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R. ALEXANDER GLENN Deputy General Counsel – Florida

August 5, 2005

Ms. Blanca Bayo, Director Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services Florida Public Service Commission Betty Easley Conference Center 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. Room 110 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Progress Energy Service Company, LLC

P.O. Box 14042

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

ഹ PM L:

Re: Petition for Rate Increase by Progress Energy Florida, Inc. Docket No. 050078-El

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Enclosed for filing in the above referenced docket are the original and twenty-five (25) copies of Rebuttal Testimonies and Exhibits of Progress Energy Florida's Witnesses: Robert H. Bazemore, Jr., Charles J. Cicchetti, John B. Crisp, Ray F. DeSouza, Steve Harris, Jeff Lyash, Robert Matthews, David McDonald, Dale Oliver, Javier Portuondo, Earl Robinson, William C. Slusser, Thomas R. Sullivan and James H. Vander Weide.

CMP _____ Please indicate receipt of this document by stamping the enclosed extra copy of this letter. Please contact me should your staff have any questions regarding this filing.

COM _____ Please contact in CTR ______ ECR _____ GCL ____ OPC _____ RCA _____ RAG/sc Enclosures SCR _____ SGA _____

SEC

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Sincerely,

R. Alexander Glenh

Bazemore 07600-05 Cicchetti 07601-05 Crisp 07602-05 DeSouza 07603-05 Harris 07604-05 Lyash 07605-05 Matthews 07606-05 McDonald 07607-05 Oliver 07608-05 Portuondo 07609-05 Robinson 07610-05 Slusser 07611-05 Slusser exhibit 07612-05 Sullivan 07613-05 Vander Wiede 07614-05

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FPSC-BUREAU OF RECORDE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished

electronically and via U.S. Mail this 5th day of August, 2005 to all counsel of record as indicated

below.

Tampa, FL 33601-3350

Counsel for FIPUG

R. Alexander Glenn

The Capitol-PL01

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050

C. Everett Boyd, Jr. Jennifer Brubaker Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP, Felicia Banks/Jennifer Rodan 2282 Killearn Center Blvd. Office of the General Counsel Florida Public Service Commission Tallahassee, FL 32309 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 James M. Bushee Harold McLean Daniel E. Frank/Andrew K. Soto Joseph A. McGlothlin Sutherland, Asbil & Brennan, LLP Office of the Public Counsel 1275 Pennsylvania Avenue N. W. c/o The Florida Legislature Washington, DC 2004-2415 111 West Madison Street, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 Mike B. Twomey Richard A. Zambo Richard A. Zambo, P.A. P. O. Box 5256 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5256 2336 S. E. Ocean Blvd., #309 Stuart, FL 34996 Counsel for AARP, Buddy L. Hansen & **Counsel for White Springs** Sugarmill Woods Civic Association, Inc. Robert Scheffel Wright Karin S. Torain PCS Administration (USA), Inc. John T. LaVia, III Suite 400 Landers and Parsons, P.A. 310 West College Avenue Skokie Blvd. Northbrook, IL 60062 P. O. Box 271 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Counsel for FL Retail Federation Commercial Group (McKenna) John W. McWhirter, Jr. Alan Jenkins c/o McKenna Law Firm McWhirter, Reeves, Davidson, Kaufman One Peachtree Center 400 North Tampa Street, Suite 2450 303 Peachtree Street N. E., Suite 5300 Tampa, FL 33601-3350 Atlanta, GA 30308 Counsel for FIPUG Office of the Attorney General Timothy J. Perry McWhirter, Reeves, Davidson & Kaufman Charles J. Crist, Jr. 400 North Tampa Street, Suite 2450 c/o Christopher M. Kise/Jack Shreve

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition for rate increase by Progress Energy Florida, Inc.

Docket No. 050078-EI

Submitted for filing: August 5, 2005

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. BAZEMORE, JR.

ON BEHALF OF PROGRESS ENERGY FLORIDA

R. Alexander Glenn James A. McGee Progress Energy Service Company, LLC Post Office Box 14042 (33733) 100 Central Avenue (33701) St. Petersburg, Florida Telephone: 727-820-5184 Facsimile: 727-820-5519

and

Gary L. Sasso James Michael Walls John T. Burnett Carlton Fields Post Office Box 3239 4221 West Boy Scout Boulevard Tampa, Florida 32607-5736

Attorneys for PROGRESS ENERGY FLORIDA

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		REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. BAZEMORE, JR.
		ON BEHALF OF PROGRESS ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.
1	I.	Introduction.
2	Q.	Please state your name.
3	А.	Robert H. Bazemore, Jr.
4		
5	Q.	Did you submit Direct Testimony in this case on April 29, 2005?
6	A.	Yes, I did.
7		
8	Q.	Can you summarize the purpose of your Direct Testimony in this case?
9	A.	Yes. The purpose of my direct testimony was to support the reasonableness of the
10		Administrative and General ("A&G") portion of the Company's Operation and
11		Maintenance ("O&M") expenses and asset retirement obligations in this
12		proceeding and to sponsor and support the Company's depreciation study.
13		
14	Q.	Have you reviewed the intervenor testimony filed in this proceeding by
15		witnesses Donna Deronne, Jacob Pous, Helmuth Schultz, and Hugh Larkin,
16		Jr. on behalf of the Office of Public Counsel ("OPC"), and Michael Gorman
17		on behalf of White Springs Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. d/b/a PCS
18		Phosphate – White Springs ("White Springs")?
19	A.	Yes, I have.
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1	Q.	What do these witnesses address in their intervenor testimony?
2	A.	Ms. Deronne and Mr. Schultz take issue with certain A&G O&M expenses. Mr.
3		Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman challenge certain aspects of the Company's
4		depreciation study and proposed level of depreciation expense.
5		
6	Q.	Do Ms. Deronne and Mr. Schultz challenge the reasonableness of all of the
7		Company's A&G O&M expenses?
8	A.	No they do not.
9		
10	Q.	Do Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman challenge the reasonableness of
11		all aspects of the Company's depreciation study in their testimony?
12	A.	No, they do not. They take issue with the calculation of net salvage for some but
13		not all of the transmission and distribution ("T&D") FERC accounts. They
14		contend that the calculation of the theoretical depreciation reserve demonstrates a
15		real surplus that should be returned to customers, but they disagree on what the
16		Florida Public Service Commission ("FPSC" or "Commission") should do. They
17		do not take issue with any of the calculations of net salvage for the generation
18		FERC accounts.
19		
20	Q.	Do you agree with the testimony of Ms. Deronne and Mr. Schultz concerning
21		the A&G O&M issues they raise?
22	A.	No, not all of them. There are two items where we noted adjustments may be
23		necessary based on information available after or right around the time the

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1		Company filed its Minimum Filing Requirements ("MFRs") and direct testimony.
2		This information was provided by the Company to the intervenors. These
3		adjustments reflect the rate of increase in the Company's health care costs and the
4		expected Company distributions from the Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited
5		("NEIL"). These adjustments are based on information available after or right
6	2 	around the time the Company filed its Minimum Filing Requirements ("MFRs")
7		and direct testimony that the Company provided the intervenors. If the
8		Commission agrees that the Company should incorporate this updated
9		information in its request in this proceeding, then the Company agrees with these
10		two adjustments, as I explain below. I do not agree, however, that their other
11		proposed adjustments are reasonable.
		proposed adjustments are reasonable.
12	{	
	{	
13	Q.	Do you agree with the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman
13 14	Q.	Do you agree with the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman concerning the depreciation issues they raise?
1	Q. A.	
14		concerning the depreciation issues they raise?
14 15		concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's
14 15 16		concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by
14 15 16 17		concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by the Company to prepare a depreciation study on the Company's behalf, will also
14 15 16 17 18		concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by the Company to prepare a depreciation study on the Company's behalf, will also file testimony in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr.
14 15 16 17 18 19		 concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by the Company to prepare a depreciation study on the Company's behalf, will also file testimony in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman. I also understand that other Company witnesses will file rebuttal
14 15 16 17 18 19 20		 concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by the Company to prepare a depreciation study on the Company's behalf, will also file testimony in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman. I also understand that other Company witnesses will file rebuttal testimony to address some of the issues raised by these witnesses in their
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	А.	concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by the Company to prepare a depreciation study on the Company's behalf, will also file testimony in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman. I also understand that other Company witnesses will file rebuttal testimony to address some of the issues raised by these witnesses in their testimony.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22		 concerning the depreciation issues they raise? No, I do not. I will generally address the issues they raise from the Company's perspective. Mr. Portuondo and Mr. Robinson, the outside consultant retained by the Company to prepare a depreciation study on the Company's behalf, will also file testimony in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman. I also understand that other Company witnesses will file rebuttal testimony to address some of the issues raised by these witnesses in their

1	А.	Yes, I am. I have supervised the preparation of the following exhibits to my
2		rebuttal testimony:
3	•	Exhibit No (RHB-8), the Company's revised response to OPC interrogatory
4		number 26.
5	•	Exhibit No (RHB-9), the Company's revised response to the Florida Retail
6		Federation interrogatory number 17.
7	•	Exhibit No (RHB-10), the Company's health care cost adjustment schedule.
8	A	Il of these exhibits are true and accurate.
9		
10	П.	Depreciation Issues.
11	Q.	Did you file a depreciation study as an exhibit to your pre-filed direct
12		testimony in this case?
12 13	А.	testimony in this case? Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study.
	А.	
13	А. Q.	
13 14		Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study.
13 14 15	Q.	Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study. Did you prepare that depreciation study?
13 14 15 16	Q.	Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study. Did you prepare that depreciation study? No. The depreciation study filed with my direct testimony as Exhibit No
13 14 15 16 17	Q.	Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study. Did you prepare that depreciation study? No. The depreciation study filed with my direct testimony as Exhibit No
13 14 15 16 17 18	Q.	Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study. Did you prepare that depreciation study? No. The depreciation study filed with my direct testimony as Exhibit No (RHB-7) was prepared by Earl Robinson of AUS Consultants. Mr. Robinson prepared that depreciation study at PEF's direction, and my staff provided
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q.	Yes. Both Mr. Portuondo and I sponsor the Company's depreciation study. Did you prepare that depreciation study? No. The depreciation study filed with my direct testimony as Exhibit No (RHB-7) was prepared by Earl Robinson of AUS Consultants. Mr. Robinson prepared that depreciation study at PEF's direction, and my staff provided oversight and input as needed on the project. Specifically, Mr. Andrew Krebs of

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1		Property and Materials Accounting is responsible for depreciation matters within
2		the Company.
3		
4	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. Pous' suggestion that the Company was unaware of
5		the work being performed by Mr. Robinson in preparing the depreciation
6		study?
7	A.	No, I do not. As I said above, Mr. Krebs was the Company's point person on the
8		depreciation study and regularly met with and discussed the work with Mr.
9		Robinson. Mr. Krebs further kept me informed of the status of the work and the
10		study. I do want to be clear, however, that the Company retained Mr. Robinson
11		for his independent assessment of the Company's depreciable plant. At no time
12		did the Company direct Mr. Robinson on what recommendations to make in the
13		depreciation study. I understand that even Mr. Pous agrees that the depreciation
14		study should be the independent work of the consultant and that was true in the
15		case of the study that Mr. Robinson prepared on behalf of the Company.
16		
17	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. Pous, Mr. Larkin, and Mr. Gorman that the
18		Company has a variance in its depreciation reserve that should be refunded
19		to customers?
20	А.	No. Mr. Robinson and Mr. Portuondo will also address this issue in their rebuttal
21		testimony, however, as a general matter, the variance is the difference between
22		the theoretical reserve, which uses proposed depreciation parameters, and the
23		book reserve, which reflects historical reserve transactions, including all previous

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Commission approved depreciation parameters. This calculation is required by Commission rule as one means for the Commission to evaluate the depreciation study submitted by the Company. I understand the Commission rule does not prescribe that any action be taken based on the calculation and comparison of the theoretical and book reserves. In fact, it would be unusual for the theoretical reserve to equal the book reserve so there will always be some variance when this calculation is performed and the comparison of the theoretical to book reserve is made.

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Also, any variance that results between the theoretical and book reserve is 9 a non-cash item that should not be "refunded" to PEF's ratepayers. In other 10 words, PEF does not have an actual cash surplus in an account for its depreciation 11 reserve. The depreciation reserve is an accounting function that reduces rate base 12 to reflect the cumulative wear and tear experienced by this investment that has 13 been dedicated to providing customer electrical service. The money received 14 from customers, which includes the recognition of the consumption of 15 16 investments, is used by the Company to replace or repair consumed Electric Plant in Service, build new power plants, build new substations and lines, pay 17 employees, and all other expenses that are necessary for the Company to provide 18 19 service. There is no bucket of money to be refunded to ratepayers.

Finally, there is a reason it is called the "theoretical" reserve. The calculation of the theoretical reserve is a point in time calculation based upon the Commission's requirement to perform a theoretical reserve calculation. In simple terms, a theoretical depreciation calculation is a depreciation reserve calculation

1 that assumes the proposed depreciation parameters were in existence since day one of the surviving investment in each account. For example and as outlined in 2 the Company's depreciation study, the Company is assuming a 20-year life 3 extension for its Crystal River 3 nuclear plant ("CR3"). The theoretical reserve 4 5 calculation assumes that the life extension assumption was known and factored 6 into the depreciation rates the day the CR3 plant became operational. This assumption is, of course, simply not true but it is a necessary assumption to 7 perform the theoretical reserve calculation. There will always be changes to the 8 9 Company's depreciation rates over time as the Company incorporates the ongoing experience with, and knowledge of, its plant and how it is performing into 10 its depreciation analysis. That is the reason the Commission requires the investor 11 owned electric utilities to file new depreciation studies at least every four years. 12 13 One should not assume from the calculation of the theoretical reserve that the Company's current rates unreasonably required current customers to pay more (or 14 less) than their fair share of the use of the Company's plant, as the intervenors do. 15 The Company's existing rates were approved by the Commission as fair and 16 reasonable rates. The Company's new depreciation study simply accounts for 17 18 changes in prospective life and net salvage values to reflect the Company's current experience with its depreciable plant and the Company's best estimate of 19 20 what the future rates should be.

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22 23 Q. Do you agree with the intervenors that the Company's current variance between the theoretical and book depreciation reserve is so significant that

the Commission should take action to eliminate it by refunding the amount to customers?

A. No, again, the principles underlying the existence of the theoretical variance created by the theoretical reserve that I explained in my prior answer do not change because of the amount of the variance. They still hold true despite the amount of the theoretical variance between the theoretical and book depreciation reserves, which at about \$504 million in the Company's depreciation study, is approximately 12% of the Company's total reserve. An understanding of the primary drivers behind the variance between the theoretical and book depreciation reserve in the Company's depreciation study helps put these principles into perspective.

Well over 80% of the \$504 million variance between the theoretical and book depreciation reserves arises in the Company's production plant accounts (i.e., the Company's power plants) and the significant drivers there are the extension of production plant service lives. As noted above, the Company has requested a 20-year life extension on CR3 and the Company has determined, based on experience with its combined cycle plants since its last depreciation study, that the Hines Unit 1 life will turn out to be 30 rather than 20 years. This new information suggests different, *lower* depreciation rates for this production plant in the future because the Company will have a longer period of time to recover its investment in this plant. It does not mean that the Company's current rates, based on the information available at the time which, for example, did not include the decision to seek an extension of the service of life of CR3 from the

1		appropriate regulatory authority, were unreasonable. Indeed, if, for example, the
2		Company's request for a 20-year extension on the service life of CR3 was denied
3		or the Company subsequently learned that the additional investment necessary to
4		really obtain an additional 20 years of service from CR3 was not economical, the
5		theoretical variance between the theoretical and book depreciation reserves
6		resulting from that service life extension would disappear.
7		
8	Q.	What is the appropriate regulatory treatment of the theoretical variance
9		between the theoretical and the book depreciation reserves in the Company's
10		current depreciation study?
11	A.	The appropriate and reasonable regulatory treatment is to adjust the Company's
12		depreciation rates prospectively over the remaining service lives of the
13		depreciable plant, just as the Company proposes in its depreciation study. This is
14		not "doing nothing" or simply "ignoring" the theoretical variance between the
15		theoretical and book depreciation reserves as Mr. Pous suggests. Indeed,
16		generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require prospective treatment
17		of the changes in plant estimates contained in the Company's proposed
18		depreciation parameters. The remaining life technique accomplishes this purpose
19		consistent with these accounting principles and those of the Florida Public Service
20		Commission memorialized in past orders as discussed in the rebuttal testimony of
21		Mr. Portuondo.
22		Mr. Pous and Mr. Gorman, in fact, agree that the prospective treatment of

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these changes in estimates under the remaining life technique is appropriate. Mr.

1	Pous proposes to "return" the full \$504 million imbalance between the theoretical
2	and book depreciation reserves in the Company's study to customers using the
3	remaining life technique – consistent with the Company's proposal – by lowering
4	depreciation rates prospectively over the remaining service lives of the
5	depreciable plant. Mr. Gorman similarly proposes to use the remaining life
6	technique to "return" to customers half of the \$504 million imbalance between the
7	theoretical and book depreciation reserves. The intervenors themselves
8	demonstrate the propriety and reasonableness of the Company's depreciation
9	study in this regard.
10	The Company also believes this approach is in the best long-term interest
11	of ratepayers in that it provides a gradual, levelized, and systematic approach to
12	factoring into depreciation the proposed changes in estimates in the Company's
13	Study. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the wisdom of such an approach is to
14	consider whether the intevenors would demand that customer rates be increased if
15	the \$504 million was a deficiency imbalance between the theoretical and the book
16	depreciation reserves. In such an event I doubt that they would be before this
17	Commission arguing that ratepayers should be required to pay an additional \$125
18	million a year for four years back to PEF to address any theoretical reserve
19	deficiency.
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III. <u>PEF Charging Practices.</u>

Q. Are you familiar with arguments made by Mr. Schultz regarding certain of
PEF's charging practices?

1	А.	Yes. As I explained in my direct testimony, PEF reviewed its capitalization
2		policies for its Energy Delivery business units, and that review indicated that in
3		the areas of outage and emergency ("O&E") work not associated with major
4		storms and the allocation of indirect costs, PEF should revise the way that it
5		estimates the amount of capital costs associated with such work. The Company
6		has implemented such changes effective January 1, 2005, that include more
7		detailed classification of outage and emergency work. As a result of the changes
8		in accounting estimates for the outage and emergency work and indirect costs, a
9		lower proportion of PEF's costs will be capitalized on a prospective basis.
10		Mr. Schultz does not take issue with the substance of PEF's proposed
11		accounting change. In fact, he agrees that the "Company's proposed accounting
12		change for outage and emergency and indirect costs appears to have merit."
13		(Schultz at page 25, lines 13-14). Rather, he contends that "quantitatively the
14		Company has not supported the claimed impact on the test year; nor has it
15		addressed possible carry-over impacts from years past." Based on his arguments,
16		Mr. Schultz suggests that PEF should reduce its operating expense \$10,356,000
17		on a jurisdictional basis and increase rate base \$25,673,000 on a jurisdictional
18		basis.
19		
20	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. Schultz's suggestions?
21		A. Absolutely not. As can be seen from Mr. Schultz's testimony, he
22		summarily assumes that there are "carry-over" impacts in past years based on

PEF's prior accounting treatment for O&E work and he arbitrarily recommends a

1	50% adjustment to operating income and rate base. However, Mr. Schultz's
2	proposed adjustments are incorrect and improper. First, Mr. Schultz implies there
3	are unresolved issues around the accounting treatment of the change in estimate,
4	when there are not. The change in estimate was independently verified by an
5	outside consultant retained to review the issue and make its own
6	recommendations. PEF's outside, independent accounting firm also reviewed the
7	issues and concurred with the treatment as a change in estimate and, further, the
8	Florida Public Service Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission
9	(SEC) have been notified of the change. While Mr. Schultz has all of this
10	information, including the report of the Company's outside consultant, all he
11	refers to is an SEC notification filing (Form 8K dated December 16, 2004) in his
12	testimony. In that filing, the SEC requires the Company to outline scenarios
13	related to the accounting treatment. Mr. Schultz, therefore, relies on nothing more
14	than a reference to a hypothetical scenario and, accordingly, his suggestions are
15	mere speculation at this point. There is no open question or issue concerning the
16	prospective treatment of the change made effective January 1, 2005.
17	I also take issue with Mr. Schultz's implication that the Company has been
18	"vague and/or evasive" in its discovery responses. The Company has provided

"vague and/or evasive" in its discovery responses. The Company has provided
background and detail on the charging practices change through several
interrogatories and production of document requests. Upon review of these
documents, Mr. Schultz himself states that the change "appears to have merit," as
noted above. As Mr. Schultz knows from the Company's discovery responses,
the Company identified an area for further study; engaged a qualified independent

1		firm to review the issue; implemented that firm's recommendations; notified the
2		regulators of the issue; and reviewed the accounting treatment with its
3		independent accounting firm. At this point, the accounting treatment is clear and
4		Mr. Schultz's concerns with a potential "prior year impact" are unwarranted.
5 6	Q.	Did Mr. Schultz raise any other arguments regarding this issue?
7	A.	Yes. First, Mr. Schultz appears to take issue with how PEF described the outside
8		consulting firm that PEF hired to evaluate its proposed change in its accounting
9		practices and make best practices recommendations to PEF. Next, Mr. Schultz
10		appears to take issue with how PEF has notified various regulatory bodies of its
11		change in accounting policy. Neither of these arguments have any merit.
12		
13	Q.	What issue does Mr. Schultz raise regarding how the Company described the
13 14	Q.	What issue does Mr. Schultz raise regarding how the Company described the outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting
	Q.	
14	Q. A.	outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting
14 15		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices?
14 15 16		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices? The consulting firm hired to evaluate PEF's proposed change in accounting
14 15 16 17		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices? The consulting firm hired to evaluate PEF's proposed change in accounting practices was erroneously identified as an independent accounting firm in Javier
14 15 16 17 18		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices? The consulting firm hired to evaluate PEF's proposed change in accounting practices was erroneously identified as an independent accounting firm in Javier Portuondo's testimony. It should have been referred to as an independent
14 15 16 17 18 19		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices? The consulting firm hired to evaluate PEF's proposed change in accounting practices was erroneously identified as an independent accounting firm in Javier Portuondo's testimony. It should have been referred to as an independent consulting firm. As Mr. Schultz can see from the documents provided in
14 15 16 17 18 19 20		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices? The consulting firm hired to evaluate PEF's proposed change in accounting practices was erroneously identified as an independent accounting firm in Javier Portuondo's testimony. It should have been referred to as an independent consulting firm. As Mr. Schultz can see from the documents provided in discovery, the Company went through a rigorous proposal process to select the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21		outside consulting firm that evaluated PEF's proposed change in accounting practices? The consulting firm hired to evaluate PEF's proposed change in accounting practices was erroneously identified as an independent accounting firm in Javier Portuondo's testimony. It should have been referred to as an independent consulting firm. As Mr. Schultz can see from the documents provided in discovery, the Company went through a rigorous proposal process to select the consulting firm in question. The consulting firm that was retained was selected

competitive with others in the bid process. The Company implemented the consultant's recommendations (which Mr. Schultz agrees with) and our independent accounting firm reviewed the recommendations, results, and related accounting treatment.

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IV. Incentive Programs.

7 Are you familiar with the proposed adjustments that Mr. Schultz and Ms. Q. **Deronne recommend regarding PEF's incentive compensation programs?** 8 9 A. Yes. Mr. Schultz contends that PEF's incentive compensation plans are not 10 "customer oriented." He also contends that goals under PEF's incentive plans are 11 not challenging enough. Based on his opinions, Mr. Schultz recommends that the Commission exclude all expenses for PEF's Management Incentive 12 Compensation Plan and its Long Term Incentive Plan, and he further recommends 13 14 a 50% reduction of PEF's Employee Cash Incentive Plan.

In addition to the adjustments recommended by Mr. Schultz, Ms. Deronne 15 16 adopts Mr. Schultz's arguments regarding PEF's incentive compensation plans and suggests that the Commission also exclude the incentive compensation 17 expense projected to be allocated from Progress Energy Service Company to PEF 18 19 in the projected test year. Ms. Deronne's only justification for her proposed adjustment, other than the arguments made by Mr. Schultz in his testimony, is her 20 incorrect claim that Service Company incentives should be disallowed in this 21 22 proceeding because, according to her, they were not included in PEF's 2002 rate 23 case.

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Q. Do you agree with the proposed adjustments that Mr. Schultz and Ms. Deronne recommend?

4 A. No, I do not. As an initial matter, Mr. Schultz, and Ms. Deronne through her 5 adoption of Mr. Schultz's arguments, are simply incorrect in their assertion that PEF's incentive compensation plans are not "customer oriented." Logically, 6 7 PEF's ability to attract, retain, and motivate a quality workforce has a direct 8 correlation to PEF's ability to effectively and efficiently serve its customers. 9 Simply stated, a highly motivated, quality workforce provides better service to 10 PEF's customers. In order to attract, retain, and motivate quality employees, 11 managers, and executives, PEF's compensation must be competitive. To be competitive in attracting and retaining high quality, highly motivated Company 12 personnel, the Company must provide them with incentive compensation. Indeed, 13 that was one factor that allowed PEF to provide superior performance, to the 14 15 benefit of its customers, since the merger.

In addition, PEF's incentive compensation goals are customer focused. In 16 an attempt to justify disallowing 50% of PEF's employee incentives and 100% of 17 management incentives, Mr. Schultz refers to PEF's incentive compensation legal 18 plan documents and states that these documents make no mention of PEF's 19 customers in the purpose of the plans. However, the Company's incentive goal 20 structure demonstrates a clear focus on PEF's customers. For example, PEF's 21 incentive goals are created in four broad categories (customer, operations, 22 financial, and employee). PEF's customers indirectly benefit from all of these 23

1		goals and directly benefit from success in the "customer" and "operations"
2		categories. Examples of customer and operational goals include: customer
3		centered gauge results, customer transaction study results, customer call metrics,
4		transmission and power quality measures, environmental and safety goals,
5		capacity factor, commercial availability, INPO performance index, and other
6		similar initiatives. Success in these areas enable PEF to provide safe, responsive,
7		and reliable service to the customers and locations it serves. Thus, PEF's goal
8		structure itself demonstrates PEF's focus on its customers, and Mr. Schultz's
9		arguments to the contrary are simply wrong.
10		Additionally, this Commission, in PEF's last litigated rate case in 1992,
11		recognized that PEF's Management Incentive Compensation Plan provides a
12		benefit to PEF's customers. Specifically, the Commission stated:
		The company has placed a portion of the total compensation of specific key employees at risk by requiring the achievement of goals and objectives. Placing part of executives' pay at risk has proven to be a substantial performance motivatorFPC's incentive plans are similar to plans adopted by other electric utilities in FloridaIncentive plans that are tied to the achievement of corporate goals are appropriate and provide an incentive to control costs.
13		In Re: Petition for a Rate Increase by Florida Power Corporation, Docket No.
14		910890-EI, Order No. PSC-92-1197-FOF-EI at *117-18.
15		
16	Q.	Do you have any other points that you would like to make with respect to this
17		issue?
18	A.	Yes. With respect to Mr. Schultz's and Ms. Deronne's contention that PEF's
19		incentive compensation goals are not challenging enough, Mr. Schultz cites to

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1	PEF's earnings per share ("EPS") goal; its environmental index goal; and its
2	energy supply customer care goal. I address each of these goals below:
	• <u>EPS</u> - The Company evaluates the EPS goal each year during the budget process, considering the many variables in place that impact this goal. This goal will naturally vary between years and can, in some situations, decrease between years. Just because this goal is less, however, does not make it less challenging. If the number of shares outstanding increases from one year to the next, such a change will lower the EPS goal. Changes in the underlying business operations, such as divestitures of business lines, can also impact EPS. Based on the many variables that impact an annual EPS goal, it is not reasonable to compare it between years unless the underlying businesses and the number of shares outstanding are static – which is clearly not the case.
	• <u>Environmental Index</u> – As the name implies, this is an index that is established and approved annually by the Company's Environmental Health and Safety Performance Council. While the index remains static, the underlying metrics do change.
	• <u>Energy Supply Customer Care</u> – While Supply may use the same goal each year, that does not mean that the goal is de minimus or becomes so over time. The Supply goal is set based on the expected superior performance. Meeting this goal each year means Supply is providing superior service to the Company.
3	My overall point is that PEF's incentive goals are evaluated and updated annually to
4	ensure that they are current and that they reflect the Company's objectives with
5	respect to customer service, operations, financial goals, and employee performance.
6	The examples cited by Mr. Schultz in his testimony do not reflect diminishing goals,
7	but instead reflect goals that are updated from year to year based on PEF's most
8	updated sets of data and objectives.
9	I would also note that Mr. Schultz seems to imply in his testimony that there is no
10	oversight in the incentive compensation area. This is not accurate. For the
11	Management Incentive Plan ("MICP"), the Compensation Committee of the Board
12	("Committee") has been assigned responsibility to (a) approve the applicable
13	threshold, target, and outstanding levels of performance for a Performance Measure

1	for the year;	(b) approve the performance criteria and awards for all participants who
2	are members	s of the Senior Management Committee; and (c) determine the total
3	payout unde	er the Plan up to a maximum of four percent (4%) of the Sponsor's after-
4	tax income	for a relevant year. Additionally, the Committee is authorized to change
5	Target Awa	rd Opportunity for the Chief Executive Officer of the Sponsor from year
6	to year, or to	o award an amount of compensation based on other considerations. The
7	Committee	also reviews the employee incentive goal structure before each year and
8	approves ad	justments to the EPS goal for unusual items (i.e. the impact of storms and
9	the like). T	herefore, Mr. Schultz is incorrect in his assertion that there is no oversight
10	of the incen	tive compensation program.
11		
12	Q. Did Mr	. Schultz and Ms. Deronne express any other concerns regarding
13	PEF's i	ncentive compensation programs?
1.4		
14	A. Yes. Ap	oparently they contend that the expense amounts for incentive
14		sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend
	compen	
15	compen that ince	sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend
15 16	compen that ince	sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend entive compensation necessarily cannot be warranted when a utility has a
15 16 17	compen that ince need to	sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend entive compensation necessarily cannot be warranted when a utility has a
15 16 17 18	compen that ince need to Q. Are Mr	sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend entive compensation necessarily cannot be warranted when a utility has a increase its rates.
15 16 17 18 19	compen that inco need to Q. Are Mr A. No, the	sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend entive compensation necessarily cannot be warranted when a utility has a increase its rates.
15 16 17 18 19 20	compen that ince need to Q. Are Mr A. No, they has incr	 sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend entive compensation necessarily cannot be warranted when a utility has a increase its rates. Schultz's and Ms. Deronne's concerns in this regard warranted? y are not. Mr. Schultz makes the point that PEF's incentive compensation
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	compen that ince need to Q. Are Mr A. No, they has incr which p	sation programs have increased too rapidly since 2002. They also contend entive compensation necessarily cannot be warranted when a utility has a increase its rates. •• Schultz's and Ms. Deronne's concerns in this regard warranted? y are not. Mr. Schultz makes the point that PEF's incentive compensation reased since 2002 and is normally over budget. However, 2002 was a year

1 purposes, the Company uses a target level assumption for incentives (the middle 2 achievement level). Actual payouts in 2003 and 2004 averaged between the 3 target and outstanding levels. The years 2003 and 2004 were a time of increasingly improved performance due largely to PEF's Commitment to 4 Excellence program, so an increase in incentives is not unusual for those years. 5 6 As an additional argument, Mr. Schultz implies that the corporate success 7 driving incentive payouts is contradictory to PEF's need to increase rates. In 8 other words, Mr. Schultz contends that if a utility seeks a rate increase, there 9 cannot, by definition, be any circumstances that would warrant incentive compensation payments. Such an argument, however, is illogical on its face. 10 Excellent corporate performance and the need to increase rates are not directly 11 related. PEF's need for a rate increase based on continued customer growth and 12 13 new generation units has nothing to do with how PEF and its employees have performed or will perform. It is apparent that a utility can provide excellent 14 performance that warrants incentive compensation to its employees, but 15 nonetheless need a rate increase to account for factors (such as customer growth) 16 17 that are beyond the utility's control.

18

19 Q. Is Ms. Deronne correct in her assertion that Service Company Incentives 20 were not included in PEF's 2002 rate case?

A. No. Ms. DeRonne's belief that Service Company incentives should be disallowed
in this proceeding because they were not in the 2002 rate case is incorrect.
Service Company incentives were included in PEF's 2002 rate case. PEF's

product code structure was changed between 2002 and 2006 to add a separate product code for incentives. In 2002, incentives were charged to PEF by each Service Company department separately. This may be why Ms. Deronne believes that Service Company incentives were not included. The incentives charged and budgeted to PEF are as follows:

Year	Amount
2002 Actual	\$3,207,000
2003 Actual	\$4,762,000
2004 Actual	\$5,850,000
2005 Budget	\$5,549,939
2006 Budget	\$5,671,471

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V. Payroll Issues.

Q.

8 9

Are you familiar with the proposed adjustments that Mr. Schultz

recommends regarding PEF's payroll and payroll tax expenses?

10 Yes. While Mr. Schultz makes clear that he does not question PEF's payroll A. 11 dollars in total, he nonetheless contends that PEF's projected expense for base pay 12 and overtime is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Schultz states that the company has 13 improperly increased the expense factor for its payroll from 54% to 57% without 14 providing any justification for the increase. Additionally, Mr. Schultz opines that PEF may not have captured the full impact of PEF's recent employee reduction 15 16 programs in its payroll expenses. With respect to payroll tax expenses, Mr. Schultz states that those expenses should be reduced commensurately with payroll 17 expenses because payroll taxes are based on payroll. 18

2

Q.

Do you agree with the proposed adjustments that Mr. Schultz recommends regarding PEF's payroll and payroll tax expenses?

3 A. No. Upon reviewing the intervenor testimony, we discovered an error made in 4 the interrogatory responses related to this area. One component of base payroll is 5 labor charged to clearing accounts. In the data supporting the initial responses to 6 OPC interrogatory number 26 and FRF interrogatory number 17, the total labor in 7 clearing accounts was treated as capital in calculating the percentages Mr. Schultz 8 cites. However, a significant amount of these dollars are correctly cleared out to 9 expense accounts. Examples of the types of costs include stores, fleet, and 10 exceptional hours (loading of vacation, holidays, etc. on productive labor). 11 Therefore, we revised both interrogatories to correctly reflect where the clearing labor is ultimately charged. You can see the results in Exhibit No. (RHB-8) 12 and Exhibit No. (RHB-9). A summary of the expense percentages from the 13 14 revised answers to these interrogatories is outlined below:

1	5	

	Base Payroll	<u>Payroll</u> Taxes
2006 budget	68%	67%
2005 budget	67%	67%
2004 actual	66%	65%
2003 actual	65%	63%
2002 actual	66%	64%

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I believe the results are reasonable. The percentage expensed will vary between years based on the nature and type of projects (O&M vs. capital mix) in any given year.

1		I would also point out that the payroll expense percentage is much more in
2		line with the payroll tax expense percentage in the revised interrogatory responses
3		and is consistent with our actual experience. Based on the new information
4		outlined above, I do not believe any adjustment to either payroll or payroll tax is
5		warranted.
6		
7	VI.	<u>D&O Insurance.</u>
8	Q.	Do any of the intervenor witnesses take issue with PEF's expense for D&O
9		Liability Insurance?
10	A.	Yes. Ms. Deronne agrees with me that premiums for D&O Liability Insurance
11		have steadily increased in the past few years largely due to corporate scandals
12		such as Enron. However, Ms. Deronne, without challenging the validity of the
13		actual expense numbers that PEF has offered, makes the argument that all
14		expenses for D&O Liability Insurance should be removed because, in her opinion,
15		D&O insurance only benefits PEF's shareholders and not PEF's ratepayers.
16		
17	Q.	Do you find Ms. Deronne's proposed adjustments to be logically persuasive?
18	A.	No, I do not. D&O insurance is a legitimate, reasonable cost of doing business.
19		All companies, investor owned regulated electric utilities included, must have
20		officers and directors to manage their operations. D&O insurance is a required
21		component of the compensation for officers and directors because no officer or
22		director can reasonably be expected to be retained without D&O insurance
23		coverage. To compete for quality management, the Company must provide such
	1	

	coverage and, accordingly, it is a reasonable and prudent business expense of the
	Company.
VII.	Healthcare Costs.
Q.	Are you familiar with the proposed adjustments that Mr. Schultz
	recommends regarding PEF's healthcare expenses?
A.	Yes. Mr. Schultz contends that PEF has overestimated its healthcare costs based
	on inflation trends that are too high; by failing to assume proper levels of
	refunds/rebates; and by using an expense factor that is too high.
Q.	Do you agree with any of Mr. Schultz's adjustments?
A.	Yes. Mr. Shultz does note that the actual trend of increase in health care costs has
	not been as significant as we estimated in the initial MFR filing. Based on more
,	recent information and analysis, available following the filing of the Company's
	MFRs and my Direct Testimony, we agree the trend warrants adjustment to the
	amount as noted in my Exhibit No (RHB-10). I also agree that the
	rebate/refund amount should be forecasted into the Test Year. However, I
	disagree with the amount Mr. Shultz recommends. In my Exhibit No (RHB-
	10), you can see the results of a four-year average of experience in this area.
	Based on that analysis, I concur with a \$448,500 decrease in health care costs, not
	\$757,000 as Mr. Shultz contends (2004 actual).
	I do not agree with one component of his adjustments in the health
	insurance area. As discussed above, the percentage of payroll that is expensed in
	Q. A.

1		the case is appropriate. Therefore, Mr. Shultz's adjustment to health care costs
2		based related to that issue is not valid.
3		
4	VIII.	NEIL Issues.
5	Q.	Are you familiar with the proposed adjustments that Ms. Deronne
6		recommends regarding PEF's insurance through the Nuclear Electric
7		Insurance Limited ("NEIL")?
8	A.	Yes, Ms. Deronne states that PEF's projections for NEIL nuclear distributions in
9		the test year is too low based on 2005 data schedules.
10		
11	Q.	Do you agree with Ms. Deronne on this point?
12	A.	Yes. Based on new information available to the Company around the time of its
13		initial filings in this proceeding and produced to the intervenors, the Test Year
14		distribution estimate should be \$2,834,700, which results in a \$639,000 reduction
15		to insurance expenses. If the Commission agrees that the Company should rely
16		upon this updated information, the adjustment should be made.
17		
18	IX.	Conclusion.
19	Q.	Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
20	A.	Yes, it does.
21	-	

Docket No. 050078 Progress Energy Florida Exhibit No. _____(RHB-8) Page 1 of 1

Revised Response to Question #26

	2006 Budget	2006 Budget 2005 Budget 2004 Actual 2003 Actual 2002 Actual	2004 Actual	2003 Actual	2002 Actual
Total Gross Payroll & Fringe Benefits Expensed	252,133,149	242,428,970	260,876,751	240,850,785	200,383,597
Total Gross Payroll & Fringe Benefits Capitalized Percentage of Payroll Charged to Expense	123,137,552 68%	121,405,972 67%	132,065,043 67%	125,898,129 65%	107,393,049 67%
Percentage of Fringe Benefits Charged to Expense	65%	65%	65%	69%	54%
Fringe Benefits (excluding Pension) *	68%	67%	%02	68%	69%

* Progress Energy Florida's Pension cost is charged entirely to expense, and this dollar amount fluctuates a great deal from year to year. When Pension cost is excluded from Fringe Benefits, the remaining Fringe Benefits are charged approximately 65% to

Docket No. 050078 Progress Energy Florida Exhibit No. ____ (RHB-9) Page 1 of 3

Revised Response to Question #17

Total Gross Payroll & Fringe Benefits expensed and capitalized Percentage of Payroll charged to expense Percentage of Fringe Benefits charged to expense

	[2006		
Line #		C-35	% Capital	% Expense	\$ Capital	\$ Expense
2	Base Payroll - Regular FT Employees	272,926,655	32%	68%	87,862,059	185,064,596
3	Incentive Compensation Plan	18,761,714	34%	66%	6,461,742	12,299,972
4	Long Term Incentive Plan	684,000		100%	-	684,000
6	Total Payroll	292,372,369	32%	68%	94,323,801	198,048,568
10 & 11	FICA and Unemployment	23,363,155	33%	67%	7,642,351	15,720,804
12	Workers' Compensation	5,010,000		100%	-	5,010,000
13	Pension Plan Expense	(7,450,000)		100%	-	(7,450,000)
14 - 18 & 21	OBB Benefit Plans	60,354,789	35%	65%	20,983,500	39,371,289
19	Employee Educational Assistance	658,312	7%	93%	48,660	609,652
20	Performance Awards & Relocation	962,076	14%	86%	139,240	822,836
22	Total Fringe Benefits	82,898,332	35%	65%	28,813,751	54,084,581
24	Total Payroll & Fringe Benefits	375,270,701	33%	67%	123,137,552	252,133,149

				2005		2
Line #		C-35	% Capital	% Expense	\$ Capital	\$ Expense
2	Base Payroll - Regular FT Employees	265,864,980	33%	67%	87,029,629	178,835,351
3	Incentive Compensation Plan	18,702,959	34%	66%	6,451,319	12,251,640
4	Long Term Incentive Plan	552,000		100%	-	552,000
6	Total Payroll	285,119,939	33%	67%	93,480,948	191,638,991
10 & 11	FICA and Unemployment	22,896,478	33%	67%	7,576,404	15,320,074
12	Workers' Compensation	4,392,000		100%	-	4,392,000
13	Pension Plan Expense	(6,990,000)		100%	-	(6,990,000)
14 - 18 & 21	OBB Benefit Plans	56,827,278	35%	65%	20,163,395	36,663,883
19	Employee Educational Assistance	642,040	6%	94%	38,665	603,375
20	Performance Awards & Relocation	947,207	15%	85%	146,560	800,647
22	Total Fringe Benefits	78,715,003	35%	65%	27,925,024	50,789,979
24	Total Payroll & Fringe Benefits	363,834,942	33%	67%	121,405,972	242,428,970

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				2004		
Line #		C-35	% Capital	% Expense	\$ Capital	\$ Expense
2	Base Payroll - Regular FT Employees	292,064,099	34%	66%	99,548,570	192,515,529
3	Incentive Compensation Plan	26,017,095	26%	74%	6,634,816	19,382,279
4	Long Term Incentive Plan	599,428		100%	-	599,428
6	Total Payroll	318,680,622	33%	67%	106,183,386	212,497,236
10 & 11	FICA and Unemployment	24,562,873	35%	65%	8,574,597	15,988,276
12	Workers' Compensation	4,515,064		100%	-	4,515,064
13	Pension Plan Expense	(11,302,220)		100%	-	(11,302,220)
14 - 18 & 21	OBB Benefit Plans	54,296,096	32%	68%	17,257,783	37,038,313
19	Employee Educational Assistance	370,676	2%	98%	8,923	361,753
20	Performance Awards & Relocation	1,818,683	2%	98%	40,354	1,778,329
22	Total Fringe Benefits	74,261,172	35%	65%	25,881,657	48,379,515
24	Total Payroll & Fringe Benefits	392,941,794	34%	66%	132,065,043	260,876,751

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		2003				
Line #		C-35	% Capital	% Expense	\$ Capital	\$ Expense
2	Base Payroll - Regular FT Employees	260,992,358	35%	65%	91,219,067	169,773,291
3	Incentive Compensation Plan	21,901,319	41%	59%	8,968,642	12,932,677
4	Long Term Incentive Plan	295,777		100%	-	<u>\$</u> 295,777
6	Total Payroll	283,189,454	35%	65%	100,187,709	183,001,745
10 & 11	FICA and Unemployment	22,289,553	37%	63%	8,204,631	14,084,922
12	Workers' Compensation	4,108,489		100%	-	4,108,489
13	Pension Plan Expense	2,355,570		100%	-	2,355,570
14 - 18 & 21	OBB Benefit Plans	52,495,302	33%	67%	17,423,914	35,071,388
19	Employee Educational Assistance	445,076	4%	96%	16,004	429,072
20	Performance Awards & Relocation	1,865,470	4%	96%	65,871	1,799,599
22	Total Fringe Benefits	83,559,460	31%	69%	25,710,420	57,849,040
24	Total Payroll & Fringe Benefits	366,748,914	34%	66%	125,898,129	240,850,785

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		2002						
Line #		C-35	% Capital	% Expense	\$ Capital	\$ Expense		
2	Base Payroll - Regular FT Employees	245,246,334	34%	66%	83,622,397	161,623,937		
3	Incentive Compensation Plan	11,966,686	6%	94%	680,142	11,286,544		
4	Long Term Incentive Plan	58,444		100%		58,444		
6	Total Payroll	257,271,464	33%	67%	84,302,539	172,968,925		
10 & 11	FICA and Unemployment	21,468,196	36%	64%	7,629,509	13,838,687		
12	Workers' Compensation	4,200,137	1	100%	-	4,200,137		
13	Pension Plan Expense	(24,191,457)		100%	-	(24,191,457)		
14 - 18 & 21	OBB Benefit Plans	45,341,282	33%	67%	15,023,745	30,317,537		
19	Employee Educational Assistance	384,284	13%	87%	49,440	334,844		
20	Performance Awards & Relocation	3,302,740	12%	88%	387,816	2,914,924		
22	Total Fringe Benefits	50,505,182	46%	54%	23,090,510	27,414,672		
24	Total Payroll & Fringe Benefits	307,776,646	35%	65%	107,393,049	200,383,597		

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Adjustments to Medical Insurance

	2002 Actual	2003 Actual	2004 Actual	2005 Projection	PGN Proposed Adj	Intervenor Proposed Adj.	Difference	Comment
Rebates/refunds	\$567,000	\$160,000	\$757,000	\$310,000	\$448,500	\$757,000	(\$308,500)	Reduce intervener H. W. Schultz adjustment by \$309K based on four year average of Florida refund/rebates.
Impact of proposed change in payroll expense percentage	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	\$659,444	(\$659,444)	Reduce intervener H. W. Schultz adjustment by \$659K; 54.26 % used is related to impact of Mr. Schultz's proposed adjustment to payroll expense; we do not agree with this adjustment.
	11/4	11/4		144				Agree analysis of recent trends warrants adjustment
Medical trend rate adjustment Total	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	\$2,386,907 \$2,835,407	\$2,386,907 \$3,803,351	\$0 (\$967,944)	to the amount