1	BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION					
2	In the Matter of					
3		NE NEED FOR DOCKET NO. 020262-EI				
4	AN ELECTRICAL POWER PLANT IN					
5	MARTIN COUNTY BY FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY					
6	PETITION TO DETERMINE NEED FOR DOCKET NO. 020263-EI					
7	AN ELECTRICAL POWER PLANT IN MANATEE COUNTY BY FLORIDA POWER &					
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10	ELECTRIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT					
11	THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY					
12		VOLUME 1				
13		PAGES 1 THROUGH 159				
14	PROCEEDINGS:	HEARING				
15	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON				
16		COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI				
17		COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY				
18	DATE:	Wednesday, October 2, 2002				
19	TIME:	Commenced at 9:40 a.m.				
20	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148				
21		4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida				
22	DEDODTED DV	· ·				
23	REPORTED BY:	LINDA BOLES, RPR Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6734				
24		(000) 413-0/34				
25						

APPEARANCES:

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JOHN W. McWHIRTER, JR., McWhirter, Reeves, McGlothlin, Davidson, Decker, Kaufman & Arnold, P.A., 400 North Tampa Street, Suite 2450, Tampa, Florida 33601-3350 appearing on behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group.

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EXHIBITS				
NUMBER:		ID.	ADMTD.	
1	Evanson Deposition Dated 9-23-02	24	24	
2	RS-1 through RS-8, with Errata Sheet	76		
3	Need Study Exhibits 1 through 16	77		
4	Need Study Exhibits 17 through 23	77		
5	Summary of Economic Analysis	141		
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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN JABER: All right. We're ready to start the hearing. Counsel, you have a notice to read.

MR. HARRIS: We do, Commissioners. By notice issued September 3rd, 2002, this time and place is set for a hearing in Docket Numbers 020262-EI, petition to determine need for an electrical power plant in Martin County by Florida Power & Light, and Docket Number 020263-EI, petition to determine need for an electrical power plant in Manatee County by Florida Power & Light. The purpose of the hearing is set out in the notice.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Let's take appearances. We'll start on the left.

MR. GUYTON: Charles A. Guyton, John T. Butler, William Hill, Gabriel A. Nieto and Elizabeth C. Daly with the law firm of Steel, Hector & Davis, appearing on behalf of Florida Power & Light Company. Also appearing on behalf of Florida Power & Light Company is R. Wade Litchfield.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: Jon Moyle, Jr., with the Moyle, Flanigan Law Firm, appearing on behalf of the Intervenor in this case, CPV Gulfcoast Limited.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Joe McGlothlin, 117 South Gadsden Street. Tallahassee, appearing for Florida PACE.

MR. McWHIRTER: John McWhirter, 400 North Tampa

Street in Tampa, appearing on behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group.

MR. TWOMEY: Good morning, Commissioners. Michael B. Twomey, Post Office Box 5256, Tallahassee, Florida 32314-5256, appearing on behalf of the Florida Action Coalition Team, Thomas and Genevieve Twomey, Burton Greenfield, et al., in the second petition I filed.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Any other appearances?

MS. CARTER: Martha Carter Brown and Larry D. Harris on behalf of the Commission.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Okay. Ms. Brown, I know that there are preliminary matters. I'd like to go through the ones that I know of and let you check them off the list, and at the end of that process you can tell me if I've forgotten any.

I have a copy of South Pond Energy Park's notice of withdrawal in the case, and for purposes of the record that notice of withdrawal is acknowledged.

I've got -- and let me just announce right from the beginning that I have all the motions that I'm going to go through today and I've got copies of the responses. I have read the motions and I have read the responses. I will not need oral argument, I will not be asking for presentations by the parties on a majority of these motions. The ones where I will need to hear from the parties I'm going to save to the end.

1 So the first motion is FP&L's motion for official 2 recognition of various agenda transcripts. I've read that 3 motion and I've read the response from CPV and from PACE. Were 4 there any other responses. Ms. Brown? 5 No, Chairman Jaber, not that I'm aware MS. BROWN: 6 of. 7 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. The ruling is this: 8 motion for official recognition of the agenda transcripts is 9 denied. 10 There is a motion -- petition to intervene filed by Mr. Twomey on behalf of Tom Twomey and Genevieve Twomey. That 11 12 petition to intervene is granted. 13 MR. TWOMEY: Thank you. 14 CHAIRMAN JABER: Florida Partnership for Affordable Competitive Energy, PACE's request for oral argument. 15 read that motion and understood that it was withdrawn, that it 16 17 may be withdrawn. Ms. Brown, has it been? 18 MS. BROWN: Yes. I think the parties will need to 19 fill you in on that. It's my understanding that PACE's motion 20 for official recognition has not been contested. Is that 21 correct? CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm not on the official recognition. 22 23 PACE has filed a request for oral argument related to FP&L's 24 motion to compel and PACE's motion for protective order.

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MS. BROWN: Yes. It's my understanding that that's

1 been withdrawn. 2 MR. GUYTON: That motion to compel has been 3 withdrawn. 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So doesn't that make PACE's 5 request for oral argument moot? 6 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Yes. That was filed only as a 7 contingency in the event that the other motion went forward. 8 CHAIRMAN JABER: All right. Well. Mr. McGlothlin. 9 I'll leave it up to you. Are you withdrawing the request for 10 oral argument or do I need to find it moot? I don't care. 11 MR. McGLOTHLIN: No. It's withdrawn. CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Thank you. PACE's motion for 12 13 official recognition of Order Number PSC99-2507-S-EU is 14 granted. The notice of substitution of witness and adoption of 15 testimony, it is a request by CPV that Mr. Finnerty -- is that 16 the right pronunciation. Mr. Moyle -- will be substituted for 17 Douglas Egan, and that request is granted. 18 The motion for summary final order filed by FP&L --19 MS. BROWN: Chairman Jaber, I'm sorry to interrupt. 20 CHAIRMAN JABER: That's all right. 21 MS. BROWN: There is a petition to intervene of 22 Burton Greenfield, et al., filed by Mr. Twomey. 23 CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Thank you. I had that all 24 taped together, Ms. Brown, and I neglected to mention it. That 25 was also filed by Mr. Twomey, and that request for intervention

1 is granted. Thank you. 2 What is the status of FP&L's motion for summary final 3 order. Ms. Brown? 4 MS. BROWN: I think I should let Florida Power & 5 Light respond to your question. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton? 7 MR. GUYTON: As I recall, that motion for summary 8 final order as to -- had to do with FACT's party status; 9 correct? 10 MR. HILL: Shall I address it? 11 MR. GUYTON: Yes. 12 MR. HILL: Good morning, Commissioners. William 13 Hill. We took the deposition last night pursuant to the 14 Commission's ruling. There were a number of guestions that 15 were asked that were not answered. There was a ruling from the 16 prehearing officer, Commissioner Deason, ordering the answers 17 be given. The answers were still not given. 18 We're disappointed we didn't get the information we sought and was ordered, but we've spent enough time and effort 19 on this and we're prepared to move forward. We'll withdraw the 20 21 motion at this time. 22 CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Hill. FP&L's motion for summary final order has been withdrawn. For purposes of 23 24 the record, I acknowledge that.

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Now, Mr. Hill, there is an issue in the prehearing

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order related to standing. Are you asking that that issue be 1 2 withdrawn as well? 3 MR. HILL: Yes. Commissioner. Yes. Chairman Jaber. 4 CHAIRMAN JABER: Ms. Brown, is that Issue 18? 5 MS. BROWN: Issue 18. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Issue 18. Commissioners. will 7 be withdrawn from the prehearing order; Issue 18, Page 35 of 8 the prehearing order. 9 There is a request to quash subpoena; it was filed by 10 FP&L. This relates to Mr. Evanson's deposition and his 11 appearance at this hearing. I don't have a copy of a -- we just received a copy of the response, Mr. Moyle. I guess that 12 13 was filed this morning. 14 MR. MOYLE: Yes. ma'am. 15 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Obviously I have not had time 16 to read the response, so I will entertain argument on this 17 motion. Are the parties ready to do that now? 18 MR. LITCHFIELD: We are. Madam Chairman. 19 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. FP&L, it's your motion. I'll 20 let you start. 21 MR. LITCHFIELD: Thank you, Madam Chairman. We have read our motion. CPV, through Mr. Moyle, served notice of a 22 23 deposition for Mr. Paul Evanson, I think it was Tuesday of last 24 week, and Mr. Evanson was noticed for deposition on Thursday 25 afternoon. The deposition was taken.

Immediately following or perhaps immediately before, I just don't recall, Mr. Moyle served Mr. Evanson with a subpoena requiring him to appear at the proceedings this week, and FPL, as you know, filed its motion to quash, I think, within a day of that.

You've read our motion, so I won't rehash it, but rather let me spend some time responding to, to the response filed to our motion by Mr. Moyle.

When you read it, you will see that he contends that, that there, that Mr. Evanson is the person who has admitted that he is ultimately responsible for the decisions on which these hearings are based. That's true. Mr. Evanson is the president of Florida Power & Light Company. Ultimately he's responsible for all decisions at the company, and I think he admitted to that in his deposition.

But on, on Mr. Moyle's theory then, Mr. Evanson would be required to appear or could be required to appear at every proceeding that ever comes before this Commission. We think that's bad policy and we think that's bad precedent.

He indicates that no other FPL witness is in the position of being able to make the ultimate decision or to testify regarding the factors that he considered in making that decision. Well, as I indicated, Mr. Evanson did, in fact, make the ultimate decision, as he makes the ultimate decisions in a great many cases in most any things of substance to Florida

Power & Light Company.

That could probably be stipulated. We don't need Mr. Evanson here to, to put that into the record. And, in fact, we have his deposition and that's clear in his deposition and could be used as a substitute for his live testimony.

As to the factors that he considered in making that decision, the contention is that we don't have any FPL witnesses here that could discuss the factors that went into that decision. Well, that's just patently false. The factors that went into the decision are before you in this docket through prefiled testimony, exhibits, the need determination, which were presented to Mr. Evanson in summary fashion, mind you, and those were the factors upon which he endorsed the recommendation of Mr. Silva.

Mr. Moyle will also argue that the Brook case and the Halderman cases, which I referred to in our motion, don't stand for the proposition that, for which they are offered because they, they deal with state and governmental officials as opposed to private corporations. Well, we think that nonetheless the principle is analogous and it should be adhered to and adopted by this Commission as a matter of policy.

Mr. Moyle also contends that, that Mr. Evanson should be required to appear because, as he states, there's at least one question in the deposition that Mr. Evanson was instructed not to answer. Well, that's true as a matter of deposition

14 practice that, that witnesses from time to time are instructed 1 2 in certain limited circumstances not to answer a question. 3 Mr. Moyle's opportunity then is to pursue that with the 4 prehearing officer, which, frankly, he indicated to me he intended to do and had already made sure that Commissioner 5 6 Deason was available Friday to air that issue and to have that 7 resolved before the hearing today. And when he chose not to do 8 that, I assumed he was going to let that lie. But instead he's 9 reserved it as an argument in support of his motion or his 10 contention that Mr. Evanson ought to be compelled or required 11 to appear here today to answer that question. 12 CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Litchfield. what are what are 13 those limited circumstances where an attorney can instruct a 14 deponent not to answer?

MR. LITCHFIELD: In my experience, an attorney is allowed to instruct a witness not to answer if it would tend to disclose privileged information including attorney work product or communications, if the questions are to the point where they are essentially a form of harassment of the witness or if the information is otherwise confidential or privileged and not subject to an existing confidentiality agreement. And it was in that latter case that I instructed Mr. Evanson not to answer the questions that are the subject of Mr. Moyle's response.

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The -- so as I said, we're entitled to make certain objections in the deposition and to instruct the witnesses not to answer. And Mr. Moyle's remedy was, as he had mapped out in his mind and has articulated to me, was to pursue that with the prehearing officer before this hearing. And he failed to do that and now he would have you use that as a reason to compel Mr. Evanson to appear live today.

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He indicates, also, that, again, Mr. Evanson was clearly the person with the final say. And I'll refer you to Page 4 of his response. "Clearly the person with the final say in determining the best alternative." Well, again, he is the president and has the final say on a great many matters. But as he indicated in his deposition to Mr. Moyle, the recommendation that was given to him was, was presented by Mr. Silva and, and the work that was done to produce that recommendation was done by Mr. Silva or people under Mr. Silva's direction or control or Mr. Taylor, who is a witness in this case. And, in fact, the interrogatory and answer reflected here on Page 4 is clear; the results of the analysis performed independently by FPL and Mr. Taylor show that the All-FPL self build option is the lowest cost alternative to meet FPL's capacity need. Based on these results and on his own review, meaning Mr. Silva's own review of noneconomic factors related to different generation capacity alternatives, Mr. Silva concluded that the All-FPL self build option is the best alternative. Mr. Silva communicated his conclusions and the bases for those conclusions to Mr. Evanson,

who concurred.

I think we have ten witnesses here, including Mr. Silva, who can adequately and fully address any question relating to the factors that went into the decision, the reasons for the decision, the details of the analysis. And I think it is cumulative, unnecessary and would set a poor precedent to require Mr. Evanson to appear here at this hearing.

Now having said that, I don't know what Mr. Evanson's availability is, but clearly if it is the Commission's intent, and order to have Mr. Evanson appear, we will certainly make him available. We just think as a matter of practice it doesn't make sense and we think, frankly, that in this case it borders on harassment. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Litchfield, I may have missed this. I don't think so. Did you make the offer of admitting the deposition transcript into the hearing in lieu of Mr. Evanson being physically here?

MR. LITCHFIELD: Yes, we did.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Does that offer still stand?

MR. LITCHFIELD: It certainly does.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle, response.

MR. MOYLE: Sure. And we did just receive the motion to quash on Monday and worked yesterday in addition to preparing for this case to put together a response, which you

have before you. It was filed this morning. So I will, I will try to spend a little time summarizing the arguments set forth in the pleading and make the case we believe why it's appropriate to have Mr. Evanson called as a witness.

Before I get into the legal arguments in the pleading, I guess I would just note that it's my understanding that this is the biggest need case that's ever been filed in the State of Florida. And we've had a lot of discovery in this case, we've taken depositions and what not. Mr. Evanson was very much involved in this decision. Ultimately it was his decision. I think the interrogatory answer which is appended as part of the motion reflects that.

Also attached to the response to the motion to quash is a sampling of the E-mails that went back and forth between Mr. Evanson and others regarding various aspects of the need determination in the case.

So just by looking at that, I would argue that Mr. Evanson played and integral role, it's ultimately his decision, and he ought, ought to be compelled to appear.

With respect to the timing, counsel and I, we've known Mr. Evanson was going to be a witness for CPV for quite some time, we've had discussions about his available. There was discussions about would he appear voluntarily and what not. We weren't able to come to an agreement. So as a result, at the deposition, which counsel and I had worked out as to when

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it would be held, CPV felt it had no choice but to have him under a subpoena to compel his availability.

If I could just, just briefly talk on a couple of legal points. It seems that FPL takes the position that because a deposition is available, that Mr. Evanson is not needed. Well, I think that misconstrues the role of depositions and discovery in preparing for a fact-finding process.

If it were always true that depositions could be used in lieu of live testimony, it seems to me that that would severely curtail the power of this Commission to have statewide subpoena power, number one. And, secondly, it would prevent somebody from putting on a case at a proceeding like CPV plans to do here. You would have to go through and prepare your deposition in a way that is wholly different because you would say, well, wait a minute, this has to come in as, as evidence of the proceeding. I think if you review the deposition, it was clear that CPV conducted the deposition as a discovery deposition designed to elicit information that would then be used to prepare for cross-examination. So the reliance on 1.330(a)(3) with respect to the deposition, we think, is misplaced.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle, did you ask in the deposition questions related to the E-mails that you've attached to your response?

1 MR. MOYLE: I believe, I believe I did. ma'am: 2 particularly one that Mr., Mr. Evanson got from Mr. Waters. 3 And I'll get into it -- the question that I want --4 CHAIRMAN JABER: Is that deposition dated 5 September 23rd? 6 MR. MOYLE: I believe that's right. 7 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Go ahead. 8 MR. MOYLE: Okay. Section 120.569(2)(k)(1), Florida 9 Statutes, under Chapter 120, which is the statute that this 10 proceeding is being conducted under, sets forth the standards 11 for quashing a subpoena. 12 And I'll just quote. It says, "Any person subject to 13 a subpoena may, before compliance in a timely petition, request 14 a presiding officer having jurisdiction of the dispute to 15 invalidate the subpoena on the ground that it was not lawfully 16 issued, is unreasonably broad in scope or requires the 17 production of irrelevant material." 18 Now I don't think FP&L has argued that the subpoena was unlawfully issued, I don't think they've argued that it's 19 20 unreasonably broad in scope, and I don't think that they've 21 argued that it requires a production of irrelevant material. 22 So we would argue as a matter of law that this subpoena is 23 valid and ought to be enforced. Let Me --CHAIRMAN JABER: How does, how does the argument 24

related to availability and, and distance, you know, he lives

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beyond the 100-mile radius, how does, how do you reconcile
those two arguments?

MR. MOYLE: My understanding of that is that that's something that can be used if, if you can establish that the person is beyond the 100 miles, but it doesn't trump the subpoena power. For a party putting on a case that feels that this witness is necessary, if, if a jurisdiction has subpoena power over them, I do not believe that the, the provision related to the admissibility of depositions trumps the subpoena power.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And the subpoena Rule of Civil Procedure you said is?

MR. MOYLE: I think it's on the subpoena. I don't have it right at my fingertips. I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. But you cited to some rule.

MR. MOYLE: I cited to 120.569, Florida Statutes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Oh, the statutes. Okay.

MR. MOYLE: Right. The, the other point that, that is made in the motion, and I think it's also reflected in a portion of the transcript was, which was attached, is CPV asked Mr. Evanson a series of questions related to his authority with respect to settlements and whether settlements were things that he would be made aware of and what not.

We had that discussion and then referred him to a piece of testimony from another witness, from another FP&L

witness, which we argue shows that if the equity penalty were not applied, that FP&L's proposal would not be the least cost alternative. We showed him that, that testimony and asked him if he knew the person who offered it and knew whether he considered this person to be trustworthy. He said he did.

I then asked Mr. Evanson whether he was aware of why the entity that had the lower cost proposal was no longer in the case. Mr. Evanson said, you need to go ask that entity. I said, well, with all due respect, I'm asking you. He said he wasn't really aware.

I then asked him whether FP&L had entered into a settlement agreement with that entity taking them out of the case. Okay? And that was when he was instructed not to answer the question. Mr. Litchfield and I engaged in some lawyerly back and forth about the relevancy of that, and I argue that I consider it relevant to the extent that the statute requires the most cost-effective determination be made by the Commission. And to the extent that there was a lower cost alternative out there and you didn't apply the equity penalty, if FP&L had entered into a settlement agreement with this entity and taken them out of the case, that that was relevant, I would argue, to the proceeding. And Mr. Evanson (sic.) directed the witness not to answer that question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: On that point, before you leave that point.

MR. MOYLE: Uh-huh.

CHAIRMAN JABER: With respect to the direction not to respond, why didn't you then seek recourse from the prehearing officer? Why not move to compel? I'm trying to understand why the remedy there is having him appear at the hearing versus ask the prehearing officer to order the witness to answer.

MR. MOYLE: Sure. Sure. I'll tell you, tell you my thoughts in that regard.

Number one, he had been served with a valid subpoena. I didn't know for sure whether FP&L was going to move to quash or not. I didn't get the motion to quash until, until Monday, I believe. Okay. They indicated that they had it prepared but they, you know, hadn't made a decision. So my --

CHAIRMAN JABER: I'm not sure you're answering my question.

MR. MOYLE: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: The motion to quash is the motion to quash the subpoena to have him appear at the hearing.

MR. MOYLE: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: My question goes to the heart of the deposition and your remedy associated with him not answering the questions at the deposition. Isn't the appropriate remedy going to the prehearing officer and seeking that the prehearing officer compel the response?

MR. MOYLE: Well, I'm not sure. I mean, we gave that

some thought. But my thought was, listen, if he's going to be at the hearing, which I had him under subpoena, there had been no motion to quash filed, then, you know, that decision could be made by the Commission; if he was instructed again not to answer, that that decision could be made by the Commission, number one.

And, number two, quite frankly, we were working under pretty tight time frames. The deposition was last Thursday. I was in West Palm Beach Friday, you know, came back here yesterday, I'm losing my track of days, but the bid rule was, I guess, Monday. So it was, it was a pretty, pretty hectic time.

But I would point out, also, that, you know, Mr. Litchfield says that I said, well, I'd go to the prehearing officer, and I considered going to the prehearing officer. But the transcript that's attached on Page 58 says, "Mr. Moyle: We'll let the Commission sort this out. Mr. Litchfield: I think that's probably what we need to do." So, you know, the transcript reflects that I said let's let the Commission sort this one out. And, you know, I think that's the appropriate way in which to pursue it.

But back on my point, you know, that also points out the reason, I believe, why he needs to be here personally, because I think that's a pertinent question to this case. If FP&L has entered into a settlement agreement with somebody who had a lower cost alternative and deprived the Commission of

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that evidence, I think that's relevant to your decision and to your judgment. And for that reason, you know, I think that the information he has is, is necessary, and we would ask that you go ahead and enforce the subpoena power that you have.

MR. LITCHFIELD: May I respond, Madam Chairman?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Moyle. No, you may not. I've heard the arguments and I've heard the response.

I've read the pleadings. Here's what we're going to do. The motion to quash the subpoena to have Mr. Evanson appear at the hearing is granted. However, the deposition transcript dated September 23rd, 2002 -- my copy indicates it is 107 pages -- I'm going to leave it up to the parties to make sure it's the transcript that belongs in this hearing, that this is the accurate transcript that the court reporter should have. That transcript will be identified as Exhibit 1 for purposes of the hearing and it will be admitted into the record.

(Exhibit 1 marked for identification and admitted into the record.)

MR. MOYLE: Could I just for the record make one, one request?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: With respect to that question that I contend is very important to CPV's case, would it be permissible to have that question asked and answered or that line of questioning asked and answered with respect to the

settlement agreements that FP&L has entered into with respect 1 2 to other intervenors in this case? 3 CHAIRMAN JABER: Are you asking that I now compel 4 Mr. Evanson to answer that question? 5 MR. MOYLE: Yes. 6 CHAIRMAN JABER: Is that what you're asking? No. 7 That request is denied. 8 MR. MOYLE: Okay. Thank you. 9 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. The next motion I have in 10 front of me, Ms. Brown, is the motion in limine to exclude new 11 testimony by PACE. And I do need to hear argument on that. 12 FP&L filed a motion. I've got that motion, I've read it. The 13 time for filing responses obviously has not expired. So --14 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Chairman Jaber, we may be able to call that a moot motion. Mr. Guyton, suggested a work out to 15 16 me before we started up here, and on reflection I think it's 17 acceptable to our side. 18 MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, we would withdraw the motion with the understanding that if Mr. Slater takes the 19 20 stand, he would only be allowed to supplement or clarify his 21 prefiled testimony to the extent that he did so in deposition 22 that was taken yesterday, with the understanding that if he's 23 allowed to do that, we would be given the opportunity to 24 present live rebuttal witnesses as to that supplemental

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testimony.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, let's talk about that. Let me just tell you for future knowledge as well, there is a -- I have a strong feeling as it relates to preserving the integrity of the process and the integrity of having prefiled testimony that all parties benefit from, prepare their case to and, frankly, that the Commissioners and staff prepare for the hearing. So I have a strong feeling as it relates to preserving that process. I don't want surprises in the next couple of days. I mean, you all are put on notice. There will be no surprises. I expect courtesy to each other throughout the entire week.

So, Mr. McGlothlin, I would ask that you make sure that you sit down with Mr. Guyton and find out what those supplemental changes, corrections, modifications might be and understand what the ramifications are. I don't like the idea of live rebuttal, when clearly the procedure for having, governing this case has been established by the prehearing officer for some time now. So give me a little more information, Mr. McGlothlin.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: The nature of the updated testimony will be that Mr. Slater, since he filed his prefiled testimony, has reviewed, with the aid of the confidential instruction manual, the EGEAS runs and has additional observations, many of which serve to supplement and reinforce conclusions already made in the same areas.

There are a limited number of observations that are additional points, but I think what we've arrived at here is a reasonable work out because there was an issue of some delay in his ability to review that materials.

And we, I think, went the extra mile yesterday by making him available for a deposition at 4:00 yesterday afternoon. Mr. Slater drove five miles to a court reporter's office to accommodate FPL's wishes and need in that regard. And I think it's acceptable to us to have the content of that deposition serve as the blueprint for whatever supplemental testimony would be offered.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, you are not, you're not requesting now that you be given an opportunity for live rebuttal. You're reserving your right to seek that later.

MR. GUYTON: Our understanding is that there are additional points that we would like to rebut based upon the deposition. There's an elaboration and some additional new points that had we had it earlier, we could have prefiled rebuttal testimony, as is our preference. But with the understanding that that additional information would come in when he takes the stand, yes, we are asking for leave to offer two additional witnesses, actually it's two witnesses that are already preparing rebuttal, but they would elaborate when they take the stand beyond what they've prefiled to address what Mr. Slater proposes to elaborate on when he takes the stand.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't expect that Mr. Slater will testify today, so let me take that motion and your request under advisement.

MR. GUYTON: That's fine. I mean, the other alternatives, we're perfectly comfortable with the motion in limine and proceeding that way as well. But we offered this accommodation to try to facilitate the process. And, you know, we'll yield to your judgment as to which you'd prefer.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. I'll let you two talk about it further. Get a clear understanding what the changes are, Mr. McGlothlin, and I will revisit this later on in the day.

All right. Ms. Brown, that's the only motion I want left outstanding. So are there any other ones I don't know about?

MS. BROWN: I'm not aware of any, Chairman Jaber. And if the parties are, I'd like them to speak up now.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: I'm not sure it's -- well, maybe it is a motion. It was my intent to invoke the rule prior to witnesses testifying. I'm not sure we're at that point. But I've raised it with the prehearing officer and it's usually been my practice before witnesses are called to invoke the rule, and I would intend to ask that it be done in this case.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I think for purposes of the record we just need to acknowledge that and leave it up to you to

handle the questions with respect to each witness. Do you
intend to do that on every single witness?

MR. MOYLE: No, ma'am. What I was intending to do is, as authorized by the Florida Evidence Code and some case law, to invoke the rule in that witnesses -- again, let me start from this premise.

CPV Gulfcoast has offered a number of witnesses; I think one witness of CPV that's going to testify. Our, our case is going to have to be made largely based on cross-examination.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Uh-huh.

MR. MOYLE: I would ask that the rule be invoked to preclude all of the FP&L witnesses remaining in the room to hear my cross and the answers and what not because that would be unfair to CPV Gulfcoast. So at the appropriate time I would ask that the rule be invoked consistent with Section 90.616, Florida Statutes, which is the evidence code. And if you want to take argument on it, I can argue it in greater detail. But I just didn't know whether this was the time to argue it or right before we get to --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yeah. I don't know either, Mr. Moyle.

Staff, what, procedurally what is the timing? Can I just acknowledge the request now or do I actually have to make a finding now? What is the procedure?

MR. HARRIS: Commissioner, generally in civil practice prior to the swearing of the witnesses the rule is invoked. It will -- it's been my experience that usually all the witnesses will be sworn and then they're asked to leave the courtroom if the rule is invoked and the tribunal decides to grant that request.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yeah, Mr. Moyle. I think that's something we handle right before each witness comes up. But I don't, I don't mind hearing argument on this. Mr. Guyton, do you have any objection to the request?

MR. GUYTON: Yes. And I'd ask Mr. Hill to address the request.

MR. HILL: Thank you, Chairman Jaber. We oppose the sequestrations of witnesses in this case for a number of reasons. First, it is based on the Florida Evidence Code, which is not applicable here. We don't think there's any purpose for invoking the rule here.

Even if the rule of evidence were applicable in this case, we would note that courts apply it with considerable discretion, and courts have wide discretion in applying the rule of sequestration or not applying the rule of sequestration.

The case law makes clear -- and I've got a case I can hand up, if necessary. I've provided it to Mr. Moyle. The rule of sequestration is not a strict rule of law. There are a

number of exceptions. First and foremost, and this exception is generally recognized and utilized, experts are generally outside of a rule of sequestration even when invoked.

In this particular case, FPL has -- of course, I should cite my case when I, when I mention it; Goodman versus West Coast Brace & Limb, 580 So.2d 193.

The recognized exception for experts applies particularly here. FPL has chosen carefully ten witnesses in different areas to testify to areas that are within their particular expertise. These witnesses are either practical experts or in essence they are experts and their testimony or their presence will be necessary during all parts of the presentation of the case in order that they may evaluate matters and, and apply their expertise.

Second, there is an exception to client representatives. Our witnesses are all, in essence, client representatives. Generally, generally speaking, people in courts, the exception for client representative is to a single representative, but that's not necessarily the case. And here we have client representatives from various areas of the company with various areas of knowledge, and we think it's appropriate to have them here.

Additionally, the principle rule underlying or the principle reason for the rule of sequestration is to avoid witnesses from listening to other testimony and coloring their

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testimony as a result. That danger is absent or an absolute minimum here because we're talking about prefiled testimony. And this, this is the common sense approach. Every witness here knows what every witness is going to say, it's been part of the public record for months, there's no secret about what these testimonies are going to be. Most of our witnesses have already been deposed, so there's no issue about the issues that will be brought up in cross-examination. So the basis underlying the rule is not present here. There's no danger of witnesses coloring their testimony.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. -- just if I could interject. Mr. Moyle, it's been my experience since my time here that the ball gets passed so much as witnesses testify that the guy that ends up holding the ball at the end of the day is the last witness, and it just saves so much time when he's heard all the questions that have gotten referred to him. But it is your request.

MR. MOYLE: Yeah. And I guess, again, it's premised largely on the situation in which we find ourselves, which is having to build a case on cross-examination. And I would argue that it's inherently unfair for all the witnesses to sit in the room and listen to my cross and then the answers, and it's more likely than not that answers would dovetail if they were all in the room.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But the choice to build your case on

cross-examination was your choice.

MR. MOYLE: That's right. That's right. But, but, again, the case -- I think the case law, the case that Mr. Hill gave you, if you look at the, the first section there, it says, quote, "When a party requests that witnesses will be excluded from a trial proceeding under the sequestration rule, generally the trial court will exclude all perspective witnesses from the courtroom," quote, "to avoid coloring of a witness's testimony by that which he has heard from other witnesses who have preceded him on trial." And it cites, you know, a number of different cases.

It's always been my practice, trying things over at the Division of Administrative Hearings or in courts, to invoke the rule when I felt it would be beneficial to a trial strategy. Today, without getting, you know, into all of my trial strategy, you know, the case is largely premised on cross, and for that reason we think that it's appropriate to invoke the rule.

Just a couple of comments. With respect to -CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang onto that thought. I need to
let Mr. Hill finish. I interrupted him. But I will let you
respond.

MR. MOYLE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. HILL: Thank you, Chairman Jaber. My next point was going to be the efficiency point, and there are going to be

occasions, we expect, where a witness will simply have to defer a question either from cross-examination or from the Commission to another witness. It would be much more efficient to have the witnesses present. And, as you noted, the last one of the day is probably going to be answering a lot of questions.

So the way this proceeding is set forth, the rule will not support efficiency, it will detract significantly from the efficiency of putting on our case. And we believe it will be much more beneficial to the panel to have the witnesses present during all phases, during all the questioning.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Is it your opinion I have the discretion to deny this kind of request?

MR. HILL: Absolutely. You have, you have wide -you have the discretion not to even apply the rule of
sequestration here. And we have looked carefully to find
whether this Commission has ever invoked the rule of
sequestration. We were not able to find any purported places
where this Commission has even applied the rule of
sequestration. So you don't -- you can check with staff and
I'd invite you to, but you have the discretion not to even
recognize the rule of sequestration. And certainly if the rule
were applicable here as it were in a court, you would have the
discretion to deny it for the interest of efficiency and, and
putting on an efficient case. So, absolutely, you have the,
you have the discretion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Hill. Mr. Moyle, I want you to respond to all of that. But two questions for you: Is there anything in 120 in the APA that's, that is similar to the provision in Chapter 90 is the first question? And the second question is, do you agree I have the discretion to deny your request?

MR. MOYLE: Let me start with the second one first because I don't have to go look. Yeah. I do believe the standard is a discretionary standard, and it's whether that discretion is abused or not. So Mr. Hill and I agree on, on that point.

With respect to just a couple of other points that he made that I think I can concur on. It's been my experience that when the rule is invoked, that parties are allowed to have one client representative remain in, and that's, I think, almost a due process issue so they can be part of the proceedings and partake.

With respect to the efficiency argument, I would disagree with that because I think it's incumbent on the lawyers to have the questions to ask the witnesses. And to the extent that Witness A says, well, Witness B would be better to answer that question, you know, particularly for me on cross, then it's going to be my job to say, okay, I need to ask that question of Witness B. And, you know, the idea that somehow the witnesses are going to be responsible for that or doing

that, I just disagree from an efficiency standpoint. I mean, it's the lawyers' responsibility to keep track of that and to pose the questions to the, to the right, right witnesses.

With respect to your, your question about, about Section 90 and 120, I can't give you a definitive answer on that, candidly. I'm sorry I can't. It's been my understanding that typically administrative processes follow the evidence code as guidance. I mean, I think it wouldn't make sense not to follow the evidence code. It's been put together because it's been dependable and reliable and the courts of the State of Florida use it. And I would argue that administrative tribunals ought to also follow its fundamental tenets, and the exclusive of witnesses, I would argue, is sort of a fundamental tenet of the evidence code.

I would point out that the administrative procedures has been known to be a little more lax on certain evidence things like hearsay evidence can come in so long as it doesn't serve to prove the essentially fact, as the basis of the essential fact.

So I'm sorry I can't give you a definitive answer on that. Maybe staff knows or maybe Mr. Hill knows.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Moyle. Does that conclude your response?

MR. MOYLE: Yes. ma'am.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Staff, I think Mr. Moyle is correct

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where in the APA, if there isn't a provision on a certain subject, we do defer to the evidence code. I think that that is a correct statement. Do you agree with that?

MR. HARRIS: Commissioners, my understanding is the Commission does follow the evidence code when possible. I do not believe there is a binding requirement that you must follow it on all occasions.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But saying all of that, staff agrees I have the discretion to the deny the request to invoke Section 90.616 of the Florida Evidence Code?

MR. HARRIS: Absolutely, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Mr. Moyle, I'm going to deny your request.

MR. MOYLE: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't think the circumstances you raise in this case warrant deviation from our practice. And, frankly, I have confidence in the way this hearing will be conducted to allay your concerns. This is going to be, as they always are, fair hearings with witnesses being admonished when they don't answer the questions and counsel being put on notice how this hearing will be conducted. So I think your concerns will be addressed in other ways.

MR. MOYLE: And I have, I have no doubt -- don't understand my comments to suggest any doubt about that.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I don't.

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MR. MOYLE: I was just, you know, making a point with respect to witnesses hearing others. But I thank you for considering the request and appreciate the, the ruling.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Any other preliminary matters?

All right. Here's what we're going to do. We're going to go ahead and swear in the witnesses. I would ask that the witnesses please stand and raise their right hand.

(Witnesses collectively sworn.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you. Now while I see the witnesses, let me tell you that I expect your responses will begin with a yes or no where appropriate, with a fair opportunity for a response or an elaboration. But if a question calls for a yes or no answer, I'm going to be listening to a yes or no. And, frankly, I won't wait for an objection. I will be prepared to remind the witnesses of the instruction.

The attorneys, absolutely you have a right to preserve the record on appeal by making various objections. You know, we don't stand in the way of that. But I would ask that you remember what the big picture is as it relates to this Commission making a finding at the end of the day. I, for one, and I know my colleagues share the concern, we want to hear the substance of the testimony. We want to hear the substance of the petition so that we can make the most informed decision we

can make at the end of this process. I respect the need to consider objections, and don't get me wrong, I will rule on objections. But I would ask that we weigh all of that with a professional courtesy and the understanding of what the Commissioners are really here to decide throughout this process.

This hearing will get done by Friday. If this

This hearing will get done by Friday. If this hearing does not get done on Friday, I am not kidding, ask around, I'm prepared to be here Saturday and I know my colleagues will be here Saturday. That's not a bluff; right? We've had Saturday hearings before.

I would expect that we conduct this hearing with the utmost professionalism. We're going to take a short break before opening statements because I understand there needs to be a setup over here for the Commissioners in the use of visual aids.

Staff, before we take a short break, is there anything else we need to discuss right now?

MS. BROWN: Not that I'm aware of, Chairman Jaber.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We're going to come back at -- we're going to take a ten-minute break. I think ten minutes is what you asked for, Mr. Guyton.

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Madam Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We'll take a ten-minute break and then start the hearing. Thank you.

(Recess taken.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's get back on the record. We're at the stage now where we can entertain opening statements. I've been looking at the prehearing order, and it looks like the prehearing officer allowed opening statements of ten minutes per party and requested that the parties coordinate with respect to their openings statements to avoid repetition. I assume that's been done.

I notice also that an opportunity will be given to FP&L to respond to the arguments, if they decide to. I mean, that may not be necessary at all, I would imagine, Mr. Guyton.

MR. GUYTON: I'll keep that in mind, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. We'll start with you,

Mr. Guyton.

MR. GUYTON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: You catch on so fast.

MR. GUYTON: Commissioners, in these two companion proceeding Florida Power & Light Company seeks a determination of need pursuant to Section 403.519, Florida Statutes, for two highly efficient low cost power plants that are necessary to meet the needs of its customers.

The first unit is Martin Unit 8. It is a conversion of two 159-megawatt combustion turbines into a 1,107-megawatt four-on-one combined cycle unit. This conversion with result in an incremental capacity of 789 megawatts. The second unit

is Manatee Unit 3. It is an 1,107-megawatt four-on-one combined cycle unit.

Commissioners, these cases are the culmination of almost two years and countless hours of work by Florida Power & Light Company. As a result of this unprecedented effort, these two unit additions are the most analyzed and the most carefully scrutinized capacity additions ever undertaken by Florida Power & Light Company, and we submit probably in the history of Florida.

FPL's case is extensive and it is well documented. The same cannot be said of the intervenors' case. I will help, I will help you or at least I will attempt to help in terms of giving you some visual idea of the evidence that you will hear over the next three days.

I do that by directing your attention to this table to my right and to your left. FPL will present prefiled direct testimony of ten witnesses and their exhibits. That's the pile on the far, your far left of the table there.

Supplementing that as an additional exhibit is this stack of materials towards the middle of the page, which -- towards the middle of the table, which consist of the Need Study and all the appendices underlying the Need Study.

In addition to that, FPL is submitting confidential exhibits that include the bid documents that were submitted or a summary of the economics of the bid documents, and the

primary computer runs that FPL used to reach its determination on cost-effectiveness. Those materials are in the boxes behind our Need Study and exhibits. That is FPL's direct case.

Next to it, this relatively modest stack here next to the Need Study, is the intervenors' testimony consisting of about 30 pages of testimony and a few exhibits.

Next to it on the right-hand corner is Mr. Maurey's, the staff witness's testimony, and he testifies as to one issue in the economic analysis.

And then this last pile back closest to me is our rebuttal testimony where we rebut both the intervenor testimony as well as Mr. Maurey's testimony.

This information, plus whatever you hear on cross-examination and in the exhibits that are in, will be the evidence in this case. But that is not all the documentation. FPL performed hundreds, if not thousands of computer simulations in its economic evaluation. In addition, it had an independent evaluator conduct numerous simulations.

The intervenors and staff posed 354 interrogatories to Florida Power & Light Company and 309 request for production of documents, and they took nine depositions of current and former FPL employees. FPL produced 21,981 pages of documents in response to the request to produce.

Now you will hear some argument and evidence over the next two days about openness and transparency. I submit to you

that this process and evaluation has been fully and completely documented and it is in every sense of the word an open process for the intervenors and you to examine.

Now despite the volume of documents that I've drawn your attention to, I'd like to distill FPL's case into relatively modest six or seven points.

First is FPL needs 1,722 megawatts of additional capacity in 2005 and in 2006 to meet its Commission-approved 20 percent reserve margin. As best I can tell, this issue is uncontested.

FPL conducted not one, but two capacity solicitations in which 18 bidders presented 134 alternatives to Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3. FPL conducted a rigorous, comprehensive and demonstrably objective economic analysis. FPL used analytically sound models and reasonable and consistent assumptions to analyze both the bidders' proposals and FPL's self-build options.

FPL's economic analysis, as the evidence will show, was conservative and in some ways even favored the bidders. FPL did not question any of the optimistic assumptions that were used by a number of the bidders in their proposals and FPL did not adjust for the caveats or exceptions that were proposed in their proposals that in all likelihood would have increased the costs associated with the projects.

As to its own self-build options, FPL did not include

the residual value that would be associated with its unit after the life of the unit, which could be considerable. And we did in our modeling, we recognized revenue requirements associated with a self-build option, even those these units would be brought in seven months before we have a revenue sharing agreement that is set to expire and, therefore, we would not be able to request a rate increase at the time that these units were brought into service. Those costs were attributed to us even though they wouldn't be experienced by customers.

With this conservatism, the Martin Unit 8/Manatee
Unit 3 portfolio was still the most cost-effective alternative
over the next best portfolio that didn't include those units by
\$83 million net present value.

The Martin Unit 8/Manatee Unit 3 plan costs approximately \$500 million. That's a half a billion dollars net present value less than the lowest cost all outside proposal portfolio.

FPL's cost-effectiveness analysis was monitored by your staff, and FPL's conclusions as to its cost-effectiveness analysis was confirmed by an independent third-party evaluator who found that FPL's lowest cost alternative -- or was the lowest cost alternative by at least \$135 million net present value.

Now before we conducted or my client conducted its economic analysis, FPL declared three bidders with 18 proposals

to be ineligible, and it did so to protect FPL's customers. One bidder with one proposal was dropped because that bidder was unwilling to meet a minimum requirement specified in the supplemental RFP, that being a completion security that was designed to protect customers.

One bidder with five proposals was dropped because of it's stated intent to miss an in-service date on an existing power supply agreement and because FPL had concern about its financial viability.

And one bidder with 16 proposals withdrew four and the other 12 were dropped because the bidder was considered to be too risky by Florida Power & Light Company to supply its customers. It had faced allegations of gross misconduct and FPL also had concerns about its financial condition.

Indeed, FPL was concerned about the financial viability of several of the bidders that submitted proposals, and FPL made the decision that it would not entrust its customers' reliability or cost to bidders that were financially distressed.

Commissioners, there is far more evidence in this case, but that is the essence of FPL's case. Based on that evidence, we're asking you to grant Florida Power & Light an affirmative determination of need for Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3. As to both units, all four of the statutory criteria of 403.519 have been met. Both units are needed for system

reliability and integrity. FPL needs both units to meet its Commission-approved 20 percent reserve margin in both 2005 and 2006. Both units are needed for adequately electricity at a reasonable cost. Both of these units have very low heat rates and very high availability. And with FPL's demonstrated ability to run combined cycle units, excuse me, at high availability and low cost, that will result in more than adequate electricity at a reasonable cost to customers.

FPL's units are the most cost-effective alternatives available by at least \$83 to \$135 million over any of the portfolios that do not include both those units and by \$500 million by a portfolio that only has the best of the self-build options available. And, finally, there is no DSM available to FPL that would mitigate the need for either unit.

Commissioners, thank you. I'll reserve the opportunity that will remain in my time to respond to the other remarks.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Guyton. Mr. Moyle?

MR. MOYLE: Thank you. I have some prepared remarks
that I'll respond to. But I might just note, if we were doing
this by weight, I think CPV would have a pretty distinct
advantage if you tallied up their counsel's poundage. So
anyway I appreciate Mr. Guyton's pointing out all this
information, but I think this case is not something that's
decided on volumes of information but based on the testimony

that you're going to hear from these witnesses.

For the record, I am Jon Moyle, Jr., representing Competitive Power Ventures, CPV Gulfcoast's bid in this project and I'm here on their behalf today.

This case from CPV's perspective essentially involves three issues: Was the RFP process conducted fairly; did FP&L tell the bidders how their bids would be judged and the criteria that would be used to judge their bids as the bid rule requires; and can FP&L carry its burden of proof that it's self-build projects are the most cost-effective?

I want to take a minute and talk about each of these and sort of preview a little bit for you some of the evidence that you will see.

Fairness, was the RFP conducted fairly? CPV contends that it was not for a number of reasons. I don't believe you have to look much further than the terms of both the original RFP and the supplemental RFP to see that the RFP was crafted in a way to give FP&L's self-build options an advantage over other proposals.

I will point out an example. The original RFP had a legislative out provision which essentially said if the Legislature made any change with respect to the regulatory scheme in Florida, that FP&L could get out of a contract that it entered into.

Now the IPPs said this is not fair, it places all the

risk on the IPPs, and argued that that legislative out provision was inherently unfair.

FPL in their supplemental RFP did change it, but we would argue it's still relevant evidence to show the mind set of FP&L in putting together the RFP.

There was a reg out provision that is in the supplemental RFP that you will see in an internal FP&L E-mail that FP&L acknowledged this reg out provision is likely to be disfavored by the Commission. Yet it's our understanding that that reg out provision was included in the terms of the supplemental RFP.

You're going to hear a lot of talk about an equity penalty, and FP&L in their supplemental RFP put in place an equity penalty. I'm not an economist, and you're going to hear from experts about the equity penalty, but I think there's a lot of disagreement on the equity penalty. I think FP&L in their internal E-mails acknowledged that it would be a controversial item. And CPV would argue that the equity penalty was in part built in to give FP&L room in the event that it needed to be applied to declare themselves the winner.

And you'll see an E-mail written by Steve Sim, one of the key people in charge of the RFP, that refers to this equity penalty as, quote, not the cake, but it may not even be the icing; it's more like the candle.

While FP&L will attempt to explain away this E-mail,

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remember the power of E-mails written contemporaneously as you weigh evidence and gauge its significance.

CPV would argue that the equity penalty is yet another example of how the RFP was designed with features that unfairly favor FP&L.

You will also see, and it's appended to the testimony that CPV has offered, a document that was prepared at the request of Steve Sim, the person charged with running the RFP. that suggests how the evaluation process could be conducted. This memo concludes by listing a seven-step approach to be used in evaluating the bids.

CPV believes this is an important document because it was prepared before the first RFP was ever issued. And as best CPV can tell, it's the only internal FP&L document that formalizes how the evaluation will be conducted.

I would tell you when you review this memo that the second step indicated that FP&L would review the outside proposals and then it will obtain FP&L's cost of construction. Regarding FP&L's construction cost, the memo says, quote. "These costs should be as aggressive as possible to both minimize the remaining work and increase the defensibility of any subsequent decision to go with an FPL option." We interpret that to say they're telling their folks to be aggressive with their construction numbers.

Step five of this document tells, says, it directs

that you repeat steps two to four until FP&L's numbers are lower than the outside bidders. Remember, step two is the step that says be aggressive in your construction numbers. So we viewed this as sort of a process that would continue until FP&L declared itself the winner.

This document -- step six says that you enter the resulting FP&L projects into EGEAS versus the proposals to ensure that the FPL projects are selected by EGEAS as the winner. That's a quote from this docket.

FP&L produced this to us and we think it's indicative of sort of the mind set of the folks that were in charge of evaluating the RFP.

There's also another document that is attached to the testimony of CPV's witness. That's an E-mail from Sam Waters to Paul Evanson, the president of FP&L, in which Sam is setting up a meeting, quote, "to discuss a strategy in responding to the bids received addressing our RFP as well as the long-term generation strategy."

Normally setting up this kind of meeting may seem rather routine. However, in the same E-mail, Sam states, "I have to caution everyone that we will not have a proposed list of bidders or anything approaching a final result of the analysis." He concludes in his E-mail by saying, quote, "My intent is to develop a consensus on generation for our generation plan; i.e., do we want to build or buy or a

combination of both? What kind of project should we be involved in? How long should we be buying for if that is the choice? Should FPLE," I believe that's FP&L Energy, "be involved in the projects?"

I would argue that that memo is perfectly fine to sit around and talk about a generation strategy plan if you don't have an RFP out there. But given the fact that there's an RFP out there, and by Sam's own words in this E-mail he won't have final analysis to call a meeting and to have such a meeting to develop a consensus about which way you want to go, we would argue is further evidence that, that this process was not conducted in a fair and impartial manner.

Let me move on to the second issue which I've identified, which is a description of how the bids would be judged. Did FP&L adequately inform the bidders about the criteria that would be used and how their bids would be evaluated?

You'll look at the supplemental RFP and it has language in there that talks about how things may be done. Here's the criteria that may be used. Your bids may be grouped. There was no certainty with respect to how it would be done. And I think your bid rule requires that the methodology be described in detail about how the bids will be evaluated.

The Martin 3 Unit is being proposed in 2005 to meet a

load of approximately 15 megawatts. You're going to hear testimony about that, and I think Mr. Guyton in his opening remark mentioned that there was no DSM that could get them to 15 megawatts. Notwithstanding this very, very small shortfall, rather than going and looking for programs that would meet the need for the Manatee Unit, FP&L engaged in this process where they combined all of these bids. So if somebody submitted a bid, they would be lumped in with a bunch of other proposals, and you'll hear testimony about this.

FP&L, when they decided to negotiate, they only negotiated it in a face-to-face meeting with one bidder. And the reason is because, well, this was a low cost bid in this group of proposals. But to my way of thinking, having a bid that gets looped in and grouped in with a group of proposals, the bidder has no authority or say over which proposal it's grouped in with, and you don't have any ability to control those negotiations or be at the table. Your whole position is dependent on how these negotiations between FP&L and one bidder ensue is not fair. And we think this grouping issue indicates -- and it was never disclosed fully to the bidders that that would be the methodology employed. Their RFP says it may be used. I would argue that it may not be used; it was not described with certainty.

With respect to criteria, we would argue the bid rule says you need to know the criteria by which you're going to be

judged. FP&L reserved the right in their supplemental to have other criteria. In the testimony you'll see that they indeed used other criteria in evaluating the bids. Things like experience in the Florida labor market, that was a criteria that cannot be found anywhere in the supplemental RFP. Yet in testimony that will be received by you today, you will see that the labor market was a factor that was considered.

Another factor was the contractual certainty or contractual commitment of the bidders. That was something that FP&L placed weight on and emphasis on, yet it was never disclosed to the bidders in the supplemental RFP.

So we're going to show you through cross-examination, we hope, that there are issues like that where FP&L evaluated the bids, it was part of the methodology, yet it was never disclosed to the bidders as being part of the methodology as required by the rule.

The final issue that I've identified for you, and I want to talk just a minute about, is can FP&L meet its burden that it has the most cost-effective alternative? We would argue no for a number of reasons. One, we think that because the process was not conducted in a fair way that it calls into question all the decisions that flow from it, number one. Secondly, without the imposition of an equity penalty, I think the evidence will reflect that there were a number of proposals that were more cost-effective than FP&L's self-build options.

and that the, we don't believe the equity penalty should be applied for the results, for the reasons set forth in staff's testimony that you will be hearing.

The FP&L numbers, if you look at that memo, were aggressive numbers based on estimate, not firm contracts. Bids were submitted that the supplemental RFP required there to be guaranteed pricing in them. Had a bid been accepted, a binding contract would have been entered into, and that contract would be before you today and you would be making a decision, a judgment about whether that contract was the most cost-effective approach in which to meet this need.

FP&L doesn't, doesn't have a contract before you today. What they have before you today are numbers that are not based on contracts.

You will hear questions asked about do you have contracts for turbines, do you have contracts for construction, do you have contracts for gas? The answer, I believe, to all those questions will be no. FP&L does not have firm contracts for just about any component of these two facilities.

I think you'll also hear some testimony, and with respect to being bound by your numbers, that FP&L indicates that these numbers are estimates and they will not be bound to them and that they reserve the right, should something go wrong, to come back in later and seek additional cost recovery.

CPV would argue that that is not fair, that it's not

giving you the evidence you need to make the decision that FP&L's projects are the most cost-effective alternative because it's based not on contracts but on mere estimates and there's no willingness to stand by that, that number.

In sum, CPV believes that both the Manatee Unit and the Martin Unit should be denied based on the reasons we've set forth in this opening statement. However, particularly given that the Martin Unit, a 600-megawatt unit, is being proposed for a 2005 date to meet a 15-megawatt need, an amount representing less than one-tenth of one percent of FP&L's resources, that the Martin Unit should not receive approval of its need determination petition. Thank you, and I appreciate your consideration of my argument.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Moyle.

Mr. McGlothlin?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Joe McGlothlin for Florida PACE.

Mr. Moyle and I compared notes before the oral argument. I may touch down very lightly on a couple of points that he mentioned, but I think by and large our focuses are quite different.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: As he said, what you have before you is, as far as I can tell, by far the largest determination of need case the Commission has ever considered: 1,900 megawatts, two large units, construction costs estimated at more than

\$1 billion, and numerous alternatives to compare to the self-build option.

In addition, these alternatives, when one looks at it in the right perspective, were close to the self-build option in terms of cost. The -- one witness for FPL says of Mr. Slater's reference to a \$60 million differential, that looks like a lot of money to me. Well, it does to me, too. But consider that the overall cost of the two projects is in the magnitude, order of magnitude of \$40 billion, and that's net present value, and that's just the project costs. So when you relate one to the other, you're looking at differentials on the order of one percent. So it seems to us that this analysis and evaluation calls for a careful and rigorous scrutiny of the alternatives.

Our witness Kenneth Slater will testify that the effort of FPL to evaluate the alternatives fell far short of that standard and they fell far short for two reasons. First, the use of a tool that was inadequate for the purpose; the testimony will show that FPL used a computer model called EGEAS, which is designed to be a screening tool taking a long-term look at alternatives, but was never intended to be good at detailed production costing simulations. The production costs are critical, a critical component of the analysis of the most cost-effective alternative.

As a matter of fact, when FPL points to the, the

bottom line of its evaluation, that's expressed in revenue
requirements. EGEAS does that poorly and, because it wasn't
designed to do it well.

But in addition to the crude method of using EGEAS to approximate production costs, there are flaws in the use made of EGEAS. And Mr. Slater is prepared to testify that because of the simplistic methods used, FPL did not even employ all the features that EGEAS is capable of performing.

So what you have here is an evaluation that is riddled with shortcomings and is inadequate to give you confidence that FPL has selected the most cost-effective alternatives under the circumstances.

And it didn't have to be that way. FPL uses hourly production costing simulations for other purposes that, where detailed analysis and refinement of costs is called for. It could have taken the top six or eight of the EGEAS runs and put them through an hourly production costing simulation and gotten a quality result using a tool that looks at the details on an hourly basis in detail as opposed to a yearly look of rough and dirty. It chose not to do that.

And you may hear them talk about the number of comparisons they had to run, you may hear them talk about run time, but we come back to this: A billion dollars, numerous alternatives to examine, and a need for a rigorous and detailed review. It didn't happen.

1 In addition to the modeling and the tools used, there 2 were some assumptions that FP&L employed that are also 3 problematic. For instance, Mr. Moyle referred to the 4 aggressive assumptions regarding construction costs. FPL, the 5 testimony will show, also used aggressive assumptions with 6 respect to the heat rate and the availabilities assigned to its 7 self-build options, so aggressive as to be unrealistic. And 8 that should matter to you because, first of all, these 9 assumptions have the effect of favoring the self-build options 10 when compared to the alternatives. And, secondly, because 11 while they are aggressive, if they are also unrealistic, we 12 haven't heard FPL say yet that they will commit to live with 13 them when they, if and when they get to build the units. So I 14 think it goes to, again, to the confidence you have that the 15 most cost-effective units have been selected.

These shortcomings and these unrealistic assumptions take on even more significance when you consider that this is all exacerbated by the tenuous claim of need in 2005 that Mr. Moyle touched on very briefly.

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FPL needs 1,122 megawatts in 2005. Manatee is 1,107. That means if they add Manatee, they need only 15 more to reach their 20 percent reserve margin in 2005. They propose to meet that need by adding the 789 megawatts of Martin Unit 8. They will contend that's because they've stipulated to meet a 20 percent criteria and that's what they intend to do.

But it's time to use a little common sense. They refer to the 20 percent guideline. But in the order accepting that stipulation, the Commission was careful to reserve its own judgment and discretion in that regard. And at Page 3 of 7 the Commission said, "The Commission shall retain the ability and discretion to consider all facts and circumstances applicable to a given utility and/or Peninsular Florida. Further with respect to the evaluation of the adequacy reserves in Peninsular Florida the Commission may employ any methodology in considering any facts and circumstances it deems appropriate, subject to applicable legal requirements."

So the Commission has the discretion to view this in light of facts and circumstances. And I think the fact that we're talking about a 15-megawatt shortfall, that's certainly something you should consider with respect to the need to add Martin 8 in 2005.

But even if it's decided that the 20 percent criterion is the applicable standard, FPL could buy 15 megawatts for a year and meet its standard. FPL, the evidence will show, didn't investigate that possibility, much less analyze it. And so we think its application to add the full amount of capacity it proposes in 2005 fails from that standpoint.

This case reminds me somewhat of the 1992 Florida Power Corporation case. In 1992, Florida Power Corporation proposed the then unheard of figure of 940 megawatts that it wanted a determination need for. The Commission in its discretion decided that only two of the four proposed units would receive determinations of need because FPC was premature with respect to the balance of its request.

In this case, FPL refers time and time again to a need for 2005 and 2006. This suggests to me that they would like to build some sort of big, soft landing place for the outcome. But what they've asked for is a determination of need that both Manatee 3 and Martin 8 are needed in 2005, and we think the evidence will show that they haven't made that case.

We think the evidence will show that they haven't made the case because they have not provided a basis on which the Commission can have confidence that they have selected the most cost-effective units. But in any event, they have not made the case that they should build both units in service in 2005. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. McGlothlin. Mr. McWhirter?

MR. McWHIRTER: May it please the Commission. My name is John McWhirter, representing the Florida Industrial Power Users Group. Mr. Twomey and I are here on behalf of consumers. I represent large consumers of large amounts of electricity and he is the mom and pop consumer. And he -- I will give a broad overview, and then he will hit to the heart

of the image and, and give you the things that perhaps I omit.

The primary litigants in this proceeding are obviously Florida Power & Light and the disappointed bidders. The persons primarily interested in the outcome of the case, however, are consumers.

Ironically, the rate stipulation that was referred to by Florida Power & Light expires shortly before these planned plants come online. So there will definitely be an impact on consumers' rates when they come into play.

We've come to conclude in the recent past that a critical part of the ratemaking process is the certificate of need proceedings. What happens is -- this started out, of course, as an environmental activity so that you wouldn't build more polluting power plants than you really needed to meet the needs of your customers and, secondarily, to give utilities the opportunity to bring together all of the environmental interests so that it could be handled in one proceeding rather than a series of proceedings which would string out the length of time it takes to build a power plant and the necessary barriers that have to be overcome, and that's been very successful.

But the outgrowth of the certificate of need component is that once this Commission has determined in that process that it's come up with the least, least effective or the least cost-effective alternative, that that cost is pretty

well chiseled in stone for the rate base. And to come in five years from now and challenge the decisions that are made today is, and overcome the presumption that what's being built in this proceeding is not the least, the most cost-effective construction is a very and almost impossible burden to bear. So we think this is an extremely important decision that you make in this case.

We're at a unique period in Florida history. We -- as you know, we have 56 utilities that serve customers. However, in the state there are only two utilities that have market power and their power is quite significant. These are Florida Power & Light, of course, that has a proceeding before you today, and Florida Power that has one in the wings.

There are competitive suppliers at the gate, and these are the people that have protested in this case, some of whom have dropped out for various reasons, and we're down to the crux of these competitors seeking to get into the, into the marketplace.

If Florida Power & Light and Florida Power continued to be the principal suppliers of generation in the state and if this case is so big that it preempts competitive suppliers from coming in the state in the future, they, your regulatory function becomes ever more important because you're dealing with a monopoly. And the prices the monopoly charges are extremely significant because all the customers are captive

customers. But ironically the sales that generate the cost for the customers will be made in the wholesale market. And you're studying that in your GridFlorida case, which is coming up.

We think that if the two utilities with market power are given continuation of that power, the competitive suppliers in the state will whither and die. We think that the transmission links to other states make it relatively improbable that power will come to the State of Florida from other sources. So we think that it is extremely important in this case for you to determine that the bid process that was used was fair and that the competitors have been given a fair opportunity.

If you conclude that that's the case and that the people with market power should be able to expand that power, then we applaud your decision because we know it will be a fair and just decision. But we admonish you to be, take careful consideration that the details of this case be dealt with in such a fashion that you are certainly assured that you're getting the least cost alternative when you accept the certificate of need, if you do.

So having given you those broad observations, which belabor the obvious, I'll turn it over to Mr. Twomey to move to the heart of the matter.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, Madam Chairman and

Commissioners. Mike Twomey on behalf of the Florida Action Coalition Team, Thomas and Genevieve Twomey and Mr. Burton Greenfield. et al.

As Mr. Moyle correctly noted, the weight of evidence isn't calculated in terms of which parties killed the most trees. Your statutory duty is found in Section 403.519, and it is FP&L's burden to demonstrate that it has met the requirements of the law, especially that portion of the law that requires it to show you that they have selected the most cost-effective units. If the proposed units are not the most cost-effective and this Commission approves them anyway, then it is a mathematical certainty that FP&L's customers and, hence, my clients will eventually pay higher rates than they otherwise would and should.

The bid process appears biased for the reasons given to you by Mr. Moyle and Mr. McGlothlin, especially in the form of the highly controversial equity penalty.

As you'll see from the evidence, that one factor makes a huge swing in how the units are compared from the outside bidders to the self-build options. Those biases appear to bias the decision in turn in favor of the self-build options which were selected by FP&L. Consequently, the selection of the self-build options as the, quote, unquote, most cost-effective appears highly suspect.

If the two units are not the most cost-effective.

this Commission should deny their need determination approvals. But you're going to have to ask yourself if you can deny the approval of these two units even if they are not the most cost-effective and still keep the lights on.

You have heard that you certainly can with respect to the second unit, which is going to be shown necessary only to meet the 15-megawatt shortfall. That can be dealt with and should be dealt with if it's shown not to be cost, most cost-effective by denying it straight out. Excuse me.

Even if you find that both of the units are not the most cost-effective and that Florida Power & Light has not, therefore, met its statutory burden, you should consider denying them both and try to figure some way of having them rebid on an accelerated basis and trying to find power and capacity elsewhere in order to keep the lights on.

I say that because this Commission should never allow itself to be placed in the position of being painted in a corner by the threat of having the lights go out as a result of time constraints that are statutory in a limited sense, but prior to the beginning of the statutory time constraints entirely controlled by the utility in question.

So, Commissioners, if you find that the units are not the most cost-effective, then I would urge you to deny them.

Thank you for your time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Twomey. Any other

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presentations? Mr. Guyton, you have a few minutes reserved for response.

MR. GUYTON: Thank you, Chairman Jaber. I'll attempt to be brief.

Several parties mentioned the equity penalty used in the economic analysis. The evidence will show that the equity penalty employed by FPL was disclosed in both RFP documents; it is consistent with prior Commission decisions; it is premised upon the uncontroverted fact that rating agencies treat a portion of a capacity payment of purchase power contracts as debt when whether analyzing utilities; it is supported by the testimony of at least four witnesses; it is not necessary in the analysis to reach the conclusion that FPL's option is the most cost-effective alternative; it is the most cost-effective among the remaining bids without the equity penalty. And, finally, the evidence will show that it is necessary to be employed if the self-build and the purchase power options are to be analyzed on a consistent basis.

And I want to address that point in particular. The evidence will show that the equity penalty adjustment applied to bidders' proposals had the same effect that FPL's use of a 55 percent equity/45 percent debt incremental capital structure had on FPL's self-build options. When FPL's self-build options were analyzed and the costs were developed, we used an assumption that the incremental capital that would be used for

those units would be 55 percent equity and 45 percent debt. And that would have the effect of leaving FPL's adjusted capital structure where it is now, at 55 percent/45 percent, 55 percent equity/45 percent debt. No impact on the cost of capital.

FPL could have used a lower equity ratio and reduced its self-build options and costs in the analysis, but it chose not to do that out of a matter of fairness.

Similarly, when you're analyzing purchase power options, FPL recognized that new purchase power obligations would be treated by rating agencies, at least a part of them would be treated by debt, and that would have the effect of lowering the equity ratio and raising the debt ratio. And the equity penalty simply restores that 55/45 percent equity/debt ratio. So it is absolutely essential that one analyze and recognize the equity penalty so it's treated the same way as self-build options.

Regarding the fairness arguments that you've heard much about this morning, CPV offers you very little evidence that the evaluation evidence or process was flawed or unfair to bidders. And, indeed, a good part of their evidence will show that it was not flawed, that it was certainly fair.

The fact is that CPV was unable to compete economically, not only with FPL, but with every other bidder.

Both FPL and the outside evaluator ranked CPV, at least one CPV

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alternative dead last in the economic evaluation. Unable to compete on cost, they now unpersuasively argue fairness.

The evidence will also show that the cost estimates for Martin 8 and Manatee 3 are not overly aggressive but are based on reasonable assumptions. I'd encourage you to explore this with Mr. Yeager and particularly FPL's experience in Martin Unit 3 and 4 where we -- the most recent similar type new construction where we brought in a project \$159 million below what was forecast.

The evidence will also show -- there was mention of a memorandum that was provided to the parties in discovery and there's going to be a great deal of evidence about it. I would ask you to consider that memorandum. It's clearly stamped "Draft." The testimony will show that this evaluation plan was preliminary in nature, was not employed in the analysis ultimately and, most importantly, you're not going to hear anything from CPV's witnesses about this, but they omit the last step which is on the memo which reads, "Presents results to FPL's management, PGD, for them to use in deciding if FPL will build or buy." The plan from the start was to make the decision at the end of the analysis once you had the numbers as to whether or not you were going to build or buy. That's not a biased process. That is an unbiased process.

We have set forth in the supplemental RFP the evaluation methodology and criteria. So I think the evidence will show that this has been a fair and unbiased process.

A brief moment of comment about PACE's witness. He admits in his testimony that he performed, and I quote, "A less than exhaustive review," end quote. We do not disagree with that assessment. The problems that Mr. Slater suggests in his rebuttal testimony do not exist -- in his direct testimony do not exist as is shown and documented in our rebuttal testimony.

I do want to mention briefly this, the question of whether or not there is a 15-megawatt shortfall in 2005 that causes the Martin Unit to be built in 2005 rather than 2006.

It is true that the Manatee Unit would leave us 15 megawatts short of our reserve margin if it were constructed in 2005. We decided to go ahead and build that for, or to include the Martin Unit in the analysis for a number of reasons. One, it's needed to meet the reserve margin, and we've committed to you that we'll meet the entire reserve margin that you've given to us, not some subset out of it. Two, the evidence will show that it actually costs customers less for us to build both units and put them in service in 2005 than it would if we were to defer the Martin Unit to 2006. So it's in our customers' interests to build Martin 8 in 2005.

Indeed, it makes a great deal of sense in terms of flexibility to deal with unanticipated load growth if we have a load that grows more than we forecasted. If we have -- if we have Martin available in 2005, we have the flexibility to meet

it. If we have to defer it to 2006 because there are
unanticipated -- we have greater or less load growth than we
anticipate, we can always defer the unit, but we can't
accelerate the construction after the fact. So the flexibility
argues that we should go ahead and build it as well.

And, finally, there are two other reasons. One, why would we defer it? I mean, we've exhausted the market out there. We've looked at 134 proposals. There's not another alternative that's more cost-effective. So it doesn't make sense to start this process over and do it for yet, again, a third time.

And, indeed, it raises serious questions if we had to do the process over again and go through this exhaustive analysis again yet when we could even get Martin on in 2006. And that's what the evidence will show with Mr. Silva.

Commissioners, I would conclude by saying it is time to act on this. The evidence will show that it's time to act and to act favorably solely to benefit Florida Power & Light's customers. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Guyton. Staff, by my estimation our first witness is Rene Silva.

MS. BROWN: Yes, that's correct.

MR. GUYTON: Okay. We call Mr. Silva to the stand. May we take a minute to remove this so staff can see the witness. Madam Chairman?

1	CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.
2	(Pause.)
3	MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, may I approach to
4	distribute a
5	(Pause.)
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Good morning, Mr. Silva. You were
7	sworn this morning; right?
8	THE WITNESS: Yes, Madam Chairman.
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: Great. Mr. Guyton?
10	MR. GUYTON: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
11	RENE SILVA
12	was called as a witness on behalf of Florida Power & Light
13	Company and, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
14	DIRECT EXAMINATION
15	BY MR. GUYTON:
16	Q Would you please state your name for the record.
17	A My name is Rene Silva.
18	Q By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
19	A By Florida Power & Light Company, and presently I
20	serve as Director of Resource Assessment and Planning.
21	Q And, Mr. Silva, did you have occasion to prefile
22	direct testimony in this case consisting of 54 typewritten
23	pages?
24	A Yes.
25	Q And did you have occasion to have filed on your
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behalf an errata sheet to that, that testimony?

A Yes.

MR. GUYTON: Commissioner, those have both been previously prefiled with the Commission.

BY MR. GUYTON:

Q If I were to ask you the questions as contained in your direct testimony today, would your answers be the same as amended by your errata sheet?

A Yes.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, let me ask you about that. My copy of the prefiled testimony obviously doesn't have the corrections contained in the errata sheet made. So are you suggesting that we just include the errata sheet as an additional two pages to the testimony?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner. I would suggest that. We can file supplemental pages, but we've in the past found that that is somewhat burdensome on the Commissioners and the staff. And I think the, perhaps the easier way to do it is just insert the errata sheet as well as the testimony into the record.

CHAIRMAN JABER: All right. I prefer that,

Commissioners. Let me make sure though that you have copies of
the errata sheet. I think there are -- throughout the hearing
there are errata sheets to testimony and they consist of
corrections. I prefer to just consider these supplemental

1 pages to the testimony in lieu of identifying it as an exhibit 2 or having the witness go through each one of these orally. Do 3 the parties have any objection to that? This seems more 4 efficient. Okav. 5 MR. GUYTON: Commissioner, I have extra copies, if 6 anyone on the bench or any of the parties need the errata sheet 7 for Mr. Silva. 8

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Guyton.

MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, we'd ask that Mr. Silva's direct testimony be inserted into the record as though read, along with the errata sheet.

CHAIRMAN JABER: The prefiled direct testimony of Rene Silva shall be inserted into the record as though read, and that would include the one-page errata sheet.

> MR. GUYTON: Thank you.

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(REPORTER'S NOTE: For convenience of the record. Mr. Silva's direct testimony was inserted in the record at Page 78.)

MR. MOYLE: Madam Chair, I'm sorry. I just want to preserve an objection with respect -- I think Mr. Silva had some testimony related to the equity penalty and what the rating agencies would do, and I would just make in effect a standing objection with respect to anybody indicating what Moody's does or does not do. That -- I don't believe that that, because it's hearsay based on conversations with Moody's.

74 should serve as the basis for any particular finding as to what 1 2 Moody's does or does not do. There's no Moody's from -- no witness from Moody's. So I would just like to preserve a 3 standing objection related to that, that issue. 4 5 CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, at some point before the 6 conclusion of the hearing though we need to address that objection and I need to allow an opportunity for response. 7 So 8 don't let me forget. 9 MR. MOYLE: Okay. 10 CHAIRMAN JABER: And if this is the appropriate time, 11 Mr. Moyle, we can do that right now. 12

MR. MOYLE: That would be fine. I mean, I just -you heard in the opening statements, you know, Moody's imposes
this equity penalty. I haven't seen anything where somebody
from Moody's has said, hi, I'm from Moody's and here's what we
do in terms of a witness. I've heard people talk about what
Moody's does. And, of course, it's okay for someone to say,
well, it's been communicated to me, but if it's serving as the
primary basis upon which a factual determination is made, I
would object on hearsay grounds.

CHAIRMAN JABER: So is your objection that it's hearsay and needs corroboration, independent corroboration?

MR. MOYLE: Right.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, your response.

MR. GUYTON: Well, of course, hearsay evidence is

1	admissible under the, under the APA. It, it will be
2	corroborated. Indeed, it is corroborated by the testimony of
3	Dr. Avera, Mr. Dewhurst, Dr. Sim and Mr. Taylor. And I think
4	as to this witness, Mr. Silva is simply relying on their
5	representations in that regard. So I think it's fully
6	corroborative. It's certainly admissible.
7	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle, at this point I'm going
8	to deny your request and overrule the objection without
9	prejudice.
10	MR. MOYLE: Okay. And we can raise it with the
11	individual witnesses. Thank you.
12	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.
13	BY MR. GUYTON:
14	Q Mr. Silva, did you have occasion to prefile along
15	with your direct testimony exhibits consisting of Document
16	Number RS-1 through Document Number RS-8?
17	A Yes.
18	Q And have you filed does your errata sheet also
19	address corrections to, to those, those documents?
20	A Yes, it does.
21	Q And is the information contained in your exhibits
22	RS-1 through RS-8 true and correct to the best of your
23	knowledge and belief as amended by the errata sheet?
24	A Yes.

MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, we'd ask that

1 Mr. Silva's -- I'm sorry. I should have done a preliminary 2 matter, but I didn't. And I -- we're going to ask that Mr. Silva's exhibit be identified, but we have a question of 3 4 the number identification. 5 In the prehearing order we had identified exhibits, 6 preidentified Exhibits 1 through 23 being FPL's Need Study and 7 all the supporting appendices, and I failed to mention that 8 this morning when you identified Mr. Evanson's deposition 9 exhibit as Exhibit 1. I'm at your pleasure as to how you'd 10 like to proceed in that regard. 11 CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Thank you for the reminder. 12 For the sake of consistency, let's go ahead and conclude with 13 the exhibits with Mr. Silva and then we'll come back to the 14 preliminary exhibits. 15 MR. GUYTON: Very good. We'd ask that Mr. Silva's 16 exhibits be identified. 17 CHAIRMAN JABER: RS-1 through RS-8 are identified as 18 hearing Exhibit 2. (Exhibit 2 marked for identification.) 19 20 CHAIRMAN JABER: And with respect to exhibits --21 well, let me ask the parties, do you have any objection to 22 identifying Exhibits 1 through 16 as a composite exhibit? 23 Staff? 24 MS. BROWN: Staff has no objection.

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Exhibits 1 through 16 are

1	identified as composite Exhibit 3.
2	MR. GUYTON: Those being 1 through 16 in the
3	prehearing order, Commissioner Jaber?
4	CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes. Thank you for that
5	clarification. The Need Study Exhibits 1 through 16. Those
6	are the public documents, Mr. Guyton.
7	MR. GUYTON: Yes, ma'am.
8	(Exhibit 3 marked for identification.)
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: And then it looks like the
10	confidential are those the ones shaded, staff?
11	MS. BROWN: Yes, Chairman Jaber.
12	CHAIRMAN JABER: Exhibits 17 through 23 are composite
13	Exhibit 4. Exhibits 17 through 23 preidentified in the
14	prehearing order are composite Exhibit 4.
15	(Exhibit 4 marked for identification.)
16	BY MR. GUYTON:
17	Q Mr. Silva, did you have occasion to sponsor what has
18	been identified now as composite Exhibit 3, FPL's Need Study
19	and nonconfidential appendices or portions thereof?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And which portions do you sponsor, sir?
22	A I am sponsoring the following sections: Section I,
23	Section II, Section VIII. I cosponsor Section V and
24	Section VII. And I sponsor Appendices A and B of the Need
25	Study document.

1		BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
2		FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
3		DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RENE SILVA
4		DOCKET NOS. 020262-EI, 020263-EI
5		JULY 16, 2002
6		
7	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
8 .	A.	My name is Rene Silva, and my business address is 9250 West Flagler Street,
9		Miami, Florida 33174.
10		
11	Q.	By whom are you employed and what position do you hold?
12	A.	I am employed by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL), and presently
13		serve as Director of Resource Assessment and Planning (RAP).
14		
15	Q.	Please describe your duties and responsibilities in that position.
16	A.	I manage the group that is responsible for the development of FPL's
17		integrated resource plan and other related activities, such as analysis of
18		demand side management programs, system production cost projections,
19		development of FPL's demand and energy forecasts, and the administration of
20		wholesale power purchase agreements.
21		
22	Q.	Please describe your education and professional experience.

I graduated from the University of Michigan with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering Science in 1974. From 1974 until 1978, I was employed by the Nuclear Energy Division of the General Electric Company in the area of nuclear fuel design. While employed by General Electric, I earned a Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering from San Jose State University in 1978.

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I joined the Fuel Resources Department of FPL in 1978, as a fuel engineer, responsible for purchasing nuclear fuel. While employed by FPL I earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration from the University of Miami in 1986. In 1987, I became Manager of Fossil Fuel, responsible for FPL's purchases of fuel oil, natural gas and coal. In 1990 I assumed the position of Director, Fuel Resources Department, and in 1991 became Manager of Fuel Services, responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of FPL's fossil fuel procurement strategy. In 1998 I was named Manager of Business Services in the Power Generation Division (PGD). In that capacity I managed the group that is responsible for coordinating (a) the development of PGD's strategic plan for the effective and efficient construction, operation and maintenance of FPL's fossil generating plants, (b) the preparation of PGD annual budgets and tracking of expenditures, and (c) the preparation of reports related to fossil generating plant performance. On May 1, 2002, I was appointed to my current position.

1	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?
2	A.	My testimony introduces FPL's Need Study document and appendices and
3		identifies the sponsors of each of the sections contained within that document.
4		I also introduce the FPL witnesses in this case and describe the areas of the
5		case they will cover.
6		
7		In addition to this introductory role, my testimony:
8		- Describes FPL's Need Study Document,
9		- Summarizes the focus of each witness' testimony,
10		- Summarizes FPL's need for new resources in the 2005/2006 time
11		frame, the Supplemental Request for Proposals (Supplemental RFP)
12		issued by FPL to address those needs, and the results of the
13		solicitation,
14		- Briefly presents the results of the analysis of bids received in response
15		to the Supplemental RFP,
16		- Describes selection of the "short list" of bidders and the
17		communications and negotiations that took place between FPL and
18		those "short list" bidders,
19		- Discusses a number of qualitative factors which are incorporated into
20		FPL's decision making process, and
21		- Discusses the adverse consequences to FPL's customers if the
22		proposed Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 projects are not brought
23		into service by the target dates.

1	Q.	Are you sponsoring an exhibit in this case?
2	A.	Yes. I am sponsoring an exhibit consisting of 8 documents attached to my
3		direct testimony. Those 8 documents are:
4		
5		• Document RS-1, FPL's generating resources,
6		• Document RS-2, Summary of FPL's power purchases,
7		• Document RS-3, Schedule of FPL's QF purchases,
8		• Document RS-4, List of 16 bidders who responded to FPL's Supplemental
9		RFP, the types of proposals submitted and technology,
10		• Document RS-5, List of 31 eligible bids received by FPL in response to its
11		Supplemental RFP,
12		• Document RS-6, Summary of results presented to FPL management on
13		June 18,
14		• Document RS-7, Updated version, as of July 2, 2002, of Document RS-6,
15		and
16		• Document RS-8, Fossil System Net Heat Rate.
17		
18	Q.	Are you sponsoring any sections in the Need Study document?
19	A.	Yes. I am sponsoring the following sections:
20		Section I Executive Summary
21		Section II Introduction
22		Section VIII Conclusion

1		I also co-sponsor So	ection V with Dr. Steven Sim and Section VII with Mr.
2		William Yeager.	
3			
4		In addition, I sponso	or Appendices A and B to the Need Study document.
5			
6	I.	Description of FPL	's Need Study document
7			
8	Q.	Please describe FP	L's Need Study document supporting its Petitions for
9		Determination of	Need for the Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3
10		projects.	
11	A.	The Need Study do	cument is a comprehensive overview of FPL's planning
12		process, and of the S	Supplemental RFP process used to identify the Martin Unit
13		8 and Manatee Unit	3 projects as the most cost-effective alternatives for new
14		resources. The docu	ment consists of eight sections:
15		Section I	Executive Summary
16		Section II	Introduction
17		Section III	Description of Proposed Power Plants
18		Section IV	FPL's Need for the Proposed Power Plants
19		Section V	FPL's Process for Determining the Best Available
20			Options
21		Section VI	Non-Generating Alternatives
22		Section VII	Adverse Consequences if the Proposed Capacity
23			Additions are not Added on Schedule

1	Section VIII Conclusion
2	
3	Section I provides a summary of the overall process FPL employed to identify
4	its capacity needs and the results of the process.
5	
6	Section II describes FPL's existing system and provides the underlying
7	methodologies and assumptions used in the analyses, including the load
8	forecasting methodology.
9	
10	Section III provides a detailed description of the proposed Martin Unit 8 and
11	Manatee Unit 3 projects, including cost and performance expectations.
12	
13	Section IV describes the analysis which concluded that FPL has a need for
14	1,722 MW in the 2005/2006 timeframe.
15	
16	Section V describes in detail FPL's general planning process, the
17	Supplemental RFP process employed to solicit bids from other parties to meet
18	the identified capacity needs, the analytical process used to evaluate those
19	bids, and FPL's negotiations with the short list bidders.
20	
21	Section VI details the non-generating alternatives considered by FPL prior to
22	determining a need for additional capacity and addresses the potential for
23	additional cost-effective Demand Side Management (DSM) programs.

1		Section VII discusses the adverse consequences that would result from delay
2		of licensing the Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 projects, including a
3		deterioration of system reliability and increased costs.
4		
5		Section VIII is a summary of the need for the new capacity, the cost-
6		effectiveness of the Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 projects and the
7		processes FPL employed to reach these conclusions.
8		
9	II.	Focus of Witnesses' Testimony
10		
11	Q.	Please summarize the testimony of the other witnesses who will appear on
12		FPL's behalf in this proceeding.
13	A.	Dr. Leonardo Green describes FPL's load forecasting process, discusses the
14		assumptions used in that process, and presents the resulting load forecast
15		which has been used in FPL's integrated resource planning analysis to identify
16		FPL's resource needs in 2005 and 2006, and in the economic analysis of the
17		various alternatives proposed by FPL and others to meet those needs. Dr
18		Green is the sponsor of Section V.B. of the Need Study, the portion of
19		Appendix C of the Need Study that discusses FPL's sales and load forecas
20		models and Appendix G to the Need Study.
21		
22		Dr. Steven Sim describes FPL's resource planning process, identifies FPL's
)3		additional resource needs in 2005 and 2006, describes FPL's proposed self-

build options to meet those resource needs, discusses FPL's Supplemental RFP issued on April 26, 2002, and the proposals received in response to the Supplemental RFP, explains, in detail, the process FPL followed to perform the economic evaluation of the eligible outside proposals and the FPL self-build options, discusses the assumptions used in the analyses, with the exception of the load forecast and fuel forecast, which are presented by Dr. Green and Mr. Yupp, respectively, and presents the results of the economic evaluation. Dr. Sim demonstrates that the combination of FPL's Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3, both in 2005, results in the lowest cost to FPL's customers. Dr. Sim is sponsoring Section IV and co-sponsoring Section V of the Need Study. He is sponsoring the portion of Appendix C that describes the EGEAS and TIGER models and Appendices C, D, E, F, J and K, and co-sponsoring Appendices M and N to the Need Study.

Mr. Alan Taylor describes his role as an independent evaluator of the new capacity proposals received by FPL in response to the Supplemental RFP and of FPL's self-build alternatives, describes the process he followed and the tools he used to conduct his evaluation, and presents the results of that evaluation and explains his conclusion that the combination of Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 constitutes the most cost-effective portfolio that meets FPL's resource needs.

Mr. William Yeager presents the engineering details of FPL's proposed Martin Unit 8 project, which consists of the conversion of two simple-cycle combustion turbines to a new state-of-the art 4x1 combined cycle unit, and the Manatee Unit 3 project, which involves the construction of a new state-of-the art 4x1 combined cycle unit. Included in his testimony are the cost and performance specifications of these proposed units, corresponding to the data used in FPL's analysis. Mr. Yeager sponsors Section III of the Need Study, except for the transmission integration discussions sponsored by Mr. Stillwagon, as well as a portion of Appendix L to the Need Study.

Mr. Dennis Brandt's testimony presents the details of FPL's DSM goals, and FPL's DSM programs and plan. He demonstrates that there is not sufficient DSM potential to avoid the proposed generating units. Mr. Brandt is sponsoring Section VI and Appendix O of the Need Study.

Mr. Donald Stillwagon describes the transmission assessment and calculations performed under his direction and control to determine the transmission integration costs associated with those capacity combinations identified by Dr. Sim's analysis as being economically competitive, and presents the results of that process. He also presents the transmission integration facilities and costs associated with Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3. He sponsors the transmission integration discussions in Section III of the Need Study and the direct cost estimates in Appendix M to the Need Study.

Dr. William Avera addresses the impact of power purchase contracts on FPL's financial position and describes the method FPL used to account for this impact in its evaluation of capacity proposals submitted in response to the Supplemental RFP. His testimony discusses the financial risks associated with purchased power contracts and the importance of recognizing these implications in an economic evaluation of power supply alternatives. Dr. Avera concludes that FPL's calculation to determine the amount of cost to impute to the outside bids was based on reasonable assumptions, and that the application of the resulting equity penalty in its analysis of the capacity proposals is consistent with both the Standard & Poor's Corporation (S&P) methodology and prior Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC) practice. Dr. Avera is co-sponsoring Appendix N to the Need Study along with Dr. Sim and Mr. Dewhurst.

Mr. Moray Dewhurst describes the importance, from the perspective of both FPL and FPL's customers, of ensuring that the entities with whom FPL may enter into a capacity and energy contract have, and will maintain, the level of financial viability necessary to ensure that their facilities will be constructed, completed on schedule, and properly operated and maintained. Mr. Dewhurst also explains the need for, and appropriateness of, applying the equity penalty included in the economic analysis to any plan that results in FPL entering into a power purchase contract. Mr. Dewhurst sponsors Appendix I to the Need Study.

Mr. Gerard Yupp describes the transportation alternatives available to deliver natural gas to FPL's Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3 and explains why FPL does not need to design Manatee Unit 3 as a dual-fuel unit with light oil capability. He addresses the ready availability of natural gas for Martin Unit 8 and Manatee Unit 3. Mr. Yupp also supports the fuel price forecast used in FPL's economic analysis of its self-build option and the outside proposals in the Supplemental RFP. Mr. Yupp sponsors Section V.B.2 and Appendix H of 8 . the Need Study.

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III. FPL's Capacity Need and Supplemental Request for Proposals

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Please describe FPL's electric generating system. Q.

A. To serve its customers, FPL has 17,860 MW of generating resources at 14 sites located throughout its service territory and beyond, including partial ownership of one unit located in Georgia and partial ownership of two units located in Jacksonville. The location of these FPL generating units, their fuel types, and their projected summer capabilities for 2002 are shown in a map attached to my testimony as Document RS-1.

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Q. Does FPL purchase power from other sources in addition to its own generation resources to meet demand?

A. Yes. FPL purchases from utility/non-utility sources and qualifying facilities (QFs). Over the next 10 years, to meet seasonal peak demand, FPL will purchase from utility/non-utility sources as much as 2,620 MW (winter). By summer of 2010, the purchases are expected to decline to 382 MW. A summary of these power purchases is provided in Document RS-2. FPL also will purchase as much as 877 MW from QFs within the next 10 years. By the summer of 2010, QF purchases are expected to decline to 640 MW. A schedule of QF purchases is provided in Document RS-3.

The decline in purchased power and QF purchases is simply a result of the expiration of a number of different contracts. For example, FPL's current Unit Power Sale (UPS) purchases from the Southern Companies terminates in 2010, and FPL has not decided how to replace this capacity at this time. A number of other purchases are shorter-term, intended to help FPL achieve a 20% reserve margin in the near term, but not needed beyond the period FPL's Supplemental RFP was intended to address.

A.

Q. How much DSM is included in FPL's resource plan?

Measured from the end of 2001, FPL's cumulative DSM goal is to achieve approximately 565 MW of additional summer peak demand reduction at the meter through 2009, the end of the current goal setting period. This reduction is in addition to the 3,076 MW of demand reduction at the generator already accomplished through 2001. This reduction to date, after accounting for reserve margin requirements, translates to an avoidance of more than 3,600

1		MW of generation requirements, while FPL's goals from 2002 to 2009
2		represent approximately an additional 725 MW of capacity avoidance.
3		
4	Q.	What were FPL's actual peaks and net energy for load during 2001?
5	A.	FPL experienced a record summer peak of 18,754 MW in 2001, an increase of
6		5.3% from the 2000 summer peak. The winter peak for 2000/2001 was
7		18,199 MW, a 6.7% increase from the previous year. Net Energy for Load
8		(NEL) in 2001 was 98,404 GWh, up 2.5% from 2000.
9		
10	Q.	What is FPL's projected total peak load for the summer of 2005 and
11		2006, respectively?
12	A.	As shown in Dr. Green's testimony, FPL's projected total summer peak loads
13		for 2005 and 2006 are 20,719 MW and 21,186 MW, respectively.
14		
15	Q.	What are FPL's projected additional resource needs for 2005 and 2006,
16		respectively?
17	A.	As shown in Dr. Sim's testimony, in order to maintain a 20% reserve margin,
18		FPL needs 1,122 MW of new generation capacity by June 1, 2005, and an
19		additional 600 MW of new generation capacity by June 1, 2006. This results
20		in a total required increase in capacity of 1,722 by June 1, 2006.
21		
22	Q.	Why does FPL apply a 20% reserve margin target to determine its need
23		for 2005 and 2006 ?

A. In 1998 the Commission staff expressed concern over the projected level of 1 reserves in the state. The Commission initiated an investigation of reserve 2 margins and, in that case, FPL and the other investor-owned utilities in 3 peninsular Florida proposed and voluntarily agreed to begin using 20% of 4 annual peak as a reserve margin criterion and to achieve this level of reserves 5 by summer 2004. The Commission approved this stipulation in Order No. 6 PSC-99-2507-S-EU. FPL continues to use a dual criteria approach to assess system reliability, leaving in place the 0.1 days/year Loss of Load Probability 8 (LOLP) standard and a reserve margin standard of 15% of annual peak until 9 mid-2004, at which time the reserve margin standard becomes 20% of annual 10 peak. 11

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Q. Which reliability criterion is the primary driver of the need for new resources?

A. As discussed by Dr. Sim, FPL's need for new resources is driven by the 20% summer reserve margin criterion. Use of LOLP alone would result in a lower level of resource additions.

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- Q. How does FPL plan to meet its 2005/2006 need for new resource capacity?
- As discussed by Dr. Sim, FPL has identified a need for approximately 1,722

 MW in the 2005/2006 time frame. FPL plans to meet this need by converting

 Martin Unit 8 to combined cycle, which adds 789 MW of summer capacity,

1		and adding Manatee Unit 3 combined cycle, which adds 1,107 MW of
2		summer capacity to FPL's system. These are the most cost-effective resource
3		options for FPL's customers.
4		
5	Q.	Do the units identified by FPL require licensing under the Power Plant
6		Siting Act (PPSA)?
7	A.	Yes. Manatee Unit 3 and Martin Unit 8 will each add more than 75 MW of
8		steam capacity in their proposed configurations, and therefore would require
9		FPL to pursue licensing under the PPSA, including a Determination of Need
10		filing with this Commission.
11		
12	Q.	Did FPL issue a request for proposals prior to seeking a Determination of
13		Need for these units?
14	A.	Yes. Not once, but twice.
15		
16	Q.	When did FPL issue its initial request for proposals?
17	A.	FPL issued an announcement of its initial request for proposals on August 13,
18		2001.
19		
19	Q٠	What was the result of the initial request for proposals?
	Q. A.	What was the result of the initial request for proposals? FPL received 80 eligible proposals from 15 bidders, and after its analysis, as

1 Manatee Unit 3 and expanding Martin Unit 8 to meet its 1,722 MW need was the lowest cost alternative. 2 3 Q. When did FPL issue its Supplemental RFP? 4 FPL issued its Supplemental RFP on April 26, 2002. A. 5 6 Q. Please summarize the Supplemental RFP. 7 As explained in greater detail by Dr. Sim, the Supplemental RFP requested up 8 . A. to 1,722 MW of firm capacity in the 2005/2006 time frame. Proposals for 9 power purchases of from 3 to 25 years and turnkey bids for new units were 10 specifically noted as acceptable. No technology preference was stated; in fact, 11 FPL invited any project of any type that would satisfy FPL's capacity needs. 12 By leaving the timing and technology open, FPL did not preclude sales from 13 other utility systems, construction of new units, or sales from existing units. In 14 addition, tolling agreements, under which FPL would purchase and deliver 15 the fuel utilized at a generating plant owned and operated by an independent 16 power producer, were specifically noted as acceptable in the Supplemental 17 RFP. FPL's intent was to make the solicitation as open as possible. 18

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Q. How many bidders responded to FPL's Supplemental RFP?

A. FPL received capacity bids from 16 organizations totaling approximately 12,500 MW. The 16 organizations, along with the type of proposal submitted and the technology, are listed in Document RS-4.

1	Q٠	Did any bidders submit multiple projects?
2	A.	Yes. When multiple proposals, with pricing, start date and term-of-service
3		variations were accounted for, FPL actually received 53 discrete alternatives
4		in response to its Supplemental RFP.
5		
6	Q.	Were all of these 53 alternatives evaluated in the economic analysis?
7	A.	No. Only 31 separate proposals were eligible to be considered in the economic
8		analysis. As explained by Dr. Sim, one bidder, who had originally submitted
9		12 proposals under the initial request for proposals in 2001, submitted 16
10		proposals in response to the Supplemental RFP on May 24, 2002, but later
11		withdrew 4 of them to avoid paying the evaluation fee. This reduced the
12		number of bids to 49.
13		
14		Three of the sixteen bidders were subsequently determined to be ineligible
15		Because these 3 bidders were sponsoring 18 separate proposals, their removal
16		from consideration reduced the number of eligible proposals to 31. These 31
17		eligible bids are listed in Document RS-5.
18		
19	Q.	Why did FPL declare the bids submitted by three of the bidders
20		ineligible?
21	A.	In the Supplemental RFP FPL listed nine Minimum Requirements which each
22		proposal should satisfy and noted that failure to satisfy all of the Minimum

Requirements would be grounds for determining a proposal ineligible. FPL

also indicated in the Supplemental RFP that it would undertake an initial screening of the proposals to determine eligibility. FPL's Supplemental RFP stated that any such proposals so screened would be returned along with their associated fees.

A number of the Supplemental RFP bidders did not agree to the Completion Security requirement of the Supplemental RFP. Consequently, FPL notified each such bidder that the Completion Security requirement amount was a Minimum Requirement necessary for their proposals to be considered. In response, all but one of the bidders notified FPL of their willingness to comply with the Completion Security requirement amount. The single proposal submitted by the one bidder which did not indicate its willingness to comply with the Completion Security requirement was determined to be ineligible.

Another bidder is currently under contract with FPL to provide energy and capacity to FPL in June of 2003 and has informed FPL that it will not be able to meet its in-service date. Given that bidder's failure to perform under an existing contract, the bidder's five proposals were determined to be ineligible. FPL was unwilling to entrust its system reliability to a bidder which had already announced an inability to perform on another contract, and which appeared to lack the ability to finance, construct and operate facilities on schedule.

Finally, twelve proposals submitted by another bidder were determined to be ineligible because, in FPL's judgment, entering into a contract with this bidder would result in an extremely high level of risk to FPL's customers. The bidder has been accused of filing misleading financial statements, and of "gaming" the system in the California energy market. FPL is simply unwilling to entrust its system reliability to such an entity. Therefore, its twelve proposals were determined to be ineligible.

It should be noted that these determinations of ineligibility were made without consideration of the economic standing of the bidders' proposals. FPL was not willing to entrust its system reliability to entities who were unwilling to post Completion Security to protect customers, who were failing to perform on another contract with FPL, or who had been accused of gross misconduct.

Q. Do you consider FPL's Supplemental RFP to have been a successful solicitation for new capacity?

17 A. Yes. Based on the large number of both respondents and projects proposed, I
18 believe that FPL's Supplemental RFP was the most successful investor-owned
19 utility solicitation in Florida to date. Sixteen bidders, including three bidders
20 who had not participated in the initial request for proposal, submitted
21 proposals totaling over 12,500 MW. No other Florida investor-owned utility
22 has received this volume of responses to its Supplemental RFP. The
23 Supplemental RFP has certainly served the interests of FPL's customers.

IV. Supplemental RFP Economic Analysis

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Q. What is the objective of the economic analysis?

A. The objective of the economic analysis is to identify the combination of resources that results in the lowest cost (i.e., electric rates) to customers. The 5 economic analysis of competing alternatives must reflect all associated 6 quantifiable costs, both direct and indirect. For example, in comparing supply 7 alternatives, such as competing generating units, the direct costs would 8 include capital costs (or capacity payments), fixed operating and maintenance 9 (O&M) expenses, capital replacement costs, variable O&M expenses and fuel 10 costs, transmission interconnection and integration costs, and the cost of any 11 equity penalty resulting from entering into a power purchase obligation. 12 Indirect costs would include the change in the fuel costs of other, existing 13 generating units when the new unit is added to the system. This last item 14 might either be a cost (increase in other units' fuel costs) or a benefit 15 (reduction in other units' fuel costs). The totals of these costs for the various 16 combinations of resources, expressed as revenue requirements, are compared 17 18 over time on a cumulative net present value of revenue requirements (CPVRR) basis. 19

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Using competing new generation unit alternatives as an example, the generating alternative with the lowest CPVRR over the period of the analysis,

1		which is equivalent to providing the lowest rates, is generally favored,
2		although other factors must be considered.
3		
4	Q.	Have these direct and indirect costs been reflected in the economic
5		analyses?
6	A.	Yes. As explained by Dr. Sim and Mr. Taylor, all of the above costs have
7		been appropriately reflected in the economic analyses related to the
8 .		Supplemental RFP.
9		
10	Q.	Should the costs of transmission integration for the various generation
11		plans be reflected in the economic analysis?
12	A.	Yes. Whether these transmission integration costs are assigned to a specific
13		project or rolled into overall rates, FPL's customers will pay those costs.
14		Therefore, for bid comparison purposes, the costs of transmission
15		enhancements must be, and have been quantified and should remain with the
16		generator or group of generators that cause the need for the enhancement.
17		
18		The analyses performed to determine transmission integration costs are
19		addressed in the testimony of Mr. Stillwagon. He addresses the load flow
20		analysis performed, as well as the resulting cost estimates for 28 expansion
21		plans.
22		
23	Q.	What is the equity penalty?

A. The equity penalty is a real cost associated with power purchases. The cost is a result of an imputation by rating agencies, such as S&P, of additional debt to a purchaser who enters into a power purchase contract.

The equity penalty is addressed in the testimony of Drs. Sim and Avera, Messrs. Dewhurst and Taylor. The equity penalty calculations performed in this analysis are set forth in Appendix N of the Need Study.

A.

Q. What do the results of FPL's analysis show?

The results of FPL's analysis show that the most cost-effective alternative for FPL's customers when all costs are considered is the construction of a new combined cycle unit at FPL's Manatee site (Manatee Unit 3) and the conversion of Martin Unit 8, which currently consists of two simple cycle combustion turbines (CTs), to a 4x1 combined cycle configuration. There is no plan consisting entirely of non-FPL options that is even remotely competitive with this Manatee/Martin plan. As Dr. Sim shows, the smallest differential between the All-FPL self build plan and the best all non-FPL plan was greater than \$470 million, (CPVRR).

Only a few combinations of either FPL's Manatee Unit 3 or Martin Unit 8, respectively, with one or more non-FPL alternatives had total costs that came within \$100 million of the All-FPL self build plan. The best of these

1		combination plans is \$83 million, (CPVRR), more expensive than the All-FPL
2		self build plan.
3		
4	Q.	Was FPL's analysis independently verified?
5	A.	Yes. Mr. Taylor's firm, Sedway Consulting, Inc., was retained prior to the
6		analysis to run an independent study of the outside proposals and the FPL
7		options. As Mr. Taylor describes in his testimony, he used his own model to
8		perform the analysis.
9		
10	Q.	What did Mr. Taylor's results show?
11	A.	Mr. Taylor obtained similar results from his studies. According to Mr
12		Taylor's analysis, the All-FPL self build plan was better than the best
13		FPL/non-FPL combination plan by \$135 million (CPVRR), and better than
14		the best all-outside combination by more than \$423 million (CPVRR).
15		
16	Q.	Do you believe that these results provide a reasonable basis for
17		concluding that the All-FPL self build plan is the most cost-effective
18		alternative available?
19	A.	Yes. Not only has FPL determined that its own self build options are the mos
20		cost-effective, but also this result has been independently verified. The
21		analytical process was comprehensive and subject to an internal critical
22		review. Moreover, FPL undertook initial negotiations with the predominan

bidder in several of the next lowest cost plan; and these negotiations

reinforced the conclusion that the All-FPL self build plan is the most cost effective option.

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IV. "Short List" Selection and Negotiation

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Q. Please address how FPL developed its "Short List" for negotiations?

Once Dr. Sim's group developed the lowest cost alternative plans available, based on analysis results as of June 18, 2002 there were 33 plans that were within \$200 million of the All-FPL self build plan. Many of these plans consisted of the same options with different proposed terms of service. For instance, one entity offering system sales offered the sales for either 3 or 5 year terms. Similarly, some entities offering capacity from one or more new units offered mutually exclusive contract terms of various lengths from the same unit(s). One entity offered capacity from units in two different locations, each unit sufficient to meet all of FPL's need in 2006. Thus, many of the alternative plans were mutually exclusive, containing options from the same units but priced differently or with a different term. From this list of 33 plans, I aggregated the alternative plans that did not include both FPL units into five separate groups of mutually exclusive combinations (within each group) and compared the cost of the best combination in each group to the cost of the All-FPL self build plan. The comparative sheet is Document RS-6.

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Q. Please describe the five Groups shown on Document RS-6.

A. The five groups shown in Document RS-6 are labeled Groups A through E. Except for the bidders that were selected for the short list (i.e., Group A), the names of the bidders whose proposals are reflected in these groups are coded to comply with the bidders request for confidentiality.

Group A consists of FPL's Manatee Unit 3, 1,107 MW, and a 50 MW system purchase from Florida Power Corporation ("FPC") in 2005, plus a 708 MW purchase from an El Paso Merchant Energy Corporation ("El Paso") unit in 2006. There are three plans that consist of some combination of these three options with varying contract terms, or different costs and locations, for the FPC and El Paso alternatives. I chose the least cost plan from this Group A for comparison. This Group A plan had a cost of \$58 million more than that of the All-FPL self build plan. Subsequent refinements of FPL's analysis based, in part, on inputs provided by El Paso, result in this cost differential increasing from \$58 million to \$83 million.

Group B consists of FPL's Martin Unit 8, 789 MW, a 200 MW system purchase from Bidder W, and a 250 MW purchase from a new Bidder X combined cycle unit in 2005, plus a purchase of approximately 700 MW from one of two proposed El Paso combined cycle units in 2006. There are six plans that consist of some combination of these four options, with varying contract terms, costs, and locations. I chose the lowest cost plan from this Group B for comparison. This Group B portfolio had a cost of \$59 million more than that

of the All-FPL self build plan. Subsequent refinements of FPL's analysis based, in part, on inputs provided by El Paso, result in this cost differential increasing from \$59 million to \$87 million.

Group C consists of FPL's Martin Unit 8, 789 MW, and a 506 MW purchase from a new Bidder Y combined cycle unit in 2005, plus a purchase of approximately 700 MW from one of two proposed El Paso combined cycle units in 2006. There are four plans that consist of some combination of these three options, with varying costs and locations. I chose the lowest cost plan from this Group C for comparison. This Group C plan had a cost of \$87 million more than that of the All-FPL self build plan. Subsequent refinements of FPL's analysis based, in part, on inputs provided by El Paso, result in this cost differential increasing from \$87 million to \$122 million.

Group D consists of FPL's Martin Unit 8, 789 MW, a 200 MW system purchase from Bidder W, a 50 MW system purchase from FPC, and a 250 MW purchase from a new Bidder X combined cycle unit in 2005, plus a purchase of approximately 700 MW from one of two proposed El Paso combined cycle units in 2006. There are two alternative plans that consist of some combination of these five options, with varying costs and locations. I chose the lowest cost plan from this Group D for comparison. This Group D plan had a cost of \$104 million more than that of All-FPL self build plan. Subsequent refinements of

1		FPL's analysis based, in part, on inputs provided by El Paso, result in this cost
2		differential increasing from \$104 million to \$141 million.
3		
4		Group E consists of FPL Martin Unit 8, 789 MW, and a 506 MW purchase
5		from a new Bidder Z combined cycle unit in 2005, plus a 708 MW, purchase
6		from a new El Paso combined cycle unit in 2006. There are three plans that
7		consist of some combination of these options, with various contract terms. I
8		chose the lowest cost plan from this Group E for comparison. This Group E
9		plan had a cost of \$145 million more than that of the All-FPL self build plan.
10		Subsequent refinements of FPL's analysis based, in part, on inputs provided by
11		El Paso, result in this cost differential increasing from \$145 million to \$182
12		million.
13		
14	Q.	What entities were ultimately named to the short list?
15	A.	The short list consisted of FPC and El Paso, the entities offering the options
16		that comprised the Group A plan I previously discussed. As I stated above, one
17		of El Paso's proposals was part of every marginally competitive plan. FPC's
18		proposal was also included in an alternative plan that included FPL's Manatee
19		Unit 3 in 2005 and Martin Unit 8 in 2006.
20		
21	Q.	Upon what bases was the short list determined?
22	A.	The primary factors that led to the determination of the short list are as follows:

First, it was clear that (1) all of the plans in these Groups were much more costly than the All-FPL self build plan; (2) the plans in Groups C, D and E were much more costly than some of the plans of Groups A and B; and (3) none of the plans would have been even remotely competitive with the All-FPL self build plan but for the fact that they included one of the two El Paso options in 2006.

These two El Paso bids were particularly competitive, and without those bids no plan was close to the All-FPL self build plan (other than one plan that included both FPL units and a short-term utility system purchase). Specifically, without El Paso, the only plan within \$200 million of the All-FPL self build plan included both FPL's Manatee Unit 3 in 2005 and FPL's Martin Unit 8 in 2006, plus a short-term 50 MW system purchase from FPC in 2005 to allow FPL to achieve its reserve margin target. Thus, El Paso was the driver in all of the top economic plans other than those that included both FPL units. Consequently, it was clear that El Paso should be on the short list. Moreover, if an agreement with a reduced price could not be reached with El Paso, there was no point in negotiating with any of the other bidders.

Also, the significantly higher cost of the plans in Groups C, D and E compared to those in Groups A and B, and to the All-FPL self build plan eliminated them from further consideration.

Second, FPL had concerns about two of the proposals in Group B (and also Group D). Both proposals were necessary for that plan to meet FPL's reserve margin requirements. So, the loss of either proposal would make the plans reflected in Group B (and Group D) insufficient. FPL had a concern with the Bidder W proposal related to whether it could deliver 200 MW of capacity to FPL in 2005 through 2011, and still achieve it's own 20% reserve margin. FPL had separate serious concerns with Bidder X that would independently disqualify Groups B and D. As Mr. Dewhurst testifies, Bidder X's bond rating was rated below investment grade. This raised serious concerns about Bidder X's financial viability and its ability to finance, construct, operate and maintain its proposed facility.

Third, it made sense to focus FPL's efforts on negotiation with the entities offering the plan that was economically closest to the All-FPL self build plan. Based on the results of FPL's economic analysis, as well as those of the independent analysis performed by Mr. Taylor, even the plans in Groups A or B were not economically competitive with the All-FPL self build plan. They are all at least \$58 million more expensive than the All-FPL self build plan, and were all more costly than another plan that included both FPL plants and a 50 MW utility system purchase. With the All-FPL self build plan clearly the economically superior plan, FPL focused its negotiating resources on the entities and plans that held the most promise as an alternative to the All-FPL self build plan, especially since the negotiations were likely to be very

challenging, given the economic improvements those entities would have to make to achieve a lower cost than the All-FPL self build plan.

Therefore, on June 19, 2002, FPL contacted the bidders regarding their status and announced its short list of FPC and El Paso (i.e. Group A).

Q. Please summarize what FPL communicated to the short list bidders.

A. FPL initially contacted both the short list bidders on June 19, indicating that they had made the short list for negotiations and that follow-up communications would be sent shortly.

On June 19, FPL sent a letter to El Paso, inviting El Paso to lower its price, forwarding a draft purchased power agreement ("PPA") and proposing a round of face-to-face negotiations on June 27 and, if appropriate, June 28. On June 20, FPL forwarded to El Paso a series of questions regarding El Paso's bids. On June 21, FPL informed El Paso that El Paso's bids were part of plans that were not the most cost-effective alternatives available to FPL. FPL requested that prior to June 27 El Paso provide the responses to the questions, any reactions to the PPA and any bid price reduction. On June 21, FPL asked El Paso if it would agree to have Commission Staff observe the negotiations session; El Paso indicated its agreement, and FPL extended an invitation to the Staff to observe the negotiations.

1		On June 25, FPL again informed El Paso that El Paso's bids were part of plans
2		that were not the most cost-effective alternatives available to FPL, again
3		requested that El Paso consider reducing the price of its bids, and extended to
4		Monday, July 1, the deadline for any price reduction.
5		
6		On June 21, FPL also sent a letter to FPC advising FPC that it was part of a
7		plan that was not the most cost-effective alternatives available to FPL, and
8 .		providing FPC with the opportunity to refine its pricing by a date certain. FPC
9		responded on June 25, indicating that FPC would not reduce its bid price.
10		
11		On June 27, FPL met with representatives of El Paso, with Commission Staff
12		in attendance.
13		
14	Q.	Please summarize the key relevant information provided by El Paso
15		during your meeting of June 27, and subsequently via fax on July 1.
16	A.	During the day of discussions, in response to FPL's inquiries regarding the
17		aspects of its proposals that El Paso would be willing to contractually
18		guarantee, El Paso explained the following:
19		
20		First, El Paso indicated that for both of its bids, the heat rates that had been
21		provided by El Paso were the "best" heat rates that could be achieved by the
22		proposed units, not the average heat rates that the units would achieve over
23		time, as FPL assumed for all alternatives in the evaluation process. El Paso

further communicated that the average heat rate that FPL should use to evaluate El Paso's two bids was 3% higher than the "optimal" heat rate El Paso had originally submitted in its bids. This was subsequently revised by El Paso (via fax) to be 1% higher than the "optimal" heat rate. This meant that all energy produced at El Paso's proposed facilities would be 1% more costly than had been evaluated by FPL and Mr. Taylor.

Second, El Paso indicated that although it had not stated it in its bids, it intended its bids to be "tolling agreements," where FPL would acquire and deliver the natural gas required to operate the proposed El Paso units. El Paso had asked FPL to evaluate El Paso's proposal at the Belle Glade site assuming that gas would be delivered through the Gulfstream pipeline. However, it is not known when the Gulfstream pipeline would be extended to reach the Belle Glade site.

El Paso indicated that until the Gulfstream pipeline was actually extended to reach the Belle Glade site, gas could be transported through the FGT pipeline to the NUI pipeline (a local distribution company), and then delivered through the NUI pipeline to the Belle Glade plant. Aside from the cost of transporting gas through the FGT pipeline to the NUI pipeline, El Paso indicated that NUI would impose additional charges to deliver the gas through its own pipeline. This meant that given the higher cost of gas transportation through the FGT pipeline, compared to the Gulfstream pipeline, and adding the NUI cost,

beginning on the in-service date of the Belle Glade unit, all gas used at El 1 Paso's Belle Glade facility would be more costly than had been evaluated by 2 FPL and Mr. Taylor. 3 Moreover, it is not clear when Gulfstream would extend its pipeline to reach 5 6 the Belle Glade plant, or how long a contractual commitment FGT and NUI would require FPL to make, paying the higher transportation rate, in order for 7 FGT and NUI to make the pipeline enhancements that would be necessary to 8 deliver sufficient gas to the Belle Glade facility at the required pressure. 9 10 Third, El Paso indicated that, although in its bids it had asked FPL to assume 11 that its proposed units would operate at approximately 93.6% availability, on 12 average, El Paso's proposal in fact was a "unit contingent" energy proposal, 13 where FPL would control and dispatch the unit when and if the unit is 14 available, but that El Paso's proposal did not guarantee any specific level of 15 availability. El Paso indicated that a proposal that would offer a performance 16 guarantee on availability would be more costly. 17 18 Fourth, El Paso indicated that its bid was very aggressive and hence it would 19 not further reduce its bid prices. In fact, no price change was received by the 20 extended July 1 deadline. 21

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- Please summarize FPL's actions to reflect, in its evaluation, the Q. information provided by El Paso on June 27, and subsequently via fax on July 1, and the results of those actions.
- A. FPL reflected in its economic analysis for Groups A through E described above 4 a 1% increase in the heat rate of each of the two El Paso proposed units and an 5 increase in the cost of natural gas delivered to El Paso's Belle Glade unit for the 6 first two years of the proposed 25-year contract (a very conservative 7 assumption regarding the term of the commitment that FGT and NUI are likely 8 9 to demand prior to making the necessary pipeline improvements to provide this service). El Paso's clarifications increased the cost of the plans in Groups A 10 through E that included El Paso's Belle Glade proposal by approximately \$24 million (CPVRR). The cost increase for the best plans in Groups A through E that included El Paso's Manatee proposal is approximately \$11 million.

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Did FPL make any adjustments in the economic evaluation due to the Q. clarification by El Paso that its proposals were for "unit contingent" energy?

No. Without making any additional adjustments related to the "unit A. contingent" nature of El Paso's proposal, FPL's economic analysis already concluded that the best alternative plan to the All FPL option is \$83 million more costly than the All-FPL self build plan. Therefore, it was not necessary to make further adjustments. However, it should be noted that in negotiations

1		El Paso stated that if it provided a more firm proposal, its bid would have been
2		higher.
3		
4	Q.	Aside from the adjustments applied to the best plans in Groups A
5		through E, related to the heat rate and gas transportation cost
6		clarifications provided by El Paso, did FPL make other adjustments to its
7		economic analysis after the June 18 meeting with FPL management?
8	A.	Yes. As explained by Dr. Sim, adjustments were made to reflect the fact that
9		if only one of FPL's units is built in a plan, the cost of building that single FPL
10		unit is approximately \$15 million greater (CPVRR) than when built in
11		conjunction with the other FPL unit. Small adjustments (approximately \$1
12		million) were also made to the transmission integration costs in some of the
13		plans. All adjustments are reflected in the results provided in Document RS-7.
14		As this Document shows, the most competitive of all the plans that do not
15		include both of FPL's generating units exceed the cost of the All-FPL self
16		build plan by at least \$83 million.
17		
18	V.	Other Factors Considered in Resource Selection
19		
20	Q.	What other factors influence FPL's selection of a generating alternative?
21	A.	FPL considers a number of other factors in the selection of generating
22		alternatives, including:
23		- Financial viability of the supplier;

1		- Extent of contractual commitment of supplier;
2		- Feasibility of licensing and construction plans;
3		- Delivery risk related to firmness of fuel supply, construction
4		schedule, and experience of the seller;
5		- Degree of control to be exercised by FPL, including items such
6		as dispatchability, and FPL's rights to sell power;
7		- Fuel diversity impact of the various alternatives;
8 .		- Technology risk; and
9		- Environmental risk.
10		
11	Q.	Please describe how these factors may be applied.
12	A.	These factors can cause some proposals to be eliminated from consideration
13		because of their negative impact on system reliability and costs to customers.
14		The factors may also be used to raise one alternative above another that, on
15		the surface, may seem to provide a better economic result.
16		
17		For example, if a supplier's financial viability is not strong, it may not be
18		financially capable of performing its primary obligations under a purchase
19		power contract, including the timely construction and completion of the unit
20		and the reliable long-term operation of the resource, thus adversely affecting
21		system reliability. Mr. Dewhurst addresses this issue in his testimony.
22		

"Contractual commitment of a supplier" refers to the relative ability and willingness of a supplier to make a substantial contractual commitment that gives adequate assurance to FPL of its intention to perform reliably. Absent a strong contractual commitment, a supplier may find it easier to renege on its obligations to FPL and FPL's customers if performance difficulties arise. Consequently, FPL will require a certain level of financial viability and a certain level of contractual commitment before it enters into a purchase power contract.

"Feasibility of licensing and construction plans" relates to the relative degree of difficulty that the overall licensing process could have on a generation resource and the impact that the process could have on the construction of the resource.

"Delivery risk related to firmness of fuel supply, construction schedule, and experience of seller," addresses the relative risk associated with (1) projects that include firm gas supply and transportation contracts, which would have less delivery risk than those that do not, or (2) projects whose technology dictates a longer construction process, with greater opportunities for delay, such as a nuclear plant, which would be disadvantaged when compared to one with a less involved construction process, such as a combined cycle unit, or (3) projects in which the seller demonstrates that it has ample experience with the same type, brand and size of equipment, labor markets, and operating

conditions, which would be advantages, compared to those where they do not have similar experience, and (4) the experience of the bidder with which FPL is familiar.

"Degree of control that can be exercised by FPL, including dispatchability and FPL's right to sell power" from the resource into the wholesale market (which results in fuel credits to its customers), relates to how effectively a proposal allows FPL to have the resource operated and maintained in the same manner as FPL dispatches, operates and maintains its own units to maximize the benefit to the customer.

"Fuel diversity" is a way of mitigating the risk that one event or market condition related to a single fuel could adversely affect the availability or cost of all or a large portion of electricity produced or purchased by FPL. There is no definite guideline as to how much energy any single fuel source should provide, but in choosing between, for example, a new coal generating unit and a new gas generating unit to augment the capacity of the existing system, if the existing system currently uses much more gas than coal, the new coal unit would have an advantage based on its greater contribution to fuel diversity. Similarly, purchasing system power from a diversified system or from a system that uses fuel types that are different from those used by the purchaser adds to fuel diversity.

Another aspect of fuel diversity concerns the degree to which risk can be mitigated by obtaining the same fuel type (e.g., gas) from different geographical sources, and/or delivering it through different delivery systems. An example of this might be in the comparison of two gas-fired options, one fed from an existing gas pipeline, from which gas is delivered to the existing system, and the other fed from a separate gas pipeline. The alternative fed through the separate pipeline would be considered a better contributor to fuel diversity because some events that affect the first pipeline that feeds the existing system would not affect the new gas-fired option which is fed through a different pipeline.

"Technology risk" is based, in part, on an assessment of the relative maturity of a technology. For example, an alternative based on a new gas turbine still in the prototype stage might be considered a greater risk than a more commercially developed technology. Also, the lower the degree of experience that a particular supplier has in constructing, operating and maintaining a certain combination of equipment, or in a certain operating pattern (e.g., cycling up and down), the greater the susceptibility of that supplier's proposal to technology risk. This risk can be manifested in a generating unit's inability to maintain the required high level of availability to satisfy FPL customers' needs.

1		"Environmental risk" is a recognition that some technologies, coal and nuclear
2		for example, may face a higher hurdle in licensing, and run a greater risk of
3		future tightening of controls than a gas option.
4		
5		These factors should be considered in the selection of a generating alternative,
6		to the extent it is relevant and meaningful to do so.
7		
8	Q.	Did FPL consider any of these factors in the evaluation of proposals
9		submitted in response to the Supplemental RFP?
10	A.	Yes. Consideration of two of these factors, financial viability and prior
11		experienced bidder, led to the elimination of two bidders. The other factors
12		discussed below would not change the outcome of the economic analysis;
13		rather, they serve to reinforce FPL's conclusion that the All-FPL self build
14		plan is the best option to meet the needs of its customers.
15		
16	Q.	Please address the first factor, which is financial viability of the bidder.
17	A.	The recent collapse in the credit rating of a number of energy companies has
18		brought much more attention to this issue. However, this has always been a
19		concern to FPL, because the long-term financial viability of any purchased
20		power project needs to be confirmed up front, and then maintained during the
21		term of the contract, to ensure that FPL's customers would receive the

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benefits associated with both the timely initial delivery of capacity and energy

from the generating unit that would be the subject of such a contract, and the

reliable performance of that unit throughout the life of the contract. Any delay in startup or subsequent degradation in performance, whether related to financial viability or not, jeopardizes the ability of FPL to provide an adequate, economic supply of electricity to its customers.

8 .

Therefore, FPL must evaluate, at least qualitatively, whether a supplier can avoid financial problems, and further, whether the supplier would be willing and able to complete construction and continue effective operation and maintenance of the proposed generating facility, even if the supplier were to experience financial setbacks.

On the basis of financial viability, a qualitative comparison of the proposals received in response to the Supplemental RFP favors FPL's self-build options, along with power purchases from other utilities, because FPL's credit rating and those of other utilities are significantly higher than those of the non-utility bidders. Moreover, even where a developer's current credit ratings meet FPL's minimum requirement, power purchases from the independent power producer (IPP) could rate lower due to concerns over the future financial state of the supplier in question or its corporate parent. Moreover, it is unclear whether the corporate parent of such an IPP will continue to include power generation as a key component of its future corporate strategy. To the extent that the corporate strategy does not expressly include power generation, there

is greater uncertainty regarding that supplier's commitment to overcome problems during construction, operation and maintenance.

Given the general effect of recent energy market developments on independent power producers, in general, it is logical to conclude that a contractual commitment to buy power from IPPs would present much greater risk to FPL's customers than would FPL's self-build options. Mr. Dewhurst addresses more specifically the recent market reaction to IPPs and the increased financial challenges they face.

A.

Q. Please address the factor - "Feasibility of Licensing and Construction Requirements."

FPL's self-build option requires licensing under the Power Plant Siting Act, including a Determination of Need from the Commission and a Site Certification from the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida sitting as the Siting Board, after the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) has processed FPL's application. All plans resulting from the Supplemental RFP similarly would require this licensing for both the FPL unit and the combined cycle unit(s) proposed by bidders. And although power purchases from existing plants operated by other utilities require no licensing, just FERC approval, these types of proposals were small in size and could only be considered in combination with both an FPL unit and a non-FPL unit,

both of which require licensing under the PPSA. Therefore, all portfolio plans 1 2 require PPSA action. 3 The fact that FPL proposes expanding existing sites instead of developing new 4 "greenfield" sites, along with FPL's experience in permitting and constructing 5 plants in Florida gives FPL an advantage in terms of the feasibility of 6 7 environmental licensing and construction requirements. 8 Q. Please address the relative risks related to firmness of fuel supply, 9 construction schedule and experience of the seller. 10 Generation strategies that include firm gas transportation and secure sources A. 11 of supply for the gas commodity are favored over those that do not. FPL's 12 self-build projects will be supported by contracts for firm gas transportation 13 and supply to ensure that the total firm gas requirements of FPL's system, 14 including the needs of these new FPL units, are met. Other portfolios that do 15 not include firm fuel transportation arrangements are inherently more risky in 16 terms of reliability. 17 18 Since it was not clear in most bids to what extent the bidders' fuel supply and 19 transportation needs would be met through firm contracts, bidders were not 20 penalized during the evaluation. This is the kind of issue that was to be 21

explored during negotiations. However, given the fact that FPL does plan to

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meet its firm fuel needs through firm fuel supply and transportation contracts, it is clear that no bidder would have an advantage over FPL in this category. Construction schedule relates to the likelihood that a proposal can meet the desired in-service date. To the extent that this issue relates to technology, it would not be relevant in FPL's Supplemental RFP process, since all proposals were either combined cycle or combustion turbines, as were FPL's own units. However, even with a common technology among all new plant proposals, given the extensive experience that FPL has in permitting, building and operating combined cycle units in Florida, the All-FPL self build plan has an

An assessment of the level of experience of the entity proposing to construct and operate the resource, which considered the number of similar projects which the supplier has constructed and is currently operating, would favor FPL. FPL is proposing to build units that are the same as existing units it operates, using the same equipment.

Q. Please address the factor - "Degree of Control."

advantage in this category.

A. Ultimately, the degree to which this would differentiate the All-FPL self build plan from power purchase alternatives would be determined by a negotiated contract. However, it is very difficult to duplicate ownership rights in a negotiated contract between parties with disparate and often opposing objectives.

As the owner of a generating unit, FPL has complete control over the level of output of the unit at any point in time, including shutting down the unit or turning it on, within the engineering limits of the unit. FPL also completely controls maintenance scheduling for the unit and has the right to sell power from the unit in the wholesale market when the power is not needed to serve FPL's retail customers, with the benefit of those sales accruing to the customer. In purchasing power, FPL attempts to duplicate these rights by contract. However, the degree of control FPL can exercise under a contract is never as complete as it is for a unit FPL owns and operates. In light of FPL's outstanding performance record in operating its generating plants, having as much control as possible over the generating resources is in the customers' best interests.

Q. Why can't FPL duplicate through a contract the rights it has through ownership?

Such a contract would have to specify clearly when a unit could be turned on A. or off, up or down, during the entire term of the contract. Addressing explicitly in a contract every conceivable combination of fuel prices and availability, operating capability (which can change due to many factors, including ambient temperature), maintenance requirements, customer demand, etc., would be extremely difficult if not impossible. In addition, where a difference of opinion exists with respect to the terms of a purchased power contract, exercising control rights that FPL believes to exist may require

litigation.	It has result	ed in litigation	on in the past.	This	represents	a	risk	to
customers	that is not pre	esent with sel	f-build options					

Q. Is fuel diversity a significant factor that helps create differentiation among the various bids in the Supplemental RFP?

A. No, not to a significant extent; however, to the extent it does, it gives an advantage to the All-FPL self build plan over other new construction alternatives. In this Supplemental RFP, all of the alternatives considered 8 . would be fueled by natural gas or are utility system sales. Thus, the system fuel price response to changes in any single fuel price would be relatively similar in all cases. Regarding the mitigation of risk introduced by having access to separate pipelines, because FPL will be connected to both the Gulfstream and FGT pipelines, the All-FPL self build plan provides as much mitigation against fuel risk as the best new construction options. Only the proposed utility system sales offer greater fuel diversification.

Q. Can the FPL and non-FPL alternatives be distinguished based on technology risk as you have presented it?

A. Yes, to some extent. Some of the bids, all of which utilize CTs, have proposed the use of a specific model/brand of CT with which they have not reported having any prior experience. This raises concerns regarding these bidders' ability to operate and maintain the equipment in a manner consistent with the high level of availability reflected in the proposals. As explained by Mr.

Yeager, the All-FPL self build plan, on the other hand, consists of a standardized plant design, using the same type equipment with which FPL has had extensive experience. This makes the technology risk of the All-FPL self build plan less than that of bidders employing CTs that are new to them.

Q. Is environmental risk different for FPL than for non-FPL alternatives?

A. Yes. Although all bids were based on natural gas as a fuel source, there is little difference in environmental risk; however, there are obvious environmental and permitting advantages to adding capacity to a "brownfield" site, i.e., a site with existing generation - as proposed by FPL versus development of a new "greenfield" site, as proposed by most other bidders.

A.

Q. Did the qualitative factors that you have discussed influence FPL's decision to pursue the Manatee and Martin projects?

Yes. Consideration of the qualitative factors reaffirmed FPL's finding that its self-build option is the best strategy for our customers. As discussed above, both FPL's economic analysis and that performed independently by Mr. Taylor concluded that FPL's self-build plan is the clear economic winner. Accordingly, there would have to have been clear and significant qualitative advantages associated with one or more of the other alternatives to offset the economic advantages that FPL's self-build plan provides. Most of these qualitative factors favor the All-FPL self build plan to a greater or lesser degree over other alternatives and none would make an alternative plan

superior to the All-FPL self build plan. Consequently, since the qualitative considerations I have listed above reinforce the results of FPL's quantitative analysis, it is clear that FPL's self-build option is by far the best strategy for FPL's customers.

A.

- Q. Couldn't the argument be made that signing a contract with an independent power producer is less risky than "saddling" the customers with a long-term obligation in rate base?
 - The argument is made by some, but it is specious. It ignores the fact that the commitment made through the power purchase contract places as much or more of a long-term obligation on the customers as does adding to rate base a generating unit built by FPL. The fact is that a generating unit built by an IPP under contract to FPL to meet FPL's customers' needs will be paid for by the customers through the Capacity Cost Recovery Clause and the Fuel and Energy Cost Recovery Clause. That recovery will be immediate upon delivery and will raise those cost recovery costs. In contrast, customers do not face increased rates for rate base additions until the utility seeks base rate relief. Further it should be noted that FPL has added over \$13 billion in new plant over the last seventeen years while actually decreasing rather than increasing base rates. So, at worst customers will pay for the capacity and energy either way.

Q. Is FPL predisposed to build its own units rather than to buy power?

A. No. FPL has a history that demonstrates its willingness to purchase power if that is the most economic alternative to customers. In 1989, prior to establishment of the Commission's bidding rule, FPL issued a request for proposals. After an evaluation of the bids received in response to that request for proposals, FPL selected an offer of a Unit Power Sale from the Southern Company as the preferred alternative, with other projects identified as secondary options. FPL's self-build option was not evaluated to be cost-effective. FPL eventually purchased Scherer Unit No. 4 after discussions with Georgia Power and presented the results of its RFP analysis to the Commission in Docket No. 900796-EI.

In 1992, FPL returned to the Commission as a co-applicant in the Petition to Determine Need for the Cypress Energy Partners, Ltd. Project, Docket Nos. 920520-EQ and 920648-EQ, which consisted of two 400 MW coal-fired units located near Lake Okeechobee. Although the Commission ultimately found that this project was not the most cost-effective alternative available to FPL, the fact that in both cases FPL brought forward non-FPL options demonstrates that there is no predisposition toward self-building.

In addition, as recently as 2001 FPL contracted with IPP's to make significant short-term purchases during the period 2002-2007. If FPL had been predisposed to build rather than buy, it could have built out at least part of that capacity. Instead, it chose to purchase capacity.

1	Q.	Did FPL include an equity penalty and transmission integration costs
2		when it selected the Cypress Energy project?
3	A.	Yes. FPL included \$73 million of equity penalty and \$99 million of
4		transmission integration costs and still found the project to be cost-effective.
5		
6	Q.	Won't units built by unregulated, "competitive" companies be cheaper
7		than units built by a regulated utility?
8	A.	The fact that FPL is regulated does not mean it is not price competitive.
9		Being regulated does not affect FPL's ability and willingness to compete on
10		price as well as quality and reliability. The ultimate proof of FPL's ability to
11		compete with unregulated companies is found in the results of FPL's
12		Supplemental RFP process. FPL invited the market to compete and the All-
13		FPL self-build plan remains the lowest cost, most reliable alternative.
14		
15	Q.	Are there any other qualitative or quantitative factors that could be
16		considered in the comparison that FPL has done?
17	A.	Yes. The residual value of a generating unit is a quantitative factor and refers
18		to any remaining value in that unit after its useful or expected life has passed.
19		For example, the combined cycle units proposed by FPL have expected book
20		lives of 25 years. While this is the life used to calculate depreciation expense
21		for these units, it is reasonable to assume that they will operate beyond 25
22		years with reasonable upkeep. Therefore, they will continue to have value

beyond the end of their "book life."

23

1	Q.	Did FPL quantify the benefit of residual value of the All-FPL self build
2		plan?
3	A.	No. However, Mr. Taylor did. His calculation of residual value increased the
4		cost differential between the All-FPL self build plan and the next lowest cost
5		portfolio without both FPL units by more than \$30 million. FPL's analysis in
6		this Supplemental RFP has taken a conservative approach and did not attempt
7		to quantify residual value. However, it is reasonable to assume that there will
8 .		be some value left in FPL's generating units at the end of their depreciable
9		life. Thus, residual value is an additional factor that favors the All-FPL self
10		build plan.
11		
12	VI.	Adverse Consequences of Delay
13		
14	Q.	Are there any adverse consequences to delaying approval of the Manatee
15		and Martin projects?
16	A.	Yes. Delaying approval could create a threat to system reliability, increase
17		system fuel cost and cause greater use of oil-fired generation
18		
19		The threat to system reliability would come from FPL's inability to meet its
20		20% reserve margin target if one or both units failed to meet their proposed
21		June 2005 in-service dates. For example, if both units were delayed and
22		unavailable in the summers of 2005 and 2006, FPL's reserve margin would
23		fall to 14.1% and 11.1%, respectively. While falling to these levels of reserve

margin does not necessarily result in loss of service to any of FPL's customers, lower reserve margins certainly increase the possibility of outages and increase the probability of load control operations.

Increased system fuel costs would result from any delayed in-service date of the proposed combined cycle units. These units will be highly efficient, state-of-the-art generating units which would displace energy from older, less efficient units. In addition, as shown in Document RS-8 the addition of these units will result in a significant reduction in the projected average heat rate of FPL's fossil units, from 8,402 kwh/MMBtu in 2004, to 8,095 kwh/MMBtu in 2006, a reduction of more than 3.6%. This means that fuel expense during the second half of 2005 and in 2006 will be significantly lower than it would be without Manatee Unit 3 and Martin Unit 8. The absence of the new gas-fired units will result in increased operation of FPL's older units, which generally are oil-fired, leading to increased oil use.

VIII. Summary

Q. Please summarize your testimony.

A. The Manatee Unit 3 and Martin Unit 8 projects proposed by FPL are by far the most cost-effective alternatives to meet the capacity and energy needs of FPL's customers in 2005, 2006 and beyond. These projects are needed to maintain system reliability in 2005 and 2006 as measured by FPL's 20%

1	reserve margin criterion. They will provide FPL's customers with an
2	adequate supply of electricity at a reasonable cost.
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4	The Manatee and Martin projects offer a clear economic advantage over the
5	best of the alternative plans resulting from the Supplemental RFP, as well as a
6	number of other important non-economic advantages, including the following:
7	
8	- They have potential access to more than one pipeline, resulting
9	in greater reliability of fuel supply than competing proposals.
10	
11	- Ownership offers greater operational flexibility and control
12	over the generation resource than purchased power for the
13	benefit of FPL's customers, and eliminates any litigation
14	potential related to power purchase contracts.
15	
16	- Ownership also presents less financial risk than purchased
17	power from entities that may become financially stressed in the
18	post-Enron era.
19	
20	- There is a residual value for FPL's customers in units owned by
21	FPL versus units under contract.
22	

FPL's proposed Manatee Unit 3 and Martin Unit 8 projects meet all of the criteria required by the Commission and should be granted a Determination of Need.

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- 5 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- 6 A. Yes.

Errata Sheet Direct Testimony of Rene Silva Docket Nos. 020262-EI and 020263-EI

Page	Line	Correction
5	1	after "Sim" add ", Mr. William Yeager, Dr. Leonardo Green and Mr. Gerald Yupp"
8	12-13	move Appendix C reference to the list that Steve Sim is cosponsoring so that it reads "Appendices D, E, F, J and K, and cosponsoring Appendices C, M and N to the Need Study."
9	7	after "Section III" add ", V (D) and VII (C)"
10	12	Delete last sentence
10	22	after "Appendix I" add "and co-sponsors Appendix N"
12	1	replace "2,620" with "2,673"
25	3-4	after the word "coded" replace remainder of sentence with the following: "as a courtesy to the bidders"
27	4	replace first sentence with the following: "Group E consists of FPL Martin Unit 8, 789 MW, a 50 MW system purchase from FPC and a 608 MW purchase from a new Bidder Z combined cycle unit in 2005, plus a 708 MW, purchase from a new El Paso combined cycle unit in 2006."
28	10	The sentence beginning with "Specifically" should be replaced with the following: "Specifically, without El Paso, the only plans within \$200 million of the All-FPL self build plan included both FPL's Manatee Unit 3 and FPL's Martin Unit 8, plus at least one other purchase."
40	10	The sentence beginning with "Consideration" should be replaced with the following: "Consideration of two of these factors, financial viability and the prior experience of the bidder, led to the elimination of two bidders."
42	18	Add an "s" to the word "unit" at the end of the line.

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

Exhibit RS-2

Columns "Other Firm Capacity Purchases – Winter" and "Total – Winter" should have the following adjusted numbers (for the associated years):

	Other Firm	
	Capacity	
	Purchases	Total
Year	Winter	Winter
2002	593	1910
2003	1317	2634
2004	1356	2673
2005	1306	2623
2006	543	1860
2007	542	1859

Exhibit RS-6

The last row ("E"), third column ("In-Service Year 2005) should be replaced with the following:

PMR / FPC / BIDDER Z 789MW / 50MW / 608MW

Exhibit RS-7

The last row ("E"), third column ("In-Service Year 2005) should be replaced with the following:

PMR / FPC / BIDDER Z 789MW / 50MW / 608MW BY MR. GUYTON:

Q Mr. Silva, would you please summarize your direct testimony?

A Yes. Good morning, Madam Chairman, Commissioners. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to summarize my testimony.

In these dockets Florida Power & Light Company, FPL, seeks that this Commission grant FPL affirmative determination of need to construct Manatee Unit 3, a four combustion turbine-based combined cycle unit on FPL's existing Manatee site, which will add 1,107 megawatts of summer capability, and to convert Manatee 8, which would combine two existing combustion turbines at FPL's Martin site, plus two additional combustion turbines into a four combustion turbine-based combined cycle unit, which will add a net 789 megawatts of summer capability.

These two projects, which I will refer to here as the FPL plan, will add together 1,896 megawatts of firm summer capacity in June 2005. These two units are necessary for FPL to achieve the Commission-approved 20 percent reserve margin in 2005 and maintain it in 2006. Without these two units FPL's reserve margin would fall to 14.1 percent in 2005 and to 11.1 percent in 2006.

The documents filed by FPL under these dockets including the Need Study document and the testimony of the

witnesses show that for FPL's customers the FPL plan is the most cost-effective choice and the best overall strategy to meet FPL's capacity needs in 2005 and 2006. Specifically, as is shown on this board, the FPL plan compared to the best plan with --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Silva, I'm so sorry to interrupt. I need you to speak right into the microphone for the court reporter. The one you're holding, is that working? THE WITNESS: Hello. Yes.

This is the FPL plan consisting of Manatee Unit 3 and Martin Unit 8. Compared to the best plan that only has one FPL unit, the FPL analysis shows that the FPL plan is the lowest cost for FPL's customers and that it is \$83 million cumulative revenue requirement lower than the best plan with only one FPL

15 ||unit.

When looking at the independent analysis performed by Sedway Consulting, that difference is \$135 million in net present revenue requirement. When compared against the best plan with only one FPL unit and without the top bidder, the margin is much greater; more than \$200 million that benefits the FPL plan. And when compared to a plan that has neither FPL unit, the margin is almost half a billion dollars in both of the analysis.

When we combine the results of those economic analysis with the results of our qualitative review of nonprice

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factors as they relate to the best alternatives available to FPL, we reaffirm the conclusion that the FPL plan is the best overall strategy for FPL's customers.

This process started with a bid solicitation, the supplemental request for proposal which was issued on April 26th, 2002. And our objective was to have a solicitation that would be as open as possible and we succeeded. received 53 bids from 16 bidders. This solicitation had more participants than any other capacity solicitation in Florida.

In order to help put in context during the course of these hearings the various steps that we took, I will give you a brief road map of those steps that we did to evaluate the self-build options and the bids from the bidders.

The first step in the evaluation was an initial screening. Based on our aim to protect the interests of the customer, based on nonprice factors, three bidders were determined to be ineligible prior to the performance of the economic evaluation, and 31 bids from 13 entities were determined to be eligible and proceeded to the economic evaluation stage.

The economic evaluation was a rigorous and extensive analysis performed by FPL and independently by Sedway Consulting to identify the plan or grouping of resources that would result in the lowest cost to FPL's customers compared in terms of cumulative present value revenue requirement. These

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analysis which have correctly reflected all the costs, both direct and indirect, associated with all competing plans are described in detail by Dr. Sim and Mr. Taylor.

One of those costs, transmission integration costs, are addressed by Mr. Stillwagon. Different aspects of the equity penalty costs are discussed by Dr. Avera, Mr. Dewhurst, Mr. Taylor and Dr. Sim. And other assumptions used in the economic analysis are presented by Dr. Green, who talks about the load forecast, Mr. Yupp, who deals with the fuel price forecast, and Mr. Dewhurst, who addresses financial assumptions respectively.

After the economic evaluation, the next step was the selection of bidders for the short list. And here are some of the key observations that we had before us when we made that decision.

First, as the table shows, all plans with no FPL unit were so costly that they were not economically viable. Also, all plans with only one of the FPL units were much more costly than the FPL plan.

We did identify a plan with bids from El Paso and Florida Power Corporation, which also included FPL's Manatee Unit 3, and it comprised the best plan that did not include both FPL units due to El Paso's bid. That was the plan that was \$83 million ultimately higher than the FPL plan.

And the reason why that was compared was El Paso's

bid. In fact, we had El Paso's bid, which was very aggressive. None of the plans with only one FPL unit were even remotely competitive. As I showed on the board, they were \$200 million costlier than the FPL plan.

We looked at the next best plan after the plan with Florida Power Corporation and El Paso, which included a bid also from El Paso as well as FPL's Martin Unit 8 and it also included bids from two other bidders. But FPL determined that contracting with those two other bidders posed significant reliability risks.

We looked at other plans that had only one FPL unit, but they were also much more costly than these. Therefore, FPL selected El Paso and Florida Power Corporation for the short list in order to focus on the plan that presented the least uncertainty and the least risk and that had the greatest potential for being economically competitive.

At that point we proceeded to initial negotiations with El Paso. This was the first step intended to exchange more detailed information with these selected bidders. In the case of Florida Power Corporation we discussed issues with them by phone and via E-mail.

If a price reduction with these bidders could overcome the significant economic disadvantage that they had against the FPL plan, we would have expected that negotiations would have continued into August. FPL at that point explained

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to Florida Power Corp and El Paso that although they were competitive, they were not the lowest cost and asked them to reduce their prices. Both indicated that they could not, could not do that.

In fact, during those initial negotiations, El Paso provided information that modified their bids and required an upward adjustment in the evaluated cost of their bid, which in turn affected all the other top plans.

So at the end of this extensive analysis and negotiation effort, FPL and, separately, Sedway Consulting obtained results that provide compelling evidence that the FPL plan is the most cost-effective for FPL's customers by \$83 million in one case and \$135 million in the other.

At this point we return to the nonprice factors. Given the overwhelming economic advantage of the FPL plan, FPL did not attempt to quantify the relative nonprice merit of individual's bids or bidders, but rather we performed a qualitative review of the advantages and disadvantages of purchasing power from these top bidder versus FPL building, owning and operating its plants to see if this difference would change the economic decision. It did not. The results of this qualitative review reinforced the conclusion that the FPL plan is the best overall strategy to meet FPL's customers' needs in 2005 and 2006.

And the last point in my summary relates to the

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adverse consequences of delaying approval of these units. If these units are not placed in service as proposed, FPL will not be able to meet the Commission-approved reserve margin. As we know, lower reserve margins increase the possibility of outages and make the use of load control more probable, and they will reduce our flexibility in assisting others in the state as well.

But aside from the increased reliability risk, our customers will definitely incur significantly higher costs if these units are delayed because they are so efficient.

Therefore, FPL petitions this Commission for an affirmative determination of need for the construction of Manatee Unit 3 and the conversion of Martin Unit 8. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Silva. Before you tender the witness for cross, Mr. Guyton, I should note for purposes of the record that Exhibit 2, RS-1 through RS-8, includes a one-page errata sheet on the exhibits as well.

MR. GUYTON: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Would it be helpful to identify the board that Mr. -- exhibit -- that Mr. Silva presented during his summary as an exhibit?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Is this contained anywhere else?

MR. GUYTON: This is a summary -- this is not in this form contained elsewhere. It's taken from, from various testimonies.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We can identify it in the event that

Τ	manyone has cross-examination on it. I don't have any objection
2	to identifying it.
3	MR. MOYLE: It's not being admitted? It's just being
4	identified?
5	CHAIRMAN JABER: For now it's being identified.
6	Exhibit Number 5, short title, Summary of Economic
7	Analysis.
8	(Exhibit 5 marked for identification.)
9	MR. GUYTON: With that, I tender Mr. Silva for cross.
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Guyton.
11	Mr. Moyle, are we have you all agreed on which
12	direction? Okay. Mr. Moyle.
13	MR. MOYLE: Before I jump in, I just wanted to see
14	what your pleasure was. I probably have, I would guess, 45
15	minutes to an hour of, of cross.
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: So we better get started.
17	MR. MOYLE: It's 12:00. Well
18	CHAIRMAN JABER: We better get started.
19	MR. MOYLE: You want to go ahead and, and go?
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: Yes.
21	CROSS EXAMINATION
22	BY MR. MOYLE:
23	Q Good morning, Mr. Silva. I'm Jon Moyle. I represent
24	one of the intervenors this case. How are you?
25	A Good morning, Mr. Moyle. I'm fine.

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Q Now I've read your testimony. If I understand it, you describe FP&L's evaluation process used in evaluating the bids received in response to the supplemental RFP; correct?

A Yes.

Q And you were not involved in the initial RFP; correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. You never put in place a formal plan to evaluate the responses to the RFP, did you, other than what's contained in the supplemental RFP?

A No documented plan other than what's in the RFP, yes.

Q Let's talk a little bit about the methodology that was used. In your testimony you have a section entitled, Other Factors Considered In Resource Selection, and I think it's on Page 35. You do have your prefiled testimony with you, don't you?

A Yes.

Q I'm going to ask you some questions about the criteria and what not.

The testimony found on Page 35 to 47, this testimony generally describes the methodology FPL used in considering noneconomic factors; correct?

A I think the testimony discusses some of the factors that were used and it discusses the conclusions that we reached in applying these in a qualitative review when comparing FPL's

1 alternative, meaning the self-build option, to generally the 2 top bidders. So it describes the process that we followed. 3 0 Okay. 4 But it was not to look at individual bids, but rather 5 to look qualitatively at, or conceptually the concept of FPL 6 building and buying -- building versus FPL buying. 7 But you did, you did apply that, the criteria 0 Right. 8 that's listed in there to certain bids, did you not, in making 9 judgments? 10 Α Yes. 11 0 Okay. 12 Α These are descriptions of the criteria that were used 13 and how they were used. 14 Okay. And you heard the Chair, I believe you were in 0 15 the room, and the practice usually at the PSC is to answer a 16 question yes or no and, if explanation is needed, go from 17 there. So I would just ask that you follow, follow that 18 process. 19 Let me direct you to Page 43 of your prefiled 20 testimony. There is reference in there to greenfield sites. 21 Would you please read that out loud for the Commission? 22 Could you direct me to the line number that you are Α 23 asking me to read? 24 Sure. Line 4. 0

Line 4 begins, "The fact that FPL proposes expanding

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existing sites instead of developing new greenfield sites, along with FPL's experience in permitting and constructing plants in Florida gives FPL an advantage in terms of the feasibility of environmental licensing and construction requirements."

Q Okay. And isn't it true then that when FP&L was analyzing this process, the fact that they were building on a site that was already disturbed, I don't want to call it a brownfield site, but a site that was already disturbed was something that was of significance?

A Yes. The fact that we are building on a site that is already disturbed provides, in our view, a greater likelihood that there would be reduced problems in obtaining permits to add to the site as opposed to going into a brand new location and asking for a permit for that site.

Q Okay. In the supplemental RFP you didn't tell bidders that developing on an existing site would be viewed more favorably as compared to developing on a greenfield site, did you?

A Excuse me a second. In the RFP we did discuss the difficulties in licensing as an issue that would be considered for itself and for the impact on construction.

On Page 17 where we talk about the proposal evaluation, we ask for pollution control strategy and equipment, projected emission rates and cooling method.

And on Page 19 we talk about other considerations, including permitting limitations, the likelihood of success in receiving all permits to build and operate the facility.

So, clearly, under the major heading on Page 42 in which the paragraph that you asked me to read rests, which is feasibility of licensing and construction requirements, we did, in fact, indicate that in the RFP.

Q Okay. I appreciate that and I have some follow-up questions related to it. But you didn't indicate that you would give a preference to building on -- or you didn't indicate that you would have a concern with respect to a proposal which was building on a greenfield site; correct?

A No. And we didn't really have a concern with the proposal that was building on a greenfield site. We said that we were going to evaluate the feasibility of licensing and construction requirements. And we did not say that brownfield was better than greenfield in the RFP, but we did say feasibility of licensing and construction requirements, and that comes into play in evaluating that criterion.

Q Okay. The feasibility of licensing and construction requirements, that's a pretty broad category, wouldn't you agree?

A I think it's fairly explicit. These units have to be licensed, and how feasible are they of licensing?

Q I understand. But couldn't the feasibility of

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permitting also relate to whether somebody was trying to permit, let's say, a coal plant, that that would be viewed as probably having more difficulty than permitting a combined cycle unit?

A Yes. That could apply to that, too.

Q And your answer about pollution technology, that that was part of it, there's a whole host of pollution technology, is there not?

A Yes. And if we have to consider that when we issue the RFP, there is no way of knowing how we are going to receive bids. So we have to make the criteria that we ask for the, for the bidders to comment on broad enough that we receive whatever they have to offer; to make it useful for them in being creative and to give us everything that they can give us, as opposed to being very restrictive in exactly how we are going to evaluate each criterion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Silva, is there anything clearly stated, any provision in the RFP or statement that makes it clear to potential participants that FP&L believes that use of their own greenfield sites gives FP&L an advantage in terms of obtaining permits and licenses for construction?

THE WITNESS: No, Commissioner. To my recollection there is no such statement in the RFP.

BY MR. MOYLE:

Q Let me direct you to Page 41, Line 21 of your

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

testimony.

2 CHAIRMAN JABER: Page 41, Line --

3 BY MR. MOYLE:

Q Page 41, Line 21. And ask you if you would read for the record the sentence that starts at the end of Line 21, "To the extent"?

A "To the extent that the corporate strategy does not expressly include power generation, there is greater uncertainty regarding that supplier's commitment to overcome problems during construction, operation and maintenance."

Q Was that a factor that was never disclosed to bidders?

A That -- yes. That is a factor that specifically was not stated to bidders in that fashion. However, the issue of financial viability and reliability under which this subset is included was included very prominently in the RFP, and it was also included separately in a letter that was sent to all bidders indicating how important the issue of reliability and financial viability was in FPL's eyes for the protection of the customers.

Q Okay. But the idea about a corporate strategy not including power generation, that was something you deemed significant; correct?

A It was one of the things that we considered when we did -- yes. It was one of the things that we considered when

1	we did our evaluation.
2	Q Okay. Did FP&L apply that factor to itself?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Were you aware that FP&L had recently considered
5	becoming a wires-only company when you applied that factor?
6	MR. GUYTON: Objection. That fact has not been
7	established in evidence.
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Moyle, your response, or do you
9	want to just
10	MR. MOYLE: No. I was hoping, I was hoping I
11	mean, I'm not necessarily asking. He may know, he may not
12	know. But I was simply asking him whether he was aware if FP&l
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14	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. But the objection I
15	understand what you're trying to do. But the objection is tha
16	you haven't laid the appropriate foundation to ask the
17	question. So do you want to
18	MR. MOYLE: Okay. I'll back up and ask a couple of
19	preceding questions.
20	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Moyle.
21	BY MR. MOYLE:
22	Q Are you involved in meetings that involve FP&L's
23	corporate strategy?
24	A I have yes, to the extent that they include
25	generation strategy.

1	Q Have you ever been in meetings in which the future of
2	FP&L, the regulated company, was discussed as to whether it
3	would be in the generation business or not?
4	A No. However, every indication that I have ever been
5	privy to has indicated that generation is a central part of
6	FPL's strategy.
7	Q Okay. So given your answer there, to the extent that
8	FP&L was giving consideration to being a wires-only company,
9	that would, that would cause you to not evaluate their bid as,
10	as fully as you evaluate, evaluated it previously; correct?
11	MR. GUYTON: Objection. The fact still has not been
12	established in evidence.
13	MR. MOYLE: And I'm not asking him about the fact.
14	I'm asking him if he, if he were made aware of that fact, would
15	it have affected his evaluation?
16	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Guyton, with the question
17	reworded that way, I don't think your objection is the
18	appropriate one.
19	MR. GUYTON: No. No. As it was reworded by
20	Mr. Moyle then, I'll withdraw the objection. It was the prior
21	question that assumed a fact that wasn't established.
22	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you for withdrawing the
23	objection.
24	Mr. Moyle, there was a distinction in how you just
25	stated the question to me.

MR. MOYLE: I'll try to reformulate it. I might have to ask the court reporter to read it back.

CHAIRMAN JABER: That's fine. But the distinction I heard, for your benefit, is if he was aware that FP&L wanted to be a wires-only company.

BY MR. MOYLE:

Q Mr. Silva, if you were aware that FP&L had given consideration to being a wires-only company, would that have affected your judgment in evaluating the bids?

A No.

Q Why not?

A If I had heard that FPL had considered becoming a wires-only company, it would not have in any way affected my evaluation of the bids.

Q And you, and you maintain that, notwithstanding your testimony that's found on Page 41, that you say, "To the extent that the corporate strategy does not expressly include power generation, there is greater uncertainty regarding that supplier's commitment to overcome problems during construction, operation and maintenance."

A I think that there is a distinction. In that statement we say a company who is not involved in generation. And the question you posed was if I had heard if FPL was considering it.

And the fact that we consider one thing or the other

doesn't affect the way that I evaluate things. It's the stated strategy of the company that I would look at when I do my evaluation.

Q Who would know if FP&L has given consideration to becoming a wires-only company?

A I don't have any personal knowledge of anybody that knows that because I never heard that discussed.

0 And --

A But if someone were to know, it would have to be executive management, if it had been ever discussed.

- Q Okay. Do you think Mr. Evanson might know?
- A I don't know.
- Q Let me direct your attention to Page 37 of your testimony.

Down at the bottom there's a reference to a labor market. And I want to ask you to affirm that you used as a criteria whether a bidder had experience in the Florida labor market.

A No, we did not use that specific criterion to determine whether a bidder would be at a disadvantage or not a disadvantage.

As I indicated earlier, we looked at these general criteria saying FPL has a very large economic advantage based on the economic evaluation. Is there any reason why we should overturn that outcome based on nonprice factors? So we looked

at the strengths and weaknesses of building the plant and some of the strengths and weaknesses of buying power. And we reached the conclusion, based on this general discussion of issues, that there was nothing that would give a general advantage in these categories to a purchase agreement over the self-build option. We did not look at each individual subcomponent of this and say, we are applying it to this bidder and we find that they're at a disadvantage; therefore, we're going to grade them down. That was not the process we followed. We reached the economic evaluation results and then

We reached the economic evaluation results and then we asked ourselves, can these be overturned? Are there reasons for this decision to not be the right decision? Let's look at all these issues. Whether we included them specifically in the RFP or not, we know that they could give an advantage to somebody else. Did they? And we concluded, no, they did not.

- Q And that was because you did an economic evaluation in which you were far out in front of others; correct?
 - A That's correct.

- Q Okay. And if you, if you didn't apply the equity penalty, the economic analysis would not put you far out front; correct?
- A If we had not done the equity penalty, the economic analysis would have been flawed to begin with because it would not have reflected all the costs.

1 Okay. But my --Q 2 But without the equity penalty, the FPL self-build 3 option would still have been the lowest cost alternative. 4 There weren't other, other proposals out there that Q 5 had lower numbers than the FPL all proposal if you don't impose 6 the equity penalty? 7 If we don't impose the equity penalty, there are no 8 proposals or combinations that would come out ahead of the FPL 9 self-build option today. 10 0 11 12 Α 13 14 15 during the course of the evaluation. 16 Q 17 Α Somewhat. 18 0 19 process; right? 20 Α Yes. 21 0 22 Α Yes, at one point. 23 0 24 25 identify the bidder, if I could.

Is that related to intervenors who are in the case now or intervenors who were in the case at any point in time? I'm not speaking about intervenors. I'm speaking about bidders who are in -- who bid and maintained their bids -- who were deemed eligible and maintained their bids Are you familiar with the testimony of Mr. Sim? All right. And he was in charge of the evaluation Have you read his rebuttal testimony he filed? I want to show you a portion of his rebuttal testimony, and I'm going to ask you to read it but don't FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Silva, the caution there is the
2	confidential nature of what you're about to see, I suppose,
3	Mr. Moyle; is that correct? That's a confidential document?
4	MR. GUYTON: No, Commissioner. That's not a
5	confidential document.
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.
7	MR. MOYLE: No. And I'm asking him just to do it as
8	a matter of courtesy to the bidder.
9	CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Moyle.
10	BY MR. MOYLE:
11	Q Just say with X's withdrawal.
12	MR. GUYTON: The reference, Jon?
13	THE WITNESS: It's Page 16, Line 2 of the rebuttal
14	testimony.
15	BY MR. MOYLE:
16	Q Go ahead.
17	A "With Calpine's withdrawal"
18	MR. MOYLE: Never mind.
19	CHAIRMAN JABER: It's all right, Mr. Silva. It's,
20	it's not it's really fine.
21	THE WITNESS: "With Calpine's withdrawal of all its
22	proposals there is no remaining plan that has lower total
23	revenue requirements than the All-FPL plan even without an
24	equity penalty."
25	BY MR. MOYIF:

Q So do you understand that to indicate that if that entity were in the case, there would be a plan that had lower total revenue requirements than the All-FPL plan if the equity penalty were not imposed?

A Yes. If the equity penalty improperly were not imposed and if we ignored the fact that this bidder withdrew its bid, then there would be an evaluated combination that would have a somewhat lower cost than the FPL plan.

- Q Okay. Do you know why this particular bidder is no longer in the case?
 - A No. However, I have --
 - Q Who, who might know that?

A I don't know who might know that. But my reading of the statements made by Calpine to investors give me a lot of reasons why they would have wanted to withdraw from this.

Q I'm not asking you to speculate.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Silva -- Mr. Silva, consistent with the cautions I gave you in the beginning of the process, I want you to refrain from speculating and stick to the questions that are being posed to you. And if your attorney thinks that additional evaluation is necessary, he's going to do that on redirect. Okay?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Madam Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you.

BY MR. MOYLE:

Q Okay. Do you know if FP&L has entered into a settlement agreement with this particular bidder?

MR. HILL: Objection to the existence of a settlement agreement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: I didn't even hear the question. Go ahead, Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: I'm asking him if he knows whether FP&L has entered into a settlement agreement with this particular bidder who had the lower revenue requirements --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Silva, do not respond yet. Your objection was?

MR. HILL: The objection is that the existence of a settlement agreement is probably confidential in nature. And consistent with long-standing policies of this Commission to encourage parties to enter into settlement negotiations and, indeed, to reach negotiated settlements, to require a witness to testify to a settlement would have a chill on that process. So we think to encourage the settlement, as is the policy of this Commission, a witness should not be required to disclose settlements.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. --

MR. GUYTON: And, Commissioner, the observation is that whether or not there is a settlement, there shouldn't be a line of inquiry as to it because it would chill. We don't mean to suggest --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let me tell you two something right off the bat. One of you has to talk at a time.

MR. GUYTON: Fair enough.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But the other thing is, absolutely, a long-standing practice of not wanting to chill negotiations and settlements. But I think what's instrumental here is is there a confidentiality agreement executed by the parties in relation to not discussing the settlement? Settlement negotiations usually come with some sort of agreement to have those discussions remain confidential.

Mr. Guyton?

MR. GUYTON: Madam Chairman, I don't know how to address that without acknowledging whether or not there was even a settlement discussion. I mean, the difficulty that I have is that I can't address that issue without addressing the fundamental premise that we're trying to protect here, and that is we, we ought not be inquiring about settlements that have, that might potentially have a chilling effect on parties reaching a settlement.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Yeah. I tend to agree with you. I see your point. Mr. Moyle --

MR. MOYLE: Sure.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- is there a way to ask your question without delving into whatever settlement negotiations there were? And if there is, great, do it now. If not, and

you all need a few minutes to talk, we may go ahead and break for lunch.

MR. MOYLE: I think it might be helpful to give us a couple of minutes to speak. But I would just make this point. We signed a confidentiality agreement, you know. So to the extent that there needs to be a line of inquiry related to that that is held in confidence, I think you have the ability, as I understand it, to clear the room and have that type of discussion.

So, you know, I would argue that it's a relevant question to the extent that there was a lower cost alternative out there that was taken out of the case through a settlement agreement is relevant. So maybe we could take a few minutes and talk about it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: We're going to take a one-hour lunch break. We're going to come back at 1:30. Try to work this out. Staff, can I talk to you?

(Recess taken.)

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON)
4	
5	I, LINDA BOLES, RPR, Official Commission
6	Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically
8	reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this
9	transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
11	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
12	the action.
13	DATED THIS 3rd DAY OF OCTOBER, 2002.
14	
15	- Dinda Coles
16	FPSC Official Commissioner Reporter (850) 413-6734
17	(650) 415-0754
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