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July 30, 2009

Ms. Ann Cole, Commission Clerk
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee FL 32399-0850

Dear Ms. Cole:

RE: Docket No. 080410-EG

Enclosed for official filing in the above referenced docket are an original and fifteen (15) copies of the following:

1. Prepared rebuttal testimony of John N. Floyd.

Sincerely,

Susan D. Ritenour

mv

Enclosures

cc: Beggs and Lane
J. A. Stone, Esq.

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: **Commission Review of Numeric
Conservation Goals for Gulf Power
Company**)
)
)

Docket No.: **080410-EG**

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was furnished by U. S. mail this 30th day of July, 2009, on the following:

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Gulf Power Company
Before the Florida Public Service Commission
Prepared Rebuttal Testimony of
John N. Floyd
Docket No. 080410-EG
Commission Review of Numeric Conservation Goals
July 30, 2009

- Q. Will you please state your name, business address, employer and position?
- A. My name is John N. Floyd, and my business address is One Energy Place, Pensacola, Florida 32520. I am employed by Gulf Power Company as the Economic Evaluation and Market Reporting Team Leader.
- Q. Are you the same John N. Floyd that provided direct testimony on Gulf Power's behalf in this docket?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Mr. Floyd, what is the purpose of your testimony?
- A. My testimony is in rebuttal to the testimony of SACE/NRDC and GDS witnesses previously filed in this docket.
- Q. What is your response to SACE/NRDC's claim that the Commission should establish interim conservation goals for Gulf Power Company of one percent of annual energy sales?
- A. I do not believe Witness Steinhurst's recommended goals meet the requirements of Section 366.82, Florida Statutes and Rule 25-17.0021, Florida Administrative Code, for developing goals. Specifically, Section

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1 366.82(3) requires evaluation of the full technical potential of available
2 energy efficiency and demand-side renewable measures and
3 consideration of four criteria in establishing goals. Rule 25-17.0021(1), in
4 turn, requires that goals be “based on an estimate of the total cost-
5 effective kilowatt and kilowatt-hour savings reasonably achievable through
6 demand-side management in each utility’s service area.” This rule also
7 requires consideration of building codes, which are specific to Florida,
8 free-riders, and specific market segments and end-use categories.
9 Dr. Steinhurst’s recommended goals do not appear to be based on the
10 criteria set forth in 366.82(3) Florida Statutes, or the Commission’s rules,
11 but rather on a generic application of a percentage multiplier to the
12 Company’s forecasted energy and seasonal peak demand projections as
13 reflected in its Ten Year Site Plan. Further, the goals recommended by
14 Dr. Steinhurst are not reflective of a thorough, deliberate process like the
15 one used by the Collaborative to develop Gulf’s proposed goals.
16 Dr. Steinhurst’s proposed goals do not reflect Gulf Power’s planning
17 process, including the nature and timing of the avoided unit being used in
18 the evaluation of energy efficiency measures associated with development
19 of the Company’s proposed goals. In essence, Dr. Steinhurst’s
20 recommendation rests on the bare assumption that because other
21 “leading” electric utilities in the country run DSM programs that save the
22 equivalent of approximately 1.0 percent of electricity sales each year, then
23 a similar goal must necessarily be appropriate for Florida. In his rebuttal
24 testimony, Mr. Dean also discusses other reasons this approach to goal
25 setting is not appropriate in Florida.

1 Analytical deficiencies aside, the most astonishing aspect of
2 SACE/NRDC's proposed goals is the sheer magnitude of cost that would
3 be required to achieve this extreme level of energy savings. While
4 Dr. Steinhurst calculates a numeric goal for Gulf Power, he offers no
5 insight into the associated cost. Perhaps this is a reflection of SACE's
6 stated and narrowly focused objective in this proceeding as "an advocate
7 for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions" as established by
8 Mr. Wilson. Unlike SACE's purpose, Florida utilities and the Commission
9 have the interests of customers to consider as well. Dr. Steinhurst's goal
10 proposal is certain to have cost impacts far beyond anything Florida utility
11 customers have ever experienced. Since 1981, Gulf Power has spent in
12 excess of \$113 million on approved conservation programs that have
13 achieved 538 GWh cumulative annual energy savings for its customers.
14 SACE/NRDC's proposed goals for the next ten year period are more than
15 double the level of energy savings Gulf's customers have realized over
16 twenty-eight years. The cost associated with achieving the goals
17 proposed by SACE/NRDC would surely be well beyond anything Gulf
18 Power's customers have experienced to date.

19

20 Q. GDS witness Spellman has recommended goals for Gulf Power which are
21 similar in magnitude to those recommended by SACE/NRDC. What is
22 your assessment of this recommendation?

23 A. Mr. Spellman proposes goals that, like those of SACE/NRDC, do not
24 comply with Commission rules. Mr. Spellman's proposed goals are not
25 consistent with Rule 25-17.0021(1) as they are clearly identified as

1 "maximum achievable" values. As mentioned earlier, Rule 25-17.0021(1)
2 plainly states that goals must be based on an estimate of savings which
3 are "reasonably achievable" through demand side management in each
4 utility's service area; not "maximum achievable" savings. As a proposed
5 portfolio, this would represent maximum adoption of all measures resulting
6 from unlimited incentive levels. As a practical matter, this target for a
7 utility-sponsored goal portfolio is extreme and not reasonably achievable.

8 Mr. Spellman begins the development of his proposed goals with
9 the results of the E-TRC achievable potential results produced by Itron
10 and filed in Schedule 9 of Exhibit JNF-1 to my direct testimony. He then
11 includes sweeping adjustments for various exclusions and perceived
12 understatements in the Itron-developed achievable potential study. These
13 adjustments did not utilize the same DSM ASSYST model; rather, it
14 appears that Mr. Spellman is taking the results of one study and adding
15 additional potential based on some other unexplained analysis. In my
16 opinion, it is important to the integrity of the proposed goals that they are
17 derived from a common framework used for all phases of the analysis
18 from technical to achievable potential. Mr. Spellman also makes another
19 arbitrary adjustment in his recommendation of "transition period" goals by
20 reducing the calculated goal by 50 percent during the first five years of the
21 2010 through 2019 period. While this adjustment is intended to recognize
22 the "significant cultural and economic change" associated with
23 Mr. Spellman's proposed goals, the basis is again not consistent with any
24 provisions of the Commission's rules.

25

1 The most significant adjustment made by Mr. Spellman is the
2 added achievable potential of measures that have less than a two-year
3 payback. The level of energy savings Mr. Spellman associates with the
4 two-year payback measures represents 100 percent of the technical
5 potential for measures applicable to the residential sector and 60 percent
6 of the technical potential for measures applicable to the
7 commercial/industrial sector. Achieving a level of 100 percent penetration
8 of the residential measures is not feasible even by giving away the
9 measures to every single customer. This is an extreme scenario,
10 especially since this group of measures has the highest incidence of
11 naturally occurring adoption of all measures in the portfolio.

12
13 Q. Does Witness Spellman provide any meaningful analysis of the costs or
14 rate impacts which would be associated with achieving his proposed
15 goals?

16 A. No. As was true of the goals proposed by SACE/NRDC, one of the most
17 disturbing aspects of Mr. Spellman's recommendation is the failure to
18 provide any kind of cost estimate associated with achieving such a
19 monumental level of energy and demand savings. Mr. Spellman's own
20 testimony acknowledges that this proposal will result in rate increases, but
21 that is dismissed as being "within a range that is acceptable to the
22 Commission". On top of this, Mr. Spellman also proposes an additional 10
23 percent increase in Gulf's historic ECCR spending to promote admittedly
24 non cost-effective demand-side renewables. This proposal is not based
25 on any cost/benefit analysis, but is merely an arbitrary additional

1 expenditure to be shared by all of Gulf's customers to promote the most
2 expensive technologies available. This proposal is directly contrary to the
3 requirement of Rule 25-17.0021 that goals be cost-effective and serves to
4 further underscore Mr. Spellman's indifference to the impact that his
5 recommendations will have on utility customers throughout Florida.

6 To be sure, unlike the RIM based proposal by Gulf, Mr. Spellman's
7 proposal will certainly result in increased rates.

8

9 Q. Witnesses for SACE/NRDC and GDS contend that Itron's Technical
10 Potential Study improperly excluded important measures and sectors from
11 consideration. Do you agree with this contention?

12 A. No. I do not agree with this contention. I am particularly disappointed in
13 how Mr. Wilson has characterized the Technical Potential Study given that
14 he was an active and very engaged member of the Collaborative during
15 the measure selection and identification phase of the project. During a
16 November 3, 2008, presentation before the Commission, Mr. Wilson
17 characterized this study in favorable terms, stating that "[t]his is going to
18 be, quite simply, the finest study of its caliber in the southeast and
19 probably one of the finest in the nation in the past few years."

20 (November 3, 2008 Commission Workshop Transcript p. 45, lines 17-19)

21 As discussed in my direct testimony on page 11, the criteria utilized to
22 determine which measures and sectors were ultimately studied are
23 reasonable and lend credibility to the resulting potential forecasts.

24 Mr. Rufo also addresses the measure selection criteria in his pre-filed
25 direct testimony. Ultimately, the Collaborative agreed to the final

1 measures list to be evaluated and it is my opinion that the resulting
2 measures are robust and appropriate.

3 Mr. Spellman also identifies several measures that he claims were
4 omitted from the study. Itron provides a detailed explanation as to their
5 rationale for not including the subject measures in Gulf's response to
6 staff's fourth set of interrogatories, questions 20 and 21. Mr. Spellman
7 appropriately points out that the source and validity of the measure data
8 used in a study like this is as important as the data itself and that "it is
9 necessary to use Florida-specific data wherever possible so that the
10 estimates reflect actual potential for service areas in Florida". This is, in
11 fact, one of the reasons the measures cited by Mr. Spellman were not
12 included in the final measure list to be evaluated for technical potential.
13 In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Rufo also addresses the assertions made by
14 GDS and SACE/NRDC witnesses related to exclusion of measures in the
15 technical potential study.

16

17 Q. SACE/NRDC and GDS witnesses have claimed that the Florida utilities'
18 demand side conservation plans place too much emphasis on peak
19 demand reduction and too little emphasis on annual energy savings. Do
20 you consider this to be the case for Gulf Power Company?

21 A. No, I do not. Gulf's conservation plans appropriately emphasize both the
22 demand and energy reductions associated with energy efficiency
23 programs that are included in the resource planning process as described
24 in Gulf's Ten Year Site Plan (TYSP). This process is consistent with
25 FEECA requirements to reduce growth of weather-sensitive peak demand

1 in addition to the growth rate of energy consumption as described in
2 Section 366.82 (2), Florida Statutes.

3 It should be noted that, in establishing its proposed goals, Gulf has
4 for the first time included benefits of carbon emissions reductions in the
5 evaluation of energy efficiency measures based on projections of potential
6 greenhouse gas emissions regulations. These benefits, in part, have
7 resulted in Gulf increasing its proposed goal for annual energy reduction
8 by 184 percent as compared to its current Commission-approved goal.
9 The proposed goals appropriately value both the demand and energy
10 benefits associated with energy efficiency in the resource planning
11 process.

12
13 Q. SACE/NRDC and GDS suggest that public policy favors use of the TRC
14 test. Please comment on this subject.

15 A. In this goals development process Gulf has proposed goals that provide
16 for a 184 percent increase in energy savings over currently approved
17 goals. Gulf recognizes that achievement of these significantly higher
18 goals will require the promotion of additional energy efficiency programs
19 within our customer base. I consider it to be favorable public policy to be
20 able to accomplish this objective in a manner that places downward
21 pressure on overall rates while not burdening the general body of
22 customers to pay for programs that only benefit a portion of the customer
23 base. Use of the TRC test, on the other hand, cannot ensure that
24 achievement of any level of energy efficiency savings can be
25 accomplished while also placing downward pressure on rates.

1 Q. In his direct testimony, SACE/NRDC witness Mosenthal testifies that the
2 Participant test should only be considered at the program level and that
3 the FEECA utilities have inappropriately screened out measures that do
4 not pass the Participant test without any incentive. Do you agree with
5 Mr. Mosenthal's testimony in this regard?

6 A. No. Mr. Mosenthal has reached an overly broad and unfounded
7 conclusion. In fact, his conclusion is directly contrary to my direct
8 testimony on page 15, lines 6-15. Gulf did not screen out any measures
9 based on the Participant test without any incentive. Gulf only applied the
10 Participant test criteria required by 366.82 (3)(a) once the maximum
11 incentive levels were established for both the RIM and TRC portfolios. If,
12 at these incentive levels, a measure did not pass the Participant test then
13 it was removed from the portfolio. This ensures Gulf is only including
14 measures in proposed goals that make economic sense to participating
15 customers.

16

17 Q. It has been argued by GDS and a number of SACE/NRDC witnesses that
18 the FEECA utilities' use of a two-year payback criterion to screen
19 measures was improper. How do you respond to this contention?

20 A. As explained by Mr. Dean in his rebuttal testimony, the two-year payback
21 criterion has been used in previous goal setting proceedings and was
22 initially accepted by this Commission in Order No. 94-1313-FOF-EG
23 approving FP&L's DSM goals for the period 1994 through 2003 as a
24 means of reducing free-riders. Further, In accordance with the
25 Collaborative agreement on screening criteria to be used in this study,

1 Gulf removed measures that had less than a two-year payback with no
2 incentive applied. This step of the screening process occurred after
3 measures failing the RIM or TRC test were removed. This criterion was
4 utilized to reduce free-riders by removing the measures with the highest
5 incidence of naturally occurring adoption. Rule 25-17.0021(3) requires
6 utilities to consider free-riders in the goal setting process in order to
7 prevent overstating goals based on the fact that some customers would
8 adopt measures without utility program intervention.

9 This criterion is implicitly used in Gulf's Commission-approved
10 Commercial Energy Services program in which customized incentives are
11 offered for energy efficiency projects up to a level that results in a two-
12 year payback. GDS witness Spellman recognizes the validity of this
13 criterion in some market segments, but argues that it should not be used
14 in the residential and small commercial sectors because "customers are
15 typically not energy efficiency or financial experts". On the contrary, this is
16 exactly why the criterion of two years was used. That is, a customer
17 should not have to be an energy efficiency expert to recognize that
18 adoption of a measure with less than a two-year payback is a sound
19 financial decision. One other interesting point is that Mr. Spellman did not
20 take issue with the criterion to limit customer incentives in the achievable
21 study to produce a payback of two years, implicitly acknowledging that this
22 is a reasonable criterion for establishing an economic threshold for the
23 customer. Overall, the two-year payback threshold is a reasonable means
24 to reduce the impact of free-riders in the goal-setting process.

25

1 Q. Mr. Mosenthal also makes a point that some effective DSM strategies are
2 non-financial ones. Do you agree with this statement?

3 A. In general, yes. Many of the measures having a customer payback of two
4 years or less are highlighted in various consumer energy savings guides
5 including the FPSC Energy conservation house, DOE website
6 www.energysavers.gov, utility brochures and audit programs, and many
7 other sources. In fact, Gulf addresses a number of energy efficient
8 measures and practices, including some with less than two-year payback,
9 in its educational and audit programs. Gulf conducts technical analyses
10 for customers, trains builders and other trade allies, and works with
11 architects and engineers to ensure energy efficiency opportunities are
12 effectively considered and incorporated in building designs. While Gulf
13 does not capture and associate savings with many of these activities, they
14 clearly are beneficial to achieving an objective of increasing the efficient
15 use of energy.

16

17 Q. As an alternative to the two-year payback criterion, SACE/NRDC
18 recommends that free ridership should be addressed through good
19 program design rather than during the goal-setting process. Is this a
20 viable alternative, in your opinion?

21 A. No. Rule 25-17.0021(3) expressly requires that free ridership be
22 considered during the goal-setting phase. SACE/NRDC's position is
23 directly contrary to the Commission's rule.

24

25

1 Q. In his direct testimony SACE/NRDC Witness Steinhurst takes issue with
2 the carbon cost assumptions used by utilities in establishing their
3 proposed goals and recommends that the Commission require use of a
4 low-cost carbon price of \$15 per ton, a base-case allowance price of \$30
5 per ton and a high-case allowance price of \$78 per ton. Mr. Floyd, do you
6 agree with Dr. Steinhurst's recommendation?

7 A. No, I do not. Gulf Power has considered a range of potential carbon cost
8 impacts to represent the possible outcome of carbon legislation. Gulf
9 utilized the mid-range of these projections in the evaluation of energy
10 efficiency measures for development of the Company's proposed goals.
11 As stated previously, this has contributed to a 184 percent increase in Gulf
12 Power's annual energy reduction goal. Also, I would note that Gulf's
13 projected carbon costs are generally consistent with the Congressional
14 Budget Office (CBO) analysis of HR 2454 as referenced by Mr. Spellman.
15

16 Q. SACE/NRDC Witness Wilson testifies that a 2007 study performed by
17 Summit Blue Consulting LLC identifies Gulf Power as a "high-cost outlier"
18 in terms of costs of conserved energy. Is Mr. Wilson's testimony accurate
19 in this regard?

20 A. No. Based on my research into the source data utilized in the Summit
21 Blue Study, Gulf is mis-characterized in the report as having a commercial
22 cost of energy saved of approximately \$0.50 per kWh when the actual
23 data reported to the FPSC for 2005 is \$0.05 per kWh.
24
25

1 Q. Are there any corrections needed in Mr. Spellman's testimony related to
2 assertions about Gulf Power?

3 A. Yes. In his testimony, Mr. Spellman states that some utilities limited the
4 application of energy efficiency measures to incremental new loads and
5 did not allow energy efficiency measures to displace current electric loads.
6 This was not the case for Gulf Power. Gulf's achievable potential results
7 include both the impacts of replace-on-burnout efficiency gains and retrofit
8 measure gains depending on the particular measure.

9 Also, Mr. Spellman states in his testimony that some utilities used a
10 linear programming model to determine the optimal level of energy
11 efficiency investment. Gulf Power has not proposed a level of energy
12 efficiency investment below what is shown to be cost-effective.

13

14 Q. Mr. Floyd, FIPUG Witness Pollock has testified that some controversy has
15 arisen over the application of the RIM test because it is unclear that each
16 utility is applying the RIM test in the same way, especially regarding what
17 is included in the category of "lost revenues." (p. 4, lines 4-10). What is
18 your response to this testimony?

19 A. It is my understanding that the Investor Owned Utilities are calculating
20 change in electric revenues consistently. This calculation appropriately
21 includes clause revenues in the calculation.

22

23 Q. Mr. Floyd, do you have any other observations regarding the positions
24 advocated by SACE/NRDC and GDS in this docket?

25

1 A. Yes. While the SACE/NRDC and GDS witnesses may be experienced in
2 theoretical studies and policy debate, they have not adequately addressed
3 the impact of their positions on Gulf Power's customers. None of the
4 SACE/NRDC and GDS witnesses even speak to the cost or rate impacts
5 associated with the admittedly aggressive goals they propose. Particularly
6 in light of the order of magnitude difference in their goal proposal as
7 compared to the goals thoughtfully and thoroughly developed by the
8 utilities, some mention of cost would be expected. The fact is that a DSM
9 portfolio based on the TRC test will cause upward pressure on rates. Any
10 upward pressure on rates should be avoided when the opportunity exists
11 both to increase the level of energy efficiency goals for Gulf Power and
12 ensure that the costs of these actions will result in downward pressure on
13 rates. In this way, whether a customer participates in a Company
14 sponsored energy efficiency program or not, they will share in the benefits
15 of the program. Using RIM and the Participant's test to evaluate energy
16 efficiency programs ensures that both rates and customer bills go down.
17 The TRC test cannot ensure this will happen. Mr. Spellman cites NAPEE
18 in his testimony in estimating that "bills, on average, will be reduced".
19 While average bills may go down, non-participants' bills will go up. This is
20 the essence of the cross-subsidy outcome of utilizing TRC as a criterion to
21 judge DSM programs. One general assumption that appears throughout
22 the SACE/NRDC and GDS testimony is that TRC supports much more
23 energy efficiency than RIM. In fact, Gulf's proposed goals, which are
24 based on the RIM-high incentive scenario, produce a higher energy and
25 demand savings goal than the TRC-low incentive and TRC-mid incentive

1 scenarios. Only the TRC-high incentive level scenario produces a higher
2 goal, but at more than double the cost.

3 GDS and SACE/NRDC's witnesses also ignore the fact that
4 electricity costs have a significant impact on the ability to attract and
5 maintain economic development in our service area. As recognized by
6 FIPUG witness Pollock, industrial and commercial enterprises are
7 particularly reliant on a reliable, low cost supply of electricity to power their
8 operations. Rule 25-17.001(7) recognizes this fact and states that "Rules
9 25-17.001 through 25-17.005 F.A.C. shall not be construed to restrict
10 growth in the supply of electric power or natural gas necessary to support
11 economic development by industrial or commercial enterprises. Rather,
12 these rules should be construed so as to enhance job-producing economic
13 growth by lowering energy costs from what they otherwise would be if
14 these goals were not achieved." I do not believe that the positions
15 advocated by GDS and SACE/NRDC in this docket are consistent with the
16 directives of Rule 25-17.001 or with the best interests of Gulf Power's
17 customers.

18
19 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

20 A. Yes.


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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF FLORIDA)
)
COUNTY OF ESCAMBIA)

Docket No. 080410-EG

Before me the undersigned authority, personally appeared John N. Floyd, Economic Evaluation and Market Reporting Team Leader of Gulf Power Company, and who on behalf of said corporation, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that, pursuant to Rule 1.340(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the foregoing is true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information and belief. He is personally known to me.



John N. Floyd
Economic Evaluation & Market Reporting Team Leader

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of July, 2009.



Notary Public, State of Florida at Large

