this very proposition. And it's taken from section 1.2 of Trawick. "Every cause of action has two or more elements. All of the elements must occur or be complete before an action is commenced. If all the facts giving rise to a cause of action do not exist at the time the action is filed, it is premature. This has not been changed by permitting supplemental pleadings setting forth transactions, occurrences, or events that have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The objection that the action is premature may be raised by a motion to dismiss the pleading if the allegations show the defect," end quote.

Commissioners, that is precisely the situation that you have before you today.

Calpine's petition does not and did not state a cause of action, because all of the necessary elements did not exist when calpine filed. Calpine and your staff hope that calpine may be able to make those necessary allegations in supplemental pleadings before trial, but that's not the law. If a cause of action is premature because the elements didn't exist when it was filed, it should be dismissed, and it cannot be cured by supplemental proceedings.

As the Third DCA has observed, and I quote, "The claims should be dismissed without leave to amend, allowing the refiling of a new suit if, as and when such alleged causes of action may mature." That's from Rolling Oaks Homeowners Association vs. Dade County, 492 So.2d 686.

Commissioners, you're being encouraged to ignore the deficiencies of the petition, rely upon outside of the petition assurances made by staff, and perhaps to be made here today, and assume that supplemental filings will cure these deficiencies, and either misapply or ignore applicable legal principles.

These are the same types of errors that were urged upon you in the recently reversed

Duke case. There, like here, it was suggested that you should disregard the Nassau cases, although they were clearly applicable. There, like here, you were urged not to dismiss a case which should property have been dismissed. And as a result, the intervenors and the applicant spent hundreds of thousands of dollars that were wasted, and we ended up with a case in which there was reversible error.

This case should be dismissed without leave to amend, and Calpine should be allowed to refile if and when it secures its necessary contract and co-applicant.

I'17 reserve what time $I$ have for rebuttal. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Before we begin, how would you address the case law cited by Calpine? what about the scherer case?

MR. GUYTON: Well, they cite the scherer case not in regard to our motion to dismiss, but in regard to the motion for abeyance. And $I$ can address that now, or $I$ can address it later when we address the motion for abeyance, so whatever your pleasure is, commissioner.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: You'11 do that
later? okay. That's fine.
MS. SASSO: Good afternoon. I'm Gary
Sasso with Carlton Fields, representing florida Power Corporation.

I would like to take a slightly different road, but end up at the same point, and actually raise even a more fundamental objection to this proceeding.

The petition should be dismissed for the simple reason that calpine is not a proper applicant. It does not have standing. It does not have legal entitlement to initiate a need proceeding. As a matter of law, it is logically and legally impossible for calpine at this time to file a legally valid petition. And likewise, it is legally untenable for this commission to process it. This Commission simply does not have jurisdiction to process Calpine's petition. The Florida supreme court has said four times now that independent power producers like Calpine are not applicants.

COMMISSIONER JABER: How do you know that without an evidentiary hearing? How do you know they're not a proper applicant until you've heard evidence at a hearing?

MR. SASSO: on the face of the petition, Calpine identifies itself as an independent power producer that does not have a contract with a retail utility. on the face of the petition, it concedes that it currently, or at least as of the time it filed the petition, did not have a power purchase agreement to meet the needs of a retail utility. And under the Duke decision and under the Nassau decisions before that, that is dispositive of Calpine's standing to file this proceeding.

The Supreme Court made that clear, as I said, four times, twice in the Nassau cases and now twice in the Duke case. In Duke, this is what the supreme court said. It said, "Our analysis of the siting Act articulated in the Nassau decisions is applicable to the present case." Quoting the Nassau cases, the supreme Court said in Duke, "Only an applicant," quoting applicant, "can request a determination of need under Section 403.519."

The Court reviewed the legislative history that we discussed in that case and reaffirmed that the only proper applicants are florida utilities that, quote, have a duty to serve
customers. In reviewing the legislative history, it agreed with us that retail utilities have standing to bring a need proceeding. This is what the court said. "Our reading of this statutory history leads us to continue to conclude that the present statutory scheme was intended to place the PSC's determination of need within the regulatory framework allowing Florida regulated utilities to propose new power plants to provide electrical service to their Florida customers at retail rates."

Nothing could be clearer. Calpine is simply not a proper applicant. That is what the Supreme Court has said now repeated7y.

This Commission's own decision in the Martin expansion case, which was the seminal decision on which the Nassau cases relied, provides further instruction here. That is the case where this Commission first said that an independent power producer who would like to sel1 power at wholesale to a retail utility can't initiate a need proceeding on its own. In that case, Florida Power \& Light had several projects underway. It was going to build several plants, and it had outstanding RFPs.

And the commission addressed the issue, what happens if an IPP enters into a contract with Florida Power \& Light? Could that IPP file a need proceeding?

And the Commission said quite clearly, no, it cannot, even if the contract between the utility and the applicant makes the -- I'm sorry, between the utility and the IPP makes the IPP solely responsible for seeking permitting before the Public Service Commission. This is what the commission said. It said the reason is simple. The need for the capacity remains that of the utility. The winning bidder has no independent need of its own. In order for the specific mandates of the statute to be meaningful, they must be answered from the utility's perspective. The type of information required by the PSC rule that's at issue here is exclusively in the hands of the utility. It gave an example. The independent power producers under any moniker do not have the ability to produce accurate load forecasts because they don't have the database on which such an analysis is built.

So the point is that even if calpine enters
into an agreement with Seminole, which it has not -- and I'm going to address that in a moment. Even if it does, Calpine is not the proper applicant.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Seminole is?
MR. SASSO: Seminole would be.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: okay.
MR. SASSO: And that is what we suggest. If Calpine is on the verge of entering into a power purchase agreement with seminole, seminole needs to be the applicant to initiate a request for a determination of need. Calpine comes in as a co-applicant. Its standing is entirely derivative of an applicant that has standing to request a determination of need. It cannot come in and say, "we're casting about for a co-app1icant."

That's like filing a lawsuit asking for damages for an automobile accident that hasn't occurred yet, where you describe yourself, say, "This is who I am. This is the business I'm in. I drive dangerously, and $I$ expect to be in an accident by the time of trial. These are the statistics about the rate of accidents in the state of florida. And by the time I get to
trial, I expect to be able to identify other pertinent parties in the case." And it's even worse. It's like in this case, we have a complaint that's filed by a minor that does not have standing to sue in a court that does not have jurisdiction. That's an apt analogy to what is taking place here.

Calpine does not have legal standing to initiate the request. If and when it enters into a contract with Seminole, then, like every other need case, the utility that has the retail commitment should come before the Commission and initiate the request under this rule. That utility would be in a position to provide meaningfut responses to the inquiries in this Commission's rules. Calpine could appear as a co-applicant and he1p sponsor that plant. But then the Commission would have (1) a proper applicant with standing, and (2) it would have meaningful information.

The information that has been provided to the commission so far about this plant is, with all respect, virtually worthless, because it tells us a lot about Calpine, but says nothing about the retail need, which has to be the
premise for siting this plant, for getting a need determination for a new power plant in Florida under the Duke decisions.

So there is something to be said in the final analysis for doing things the right way. There is something to be said for maintaining the integrity the process, the integrity of the statutes, the Supreme Court's decisions, this Commission's own decisions, and this Commission's rules. And what calpine has proposed and what the staff has supported is simply not the right way to do things.

And with all respect, we request that the petition be dismissed forthwith, without further ado. It's improper even to hold it in abeyance, because the Commission doesn't have jurisdiction to process it any further. And if and when the parties do enter into a contract, Seminote can come before the Commission.
we have been handed a copy of what is called a Memorandum of Understanding.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Seminole could come in to the commission as a co-applicant.

MR. SASSO: No. Seminole would file the need petition as the retail utility requesting a
determination of need, that Seminole needs the plant to meet its identified retail needs. Seminole is a cooperative with 11 members that have retail need. And if Seminole believes that it has a need for more capacity to serve its retail load, then it needs to come before this Commission, explain what that need is, how this plant is best situated to serve it, and then this commission is in a position to pass on that information.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Because it's your position that as a mere co-applicant, to the degree there's a defect, it couldn't be cured by finding a co-applicant.

MR. SASSO: That is absolutely the case. COMMISSIONER JABER: And what do you cite to support that?

MR. SASSO: Both of the Nassau cases and both of the Duke decisions in this case. If the Commission will read them carefully, as we have many, many times, those cases make it abundantly clear that when an independent power producer is entering into an agreement with a retail utility, the retail utility has the standing, and only the retail utility has the standing to

[^1]initiate the need petition, to request a determination of need.

The independent power producer has a limited role in that proceeding. It can come in as a co-applicant. Here we have the cart before the horse, or the tail wagging the dog, whatever you want to call it. But we have the party who, at best, can come in after he has been selected by a retail utility with a retail need, can come in in support of that retail utility's petition for a determination of need. Instead, what we have is, we have an IPP jumping the gun, saying, we haven't found a utility to want us yet, but we want you to keep the case alive, give us hearing dates, pretend like we're a legitimate applicant, that we have standing under the law to request a determination of need, even though we can't even tell you what that need is yet. But we will someday find a utility who will do business with us, and then they can provide the information that everybody acknowledges, including staff, is absolutely indispensable to your proceeding with this case.

The Memorandum of understanding, just very briefly -- and I know that I'm asking your
indulgence on time. Again, this was handed to us just earlier today, and what its says is that the parties have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding which provides the framework for an agreement to be entered into. The parties have, quote, agreed to negotiate toward a definitive agreement. "whereas, buyer and seller have entered into discussions regarding the sale and purchase of firm electric capacity, which discussions have led the parties to agree on fundamental terms and to pursue negotiations toward a power purchase agreement" -- this is where we are now. we have an intent to negotiate in good faith.

This is further what the agreement says: "Buyer," meaning Calpine, "shall provide" -- I'm sorry. No, not Calpine. Buyer would be seminole. "shall provide such support for the petition for determination of need for Buyer's plant as the parties mutually agree is necessary if and when the PPA is executed by the parties. Buyer's support shall include, if deemed necessary and appropriate, becoming a co-applicant." It's got it all backwards. If and when Seminole decides that this plant meets

Seminole's need, then Seminote comes to the Commission, files a proper need petition, and Calpine comes in as a co-applicant.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Then for the sake of administrative efficiency, what do we accomplish by dismissing the case if Seminole can turn around and file their own petition?

MR. SASSO: The Commission has no jurisdiction over this case. It is really not a matter of expediency. It is a matter of power. The Commission has no jurisdiction over a need proceeding that is initiated by an entity that is not a proper applicant. It is an issue of fundamental power, which is what the court said in Duke. It said the commission was without jurisdiction to enter this order. This entity was not an applicant who had standing to request a determination of need. It's an issue of power.
what do you accomp1ish? A much more efficient result than what we have already incurred today. what we have incurred today is needless proceedings, needless use of this Commission's resources and the parties'
resources. calpine has actually filed
testimony. We've engaged in all kinds of discussions about discovery. Over what? we don't even know what the retail utility is. we don't have information about its need. This has been an incredible waste of time.

The most expeditious, not only the most legal, but the most expeditious way to handle this case is to say to Calpine, "Thank you, but we're not empowered to accept your petition. If you enter into a contract with Seminole, let Seminole come back and file a well-pleaded petition that does not have the conceded defects that staff acknowledges it has."

Let Seminole provide all the information that this commission has repeatedly recognized, beginning with the Martin expansion order, that only the retail load bearing utility can provide to this Commission. And then we all start with the proper beginning. we have a petition that makes sense. It has the information required by the Commission's rules, and the commission can then proceed not on a false start without jurisdiction, but with the power vested in this Commission by the Legislature.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Very we11. Thank
you.
Mr. Wright?
MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commissioners, naturally enough, Calpine supports the staff's recommendations on Items 4 and 5, Florida Power \& Light's and Florida Power Corporation's motions to dismiss, that is, the recommendations that those motions be denied. Staff's recommendation was right a week ago when it was filed based on the facts as they existed at that time, and it is right today in light of the new facts. The new facts are that seminole and Calpine Energy Services -- Calpine Power Services, L.P., an affiliate of calpine Construction Finance Company, the petitioner in this case and the primary applicant in this case, have executed a Memorandum of understanding.

Notwithstanding Mr. Sasso's inaccurate characterizations of that memorandum, that agreement is regarded as a binding agreement by both calpine and seminole. The point of the references to the definitive agreement are that there will be some more terms added. Under Florida law, the document that contains all the
essential terms and the document that we filed under cover of a request for protected confidential treatment today does in fact contain all the appropriate terms regarding pricing, duration, and everything else that's material to the performance of this contract.

And Mr. Eves, who is director of business development for florida for Calpine, is present today, and he will aver, if you want him to, that what I say is true. Likewise, Mr. Woodbury, who is vice president of power procurement, or the equivalent thereof, for seminole is also here, and he will say the same thing.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Wright, I seem to recall some case law as well that would prohibit us from considering that contract or Memorandum of Understanding outside the scope of a motion to dismiss. Aren't we supposed to just look at the four corners of the pleading?

MR. WRIGHT: you can look at the four corners of the pleading, but $I$ certainly think it's relevant, and it is on record with the Commission now. If you want to look at the four corners of the pleading, we have pled from the
outset and have argued extensively and explained extensively, consistent with Commission precedent, that the way we have pled our case is lawful, is consistent with commission precedent regarding conditions subsequent or conditions to be placed on determinations of need, and that it brings the need determination petition that we have filed squarely within the scope of what the Court has said is allowed in Tampa Electric vs. Garcia.

COMMISSIONER JABER: No, let me ask it a different way.

MR. WRIGHT: well, I think I understand. The point is, if you want to just address what we filed without the Memorandum of Understanding, we can address it that way. And what $I$ was saying is that all of our pleadings to date, up until this morning when we filed our notice of request for confidential treatment of the agreement with seminole, addressed the case on exactly that basis. And that is in fact the basis upon which the staff analyzed this. In short --

COMMISSIONER JABER: You're saying with or without that contract or Memorandum of
accurate stenotype reporters, inc.
understanding, we can go forward with your petition.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JABER: Since you have substantially alleged the elements that are needed to be considered for the need. Is that your acknowledgment that legally we shouldn't consider the contract, consider that you filed a contract or a Memorandum of Understanding today? I thought that's what the case law said.

MR. WRIGHT: I think that's correct. I think that the standard for a motion to dismiss is taking all the well-pleaded allegations as true. We're kind of in what $I$ would say is at least a gray area, in that what has happened is, the allegations -- certain important allegations that we made in our petition back in June have now become in fact true, as a matter of fact. So on that basis, I would submit that it would be appropriate for you to consider that. But if not, then we certainly up until this morning -- in fact, the staff's recommendation as well addresses this on the basis that we have alleged sufficient facts, including a condition subsequent, a condition to be placed on our need
determination, that we would demonstrate the utility-specific commitment required by the Court's order in Tampa Electric v. Garcia.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Wright, you seem to have made a representation on behalf of staff that I don't -- I would like to know whether they're in agreement with.

MR. ELIAS: I didn't hear it.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think I heard Mr. Wright say that even without -- if we say, you know, this contract obviously wasn't part of the filing -- I'm sorry, the MOU wasn't part of the filing, that staff was still considering the appropriateness of the application even in its absence. And I just want to know if you're all right with that.

MR. ELIAS: This recommendation was written prior to us being advised that the MOU --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But it was written -and you correct me if I'm wrong. It was written sort of contingent on these assurances that were given.

MR. ELIAS: That goes to -- well, there are two things. That goes to the question of
whether or not the case should be held in abeyance. And ultimately, the fact remains that this is Calpine's petition. They're going to have to prove that they meet the requirements of 403 as well as Tampa Electric Company vs. -- as interpreted by the court in Tampa Electric Company vs. Garcia before.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Right. And my question to you is, conceding, as Commissioner Jaber -- I understand her question to be that we would be -- staff might be willing to proceed or support this petition notwithstanding the fact that there, quote, is not agreement, or that this agreement isn't part of the petition at this point, that we're not considering the existence -- I mean, we've rung the bell. We all know that there's an MOU, and I guess $I$ would have questions as to whether that was sufficient for any petition. But let's say for the moment it doesn't exist --

MR. ELIAS: For purposes of the motion to dismiss, and surviving a motion to dismiss only, yes.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm struggling with that. The point of a motion to dismiss is to
look at the pleadings and determine -- whether or not we have an MOU next week or last week or three weeks from know, whether on the four corners of that document, there are assertions sufficient to raise a claim upon which relief can be granted. And that is -- I want to go back to a point very quickly, Mr. wright. It goes to -- I want to actually touch on the point brought up by Power Corp.

What they're saying is you fail because you've missed an indispensable party here, that you came without an indispensable party. And they would assert -- and I'm trying to stay away as much as I can, but they would assert the wrong party, but at least an indispensable party is not here. How do you address that?

MR. WRIGHT: what we asserted is that before we asked the commission for -- if necessary, if necessary, what we asked the Commission to do is to allow our case to proceed. We alleged and averred that we would provide information of the utility-specific commitment as soon as it became available. And we asked the Commission that if we had not accomplished that, fulfilled that allegation by
the time we got to the hearing, we asked the Commission, consistent with Commission precedent, which is cited extensively in our pleadings, we asked the commission to grant our need determination on a conditional basis in the same way that the commission has granted conditional need determinations in the past, on the basis that before the power plant could ever be built, before construction could begin, we would demonstrate the required utility-specific commitment pursuant to Tampa Electric $V$. Garcia. That's what we alleged.

And as to the indispensable party piece, we agree that before construction can begin, we would have to have the appropriate co-applicant whose need we would be meeting. I don't believe that the case law says that in order to come in the door in the first place, that's what happens. In Cedar Bay, Cedar Bay came in by itself and you all -- you all's predecessors said FPL as the contracting party with Cedar Bay is an indispensable party and joined them into the case. Now, granted, that was -- I think that was pre at least one of the Nassaus. I don't remember the exact timing of that. But
nonetheless, that is how the indispensable party term came to be in the PSC's need determination jurisprudence.

But we agree -- you know, we agree that there is an indispensable party. But as a matter of factual allegation, we alleged to you that we would show up at an appropriate time -and there was some discussion as to whether that appropriate time is before the hearing or after the hearing. Based on precedent, we assert that it's at any time before construction, because you have precedent out there in need determination cases where you have said it's completely within our authority to impose conditions on need determinations. And you have 1et need determinations -- you have granted affirmative determinations of need based on conditions to be satisfied subsequently that did not exist, non-final contracts that did not exist at the time your final orders were entered.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I could understand certain particular conditions that might be left open. However, as a matter of jurisdiction, if we don't have the proper parties before us, that
in my mind goes a little bit beyond having -and I want to get your response to this. There's a reason in my mind why, and it's Issue 2 in the recommendation today, because in order -- if we do that, we have to grant that.

MR. WRIGHT: I'm sorry. Have to grant what?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Issue 2, I think it was. I may be wrong. The waiver.

COMMISSIONER JABER: oh, 3.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Issue 3. I'm sorry.
If we go with your logic, then there can be no process where you would have gone and sought the least cost alternative, because you don't have the grounding upon which to base that analysis. How do we get beyond that? I'm not saying that that -- that's an important issue for me. How do we get beyond that?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, the relationship is, as the staff have characterized it, that whether a power plant that we are going to build to meet a specific utility's need, which we acknowledge is required under the TECO $v$. Garcia decision, is a function of whom we are selling that power plant to.

The staff have recommended, rightly, in our opinion, that the rule was never intended to apply to wholesale utilities like Calpine. They said that whether we have to -- whether any bidding process has to be followed will be determined according to the entity with whom we contract.

If it's a muni or a co-op, they are expressly exempt from the rule; hence, no bidding requirement would apply.

If we were to contract with an investor-owned utility, who was intended to be subject to the -- an investor-owned retail utility, who was intended to be subject to the bidding rule, then whether this had to go through a bidding process would be determined according to whether the need that we were meeting would have been met by a power plant that had to go through a bidding requirement. If it would have been met by a power plant that would not have been met by a Power Plant siting Act jurisidictional plant, then the answer would be no bidding process would be required. If it would be met -- for example, Florida Power's Hines 2 unit, if it would have been met by an
entity that would have -- by a power plant that would have been subject to the Power Plant Siting Act and the need determination process, then that utility would have had to fulfill the bidding process.

But the rule was never intended to apply to us, and that's what the staff have recommended, and that's what the background of that rule shows.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, not to get into -- I don't want to go too far off into arguing that issue, so let me stay as conceptual as possible. Arguably, we weren't looking at particular market entrants when our predecessors -- we were looking at a particular process, were we not?

MR. WRIGHT: You were looking at a process to protect captive ratepayers.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Correct.
MR. WRIGHT: That's exactly what you were looking at.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: correct. And that process applies whoever the interests are, aren't they, or wouldn't it?

MR. WRIGHT: well, it applies when there
are captive ratepayers involved. And -- I don't want to get too far afie1d either, but what we've alleged is that the existence of this project by itself inherently serves the fundamental purpose of the rule, which is to protect captive ratepayers by providing utilities with an alternative, with an additional alternative source, as you all said in your Duke/New Smyrna order that was reversed on other grounds.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. I don't want to get you too far afield.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Wright, you would agree that in the context of a motion to dismiss, the foundation, what we need to be looking at is whether you've alleged the elements needed under the substantive law --

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JABER: -- to go forward. And under 403, one of the things that you're supposed to allege is your status as a proper applicant, as staff has laid out in the recommendation. And then also, you have to support a utility-specific need.

That brings us back to the contract. Help
me understand why the filing of that contract with your petition is not what we need to be considering.

See, the trouble 1 'm having -- let me articulate for you the entire concern I have and let you respond completely. The trouble I shared with you all at the prehearing conference, and I'11 do it again today, is this lack of ability, whether it be on our staff's part or the parties', to govern themselves accordingly in this case. It's like they're having difficulty doing discovery. And I don't mean to speak for staff. It's just an observation $I^{\prime} v e$ made in being the prehearing officer in this case. It's difficult to know what questions to ask and how to conduct themselves, because a lot of it depends on who you enter into a contract with and the need that you demonstrate as a foundation. Now, help me get over that concern.

MR. WRIGHT: If I may, Commissioner, what I would say to you is that the case -- well, let me back up. we have pled our case alleging all the necessary elements, and we have alleged that the plant meets all the statutory criteria. we
have given you have all the information you would normally have in a need determination case. we've given you information regarding Calpine, we've given you information regarding peninsular florida need, how the plant will meet peninsular florida's need for system reliability and integrity, how it will meet peninsular Florida's need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost. We have made specific allegations based a well known computer model, PROMOD 4, as to how much money it would save if it were dispatched economically within the system. we have made the appropriate allegations that it's the most cost-effective alternative for meeting peninsular florida's needs as well as Calpine's needs.

Now, what we have not alleged with specificity, leaving aside the MOU, is which specific utility is going to take the power. what we have alleged is that there will be a specific utility, and we alleged that we were working as hard as we could to get the arrangements in place that we were even at the time in June working on, and that we would furnish the commission with that information as
soon as it became available.
Your order establishing procedure recognizes exactly those facts as alleged and sets up, as we understand it --

COMMISSIONER JABER: No. what my order establishing procedure did was recognize that you said you would file a contract by November 1st.

MR. WRIGHT: okay.
COMMISSIONER JABER: And those dates in the order on procedure were --

MR. WRIGHT: Designed to accommodate --
COMMISSIONER JABER: Designed to accommodate that, that's exactly right. But the concern I have is, as we go forward, I'm now realizing that those dates don't allow parties and staff enough time to do discovery and file testimony.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I would submit to you, that goes to the issue of abeyance and not the issue of dismissal. And if there needs to be some modification of interim dates, we're willing to work with that. We would really like to keep the hearing dates, and we set forth in quite explicit detail in our responsive
pleadings to the rous' motions to dismiss why it is in the public interest to proceed with this case as quickly as possible.

Delay, which we believe and assert is FPL's and FPC's strategy here, delay costs the state the benefits of this power plant. It costs the state cost savings in the generation of electricity. It costs the state primary fuel savings. It costs the state available reliability benefits, and it costs the state available environmental benefits.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If we can consider your application by law, if it's permissible to consider your application by law, those are the benefits to the state.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JABER: You would agree with everyone's concern that this case needs to be handled correctly and processed correctly.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JABER: I think that everyone shares that goal. What is wrong with delaying, dismissing, whatever, for a time period that would allow Seminole Electric to come in and apply for the need petition?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, there's two parts to the answer to your question, and the answer is, what's wrong from a public interest perspective -- and we have cited to you in our pleadings the public interest mandates that apply to this Commission, both in 366.01 and in 366.81. In the pubiic interest, you should not dismiss this case and not slow it down, because it would be contrary to the public interest to do so.

As a legal matter, we assert to you -- as we have since we filed our petition on June 19th, we assert to you that your precedent specifically contemplates, recognizes, and authorizes conditions on need determinations. All we have asked for here is that you let us in as an applicant, process our case, and if necessary, impose a condition on us that before we can ever build a power plant, we make the utility-specific demonstration.

COMMISSIONER JABER: You don't have anything to lose, though. See, you make it sound as if the --

MR. WRIGHT: we all do.
COMMISSIONER JABER: -- imposition of a condition helps us in some way. But in the
meantime, our staff would have -- in this agency would have expended resources on your application that at the end of the day we may not have jurisdiction to process. And to the degree there are intervenors, they would have expended a whole lot of money fighting with you all.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, on that point, 1 would say --

COMMISSIONER JABER: So that position doesn't help me any.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, on that point, I would say whatever they spend is up to them. whatever you all spend I think has to be viewed in the balancing context as to whether it's worth a few weeks of your staff's time and perhaps three days of your time at the hearing to enable the potential gain of a year's worth of additional benefits. And I would submit to you that in any kind of public interest balancing context, that kind of tradeoff is one that you have to answer in the public interest and allow this to go forward.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Are we -- go ahead
and finish.
MR. WRIGHT: Yes. I'm sorry. I've had to answer a lot of questions.

I think I -- I hope I answered your question regarding the potential difficulties with discovery. Basically, the Ious have taken the position that they don't care doing discovery about anything other than the contracts. And they were free to, as of September 19th when you let them in, conduct discovery on all of our testimony and everything else, and they elected not to. If they want to conduct discovery on it now, they can sure do so in accordance with the applicable rules. And as of today, we can start working on discovery regarding the contract.

I would just say with respect to the precedent, if you didn't have jurisdiction -- if you don't have jurisdiction to do this plant because there is a non-final event pending out there, as we stand here, ignoring the MOU, the non-final event being the identification of a retail load serving co-app1icant and the need associated with that applicant, then you didn't have jurisdiction to do the polk unit because
there were non-final contracts out there, and there were non-final contracts in other need determination cases.

The Duke case is not like this case. The threshold issue there was whether a merchant plant could go forward. This is not a merchant plant. We have made it very clear from day one, June 19th, that this is not a merchant plant. This is a contract wholesale plant. We have pled factually that this is a contract wholesale plant, that the output would be committed pursuant to contracts.

The Nassau $V$. Beard case says that a need determination is only available after the applicant -- after retail need is identified, in essence. It doesn't say you can't get in the door in the first place without that.

COMMISSIONER JABER: How is that different from Duke? Duke, as I understand it, entered into a contract with the city of New Smyrna Beach.

MR. WRIGHT: Right.
COMMISSIONER JABER: You can call it a merchant plant, or you can call it a wholesale contract provider, whatever.

MR. WRIGHT: Yep.
COMMISSIONER JABER: You've entered into -want to enter into contracts. What's the difference between Calpine and Duke?

MR. WRIGHT: Duke made it clear that it was a merchant plant except as to the 30 megawatts. And what the court said about that basically was 30 megawatts isn't enough.

COMMISSIONER JABER: So what you're saying is --

MR. WRIGHT: And that the output -- what the court said was that the statutory scheme embodied in the siting Act and FEECA was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a proposed power plant, the output of which is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who purchase electrical power at retail rates. That was the Duke case. Our case is one in which we have alleged that we would satisfy exactly that condition.

MR. SASSO: May I address that?
COMMISSIONER JABER: what you're saying is that osprey will be fully committed?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.
COMMISSIONER JABER: How do you -- okay.

MR. SASSO: May I address that one issue briefly?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: wait. Let him finish. were you done, Mr. wright?

MR. WRIGHT: No, sir.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Let him finish, and then we'11 come back.

MR. WRIGHT: I just want to make it clear, we believe that calpine is a proper applicant, because we are a regulated electric utility. This order does not say we can't be an applicant. What it says -- the Court's order. What it says is that the statutory scheme was not intended to authorize power plants, the output of which was not committed to serving a specific retail utility's needs. We have alleged that it would be. I'm trying to stay away from the fact that now we've got a contract, but we alleged that it would be. And just as a matter of factual pleading, that's sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.

Your jurisdiction under 403.519 attaches to power plants subject to the Power Plant Siting Act. I don't think anybody would disagree that this power plant, the Osprey Energy Center, as a

540-megawatt class gas-fired combined cycle power plant with steam capacity over 75 megawatts, is not subject to the Power Plant Siting Act.

There are really two questions for you here. Can you do what we've asked you to do? Do you have the legal authority?
we argue very specifically with the citations to your case law that you can. All we've done is ask for you to grant -- to the extent necessary, remember, to the extent necessary, to grant our need determination subject to the condition that before the power plant can ever be built, before we can turn the first shovelful of earth, we have to make the appropriate utility-specific need demonstration required by Tampa Electric $v$. Garcia.

And the second question is, should you allow us to go forward, should you grant the need determination in the public interest? And the answer to that question is likewise yes, for the reasons I stated before. There are significant benefits to be gained by allowing us to go forward.

And as to the procedural issues, they
really go to the question of abeyance, and we can -- I feel confident that on the facts as they exist today or at any time that we can deal with accommodating discovery and testimony interests. I mean, in Scherer 4, the case went through the final order stage with a non-final, nonbinding letter of intent. And 1 will aver to you that our MOU is in fact binding on us, with the execution of the definitive PPA intended to be a memorialization of the extensive document we've already agreed to. And in that case, Florida Power \& Light filed on the day of the hearing a three-page single-spaced supplement to their nonbinding letter of intent, and the case still went forward.

Now, we filed the contract today. we are making additional terms of the contract, specifically a reopener provision, available to the parties later today as soon as we can get the copies out here, and we're willing to work with them on appropriate discovery. Naturally, as recited in our request for confidential treatment, there is information in the document that both parties consider to be extremely sensitive, competitive, confidential
information. But that's something that can be worked out in discovery.

Where we sit today, we've got six weeks till hearing. we can get there on the schedule, and that's what we're asking you to do.

MR. SASSO: Just very briefly. Thank you, Commissioner Jacobs.

On the narrow legal issue, does Duke address only the granting of a petition or not, we submit it does not address only the power to grant the petition. It addresses who gets in the door to begin with. Again, to repeat, the Court said, "only an applicant can request a determination of need under 403.519," citing Nassau. The interesting point there is, Nassau 2 dismissed a petition at the threshold. The on7y reason the applicant, the would-be applicant in Duke got as far as it did is because the commission mistakenly allowed it to do so, induced by the representation that Duke was distinguishable from Nassau.

How was Duke distinguishable from Nassau? well, according to Duke's counsel and staff in the Duke case, Duke was supposedly distinguishable from Nassau because the IPP and

Nassau wanted to meet a retail utility's specific need. In Duke, counsel for Duke argued that Nassau was distinguishable because Ark and Nassau in the Nassau case wanted to meet FP\&L's identified need. They said, "We're a merchant, so we're different." If an IPP seeks to have a need determination granted on the basis of meeting a utility's identified need, well, yes, then we agree. They can't be an applicant in their own right.
well, that's exactly what they're trying to do today in this case. And whether they're a merchant or whether they're trying to meet the need of a retail utility that they haven't quite identified yet or contracted with yet, it doesn't matter. The point is, only a load bearing utility has applicant status to initiate such a proceeding.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Last round, Mr. wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Sasso left out a real important part of the Ark/Nassau holding. Ark and Nassau -- and I was in that case. Ark and Nassau were attempting to meet FPL's need without a contract. The difference here is that

Calpine has made it very clear from June 19th through today that we would never build a plant until and unless we had a contract and demonstrated the utility-specific need requirements to you, to the Florida Public Service Commission, consistent with the Court's holding in Tampa Electric $V$. Garcia.

MR. GUYTON: I'm sorry. I've tried to restrain myself, but that's just a factual misrepresentation, not necessarily about what they're representing here. Ark did have a contract that it proposed. It presented a contract to the commission in its case. They said, "We want to provide this power pursuant to this contract to Florida Power \& Light Company." It didn't have a signed contract, but it had a form contract that it asked you to force the utility to enter into. But I don't want you to be left with the impression that there wasn't a contract on the table.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: okay. we'11 take that as a modification. Did you have anything else to add?

MR. ELIAS: Not unless the commission has specific questions.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Commissioners?
COMMISSIONER JABER: I think you could help us a lot, Bob.

How do you respond to the assertion that this is unlike Duke, number one? And then number two, help me understand how they've met their basic allegation that there's a need. you know, in conjunction with deciding a motion to dismiss, how have they met the very basic allegation of need without a contract?

MR. WILLIS: First, it's based on the allegations in the petition that they will have a retai 1 serving utility, that they wil1 demonstrate a retail specific need for the output of this facility.

I agree with something that Mr. Sasso said earlier, you know, in reference to the Duke decision, as applicable to here and to every other need determination as well. What the Court said was that the Commission was without jurisdiction to enter this order. We're not to the stage of passing on the propriety of the factual information that is presented to the Commission, nor at this point are we conceding that it is appropriate to ask, as calpine has
requested, a conditional need determination, contingent upon some subsequent showing of a utility-specific commitment.

COMMISSIONER JABER: what you're saying is, it's not a given. You almost have to go through the evidentiary hearing to even determine -MR. ELIAS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JABER: -- whether we have jurisdiction, because our jurisdiction is dependent upon the facts that are litigated.

MR. ELIAS: The matters of proof that are put before the commission in an evidentiary hearing. And that -- you know, there is no showing one way or the other on that point. What you've got are allegations. what we've got are allegations.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: what about
Mr. Sasso's argument that even if you go with that rationale, you've got to have -- before we can proceed, we've got to have a party status contracting utility?

MR. ELIAS: Again, that goes back to a factual demonstration of what's in the petition and what's brought before the commission when the matter is heard. You know, it has been
represented to us that they will provide specific information by November 1st. To the extent that we don't -- we either don't receive information on or before November 1st or believe what is provided is sufficient to afford all parties, including staff, an opportunity to fully evaluate the proof that is offered and respond to the evidence or the evidence that's offered, we'll be back to you.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So then you do agree that there's I guess a continuum that you can -there is a point at which all of these pieces have got to be together, and it's not today.

MR. ELIAS: It's not today, and --
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But it's not -- and I guess, going back to what Mr. Wright alluded to earlier, $I$ 'm not sure that it's necessarily at the point, you know, before construction. It's somewhere before that.

MR. ELIAS: I think that issue is very much open.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: okay.
MR. ELIAS: I mean, I don't -- I'm not conceding that the Commission could or should grant a conditional need determination absent a
showing of a specific utility need for the output of this facility in an evidentiary proceeding. And I just -- you know, those are issues yet to be determined.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: what do we sacrifice if we give -- how should I say this? If we give the parties an opportunity to try and put this in the best legal posture? Let me just say this. If $I$ were to believe the argument that the contracting utility, whoever it may be -maybe somebody else will show up with an MOU. But the contracting party needs to be here. what do we sacrifice if we allow that to happen?

MR. ELIAS: Well, first, $I$ think the remedy of dismissal without leave to amend is pretty harsh. That's saying that there ain't no way, no how, on God's earth that you can amend this pleading to comport with the requirements of law, and I think that's a pretty extreme step.

And as to the second question of what we sacrifice, the allegations that there will be a delay in constructing needed capacity, that there are reliability, fuel savings, and other benefits that would be foreclosed to the people of the State of Florida if this project is
delayed any length of time. You know, you can weigh those and decide what kind of chance you want to take with them.

But I think that at this point, there is enough in terms of allegations to proceed without any judgment as to whether what is ultimately proved or offered in six weeks is sufficient to grant an affirmative determination of need pursuant to the statutory criteria as interpreted by the court.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioners, this is -- it's difficult not because the decision in this docket is difficult. It's difficult because the deck that we've been dealt from a public policy standpoint seems -- it just seems counterproductive.
we need additional power in the state. No one can argue with that. The supreme court has done what it's done. The difficulty I'm having is, we've got to consider this application with the law as it exists today, and now the supreme Court has ruled twice. We may not like that decision, but it's the law that we operate under.
what is particularly difficult for me on
these two issues with the motion to dismiss is, I almost -- I think that there's something to be said about cross examining and going forward with an evidentiary hearing just to even determine whether the contract will meet the couple of requirements that Duke has given us, whether Calpine is a proper applicant, and two, whether the plant will be fully committed to Florida's retail ratepayers. And I don't have enough today to make that decision, and perhaps the point at which we go to hearing is too 1ate. I would like to think there is a middle ground.

I'm going to move staff on Issues 4 and 5 and give staff direction, which would be to deny the motions to dismiss, right, 4 and 5 ? MR. ELIAS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER JABER: But to give staff direction that at any point they feel comfortable enough recommending to the Commission that this petition should be dismissed, then I would encourage them to do that.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: we have a motion. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm beginning to
second-guess what the order of issues should have been. I'm uncomfortable with kicking it out as well. I would love to see some middle ground here. I'm not sure if the issues that are now coming up satisfy that concern for me.

But I have -- I'm not quite sure what indispensable information is missing from this, from a petition that would allow it to go forward. As you say, I don't see that there is anything that would be indispensable in at least allowing it to go forward so that we can reach the facts at some future point. So at least on the motions to dismiss, I'11 second Commissioner Jaber's motion on denying.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: on7y as to Issues 4 and 5 ?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Uh-huh.
COMMISSIONER JABER: For now, yes.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It's the only ones that are on; right?

COMMISSIONER JABER: For now. Can we come back to --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, so we have a motion and a second. I will be voting -- I will be dissenting on the vote.

And I agree 100 percent that this is a contorted position we find ourselves in. we need capacity in this state. And where we've arrived at this moment, we need to get to the heart of how to provide the most cost-effective power to citizens in this state, and we find ourselves wrangling over legal threshold issues, many of which probably will be best dealt with in the context of a need determination process, which historically we've done.

Historically we've not sat at the door and said, "Prove up every ounce of capacity this plant will produce before we let you even state your case." Historically, we've asked that as a matter of right in coming to us you demonstrate that you've sought all possible options, and you now are presenting the most cost-effective option for providing that capacity. In the past we've said, "when you do that, take consideration of conservation measures, alternatives, and everything else that could be available to you and to provide this capacity in the most cost-effective manner." This process is not doing that now, and that is the greatest discomfort I have today with where we find
ourselves. We must get beyond this very quickly.

But specifically to the issue today, I am persuaded that a contracting utility is at least a necessary party in a need determination. I won't say whether or not I would agree with the position that they should be the filing party or not. But I believe that given the context of the law as it has been interpreted for us, the contracting utility is at least a necessary party, and therefore should be involved in the petition. And $I$ believe that is a jurisdictional issue, and therefore might sustain a motion to dismiss.

Having said that, there is a motion and a second. All in favor say "aye."

COMMISSIONER JABER: Aye.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Opposed? Nay.
COMMISSIONER JABER: Now, let me take this opportunity, Chairman Jacobs, to talk to Calpine and to staff about my concerns going forward.

It is very hard for me at the moment to understand how the Duke situation with respect to the contract with the city of New Smyrna

Beach for 30 megawatts is different from the situation that you are suggesting you'11 be able to show us. In other words, I'll be looking carefully at how you define fully committed.

Staff, Chairman Jacobs brings up precisely the point. We came -- it's interesting. we have the same concern, but we've reached a different bottom line.

The concern I have over whether Calpine is a proper applicant or, for example, seminole Electric would the applicant is something that I'm going to count on you to bring up later on. And whether that's something in a brief at the hearing or some future, you know, recommendation in an agenda, 1 don't know. I encourage you, Bob, to find ways to help us reach incremental decisions so that to the degree we can save time and money by not going forward to hearing if we don't have to, that's something I would be looking for. You know, if the decisions are all legal decisions, perhaps an informal hearing or briefs or oral argument are in order. I don't know.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I don't know, given the context of the legal kind of gray no man's
land we find ourselves in, how to proceed with that. I've always felt, as I indicated previously, that the threshold issues were about identifying need, and we ought to get focused on that, and then the most cost-effective manner of meeting that need. And the court has said that means you have to have retail need. If that's what we have to do, we have to figure out a way of getting people in the door to do that.

And in terms of how we go about that and in terms of transitioning to a competitive marketplace, those issues are going to be on everybody's back burner, I guarantee you, if we don't get this one fixed pretty quick. Nobody will be concerned about competition. If you don't believe me, ask our colleagues in California. We have to figure out how to get people in the door, and we have to do it quickly.

I quite frankly think we ought to be making sure we work very closely with the Governor's study Commission, but it ought to be on an expedited -- there ought to be some very serious urgency to figuring this issue out.

MR. ELIAS: we are working with the

Governor's 2020 study Commission, and their decision last month in adopting their work plan was to consider making recommendations concerning the wholesale market in the state for the 2001 legislative session. And they're meeting again tomorrow. You know, they haven't said that, yes, we're going to make
recommendations. They're just going to gather the information and do what they can to be in a position to decide whether they can make recommendations, and if so, make recommendations come January.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And just -- as soon as I say getting people in the door, just getting people in the door is important, but our responsibilities and duties extend much further beyond that. And so while we get that problem solved, we have to be thinking about, okay, once you get folk in the door, how are we going to manage this new world? How will it operate? And without getting into all the extracurricular facts about what's going on in the rest of the world, we have to understand what it means when we take this action. what are we saying? For instance, what does it mean when we
start waiving the bidding rule for every independent power producer that we say may have a legitimate claim to build a plant? Are we saying then that that automatically makes an independent power producer the most cost-effective option? what does that mean as far as public policy? How do we make sure that what -- carrier of last resort responsibilities are adhered to?

In this instance, because the -- I think what I'm saying is that we want the contracting utility to be on board with deciding. But if we didn't say that and we're willing to let the independent power producer have the plant, who would have carrier of last resort responsibilities, and how do we convey that?

Those sorts of issues I think have to be thought through by us in advance of dealing with how the wholesale market is going to play out, and we need to understand how those issues are going to play out. I'11 guarantee you, right now people wish they had done those sorts of thoughts, had those sorts of thoughts in other places. And we need to use -- take the benefit of those experiences to heart and proceed very
carefully and cautiously ahead when we do that. MR. ELIAS: One of the more sage things that I've heard recently is that, you know, one of the problems with being a pioneer is, you tend to take the arrows. And we do benefit from the fact that we're not out there on the leading edge, that we don't have the 12 and the 14 cent a kilowatt-hour electricity that are delivered prices in some places in the Northeast and California. So we do have the benefit of being able to see what does and doesn't work in other places before we move forward on a lot of these issues.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I'm sure they felt that way at some point too.

MR. ELIAS: Well, no. I mean, you talk to some of the people in california, and they recognized the acuteness of the problems that they had before they took those quantum leaps.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Anyway, I think that's a debate for a different day.

MR. ELIAS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER JABER: But that's Issues 4 and 5, Mr. Chairman. on Issue 2, procedurally, I don't know if I
need to move staff. Let me tell you what $I$ have decided as we were discussing the other two issues, which is that --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I know folks are waiting. Can we take about five minutes and come back to finish this up?

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay.
(Short recess.)
COMMISSIONER JABER: Chairman Jacobs, what I was about to discuss was Issue 2. And staff needs to help me get to where $I$ need to be with respect to my concerns on the hearing schedule and discovery. I really do not want to hold the case in abeyance. I think what everyone really wants, and certainly to address my concern, I'm not comfortable with a November 29th hearing date anymore or the hearing schedule as we've 7aid it out.

Since we've decided not to dismiss the case, I think there's something to be said, though, about giving the parties and staff more time and opportunity for meaningful discovery and for testimony. So with your indulgence, Chairman Jacobs and Commissioner Baez, I would like to work with the Chairman's office on new
hearing dates.
But I don't know if that would take care of the motion to hold the case in abeyance, Bob, or if it's better to just deny the motion for abeyance and then issue a new order on procedure.

MR. ELIAS: Abeyance typically carries with it the notion that all activity would stop. I don't think that that's consistent with what I understand -- my understanding of what you want to do.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Right.
MR. ELIAS: Because there are things going on. There's information that's available. There's discovery that's ongoing, at least on staff's part. I think there's plenty to be done in terms of gathering the information that may be presented to the Commission at a hearing. And perhaps a continuance or a rescheduling of the hearing is more appropriate, given the concerns that you've expressed.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Chairman Jacobs, I would move to grant staff's Issue 2, recommendation on Issue 2. But if it's all right with you all, I'm going to work with the

Chairman's office on new hearing dates and issuing a new procedural order.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If that's all our understanding, $I$ would agree with that, because my concern is this. I think -- you know, part of the utilities' arguments are reasonable, in that they haven't had time to -- you know, there are discovery issues in terms of timing.

I also don't believe that a November 1st -even the deadline that you've imposed on yourself for coming up with an agreement is really a realistic one. I think I hear Commissioner Jaber --

COMMISSIONER JABER: well, let me clarify, because I don't think that date should change. I think November 1st should be the date that -because they've said to us from day one that they can accommodate November 1st.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But here's the situation that I see coming down the pike. If it is, as $I$ feel deep down inside, that it's not a realistic date at this point, then what we're going to cause is another -- you know, for staff to have to come back here, you know, making a pretty dire recommendation, and that's to
dismiss, because it's my -- it would be my impression that certainly the MOU that doesn't exist today, you know, is probably not going to -- you know, it's not --

COMMISSIONER JABER: That's a good point.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: It's not going to be enough on November 1st. So since we're talking about moving deadlines back, I think they should al1 -- you know, why don't we create a situation where everyone gets the benefit of the scaled back deadlines.

COMMISSIONER JABER: We11, no one can tel1 us I think what date calpine could have the contracts. I mean, $I$ think they're strategically in the best place.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Wright has --
COMMISSIONER JABER: We're looking at you.
MR. WRIGHT: I just wanted to make the point that both Calpine and Seminole are of the opinion and take the position that the MOU that we filed under cover of the request for confidential treatment today is a binding agreement and that the definitive PPA, power purchase agreement, contemplated therein is intended to manifest that. But we consider
ourselves bound to go forward with that agreement and bound by the terms of the mOU itself. So our position is we beat November 1st by two weeks. But we're working with you all too.

MR. ELIAS: There's other proof that needs to be put on the table.

MR. WRIGHT: True.
MR. ELIAS: There's the question of this utility's needs and this utility's cost-effectiveness and the whole panoply of criteria that relate to the retail serving utility that we need the opportunity to evaluate, and other parties need the opportunity too.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So what you're saying is that on November 1st, there's going to be a reckoning that goes beyond the sufficiency of this agreement.

MR. ELIAS: if the present schedule holds, yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And does that comport with the -- I guess it's an internal deadine that calpine has placed on itself.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner baez,
they were going to supplement testimony on November 1st.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Correct.
COMMISSIONER JABER: And part of the testimony was going to be the contract. But you raised a good point.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But there would be other information in addition, and that was going to be the basis upon which you were going to make an evaluation on --

MR. ELIAS: Evaluate the sufficiency of the information to allow the Commission to make an informed decision under the present schedule.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: okay.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Does that include an amended petition that reflects --

MR. ELIAS: I can't speak to what they would --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes, the vehicle.
MR. ELIAS: How they would --
COMMISSIONER JABER: But, you know, look. It's theirs. It is their petition, their case, their burden. I think we have been more than generous. And Schef is shaking his head.

The balance and the difficulty we're having
is because over our head is this important public policy concern of bringing additional power to the State of Florida, and we're cognizant of the needs of florida ratepayers. If calpine isn't processing or isn't giving us a petition that we can process correctly, that's Calpine's problem, not ours.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: NO, I don't disagree with you there. But I think that even beyond this overarching issue, there's another -there's a fiscally responsible issue here. I don't think -- you know, not to second-guess an initial decision that was to let this thing move on, but we've burned some time on this, and to stop it dead in its tracks means that our dime size budget is going to get impacted, certainly much more than any other party's, no offense. COMMISSIONER JABER: Right. Well, I have to --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: You know, that's a consideration that $I$ have. You know, it's outside the four corners of any petition, but -COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me make this commitment to you. I have got to get hearing dates first. And $I$ will look at the schedule,
and to the degree that testimony can be backed up, we will. And, though, the commitment we need from Calpine is that they will try their best to meet November 1st. And if not, they need to bring something to our direction, I mean, our attention that would allow us to rule on additional time.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That sounds to me -I don't think it would be beyond the realm of possibilities that we're going to see another round of discussion about the legitimacy of this once we get all the facts before us, and I think probably to round up at that point in time and come to some conclusions about that would be a good idea before we move very much forward.

Mr. Elias?
MR. ELIAS: I'm -- yeah, this one is a long ways from over. But I'm just not sure that the kinds of issues that $I$ think are going to arise are going to be independent of factual allegations and matters of proof.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But to go forward before we have some handle on it that gets us -we get into motion practice and discovery, and when we start discussing limited resources, that
goes to a much higher level and much more severe consequences before we have everything as clear as we can have it before we go off into that, don't you agree?

MR. ELIAS: Oh, yes. Yes.
COMMISSIONER JABER: Bob, Commissioner Baez made very, very good points. I think once -because we have invested a lot of time and energy and money into this case, once we nail down the hearing dates and the procedural dates, my request is that you float that order to all of the Commissioners on this panel.

MR. ELIAS: Okay.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So what's the motion again?

COMMISSIONER JABER: I would move Issue 2, and I'll work with staff and the chairman's office on a new procedural order that moves the hearing and the testimony dates and the discovery dates.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: second.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Show it moved and seconded, that staff is moved on Issue 2, with directions pursuant to our discussion today. That only leaves -- where are we now?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Three?
MR. ELIAS: Yes, Issue 3.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Issue 3.
Commissioners?
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I have one question off the bat. I mean, is this not more substantive than procedural?

MR. ELIAS: we were going to bring this recommendation to this agenda independent of the questions that were raised by the procedural matters that we were directed to bring. It's one of those issues that we felt like needed to be resolved before the hearing, and that's what Calpine asked. And as we said in the recommendation, if you're not inclined to agree that it was not applicable to Calpine, we would bring a recommendation under the waiver criteria to the next agenda.

COMMISSIONER JABER: In the event we found that the rule was applicab7e, but we should process a rule waiver, have you noticed it?

MR. ELIAS: It has been noticed. The 90 -day period required in section 125.42 has been waived.

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COMMISSIONER JABER: And this would
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actually -- if we did it as a rule waiver, this issue would be PAA, or the rule waiver resolution would be PAA; right?

MR. ELIAS: Somebody would have to have a point of entry someplace, yes, so I would agree.

COMMISSIONER JABER: So isn't there some merit to making this an issue in the hearing if it's going to be PAA anyway?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I guess an additional question is, is this issue -- is this decision now as exposed as a PAA Later? If it's not the same disclosure --

MR. ELIAS: No, because we don't think it's applicable, and that's not subject to a right to -- an opportunity to present factual evidence on the merits by somebody whose substantial interests are affected. It would be reviewable on appeal.

COMMISSIONER JABER: what you're saying is, the way you've written the rec right now, it doesn't afford parties an opportunity to respond. No one's interests are substantially affected by saying that the rule applies to Calpine. The only time you would make it PAA is if you find that the rule does not apply to

Calpine.
MR. ELIAS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER JABER: But if we the rule applies to calpine and they can petition for rule waiver, our disposition of that recommendation should be PAA.

MR. ELIAS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Say that again.
COMMISSIONER JABER: I don't think I can.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: NO. I was impressed. You're recommending that the rule doesn't apply.

MR. ELIAS: Does not apply.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And Commissioner Jaber is saying that a recommendation or a determination that the rule didn't apply would have to be PAA.

MR. ELIAS: No.
COMMISSIONER JABER: NO.
MR. ELIAS: That's procedura1.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I had Noreen nodding back there.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me start over. Let me do this again. Staff is saying the bidding rule does not apply to calpine. This recommendation, if we approve it now, final, not

PAA.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: NOt subject to review. COMMISSIONER JABER: At the appe11ate 1 eve1.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: By somebody else; right.

COMMISSIONER JABER: If we find that the rule does apply to Calpine and Calpine then petitions for a rule waiver, our resolution of the rule waiver petition would have to be PAA.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Oh, okay.
MR. ELIAS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER BAEZ: A11 right.
MR. ELIAS: And their request for relief was in the alternative. They had said that it -- they had alleged that it doesn't apply, but if we concluded that it did, they had asked for a waiver.

COMMISSIONER JABER: We11, why don't you believe the rule applies to them, Bob?

MR. ELIAS: Because the requirement is visited on investor-owned utilities.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But there's a purpose behind that, isn't there? I mean, it's an interesting distinction that mous and co-ops are
exempted from the rule.
MR. ELIAS: And I believe the distinction was perhaps argued in terms of jurisdiction when the rule was adopted, but also that there is an another governing body making resource decisions for those ratepayers.

Now, as we said in the recommendation, if the contracting utility is a utility that is subject to the bidding rule, that would be an issue in the hearing. In other words, if it was Florida Public Utilities, although I'm not sure if they're subject to the rule or not, but if it was -- say Florida Power \& Light Company contracted for the output of this plant. The question of compliance with the bid rule would certainly be an issue in the hearing.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Now, legally can we take into consideration what we already know, even though we haven't been taking it into consideration before?

COMMISSIONER JABER: This is outside the -it's not in the motion to dismiss.

MR. ELIAS: But this is -- I think in -COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, the motion to dismiss has been disposed of.

MR. ELIAS: Yes. This is apart from the motion to dismiss.

And the fact, you know, that the allegation is that the party that's going to purchase the output is seminole, if there's a reason why the Commission can't incorporate that fact into its decision on this recommendation today, $I$ don't know it.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: wait a minute, now. When we get to the point of the waiver, we're talking about the applicant; is that correct?

MR. ELIAS: We're not to the point --
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: We're talking about the --

MR. ELIAS: The rule does not apply.
And let me throw a third a7ternative, another alternative out there for you. Given the recent decision, if you don't want to deal with this today, there's less urgency than when we were going to hearing in six weeks in terms of the clarity of --

COMMISSIONER JABER: I think that's a good idea.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Sold.
COMMISSIONER JABER: I would move that we
defer ruling on Issue 3.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm debating that even. It has been moved and seconded that Issue 3 be deferred. I'm going to go along to say that $I$ don't think my rationale would change, but I'm going to go with it, since there's a majority anyway. My rationale won't change. I think the rule applies, and we'71 see what happens there.

COMMISSIONER JABER: You know, Bob, though, what would be helpful when you bring this issue back is a better understanding of the purposes behind the rule.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Your distinction about the real issue here is an important issue, that if we find ourselves with either a municipality, a municipal-owned system or a co-op as a contracting utility, that is an important issue, and I think that's a real issue that we ought to make sure we clear up. But outside of that, we' 77 go ahead and defer this issue.

COMMISSIONER JABER: The Company has responded to this issue; right? The Company has responded to the petition for a waiver of the
rule.
MR. ELIAS: Yes, they did.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Very well.
MR. ELIAS: Point of clarification. Do you want a separate recommendation on the waiver issue, on the rule issue brought to a subsequent agenda, or do you want it rolled into consideration for the issues to be decided at the hearing?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think if you don't bring it up -- something that you mentioned earlier, if you don't bring it up independently, then that may change the entire complexion of the hearing, so it would probably -- I don't know how you feel about it.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: If our determination is that the rule applies, the hearing is too late, isn't it?

MR. ELIAS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So let's do it before.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Next agenda?
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Thank you.
MR. ELIAS: And I think we have one last issue, which is Issue 6.


STATE OF FLORIDA)
COUNTY OF LEON )

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 85 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that $I$ am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or re1ative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 19th day of october, 2000.



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