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1	FI.OR	BEFORE THE IDA PUBLIC SERVICE	COMMISSION				
2	In the Matter of						
3			DOCKET NO	020067 TI			
4	PETITION BY VERIZON FLORIDA INC. DOCKET NO. 030867-TL TO REFORM INTRASTATE NETWORK ACCESS AND BASIC LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS						
5	RATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 364.164, FLORIDA STATUTES.						
6	PETITION BY SPRINT-FLORIDA, DOCKET NO. 030868-TL						
7	INCORPORATED TO REDUCE SWITCHED NETWORK ACC	UCE INTRASTATE CESS RATES TO	BOOKET NO.				
8	INTERSTATE PARITY IN MANNER PURSUANT TO S 364.164(1), FLORIDA	SECTION					
10	PETITION FOR IMPLEM	ENTATION OF	DOCKET NO.	030869-TL			
11	SECTION 364.164, FLG BY REBALANCING RATES REVENUE-NEUTRAL MAN	S IN A					
12	DECREASES IN INTRAST ACCESS CHARGES WITH	TATE SWITCHED					
13	RATE ADJUSTMENTS FOR BY BELLSOUTH TELECON	R BASIC SERVICES,					
14	FLOW-THROUGH OF LEC	SWITCHED	DOCKET NO.	030961-TI			
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OLERK

TIME: Commenced at 11:00 a.m. Concluded at 12:20 p.m. Betty Easley Conference Center PLACE: Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida REPORTED BY: JANE FAUROT, RPR TRICIA DeMARTE, RPR Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6732

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CHARLES BECK, ESQUIRE, Office of Public

Counsel, c/o The Florida Legislature, 111 West Madison Street,

Room 812, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-1400, appearing on

behalf of the Office of Public Counsel.

RICHARD CHAPKIS, Verizon, Florida, Inc., 201 N. Franklin Street, FLTC0007, Tampa, Florida 33602, appearing on behalf of Verizon Long Distance.

JOHN FONS, ESQUIRE, Ausley Law Firm, P.O. Box 391, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, appearing on behalf of Sprint LP, and Sprint Florida, Incorporated.

NANCY WHITE, ESQUIRE, BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc., c/o Ms. Nancy H. Sims, 150 South

Monroe Street, Suite 400, Tallahassee, 32301-1556, appearing on
behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

CHARLIE CRIST, ESQUIRE, and JACK SHREVE,
ESQUIRE, Office of the Attorney General, PL-01, The Capitol,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, appearing on behalf of the
Office of the Attorney General.

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APPE	AKAM D.S	

FLOYD SELF, ESQUIRE, Messer Law Firm, P.O. Box 1876, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876, appearing on behalf of AT&T Communications and MCI WorldCom.

MICHAEL B. TWOMEY, ESQUIRE, P.O. Box 5256,
Tallahassee, Florida, Florida 32314-5256, AARP, Sugarmill
Woods Civic Association, Inc., and Common Cause of Florida.

PATRICIA CHRISTENSEN, ESQUIRE, BETH KEATING, ESQUIRE, LEE FORDHAM, ESQUIRE, and FELICIA BANKS, ESQUIRE, FPSC General Counsel's Office, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, appearing on behalf of Commission Staff.

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Good morning, everyone. Is it still morning? We are convening a special agenda on a motion for reconsideration. Thank you all for coming out. And we can get right into it.

I'm trying to look around and see if we have any housekeeping initially. No? None that we can think of.

Great. All right.

We have a couple of moving parties now. We want to welcome the Attorney General who is here today, and I think we are going to take the Attorney General's comments up first.

Commissioners, the suggestion has been -- I'm trying to go down the issues. We should take up the request for oral argument first and get that out of the way. Is there a motion on --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Move staff's recommendation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Moved and seconded. Commissioners, without objection we will show Issue 1 approved.

And I believe we have agreed to twenty minutes per side. General Crist, we will let you start off. And then Mr. Beck and Mr. Twomey going to the right of me, I guess. Go ahead.

MR. CRIST: Thank you very much, Chairman Baez, members of the Commission. Thank you for giving me the

opportunity to explain why I believe the Commission should take another careful look at your decision to grant the phone companies' petitions to increase local rates of the people of Florida by nearly \$350 million.

The 2003 Telecommunications Competition Act is premised on the view that competition in the local phone market is a good thing. I believe we can all agree that a truly competitive market is a good thing. It can bring a host of benefits to consumers, including downward price pressures, improved technology and improved service. I assume it is because of these potential benefits that our legislature passed this Act which allowed some increase in local rates, if the result will actually be to increase the level of competition in local service.

But contrary to the view taken by the phone companies in this proceeding, the legislation is not an automatic ticket to a rate increase. It rightly places certain burdens on the companies who seek to increase their local rates. It is not enough for the companies to show hypothetical theoretical benefits that might occur. This Act requires the companies to demonstrate as a matter of record that real competition will actually increase and that residential customers will actually benefit, while simultaneously ensuring that basic local telephone service remains available to all consumers at reasonable and affordable prices.

This leads me to our first concern on reconsideration, that in issuing the final order the Commission failed to take into account its overriding duty in Florida Statutes, Section 364.01(4)(a), to, quote, protect the public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring that basic local telecommunications services are available to all consumers in the state at reasonable and affordable prices, end quote.

Any suggestion that requirements of this section are superseded or replaced by the narrow provisions of the 2003 Act is absurd. Section 364.01 is the first section of the chapter on telecommunications. It is the Commission's mission statement, the bedrock principle upon which this Commission was created. It sets out the legislature's intent in forming the Commission and identifies the Commission's jurisdiction and powers.

It is not only possible to simultaneously satisfy this mission while implementing the 2003 Act, it would be an abuse of the Commission's jurisdiction to fail to do so. Yet there is no mention in the final order of the Commission's obligation to ensure reasonable and affordable rates.

And you cannot just go back and change the order after the fact to say that this requirement was considered when it plainly was not. On this record it is impossible to conclude that the petitions would make basic local phone service available to all consumers at, quote, reasonable and

affordable prices, end quote. The companies and Commission staff seem to assume that this requirement is the same as the requirement of the 2003 Act that the petitions benefit residential consumers. They are not the same.

The price of local service referred to in the introductory section refers to the price of local service only, nothing else. It does not contemplate taking into account the price of long distance service or the availability of, quote, bundled services, or any other so-called qualitative factors the Commission or staff may seek to include in an overall net benefit analysis. So you must look at the price of local service by itself to consider whether an increase of \$3 to \$7 per month, or \$4 to \$8 when tax is taken into account, is both reasonable and affordable for all customers.

Of course the increases do not affect consumers uniformly. This is important. One witness testified for Verizon that the increase will be more than five times greater for seniors over the age of 76 than for people 26 to 35 years old. The witness wasn't certain why, but suspected it was because, quote, younger customers buy more features. This is unreasonable on its face.

A Sprint witness testified that when Sprint increased its local rate by \$4 in Ohio, about one percent of the residential customers dropped off the network. In Florida that would mean nearly 80,000 residential customer would no longer

have basic local phone service. That kind of drop-off rate would not suggest to me that our local rates were reasonable nor affordable. And even if the drop-off rate was not as high as one percent, the evidence suggests that this would be because consumers consider basic phone service such an essential item that they will adjust other spending to continue to be able to pay for it.

So the mere fact that consumers may not drop off their phone service when faced with an increase does not mean that the service is affordable, instead it means that consumers are a captive market who have no other choice but to forego spending on food and medicine in order to continue to pay for basic phone service. This is precisely why the Commission is tasked with keeping rates reasonable and affordable for all consumers. It is because phone service is, as the economists say, price inelastic, that there is a real danger of consumers being exploited, and this Commission is charged with preventing that from happening.

At the public hearings the vast majority of speakers opposed the rate increase. In fact, a full third of the more than 200 who spoke said they were on a fixed income and could not afford the rate increases. Similarly, nearly 1,000 citizens took the time to send written letters or e-mails to the Commission, and those comments were overwhelmingly negative.

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Having affirmatively sought public comment, and having carefully selected the hearing locations throughout the state to reflect the state's diversity, the Commission cannot just wave away these comments by saying that they were not representative of the citizens as a state as a whole. In fact, this Commission's own survey a few years ago regarding reasonable and affordable rates found that in order to pay for a \$2 increase in phone rates, 26 percent of consumers said they would need to reduce spending in other areas. And seven percent of customers said they would discontinue service.

These statistics do not suggest that a \$3 to \$7, or \$4 to \$8 with taxes included, in local rates would be reasonable and affordable for all consumers. Quite the contrary.

Lifeline can't be relied upon as a safety net to help consumers afford the increases because the Act only suspends the increases on Lifeline customers for a short time. Nor can the Commission rely on the companies' last-minute efforts to increase the eligibility threshold or hold rates stable for a Lifeline customer for four years, because the companies did not offer these amendments until after the evidentiary portion of the proceeding was over and the parties were not given an opportunity to fully evaluate the implications of those amendments.

Many people with fixed incomes or low incomes do not qualify for Lifeline. These people are already bearing the

brunt of the cost of many luxury services they don't use such as caller ID and call waiting because the cost of the local loop is not allocated to these luxury services, but instead is borne by people who use basic service only. To increase the price that these people must pay so that people who can afford bundled and luxury services might possibly someday have the option of several service providers to choose from is anything but reasonable or affordable.

Our second area of concern regarding the Commission's decision is with respect to BellSouth and Verizon's proposal.

They propose to increase the rates of its customers who subscribe to basic service only, and not to increase the rates of customers who subscribe to basic service along with additional vertical or bundled services.

The problem with this proposal is that it keeps

Verizon and BellSouth's prices for bundled services low, thus

encouraging customers to stay with them instead of going to a

competitor. This discourages competitors from entering the

market for bundled services which, of course, is the very

purpose of the legislation. In effect, those two companies are

leveraging its market dominance by protecting its customers who

purchase bundled services, a result that is directly at odds

with the goal of the Act.

Even if there was a possibility that when the Commission issued its decision last December that BellSouth and

Verizon's proposal would enhance market entry, that possibility was eliminated when the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided the U.S. Telecom Association vs. FCC last month. The practical effect of that decision, if implemented, will be to make UNE-P lines so prohibitively expensive for competitors so as to eliminate the possibility of UNE-P or local service-based competition.

Of course this Commission had no way of knowing in December that the landscape of the local competition was about to radically change. But the fact that it has now, and now this Commission has a duty to reconsider its decision also in light of the U.S. Telecom Association case. And the record in this case demonstrates that competition will not occur if there is a rise in those local rate services.

The testimony established that a competitor's decision to enter a new market is driven by profitability and that UNE-P costs are a significant factor affecting profitability. This Commission's own report on competition characterizes the availability and price of UNE-P as key determinants of market entry by competitors. AT&T's witness couldn't have said it any more clear, quoting, certainly if UNE rates increase, the likelihood of market entry decreases proportionately, end quote.

BellSouth and Verizon's conduct in the wake of U.S.

Telecom Association bears out AT&T's concern. In this

proceeding BellSouth sought to increase its local rates by about \$3, and argued that this increase would make the local market more attractive to potential competitors. Yet at the same time they were arguing in the District of Columbia case that it should not have to make its lines available to competitors at regulated rates.

Following its victory in D.C., BellSouth has publicly attempted to increase the UNE-P costs charged to its competitors by \$7 per line. Obviously this increase in UNE-P cost will swallow the \$3 increase in local rates, negatively affecting competitors potential profit margin and making the local market less, not more, attractive to competition.

While different factions of the telecommunications industry have different views about the correctness of U.S.

Telecom's case, there seems to be universal agreement that it has thrown local competition into a state of turmoil. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, which each of you are members of, wrote a letter to President Bush stating that the decision, quote, threatens the foundation of local telecommunications competition, end quote. And Commissioners Bradley and Davidson signed on to a separate letter to the U.S. Solicitor General stating that the delay caused by an appeal of the D.C. ruling would, quote, keep the industry in a prolonged state of uncertainty and flux, end quote.

So no matter what your view of the rightness or wrongness of the U.S. Telecom Association decision, you must agree that at the very least it represents a substantial change in the state of local competition from when you made your initial decision back in December. When a key determinant of market entry is in a state of uncertainty and flux, this precludes a finding that the petitions will bring about an increase in local competition. For this reason alone, among the others, you should reconsider your decision to grant the petitions.

And there is yet another factor at play. It has been reported in the last month or so that local and long distance companies have been meeting secretly to try to reach an agreement, in fact, since last August, to eliminate interstate access fees in exchange for an increase in the subscriber line charge of the local bill. If this occurs, there will be yet another increase in the consumer's local bill by as much as \$3.50. We have been trying to learn more about this agreement as has the national utility consumer organization, but neither of us have been successful as yet.

What is relevant for the purposes of this hearing is that the telephone companies' statements and conduct outside this proceeding are not entirely consistent with their representations within the proceeding. And there are several significant factors at play that may significantly affect the

local telephone market from the perspective of both consumers and competitors.

Another concern with the final order is with the impact on residential customers. The Act requires that the petitions benefit residential consumers. Not only do the petitions not benefit residential consumers, but if implemented they actually will cause irrevocable injury to many Florida citizens.

In fact, the only people the increases will hurt are residential consumers. This is the direct opposite effect of what the Act intended. For those of us fortunate enough to have access to the documents designated as confidential in this proceeding the record is crystal clear that increases in local rates will be borne 90 percent by residential customers while the vast majority of decreases in long distance rates will flow to businesses. The Commission seems to have overlooked this fact. Yet it is perfectly clear that right out of the box residential consumers as a class are not benefitted but, in fact, are financially harmed by these petitions.

All the record testimony regarding potential nonfinancial benefits to residential consumers that might offset this financial harm was purely theoretical and hypothetical. The testimony of the ILECs' and the CLECs' witnesses on this point can be summed up as a simplistic concept we all learned in ECON 101 that, quote, in the long-run

competition brings about many good things.

While this view is hard to argue with on a theoretical level, the Act requires the Commission to look beyond the theoretical and look to the actual market to determine whether as a practical matter the rate increases will cause any of the theoretical benefits of competition to be realized. It simply defies common sense to say that even though we know consumers will be financially harmed, they might still end up better off because economic theory indicates in the long-run they will have more services to choose from, all the more expensive than the services they now have.

And so I conclude in the same way I began. This issue you must decide is not whether competition as an abstract concept is good, or regulation as a general proposition is bad. Instead you must decide whether the companies have met their burden of proving that the specific petitions will actually bring about real competition with concrete benefits to the residential consumers of Florida while ensuring reasonable and affordable basic local service to all consumers.

On behalf of the residential customers of this state who will not benefit but will be harmed by the implementation of these petitions, we urge you to reconsider the decision.

And there are three basic grounds that I will reiterate. This law says that whatever decision you make as it relates to rates must be in the public interest, it must be revenue neutral, and

it must benefit residential customers. In the Attorney General's office, we believe that it fails on all three.

Thank you very much.

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CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Attorney General. And by my count, Mr. Beck and Mr. Twomey, you have got about ten minutes to split between each other, and I look forward to seeing how you are going to negotiate that.

MR. BECK: Mr. Chairman, my name is Charlie Beck with the Office of Public Counsel; very briefly. Harold McLean, the Public Counsel, had planned to be here. His mother-in-law passed away just a couple of days ago, and he is at the funeral with his wife, Pam. But he asked me to appear and express our strong support for both the motions by the Attorney General and the AARP here today.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Beck. Please send along our sympathies to Mr. McLean and his family.

Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Good morning, Mr. Chairman,

Commissioners. Mike Twomey on behalf of the AARP, Sugarmill

Woods Civic Association, and Common Cause of Florida.

First of all, I would like to verbally adopt and join in the Attorney General's notice of supplemental authority which, as you all know, was his submission to you, the March 2nd D.C. Court Opinion reversing the FCC. As well I would like to adopt the Attorney General's arguments on the impact that

decision has had on the ability of consumers in the State of Florida, particularly residential consumers, to achieve any meaningful level of competition without the availability to the competitive companies of UNE-Ps at low cost regulated prices which you all know from your own 2003 Report on Competition to the Florida Legislature is the backbone, the foundation of the ability for there to be any competitive local service in the state.

That is how AARP and the others see your report.

There can be no local service competition without the availability of low cost UNE-P service, and your report bears that out by showing that to the extent that there was 9 percent residential service competition across the State of Florida in the year 2003, fully 14 percent of that was in BellSouth's service area. BellSouth being the only major LEC that had reasonable low cost UNE-P rates established by this Commission. Verizon's, as you will recall, having been on appeal and not charged.

So, as the Attorney General said, it is a significantly changed circumstance that occurred subsequent to your decision in this case. And effectively, as we tried to argue to the legislature, it is a changed circumstance that makes the ability of residential customers receiving the value of competition, which we say, as the Attorney General did, is ephemeral, literally impossible.

Now we took -- we brought to you five points for your reconsideration of the order. I'm only going to mention three of them, and I will be brief for the lack of time. Your Staff has addressed a number of them suggesting to you that you should clarify your order in order to take care of the concerns that we raised. So I won't address the first two.

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The third I want to address briefly is the allocation of the cost for the local loop. On this point the residential consumers that I represent say you misunderstood the facts in reaching the wrong conclusion. That is to say, in short, that you decided to give all the other ancillary services of these three companies which provide to these companies' shareholders large sums of revenues, you decided to give those services a complete and total free ride on the backs of local service.

Now, we think that financially and economically that doesn't make any sense. They get very large revenues annually from caller ID, voicemail and the others, and you elected, based upon the testimony you heard and your prior decision, not to charge any of the costs of operation of these local companies on those services. That was a mistake, and that mistake, in turn, led to your decision on the next item which was whether there was the support you found in Item 3 that we complain of, support for the residential rates by other services that you found unfair led you to conclude that that support, that subsidy was a barrier to competition.

We think, Commissioners, that was flawed, as well.

Not only the foundation that there is support, but even if
there was, finding that there was a barrier there to
competition is not borne out by the facts. Again, let's go
back to one of the exhibits in this case, your 2003 Report on
Competition to the Florida Legislature said that, and, again,
due almost entirely to the availability of low cost regulated
UNE-P rates that competition in the State of Florida had been
increasing somewhat dramatically even with the current rates.
Even with the current rates. Your report found that despite
the difference in support and that kind of thing, BellSouth was
up to 14 percent, statewide it was 9 percent.

Keep in mind, Commissioners, that your report also said most of that competition was located in core urban areas served by BellSouth. So to the extent that competition did exist, it is not going to benefit, and there are benefits, if there are any, it is not going to benefit people in more rural areas.

Lastly, benefit to residential consumers, which was borne out by the Attorney General. To the extent that we had any facts, any numbers that you could put your hands around in a financial economic sense, they said as the Attorney General just told you, that residential customers are going to lose. They are not going to come close to breaking even.

We know that 90 to 95 percent of all the local rate

increases are going to be paid for by residential customers. That is undisputed. We know, although the actual numbers are held confidential, we know that substantially less than one-half of the reductions in in-state tolls will potentially go back to residential customers, if, in fact, they use the services that will qualify. We know that the large business customers that pay no local rate increases under this legislation, under this decision, will get fully more than half, substantially more than half of the in-state toll reductions.

What we are left with -- and we think, Commissioners, that's wrong. Because all you found, as your Staff said in their recommendation to you on this issue, is that, no, you considered other testimony, economic theory as the Attorney General said. This is this wispy, these benefits out there that are going to be obtained in the long run. It doesn't measure up to the hard facts.

Let me close by saying a couple of things. What we are left with here, Commissioners, in these decisions is unregulated local service telephone monopolies. These companies have been effectively unregulated -- not effectively, they have been unregulated as to their profits since the year 1995. As a result of the decision that you might approve or reaffirm today they are going to be effectively unregulated as to their prices. Not only do we know that this decision will

allow them to have the largest rate increases by far in the history of the State of Florida, it will allow them within two to three years to begin charging 20 percent per year effectively without even having to come to you to ask permission, 20 percent per year which they say competition will stop them from doing, will reign them it. It's not going to happen.

Quality of service. Where do we stand on quality of service? Is there any evidence that if there is no actual quality of service out there that these people won't reduce the quality of service, won't show up late, won't attempt to cheat their customers. We don't think that's going to happen.

I want to caution you, Commissioners, please, if, in fact, as your staff recommends that you reaffirm your decision here and you not modify the rates, you not deny them and not reduce them, I want to urge you that when these companies come back to you within a matter of weeks and ask you to lift the stay on the rates going into effect, that you not even consider granting it for this reason: As we just said, residential customers are going to pay 90 to 95 percent of all of these massive rate increases. The in-state toll reductions are going to go from the LECs to the AT&Ts and the MCIs of the world. They, in turn, are going to give those increases, as we know from the confidential exhibit, to their large business customers that will pay no rate increases.

If, in fact, the Attorney General and the Public Counsel, Harold McLean, are successful on their appeal to the Supreme Court and the Court comes back and says you have to refund the monies improvidently paid by the residential customers, if you don't maintain the stay during the pendency of the appeal and you go looking for a refund, BellSouth, Verizon, and Sprint are going to say we don't have the money. We gave the reductions -- it was revenue neutral to us, we passed the reductions along to AT&T, MCI, and others. And when you go looking to those people, those companies, they are going to say we didn't keep it either. In accordance with the statute, we gave it mostly to our big business customers.

It will be Southern States all over again,

Commissioners, and we don't want to have that for the

Commission. We particularly don't want to have it for

residential customers. I will close on that and say that AARP

and the others think that there was substantial infirmaries in

your order, and we would urge you to reconsider them.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Twomey.

Commissioners, if it's all right with you, we would like to get all the oral argument out of the way and then we can have the full question and answer.

To the telecom, the opposite side. I'm sorry, I'm drawing a blank on the word. If you all haven't discussed how

you are going to allocate your time -- I'm assuming you have, but, you know, Ms. White, you can go ahead and fill us in on how you are going to do that.

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MS. WHITE: Yes, sir. I will go first and then Mr. Chapkis, Mr. Fons, and I believe Mr. Self has some things to say.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Great. Thank you. You are on the clock.

MS. WHITE: Thank you. Nancy White for BellSouth Telecommunications and BellSouth Long Distance.

After what we just heard from Mr. Twomey, let me remind everybody we are here on the AG and AARP's motions for reconsideration, not motions to lift a stay. And in looking at those motions, there are two overriding principles that govern your deliberations here today. First is the standard of review for reconsideration. You know that the standard is very high. You have mentioned that a number of times.

The Florida Supreme Court in Diamond Cab versus King states that the motion has to identify a point of fact or law that was overlooked or which the Commission failed to consider, that it is inappropriate to reargue matters that have already been considered. That is exactly what has just happened here. For the most part the AG and AARP's motions are arguing matters that you already decided, you already considered, you analyzed, and you deliberated and voted on in your original order. And

those matters are substantiated by cites in the order and cites to the record.

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One of the few things that is not, that is a new argument is the AG's argument that BellSouth's petition is anticompetitive because bundled services are exempt from the proposed increase in basic rates. But let me remind you that bundled services are not basic services as that term is defined in the Florida Statutes.

In addition, that piece of BellSouth's proposal was contained in its petition that was filed at the beginning of this case and the Attorney General was very aware of it from the beginning and they will never raised an argument about it. So this is a new issue that can't be raised on reconsideration.

The other standard that governs what you do here today is the fact that the Florida Supreme Court relinquished jurisdiction back to the Commission solely for the purpose of ruling on the AG and AARP motions to reconsideration that were filed on January 8th, 2004. Nothing more and nothing less.

The bottom line here is that the petition you approved, the petitions you approved were consistent with Florida law. You considered those positions consistent with Florida law. The Office of Public Counsel asked for public hearings. You gave them 14 of them around the state. You attended those hearings; you took recognition of the transcripts upon their request. The AG, and the OPC, and the

AARP asked you to look at the flowthrough issue with regard to the long distance companies. You did that. You considered it with the hearings on the ILECs' petitions.

You listened to the technical witnesses on all sides. You weighed the evidence and you ruled that granting the petitions would meet the requirements of the statute. At the end of the day the Attorney General and the AARP simply do not like the result. And that, as we all know, is not sufficient to grant a motion for reconsideration.

One thing I would like to say about the D.C. Circuit, as Mr. Fons will go into more detail on that, but the fact is that the D.C. Circuit decision did not eliminate UNE-P. In fact, it was the third time in eight years that the courts told the FCC that they got the law wrong. So it is not a big surprise to anybody. It doesn't change the fact that your decision met the requirements of the Florida law, and it doesn't change the fact that the Florida law is to encourage all types of competition, not just one type of competition. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Thank you, Ms. White.

Mr. Chapkis.

MR. CHAPKIS: Good morning, Commissioners. Richard Chapkis for Verizon. Verizon, like BellSouth, supports the Staff's recommendation. The Attorney General and AARP's motions for reconsideration should be denied because neither

motion identifies a mistake of fact or law in the Commission's decision.

As Ms. White stated, the Commission has previously considered and rejected most of the arguments in these motions, often on more than one occasion; and the remaining arguments don't raise an error of fact or law, and thus are properly rejected.

I would like to first delve into the Attorney

General's arguments. The first argument that the Attorney

General made was that the Commission didn't comply with its

statutory mandate under Section 364.01(a) to ensure that basic

services are available to customers at reasonable and

affordable rates. First I would like to note that this

argument has been previously considered and rejected by the

Commission and, therefore, isn't the proper subject of a motion

for reconsideration.

Moreover, the record flatly contradicts this argument. The record shows that pricing reform in other states did not negatively affect universal service. It shows that existing basic local rates in Florida are quite low relative to the same rates in other states, and it shows that low income customers will be among the biggest beneficiaries of pricing reform because they will receive the benefits of reduced access rates, but the Lifeline customers, the low income customers will not be subject to basic rate increases. Accordingly, this

argument made by the Attorney General should be rejected because it is both improper and it is wrong.

Second, the Attorney General has argued that Verizon and BellSouth's petition is anticompetitive because these two companies' rate rebalancing proposals do not encompass bundled packages. It is evident from the face of the Attorney General's reconsideration motion that the Commission has considered this issue before. In fact, about one-third of the Attorney General's reconsideration motion is an excerpt from a Commission hearing at which the Commission was questioning the Staff about this very issue.

What is more, this argument makes no sense. As Ms. White stated, the statute provides that the Commissioners must rebalance basic rates. Given that bundled packages are nonbasic services, they are appropriately excluded from the rebalancing equation here.

Finally, this argument is wrong. The record shows that rate rebalancing will be of particular benefit to CLECs offering bundled packages. CLECs offering bundles that include both basic services and long distance services will benefit from the basic rate increase and from the decreased terminating access rates. Therefore, the Commission should reject this argument that Verizon and BellSouth's packages make their petitions anticompetitive because it is illogical, it is improper, and it is erroneous.

Third, and finally, the Attorney General argues that elderly and low income customers will be harmed if prices are brought more into line with their costs. Like the previous arguments, this argument has been considered and rejected, and thus it doesn't meet the legal standard for a motion for reconsideration that Ms. White laid out.

This argument, like the other arguments, is also substantively incorrect. The record makes clear that rate rebalancing will benefit all customers, including the low income and elderly customers. It also makes clear that low income customers, those that participate in the Lifeline program, will be shielded from the rate increases because Lifeline customers are not subject to those rate increases under the law. And it makes clear that any rate increases experienced by the elderly will be squarely within their zone of affordability. As a result, the Attorney General's claims regarding low income and elderly customers should be rejected.

And now I would like to turn briefly to the AARP's arguments. The AARP asserts that there are several points of fact that this Commission overlooked in rendering its decision. For example, the AARP argues that the Commission erred by assigning the entire cost of the basic local loop to local service. The AARP attacks the Commission for relying on its fair and reasonable report in support of its conclusion.

Not only is this pure reargument and therefore

improper, it is both legally and it is factually incorrect. It is legally incorrect because it is not a mistake of law for the Commission to cite persuasive nonbinding authority.

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To the contrary, it is common practice for this

Commission in its decision to relay on opinions such as the

fair and reasonable report that are factually similar and

address the same or similar issues as the case at hand. And it

is an factually incorrect because the fair and reasonable

report is well-reasoned, it is economically sound, and it is

consistent with the real world realities of operating an ILEC's

network. The cost of the local loop is incurred in its

entirety in gaining access to the network and getting basic

service.

In any event, as Staff's recommendation makes clear on this point, the Commission didn't rely solely on the fair and reasonable report. It relied on the testimony of both ILEC witnesses and IXC witnesses that made clear that the local loop is properly attributed to basic local service.

So as you can see, the purported factual errors that are raised by AARP are nothing of the kind. The AARP is merely rearguing points that have been rejected by this Commission and rejected for good reason.

And lastly, I would like to turn to the argument that the Commission should reverse its decision in light of the D.C. Circuit's recent USTA II decision. This argument is also

wrong, and wrong for several reasons. First, the Florida
Supreme Court's March 3rd order prevents this Commission from
reserving its decision on reconsideration on these grounds. In
that order, the Supreme Court relinquished jurisdiction to this
Commission for the limited purpose of deciding the Attorney
General's and the AARP's January 8th reconsideration motions.
The D.C. Circuit's order was not mentioned in either of those
motions, and indeed it was decided after those motions were
filed. And, therefore, that decision can't serve -- the D.C.
Circuit Opinion can't serve as the basis for granting the
reconsideration motions.

Second, the mandate has not issued from the D.C. Circuit and further appeals are still possible.

Third, the D.C. Circuit's opinion is not going to impair competition as evidenced by industry negotiations and agreements that have been reached to date. It is wrong to conclude that competition from UNE-P providers will evaporate in the wake of the D.C. Circuit's decision. Verizon and BellSouth have made clear the they are going to continue to offer a full complement of service at commercially negotiated rates.

And, fourth, no matter what affect the D.C. Circuit opinion -- how it affects UNE prices, moving basic service rates in line with our costs is going to be good for competition, especially from facilities-based providers likes

Knology.

Therefore, the D.C. Circuit's opinion is no basis for reversing yourself in this case. And I would like to conclude by saying in light of everything that I have said today, there is no good reason to grant either AARP's or the Attorney General's reconsideration motions. Just the opposite, the motions should be denied in their entirety.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chapkis.

Mr. Fons.

MR. FONS: Good morning. My name is John Fons and I am representing Sprint Florida. And I will be very brief. Let me just first echo the comments that Ms. White and Mr. Chapkis have made towards the petitions for reconsideration. I won't go into those. I will address only the issue of changed circumstances.

And let me make it very clear that there are no changed circumstances. The changed circumstances are put at the feet of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in the U.S. Telecom case. That particular decision did nothing more than reverse the FCC and remand to the FCC on two issues. The first issue was whether or not the FCC had authority to delegate to the states the issue of impairment, and the U.S. District, or the D.C. District Court said they did not have that authority. But the court didn't close the door on the commissions, the local

state commission's abilities to participate in those proceedings. In fact, the court suggested that the FCC could look to the states as a fact gatherer.

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But more importantly, the U.S. District Court's decision addressed only one element of all the many UNE elements available, and that element was the mass market switching. That is the only element that the court addressed, and the only one that they sent back to the Commission. And they didn't say to the Commission you cannot ever have mass market switching and it is not impaired, but your rules that you wrote are not following the Act. So you are going to have to go back and look once again at how you are going to construct your rules to address the issue of mass market switching.

So the matter is back in the FCC hands. Regardless of what happens with the stay, and the stay has been extended once to June 15th, and could be extended again, but more importantly, there are still the potential for appeals. And regardless of where the appeals come out, it is still going to be back at the FCC.

So, there is nothing that has been changed. UNE-P is still there. As a matter of fact, if you look at what the financial community is saying, they are clear that UNE-P is not dead. Indeed, that is the headline of the analysis that was made by Morgan Stanley. They said UNE-P is dead, long live

UNE-P. And then they go on to conclude that UNE-P is not dead.

Let me also indicate that Merrill Lynch in its analysis of the impact on the financial community of this decision is that UNE-P will continue to exist for many different reasons. But more importantly, because UNE-P is only one method of market entry, and in their opinion it is not the best method. Facilities-based is the best, and that is happening as we speak.

The telecom industry is changing. The Voice-Over-Internet Protocol is coming into the marketplace and providing options for market entry. So to say that UNE-P is the key ingredient, that is absolutely wrong. As a matter of fact, there was nothing in this Commission's decision that said that UNE-P was the pivotal reason for granting the petitions.

So on bottom line, there is no changed circumstances. And the people that lend the money, the people that provide the money to the new entrants are saying that UNE-P is not dead. There has been no changed circumstances.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman. I apologize for interrupting Mr. Fons, but his second reference to what the investment community is or is not doing vis-a-vis UNE-P and so forth is clearly outside the record and hasn't been provided as supplemental authority, in part because it would not be, but I would object to the continued recitation of what Wall Street is going to do here. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And I don't think Mr. Fons was going to mention Wall Street once more.

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MR. FONS: I was not going to mention it once more, and moreover I think all of this is outside the record.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Well, that is for others to decide.

MR. FONS: And I have concluded my remarks. Thank

you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Fons. Mr. Self, I'm sorry.

MR. SELF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Floyd Self on behalf of AT&T and MCI. First, we are here and we strongly support the Staff recommendation and the couple of modifications that are recommended in the recommendation, and we also concur in the comments that have been made by the other telephone companies.

I just have two things that I would like to say very, very briefly. First, and maybe this is the fourth time you have heard it now, but the standard of review in a motion for reconsideration is extremely limited, and it is limited to the record in this case, and to the identification and correction of errors. I think, once again, in the oral comments that we have heard today, as well as in the written pleadings we have not heard any errors identified in any of the pleadings or comments.

The only other matter I would like to address

pertains to UNEs, and the TRO, and the D.C. Circuit decision.

AT&T and MCI may have many disagreements with the other

telephone company parties in this case about UNEs, and what the

TRO means, and whether the -- the fate of the D.C. Circuit

decision should be, but there are two things that we do very

strongly agree on.

First, and you have already heard it from Mr. Fons and the other attorneys, the D.C. Circuit decision is not the final word on this matter. The D.C. Circuit decision is no more the final word in this matter than in the same sense when you were considering this case in the fall, the TRO was itself the final order on this matter.

The future of UNEs and of the disposition of the FCC rules remains to be written, and therefore it certainly is not a limitation on your ability, and certainly it should not be used in the ways that the Attorney General and the AARP have suggested that it should be used as a basis for reconsideration.

Second, notwithstanding the TRO, your decision is a necessary and vital step for competition, especially local residential competition. You have not heard any basis for reconsideration and, therefore, the motion should be denied.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Thank you, Mr. Self. Commissioners, we are on questions to the parties. Anybody?

1 Commissioner Jaber.

COMMISSIONER JABER: What about questions to staff, Mr. Chairman? I don't want to jump the gun. Do you mind if I go ahead?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Not at all. It's all open. It's wide open.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Okay. Great.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Please.

COMMISSIONER JABER: The whole notion, staff, of the reconsideration standard and what we can and cannot consider I need clarification, and let me get clarification just by asking you a series of questions. The Diamond Cab standard, does it allow us to consider cases and decisions after our decision? That's the first question.

And the second one, Ms. Keating or Ms. Banks, when the Supreme Court remanded -- gave us -- relinquished jurisdiction for the purpose of allowing us to be here today in the reconsideration mode, how specific was that relinquishment, and can we entertain under that relinquishment the arguments made by the Attorney General and the AARP today?

That's hopefully broad enough, Ms. Keating, for you to give us an education on what we can and cannot consider today.

MS. KEATING: To the extent that any new case law impacts the state of the law upon which the Commission had

rendered its decisions or otherwise impacts the legal landscape, then I believe the Commission is not only allowed to consider such case law, then it would have to if it changed the legal landscape. Of course staff is recommending that the USTA case doesn't change the legal landscape, but to that extent, I think the Commission can consider cases that do that.

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As far as the state Supreme Court's remand and the specificity of that order, I, of course, defer to General Counsel, but I believe that if the Commission believed that the USTA decision impacted its consideration of anything that was brought up in the motions for reconsideration, then I do think that the Commission could consider the USTA decision. But General Counsel may have a different opinion.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Melson, I guess what I haven't heard addressed is, has the Supreme Court limited what we can consider through the relinquishment of jurisdiction?

That's the only thing I haven't heard being addressed.

MR. MELSON: Okay. What the order says, and it's very brief, is, relinquishes jurisdiction to the PSC for the specific purpose of ruling on the January 8th, 2004 motions for reconsideration. So to the extent there was a new grounds for reconsideration raised today, I think that would be outside of the pale. I agree with Ms. Keating though, to the extent there were a decision that was relevant to one of the points on reconsideration that changed the legal landscape, I believe

that would be within your purview to consider.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Me too, but you go ahead and ask your questions.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The language from the Supreme

Court is very precise, and it says it relinquishes jurisdiction

for the Commission to consider the reconsiderations that were

filed as of a certain date. Was it January the 8th?

MR. MELSON: January 8th, yes. Specific purpose of ruling on the January 8th motions for reconsideration.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. And when was the USTA decision issued by the D.C. Circuit?

MR. MELSON: I'm not sure of the date, but it was after January 8th.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. So it could not have been incorporated into the reconsiderations that were filed on January the 8th.

MR. MELSON: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But you're also indicating, and according to Ms. Keating, that normally the Commission has the ability to consider during reconsideration if there has been a change in the law from the time the original decision was made

and the time that the Commission actually entertains the reconsideration. So are you saying the Supreme Court relinquishment overrides the general rule and that we are prohibited from considering the USTA decision?

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MR. MELSON: No. I believe you could consider the USTA decision if it bore on one of the points on reconsideration. And the impact of your decision on encouraging competition on the future competitive landscape in Florida is really part of at least the Attorney General's motion for reconsideration. To the extent the TRO affects that, I believe you could consider the District Court's decision.

I'll tell you, it's not perfectly clear and the Court might disagree with you, but I think in relinquishing jurisdiction to consider those motions for reconsideration you've got the flexibility to consider a decision such as that if it impacts on one of the specific issues that was before you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if that decision impacts one of the issues that were originally raised on reconsideration.

MR. MELSON: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioner Bradley.

Commissioner Davidson, do you have any questions?

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: No questions, Chairman.

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CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Okay. And I think I got -- I just want to get some further clarification on the words of the order, Mr. Melson. So you're not suggesting necessarily that even the specific language in the relinquishment order has the effect of limiting the universe to which we -- that we can consider to a fixed date -- to anything that happened before -- on or before a fixed date.

MR. MELSON: No, Commissioner. And the analogy I would make would be, if the Legislature had adopted legislation this session, I think you would have to consider whether that legislation had any impact on the issues that were before you on reconsideration. The Court didn't specifically contemplate that, but had it happened, I think that would be something appropriate for you to consider.

You need to remember though that the staff's recommendation here is that even considering the TRO there is no impact that warrants reconsideration.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And another question, although I will agree that the question of the stay is improperly before us, but I'd like to get some clarification on that anyhow for further -- for future reference. Is the stay generated merely by the appeal? Is the stay -- what's the posture and the function of the stay even beyond today?

MR. MELSON: The stay is automatic because of the appeal by the Attorney General and Public Counsel, both which

are public agencies. Under the appellate rules, a party has the right to come to us and ask that the stay be vacated, and if and when that were to happen, we'd have to bring that to you for consideration. You need to be aware the parties asked the Supreme Court to specifically rule that that stay should remain in effect. And the Court said, we don't have to address that now, first, because nobody has even made a request to the Commission, so it's simply not ripe.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Very well. Thank you.

Commissioners, if there are no further questions, I don't know, we can enter into discussions, if anybody has got anything to say or anything to add or we can start entertaining motions.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It's on a different subject.

Staff, there was a reference in your recommendation to clarify that our decision did take into account 364 -- I want to say

.01(4)(a), Ms. Keating -- yes, .01(4)(a), Ms. Banks.

MS. BANKS: That's correct, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And I cannot -- forgive me, I cannot remember which one of the consumer advocates brought this up, but there was an allegation that it is not enough to go back now and make reference to that statute. And I need to have you all address that because, quite frankly, as one decision-maker, I always had that statute in mind. I mean, I think -- someone is going to have to go back and double-check me, but I could have sworn, just as one Commissioner, I

discussed the public health, safety, and welfare and the long-term benefits that I took into account in reaching the decision. So could you please for the record address whether we can now clarify that statutory reference.

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MS. BANKS: Commissioner Jaber, if I understand your question, it is whether or not the Commission can actually make a clarification to its order, and it's staff's interpretation that you can on your own motion make a clarification to your order, which is what staff is recommending.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Yes, that is my question. And the concern, if I could read into the concern, is we can't go back and bolster our order or put something in the order that wasn't the basis upon which we reached the decision. And what I'm saying is it was part of the basis in which I reached the decision, so.

MS. BANKS: And that's staff's interpretation,

Commissioner, that it was embodied in your decision. Just

for -- on a going-forward basis, we thought it appropriate to

make that clarification, but it is staff's interpretation that

your decision was premised on Section 364.01(4)(a).

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: And for what it's worth, Commissioner Jaber, I distinctly recall a fairly lengthy discussion on the bench on this very issue.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Thank you, Commissioner. It's good to have a sanity check. I could have sworn we did that.

And, Mr. Chairman, I don't have any other questions.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners, any further comments

or questions?

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COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: None here, Chairman.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Just briefly --

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Go ahead, Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: -- on the question of the additional authority. I just would like to state that I think that -- I'm in agreement that that is something that we can consider, but I fail to see that it changes the landscape to the degree that it would be a basis for reconsideration as has been brought out here. The state of UNE-P prices has been -well, it's been in a state of flux, I guess, since we've even had UNE-P and that existed at the time we were considering this case and it exists now. And it's also the case there are other means of competition other than UNE-P, and in fact, I think there's testimony in the record that in the long term, competition -- sustainable competition has got to be based on facilities-based competition. And I think there's evidence in the record that indicates -- and, staff, correct me if I'm wrong, there's evidence in the record that indicates that aligning prices with cost is a sound economic basis upon which to promote facilities-based competition; is that correct?

CHAIDMAN DARY. Commissioner Davidson I think

MS. KEATING: That is correct, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioner Davidson, I think I

heard you say you may have something --

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COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: No, I said I have no additional -- I have no other comments.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Okay. I'm sorry.

COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioners, if there are no further comments, I just want to say something just to give you an idea of how I've tried to look at all of this. It is true that a -- the standard for reconsideration is very difficult to pin down. It is also true that while there may be valid arguments as to what this Commission's interpretation of the statute and how they sought to implement it in the public interest, there may be disagreement as to that, and I think that's valid. I think reasonable people can disagree as to that.

I don't believe that reinterpreting -- I think that when you match it up to the standard on reconsideration it's a little hard to reconcile certainly at this early stage. There has been a lot of discussion on the part of the consumer advocates, and as they are doing their job rightfully so, that there is no concrete evidence, there was no concrete evidence provided. I don't necessarily agree -- we can disagree as to the concreteness and so forth, but I felt very comfortable that there was evidence, albeit from other areas and in other examples, certainly by -- what's the word I'm looking for --

anyway, there were other examples on the record that gave me comfort in my decision.

The bottom line is that, in my opinion, an argument that there is no concrete evidence on an issue such as this when you're actually changing policy, when you're actually -- and I use that word cautiously because I don't believe we're changing policy. I think this is a continuation of a policy that started nine years ago. This decision, this conversation, this debate, even this disagreement has been brewing for many, many, many years. And it is only now that it was before the Commission ultimately, and we tried to, at least I did, tried to reconcile that with the original intent of a '95 statute, which I believe was in the public interest as well. So, to me, this is part of one long continuum.

But getting back to the disagreement as to what kind of evidence. In an issue like this, it becomes very difficult to point, yes, here are the hard numbers. I think the only thing that we can really and truly grasp are some truisms. And although we can make light of it as to their thinness and to their flimsiness, we've got -- I believe that our decision, certainly my vote as part of that decision, was based on what is, to me, sound economic principle. This case on UNE-P, the future of UNE-P and how it pans out, in my mind, doesn't necessarily, although it does have an impact obviously no one can deny, I don't think that you can easily bundle it all

together. I think that this decision can stand on its own as a decision on the part of this Commission and, certainly as one member of it, to try and do our duty towards competition, a nine-year duty, a fulfillment of a nine-year duty towards competition. This is a step along the way. And I only shutter to think that if, in fact, it is -- the situation with UNE-P is as gloomy as some people purport it to be, where we would be without being honest to the proper alignment of costs and prices. That, to me, is an independent issue; that, to me, can stand or fall on its own without reference to what the future of one method of competitive entry or not is going to be.

ago was to get -- was that truly competitive markets have prices that are based on true costs, then there is no one, although we can disagree as to the degree that they are disaligned, there is no one that has at least disagreed with the fact that they are disaligned. What degree? We can argue about that and that's fine. But that they are disaligned, I have no doubt in my mind that that's a fact. And if we're going to be true to something -- a step that we as a state took nine years ago, this was a step that we had to take. I'm only sorry that the debate wasn't had sooner before all of these other clouds started burgeoning because maybe we could have made some real progress to have this go a little smoother.

It's not a clean process, gentlemen. I don't think

it's -- personally, I don't think, and, Commissioners, you may disagree with me, I don't think we are the forum to be -- even though reconsideration obviously is part of our process, I don't think this is where we have to -- we have a fundamental disagreement. I think the consumer advocates certainly, the Attorney General and others have a fundamental disagreement on what the interpretation of that statute is. Well, in my mind, the Commission has spoken, or at least I as one Commissioner, I said what my interpretation was. And I think there's a higher court -- fortunately for all of us there is a higher court where this ultimately gets decided.

I've gone on way, way longer than I intended,

Commissioners, but I think this was a time to kind of step out

and say what's on my mind.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I can give you a motion.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And in giving that motion,

Mr. Chairman, really, for the benefit of the parties that

appear in front of us today and, frankly, for my colleagues, I

want you to know the manner in which I came at this

reconsideration, just to get it all out on the table, frankly.

I do share the concerns with regard to the effect of the Triennial Review Order and the U.S. Circuit Court appeal.

I would be remiss in not saying publicly that I have concerns about the uncertainty that is created through no one's fault by

an appeal of the Triennial Review Order and by the Court's decision and what might ultimately come out of the Court decision. Not passing judgment on one way or the other whether that particular platform should continue or not because we have a pending case, and I don't want to prejudge the outcome, but my concern is this, and no one touched on it today, whatever the appellate court does will have the effect of changing behavior by all carriers, and that's not necessarily a bad thing. People will adjust their business strategies regardless of the outcome of that decision. That's the problem I have with considering the TRO and the appeal today. I can't speculate how that behavior will change.

I asked Mr. Melson and our legal staff whether we had the flexibility or if the relinquishment of jurisdiction tied our hands because, frankly, going forward I would hope that relinquishment of the Court's jurisdiction for the purpose of our entertaining reconsideration doesn't tie our hands in the future to consider a case that comes out in the meantime, you know, before we're able to address reconsideration. So I was pleased with your answer in that regard and, frankly, am comforted by the fact that the Triennial Review appeal was pending when we made our decision on this case. So, by the same token, nothing has really changed. We knew there might be a decision by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

So that's the manner in which I approached

reconsideration today, Mr. Chairman, and for all of the things you and Commissioner Deason articulated, I can --

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Before you make your motion -COMMISSIONER JABER: Go ahead, Commissioner.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Go ahead, Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: -- I'd like to ask a question.

And I know that no one has a -- some people may have a crystal ball, but I don't think that there's anyone in this Commission chamber who does have one, but I'm going to ask this question anyhow. And this is a legal crystal ball question. What might happen over at the Supreme Court if reconsideration is denied and this is remanded back to them? Can anyone --

MR. MELSON: Assuming you deny reconsideration today and -- or the relinquishment of jurisdiction is over, we issue an order reflecting today's decision; that then goes back up to the Court, the appeals resume. At that point the Public Counsel and the Attorney General will have the opportunity to file their briefs laying out what they believe any legal or factual errors we may have made. Presumably AARP may choose to file an appeal. At some point I expect the Court will grant oral argument, and we'll all be up there with 20 minutes to a side, but probably a real 20 minutes to a side. They'll cut us off after the end of 20.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: What's your point, Mr. Melson? What's your point?

COMMISSIONER JABER: So who's our general counsel, Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: I thought it was Mr. Melson.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I thought it was Mr. Melson.

MR. MELSON: We'll make our arguments and the Court will rule, and they will either affirm the order, which then would clear the decks to move forward with implementation, or presumably they could find an error in some aspect of it and remand it back to us for further proceedings. We will do our best to defend whatever order, an order on reconsideration you enter.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: So everybody gets another bite at the apple if it goes to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court will have the sole function of determining -- or interpreting the law and the proceeding that has occurred here at the Commission.

MR. MELSON: The Court will review your order both for law and for facts. There are different standards of review, and we may disagree with some of the appellants about what that standard of review is. So I really don't want to try to articulate today what that -- what I believe it will be. But I think our order goes up typically with a great deal of deference, and the Court will in most cases defer to our interpretations.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Thank you.

52 1 COMMISSIONER JABER: Commissioner Bradley brings up a 2 good point. We fulfilled a responsibility to implement the 3 legislation, and the appropriate review and stop now rests with 4 the Court. And in that regard, Mr. Chairman, I can make a 5 motion to approve staff's recommendation. 6 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: There's a motion. 7 COMMISSIONER DAVIDSON: Second. 8 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: And a second. All those in favor say 9 "aye." 10 (Simultaneous affirmative vote.) 11 CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Show the motion -- I'm sorry. Show 12 the motion approved. 13 Ladies and gentlemen, I do want to thank you all for 14 coming out. I think that this is -- again, it's a very -- it's not the cleanest process, but I think that at every turn where 15 16 everyone gets to nail down and drive their points home it's 17 always a good thing, and I quess Mr. Melson at this point looks 18 forward to seeing you all at the Supreme Court, 20 minutes a

We do have one remaining issue on agenda, and I think -- I'm trying to find what the time -- I'm sorry.

all. Your comments are greatly appreciated. The special

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Take a short break.

side, a real 20 minutes, I will add. But, really, thank you

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agenda is adjourned.

CHAIRMAN BAEZ: Yeah, Commissioners, if you don't

1	mind, I don't think that the issue is going to take much longer
2	to resolve. Let's just take a short break and not break for
3	lunch and we can probably get this finished. So we'll call it
4	five minutes so the people can line up. Is that all right,
5	Commissioner?
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes.
7	CHAIRMAN BAEZ: All right. Five minutes. Thank you.
8	A real five minutes, yes.
9	(Special agenda concluded at 12:20 p.m.)
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER COUNTY OF LEON)
3	
4	WE, JANE FAUROT, RPR, and TRICIA DeMARTE, RPR, Official Commission Reporters, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein
5	
6	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that we stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under our direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of our notes of said proceedings.
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9	WE FURTHER CERTIFY that we are not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor are we a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor are we financially interested in the action.
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12	DATED THIS 4th DAY OF MAY, 2004.
13	
14	JANE FAUROT, RPR
15	FPSC Official Commission Reporter
16	(850) 413-6732
17	
18	
19	- Fricia De Marte
20	TRICIA DEMARTE, RPR FPSC Official Commission Reporter
21	(850) 413-6736
22	
23	
24	