

BOZEMAN, MONTANA DENVER, COLORADO Y HONOLULU, HAWAII INTERNATIONAL JUNEAU, ALASKA OAKTAND CALIFORNIA SEATTLE, WASHINGTON TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA WASHINGTON, D.C. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINICAT STANFORD UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW CLINICAT STANFORD UNIVERSITY CLINICATION COMPANY STANFORD

March 16, 2007

Blanca Bayo Director, Office of the Commission Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399

RE: Docket No. 070098-EI, Florida Power & Light Company's Petition to Determine Need for FPL Glades Power Park Units 1 and 2 Electrical Power Plant

Dear Ms. Bayo,

Please find enclosed an original and 15 copies each of the supplemental testimony of David A. Schlissel on behalf of Intervenors, The Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club), Save Our Creeks (SOC), Florida Wildlife Federation (FWF), Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida (ECOSWF), and Ellen Peterson.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

СМР СОМ <u>Б</u>
CTR QLQ.
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Sincerely, MMU

Michael Gross Earthjustice 111 S. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 681-0031

All Official and Interested Parties

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

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ORIGINAL

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Florida Power & Light Company's Petition to Determine Need for FPL Glades Power Park Units 1 and 2 Electrical Power Plant DOCKET NO.: 070098-EI

SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

DAVID A. SCHLISSEL

ON BEHALF OF

THE SIERRA CLUB, INC.

SAVE OUR CREEKS

FLORIDA WILDLIFE FEDERATION

ENVIRONMENTAL CONFEDERATION OF SOUTHWEST FLORIDA

ELLEN PETERSON

MARCH 16, 2007

TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS

Exhibit DAS-4 Emission Trajectories of CO₂ Legislation in the 109th Congress

1	Q.	State your name, occupation and business address.
2	А.	My name is David A. Schlissel. I am a Senior Consultant at Synapse Energy
3		Economics, Inc, 22 Pearl Street, Cambridge, MA 02139.
4	Q.	Are you the same David Schlissel that previously filed testimony in this docket?
5	А.	Yes, I am.
6	Q.	On whose behalf are you testifying?
7	A:	My testimony is sponsored by the Sierra Club, Inc., Florida Wildlife Federation
8		(FWF), Save Our Creeks (SOC), and the Environmental Confederation of Southwest
9		Florida (ECOSWF) and Ellen Peterson.
10	Q.	Please summarize this Supplemental Testimony.
11	A.	My Direct Testimony filed on March 7, 2007 primarily provided Synapse's estimate
12		of the likely cost arising from future greenhouse gas restrictions/reductions. The
13		purpose of this Supplemental Testimony is to provide an FPL-specific context for
14		those costs as well to critique FPL's resource planning in general.
15	Q.	What have you discovered in the course of your review of FPL's resource
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16	v	planning?
	X • A.	
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- 1 consider whether the simple comparison between FGPP and natural gas generation
- 2 that FPL has presented in its Need Study is appropriate. Finally, I will raise the issue
- 3 of the justification for FPL's 20% reserve margin requirement.

Q. 4 Can you please explain why FPL's analyses do not support the choice of FGPP 5 versus natural gas generation?

FPL witness Silva has testified:¹ 6 A.

In 7 scenarios that generally reflect a wider fuel price differential between natural gas and coal and/or moderate environmental compliance costs, the Plan with Coal, which reflects the addition of FGPP results in lower costs 10 (CPVRR) than would the plan without Coal. Conversely, in the 9 scenarios that generally reflect a narrower fuel price differential between 12 natural gas and coal and/or higher environmental compliance costs, the Plan with Coal results in higher costs than the Plan without Coal.

- The results of these scenarios are summarized in Table 1. 14
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Table 1. Cost Differentials of FPL Scenarios

	A – No CO ₂	B – Low CO ₂	C – Mid CO ₂	D – High CO ₂
High Differential	(2,792)	(2,045)	(1,127)	1,912
Shocked Differential	(873)	(113)	804	1,278
Medium Differential	(219)	537	1,466	1,930
Low Differential	(1,912)	2,670	3,604	4,037

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A negative value indicates that the Plan with Coal is less expensive than the Plan without Coal.

17 Perhaps not surprisingly, if the analysis does not consider the potential costs of CO_2 18 regulations, FGPP is a more economic option than the natural gas alternatives. But, as I discussed in my March 7th Direct Testimony, at this time the question of CO₂ 19 regulation is not "if" but "when." Even FPL Group, as discussed in my March 7th 20

21 testimony, concedes that action on climate change is necessary.

Testimony of Rene Silva, page 32, lines 8-14.

1 As a result, all of the scenarios in the left column in Table 1 above are not reasonable 2 and should not be considered. That leaves the remaining twelve scenarios, of which 3 only three show that FGPP is the lower cost option.

4 Q. Are these three remaining scenarios that show FGPP as the lower cost 5 alternative reasonably likely?

A. No. FPL apparently evaluates these scenarios through the year 2054 which is to be
commended given that FGPP is likely to have an operating life of at least 40 years.
By the same token, FPL's environmental compliance forecasts must be evaluated for
their reasonableness over the same period. I've taken the nominal CO₂ price forecasts
supplied in Appendix F of the Need Study and converted them to real 2006 dollars
using a 2.25% inflation rate to illustrate the real cost per ton of CO₂ under each
forecast.

45 40 35 30 25 2006\$/ton → B - Low -D-C - Medium - D - High 20 15 10 5 0 ૾ઌૺ૾ઌૺ^ઌઌૺ૾ઌૺ૾ઌૺ૾ઌૺ૾ઌૺઌ૾ૺઌ૾ૺ૾ઌૺઌ૽૿ઌ૽૿૾ઌ૽૾ઌ૽૾૾ઌ૽૾ઌ૾ૺ૾ઌ૾

Figure 1. FPL CO₂ Price Forecasts (2006\$)

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Forecast B, FPL's low CO2 price forecast, stands out as being just that, very low. Indeed, it is so low, that it is not reasonable to expect that such low CO₂ prices actually would lead to reductions in CO₂ emissions of sufficient magnitude to address the problem of climate change. In real dollars, the highest price this forecast would ever reach would be \$10/ton in 2022. Under all reasonable estimates I've seen, that would not be enough to incent carbon capture and sequestration at coal-fired power plants of any type, for example. Essentially, FPL's low forecast rests upon the assumption that U.S. greenhouse gas regulation will never result in significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. This is an unreasonable assumption over such a long period of time and therefore the scenarios assuming FPL's low forecast should not be considered.

15 That leaves us with just one out of eight scenarios (referring back to Table 1) which 16 suggest that FGPP would be the lower cost capacity addition to FPL's system.

- 1 Q. Is this scenario reasonable?
 - A. It may be. Certainly the real cost of CO_2 escalates to a much higher level than in the
- Company's low CO₂ price scenario. However, the CO₂ price in this scenario still tops out at only \$28/ton. But, the more important question is whether the Commission's decision to grant FPL's need request ought to rest upon only one reasonable planning scenario.
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
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Q. Should the Commission approve the building of FGPP based on the results of this single scenario?

- 9 A. No. Even if we were to accept that the very limited comparison between FGPP and 10 natural gas generation is the appropriate comparison, that is, that there are no other 11 reasonable alternatives, the downside of building FGPP is, in most scenarios, much 12 larger than the upside of moving forward with the project.
- In the Mid-CO₂ Price, High Differential scenario, the upside of building FGPP rather
 than natural gas generation would be a cost savings to FPL customers of \$1.127
 billion. In *every* other reasonable scenario, however, it is *more* costly to FPL
 customers to go forward with FGPP in place of new natural gas-fired generation.
 According to FPL's own analysis, as shown in Table 1 above, that cost could reach
 \$4.037 billion.
- 19 Q. Is \$4.037 billion the upper bound of the potential cost differential between FGPP
 20 and natural gas generation?
- A. Not necessarily. My March 7, 2007 testimony presented Synapse's forecast of the
 cost of mandatory greenhouse gas reductions. Below, I've created a chart comparing
 our CO₂ price forecast to that used by FPL in its economic analyses of the FGPP
 project.

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Senators John McCain & Joe Lieberman - Climate Stewardship Act (S.1151)

Some of these bills have evolved since then, including latest version of the McCain-17 18 Lieberman bill which has more aggressive emission reduction targets as introduced in

2007 compared to 2005. Most importantly, however, it would be unreasonable to
 base a forecast of CO₂ allowance prices through 2054 on bills that do not address the
 need to stabilize the concentration of CO₂ in our atmosphere. *None* of these bills
 would achieve that.

5 Exhibit DAS-4² compares the emissions trajectories of several bills proposed in the 6 109th Congress including the Bingaman, Feinstein and McCain-Lieberman bills upon 7 which FPL's forecasts are based. The Carper bill is, unfortunately, not included, but 8 it is slightly less stringent than the McCain-Lieberman bill. The emission reduction 9 paths to achieve stabilization targets of 550 parts per million (ppm) and 450 ppm are 10 the grey lines. None of the bills upon which FPL relies, would come close to those 11 targets.³

As with federal regulation of sulfur dioxide, I would expect federal regulation of
carbon dioxide to come in steps. Over time, the regulation will become more
stringent in order to address the problem of climate change. Such a trend, however, is
apparently not reflected in FPL's CO₂ price forecasts.

Q. Does the comparison of fuel price differential and greenhouse gas regulation adequately capture the biggest risks to FGPP?

A. No, it does not. There are other major risks to building coal plants many of which
FPL identifies in its Need Study at page 17. One of those risks it has not analyzed,
however. That is the risk of increases in "the actual capital cost of completing FGPP
and placing the generating units in commercial operation."

22 Q. Please describe this risk.

A. The projected costs of building new coal plants have increased dramatically over the
 past few years. This is due in large part to intense global competition for coal plants
 coupled with constrained supply. A perfect example comes from FGPP itself. At

² The graphic in this exhibit is taken from the World Resource Institute and is available at <u>http://www.wri.org/climate/topic_content.cfm?cid=4182</u>.

³ Those are the lines "Bingaman (2005)," "McCain-Lieberman/Olver-Gilchrest (2005)," and "Feinstein (3/2006)."

1		page 17, lines 17-23 of his testimony, FPL witness William Yeager says "The
2		immense scope of this project, in the first instance, necessarily limits the number of
3		potential EPC [engineer, procure, construct] contractors. Thus, the EPC pricing was
4		based on an initial inquiry to three major contractors with coal engineering,
5		procurement, construction experience. In fact, the result of this inquiry produced
6		only one contractor with resources available in sufficient quantity to handle a project
7		of this magnitude in the timeframe required."
8		It is remarkable that the EPC contract for such a large project could not be
9		competitively bid and is an excellent example of why designers, vendors and
10		suppliers can charge premiums on coal plant components and services of all types.
11		The demand for coal plants therefore translates into a significant cost risk for FGPP.
12		At page 16 of the Need Study, FPL states "There are factors that could cause the
13		capital cost of FGPP to be higher than projected. One reason for this is that there is a
14		much longer lead time required, at least five and a half years from the date of this
15		Need filing for development, permitting and construction of the first FGPP unit,
16		compared to just over three years for gas-fired units, and a correspondingly greater
17		opportunity for changes in the cost of equipment, labor and materials to occur."
18		Unfortunately, FPL has done no analysis under which it analyzed the effect of
19		potential cost increases in the FGPP capital cost.
20		
21	Q.	Is it possible that FPL could mitigate both the downsides of new natural gas
22		generation and FGPP?
23	A.	Yes, mitigate and perhaps even avoid. Among the hundreds of pages of testimony
24		and the Need Study, the glaring omission is information on how FPL even decided
25		that its only two choices were FGPP or new natural gas generation. It is not enough
26		for FPL to say that it needs to add 1,960 MW of new coal-fired capacity; it must
27		justify that addition over other alternatives like renewables and energy efficiency (see
28		the Testimony of John Plunkett) as well as demonstrate that baseload capacity is
29		needed.

1 2	Q.	Are you saying that there is no analysis showing how FPL arrived at the conclusion that it would need either gas or coal-fired baseload capacity?
3 4 5 6	А.	Not that I have seen. In a need case such as this, I would expect to see a quantitative, economic analysis likely using a capacity expansion model to evaluate different resources. Instead, what FPL apparently has done is much simpler and excludes any sort of economic considerations.
7	Q.	Please describe what you know about FPL's analysis.
8 9 10 11 12	А.	FPL witness Steven Sim states at page 8, lines 20-21 of his testimony "FPL utilized its IRP process to first determine the timing and magnitude of resource needs." He does not describe at all what that process entails. However, on the page following he is asked the question "How did FPL decide it needed additional resources and what was the magnitude of the needed resources?" He answers: ⁴
13 14 15 16 17		FPL uses two analytical approaches in its reliability assessment to determine the timing and magnitude of its future resource needsThe first approach is to make projections of reserve margins both for Winter and Summer peak hours for future years. A minimum reserve margin criterion of 20% is used to judge the projected reserve margins.
18 19 20 21 22		The second approach is a Loss-of-Load-Probability (LOLP) evaluation. Simply stated, LOLP is an index of how well a generating system may be able to meet its demand (i.e., a measure of how often load may exceed available resources)LOLP is typically expressed in units of "numbers of times per year" that the system demand could not be served.
23		If these two analytical approaches constitute FPL's "IRP process" the Commission
24		should absolutely not rely upon the results of this analysis, i.e., the choice between
25		FGPP and natural gas generation. Even taken together, these approaches give no
26		information about the appropriate mix of resources types (baseload, intermediate,
27		peaking) that represents the least cost mix of resources or the value of delaying
28		resource additions. For example, it's possible that FPL simply looked at its load and
29		resources projection which "has been driven by the Summer reserve margin

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Testimony of Steven Sim, page 9, line 10 through page 10, line 5.

- 1 criterion,"⁵ saw that it needed capacity to meet its summer reserve margin
- 2 requirement and chose baseload capacity even though that capacity may not operate
- 3 in the winter months (because it may not be needed).
- 4 Q. What would constitute appropriate resource planning?
- 5 A. FPL ought to present this Commission with the results of analyses that have directly 6 compared resource choices like coal, gas, renewables and demand-side management.

7 Q. Do you have any additional issues you would like to raise with this Commission?

- 8 A. Yes. FPL's need for new capacity essentially appears to be a result of the 20%
- 9 reserve margin requirement; a requirement that is much higher than other
- 10 jurisdictions I am familiar with. To demonstrate the result of having a 20% reserve
- 11 margin, I've recreated Exhibit SRS-4 for the summer months as Table 2.
- 12 13

Table 2. Projection of FPL's 2007-2015 Capacity Needs: 15% Reserve

Forecast of Summer Reserve Projections Projections Projections Summer Forecast of Margins **MW Needed** of FPL Unit Peak Load DSM of Firm of Total Forecast of to Meet 15% Summer w/o August of Capability Purchases Capacity Forecast Forecast Firm Peak Reserves Additions Reserve the Year (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (%) Margin 2007 22,123 2,993 25,116 22,259 1,768 20,491 22.6% (1551) 4,625 2008 22,150 2,993 25,143 22,770 1,908 20,862 4,281 20.5% (1152) 23,435 2009 23.370 25,881 21,401 20.9% (1270)2,511 2,034 4.480 2010 24,589 2,107 26,696 24,003 2,146 21,857 4,839 22.1% (1560) 24,612 2011 24,589 2.062 26,651 2,264 22,348 4.303 19.3% (951) 2012 24,589 1.906 26,495 25,115 2,388 22,727 3,768 16.6% (359) 14.8% 2013 25,569 1,906 26,495 25,590 2,516 23,074 3,421 40 2014 26,549 1,906 27,475 26,100 23,449 4,026 17.2% (509) 2,651 28,455 18.7% 2015 26,549 1,906 26,772 2,790 23,982 4,473 (876) 14

If FPL had a 15% reserve margin it would need just 40 MW of new capacity in 2013.
Reserve margins are mechanisms to address resource adequacy concerns. My
understanding is that FPL operates under both a LOLP standard of 0.1 days per year
as well as a 20% reserve margin requirement. If the 20% reserve margin is not
necessary in order to maintain the LOLP standard of 0.1 days per year, that is, if a

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
Testimony of Steven Sim, page 10, lines 7-8.

1		15% reserve margin ⁶ could guarantee the same LOLP standard, then FPL customers
2		are paying additional money for capacity that brings little in the way of reliability
3		benefits. In the case of this particular project, they are paying about $5.7 \ billion^7$
4		extra. I would strongly encourage this Commission to open a docket to examine
5		whether peninsular Florida's reserve margin requirement ought to be revised
6		downward before granting an affirmative need determination for FGPP.
7	Q.	What is your ultimate recommendation to this Commission?
8	A.	I recommend that the Commission deny FPL's need request. FPL has failed to
9		demonstrate that FGPP is the least cost, least risk addition to its system and the
10		Commission should revisit the 20% reserve margin requirement before approving
11		new capacity at a cost of \$5.7 billion.
12		FPL's analyses in support of FGPP do not comprehensively consider potential CO ₂
13		prices and do not evaluate a full range of technically feasible alternatives. FPL's
14		analyses do not even show that FGPP would be less expensive than building and
15		operating new gas facilities.
16	Q.	Does this complete your testimony?
17	A.	Yes.
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⁶ I chose 15% as the example reserve margin since I understand that prior to 1999, that was the Commission ordered minimum reserve margin.

⁷ FGPP Need Study, page 37.

Docket No. 070098-EI Emission Trajectories of CO₂ Legislation in the 109th Congress Supplemental Exhibit DAS-4, Page 1 of 1



Emission Trajectories of CO₂ Legislation in the 109th Congress

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on this 16th day of March, 2007, via electronic mail and US Mail on:

Florida Power & Light Company R. Wade Lichtfield Natalie F. Smith 700 Universe Boulevard Juno Beach, FL 33408 Email: <u>Wade Litchfield@fpl.com</u> <u>Natalie Smith@fpl.com</u>

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