BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 020119-TP - Petition for expedited IN RE:

review and cancellation of BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc.'s Key Customer promotional tariffs and for investigation of BellSouth's promotional pricing and marketing practices, by Florida Digital Network, Inc.

COPI

BEFORE: CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH BRADLEY

AGENDA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

11 ITEM NUMBER:

Tuesday, June 18, 2002 DATE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148 PLACE:

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY: MARY ALLEN NEEL

Registered Professional Reporter

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS 100 SALEM COURT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301

PUREAU OF REPORTING (850) 878-2221

RECEIVED 8-14-02

DOCUMENT NUMBER DATE

PARTICIPANTS:

MATTHEW FIEL and MIKE GALLAGHER, on behalf of Florida Digital network, Inc.

PATRICK TURNER, on behalf of BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc.

JOSEPH McGLOTHLIN, on behalf of Access

Integrated Networks.

VICKI GORDON KAUFMAN, on behalf of Florida Competitive Carriers Association.

MARGARET RING, on behalf of Network Telephone Corporation.

HAROLD MCLEAN, MICHAEL BARRETT, PATTY CHRISTENSEN, BOB CASEY, and CHERYL BULECZA-BANKS, on behalf of the Commission Staff.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

<u>ISSUE 1</u>: Should BellSouth's 2002 Key Customer tariff filing (T-020035) be canceled?

<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>: No. BellSouth's 2002 Key Customer tariff filing (T-020035) should not be canceled.

<u>ISSUE 2</u>: Should any restrictions be placed on BellSouth's marketing practices used for BellSouth's "win-back" promotions?

RECOMMENDATION: Yes. BellSouth should be prohibited from initiating any "win-back" activities to regain a customer for 30 days after the conversion to an Alternate Local Exchange Company (ALEC) is complete. The Commission should also prohibit BellSouth from including any marketing information in its final bill sent to customers who have switched providers, and prohibit BellSouth's wholesale division from sharing information with its retail division, such as informing the retail division when a customer is switching.

ISSUE 3: Should this docket be closed?

RECOMMENDATION: If no person whose substantial interests are affected protests the Commission's PAA decision within 21 days of the issuance of the order from this recommendation, the order will become final upon issuance of a consummating order.

If, however, a timely protest of the Commission's PAA order is filed, this matter should be set for hearing to address the issues in dispute. The issues set forth herein should be considered

severable, and any issue not specifically protested should be deemed stipulated in accordance with Section 120.80(13)(b), Florida Statutes. The docket should remain open pending the outcome of the hearing. Pending the resolution of the hearing process, staff believes that BellSouth should be precluded from filing any tariff that extends, mirror, or builds upon the 2002 Key Customer Tariff provisions addressed in the proceeding until the Commission resolves the matters addressed at hearing. Staff notes that pending the outcome of the hearing there would be no need to address revenues collected under the tariff since the tariff will terminate prior to the anticipated close of the protest period.

PROCEEDINGS

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CHAIRMAN JABER: That takes us to Item 11. All right. Staff, I understand there is an oral modification to Item 11.

MR. BARRETT: Commissioners, that is correct. Good morning. Our correction is on page 21. The second sentence of the second paragraph ends with the word "ILEC," I-L-E-C. The sentence should end with the word "ALEC," A-L-E-C.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Would you repeat that, please?

MR. BARRETT: Yes. Page 21, the second sentence of the second paragraph ends with the word "ILEC." The sentence should end with the word "ALEC."

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you have an introduction to make?

MR. BARRETT: Yes.

Commissioners, Item 11 is a recommendation that came about based upon a complaint filed by Florida Digital Network, Inc., FDN, against a BellSouth Telecommunications tariff. The tariff was a promotional tariff. And two principal issues came out in the FDN petition. The first

issue was the tariff itself, and the second issue was the marketing practices, and staff's recommendation essentially follows that outline. Issue 1 addresses the tariff itself. Issue 2 looks at the marketing practices.

I would also note that representatives from the parties are here, and also I believe there are intervenors here that may wish to participate.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Barrett.

This was initially started, staff, based upon FDN's petition, so it would be appropriate to let them make their presentation first.

MS. BANKS: Madam Chair, I think that would be an appropriate manner to address this.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Feil.

MR. FEIL: Thank you, Madam Chair.

My name is Matt Feil. I'm here on behalf of Florida Digital Network. With me here is Mike Gallagher, who is Florida Digital's CEO.

In the way of background, there are basically three high level issues we're dealing with in this complaint, all pertaining to BellSouth's win-back programs. One is whether or not they're anticompetitive; two, whether

they're discriminatory; and three, whether or not there's any inappropriate cross-subsidies.

As Mr. Barrett said, FDN petitioned the Commission sometime around Valentine's Day to halt a new BellSouth win-back tariff known as the 2002 Key Customer Program, and to investigate all BellSouth win-back programs and practices.

The new tariff and the features of that new tariff are summarized on pages 4 and 5 of the recommendation. Some of the key features of that you'll hear us referring to are as follows:

One is that it is available only to business customers and only to business customers in competitive wire centers know as hot wire centers.

Second is that the discounts are of up to 25% of total billed revenue, plus there is an additional discount of up to 100% of a feature known as hunting, which is a common feature purchased by business customers that have multiple lines.

The other feature that we'll be referring to of the win-back program is the termination liability. Under the pending -- excuse me.

Under the existing tariff, BellSouth structured the termination liability such that customers, if they chose to leave the program early, would have to repay BellSouth all the discounts.

Under a tariff that BellSouth filed last week, what I'll refer to as the pending tariff, they altered the termination liability somewhat, and I'll discuss that momentarily.

The points that we want to address relative to the staff recommendation are basically points that we think that the staff recommendation doesn't address adequately, or arguments that the staff overlooked, or things where we have questions about what the intent of the recommendation is, to make sure that we're clear on what the Commission's decision will cover.

The first point of discussion is that staff's focus seems to be on whether or not BellSouth is charging compensatory rates after application of the two discounts, the discount to total billed revenue and the discount to hunting, in a typical customer example. While I accept that there is a specific test stated for compensatory rates on an issue of cross-subsidies, in stark contrast, relative to

a Commission determination of anticompetitive pricing, there's no test stated in the statute whether or not they have to be compensatory or not. There's no baseline stated in the statute by which the Commission has to judge. The test is simply whether or not the pricing is anticompetitive. With this in mind, to cover some of the anticompetitive aspects of the win-back program, Mr. Gallagher would like to address the Commission, and then after he finishes speaking, there are four or five other points I wanted to cover, with your permission.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Gallagher.

MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you. Thank you for this time today.

I wanted to make basically four points to illustrate what's really happening from our perspective on the market level as far as this First of all -issue.

MR. TURNER: Madam Chair, I apologize. I wanted to just raise a concern I have.

> CHAIRMAN JABER: Identify yourself.

MR. TURNER: I'm sorry. Thank you. I'm Patrick Turner representing BellSouth

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

_

Telecommunications.

At this stage, there certainly has been discovery conducted. But I'm concerned that what this amounts to now is testimony that cannot be cross-examined regarding a petition there's before the Commission, and I would object to Mr. Gallagher's speaking. I think to the extent there is a record before the Commission, it is certainly fair game to talk about that record. But at this point, in effect, I'm faced with a person, who frankly has been a witness for FDN in several proceedings, giving testimony that I can't cross-examine on, and I think that's inappropriate.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Feil, your response?

MR. FEIL: Commissioner, this is a PAA

proceeding. Interested persons may participate.

The public may participate. To me, Mr. Turner's argument really has no validity.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Mr. Turner, it's longstanding practice at the Commission that agenda items that are noticed as parties may participate are fair game. With respect to your proceedings, your cross-examination opportunities exists there.

_

MR. GALLAGHER: And I'm going to speak specifically to the staff recommendation as well, so I --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Mr. Gallagher.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you.

Again, the staff recommendation implies this is a promotion. To me, a promotion is something with a sunset. This tariff has been effectively renewed as of the end of this month. So it went on for six months, and it's going to go on for another six months. So from our perspective, this isn't a promotion. This is a perpetual predatory pricing vehicle.

Second of all, the Key Customer discount as is talked about in the staff recommendation currently says 25% off the retail rates of your business, you can get 25% off the retail rack rate, if you will, plus free hunting. And this sort of sounds benign, but the point I want to make is, our typical small business customer is a three- or four-line customer. A typical business with four lines will have three lines with their main number published on them, and they will buy this feature called hunting.

Hunting allows -- when the first line is

busy, the call rolls to the second line, or third, et cetera. The fourth line is typically kept separate for a modem or a fax line. But almost all of our customers buy hunting, and hunting is the most expensive feature out there. It's a \$10 feature.

So if you take a look at a \$36 rack rate for what is BellSouth's, give or take a dollar in a rate zone, a \$36 rate plus a \$10 hunting charge, if you take the \$36 and discount by 25%, you get \$27, and then you take the hunting and discount from \$10 down to zero, you have effectively a \$46 comparison to a \$27 comparable line. So it's not a 25% discount. I calculate that to be a 41 percent discount. So taken at its face value, the staff recommendation does talk about the 100 percent hunting discount. But what's really happening in the market, from a customer standpoint, it looks to them like a 41% discount, and that's what we have to compete with.

With high UNE rates in Florida and now a 41% discount coming down on us, we feel a big squeeze now. We're starting to feel a squeeze in between, and we believe this has just gone

too far in terms of pricing.

To me, they shouldn't be able to raise their prices 4%, whatever they just did, you know, 34 -- the \$36 charge was \$34 at the beginning of the year, but it just raised up. So if you're not subject to competition, you get a price increase. That's just --

CHAIRMAN JABER: What charge was just --

MR. GALLAGHER: The basic line rate bumped up by about 4% at the beginning of the year, and certain features went up as well. That happened last year as well. It has happened every year since FDN has been in business. That basic line rate has crept up.

The third point that I wanted to make is that the staff recommendation seems to imply that this discount is available to everyone. I would hold out that it is not available to everyone. It is specifically targeted at customers who have switched over to a CLEC, and it's not marketed. It may be available to everyone, but you really have to know how to get it. You have to call a certain number, and you have to really be in a competitive situation.

Remember, the ILEC has an inherent

advantage, in that they know who has left their service. The wholesale side can say, "Here's all the folks that have disconnected, retail guys. Why don't you give these guys a call and offer them the Key Customer discount." So that's an advantage that we'll never have.

The fourth point that I wanted to make is that I believe that there's a precedent for this Commission to regulate a nascent communications industry such as local. In the early days of long distance competition when MCI was just getting started and AT&T would attempt some sort of — the then dominant carrier would attempt some sort of predatory pricing, the FCC would stand behind and make sure that there was a fair playing field and that the dominant carrier had to price on tariff up until a point when it became nondominant.

As soon as there's enough market that has been gained by the competitors, then this debate is irrelevant, because the market power will have shifted. But right now we have a dominant provider with 80 plus percent market share selectively targeting lower prices, while raising prices for everyone else, and that is a

recipe for disaster for our industry.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Feil.

MR. FEIL: Thank you, Madam Chair. A few other quick points I wanted to make.

First, relative to timing, similar to what Mr. Gallagher said, these are not promotions of temporary duration. There is an enrollment period of six months for the last two tariff filings that BellSouth has made, but there has been a sequence of such tariff filings where those periods keep rolling over and rolling over.

Moreover, once a customer signs up, it signs up for a term commitment under those programs, one years, two years, three years. So if the pending tariff goes into effect and customers sign up three-year commitments, you're talking about customers tied up for four years down the road.

The second point concerns resale.

BellSouth has argued that one of the things that saves the win-back programs from being anticompetitive is that the pricing is available for resale to ALECs. I have two points to make

with regard to that.

One is the accuracy of the statement. When a customer signs up for a win-back deal with BellSouth, can the customer go to an ALEC reseller, who in turn resells the win-back promotion to the customer without termination liability issues? In other words, is the resale opportunity only available to customers not already enrolled in the program? If that is not the case, then I question whether or not it's accurate to say that ALECs have an equal opportunity to resell the promotional programs. Although BellSouth has said and staff acknowledges that the programs are available for resale, the details of that opportunity have not been provided yet.

The second point relative to resale is policy. The Commission has to ask itself a question. Does it want Florida to be a reseller state? Because of the high percentage of these discounts and the enduring nature of the discounts, do you want to drive facility-based carriers to a reseller environment just in order to compete and have them abandon their infrastructure just so they can compete on a

reseller basis?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

FDN submits that you should not be encouraging resale in that manner, you should be encouraging facility-based competition. And I think one of the things you're going to be seeing and have seen as recently as the agenda item before this, Item 10, is Allegiance abandoning its resale customers. That's what that item was -- was it Adelphia? Excuse me. I said Allegiance. I stand corrected. Adelphia abandoning its resale customer base and turning that over to BellSouth. They did the same thing in the Sprint footprint. The resale customers they abandoned. Intermedia just did the same thing, sent out a notice to its resale customers, we're not going to provide you service anymore.

And the next point concerns discrimination.

I made two arguments in the petition relative to discrimination. One is whether or not the win-back programs were discriminatory in principle because they were available only to business customers served by certain wire centers. In other words, the price was not available to all customers in the business

class.

A second argument which Mr. Gallagher referred to is whether or not it was discriminatory in practice because, although it's ostensibly available to a certain defined group of customers, whether or not it was marketed and made available to those customers in the same manner.

The staff recommendation doesn't seem to me to address the first argument regarding discriminatory in principle other than on page 7 where it refers to a statutory cite. But what has confused me about this is, the statutory cite on page 7 refers to specific geographic market targeting for nonbasic services. The win-back discounts apply to basic and nonbasic services, not just to nonbasic services.

And the other argument relative to discrimination that you should be aware of is that the discriminatory character of the program is part of what makes it anticompetitive.

Termination liability. As I mentioned, under the current tariff, the customers who left the BellSouth program before the expiration of the term had to repay all the discounts that

they had received up to the point in time that they left the program. So it was, in effect, a back end loaded penalty if the customer left, because the more time they spent on the program, the greater their termination liability.

Under the pending tariff, the tariff filed just last week, the termination liability is just the opposite. It's now front end loaded, such that customers will pay a higher termination liability charge for the shorter duration that they are on the program. -- as I understand the tariff, the customers are responsible for paying for between \$25 and \$40 a month times the number of months left on their So if a customer's typical bill is, contract. say, \$100 a month, and he signed a three-year agreement, if he wants to leave after one year and he has to pay 24 months left on the contract times \$25 for \$600, to me, that's just punitive and is designed for no purpose other than to impede migration and to impede competition.

Relative to Issue 2, one comment I wanted to make concerning the staff recommendation pertains to retail information. One of the items mentioned in the petition pertained to the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

question of whether or not it's appropriate for an ILEC to have contact with a customer and then use that customer initiated -- excuse me. Use that contact initiated by the customer for the sole purpose of setting up a migration as a win-back retention opportunity.

For example, a customer wants to port to FDN, and he has, according to his customer service record with BellSouth, some sort of pending service order. BellSouth will delay the migration when we submit the order until that pending order against his retail account is clarified. So if the customers calls to have that pending order removed or to find out what it is, or calls BellSouth to have a local service freeze lifted, for example, the issue is whether or not that contact is an adequate -excuse me, an appropriate opportunity for a win-back contact. The staff recommendation doesn't address those scenarios specifically. It was referenced in the petition, so I would like clarification on that point.

In conclusion, aside from the questions and clarifications that we have raised, since the tariff that initiated the filing is set to

24

25

1

2

1 expire I believe next week, it's not necessarily 2 practical for you to suspend it at this time. 3 But since BellSouth has renewed -- or has filed 4 a tariff to renew that program, essentially. 5 with terms and conditions similar in almost all 6 respects, other than termination liability, with 7 the tariff it filed last week, we would ask that 8 you at least suspend that tariff. In a prior case which FDN referred to in its petition involving Arrow Telecommunications

MR. TURNER: Excuse me. Madam Chairman, I hate to interrupt again, but this new tariff is absolutely not before the Commission in any way, shape, or form. It's not mentioned in the petition. It's not mentioned in anything that was sent out regarding the agenda session. I --

CHAIRMAN JABER: It's mentioned in Issue 3, Mr. Turner. The --

MR. FEIL: It's addressed in --

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- possibility of a new tariff is mentioned in Issue 3.

MR. TURNER: I believe, Madam Chairman, to the extent that he is simply going to argue in

24

support of Issue 3, I don't disagree. To the extent that he is trying to argue the merits of a tariff that is not before the Commission, I do disagree.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Feil.

MR. FEIL: It is mentioned in the staff recommendation. The petition asked the Commission to investigate BellSouth's win-back practices and promotions.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'll allow it.

Mr. Turner, I would note this. At agenda conferences, we get through the presentation, and I'm going to afford you every opportunity to respond. Let's get through it.

Mr. Fiel, you need to finish up.

MR. FEIL: This is my last point. In a prior case involving Arrow Telecom, the Commission voted to suspend a tariff where BellSouth offered a 16-1/2% discount with an enrollment period of three months for customers signing contracts for 18 months.

Now, no order was issued from that proceeding. I acknowledge that. But the reason no order was issued is because BellSouth withdrew the tariff. And I would submit to you

that the win-back programs that BellSouth has offered over the last year are significantly more anticompetitive than the one in the Arrow Telecom case.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. -- do you have a question of Mr. Feil?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. As it relates to the issue of anticompetitive, would it be anticompetitive if the ALECs did what you're saying that BellSouth is also doing? It would seem to me that in a free market that ALECs as well as CLECs should have equal ability to advertise with the intent of informing customers as to what the nature of the product is and why a customer should choose one company over another for a service that's being offered. I'm just --

MR. FEIL: While ostensibly --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: What's the other side of this argument?

MR. FEIL: While in theory -- I can't anticipate what Mr. Turner is going to say, but I will say this. While in theory competitors may be on equal footing, in practice that is

absolutely not the case. BellSouth is the dominant market provider. By ALEC estimates provided in the 271 proceeding, as I recall, BellSouth has 95% market share. And if anything, that's -- I don't see how that could have gotten any better in light of some of the items that you've seen before you relative to ALECs having to file bankruptcy or abandon market share. So we're not in actuality on equal footing.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Follow-up. But my concern is that we have well-informed customers who are informed to the extent that they can choose between -- choose the best product that's available for their dollar. And I would be very concerned if the ratepayers or the customers didn't have adequate information in order to make a good decision between two competing entities. That's my concern as it relates to your statement of anticompetitiveness.

I acknowledge that BellSouth does have a large share of the market. But I think that customers need to have the opportunity to be presented with the information to choose between competing entities, and I'm just trying to

figure out how providing information is anticompetitive.

MR. GALLAGHER: At Florida Digital, we have enough sales budget to either advertise or sell via a direct sales force. We choose to spend it on a direct sales force. So we have people who make telephone solicitations and knock on doors to advise customers of what our products are. So we — that's the way we get the word out.

Bellsouth, I would position, is only offering these products in a predatory manner, and that should they be able to price us out of business, that ultimately we'll see higher prices for the consumers and businesses in the State of Florida. Why not lower their prices all the way across the board? I understand that you all are in a political position of where lower rates are better. And what I'm saying is, these are temporary lower rates. These won't last if competition doesn't last.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think Commissioner
Bradley's question goes more toward how do you
reconcile the anticompetitive behavior argument
with a company, in this case, BellSouth's desire
to get information out on the win-back program,

sort of communicating on a product offering and a discount program, if that results in anticompetitive behavior.

Right. I would say until MR. GALLAGHER: the market is mature enough and until the competitors have some sort of market share that's significant, that BellSouth's pricing option should be available to everyone. In other words, lower the \$36 rate by 5% for everybody. That's effectively making it harder for FDN to compete, because a Bell customer just got a price discount. "I'm sorry, I'm not going I just got a discount." to switch right now. Instead of the target, let's just -- you know, if they really want to lower prices, lower them for everybody.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair, I guess what I'm struggling with is this. I mean, customers are naturally going to gravitate to the company that provides the highest quality service at the fairest amount in terms of the dollar that's being charged for the service.

And I'm just trying to figure out how customers are going to be able to make well-informed decisions if we prohibit their ability to

1

2

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

interface with information.

Having been a businessman, I recognize that -- you know, I had to spend a large amount of my budget on advertising to inform customers as to what my product is and why they should choose me rather than my competitors. And that's what I'm struggling with.

Right. That's a very good MR. GALLAGHER: question, and I don't know what the answer is to that specific question. I just don't see how, until a -- when you still have a dominant provider, there is a leveraging effect that's happening here. While the folks that aren't subject to competition are getting a price raise, while the people that are subject to competition are getting a decrease, I don't know how that -- other than just an across-the-board discount, I don't know how you would spell that out.

> COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's keep moving Mr. McGlothlin, had a you presentation? on.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: A short one. My name is Joe McGlothlin. I'm here on behalf of Access Integrated Networks, an intervenor in this case. very thorough comments made by FDN, and hopefully at the same time not belabor them, and

Commissioners, my basic appeal to you today is, when you consider the issues presented by the complaint in this case. look at the totality of circumstances. It is possible to look only at the question does the general rate increase exceed the parameters of the statute and come away with a conclusion that says, "well, this seems to fit, and so there's nothing wrong there." It's possible to look only at the question is the geographical approach to the application of a discount permitted by the statute and parse the statute and say, "Well, yes, it says that a limited geographical offering is contemplated by the statute, and there's nothing wrong there."

But the same statute on which the staff relies in support of its recommendation that the limited offering is not violative of the statute also says that the company shall not engage in anticompetitive behavior. So that statute, I argue, recognizes that you can have a limited

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

offering that is yet anticompetitive in its nature.

And by the totality of the circumstances, this is what I mean. As FDN pointed out, and as the staff recommendation acknowledges, we're now looking at the third in a series of ongoing discount programs that have been marketed to those wire centers which BellSouth acknowledges are selected on the basis of a perceived possible competitive presence.

So when you consider the nature of the discount which, based upon long-run incremental cost, undercuts anything that the new entrants can possibly hope to match in terms of their incremental cost, which is basically the UNE rate, when you consider that it's targeted at only those wire centers where competition is perceived to be a possibility, and when you recognize that these discounts for practical purposes are in place on a permanent basis, on a rolling, continuing basis as long as that competitive possibility is perceived to exist, what you have is anticompetitive conduct. What you have is a price that is predatory in nature, being applied to not compete, but to prohibit

⊿

competition. It's designed to keep competitors from ever getting a toe-hold.

And in terms of whether that's good for the ratepayers, Commissioner Bradley, consider that the only place where these deep discounts are applied are where competition is perceived to be a possibility, and the other customers are paying a general rate increase. You can be assured that if BellSouth is successful in stamping out the possibility of competition in these localized areas, prices won't stay there. They'll go up, and that is bad for ratepayers.

So again, I think it's important to look at the forest and not the individual trees in perceiving what is going on with respect to this discount.

I think it's worth emphasizing that while the tariffs, the promotions are measured in several months' duration, they are actually, in effect, sign-up opportunities for contracts that last 18 months to 36 months. So that also emphasizes the semipermanent nature of these discounts as BellSouth's response to the potential for competition.

For that reason, as you consider taking

action to monitor and regulate the types of promotions that Bellsouth and other ILECs may engage in, we suggest that one answer to this would be to, first of all, limit the duration of any such promotion, and also build in a feature that says once a promotion has ended, the subject of that promotion cannot be the subject of a replacement promotion for some reasonable period of time, perhaps a year, so that competition has a chance to get a toe-hold and to show the customer base what competition can accomplish for them without being faced with the predatory ongoing discount program.

I would like to spend a moment to discuss the fact that we're talking about a discount program and a tariff when the horse is largely out of the barn. And I think when you read the staff recommendation, that the recommendation tells a story. Staff discusses how the staff engaged in discovery, received responses from BellSouth, and then attempted to analyze whether the discounts would serve to keep a typical customer configuration from violating the pricing floor.

I think you find yourselves in the somewhat

awkward position of ruling on a matter that's almost over because of two factors.

First, the discount is applied not to individual services, but to total monthly revenues. And I think that's the aspect of the program that obscures whether individual customers would be paying a compensatory price or not. I suggest that it would be more reasonable and more appropriate for any such discount to be required to be applied to individual services and not to the total monthly revenues. And those services would include the hunting feature that Mr. Gallagher identified. That would have to be part of the overall analysis in terms of the cost of that.

secondly, I think it would be important on an ongoing basis in the future to adopt a program that requires BellSouth or other ILECs in this situation to accompany the tariff with up-front documentation that will allow the staff or interested parties to assess and detect violations at the front end rather than when the program is about to expire. I think that would be an improvement in the process that might prevent the Commissioners and affected parties

from finding ourselves in this position again.

Mr. Gallagher mentioned that the contracts are designed to make it difficult for customers who sign such contracts to exit them. And whether that happens as a function of being required to pay accrued discounts, which makes it difficult to leave later in the contract, or whether it's a function of a customer being required the pay for unused services, which makes it difficult to leave early on --

(Construction noise.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Turner, I know that's you.

MR. TURNER: I sure hope it's not.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: That difficulty -- can you hear me over that? I'll go on.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We can. I can. Yes, go ahead.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: That difficulty makes it

-- imposes a hardship on customers who may find
themselves unable, for instance, to take
advantage of a technological development, or
basically to take advantage of a better deal
made possible by competition at some point in
the contract. So we would recommend that the

3

4

כ

6

7 8

9

,

10

11

1213

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Commission consider in the overall program of parameters governing discounts the requirement of some ability on the part of the customer to exit a contract within, say, 90 days or so in protection of the customer's ability to respond either to the market or to technology.

And finally, we commend the staff's suggestion that BellSouth be prohibited from contacting a departing customer for some period of time after the ALEC has won the customer. The staff's emphasis is on preventing a situation in which a customer can find himself or herself receiving two bills instead of one, and we think that's a laudable objective. because of the nature of the billing process in which the companies bill not only back in time for usage, but also in advance on a forward-looking basis, when you trace it through, we suspect that 30 days is not sufficient to prohibit or to prevent that from happening. And so we think the Commission should look at the possibility of two billing cycles or 60 days to protect the customer from that happening.

Those are our comments. Again, we think

1 that this is an important subject and hope that the Commission considers very carefully the 2 3 possibility of an overall investigation of promotional practices and the requirements that should accompany them.

> CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

Mr. Turner. Oh, there's another ALEC? Ms. Kaufman.

MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Chairman Jaber. Vicki Gordon Kaufman. I'm here on behalf of the Florida Competitive Carriers Association this morning. And I'm not going to repeat what Mr. Feil and Mr. McGlothlin have told you. concur in those remarks.

We were very involved in the Arrow case that Mr. Feil mentioned earlier, and we agree that that's ample precedent for you to take action here this morning.

Win-back campaigns have been an area of great concern to the FCCA and I know to the Commission as well, because they have an impact, a tremendous impact on the ability of competitors to, as I think Mr. McGlothlin said, get a toe-hold in the market such as the one that's at issue here. And I think you've

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

already heard about the sequencing or the
rolling over of these promotional programs. And
we urge you, as the speakers have before me, to

take a very hard look at these programs.

We commend your staff for the recommendations that they have made to you in Issue 2. We think you should adopt those. However, we think you should go farther and adopt the recommendations that Mr. McGlothlin discussed with you, including the specific discounting that he discussed and the extension of the period of no contact between the retail and wholesale side and some of the other items that both the speakers have mentioned.

I think as Mr. Feil said to you, we are certainly not seeing an increase in competition in the local market. We are seeing a very rapid decline. And the FCCA thinks that it's critical that this Commission take action in this area if we're ever going to get to a competitive local market in Florida.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry. The FCC said that this Commission should do something?

MS. KAUFMAN: No, I'm sorry if I misspoke.
I said the FCCA believes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Oh, I'm sorry.

MS. KAUFMAN: I wasn't trying to speak for the FCC, certainly not.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead.

MS. RING: I'm Margaret Ring with Network
Telephone Corporation, and I'm here today to
support FDN's petition also. I have just a few
brief comments to make.

On the issue of noncompensatory costs, we do believe that the Commission and the staff should look at individual customers and individual products rather than just what Bell represents as a typical customer.

We believe also that BellSouth has an issue with control of the program. In the recommendation, mention is made that BellSouth has signed up a small number of ineligible customers for the Key Customer Program. It appears to us that this does happen, and even that BellSouth has trouble representing the program as it exists in their advertising and in their information to customers, as Commissioner

Bradley pointed out. In BellSouth's response to the FDN filing, BellSouth represented, and I quote, "A single 1FB line would not satisfy the program's minimum billing requirement of \$75."

However, I have an ad here that was given to a Pensacola customer, multiline customer, and it quotes the single line discounted price. And if a single line customer is not eligible, then the single line rate should not be what is represented to the customer.

We do believe that BellSouth does target
ALEC customers. I don't think that there's a
lot of question about that. Although BellSouth
does say it's available to everyone, this
particular ad represents the entire way down the
page, "Come back to BellSouth." So it's
definitely targeted at ALEC customers.

BellSouth also appears to target potential ALEC customers, in that we do repeatedly see when a CSR is pulled so we can quote a customer rates, BellSouth will then approach that customer with the Key Customer Program.

BellSouth does deny that it targets customers off CSR information when an ALEC pulls the CSR, but we do see that.

In fact, I had a report last week. We had 1 pulled a CSR to make a quote to a customer. 2 BellSouth then came to the customer two days 3 later with the Key Customer Program offering. 4 The customer said he had not seen a BellSouth 5 representative for four years prior to that 6 7 date. So we have a hard time believing that it's simple coincidence. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: When is it the customer 9 gets this advertisement? Is it in their last 10 bill from BellSouth, or is it a, you know, 11 12 free-standing mail item they receive? MS. RING: That was, I believe, given to a 13 customer directly by a BellSouth salesperson, 14 but BellSouth would have to answer that. 15 don't know for certain how they market it. 16 17 MR. TURNER: Madam Chair, just so --CHAIRMAN JABER: I will ask you, 18 19 Mr. Turner, once --MR. TURNER: Thank you. I didn't want to 20 21 forget. 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: You're going to get so much time to respond. Just hang tight. 23 I think that the new tariff as 24 MS. RING:

it is filed is designed to -- with the change in

the termination liability is designed to even further hinder competitive entry into the marketplace. If BellSouth can put us off a year or two years by changing the termination penalties from any attempt to gain that customer, then there's every chance that more and more of the competitors will go out business in the meantime.

We also see the Key Customer Program often coupled with other incentives that we have difficulty feeling are fair and equitable in a competitive atmosphere. BellSouth will go in to a customer with a Key Customer proposal and couple it with an offer of discounted yellow pages, free paging, discounted ADSL service. It's very difficult, and it does seem to be predatory to us.

We do appreciate staff's recommendation in Issue 2 with regard to the 30-day win-back. We would support Mr. McGlothlin's contention that that should be extended to at least 60 days.

Network Telephone does offer our customers a satisfaction guarantee when they sign up with us, and we also have had reports of BellSouth approaching customers during that period and

saying, "Well, if you would like to go with the Key Customer Program now, even though you've signed up with Network Telephone, just tell them you're dissatisfied." So a 60-day win-back window would be a good thing for Network Telephone and for the industry.

CHAIRMAN JABER: When you sign on a customer to Network Telephone, is there an agreement on behalf of the customer that they stay with your company for a set period of time?

MS. RING: It depends on what service they get with us. We do offer stand-alone service that requires no contract. If they get our bundle which includes long distance and DSL service, then there is a term agreement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And how does that customer get out of the term agreement? Do they have to show you that they're dissatisfied?

MS. RING: We will accept the customer's word that they're dissatisfied with the service. We don't require a history -- I mean, we would prefer, of course, the customer to show a history of poor service or poor billing. But as a new entrant in the marketplace, we don't like to put a lot of terms and conditions. We

want to be able to sell the customer, "You will be happy with us, and if you're not, you can leave."

CHAIRMAN JABER: And I will ask BellSouth this, but is it your understanding that a BellSouth customer who signed a term agreement can get out of the BellSouth contract by indicating their dissatisfaction?

MS. RING: I don't believe that's the case.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner

Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes, a question.

And I'm just really concerned about this whole issue of anticompetitiveness, because I am a person who thoroughly believes in the free market concept, and I wouldn't want the Commission to promulgate a rule or make a ruling that would be anticompetitive.

Don't ALECs -- would you also be in favor of ALECs not being able to contact the customer within 30 days if they switch over to BellSouth and you want to win them back?

MS. RING: I think that BellSouth's in a different position in the marketplace, and I think that they have more opportunity to

1 participate and win back than the ALECs do. Т 2 think certainly an argument can be made for 3 equal treatment, and on some fronts, that seems 4 reasonable, but I think in reality it is not, 5 because BellSouth really -- you know, they're 6 the 800-pound gorilla. They're the ones that 7 are holding all the cards. And I think any 8 win-back rules, if the Commission goes with rulemaking, should apply to the incumbent, at 9 10 least until we have a more level playing field. 11 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: At what point will 12 we have a more level playing field? 13 MS. RING: When BellSouth no longer has a dominant market share, if BellSouth no longer 14 15 has a dominant market share.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And these customers that we're talking about, are these residential customers or business customers?

MS. RING: That we're talking about as far as Key Customer?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Uh-huh.

MS. RING: The customer is business.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Were you done with your presentation?

MS. RING: Yes. Thank you.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Mr. Turner, I don't 1 2 see any other ALECs standing up, so you're on. 3 MR. TURNER: Thank you, Madam Chair. I've got a lot of arrows to pull out and try to throw 4 back now, so I appreciate the time. 5 What I would like to do is tell you briefly 6 7 how I plan to do this. The first thing is, 8 BellSouth does have two issues with the staff recommendation as it's written, and what I would 9 like to do first is tell you what those are and 10 explain that. Once I do that, I have a lot of 11 12 ground to plow as quickly as I can. But this is a very critical issue to BellSouth and to 13 consumers in Florida, because what you're being 14 asked to do today is say, in effect, "No 15 more." 16 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Turner. 18 MR. TURNER: Yes, ma'am. CHAIRMAN JABER: I know you've been waiting 19 to talk, but we're going to take a 10-minute 20 21 break, and then we won't interrupt you until 22 you're done. MR. TURNER: No problem. Thank you. 23 24 (Short recess.) 25 CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Turner.

2

3

4

2

6

/

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. TURNER: Thank you, Madam Chair.

As I mentioned, I'm going to first speak about our concerns with the order and then -the proposed recommendation. And then I am going to do my best to address every issue broadly that was raised by the petitioners. And as I was mentioning earlier, the reason I'm going to do that is, this is very important to BellSouth and to customers in Florida. You're being asked to say BellSouth can no longer, in effect, roll out promotions until some unspecified type of proceeding is held or some ruling is made. And throughout the course of my comments, I'll try to explain why that is not the appropriate course to take, especially in this proceeding.

But one thing I need to do before I get started is just to harken back. During the last 40 minutes, several questions were asked from the Commissioners about what are the overall implications of what you're asking us to do, how does this affect the ALEC community, how does it affect consumers? Those are exactly the kind of questions that need to be asked and answered if you're going to embark on the type of course

5

you're being asked to embark on, and that's why it's critical to make this point.

This is not a rulemaking proceeding. This originated as a petition by a single party in which three other parties, four other parties have intervened. If you are inclined to address any of these broad issues that the petitioners have asked you to address, BellSouth suggests that the place and the time to do that is in a generic ratemaking type -- I'm sorry, rulemaking type proceeding where you can consider all the implications that would be involved on the ALECs, on CLECs, on ILECs, on customers, and on everybody.

Having said that, let me first tell you BellSouth's concerns with the proposed recommendation, and there are two. One is procedural, and one is substantive.

Procedurally, we object to the position staff has taken on Issue 3, which states that if a protest of the PAA is filed, BellSouth should be precluded from filing any tariff that extends, mirrors, or builds upon the 2002 Key Customer Tariff provisions until the Commission resolves the matters addressed at that hearing.

I have three points to make about that.

First, the record doesn't support that.

BellSouth is operating under a rule of presumptive validity these days. What they are asking you to do or suggesting that you do is inflict a rule of conclusive invalidity on any tariff that we file that arguably is similar to the one that's out there now. They're asking you to predetermine that any such promotion that you haven't even seen yet is invalid. We believe that that's not the appropriate course to take as a matter of policy, and it violates the Florida Statutes, the 15-day notice.

Moreover, there's no reason to do that.

This is not a proceeding that is taking place in a vacuum. The staff has filed discovery requests on FDN. The staff has filed either three or four sets of discovery requests on BellSouth, and we've answered them. And there has been a lot of material put into the record, and after carefully reviewing that record, the staff has quite properly stated in its recommendation that there's no violation of any existing rule or any existing law that has been shown throughout that extensive course of

discovery. Given that recommendation, there's absolutely nothing in the record before you to support what they've asked you to do, which is conclusively rule in advance that any such promotion in the future, although this one didn't violate any statutes, would be invalid.

The second reason we object to that is that it imposes a Hobson's choice on BellSouth. You're going to hear in a second that we do have one problem with the proposed recommendation. Well, if you vote staff on Issue 3, we have a Hobson's choice of either protesting one portion of that PAA so that we can get our view on the record and in a full record proceeding have you rule on it. We have to choose between that or else saying, "You know, we're just hog-tied. We cannot put out any promotions that are similar to this one that we're using in order to compete with the competitive offerings that we're facing every day from the ALECS."

The third reason we oppose it is because it gives the petitioners the sole power to hobble BellSouth's efforts to compete with them. What petitioner at this table -- if Issue 3 is voted, what petitioner at this table will not file a

challenge? There's no reason not to. If you do, you effectively hobble BellSouth's ability to compete with you for as long as you can make this proceeding last, and that's just not appropriate.

And let's not forget that it's the consumers who would suffer. The staff has found that these proceedings -- that this promotion that they have looked at extensively complies with Florida law. It does give business customers who are more than capable of making their own business decisions an additional competitive choice in response to the competitive offerings made available by numerous CLECs throughout the areas of Florida that they've chosen to compete in.

The second problem we have with the proposed recommendation is the 30-day waiting period. Our concerns there are, again, there's no record basis for it. BellSouth has already implemented voluntary efforts that will address the concerns. And if the concerns that the staff has raised in support of that recommendation are valid, they apply equally to ALECs and ILECs, so again, it should be done in

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the form of a rulemaking that applies across the board.

First, there's no record that there's a need for it. In the FDN arbitration proceeding, FDN said that at that time it had 60,000 customers in the State of Florida. A few months later in the UNE Phase 2 proceedings, FDN testified they have 80,000 customers in the State of Florida. During the same time period that all these anticompetitive and predatory and, dare I say it, evil programs were in effect, FDN has gained 20,000 customers in the State of Florida. Discovery submitted in this proceeding by FDN indicates that in January and February of this year, that one-month time period when our promotion, the 2002 promotion before you today first went into effect, during that time period, FDN gained eight times the number of customers that it lost during that time period. So this notion that the 2002 Key Customer promotion dooms them to failure is absolutely refuted by the record that's before you today.

The second point is, BellSouth in discovery stated that it takes typically three to seven

weeks for to us get the list together that we use and make a win-back effort, and that is still true today. Nothing has changed. It still takes about that much time. What has changed is that since we made that statement, we have voluntarily in the State of Florida imposed on ourselves a 10-day wait period.

Now, for the small business market, it takes that much time to get these lists together. Now, a BBS customer, a large business customer that has an account executive assigned to a given customer, they know the day that customer leaves that they left, and it's not because of wholesale information. It's because of a retail relationship. But even in those situations, BellSouth has voluntarily imposed a 10-day wait period on itself.

That 10-day wait period is equal to what the South Carolina Commission imposed after a hearing. It's three days longer than what North Carolina, Louisiana, and -- I'm missing one -- Georgia had imposed. And aside from one order cited in the staff's petition, it's longer than any other period that they have cited any other state commission imposes. There is one that's

30 days. And certainly the 60 days that you've been asked to consider, I don't know of any order anywhere that imposes that kind of a restriction, and I certainly don't think it is warranted from the record before you now.

And finally, on this point, the staff -one of the main staff concerns for the 30-day
period is, they're saying, "Get one billing
cycle in, because if someone wins that customer
during the first billing cycle, you'll have some
billing problems. You need to let them get a
full billing cycle in."

Now, to the extent that that is a valid concern, doesn't it apply when FDN wins a customer from Access Integrated? Doesn't it apply when FDN has won a customer from BellSouth and then three days later, Access Integrated knocks on the door and says, "I've got a better deal for you. Come to me"? So if there is a concern there, it's a global concern that needs to be addressed globally and not in the context of an imposition on one company on the basis of this petition.

And finally, I would like you to keep in mind one thing. The staff does cite to

364.01(4)(g), which says that the Commission shall exercise its exclusive -- I'm sorry. The staff cites to (d) in support of that rule. If you go down three subsections in the same statute to subsection (g), it says that the Commission shall exercise its exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that all providers of telecommunications are treated fairly by, among other things, eliminating unnecessary regulatory constraint.

Additionally, in 364.377(5), talking about the Commission's authority to regulate ALECs, it says the Commission shall have continuing regulatory oversight over the provision of basic local exchange telecommunications provided by certificated ALECs, among other things, for the purposes of ensuring the fair treatment of all telecommunications providers in the telecommunications marketplace.

Fair treatment in this case means looking at the entire realm of it, determining is there really a reason in this instance to treat BellSouth different than the ALECs, and making that decision in a rulemaking proceeding and not here.

2

3

--

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I would like to now move to the presentations of the petitioners and try to address those issues. I wish I had had time to organize this better, but please bear with me.

I'm just going to hit them as I come to them based on my notes.

we've heard the term "predatory pricing" thrown about many times during the proceedings today. That term has a definition. proceeding after proceeding before state commission after state commission, ILECs and ALECs alike have put forth economists who have testified that the way that you prevent predatory pricing is to make sure that the prices exceed LRIC, long-run incremental cost. If you want to take it a next step and be sure that you do not have cross-subsidization going on, you do what the Florida Legislature has done in the statutes already. You impose a TSLRIC, total service long-run incremental cost standard. And if you exceed TSLRIC, you necessarily exceed LRIC, which is the predatory pricing.

BellSouth in response to discovery by the staff has given exhaustive evidence to show that

we exceed TSLRIC. That cannot be ignored. This is not a predatory pricing scheme by any stretch of the imagination.

Mr. Gallagher says the promotion needs a sunset. It has a sunset, six months. If you sign up a contract under the promotion, you're under the contract for 18 months or 36 months, but there's a sunset. There's an end period. Just like in a volume and term commitment that is already in tariffs throughout Bellsouth's tariffs, you've heard today, they're in the CLECs' tariffs, the ALECs' tariffs. Volume and term commitments are nothing new. And this does have a sunset provision in it.

There was mention about the comparison of UNE rates to the rates that result from BellSouth's retail offerings. First, in our petition, we address that head on. We cited that in a Miami wire center, for instance, a business customer that has two lines under the BellSouth Complete Choice of Business Program, when you compare the discounted rate that customer pays for just those two lines -- don't even start looking at intraLATA toll, don't even start looking at features, just look at those

two lines -- the UNE rate that the petitioners would pay for the UNEs necessary to provide that exact same service, going from memory, and it's in the petition, I think it's about \$30 below -- the UNE rates are \$30 below the retail rates. So this idea that the UNE rates are so much above the retail rates under this promotion is simply not supported by the record.

Well, then the petitioners said, "Yeah, and then BellSouth says that they can resell the promotion." Well, you know, what do you want, resale or facilities-based? Well, fortunately, the Commission now has guidance that up until recently it has not had when faced with that type of argument.

In the FCC's decision approving BellSouth's 271 application in Louisiana and Georgia, AT&T said, "Look, if you look at Zone 3 in Louisiana and you compare the retail rate in Zone 3 to the wholesale rate of the UNEs that I have to purchase to do the same thing, the UNE rate is above the resale rate, and that's a price squeeze, and that simply cannot happen."

Well, the FCC's order squarely addressed that, and in doing so, it said, "well, first of

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

all, you have to consider that statewide, you're in pretty good shape. Once you consider that, let's look at the zone 3 issue and figure out how we're going to address that." Here's what they say in paragraph 287. The FCC said, "The Act contemplates the existence of subsidized local rates in high cost areas and addresses such potential price squeezes through the availability of resale." The Commission said, "The top-down approach to setting resale rates ensures that resale provides a profit margin where, as in the case here, the cost of individual elements exceed the retail rate." And then the Commission flat out said, "It is appropriate to consider the effect of resale on whether a price squeeze exists."

Then they went a step further. They said, "AT&T claimed in this docket that it needs X dollars, it costs them X dollars to provide a line in Louisiana." The FCC says, "You know, we're looking at the federal law, the federal jurisprudence on price squeezes, and you're not supposed to look at what it costs any given competitor. You're supposed to look at what it costs an efficient competitor." And they said,

"AT&T nor anyone else has put any record evidence in this docket that says what an efficient competitor would have to pay to get that line out there. And in the absence of that kind of evidence of record, AT&T," it says, "has not shown that the UNE pricing at issue dooms competitors to failure." That's the federal standard for a price squeeze, do you doom them to failure.

well, given that FDN itself has gone from 60,000 to 80,000, I hardly think the evidence in this case shows anything about dooming about anvone to failure. In fact. BellSouth has submitted evidence or records in the price regulation filings and in the 271 filings to show that statewide, CLECs have gained about 30% of this market we're talking about. When you take that to -- when you consider the fact that CLECs are not, nor are they required to offer service at a statewide level, they do what we all know they do. They go to the highest concentration of customers in the lowest cost zones, and they compete like everything to get So it makes sense that our filings show that in some wire centers, we're at 60%, 50 to

60% market share.

The evidence before this Commission simply does not support any of the predatory price arguments or any arguments that the pricing is in any way hindering competition in Florida.

FDN then says, "Well, the discounts are specifically targeted to customers of a CLEC." Staff asked us about that, and what we did is, we gave them discovery responses that flat out say BellSouth extensively markets this promotion to potentially eligible customers, including existing BellSouth customers. The discovery responses say we do it through outbound calling, through direct mail campaigns. And when a potentially eligible customer calls inbound to us, we tell them about it too. We market this to everyone.

Now, you were shown -- that's not it. You were shown the fish bowl that BellSouth sent out. Madam Chairman, that's a direct mailing piece that we sent out. And, you know, we do send this one out to our customers that we believe have gone to a competitor. But before I leave this one, though, let me point out that there's an asterisk that appears up here on that

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

\$19.30 rate. None of the footnotes that are associated with the asterisk are on this page. I don't know why that is.

But if you look at our filings, and specifically if you look at what we're going to file in a couple of days to address the informal complaint that was filed about this promotion, you're going to see that those footnotes explain in very clear and unequivocal language that that \$19.30 rate is only for single wire customers. That one line alone, \$19.30 is not going to get you into the program, but if you have that line and you have some other services, vertical features, if you have an area-plus plan, if you have intraLATA toll, any of the other features other than just the line, you can easily get to that amount. So I think when you see the answer that we're going to file to the informal complaint, that will address most of the issues that were presented about this ad.

One other thing I want to point out, though. If you look at our discovery responses, we gave representative samples of this ad. We also gave representative samples of another ad that goes out to potentially eligible customers

who are still with us. We market through direct mail, through direct contact, telephone. We market this to our own customers as well as customers that have left us. And the evidence of record to suggest otherwise is nothing but conclusory allegations that we don't think that's happening. We've conclusively refuted that.

The next argument that I recall hearing was, "Well, you're stringing these promotions one after another." Well, as far as I know, there is exactly one piece of law or administrative order that has any concerns about In its local competition order, the FCC that. says, "We don't want you to string sequentially a series of short-term promotions together." And you know why they said that? Because short-term promotions are available for resale, but not at the wholesale discount rate -- I'm sorry, the resale discount rate. So, in other words, if I have a short-term promotion that's priced at \$15, an ALEC can resell it, but they're got to pay me \$15 for it. If it's a long-term promotion, they pay me \$15 less -- I think it's about 16% in Florida.

1

2

3

4

5

So the reason that the FCC said, "We don't want you stringing short-term promotions around," is, they expressly say, in order to evade your duty to resell it at the resale discount rate. We say throughout this thing, and we have done it in practice, this is available for resale, and you get the resale discount rate. So the only concern that is expressed about sequentially filing promotions has been squarely addressed by the fact that we make this available at the resale discount rate.

Another interesting thing was, on the one hand you've got some petitioners here saying, "You're filing the same thing one after another. You can't do that," and then other petitioners are saying, "Look at the termination charges. They changed. You can't do that." well, you know, they're getting us coming and going. But the bottom line is, we can do that. There's no prohibition in federal or state law against it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Turner, I also asked about the term agreements, how a BellSouth customers gets out of the term agreements.

MR. TURNER: Yes, ma'am. Let me address

those. I appreciate you reminding me.

First of all, let's talk about term agreements generally. And what I would like to do is set out the Florida analysis under Florida law of when you can and cannot liquidate a damage. Then I want to show what we do and what the CLECs do, because I think you'll find that it's an interesting comparison.

Under Florida law, you can liquidate a damage, in other words, agree on the front end that if you violate this contract or breach this contract, I'll pay X dollars. You can do that under Florida law, unless it's a penalty. And the test is, a clause for liquidated damages is enforceable if the amount is not grossly disproportionate to the damages that might reasonably be expected to flow from the breach.

Now, let's look at what would happen if neither BellSouth's tariffs nor BellSouth's promotions nor the ALEC promotion had any termination liability in it at all, and a customer breached the contract, because, don't forget, the customer still has signed a contract, a commitment to stay for three years, two years, whatever the term is. If the

customer leaves early, that's a breach of contract.

If there were no liquidated damage provision, what happens? Well, you've got to go somewhere to enforce your right to seek damages. And since this Commission cannot award monetary damages, that means you go to court and you sue your customer for damages. And if that happens, not only do you get the full amount of damages you would be entitled to under law, but your customer has to go to court, has to hire an attorney, has to go through a lot of expense to defend that lawsuit.

It makes good public policy sense to liquidate a damage in a contract on the front end so the business customer can say, "Okay. I know there are competitors out there, just like when I sign up for my wireless service, I know there's a lot of them out there. I also know that every time I think about signing with one, I'm always worried, well, heck, what happens next week if a better offer comes up and I'm stuck with this one."

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Turner, all I want to know is how your existing customers get out of

the term agreements. I don't want to be educated on liquidated damages.

MR. TURNER: Well. I --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I just want to know, can they leave BellSouth for dissatisfaction? How do they get out of that contract?

MR. TURNER: To answer the question, if there has been a -- if they're dissatisfied just because they wish they had made a different deal, then, no, ma'am, that does not get them out. If they're dissatisfied because the service was not good or for something of that nature, and it's documented, and we look, and we say, "You know, we did not do you right," then that's a breach on our part, and they can get out.

If I may, I would like to go back and finish my discussion, though, because termination liability was -- yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have a question before you go back and get into your discussion. Should ALECs be prohibited from initiating any win-back activities to regain a customer? Is that BellSouth's position?

MR. TURNER: No, sir. We think that

competition should be full and fair, and everybody should be able to compete equally. An ALEC should try to win our customers back, we should try to win their customers back, and the same rules should apply to everybody. Our position is simply that if there is going to be a restraint on BellSouth's ability to do so, the restraint should be equal to all parties and make it a level playing field.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: One other question, Madam Chair.

Should the Commission also prohibit ALECs from including any marketing information in its final bill sent to customers who have switched to BellSouth or any other -- or another --

MR. TURNER: I think it's the same answer, Commissioner Bradley. I think that in an unrestricted market environment, that would be perfectly permissible. BellSouth believes in full competition. If there is an imposition, though, you should look at whether or not to apply it equally across the board to everyone.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: One other question and I'll be finished.

Should ALECs be prohibited from sharing

information with its retail division, such as
informing the retail division when a customer is
switching?

MR. TURNER: It seems to me that if FDN -when BellSouth --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'm just curious as to what BellSouth's position is.

MR. TURNER: Again, it should be the same, because to me, FDN is going to have folks who work orders to send the customer back to BellSouth. And if those customers -- if FDN's folks are allowed to walk over or pick up the phone and say, "Hey, we're about to lose somebody. Go back and get them," you know, whether that's good or bad, it's equally good or bad for BellSouth, I would think. So again, I believe it should be -- our concern is, if you're going to impose that type of restriction, you should consider whether to do it across the board or not.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Turner, quickly finish your presentation.

MR. TURNER: Getting back to termination liability, FDN's tariff has a full buy-out provision in it. It says that if you come with

us, the tariff on file with the Commission, and you leave us, among other things, you pay the full tariffed rate or the full contract rate for the service for the remaining term of the contract, discounted by the -- some interest rate. It's a net present value full buy-out provision.

The termination provisions in the promotion we have are much less than that. The termination provisions of the new promotion that we filed are much less than that. So, number one, I think our termination liability provisions are entirely consistent with Florida Statutes or Florida law. They're valid liquidated damage provisions.

But this goes to the point about looking across the board. If the concern is that you are -- one concern that has been expressed, maybe not exactly in these words, but the basic concern seems to be if a customer is going to pull some -- if a carrier is going to pull somebody out of the available pool of customers and, quote, lock them into a contract, that's bad, because you take somebody out of the pool.

Well, I don't agree with that. I think

when you limit the ability to enforce a term contract, you limit the ability to offer lower discounts that come with term contracts.

But setting that aside, how is a customer any less drawn out of the pool of available customers, if you apply that logic, if they're sitting with FDN with a full buy-out termination provision than they are if they're sitting with Bellsouth with a partial buy-out provision? And FDN is not alone. If you look through the files, there are about eight or ten CLECs that have full buy-out provisions. There are seven or eight more that have something that's very akin to them, and we have a list of them that we can make available to you either directly or through staff.

But again, termination liability, ours comply with the law, and if you're going to put any restrictions on them, it certainly should apply across the board, and it should be imposed not in this proceeding, but in an appropriate proceeding in which everyone participates.

As far as using retail information, I would like to harken back to the IDS proceedings.

There were some allegations throughout those

proceedings that BellSouth does this and BellSouth does that. And when we finally came to the hearing room, when we sat Mr. Brett Hamilton in that chair over there and started asking him about it, if you go back and look at that transcript, they weren't able to substantiate a lot of that.

So if there is a desire to look into the retail practices and what kind of information exchange is going on, again, it should be done on an overall basis. But you should not make a decision today based on anecdotal evidence that has not been subjected to cross-examination.

I'm going to quickly go through the rest of my list. There was a comment made about you're in the position of having to decide whether to stop a program that's already in effect. Well, with all due respect to the petitioners, it was the petitioners that waited until this program went into effect to challenge it. Now, they were on 15 days' public notice from the tariff filing, but they were on 45 days' notice from the filing on the ALEC interconnection page that says we're about to make this filing. So they have a whole lot more advance notice of our

promotions than we have of theirs, and they could have protected any rights they think they had earlier than they did.

There was a question about why not lower rates all across the board, and Mr. Gallagher said, "Why don't you do a 5 percent discount across the State of Florida?" Well, if a customer is sitting in Miami and he has an offer for 5% off of BellSouth's tariffed rates, or 20% off of BellSouth's tariffed rates through FDN, or 22% from Access Integrated, which one is he going to choose?

And as far as geographic -- concentrating in geographic areas, the staff is correct. The statute allows that. But, you know, the argument I'm hearing is akin to if a team runs the ball up the middle play after play after play, the other side is not going to play a prevent defense and spread the field. The other side is going to pack right in the middle and say, "Until you show me you can do something else, this is where I am." And there's no foul in that. That's the way it works.

And if the CLECs decide, "You know, we're going to have to spread out a little bit. We're

not making as much headway anymore in Zone 1.

Let's go out to Zone 2, or let's go out to Zone

3. Let's package intraLATA toll with paging
services and with Internet services, and let's
go out there," that's what competition is
designed for. Make them spread out, make them
go out there into the other areas, and then
we'll have to go out there too, and consumers
will benefit.

An analogy was drawn to the Arrow case. I have two points to that. The first is, the Arrow case involved a petition to suspend a tariff that was filed before the tariff went into effect. The other thing I have to point out is that when the Arrow case was filed, you didn't have the FCC's analysis in the Georgia 271 -- I'm sorry, the Georgia-Louisiana 271 case. You didn't have the D.C. Circuit Court of Opinion throwing back the impaired standard of the FCC, saying, "You guys just got it wrong. You've got to relook at this. You've got to consider all these things." A lot of jurisprudence has been put out there since that Arrow case, and that's why a comparison to Arrow is not appropriate, not to mention the fact that

1

2

3

4

5

6

1 in Arrow you didn't have comprehensive discovery and build a record as you did in this case, and 2 3 the record supports BellSouth's position. Madam Chair, may I have one moment to make sure I haven't missed anything? 5 Thirty seconds. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: 7 MR. FEIL: Madam Chair, are we going to 8 have a brief opportunity for rebuttal, or did you want to move on with discussion? 9 10 CHAIRMAN JABER: No, we're going to move on 11 to Commissioner questions, but certainly 12 Commissioners can address questions --13 MR. FEIL: Thank you. CHAIRMAN JABER: -- to all the parties. 14 15 Madam Chair, I apologize for MR. TURNER: the length and for not being a little bit more 16 17 organized, but I do very much appreciate the 18 opportunity to address this. 19 Thank you, Mr. Turner. CHAIRMAN JABER: 20 Commissioners, do you have any questions? 21 Go ahead, Commissioner Palecki. 22 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I have one question 23 for staff. I wonder if you could comment, 24 please, on Mr. Feil's position regarding 25 customer contact in order to effectuate

conversion. And his position was that that should not be an opportunity for win-back, and I think he gave an example of where there was some sort of existing work order that a customer had to cancel and that that customer was then approached with the win-back sell. And if you

could just comment on that --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. CASEY: Sure, Commissioner Palecki. We did address it in our recommendation on page 23 at the very top. We have quoted an FCC order, and in the order, if I may read it, it says, "Petitioners argue that the use of another carrier's order, including a carrier or customer request to lift a PIC freeze, is clearly and separately forbidden by sections 222(b) and 201(b). We conclude that section 222 does not allow carriers to use CPNI" -- that's customer proprietary network information" -- to retain soon-to-be former customers where the carrier gained notice of the customer's imminent cancellation of service through the provision of carrier-to-carrier service. We conclude that competition is harmed if any carrier uses carrier-to-carrier information, such as switch or PIC orders, to trigger retention marketing

campaigns, and consequently prohibit such actions accordingly."

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So would that cover the situation that was suggested by Mr. Feil where a customer affirmatively would call the ILEC in order to effectuate the conversion, but the reason for the call was to cancel a work order?

MR. CASEY: It would depend on what the work order is, Commissioner. If it was a work order to switch service, something like that, oftentimes customers will call and notify BellSouth or an ILEC, "I'm going to switch," and that, of course, triggers retention marketing, and that's allowable under the FCC. But anything such as a PIC freeze, where a customer calls up to notify them to lift a PIC freeze or anything like that is prohibited.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So it would basically depend upon the language the customer used when the customer called the ILEC. So if the customer informed the ILEC that his call, the purpose was to remove the PIC freeze, then the win-back sell could not take effect. But if the customer did not inform the ILEC and just

1 went ahead and said, "I need to have a work 2 order canceled," because they had been informed 3 that they could not convert to the CLEC until that occurred, then that would not trigger the 5 prohibition. 6 MR. CASEY: A standard work order should 7 not. 8 COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, any other 10 questions? 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have --12 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason. 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I guess I have two. 14 First of all, what is the -- I understand that 15 you have a concern with the possibility that 16 when there is a switch from one company to 17 another that there could be the possibility of a 18 double billing if there's a switch from 19 BellSouth to an ALEC and then an immediate 20 switch back, and that's the reason for the 21 30-day prohibition. 22 MR. CASEY: Yes, Commissioner. 23 COMMISSIONER DEASON: How did you learn of 24 that problem?

MR. CASEY: From complaints we have

received not only in this case, but in our compliance docket. ALECs have complained that ILECs will immediately start win-back promotions as soon as the completion of the switch-over, at the completion of the switch-over. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Have we had complaints with customers switching from one ALEC to another and getting double bills? MR. CASEY: I'm not aware of any. would the basis for that problem exist

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Would that problem -would the basis for that problem exist
regardless of which direction or whether it was
two ALECs involved or an incumbent LEC and an
ALEC? I'm trying to understand what the basis
of the problem is and whether this is something
that we need to explore on a generic basis or
whether this is appropriate for this particular
tariff filing.

MR. CASEY: We believe it's only one way. It would be from the ILEC to the ALEC, because of the ILEC billing the ALEC.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because of the ILEC billing the ALEC. Go ahead.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Do you understand that? I don't understand this.

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes. Can you --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Can you elaborate on that? MS. BULECZA-BANKS: I will try to do my best. What we have heard happens -- and we have had some of the customers actually by phone happen to tell me that this has happened to them -- is that when the switch-over occurs or change-over in between and a win-back occurs in that series, Bell will still bill the ALEC for that period of time, even though the customer didn't fully come over. So the ILEC receives a billing statement from Bell. They assume that it has already gone through and the customer is switched and then renders a bill to the customer. Bell, of course, didn't really lose the customer after all, so it renders its own bill, so the customer actually gets two bills.

Now, eventually it gets straightened out, and the ALEC generally will end up telling the customer it does not have to pay that bill, because it finds out subsequently it never did go over. That's the issue that we generally have with two bills.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, it doesn't -- I mean, I'm trying to think of an example.

I mean, if you've got an insurance carrier and you've been with them for a while and they automatically renew it and send you the premium, and in the meantime you decide you want to switch to a different insurance carrier and you make arrangements with them, you get two bills, and you just have to call up and say, "I'm sorry. I'm no longer your customer anymore. I don't want your insurance coverage. I'm not paying the bill." I mean, doesn't that happen? It's just not something that is confined to telecommunications, is it?

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: I think that's correct, and I would agree with you. I think that the difficulty now is that a lot of times the customer doesn't know what actually happened, because a lot of times when they call up, if there's problems during the change-over or anything occurs and they call, the ILEC may say, "well, you're not my customer anymore. You need to call your competing carrier." The competing carrier goes on and says, "well, I need to find out this information from the ILEC." When they call the ILEC, the ILEC says, "The conversion is

not competed. I can't address your concerns until after the conversion is completed." You have this window of difficulty. And I think that because of those things occurring, when customers get the bill, they're not sure who they are or who -- did they really make the switch-over. I mean, do I know that I'm not obligated to pay carrier 1 or carrier 2?

I think in some of the other industries like insurance or any other ones that you have bills, you're kind of -- you realize that, because you've been involved in that for so long and you know how that works, that if I don't renew and I receive a bill from them, they generally say your service is going to be canceled if you don't renew in 12 days or 15 days. And I don't know. I haven't reneged on my insurance, so I don't know if actually they would call me and remind me that, you know, I still didn't pay. But generally it just says that you'll be canceled in 15 days for nonpay, we will cease your insurance.

But, I mean, I see your analogy. I'm just
-- I think it may be the infancy of the
competitive situation we are in telephone versus

maybe some of the more established industries.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is it asymmetrical in the sense that this is a 30-day prohibition for there to be marketing efforts for a lost customer from BellSouth's perspective, but that there's not a 30-day prohibition if the direction is from the ALEC to a customer switching from the ALEC to BellSouth, or vice versa, or whatever. You understand the question.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: I understand. And I can actually argue both sides of that for you. Because we're in a posture that we're trying to promote competition, I have no problem with telling you that for a period of time, I don't have a problem with it being asymmetrical. I can also argue for you the other side, that in all fair play, I don't really necessarily have a problem if it was put on both sides.

On the flip side, the ALEC is not going to bill BellSouth for any services like the ILEC has to bill the ALEC, and that's the distinction that I have, because the ILEC is not going to receive a bill from the ALEC for services it provided. And that's the difference.

1 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, when --2 MS. BULECZA-BANKS: But I can argue both 3 sides for you on that. COMMISSIONER DEASON: When is the ALEC 5 notified by BellSouth that they've lost the 6 customer? In other words, if BellSouth has the 7 obligation as the wholesale provider and there 8 is an ALEC that is using UNE to provide service 9 to a customer and they have an obligation to pay 10 BellSouth for those UNEs, when does BellSouth 11 notify the ALEC when that customer leaves? 12 MS. BULECZA-BANKS: If I'm correct, and I'm 13 sure one of them will correct me if I'm wrong, 14 my understanding is on a period -- every 30 days 15 or something, they develop a list where they 16 send it to the ALEC. 17 No? Okay. That was my understanding. 18 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, if it's 19 permissible, Madam Chairman, I'll just direct 20 that question to either BellSouth or the ALECs. 21 or both, to find out how that works. 22 MR. GALLAGHER: When we lose a customer, we 23 get a port-out request. BellSouth actually 24 creates an LSR, sends it to us and creates an 25 impact porting event, and three days later the

customer is gone.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you have three days' notice?

MR. GALLAGHER: It's not even notice.

We're not allowed -- we're not allowed to use

the CPNI to market, so it's just basically -
it's informational in nature.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: And I guess I'm confused, because I was referring to the situation generally where that's going -- where it's in the middle of that window where they haven't really switched and they're in the process there. And I'm not sure that -- at least that's not what I have occurs or would happen. That's when they assume they stayed with Bell and you don't know, and then a list is generated at the end of the month that are provided to the -- I mean, that's the situation I was told.

MR. GALLAGHER: That sounds like a resell or a UNE-P possible application, whereas, since we use the loops, they're either gone or they're, you know, with us.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess what I'm trying to understand is, BellSouth has

indicated -- and I think I heard them correctly that they have voluntarily implemented a 10-day period where there would be no solicitation. And depending upon the promptness in which they advise you as to when a customer has changed back, maybe if you just act promptly on the information you get from BellSouth, there would be no double billing. You would know before you have to give that bill out that there's no need to send that bill because the customer has actually gone back to BellSouth. That's the basis of the guestion.

MR. GALLAGHER: Okay. With FDN, the way we do our facilities-based, we don't have a problem with double billing. I think the double billing occurs when there's an ILEC customer, a reseller type of CLEC takes that customer, and the reseller doesn't know how to bill until the reseller gets a record from BellSouth. The reseller reads the record and marks up and creates a bill. But in that period of time while that bill was being created, if the customer went back to BellSouth, I could see how that double billing would occur.

We don't bill off of some record from

1 BellSouth. We create our own bill record, and 2 so that's not the case with a facilities-based 3 guy. COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm about to switch 5 gears to something else unless somebody wants to 6 follow up on that. 7 I think Commissioner Baez CHAIRMAN JABER: 8 wanted to follow up. And, Commissioner Bradley, 9 did you have a follow-up --10 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. 11 CHAIRMAN JABER: -- at this point, or --12 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: To this point, but I 13 think it got straightened out. It was just that 14 listening to Ms. Banks, I had -- I thought I 15 heard two different bill flows happening, but I 16 think after the discussion I'm all right. 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner 18 Bradlev. 19 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. As it relates 20 to win-back, the win-back issue, why is 30 days 21 the magical number? I'm asking staff that 22 question.

23

24

25

MR. CASEY: We've looked at a number of periods. You know, there are some states that do seven days. As he mentioned, South Carolina

does 10 days. We even looked at 60 days, and we believed that wasn't necessary. That's why we came back to 30 days, to allow the ALEC to complete a billing cycle with the customer and in order for the customer to experience some competition by having their service provided by an ALEC.

Now, we -- in an interrogatory, we had asked BellSouth what is their policy regarding win-back in the State of Florida, and they specifically stated that they wait from three to seven weeks before contacting a customer. So that's 21 to 49 days that we did have. And then they sent the memo out saying, "Well, we're going to do 10 days system-wide."

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Is that 30-day period consistent with Texas and Ohio's decisions?

MR. CASEY: The 30-day period has been granted in Ohio. Texas is proposing a rule which will have the 30-day period in it.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: So that still has not been enacted at this point?

MR. CASEY: No, sir. They're in the process of rulemaking.

1.5

CHAIRMAN JABER: The rule that Texas is proposing, is that ILEC-specific, or industry?

MR. CASEY: I believe it's ILEC-specific.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: One other question. Why would -- do you know what Georgia's rationale is behind the seven-day period, and Illinois for 17, and Louisiana for seven days?

MR. CASEY: The reason for that? No, sir, I couldn't tell you their theory behind using seven days. We just looked at Florida and what's best for Florida.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Bob and Cheryl, with respect to the billing, the double billing, I guess that wasn't so much of a concern to me. Throughout these proceedings and from the petition, I gather the ALEC concern also is that you have to allow a sufficient period of time to allow the switching to occur, whether it's because the orders get kicked back or there's some level of communication that has to continue to occur between the ALEC and ILEC. Where I struggle, though, is knowing what a sufficient period of time is. You know, I want the switching the customer to occur, and -- you know, I guess maybe that's what you mean by

allowing the ALEC to have one competitive
billing cycle before the customer is contacted.

What I envision is, you know, you've got -initially when you call to switch service, you
may have difficulty. It may take two or three
days to get the switch to happen. If the
customer is contacted during that period of
time, they may associate the difficulty
automatically with the ALEC. And maybe that
continues on for seven days, or maybe it
continues for 10 days. It definitely won't
continue for 30 days, I hope. But is 10 days
okay? You know, in terms of customer
complaints, what have we heard? How long does
it take for the switching to occur?

MR. CASEY: What we're talking about on 30 days now is after the switch is complete. So the switching is all complete. We're just allowing a period of time for the ALEC and the customer to get acquainted.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I know, but -- oh, so you're suggesting it's a 30-day period even beyond the switch?

MR. CASEY: That's correct. That's correct.

1 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. That wasn't clear 2 to me. I thought the whole period of time was 3 30 days. MR. CASEY: Win-back marketing to regain a 5 customer starts after the switch is complete. 6 Prior to that, it would be retention marketing. 7 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So how long does it take for the switch to occur? 8 9 MR. CASEY: Sometimes it may take a couple 10 of weeks to switch over. I believe FDN could 11 probably give you a better idea. 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. But while the 13 switching is -- the transition is occurring, 14 there is no contact from ILEC to win the 15 customer back. 16 MR. CASEY: That's what we're saying in our 17 recommendation. 18 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And it's a period 19 once the switch is complete that we're 20 suggesting -- that you're suggesting a 30-day 21 waiting period? 22 MR. CASEY: Yes, ma'am. 23 CHAIRMAN JABER: Now, the 10 days suggested 24 by BellSouth would be again post switch, there 25 would be a 10-day waiting period.

2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

That's correct. MR. CASEY:

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner Deason, you were going to move on to the next --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, actually, I guess I need to follow up on my own question. Back to the double billing situation. I quess I'm having difficulty understanding why 30 days cures that. It seems you could be a customer for six months and then decide to switch back to BellSouth. And depending upon when that decision is made and how that's communicated to the ALEC, there may be a double bill then too. I mean, why is it that 30 days is a magic number on the front end to prevent a double bill?

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: It's not designed to be a magic number or anything, but I think what it is is to try to get people who are first time switching to an ALEC to have that situation be as easy and less controversial as it could be. And after I've been there for six months, I really don't have a problem with that, because you've already done the switch. You've already experienced a changed carrier from what you have been used to as a monopoly carrier all the time. So I really don't have a problem with it

1 where it occurs in six months. It's kind of like in the initial phase to try to get it as smooth as possible with the least amount of problems. Otherwise, we envision that the consumer will have this concept that anytime I try to change to an alternative carrier, I'm going to have problems, and this is not what I want to do.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, you have a question?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. Let me see if I understand this now. It takes 30 days to switch a customer from one carrier to another.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: No, sir, I wouldn't say that it takes 30 days. We've heard a range from seven -- and we've had some situations where there has been some difficulties, so there are some anomalies that it may be as long as 30. can't give you a typical, because I don't know what a typical is, because I don't hear the typicals. I only hear the complaints when things aren't switched quick enough for the customer.

So I would be surprised if it's much less than seven to 10 days, because Bell still has to

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

-- or Sprint or any of them, they still have to get them in the roster when they're going to switch over. They have new services that are coming on for customers coming on-line to the IELC itself that they have to fit in to be able to get them on-line. So I don't think seven to 10 is an unreasonable time frame to look at when someone is switching.

CHAIRMAN JABER: The waiting period starts after the switching is complete.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay, but I thought I heard --

CHAIRMAN JABER: That was the clarification I needed. I didn't understand that. What staff is saying -- BellSouth has proposed the 10-day waiting period is appropriate after the switching is complete. Staff's recommendation is to make it 30.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: And again, going on further, that if we had -- if we didn't measure -- whatever the time frame you have, I think it's appropriate to measure from the time the switch-over is complete because of the variance of time that it takes to switch over a customer. So whatever time frame you're choosing, I think

it's just important to set that as the starting time frame.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think Commissioner Bradley has a follow-up.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

_

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And I'm thinking like a customer. You know, I've had business lines before, and if I switched to one carrier and within a week I found that I got a bad deal, I wasn't so much concerned about the billing period, because I was going to pay the bad carrier and switch to the one that had the best deal for my business purposes. So therefore, I don't see a 30-day billing period as being an issue with the customer, because the customer really is concerned more about the bells and the whistles, the price of the bells and the

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: I think the difficulty that still will come through on that situation is that in those carriers — no matter who you're going with, there are term contracts you're signing. So in seven to 10 days, the customer generally doesn't have an option to

whistles, and the quality of the service.

carrier. CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez.

23

24

25

14

15

16

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I have a question again on the double billing issue. If there were -did you all consider perhaps notification alternatives? Instead of actually creating -- I keep -- you know, a cone of silence, if you will, where you can't contact the customer or approach the customer on a win-back, would an alternative be to have notification requirements between the carriers that eliminated this possibility of double billing in these

circumstances, instead of a hands-off policy?

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: I'm sure that could possibly work. I know that if you are -- if an ILEC has the win-back that occurs during the transition -- and this is when the situation occurs generally -- the ILEC will still continue to bill, because it technically hasn't lost the customer, so that bill is going to go through. So I would think we would have to get processes in place where notification, like you said, is given at some extent so that those in reseller situations won't issue the bill for that.

The difficulty also is, however, that my understanding is -- and I'm not sure this is correct either. I'm just going from what I was told, that the ILEC will still bill the ALEC even if they win the customer and transition.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, and --

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: And that's where the difficulty gets in, because if they get a bill and they feel compelled they have to pay that bill, I guess that was part of our basis for saying 30 days, because I'm going to have to pay the ILEC. Even though I never got the customer, I still have to pay that bill to the ILEC for at

least a month's worth of service.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But I think that that's addressed under other processes. And I guess one of the difficulties that I'm having with this particular issue is, you know, are we protecting -- which relationship are we protecting, first of all, because I've heard both you and Mr. Casey say, "Let's let the customer get acquainted with the ALEC," and I have some concerns about that as well. That's another point. Are we protecting two businesses, two carriers, how they deal with each other in their business relationship as a customer and provider as well, or are we really trying to eliminate confusion to the end customer? And I see those as two different --

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: And I think that maybe we're trying to look at it all, I mean, to be honest. I think we're trying to make the process as smooth as possible and to try to eliminate double billing, try to eliminate the difficulty that — to help spur competition. If I am an ALEC and I have to — I'm submitted a bill for 30 days that I have to pay the ILEC, even though I never got the customer, I think

trying to get the whole process a little more fair, maybe, or even balance, and help the transition to see if the process can work. I think we're trying to do it all.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: But isn't that particular issue somewhere addressed, for instance, in an interconnection agreement or a resale agreement, I mean, the process in place for how you true up bills if there's a bill dispute, for lack of a better word, you know, how you clear up that particular aspect of the relationship, so that you're really only left with whatever public interest you have in eliminating some confusion to the customer? And I suspect that there are alternative ways of doing it, but I think that may be a discussion for another day.

You know, I see them as two -MS. BULECZA-BANKS: I agree.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- different things, so that maybe you don't have to be looking at it all. I don't know. I'm just trying to eliminate some of the confusion that I have on this, because we're trying to address -- we're trying to kill --

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: Sure.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1.7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: We're not trying to kill two birds, but, you know, we're trying to address two distinct things in my mind anyway, and I'm not sure that we're getting where we need to be on either.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Something you said, Ms. Banks, I can't reconcile with the clarification you made for me earlier. You just said in response to Commissioner Baez's question that BellSouth continues to bill, because in their mind, they still have the customer?

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: They bill the customer, yes. They bill the customer because he never left.

CHATRMAN JABER: I don't understand that. In clarification to my concern, you said the switch occurs, and then BellSouth --

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: "I" is the ALEC. submit my LSR, and in the process of switching over and having the customer leave, Bell wins back, or Sprint or whoever wins back the customer during that period of time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. How is it they win back that customer if they're not even allowed

1 to contact that customer until the switch is 2 complete? That's what confuses to me. Ι 3 thought in response to my question you said BellSouth does not contact the customer until 5 the switch is complete plus 10 days. 6 MS. BULECZA-BANKS: But they can retain the 7 customer if the customer calls. And, you know, 8 a lot of customers do call, and they say, "Hey, 9 look, I got this bigger better deal. What can you do for me?" And that's --10 11 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So in those 12 situations --13 MS. BULECZA-BANKS: -- entirely okay. CHAIRMAN JABER: So in those situations 14 15 where during the transition period the customer 16 on his or her own contacts BellSouth and says, 17 "I've changed my mind. I want to retain you, 18 BellSouth," there might a double billing situation. 19 MS. BULECZA-BANKS: That's my 20 21 understanding. 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, that's very limited 23 then. That possibility is very limited. 24 COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Madam Chair --25 CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on, Commissioner

Bradley. See, what I've been hearing you say is there's this double billing scenario that would warrant a 30-day waiting period, but it's not that broad. It's not that general. It's when a customer changes their mind before the switch is complete, there is a potential for a double billing to occur.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. You just made a very interesting comment about how customers respond to competition when they discover that they've bought into a plan that is less advantageous for them as compared to a plan that may be offered by another competitor. It would seem to me that if a customer calls either the ALEC or the ILEC and says, "Hey, I just bought this plan from you, and I discovered that your competitor, even though I have this contract with you, has a better plan," it would seem to me that the response from the competitor would be, "They have a better plan. Well, let me match that plan." I mean, that's when you have true competition.

And what I'm really getting at is this.

You know, I'm not so much concerned about what's going on with the ALEC and the ILEC. I'm more concerned about what's going on with the consumer, because competition is — just to have competition for competition's sake is not necessarily good for the consumer. Competition is only good when you have as a result of that interaction better pricing, more bells and whistles, and a higher quality of service.

You know, when I think back to the late '70s in the automobile industry when Toyota hit the market, well, Ford and Chevrolet were just puttering around out there. But guess what? They had to do a better job of producing high quality automobiles if they wanted to remain in the market. And guess what they've done? Just that. And that afforded the consumer a higher quality choice and a better price on the automobile.

And that's really my position on this, and I'm trying to figure out how all this fits into that particular scheme. Just to have competition out there -- I mean, you know, that's not the American way. The American way

is to have people -- the strong survive because of what they have to offer the public, and the public should have good solid choices.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: Did I miss a question in there?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: A statement. So how are you really defining competition here? And I can see what the FCC has put forth in terms of helping the ILECs -- I mean the ALECs compete and get into the market. But, you know, the statement was made that, you know, we're concerned about what's best for Florida. Well, when you say what's best for Florida, who are you referring to? I mean, most certainly I'm referring to the customers.

MS. BULECZA-BANKS: And I would agree. I think that you're right. I mean, competition for competition's sake is not necessarily the best alternative, and the majority of -- when we can get the customers to have choices and be able to find a package that suits them at the best price they can get is the ideal situation. And I just don't think we're there yet. I don't think the market has broadened enough to the point where in every rate center within the

state we have ample competition. I just don't think we're there yet.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason, you had additional questions?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. I want to switch gears now to Issue 3, and my question is, as I understand staff's recommendation, you're asking the Commission to preclude BellSouth from filing a like tariff if there is a protest, and we are considering the protest of this existing tariff; is that correct?

MS. BANKS: That is correct, Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do we have the statutory ability to do that?

MS. BANKS: Staff believes that we do. I know that -- I believe Mr. Turner had made a point that for the Commission to take the position to preclude BellSouth from filing any tariff that mirrors, extends, or builds upon the tariff at issue in this proceeding would -- I believe he used "conclusively invalidate any future tariff filings."

Although that is an argument, I believe another argument could be made that it's not

necessarily considered to be invalidated, but it could just be for delaying the implementation of that particular tariff until there's a further investigation and review.

And I believe that statutory authority is premised or embedded in the Commission's authority under 364.01(4)(g), which provides that this Commission shall ensure that all providers of telecommunications services are treated fairly by preventing anticompetitive behavior and eliminating unnecessary regulatory restraint.

At issue in FDN's petition is that this tariff is viewed as anticompetitive, and with that being an issue, this Commission, if we were to find or view it as anticompetitive, I believe that this Commission could indeed actually preclude or prohibit BellSouth from filing tariffs that are similar --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But that would be after a finding that we determine that it's anticompetitive, and that would be after a hearing process, a protest, evidence, a decision. We're basically prejudging it and telling BellSouth we've already found it to be

anticompetitive, so don't file it again while we take it to hearing. Is that appropriate to do?

MS. BANKS: I believe that it is an avenue that we can take. The appropriateness of it, I guess that could be debated. As I mentioned, with the Commission's jurisdiction to protect consumers as well as prevent any anticompetitive behavior, if there is something pending that could be viewed potentially as anticompetitive, I believe that the Commission does have the power and authority to possibly delay the implementation of that tariff if there's going to be any potential harm to consumers.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, how do we -let's say that we're not in this proceeding at
all, and there's a new tariff that comes in from
BellSouth or any incumbent telephone company,
and we have a problem with it, we think there
may be some anticompetitive ramifications. Do
we have the ability to suspend that tariff?

MS. BANKS: I'm not sure I understand your question. If you could just --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: A new tariff comes in dealing with something totally different from this, but we have some concerns that it may be

anticompetitive. What do we do at that point?

Do we suspend it, or do we have that authority

for a telephone company? Is it presumptively

valid and it goes into effect, but there's

refund provisions or make-whole provisions? How

are tariffs normally treated, a brand new

tariff?

MS. BANKS: Well, the Commission could on its own take a recommendation, and if it's found that a tariff is in noncompliance or otherwise not valid, on its own motion or own initiation take a recommendation saying that it should be canceled. As it relates to -- I think your question is whether this Commission has suspension authority. That issue has not been squarely addressed before this Commission.

If I could just reference the decision that the parties had referenced earlier, the Arrow decision, and in that particular decision, this Commission did actually vote, and the tariff was at issue, and that was actually filed in Docket No. 99043-TP (sic), which was a petition to review and cancel BellSouth's tariff by Arrow Communications. And in that docket, the Commission did vote that it had the power to

suspend or postpone the effective date of a price-regulated tariff upon a prima facie showing that irreparable anticompetitive harm would result from that tariff.

However, subsequent to this vote, the petition or the tariff was withdrawn by Bellsouth, and so was Arrow's petition, and therefore, there wasn't an order that was actually drafted or that resulted from that decision. So as it relates to our suspension authority, this Commission has not addressed that squarely.

CHAIRMAN JABER: May I follow up, Commissioner Deason, on that point?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Sure

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't know that this is a legal question or a policy question. With respect to your concern, is it undermined by the fact that those agreements can go up to 18 and 36 months, so that trying to restrict BellSouth from refiling a tariff is really for naught when the existing tariff, even though it has a limited enrollment period, actually has a life that will exceed the hearing process? Does that make sense?

-

MS. BANKS: Yes, Madam Chair. That is -- and I think someone actually referenced about -- I think one of the parties referenced maybe this Commission should look at developing some policy that would put a limited duration on tariffs, because as in this instance at issue, this tariff, it is facially moot, because the tariff will actually expire net week. One of the things that I guess --

CHAIRMAN JABER: The tariff expires, which is the enrollment period, I suppose, but the implementation of the program that customers have chosen doesn't expire for whenever, you know, the program period is.

MS. BANKS: That is correct. That is correct. And that is a concern of staff, and we have looked at that. But if I could just clarify that the only -- what staff is recommending in Issue 3 is that BellSouth be precluded from filing any subsequent tariff or filing, et cetera, only in the event that this PAA recommendation is protested. If it is not protested, then, you know, staff is not recommending that BellSouth be precluded, but only in that instance.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I have a sneaky suspicion that this thing is going to get protested. And I don't mean that there's anything mischievous about that. I mean, for the reasons --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I would protest it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- articulated -- yes,
exactly.

MS. BANKS: Madam Chair, if I could just make I guess a notation, and I think this was referenced earlier by one or more of the parties. As you're aware, BellSouth did file a similar tariff on June the 11th that would go in effect, I believe, June 26th. And at the time that staff actually filed this recommendation, that tariff had not been filed. And it was staff's belief or thought that the PAA order resulting from today's decision would be on a prospective basis. That is, it would not be inclusive of the June 11th or would not consider the June 11th tariff filing.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. Mr. Turner, I'm going to ask you, what authority does this Commission have over your tariff filings if we have a concern that there may be something anticompetitive within it? It could be any

tariff.

MR. TURNER: I think you have the authority to look into it. Now, let me say this. I wish like everything both of our Florida lawyers were not on vacation right now, because I'll tell you, I am no expert on Florida law.

I will say, however, that I think to the extent that you're considering this particular rec, it doesn't come into play. We're not talking about a what-if scenario. We've got evidence in the record on which the staff has actually found that this existing tariff is not violative of Florida law.

I don't see -- setting legalities aside, I don't see policywise what reasoning there is behind saying if this one complies with the law, but if you file another one that's like it, that one presumptively does not. So I think, especially in the case of Issue 3, clearly, I don't think that that's appropriate. It is prejudging something.

And I am not trying to avoid your question.

I just do not know enough about the Florida

Statutes to address it squarely right now, and I apologize.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, you had a follow-up?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Yes, Madam Chairman, a follow-up to Commissioner Deason's question, and I'll pose it to all the legal personnel of various persuasions.

Is there anything that this Commission has authority over in the event -- for instance, a generic docket. Is there any vehicle under which it would be appropriate to, in essence, hold any tariff filings, any similar tariff filings back or keep them from taking effect while certain issues are considered?

MR. TURNER: Commissioner Baez, I would suggest that if there is, it would have to be based on an initial prima facie showing that there is something wrong with that tariff. It's either the Kansas Commission -- I think it was the Kansas Commission, and I can clarify in just moment which one it was, but a similar issue was raised in which the staff of the state commission said, "we've got some general problems with win-back tariffs that we want to look into," and they opened a generic proceeding. And when a subsequent tariff was

filed, the staff recommendation was, "Suspend it. It touches on the subject of win-back. We've got this proceeding over here. You'll just suspend it." And the Commission on reconsideration reversed and said, "How in the world can we suspend a tariff when we don't even — haven't even looked at it and haven't determined whether the issues allegedly presented about that tariff have facial validity or is sufficiently connected to what we're looking into, just say on the front end suspend it?"

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So you're suggesting that suspension of a tariff as a notion is something that has to go on a case-by-case basis?

MR. TURNER: Absolutely, yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Anybody else? Any

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Feil.

other takers?

MR. FEIL: Commissioner, if I may, I think you've actually already decided this issue in the Arrow case, as Ms. Banks referred to, and what you decided there was if a tariff had on a facial showing indicated that it was

anticompetitive, then the Commission had the authority to suspend or cancel that tariff. And if you think about it, the reason that that makes sense is that you could have the most anticompetitive, evil tariff there is out there, and it you didn't have authority to stop it before it happened, then, you know, what good is your authority to prevent competitive harm?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, but I think you touch on an important issue. You have to stop it before it happens. I mean, it hasn't happened. It's not before us yet.

MR. FEIL: In this case, it has been progressive, because --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, in this case, somehow all the petitions came in after it took effect, unless I'm getting the time line wrong.

MR. FEIL: We filed a petition relative to the in-effect win-back tariff now several days after it became effective. But then you have to ask yourself the question, does it make a difference whether or not we have to wait for the competitive harm to come in effect, or we can only stop competitive harm before it happens? It shouldn't make a difference one way

or the other.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I may not disagree with you. However, the fact still remains that that -- even this prospective, this pending tariff, as you said, isn't before us now for us to be able to suspend it.

So you're not -- I don't think, Mr. Feil, you're giving me anything different than this case-by-case -- you know, this case-by-case constraint that seems to be suggested. I'm not sure I agree with it, but --

MR. FEIL: Well, the petition did reference win-back tariffs, not --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: In general.

MR. FEIL: In general, yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. McGlothlin.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I would just like to offer a couple of comments. One is this. Listening to Mr. Turner, I've heard him refer several times to evidence of record. Well, today it seems like if there's something he can put his hands on that he likes, it's evidence of record. Something that we offer is anecdotal. But what you have is a situation that there has been no evidentiary proceeding on this issue as

of yet.

2

3

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I would just offer a couple of things in response to Commissioner Baez. I agree with Mr. Feil that the Commission got it right in the Arrow case, and that is one regulatory tool you have at your disposal. I think in the absence of a generic rule, what you have is a case-by-case approach, but you do have the ability and the authority under case law to engage in incipient policymaking on a case-by-case basis until you reach a point where you have in place a generic rule that governs the broad spectrum of things. So I think you have several things in your arsenal, and I think one premise should be that you're not limited to tools that are by definition too ineffective and too late to serve your purpose.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Christensen, you had a response to Commissioner Baez's question?

MS. CHRISTENSEN: I believe so. I wanted to clarify one thing, which is, there has been a new filing, a June 11th filing which will go into effect next week, which is basically an extension of this win-back program, the Key Customer win-back program.

And also, I think, if I'm understanding your question correctly, Commissioner Baez, is the question not do we have to do this on a case-by-case basis as the tariffs come in, or can we determine a specific type of tariff, i.e., the Key Customer win-back type of tariff, is anticompetitive on a prima facie showing and prevent any similar type of tariffs from being filed in the future?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, for the --

MS. CHRISTENSEN: For the duration of the proceeding until there's an actual --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: For the duration of the proceeding and pending whatever determination is --

MS. CHRISTENSEN: -- determination. I would argue that under your authority under 364.01, (d) and (g), that you would have the power to suspend any similar types of tariffs if you find that this type of tariff filing is prima facially anticompetitive, and that way mitigate some irreparable harms if it's perceived by the ALECs that these continue to go on while you're trying to make that final determination. And if you make a determination

that there's irreparable harm and that these prima facially are anticompetitive, I would argue that, yes, you could not only suspend any tariffs that are in effect, but any future tariffs that may be filed during that period of time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Legal, with respect to the June 11th tariff, what does that clarification mean that there is a June 11th tariff that BellSouth has filed? Does that mean that there's no harm to BellSouth if we conduct a hearing proceeding because the June 11th tariff will be in effect? Clarify that for me.

MS. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I know staff has some concerns about the June 11th filing that has been filed, and we are looking at bringing that to the Commissioners' attention. The way the issue was worded on Issue 3, there was a gap that was kind of left open between the current tariff filing, and should the Commission vote to approve staff on Issue 3, this June 11th filing would not have been captured by that language. It wouldn't have been prevented, because it would have already been filed.

So I suppose at the Commissioners'

discretion, they could go ahead at this time and vote to suspend that if they determined that it was anticompetitive, or that could be addressed in a subsequent recommendation brought by staff.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you have questions?

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I have a question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Were you done,

Commissioner Deason?

Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Of General

Counsel. Harold, I understand -- Mr. McLean, I

understand very clearly what our statutory

authority is as it relates to this Commission

itself following federal law. What's the

governance -- I mean, what are the parameters as

it relates to our ability to govern or to make

decisions as it relates to FCC rules?

MR. McLEAN: We're compelled to follow those rules, if I understand your question correctly.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: We're compelled to follow the rules to what extent? To the letter, or do we have some ability to interpret for

ourselves also on a case-by-case, state-by-state basis?

MR. MCLEAN: If I understand your question, yes, sir. But our authority flows from the Florida Legislature, not from the Federal Government. But we have to implement the Laws of Florida such that they're not inconsistent with federal laws and federal rules which implement those laws.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, I don't know if you have any more questions or not, but let me try to put this in perspective for us and see if we can get a vote out of this.

These are very important issues, because they do affect one way or the other the competitive arena that we have in telecommunications in Florida. I think -- and, Commissioner Bradley, you know this better than I do. The Florida Legislature spoke to this very issue in 1995 when they charged us with the mandate to promote a telecommunications local market in the State of Florida.

And I look at 364.01(4)(b) and just go down the list, encourage competition through flexible

regulatory treatment among providers of telecommunications services in order to ensure the availability of the widest possible range of consumer choice in the provision of all telecom services; (c) protect the public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring that monopoly services provided by telco companies continue to be subject to effective price, rate, and service regulation; and (d) promote competition by encouraging new entrants into the telecommunications market and by allowing a transitional period in which new entrants are subject to lesser regulation.

I didn't write the law. I didn't write the state law. I didn't write the federal law. But I have to tell you, I look at those statutes in relation to does the tariff, the promotional tariff create an environment that doesn't let competition occur in the local market. That's the test I've used for myself, is that tariff prohibiting the ALECs to compete adequately in the local market.

I have to tell you, Commissioners, based on today's discussion, I'm not convinced that's the case. I am not convinced today that BellSouth's

That's not

what we have today. But depending on the evidence in the record, I'll look forward to fully understanding whether there is some behavior that results in a lack of competitive entry.

Commissioners, we can go forward with

tariff results in behavior that does not allow

the local entrants to compete. But I have to

also tell you that I look forward to the hearing

in this case, because I think that, depending on

the evidence in the record, Mr. Turner -- and I

would agree with Mr. McGlothlin.

Commissioners, we can go forward with questions, or we can take a motion.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, Madam Chair, I too would look forward to a hearing. But my question still remains. I mean, I'm sensing that our process, our noticing requirements and so on have created a gap so that we're -- I need the answer to be cleared up, or I need to get a clear answer anyway, if we can in fact hold off on these tariff filings, and how do we go about that? You know, I don't know that Issue 3's recommendation gets us there, because I do have concerns over prospectively foreclosing, you know, a process that is available or that should

be available under our rules.

,

I have trouble not having a tariff before me to say, "Okay. We suspend it. This is what we're going to be looking at." And I'm not sure that we're on clear legal footing as to whether we can do it through the vehicle of a generic proceeding, because I think, and I'll tell you honestly, I can go either way on this. I would just as soon entertain a generic proceeding under our own motion and set out the issues, many of which we've heard today, the issues that we would want to be considering, or wait on a protest.

I'm just not confident that a protest under this particular docket is going to afford us the opportunity to really do the right thing and say, well, if we have a concern with these types of programs and we want to look at them and really make a -- you know, decide whether they're good or bad or whatever, that this particular opportunity will let us say, "This stops here until we've been able to make our determinations."

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Is your question -- because I think legal has taken a stab at it, so

let's try to be more specific, and maybe we can get a specific answer.

I heard two questions. Do we have the clear authority to suspend a tariff, that's the first question. The second question is, how do we go about --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I am less -- Madam
Chairman, I am less concerned with our authority
to suspend a tariff under the appropriate
circumstances and pursuant to the appropriate
process as I am -- my concern here is, if we've
identified policy concerns that we want to
consider, if we've identified aspects of these
types of programs that we want to look into
further, how do we -- in the context of what we
have before us today, how do we say, "Let's
everybody take a step back, because we are going
to look at these on a generic basis," or "we are
going to look at these issues, generally
speaking, if we have the authority to do that."

CHAIRMAN JABER: Whether we call it suspension or something else.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Precisely. I mean, I'm certainly not married to -- I think suspension is a different process.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. McLean,

2

Ms. Christensen. Ms. Banks.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. McLEAN: Well, I like Ms. Christensen's analysis. The point is, you know, you want these win-back programs before you either in a generic sense or in this particular docket. You've got to deal with entities filing these same tariffs in the meantime. What are you going to do with those? How can you avoid prejudging them?

And my notion is that you ought to be able to suspend them pending the outcome of this proceeding. I can't think of a more rational way to go about it. Any other scenario to me has you prejudging them as they come in. And maybe to some extent, suspending them does that too, but at least this gives you an opportunity to have a proceeding of some sort, yet to be decided, in which you determine and think about in a very generic sense these win-back programs.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. McLean, this may be a distinction without a difference. The problem is that here we're taking -- we're morphing a specific petition into what would amount to a generic proceeding, and I'm not sure that -- I'm

not sure that we can -- I don't know if we can do that or not.

MR. MCLEAN: I'm not sure that it serves the interests of all the parties, but then rulemaking is a rather cumbersome thing in which to engage --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I would agree. I mean --

MR. McLEAN: -- down the road somewhere, whereas, you know, with this proceeding, at least you're dealing with something fairly soon, and you know -- I mean, in many ways, this would be a generic. I mean, looking at the folks at the table, it's going to be a fairly generic proceeding too. But whether you can make general policy statements from that particular proceeding is a matter that Bell addressed and is my concern too. It's a difficult question.

Time is of the essence, I think. If what the ALEC community says is true, then you need to stop the bleeding. If what they say is not true, then you need to permit these kinds of filings. So I think time is of the essence, and the PAA process is probably the quickest way to a resolution.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, at the very least, regardless of the outcome of Issue 3, at the very least, we should expedite the proceeding, and certainly we'll try to make that happen.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Does that require us to make a decision on Issues 1 and 2, I guess is really the -- that would be my question. And I don't want to put words in anyone's mouth here. If you're talking, Madam Chairman, about expediting the proceeding by recognizing that on our own we need to have a proceeding or just waiting on -- let the PAA process take its effect.

MR. McLEAN: Madam Chairman, I didn't mean to imply that you could not go on your own. You don't have to wait on the PAA thing. You can vote today to go to hearing if you choose to.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Right. Commissioner
Baez, when I made that statement, it's in
anticipation of a protest to a PAA. But
honestly, that's not to preclude the alternative
of setting this directly for a hearing. That
just -- that didn't to occur me.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: No, and I'm not -- you

know, again, I can -- the will of the

Commission. Either way works for me. If it

gets the issues out, I don't have a problem,

whichever way is fastest.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, any feedback?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm willing to make a motion, and we'll just see what happens.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's do it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move staff on Issue

Or I can make a motion on all three issues.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'll second that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's hear your motion on all three, and maybe we can do it all together.

Staff on Issue 1; I would move staff on Issue 2, with the exception of the imposition of the 30-day moratorium period for the initiation of win-back activities; and I would move staff on Issue 3, with the exception that we do not include a provision which would prohibit BellSouth from filing a like tariff while this matter is going to hearing.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And on Issue 2, your removal of the 30 days is also acceptance of the

voluntary 10-day period, Commissioner Deason?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, it would be

acceptance of that.

And let me say that the 30-day moratorium I have a number of problems with. First of all, it appears it's asymmetrical. I'm not so sure it's appropriate in a tariff filing of this nature.

And the double billing problem, I'm not so sure how pervasive that problem is. It's very limited circumstances, it appears, and it seems like the double billing can be better addressed in a different venue. It seems to me that it's more a question of accurate and timely billing, either in an interconnection agreement or in performance standards, not necessarily in a tariff filing.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: And, Madam Chair, I would like to offer a second to Commissioner Deason's motion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. The motion is to move staff on Issue 1, to move staff on Issue 2 with the exception of the 30-day wait-out period and acknowledge BellSouth's voluntary 10-day waiting period, and on Issue 3 it's move staff

1	with the modification regarding not precluding
2	BellSouth from filing a tariff in the interim.
3	There has been a second, a motion and a second.
4	All those in favor say aye.
5	(Simultaneous affirmative responses.)
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Opposed, nay.
7	(No response.)
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. That addresses
9	Item 11.
10	(Conclusion of consideration of Item 11.)
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

4 | STATE OF FLORIDA)

5 | COUNTY OF LEON)

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 128 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 26th day of June, 2002.

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

100 salem Court

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(850) 878-2221