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3	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center	
4		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way	
5	REPORTED BY:	Tallahassee, Florida	
6	REPORTED DI:	JANE FAUROT, RPR Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6732	
7		(050) 415 0752	
8	PARTICIPATING:	(As heretofore noted.)	
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(Transcript follows in sequence from
3	Volume 26.)
4	CONTINUED CROSS EXAMINATION
5	BY MR. REHWINKEL:
6	Q. Now, what you provided the Commission for
7	guidance with respect to GAAP is contained in,
8	basically, this approximately a page of testimony,
9	correct?
10	A. Yes. For me it was the clearest evidence of
11	what the principle is that should be applied associated
12	with changes in estimates.
13	Q. Okay. Now, the average remaining life or
14	remaining life approach that you would propose, that to
15	some degree, but to a much lesser degree, restates
16	depreciation, does it not?
17	A. No, it does not restate depreciation.
18	Q. It does not correct depreciation reserve
19	variance?
20	A. No, it does not restate depreciation expense
21	in the sense that previously recognized depreciation
22	expense is not adjusted in any way.
23	${f Q}$. In your research regarding the Commission's
24	long-standing policy about correcting depreciation
25	reserve variances, you didn't find any discussion about
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GAAP, did you?

A. Not that I can recall.

Q. And I think you may have alluded to it earlier or you may have expressly stated it, but you would agree with me, would you not, that GAAP is not binding upon the Public Service Commission with respect to how they treat depreciation expense or depreciation reserves, correct?

9 Yes. Clearly, GAAP is not -- shouldn't drive Α. 10 necessarily the Commission's actions. I think more 11 significantly is the precedential value of a decision 12 here in establishing depreciation policy where a final 13 depreciation study is then subject to review. And as a 14 result of changes in estimates, creates some uncertainty 15 about the ability to recover long-term the investments 16 that the company performing that study has assumed have 17 already been recovered. That is my point about assets 18 being written up to the tune of \$650 million, that I 19 would hope that this Commission, that is the policy 20 issue that they focus on, not necessarily the debits and 21 credits of GAAP, if you will.

22 Clearly, Commission actions have historically, 23 perhaps maybe not in this one, but in other 24 jurisdictions have done things that don't necessarily 25 fall within GAAP. But here I think this Commission is

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being asked to do something that is radically different than what has been done before.

Q. Okay. In this testimony that you have offered with respect to the GAAP relevance to this issue, there is nothing in here that you have cited that talks about whether there is any certainty or lack of certainty with respect to the company recovering its investment through depreciation rates, is there?

A. No. That was my opinion about that. I would
certainly defer to other witnesses that will follow me
to perhaps give their perspective on what investors'
reactions would be to this level of uncertainty.

13 **Q**. Okay. You are not testifying anywhere that I 14 have seen in your -- in your prepared rebuttal testimony that if the Commission were to adopt the Public 15 16 Counsel's proposal with respect to returning or to flow 17 back the positive theoretical reserve variance, you don't testify anywhere in here that it creates an 18 19 uncertainty with respect to being able to recover your 20 assets through the regulatory process, do you?

A. No, I did not testify to that. I addressed the GAAP accounting associated with -- you opened that perspective when you said should the Commission be driven by GAAP in making these decisions, and I thought you were asking my opinion of that. I think there are

others who will follow that are far more equipped to provide a perspective on what investors' reactions might be to such a significant uncertainty.

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Q. Well, when you use the word uncertainty, are you seriously contending that the Public Service Commission would not allow you to recover through depreciation your investment in plant and equipment?

A. No. I think the uncertainty I am referring to is that there is one thing I am certain of and that is that this theoretical reserve balance will change. It could very well move that it does not meet the expectations that we currently think. It may very well end up being a deficit.

14 As I pointed out earlier in my opening 15 comments, a lot of this relates to production plant. There is some great uncertainty around what the asset 16 17 lives of our coal plants are, for example. So I think 18 that is what I am suggesting, that if I have to, I will 19 put my bean hat on here for a moment just to account for 20 That I have to essentially wait for -- every four this. 21 years for a depreciation study to be performed to 22 determine what I really recovered in plant. That is 23 what we would be suggesting here is that I thought I 24 recovered a certain amount, I then subject myself to 25 this theoretical determination of what I should have

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1 recovered, and I somehow true that all up, and it is 2 that uncertainty that I am referring to. And in the 3 proposal that you have made, that is a \$650 million increase in plant that needs to be recovered in the 4 5 future. I didn't see anywhere in your testimony where 6 Q. 7 you took issue with Mr. Pous' testimony that he had 8 calculated that depreciation reserve deficiency on a theoretical basis to be \$858 million, did I? 9 10 No. But I don't think he took exception to Δ using the \$645 million that -- \$648 million that we 11 12 calculated. 13 Okay. So you would agree that he calculated Ο. 14 the surplus at \$858 million, correct? 15 Α. I'm not sure how he calculated that. I know 16 there is a number in his testimony that says that, but I 17 have no knowledge of how he calculated it. 18 Okay. And would you also agree that he Q. testified that it could be even greater had he looked at 19 20 all of the accounts with the same rigor that he did the 21 ones that he did? Well, actually, during his cross he seemed 22 Α. 23 quite confident in that, that he almost assured us that 24 when we look at this again there will be -- you know, 25 don't worry, there will be, if I remember correctly,

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there will be additional surpluses there. I would love 1 2 to have that type of foresight to understand how one can 3 do that. I think we are dealing with the facts as we know them today, which is we have calculated a 4 5 theoretical reserve variance, that is all it is. 6 0. So, the reason I asked you that is I guess you 7 were suggesting that the surplus or the positive 8 variance could go negative. It could go more positive, 9 too, couldn't it? 10 Again, the only thing I am certain of is that Α. 11 it will change. 12 Q. Okay. And we are also positive that it is at 13 least 646 million, right? As of that point in time it is \$646 million. 14 Α. 15 Now, Mr. Pous recommends \$162 million income Q. 16 statement credit, more or less, correct? 17 The reduction to depreciation expense Α. Yes. 18 just associated with this matter. 19 0. Yes. 20 He also recommended, if I recall, another Α. 21 113 million, roughly, in downward adjustments due to 22 depreciation parameters. 23 Right. And we can keep those separate? Q. 24 Α. Yes. I am addressing the theoretical reserve 25 variance.

1 So my question is Mr. Lawton recommends Q. 2 \$100 million income statement impact, correct? 3 Α. Yes. 4 Q. Okay. Is that one still violative of SFAS 154? 5 As I read it, it does. 6 Α. 7 Okay. What if it was a \$50 million credit, Q. 8 would that be violative of SFAS 54 -- 154? 9 As a principle, yes, but now we are getting Α. 10 into numbers that \$50 million over the course of four 11 years is dramatically different than a \$646 million 12 reduction. 13 So you are saying that the application of SFAS Q. 154, as you view it, is a matter of degree and judgment? 14 15 No, I said the principle is the same as we Α. 16 apply it. Materiality certainly comes into play whether 17 or not you could still report under GAAP a particular 18 depreciation reduction. 19 Q. Okay. Is materiality a component of applying 20 154? 21 I think materiality is a component of Α. 22 interpreting accounting principles at all times. 23 So every accounting pronouncement is applied 0. 24 with respect to materiality? 25 Α. Yes, I think accounting pronouncements are

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1 applied given consideration to materiality, yes. 2 Okay. But you would also agree that Q. 3 materiality is different based on the circumstances, 4 even with respect to the same set of financial 5 statements, would you not? 6 Could you rephrase that? Α. 7 Q. Let me ask it to you this way. If you are 8 doing -- if you are auditing a company, and you are 9 looking at kind of how you would sample certain 10 transactions, there is a materiality -- there is a 11 materiality that guides the design of your audit, 12 correct? 13 Α. Yes. 14Okay. And that materiality is different than Q. 15 the materiality that you are talking about here, 16 correct? 17 Α. In the context you just gave of a sampling 18 size? 19 Yes, sir. Q. 20 I guess it would depend on what somebody was Α. 21 trying to audit, and what attributes they were looking 22 at, and -- I am talking about the bottom line impact to 23 net income reported results. I, for one, think a \$162 million reduction to depreciation expense and its 24 25 impact on operating results is material.

3822 1 Q. Okay. 2 Α. I think that is relatively clear. And I think 3 not only that, the cumulative effect of it, of \$648 4 million or \$46 million is significant and material. 5 Q. Okay. Now, you don't use the word material 6 anywhere in Page 32 and 33 with respect with SFAS 154, 7 do you? 8 A. I was laying the principle. And, guite 9 frankly, the principle that I also then point back to in 10 terms of regulatory adoption where I think it has been 11 consistent with that principle. 12 Q. Okay. But the answer to my question is, no, 13 you don't use material. 14 Α. I saw no need to put some materiality 15 guideline of my own on top of what seems to be very 16 clear guidance in terms of how to account for change in 17 estimates associated with depreciation. 18 And there is not -- within 154 there is not Q. 19 any express guidance with respect to how materiality 20 impacts the application of this accounting pronouncement 21 to this situation, meaning Mr. Pous' recommendation, is 22 there? 23 Α. No, it would be impractical for an accounting 24 pronouncement to provide materiality guidelines for 25 every possible application that might be involved in FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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adopting it.

Q. Okay. I'm sorry. So the Public Service Commission couldn't look at SFAS 154 and determine what was material -- I mean, where the materiality threshold was, could they, with respect to applying that pronouncement to this issue in this case?

7 Well, in all due respect, I am the one who is Α. 8 responsible for accounting matters. I have to make that 9 determination in the accounting for our financial 10 records. The Commission, their responsibility strikes 11 me is more around the establishment of the cost of 12 service and what actions they think are appropriate relative to the proposals and the evidence that is 13 14 before them. In other words, it seems like they will --15 the Commission certainly will handle the ratemaking 16 considerations, but at the end of the day, the company 17 management is responsible for how these transactions or 18 how those effects would be accounted for.

19 Q. Okay. Well, you are aware, are you not, that 20 the staff of the Public Service Commission has CPAs on 21 it, aren't you?

A. Yes.

23 **Q.** Okay. And you would also agree with me, would 24 you not, that if the Public Service Commission were to 25 adopt Mr. Pous' proposal in totality, and that were to

be put in an order and the order were to become final for all purposes, whether you appealed it or not, and you implemented that order, you would not be in violation of GAAP, correct?

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A. No, that is not that my testimony.

Q. If you did what the Public Service Commission said, and it was lawful under the laws that govern this case, you are saying that that would violate GAAP?

9 Again, the Commission has latitude for Α. establishing the cost of service and how they want to 10 11 handle matters in rates. The exclusion of something 12 like the reduction of an accumulated depreciation 13 reserve in establishing rates doesn't make that GAAP. 14 In fact, clearly in FAS 71 it points to the fact that 15 the regulator's actions cannot reduce liabilities unless 16 they created them. So I think that is an example of 17 where they may choose to include or exclude particular 18 liabilities within the rate-setting process, but it 19 doesn't mean that that's GAAP. It doesn't make those 20 liabilities go away.

21 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Excuse me, Mr. Rehwinkel. I 22 just kind of want to give everyone a heads up. Jane, 23 our court reporter, is going to be with us for the 24 duration. So she is going to be the only one on board, 25 so I am going to try to stagger some breaks in for her.

We will start with this one here, and we will come back 1 2 probably at a quarter of. And what I will try to do like maybe on a two-hour cycle. 3 4 Jane, does that work for you? 5 And then we'll give her breaks so we can make 6 it to 8:00 tonight. So, see you guys at -- what time 7 did I say, quarter of? 8 (Off the record.) 9 COMMISSIONER MCMURRIAN: Mr. Rehwinkel, go 10 ahead. 11 MR. REHWINKEL: Thank you, Madam Chairman. 12 BY MR. REHWINKEL: 13 Okay. Mr. Garrett, I guess hopefully that ο. 14 break will cause me to shorten my questions for you. Ι 15am enjoying this immensely, but I don't think anyone 16 else is. 17 Let me ask you, the bottom of Page 32, on Line 18 23, continuing on to the next page, you state, "It is my 19 opinion that the amortization of accumulated book 20 reserves to reflect a retroactive adjustment to 21 depreciation expense violates GAAP." Do you see that? 22 Α. Yes. 23 Okay. Now, when you say violates GAAP, are 0. 24 you stating that it is in your opinion inconsistent with 25 SFAS 154? FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 A. Yes. Among some other input that I received, 2 I mentioned earlier that I also discussed this matter 3 with our outside auditors and looked to other references 4 beyond 154, but I thought this was the clearest example 5 or the clearest principle of where that principle is 6 laid out. 7 Okay. Now, I could be mistaken, and I think I Q. 8 wrote the word down reserve transfers when you mentioned 9 DeLoitte & Touche, is that correct? 10 Α. Yes. 11 Okay. Is it DeLoitte & Touche's opinion that Q. 12 even reserve transfers are violative of GAAP? 13 Α. Yes, in some circumstances. 14 Okay. There is no one here from DeLoitte & Q. 15Touche to testify to that, is there? No, there is not. 16 Α. Okay. If you were to stipulate to an 17 Q. adjustment similar to what was stipulated to in 2002, 18 but the amount was \$400 million instead of 250, and you 1920 were to stipulate based on the facts and circumstances that caused the company to agree to a settlement, 21 would -- and it was treated the same way as it was in 22 2002 with respect to the company incorporating into the 23 next depreciation study, would that violate GAAP? 24 That is not a scenario that I considered. My 25 A.

testimony was directed specifically to yours and FIPUG's 1 proposal to amortize very specific amounts. 2 Okay. Well, let's just take the 2002 order, 3 Q. if that had been entered into today, or let's say if 4 that had been entered into on January 10th, 2006, would 5 6 that violate GAAP? Again, I haven't -- I haven't considered those 7 Α. circumstances. 8 Okay. Let's look at Page 25, if you would, 9 Q. please, of your rebuttal. And this is on Lines 9 10 through 19, you reference a 1988 Gulf Power depreciation 11 order, is that correct? Well, actually -- yes. 12 13 Α. I'm sorry, are you on Page 20 --14 I'm sorry, 25. Q. 15 Α. 25. Lines 19 -- I mean, I'm sorry, 9 through 19. 16 Q. 17 You discuss a Gulf Power depreciation order? Yes, in the context of a Tampa Electric 18 Α. 19 matter. 20 Okay. Now, you reference JDIC, job Q. development investment tax credits, correct? 21 22 Yes. That was of subject matter in that Α. 23 order. 24 Okay. And those tax credits were created as Q. 25 part of a tax reform act sometime in the 1980s, is that FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	right?
2	A. I couldn't tell you if that was the case or
3	not.
4	Q. Okay. So were you doing public accounting for
5	utilities back in the '80s?
6	A. Yes, I was.
7	Q. Okay. And so you know what JDICs are, do you
8	not?
9	A. I really don't know what this is in reference
10	to.
11	Q. Okay. You know what tax credits are, do you
12	not?
13	A. I do know what tax credits are.
14	Q. And for utility accounting purposes, you
15	understand that tax credits are permanent tax timing
16	differences associated with purchase of eligible plant
17	and equipment, correct?
18	A. Yes, they may be.
19	Q. Okay. And for ratemaking purposes, these tax
20	credits are considered cost-free well, they are not
21	cost-free capital, they have a capital cost that is
22	calculated pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service
23	Code, correct?
24	A . Could you rephrase that?
25	Q. Well, let me ask I will withdraw that
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question and ask it this way. The JDIC -- well, 1 investment tax credits are treated as -- they are 2 recorded in the capital structure for ratemaking 3 purposes, correct? 4 Yes, we do have some investment tax credits 5 Α. 6 that are. · 7 Q. And these are unamortized investment tax credits associated with plant acquisition from earlier 8 9 periods, right? 10 Again, yes, I assume so. Α. 11 And, isn't it true that the Gulf Power order Q. 12 that you reference in your testimony dealt with the 13 confluence of two situations, one a reserve -- a 14 theoretical reserve deficiency for Gulf Power, and a 15 revenue requirements windfall associated with the 16 investment tax credits that Gulf Power received for its 17 plant and equipment purchases? 18 Yes, I believe that was the subject. Α. Μv 19 principle focus was on how the theoretical deficiency 20 was handled or the deficiency was handled in the order. 21 Q. That is what I wanted to ask you about. Investment tax credits for a new -- these job 22 23 development investment tax credits were a relatively new 24 creation in the tax code at that time, correct? 25 A. Yes. Again, I don't have intimate knowledge

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on what these tax credits were related to.

Q. Okay.

A. Back in 1988.

But what happened, I think at that time, if 4 Ο. you would accept, is that the company did not have a 5 rate case, but they had a windfall in their revenue 6 requirements and there was, if you will, a credit out 7 there; and with respect to reserve deficiency, there was 8 essentially a debit, and the Commission offset those two 9 in treating this reserve deficiency, did they not, and 10 11 didn't change rates?

A. Yes. Again, my focus on looking at this order was really related to how the unrecovered plant investment related to certain SCATA (phonetic) systems was handled, in particular how it was recovered.

Q. Okay. But what the Commission did was to take circumstances that they found themselves in with respect to the availability of tax credits, as it impacted the ratemaking process, and they used that to offset a reserve deficiency, did they not?

A. Yes. It appears that that was done. Again,
my principle focus here was that it addressed an
unrecovered balance associated with equipment that was
amortized over a two-year period of time.

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Q. Okay. On Page 26 you reference a West Florida

Natural Gas order on Lines 16 through 23. Do you see 1 2 that? Yes, I do. I'm there. 3 Α. Okay. And I think the purpose for you 4 Q. referencing this order is the language about using 5 remaining life to write off imbalances in certain 6 7 accounts, is that correct? 8 Yes, that is correct. Α. Okay. And when you did your review of the 9 0. order for purpose of this testimony and your opinion 10 about Commission's policy, did you make any inquiry into 11 the level of this depreciation reserve imbalance as it 12 13 compared to the overall accumulated depreciation reserve 14 of West Florida Natural Gas? 15 Α. No, I did not. It appeared that -- again, my 16 focus was on really how they dealt with an imbalance 17 that was brought about by technological change, and 18 specifically in the telephone industry, and what policy 19 or what -- how that was treated in prospective 20 depreciation. 21 Q. Okay. But doesn't this order kind of embody 22 for you the Commission's long-standing policy that you 23 testified to? 24 Well, it reflects, if I understand it, an Α. 25 approach associated with, in this case, an imbalance

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1	associated with unrecovered plant. So in that regard,
2	yes, I think it does embody that. It is relatively
3	small numbers compared to what we are discussing here.
4	I think it refers to an imbalance of \$13,481.
5	Q. Okay. So you would agree that that would not
6	be a material depreciation reserve imbalance, correct?
7	A. Today, no.
8	Q. What about for this?
9	A. 1986. I don't I haven't looked at the
10	financial statements of West Florida Natural Gas
11	Corporation, but I am going to go out on a limb and
12	suggest that it is probably not material.
13	Q. Okay. Thank you.
14	All right. Let's look at Page 29, and here at
15	the bottom of Page 29, Lines 15 through the end of that
16	page and carrying over to Page 30, you reference a 1997
17	Florida Power and Light order, and you also reference
18	Mr. Terry Deason. Do you see that?
19	A. Yes, I do.
20	Q. Okay. Now, you are not adopting
21	Commissioner Mr. Deason's testimony as a part of your
22	testimony, are you?
23	A. No, I'm not, I just found it informative.
24	Q. And it is true, is it not, that Mr. Deason's
25	testimony has not been entered into the record of any
	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	proceeding before this Commission, correct?
2	A. In this proceeding, no.
3	Q. Well, in any proceeding?
4	A. Well, it was provided in the FPL's current
5	base rate case.
6	Q. It has been filed.
7	A. Yes.
8	${f Q}$. But it has not not been admitted into evidence
9	there, has it?
10	A. That I don't know. I can't answer that.
11	Q. Okay. Has he testified yet in that matter?
12	A. Again, I'm not following the lineup of the
13	witnesses.
14	Q. I'm asking because you raised it in your
15	testimony.
16	A. No, again, I had access to what was filed and
17	found it informative.
18	Q. Okay. And your testimony is not that
19	Commissioner Mr. Deason's testimony is based on some
20	kind of special knowledge he had with respect to this
21	matter as a Commissioner, is it?
22	A. No.
23	Q. Okay. And you are also not testifying that he
24	is stating anything other than what can be found on the
25	record of any Public Service Commission proceeding,
	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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1	correct?
2	A. I'm sorry, could you
3	Q. You are not testifying you are not
4	representing to the Commission that his testimony is
5	based on anything other than what can be found on the
6	public record, correct?
7	A . Yes, I think that is correct.
8	${f Q}$. And isn't it true that Commissioner Deason
9	took office at the Public Service Commission in February
10	of 1997?
11	A. I don't know when Mr. Deason took office.
12	Q. Okay.
13	A. Again, I found it informative, given that this
14	particular order that I cite was he was a
15	Commissioner that participated in it, and it seemed to
16	have some important opinions about what was intended
17	there.
18	Q. Okay. Did he participate in the vote in that
19	case?
20	A. I don't know. Again, I just saw that he was a
21	Commissioner that participated in it.
22	Q. Okay. Was that an order that went based on
23	a case that went to hearing?
24	A. I can't answer that. I'm not sure.
25	Q. Okay. You don't know if it was a PAA order?
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I mean, the document I have here is a PSC 1 Α. 2 order, so --Did Commissioner Deason reference this order 3 0. in his testimony? 4 Yes, I believe he did. 5 Α. Did you review any of Mr. Deason's statements 6 Q. in any agenda conferences relating to Florida Power and 7 Light as part of your research? 8 No, I did not. My review was limited to this 9 Α. order, and as I mentioned, the testimony that he filed 10 in the FP&L case. 11 Okay. Did you review any of his statements 12 0. 13 that he might have made on Friday, March 22nd, 2002 at 14 an agenda conference related to Florida Power and Light? 15 Α. No, I did not. So, would you accept, subject to check, that 16 Q. at that agenda conference he stated on Page 34 of the 17 special agenda conference transcript, "We know that 18 if -- if we underdepreciate or overdepreciate there has 19 20 to be corrective measures taken after the next study. And my effort -- I mean, my concern is to try. I want 21 22 the depreciation reserves to be as accurate as 23 possible." 24 Have you ever seen anything where he said 25 that? FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

No, and I don't refer to it here in my 1 Α. 2 rebuttal testimony. Okay. But you are refer to his view of how 3 0. depreciation reserves ought to be handled, correct? 4 Yes, I do. Again, based on the limited -- the 5 Α. testimony that was filed in the FP&L case. 6 7 Q. Did you review any statements he might have made to the effect that, "I would hope that after the 8 conclusion of this settlement, if it is approved, that 9 we would not find ourselves in a situation where 10 depreciation reserves are way out of balance from where 11 they should theoretically be"? 12 No, I did not review that. As I stated here 13 Α. on Page 30 of my testimony, what I thought was of 14 particular relevance here was that it was not unusual 15 for the Commission to establish accelerated amortization 16 17 schedules to address equipment or facility reserve requirements. And I think it seems to me from, as I 18 19 read this, that it is ultimately intended to reduce 20 long-term revenue requirements or rate base over the 21 long-term. At least that was my takeaway as I looked at 22 this order, which is contrary to what is before us 23 today. 24 Okay. Let me ask you to turn to Page 30 of ο. 25 your rebuttal testimony?

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A. I am there.

And in Q&A beginning on line 9, continuing on 2 Q. down there, you reference a Marianna Division of Florida 3 Public Utilities Company order, and you quote the order, 4 which I think is an order of the Commission that says on 5 6 Line 15, "According to our staff, such deficiencies 7 should be recovered as fast as possible, unless such 8 recovery prevents the company from earning a fair and reasonable return on its investment." Do you see that? 9

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Now, you state then, I think, following that quote, that this statement, of course, reflects the opinion of the Commission staff at that time, not the Commission itself. What do you mean by that?

A. Well, I mean that based on the statement
before the quotation of that, that that was the opinion
of the staff at that time.

18 Q. But it is a statement that is in the19 Commission's own order, isn't it?

A. Yes, it is a statement -- it does appear in
the order, yes.

Q. Okay. Now, you are not contending, are you,
 that the Public Service Commission's depreciation staff
 doesn't possess vast depreciation knowledge, are you?
 A. Absolutely not. I'm not contending that at

1 all. Okay. Were you given a copy of the Exhibit 2 Q. 311, which is the public utility depreciation practices, 3 NARUC, August 1996, Pages 188 and 189? 4 I don't have that here. 5 Α. MR. REHWINKEL: If I may approach, Madam 6 Chairman, the witness and hand him Exhibit 311. 7 BY MR. REHWINKEL: 8 Is this something that you consulted in 9 Q. evaluating -- well, have you ever heard of this 10 11 document? 12 Α. Yes, I have. Is this something you consulted in preparing 13 0. 14 your testimony? Not in preparing this, my rebuttal testimony, 15 Α. no. It was something that was certainly consulted in 16 the preparation of our current depreciation study. 17 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. T think our Witness Earl Robinson covered that 20 ground. Okay. On Page 189, if you will? 21 Ο. 22 Α. Yes. 23 Are you familiar with this first paragraph at Q. 24 the top of this page? 25 Α. Yes, I am. FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Q. Okay. Do you have any disagreement with what is stated in actually the two paragraphs at the top of Page 189?

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A. Could you ask the question, again, please?
 Q. I asked if you have any disagreement with what is stated at the top of Page 189, and by the top, I meant these two paragraphs.

Well, I would take some exception to the 8 Α. notion that it refers to if there is a -- an analysis 9 confirms a material imbalance, one should make immediate 10 depreciation accrual adjustments to the use of an annual 11 12 amortization over a short period of time or the setting of depreciation rates using the remaining life technique 13 are two of the most common options for eliminating 14 imbalance. As my testimony was geared towards 15 addressing GAAP, depending upon how one implements those 16 two options that seem to be pretty wide, that is, the 17 18 use of a remaining life approach or a shorter period of 19 time. And that is where I would take some exception to 20 whether in all circumstances that would comply with 21 GAAP.

Q. Okay. So, other than your concern about GAAP, do you have any concerns about these two? Do you have any disagreement with what is stated in these two paragraphs?

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1 Α. No, I think it supports what I have been 2 saying about the need to understand fully or have a 3 clear understanding of what is causing a reserve 4 variance and then depending upon that, taking 5 appropriate action. It is just the response to that 6 that I would question whether or not in all 7 circumstances it would comply with GAAP. 8 Q. Okay. Do you know if any members of the 9 Florida Public Service Commission staff participated in 10 the preparation of this document? 11 Α. No, I do not. 12 Q. Okay. I just have a little bit more for you, 13 but I want to kind of go back to GAAP since we just 14 discussed it in this document here. But just so I 15 understand, is it your testimony that SFAS 154 16 supersedes the Public Service Commission's authority to 17 adjust theoretical reserve variances in the manner that 18 it feels is best in the interest of the ratepayers of 19 PEF? 20 No, that is not my testimony. As I said Α. 21 earlier, the Commission has considerable latitude, 22 obviously, I think to establish the cost of service that 23 they think is appropriate. 154, I think, just lays out 24 the clearest principles associated with how enterprises 25 should account for changes in estimates, and in

particular depreciation.

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2 And, is it your testimony that SFAS 154 would Q. 3 come into play anytime the Public Service Commission 4 corrected a theoretical reserve variance in a time period faster than the remaining life would call for? 5 6 Yes. Again, I think if any period short of Α. 7 the average remaining life is -- would warrant some 8 review of whether or not that fit in the GAAP framework. 9 MR. REHWINKEL: Okay. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask if I could have an exhibit identified for --10 11 Madam Chairman, I'm sorry, I need to look up more often. 12 COMMISSIONER MCMURRIAN: All right. MR. REHWINKEL: For cross examination 13 14 purposes. 15 COMMISSIONER MCMURRIAN: Well, I think we are 16 at 316. 17 MR. REHWINKEL: 316. 18 MS. KLANCKE: That is correct. 19 COMMISSIONER MCMURRIAN: Thank you. 20 MR. REHWINKEL: This is -- we will just call it List of PSC Orders. Ms. Bradley has agreed to pass 21 22 them out for me. 23 (Exhibit Number 316 marked for 24 identification.) 25 BY MR. REHWINKEL:

1 Mr. Garrett, what I have -- well, let me ask Q. 2 you this: In the research that you did -- if I could 3 get you to turn to the first page of this exhibit, and 4 up at the top it says FPSC orders requiring elimination 5 of a depreciation reserve imbalance (surplus/deficiency 6 through other than remaining life recovery.) And I 7 would represent to you that this was provided to the 8 Public Service Commission staff in discovery and as a 9 late-filed deposition exhibit of Mr. Pous. But be that 10 as it may, did you review these orders that are shown on 11 this page in preparing your testimony? 12 Α. I haven't gone through -- no, I haven't 13 reviewed all of these. I would have to take some time 14 to determine whether or not any of those are cited in my 15 exhibit that I provided as WG-3. But I have not -- like 16 I say, I have not reviewed all of these orders. It is 17 possible that I reviewed some in WG-3. 18 Q. Do you see some on here that you did review? 19 For example, the General Telephone one, 14929, Α. 20 is one I looked at. Do you want me to continue and go 21 through all of these? Again, I can do that if you would 22 like. 23 Q. So would we find all the orders that you 24 reviewed in your testimony? Were there some in your 25 testimony -- I mean, there were some that you reviewed

1 that you didn't include in your testimony? Well, I was looking for, as an example, one 2 Α. that we just discussed of West Florida Natural Gas 3 4 Corporation with the \$13,481 imbalance. I don't see 5 that on here. Well, that was -- if I could interrupt you. Ι 6 0. 7 am not trying to cut you off, but that was an order where the reserve imbalance was eliminated through 8 9 remaining life, correct? 10 Well, I think, what I thought was -- yes, the Α. conclusion there was that the imbalance was not the 11 result of technological changes. So it reinforced what 12 13 we have been referring to. As I notice here there is a pretty long laundry list of telephone orders here. 14 15 Again, I have not reviewed them, but I would surmise from what I have seen in the ones that I did refer to 16 17 that a lot of that may have been attributed to 18 technological changes or obsolescence. And this particular West Florida case concluded that since it was 19 20 not, they did not propose an accelerated disposition of 21 that deficiency. Okay. Let me ask you to turn to the third 22 Q. 23 page of this exhibit, and I will represent to you that the text that you see under elimination of imbalance, 24 quote, as soon as possible is something that was 25

prepared by our offices, not the Public Service Commission's language. But I would like to ask you is if you looked at these orders, there is a much smaller list of orders, and I would like to ask you if you looked at these orders, Peoples Gas, FPUC, Chesapeake Utilities, FPL, FPUC, Gulf Power, Gulf Telephone, Quincy Telephone, United Telephone, Gulf Telephone. Did you review any of those orders?

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9 Again, without going down through my exhibit Α. 10 and cross-referencing them off the top of my head, I 11 can't say that I have. There is no subject matter here, 12 it's just a docket number and an order number, and I would have to go back. Again, I haven't looked at every 13 14 order. I think we established that quite early on. But 15 I put orders in that I thought were relevant and 16 appropriate. I can't tell, again, from these what the 17 subject matters were, and so I am not sure that I looked 18 at these.

19 Q. Okay. My question from these is whether you 20 encountered any orders where you read language in there 21 that said imbalances were being eliminated as soon as 22 possible. Did you ever encounter that language in any 23 of the orders you looked at?

A. No, not associated with surpluses.

Q. What about with deficiencies?

Α. I do believe that there was cases where that 1 2 was the conclusion. 3 And was the only time where you saw orders Q. with deficiencies and the as soon as possible language 4 5 because it was some kind of a technological change? 6 Α. Principally, yes. When you say principally, does that mean every 7 Q. 8 time, or --9 Α. That is the dominant -- my dominant recollection is that it was largely due to an analysis 10 11 or determination around technological changes. 12 Okay. Did you see any language in there Q. 13 talking about the materiality of the reserve imbalance 14 that was being corrected? 15 Α. No, I don't recall that. Have you ever seen a Public Service Commission 16 0. order addressing a depreciation reserve correction that 17 18 used some sort of materiality threshold? I say as 19 part of the -- I should add as part of the review you 20 did for this docket? 21 A. No, not that I can recall. 22 Okay. Did you look at any orders where there Q. 23 was any -- look at the last page of this exhibit, if you 24 would. Did you look at any orders that discussed 25 intergenerational inequities and the Commission's

1 proposed treatment of reserve imbalances? 2 Specifically these five? Α. Well, I would represent to you that these five 3 Q. orders address or discuss that issue, but I was really 4 asking you if you came across any Commission discussion 5 6 about intergenerational inequity? Yes, I have. I have looked at orders that 7 Α. talk or speak to intergenerational inequities, but it 8 9 may not have been in the context that you are referring to here, that is a reserve imbalance. I think that in 10 11 some Commission actions that it has been appropriate to 12 consider those impacts not just related to reserve 13 imbalances or setting depreciation expense. 14 Well, does SFAS 154 have anything in it that Q. 15 takes into account intergenerational inequity? 16 Α. No, it does not. 17 MR. REHWINKEL: Okay. I know you are going to 18 be sad to hear this, but that was my last question. 19 Thank you. 20 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you. 21 Ms. Bradley, any questions on cross? MS. BRADLEY: I don't think I can touch that. 22 23 No questions. 24 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Moyle. 25 MR. MOYLE: Thank you, Madam Chair. FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	CROSS EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. MOYLE:
3	Q. Good afternoon. I am going to ask you some
4	questions about your testimony. I don't know that I
5	will go into the level of detail that you just went
6	through with Public Counsel, but, nevertheless I want to
7	have a conversation with you.
8	The first thing I want to ask you about is
9	what did you do to tell me about your research that
10	you did to try to figure out what the Commission's
11	policy or practice was.
12	A. Related?
13	Q. Related to dealing with this depreciation
14	variance that we are talking about.
15	A. Well, the first thing I did was look at the
16	direct testimony that was filed by the intervenors, and
17	made sure I had a full and complete understanding as
18	best I could of any regulatory dockets or opinions that
19	they had referred to. And so my purpose, again, of my
20	testimony was really to rebut the presumption that to
21	reserve accumulative depreciation reserves was in
22	conformity with GAAP. So I started with that. And, in
23	addition, I have done quite a considerable amount of
24	research related to the topic of what those generally
25	accepted accounting principles are.

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Did you -- did you make any effort to try to 1 Q. locate Commission orders addressing depreciation 2 variances? 3 Yes. As I said --Α. 4 You looked at the intervenor testimony, right? 5 Q. Yes. And based on discussions with counsel 6 Α. 7 and our internal regulatory people with their assistance, looked at orders that, again, I provided as 8 an exhibit that I thought were relevant to the topic. 9 Okay. So you didn't -- you know, lawyers 10 ο. sometimes they have got these computer programs, West 11 Law and Nexus and you can go, you know, type in and see 12 13 what you can find. You didn't do any kind of 14 independent computer research to try to locate Commission orders dealing with this depreciation 15 16 variance issue, did you? My focus was principally on what 17 Α. No. transpired here and was in the state of Florida. 18 19 And how about with respect -- that same Q. 20 question with respect to the state of Florida, did you do any independent research with respect to Commission 21 orders related to this issue in the state of Florida, 22 23 other than look at the orders that might have been 24 provided or cited by witnesses for the intervenors? 25 Again, the ones that I thought were relevant I Α.

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1 provided as my exhibit. Okay. But those were provided to you, right, 2 Q. you didn't independently come up with those? 3 When you say provided to me, some of those I 4 Α. 5 did have some previous knowledge of, some of them, yes, 6 were provided to me. I guess why I'm asking the question, because 7 Ο. if I read your testimony, you state on Page 3, Line 21, 8 quote, the Commission's long-standing policy is, in 9 fact, to apply the average remaining life methodology to 10 11 resolve reserve variances, correct? 12 Α. Yes. And then if I look at this Exhibit 316 that 13 **Q**. 14 Public Counsel handed out to you, that seems to suggest that the Commission has done things other than applying 15 the average remaining life methodology to resolve 16 reserve variances, correct? 17 18 Yes. And I would contend that many of Α. 19 those -- again, I haven't reviewed all of these that were on this exhibit, but --20 21 **Q**. I'm sorry? I haven't reviewed all the ones on this 22 Α. exhibit, but the ones that I reviewed it appeared to me 23 24 that the policy or at least the intent to address the reserve imbalance was one really associated with 25 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 minimizing future revenue requirement impacts. And what I mean by that is that to the extent that there were 2 deficiencies like in the telecom examples where there 3 was technological change and perhaps the assets had not 4 5 been yet fully recovered, that some accelerated amortization of that or, for that matter, if there were 6 assets that were no longer providing service, and, 7 therefore, appropriate capital recovery was necessary. 8 9 But it seemed to me that the principal motivation was to minimize future revenue requirements as opposed to the 10 11 proposals that we are looking at here. Let me refer you to the second page of OPC's 12 Ο. 13 exhibit that has been marked as 316. 14 Α. Yes. Do you see at the bottom there appears to 15 Q. eight orders dealing with electric companies? 16 17 Α. Yes. Okay. How many of those did you review? 18 Q. 19 Again, I haven't cross-referenced which ones Α. 20 of those, sir, are contained in my exhibit, but I would 21 be glad to do that if you think that is necessary. If we can look at them in the record, I won't 22 Q. 23 take the time to do it. You would recall if you 24 reviewed all of these, would you not? 25 Α. Probably more so if there was some topical

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1 information there besides -- I haven't memorized the order numbers and dates and docket numbers. 2 3 If you stay around here long enough that is Q. 4 what you start doing. 5 Α. That's what happens. 6 I'm kidding. Have you ever heard of the Q. 7 saying as a general proposition that you try to accelerate depreciation and defer taxes as an accounting 8 9 rule of thumb, have you ever heard that? 10 No, I can't say that I have. In the context Α. 11 of --12 Q. Of running a business. I have always been 13 under the impression that accelerating depreciation is a 14 positive thing for a business because it allows the 15 business to recover its capital sooner rather than 16 later. 17 No, I'm not familiar with that. Α. 18 Q. Are you aware that sometimes, you know, 19 policies are enacted where depreciation is accelerated 20 as a stimulus mechanism? 21 Ά. For tax purposes? 22 Q. Yes, sir. 23 Yes, but that doesn't mean for book purposes Α. 24 we then follow the same accelerated method. 25 Q. Okay. We spent a lot of time, and I think we FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 got into retroactive ratemaking, and I just wanted to 2 make sure that I am looking at this clearly. I mean, 3 this is really about how best to address an imbalance 4 that happens to be on the positive side, correct, a 5 depreciation imbalance? No, I think it is broader than that. I think 6 Α. 7 it is really a question of the appropriate way to 8 recover the company's investments in its plant, and, in 9 fact, doing it in a way that satisfies GAAP on the one 10 hand, but also provides for the matching of recovery of 11 those assets over the period those assets are used to 12 provide service to our customers. 13 So, that is at a little bit of a higher level? Q. 14 Α. Yes. 15 And then because the company -- the actual Q. 16 lives of certain units are longer than originally 17 projected, you have this surplus, right, in essence? 18 On a theoretical basis. Α. 19 Okay. And it is not a pile of money in a bank Q. 20 account, but it is a theoretical surplus, correct? 21 Yes. It is, again, theoretical. Α. 22 Q. Okay. So now the question becomes, okay, how 23 do you address it. How do you try to address the 24 imbalance, isn't that right? That is sort of what this 25 Commission is being asked to do?

I think they are being asked to do that. 1 Τ Α. 2 think they -- as I said in my opening comments, that I 3 think it is important to understand what is driving that, and a significant portion of our reserve surplus 4 associated with the theoretical calculation is 5 6 attributed to plant, production plant. 7 · O. Yes. It's something like 73 percent. 8 Α. Right. Which clearly there have been 9 significant investments placed in those assets that have 10 allowed us to increase, or certainly that and the 11 operating experience we have had with those plants to 12 increase those useful lives; and, therefore, we are 13 doing nothing more than matching the expense associated 14 with the use of those assets over their remaining lives. 15 0. I think we are on the same page, but I just 16 want to make sure that we are clear. The plants have 17 longer lives; therefore, we have a theoretical 18 imbalance. Now the question is what do we do about it 19 in effect. And the Commission, doesn't it have a couple 20 of options before it? One, it can follow the approach 21 that you are recommending, which is let that be 22 amortized over the remaining life of the asset, correct? 23 Α. Yes. 24 Okay. It can follow an approach that my Q. 25 clients and others are recommending, which is, no, that

1 is too long, amortize it over a shorter period of time, 2 correct? 3 Yes, that is your proposal. Α. 4 Okay. Or I guess another option is, you know, 0. 5 maybe they could -- they could punt, but I don't think 6 that is on the table today, correct? 7 Actually they really could do nothing in the Α. sense that there is really -- absent the alternative 8 9 proposals there is no need to do anything. The recovery 10 of these investments over the remaining useful lives 11 seems to me an appropriate matching recognition of that expense over the period that consumers will benefit, 12 13 customers will benefit. 14 Haven't we agreed that as a matter of good Q. 15 public policy that you should take some action to 16 correct an imbalance? It is not a good public policy to 17 kind of look the other way? 18Α. No, I don't think we have agreed on that. Ι 19 went through considerable cross about the fact that this 20 is unprecedented, I think, in terms of the size, the degree of it, and I trust that the Commission will take 21 22 the implications of that quite seriously. 23 Would you recommend that they leave the 0. 24 decision to adjust the reserve for the future, punt? 25 Α. It's not punting. It treats current customers FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	and future customers equitably. It allows the company
2	to recover no more, no less than the net book value of
3	our plant over its remaining useful life.
4	Q. Do you believe this is a material imbalance?
5	A. No, I do not.
6	Q. You do not?
7	A. Not in the context of adjusting what is being
8	recommended in terms of corrective action.
9	Q. What is your definition of materiality?
10	A. I think it all it depends on understanding
11	what the drivers are of what is creating the surplus or
12	deficit, depending upon what the theoretical calculation
13	yields. So I can't give you a magical threshold number.
14	I think it depends on what is creating it.
15	Q. So it is your testimony, just so I am clear,
16	that, you know, an accountant, you had used the term
17	bean counter and different things, but you are saying
18	that you can't give me a definition of materiality as it
19	relates to the quantification or magnitude of a number
20	in the financial outlook that you have to then go behind
21	that and figure out, well, what is the cause of that
22	number, is that your testimony?
23	A. No, I thought what you were asking me maybe
24	I misunderstood your question. I thought you were
25	asking about a materiality threshold that would require

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some response, some need to disposition the theoretical 1 2 variance. I can say that my testimony here today is 3 that the proposals that are before us are clearly material, 648 or \$46 million accumulated depreciation 5 reserve adjustment is material.

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Wouldn't you also consider a variance with 0. respect to your depreciation look that is 15 percent or greater to be a material variance?

9 No. Again, I don't have a magic threshold. Α. Ι 10 really think perhaps a different way to think about it 11 is to look at the effects that these proposals would 12 have, one, on rate base, but also the effects on our 13 depreciation expense levels. I can clearly state that 14 the proposals before us are material to depreciation 15 levels. We have today with no changes in depreciation 16rates, our depreciation levels are around \$346 million. 17 We have proposed that that would go up as a result 18 principally of investments, some \$2-1/2 billion of 19 investments since 2007.

20 It seems to me that I can draw a conclusion 21 that taking depreciation levels below the current levels 22 would suggest there is no provision being made for 23 recovery of incremental investment. That I think I can 24 draw the conclusion if I have invested \$2-1/2 billion 25 and what is before us is to reduce depreciation expense

1	below current levels dramatically, that seems material
2	to me. So from that perspective I would I would
3	start to be concerned.
4	Q. Anything else?
5	A. No.
6	Q. You have been here a little while. You are
7	aware that the Commission has a practice of trying to
8	get a yes or no answer followed by an explanation?
9	A. Yes, I am.
10	Q. Okay. And would you try to adhere to that
11	practice, please?
12	A. Yes, I will.
13	Q. Let me let me go back to this exhibit. Do
14	you still have that exhibit that was referred to as
15	Exhibit Number 311? It is the excerpt from the public
16	utility depreciation practices?
17	A. Yes, I have it here.
18	Q. Okay. And the last paragraph, I am just going
19	to read it into the record. I think it will be easier
20	to reference. If says, "Whereas, the judgment of
21	materiality is subjective, if further analysis confirms
22	a material imbalance, one, it should make immediate
23	depreciation accrual adjustments. The use of an annual
24	amortization over a short period of time or the setting
25	of depreciation rates using the remaining life technique

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1 are two of the most common options for eliminating the 2 imbalance. The size of the plant account, the reserve 3 ratio, the account remaining life, the technology of the 4 plant, and the account -- and the account reserve 5 imbalance in relationship to the account annual accrual 6 all have a bearing on the chosen course of action." Do 7 you know that these NARUC guidelines are provided to 8 utility regulators around the country? 9 Α. Yes, I would assume they are. 10 Q. Okay. Have you ever been to a NARUC meeting? 11 Α. Yes, I have. 12 And you would agree that it is where utility Q. 13 regulators, such as these Commissioners and others, come 14 and gather and have seminars and discussions about best 15 practices and have breakout sessions on things like 16 depreciation, correct? 17 Α. Yes. 18 Q. Okay. And you don't -- you don't believe that 19 what is set forth in the paragraph that I just read is 20 not NARUC's words, they are not part of this study, do 21 you? 22 Α. No, I don't doubt that this is part of that 23 study. 24 Okay. And the way I am reading this is it Ο. 25 says a couple of things. Number one, that the judgment FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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1	on materiality is subjective, would you agree with that?
2	A. Yes, I would.
3	${f Q}$. Okay. And then it says if you do have a
4	material imbalance, then there is a couple of things you
5	can do. One is to use the annual amortization over a
6	short period of time, correct?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. And that is what my clients are proposing,
9	correct?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q . Or, two, is setting the depreciation rates
12	using the remaining life technique. That is what you
13	are proposing, correct?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Okay. So you would agree that the judgment
16	about materiality ultimately has to be made by this
17	Commission, correct?
18	A. Yes, I do.
19	${f Q}$. Okay. And they can take into consideration a
20	lot of things. They have a lot of information and
21	evidence before them in making their judgment, correct?
22	A. Yes.
23	${f Q}$. Your testimony, the testimony of other expert
24	witnesses, correct?
25	A. Yes, that is correct.
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1	Q. Okay. You also are aware that our state is in
2	the middle of what some people are calling the great
3	recession, correct?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Okay. And if the action urged by my clients
6	is adopted by this Commission, there is not going to be
7	a refund. I mean, we are talking about this account,
8	this theoretical reserve account. You have said I
9	think we have established there is not a pot of money in
10	an account, correct?
11	MR. WALLS: I am going to object to the form
12	of the question.
13	THE WITNESS: No, I don't think that is
14	correct.
15	BY MR. MOYLE:
16	Q. I thought I thought we had just established
17	a little while ago that the theoretical reserve
18	imbalance, you know, my clients are saying it is a
19	surplus, that it is not it is not an account with a
20	pot of money in it, correct?
21	A. That I would agree.
22	Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure we are
23	clear. When we talk about a flowback, we are not
24	talking about refunds being issued to people, you know,
25	we are not asking that checks be written and say here is
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some money that relates to depreciation that is being 1 provided back to you, correct? 2 I think we are proposing, or the 3 Α. No. intervenors are proposing, excuse me, that revenue 4 requirements clearly are being reduced; and, therefore, 5 6 I assume that would impact what prices are ultimately 7 paid by customers. I think we are on the same page. I just want 8 0. 9 to make clear that the impact of my clients' proposal is 10 simply to reduce the revenue requirements. You are in 11 asking for half a billion dollars, correct? 12 Yes, I believe that is the correct number. Α. 13 Okay. So if the depreciation position urged Q. 14 by my clients was adopted, the number would be less as 15 compared to the number if your position was adopted, 16 correct? 17 Α. It would be -- yes, it would be lower in the 18 near term. 19 Q. Okay. 20 Α. But not in the long-term. 21 Q. But there is not a process where you would 22 have to go and issue refund checks, correct, it would 23 just be a rate adjustment? 24 It would be part of revenue requirements and Α. 25 ultimately embedded in rates.

Okay. Were you here when Mr. Dolan testified 1 Q. on rebuttal? 2 A. Not for all of it. 3 Did you hear him talk about how he viewed the 4 0. depreciation issue as a pay me now or pay me later 5 6 proposition? Yes, I did. 7 Α. Okay. And do you agree with that -- with that 8 Q. 9 characterization of it in broad general terms? 10 Yes, I do. Α. Okay. And given that -- my recollection of 11 Q. 12 the pay me now, pay me later was the old Midas commercial where there was a car, and a guy coming in, 13 14 and it was about hurrying up and getting your muffler 15 changed or something. But isn't really the pay me now 16 or pay me later proposition, isn't that an offer as to 17 when you want to make a payment, again, in general 18 terms? 19 MR. WALLS: I'm going to object. 20 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I don't follow. 21 **COMMISSIONER EDGAR:** You were going to object 22 on what? I didn't catch --23 MR. WALLS: I was going to object that it was 24 vague and ambiguous, but the witness said he didn't 25 follow, so --

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COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Moyle, would you like 1 2 to try again? MR. MOYLE: I will try again. 3 BY MR. MOYLE: 4 Couldn't we agree -- you have heard the term 5 ο. 6 pay me now or pay me later? Yes, I have. 7 Α. Okay. And doesn't that mean that ultimately 8 Q. 9 somebody -- you know, if you said to me, Mr. Moyle, you 10 have to pay me now or pay me later. You know, 11 essentially that would mean, okay, well, my choices are, 12 you know, pay you now or pay you down the road in 13 essence, correct? 14Α. Yes. 15 Q. Okay. 16 Α. That's what I think pay me now or pay me later 17 would mean. 18 Q. And if that was a choice and an option 19 provided to me, you know, in theory I should have the 20 ability to choose which I would like to do, either pay 21 you now or pay you later, correct? 22 Α. Yes. I just don't see the relevance in terms 23 of establishing depreciation policy where it seems to me 24 the axiom is that we are trying to match depreciation 25 expense over future lives, not change them arbitrarily ,

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to accommodate some pay me now or pay me later 1 2 proposition. Well, let me see if I can help you on that. 3 Q. If that is an option that I have and my clients have, I 4 think they have clearly said they would rather pay you 5 later rather than pay you now. You would agree with 6 7 that, correct? I think that is what they have said. 8 Α. Okay. And the relevancy of it, the question I 9 0. asked you about the great recession, is you are aware of 10 things like disposable income being down, businesses 11 laying off -- laying off people, unemployment in the 12 13 state being at very high levels, correct? 14 Yes, I am generally aware of the state of the Α. 15 Florida economy. 16 And so given the current state, which we know, Q. 17 and the state that may occur in four years, isn't that 18 when the pay me later would come due, four years from 19 now? 20 That would be the most -- yes, the most, the Α. 21 earliest period under your proposal. 22 So the earliest that the pay me later would Q. 23 come due would be four years. You know, there is a 24 decent chance that the economy may be improved four 25 years from now as compared to today, correct?

It may. And, again, I don't see how the 1 Α. economy affects how one views determining depreciation 2 recovery when -- I don't know of any principle there, if 3 you will, that points to the state of the economy as a 4 guiding light for determining depreciation levels. 5 And it may not be in a GAAP principle, but you 6 Q. would agree, would you not, that this Commission when 7 making judgments about setting rates is able to consider 8 9 things like the state of the economy? 10 Clearly in terms of setting cost of service, Α. 11 absolutely. I am referring more to as I provided 12 rebuttal testimony, I didn't find any example where the 13 state of the economy was an element of consideration 14 relative to establishing depreciation recovery level. 15You are not aware of anything that prohibits Q. 16 the consideration of the state of the economy, are you? 17 Α. As negative assurance, no, I'm not aware of 18 anything. 19 0. Okay. And you had talked about, you know, different circumstances. The Florida Power and Light 20 21 case that you cite, I think the circumstances there were 22 maybe there was merchant plants that are on the horizon, 23 so we are going to make an adjustment on depreciation 24 related to the possibility of merchant plants coming 25 into the picture, correct?

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Yes, I believe it was an issue around stranded Α. 1 cost-recovery, and I don't think that in the 2 circumstances that we are dealing with here we are 3 dealing with stranded cost-recovery. I think we are 4 dealing with the reduction of existing accumulated 5 depreciation reserves or a surplus. 6 Yes, sir. And the point I am simply trying to 7 **Q**. draw is there are no rules with respect to merchant 8 plants and the advent of competition in the electric 9 10 industry that would drive a decision on depreciation, 11 correct? 12 Α. Again, I'm not sure I follow your --13 The Commission -- you reference an order, the Q. 14 FPL order, and part of it was, well, there was merchant 15 plants on the horizon, we are going to allow the 16 depreciation to be accelerated, correct? 17 Yes, that is my understanding. Α. 18 0. Okay. And there is no GAAP provision or any 19 kind of rule or regulation that talks to the factual 20 circumstance of merchant plants being on the horizon as 21 a reason for accelerating depreciation, correct? 22 No, there is no -- there is no GAAP basis that Α. 23 deals with deregulation in the context that you are 24 talking about, but I think we were straying a little off 25 of the principles around how to deal with changes in FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

estimates in the context of setting depreciation levels. 1 And I want to -- I'm going to get to the nuts 2 Q. and bolts of the depreciation, but I am just trying to 3 get you to agree -- I am suggesting that the state of 4 the economy today is the equivalent of the prospect of 5 merchant plants on the horizon many years ago when the 6 FPL decision was rendered. Do you understand and can 7 8 you agree with that? MR. WALLS: Objection, asked and answered. 9 10 This is cumulative. 11 MR. MOYLE: I think it was asked. I'm not sure that I got an answer. 12 **MR. WALLS:** T believe the witness has answered 13 14 several questions about what the Commission can take 15 into account with respect to the economy. 16 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: To the witness, do you 17 have anything else to expand upon the subject that you 18 were discussing with Mr. Moyle? 19 THE WITNESS: No, I don't. Again, just real 20 quickly on -- I will say, again, I think --21 MR. MOYLE: So that would be a yes, but go 22 ahead. 23 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm sorry. I rethought 24 that because I do think -- because just with due respect 25 to the Commission, the notion of recovering stranded

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costs, and I am just struggling with the connection 1 between recognition that there may be investment that is 2 stranded in a competitive market and the analogizing 3 that to an economic climate that looks to essentially 4 the reverse and says, oh, I want to increase the rate 5 base, or increase rate base or investment in the near 6 term at the expense of future customers just strikes me 7 as not consistent with standard practices around 8 9 depreciation. 10 MR. MOYLE: Okay. COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Moyle. 11 12 MR. MOYLE: If I can follow up on that? 13 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: You may. 14 BY MR. MOYLE: 15 Q. We are the customers, correct? 16 Α. Yes. 17 And we are saying we would rather take the Q. 18 accelerated amortization, correct? 19 Α. Yes, that is your proposal. 20 And the merchant plant example that I am Q. 21 using, I am trying to just simply draw a relationship 22 between merchant plants and the economy, and that both 23 of them at a particular point in time presented factors 24 that are worthy of consideration. Can we agree with 25 that?

Yes. 1 Α. Okay. And, indeed, with respect to the 2 Ο. economy, we know as a factual matter that the economy is 3 in bad shape currently in Florida, correct? 4 Yes, the state of the economy is poor. 5 Α. Okay. And with respect to the information 6 ο. that prompted the Commission to make a decision back in 7 the FPL case, the stranded assets, that never came to 8 9 be, did it, because competition and merchant plants 10 never really got a foothold in Florida, correct? 11 That is correct. Α. 12 Just a couple more questions. I mean, with Q. 13 respect to -- I think we have covered this, but just to 14 make sure. The other expert witnesses, you don't -- you 15 don't question their expert qualifications, you just 16 question their judgments, isn't that right? 17 Α. No, I don't question -- maybe you should 18 rephrase that. 19 Sure. Like Mr. Pous, Mr. Pollock, you know, Q. 20 any of the other experts that have provided testimony, 21 you are not -- you are not questioning their -- their 22 expert qualifications to provide an opinion to this 23 Commission, are you? 24 No, I'm not questioning their qualifications. Α. 25 Okay. All right. And, indeed, this is the Q. FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	first time you have rendered testimony on depreciation
2	before before a Commission, correct?
3	A. Yes, we have established that other than in
4	the context of setting overall revenue requirements for
5	the utility.
6	${f Q}$. And you are also aware that this Commission is
7	being asked to set fair, just, and reasonable rates,
8	correct?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And judgments with respect to fair, just, and
11	reasonable, those may not be easy decisions, correct?
12	A. No doubt.
13	Q. And you have to weigh a lot of factors,
14	correct?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Would you agree that if it is a close call
17	that the benefit of the doubt ought to go in favor of
18	the consumer in these economic times?
19	A. I don't have an opinion on that.
20	Q . Page 14, Line 10.
21	A. Yes, I am there.
22	Q. I understand the point that you are trying to
23	make here is that it is difficult to, you know, to hit
24	it right on the mark with respect to estimating
25	depreciation variances, is that correct?
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1	A. Yes, they are inherently dependent on
2	significant estimates.
3	Q. And you had indicated, well, Mr. Pous, he says
4	take \$161 million per year, isn't that right, that is
5	his recommendation?
6	A. Yes, it is.
7	Q . Okay. And Mr. Pollock is at 100 million a
8	year, right?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Okay. So you would presumably prefer Mr.
11	Pollock over Mr. Pous, is that right, in terms of the
12	relative positions?
13	A. No, I
14	Q. You prefer your position is Position A.
15	Mr. Pollock is Position B?
16	A. I didn't rank them.
17	Q. Okay. Would that generally be fair?
18	A. Again, in terms of the order of magnitude, the
19	impact, yes, your proposal is not as significant as the
20	proposal by OPC.
21	Q. And to the point about that I thought you
22	were making in criticizing Mr. Pous by saying, well, you
23	know, the 161, you know, may not be the right number,
24	that there is no variability in there. One way if
25	that were a concern of the Commission, one way they
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could deal with that would be to say, okay, well, let's 1 do 150 million, that gives you a little more 2 variability. That would be a possible approach, would 3 it not? 4 I don't want to speculate how the Commission 5 Α. 6 would view that. You also have a little bit in your testimony 7 Q. 8 about the depreciation study. You are the main person 9 from Progress Energy Florida that was responsible for 10 getting this depreciation study done, is that right? 11 Yes, in that I engaged Earl Robinson to Α. 12 perform that study, yes. 13 Q. Okay. And then just so I am clear, 14Mr. Crisp yesterday testified, and he is running the 15 plants and on the ground. You took some information 16 that he provided and gave to it Mr. Robinson, is that 17 right? I say you, I'm talking about the company. 18 No, I did not provide that information to Α. 19 Mr. Robinson. Mr. Robinson sought that out through his, 20 if you will, field work, his interviewing of our company 21 management to solicit that information. 22 Q. Okay. You were here when Mr. Crisp testified 23 yesterday? 24 Α. Yes, I was. 25 Q. Okay. He said he wasn't a depreciation FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 expert, correct? Yes, I believe he did say that. 2 Α. Okay. So to the extent that there is a 3 Q. question about a service life, you would tend to rely, 4 would you not, on the information in the study that was 5 put together by Mr. Robinson, your expert depreciation 6 7 witness? 8 MR. WALLS: Let me object to this line of 9 questioning. This is way beyond the scope of rebuttal. He is now asking him about Mr. Crisp's testimony. 10 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Moyle, how does this 11 12 tie to this witness' rebuttal prefiled testimony? 13 MR. MOYLE: I hope to be able to show you in a 14minute as a foundation question. 15 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Now would probably be 16 better. 17 MR. MOYLE: He has an exhibit attached that 18 has the lives of the units. It's WG-2, I believe, and 19 deals with comparison of the plant dates. He made that 20 correction on it earlier and talks about prior study, 21 current study. 22 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I recall. And that ties 23 to your question in his rebuttal how? 24 MR. MOYLE: I'm trying to understand his 25 chart, the information on his chart relative to

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information that may have been provided in other 1 context. 2 MR. WALLS: Well, maybe we can ask about the 3 chart instead of Mr. Crisp's testimony. 4 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Moyle, can you phrase 5 it in that context related directly to the chart before 6 7 us? MR. MOYLE: Sure. 8 9 BY MR. MOYLE: Is the information contained on this chart 10 0. 11 true and accurate? 12 Α. Yes. 13 So, if I had a question about, well, what is Q. the best information to get to average service life, I 14 15 would look at your chart, is that right? 16 Α. No. Again, I corrected this --17 I'm sorry, the service life? Q. 18 -- average service life. Α. 19 Okay. Is the service life on this chart the Q. 20 same as the estimated service life, do you know? 21 It is the estimated service life, yes. Α. 22 Okay. So where did this information come from Q. 23 that is on WG-2?24 It is basically -- oh, I gave that back. Α. I'm 25 sorry. The exhibit that Mr. Crisp provided, I think we FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

talked about this exhibit earlier that had the possible 1 retirement dates that were determined by system 2 planning. I'm sorry, I don't have the exhibit number, 3 and I gave that copy back. It merely takes the 4 estimated retirement date and compares it to the 5 original in-service date to arrive at a service life. 6 So, if Mr. Crisp said in his rebuttal 7 Q. testimony on Page 4, Line 12, that the estimated service 8 life for the Anclote oil steam units is an average of 46 9 10 years, I would be better off relying on the information 11 contained in your exhibit, would I not, that references 12 the current study, which says it is 48 years, isn't that 13 correct? 14 No. This is -- the in-service year could very Α. 15 well be the first unit that went into service and the

16 information you have perhaps averages the service dates. 17 So this in-service period, I just merely went back to 18 the first date that Anclote appeared as an operating 19 plant. So, for example, Crystal River 1 and 2, that is 20 not the in-service date for Unit 2, it is the in-service 21 date for Unit 1.

Q. It struck me as a little unusual, because I think one of our experts had said 50 years was the average service life for Anclote, and if I am reading your chart correctly, it suggests 48 years, whereas, Mr.

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Crisp in his rebuttal testimony said 46 years. 1 MR. WALLS: Objection, mischaracterization of 2 3 his testimony. MR. MOYLE: Of whose testimony? 4 MR. WALLS: Mr. Garrett just explained that he 5 went back to the first year of the unit and didn't do an 6 7 average and Mr. Crisp did an average. COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Moyle? 8 9 MR. MOYLE: Well, I guess I am confused, because I thought we were doing apples-to-apples with 10 the average service lives, but I guess you're saying, 11 well, that was struck, so that's now --12 13 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I thought that it was not 14 average. 15 MR. WALLS: The witness just told you he 16 didn't average them. He went back to the first unit 17 in-service date when he prepared his chart. That is my 18 point. 19 MR. MOYLE: Okay. Well, I don't --20 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: What I would say, 21 Mr. Moyle, is we want you to get the answers to the 22 questions, and maybe you are not the only one that is 23 confused about what is on the chart. But, if you could, you know, repose the question, and let's try to see if 24 25 he can give the answers.

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1	MR. MOYLE: Okay.
2	BY MR. MOYLE:
3	Q . And I will ask it in an open-ended way, which
4	they tell you in law school not to do, but your chart
5	lists for these units, and it references a study. For
6	Anclote it lists the number 48, which I found in
7	Mr. Crisp's testimony at 46. For Crystal River Units 1
8	and 2, it lists 53, and in your chart you have 54. And
9	for Crystal for your reference, that is on Page 4 of
10	Mr. Crisp. And then 4 and 5, your chart list 53 years,
11	whereas Mr. Crisp said 52 years. Can you help me
12	reconcile the difference in those numbers?
13	A. Yes. Again, I think Mr. Crisp's information
14	is averaging the in-service date for the units to arrive
15	at this service life. I think what I am using it for
16	here is as support for why in the theoretical reserve
17	calculation it is not surprising to see that 73 percent
18	of that is attributed to production plants when I go
19	over and look at Exhibit WG~2 and see that there have
20	been on balance extensions of lives. What is relevant
21	to Mr. Robinson's study is the terminal date, which I
22	think you will find there is consistency there between
23	what Mr. Crisp provided and what I have here on the
24	schedule.
25	Q. Thank you. The schedule that you have,

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1 because we had talked earlier about, well, it is 2 important to find out what caused the depreciation 3 imbalance, right? 4 Α. Yes. Doesn't this schedule reflect that the major 5 ο. 6 cause of this has been the underestimate of the average 7 service life of the generating units? 8 Α. Underestimated? From the original point in time when they made 9 Q. an estimate, and the estimate turned out to be shorter 10 11 than in actuality the plants are able to provide as a 12 general rule of thumb, correct? 13 Yes, it does show that those service lives Α. 14 have increased since the previous study, but as I have 15 mentioned previously in my opening comments and as we 16 have talked through this, that is not surprising given the level of investment that has been made in those 17 18 assets, as well. That impact was considered, as I understand Mr. Crisp's testimony, in his integrated 19 20 resource planning. I did a quick calculation on this chart, and 21 Q. 22 it looked to me like there was an additional 98 years 23 over on the last column, increase/decrease in average

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service life. Should we strike average off that, too?

That is what I think we did, right?

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A. Yes, we did.

Q. So increase/decrease in service life, and there is a lot more years, positive years than negative years, correct?

A. Yes, there are.

Q. And if you were going to look at this and try to draw a conclusion about a trend, I mean, my numbers were 98 positive years and ten negative years, so that the net effect was an additional 88 years in the life of plant. Would it be a fair conclusion or inference to draw that looking at it historically that the judgment that was initially made with respect to depreciation as a whole came up on the light side, came up short?

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A. No, I wouldn't draw that conclusion from that.

Q. And that was because some of them -- some of them went the other way? Why would you not draw that conclusion?

Well, because these were done at different 18 Α. 19 points in time. The current terminal dates are based on, as I think we have gone over with Mr. Crisp, his 20 integrated resource planning process that takes into 21 22 consideration the most current assumptions that we know. Clearly, those assumptions could have changed from the 23 24 previous date the study was done. That is all that that 25 tells me.

Okay. And you would agree with me that 1 Q. depreciation is, in effect, a theoretical concept, 2 3 correct? No, I don't think it is a theoretical concept. Α. 4 I think it is a well-founded principle of matching the 5 utilization of assets over their useful -- or 6 recognition of expense over the useful life of the given 7 8 property. Okay. That is a concept, is that right? 9 Q. I don't know if that is concept, but maybe we 10 A. are just talking past each other. 11 12 Maybe we are. Q. MR. MOYLE: I appreciate your patience. I am 13 learning depreciation, and thank you for spending some 1415 time with me. That's all. 16 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you. 17 Mr. LaVia? MR. LaVIA: No questions, Madam Chair. 18 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: No questions. Are there 19 20 questions from staff? 21 MS. KLANCKE: There are. 22 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Okay. 23 CROSS EXAMINATION 24 BY MS. KLANCKE: 25 Good evening. Mr. Garrett, I'm Caroline Q.

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1	Klancke for Commission staff.
2	If you would turn back to Page 13 of your
3	rebuttal testimony.
4	A. Yes, I'm there.
5	Q. And in particular, on Lines 3 through 10, you
6	had previously discussed with Mr. Rehwinkel your
7	statement on this page with respect to the company's
8	2002 rate case that ended in a settlement, do you recall
9	that?
10	A. Yes, I do.
11	Q. And on Lines 6 through 7, in particular, you
12	discuss your statement that, quote, the Commission
13	approved the company's depreciation rates and, again,
14	found that the stipulation established rates that are
15	fair, just, and reasonable, do you see that?
16	A. Yes, I do.
17	Q. And you had also discussed with Mr. Rehwinkel
18	that that 2002 settlement allowed PEF to reduce
19	depreciation expense by \$62.5 million each year of the
20	stipulation with the ability to reverse all or part of
21	that amount. Do you recall that?
22	A. Yes, I do.
23	Q . Are you aware that as part of that 2002
24	settlement the depreciation rates prescribed in Docket
25	Number 971570, or what are here referred to as the 1997
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1 depreciation study, did not change? 2 Α. No, I was not aware of that. 3 Q. Well, are you aware that the Commission did 4 not, in fact, approve the company's depreciation rates 5 in the 2002 settlement, but, rather, it merely continued 6 the depreciation rates prescribed in the 1997 study? 7 A. Could you rephrase that or ask that again, 8 please? 9 Certainly. You reference the 2002 settlement Ο. 10 in your rebuttal testimony. I'm asking if you are aware that this Commission did not, in fact, approve the 11 12 company's depreciation rates in that 2002 settlement, 13 but, rather, in that settlement it merely continued the 14 depreciation rates that were prescribed in the 1997 15 study? 16 Α. Yes, it does say that on Page 18 of the 17 settlement document. 18 Switching gears, would you agree, basically, Q. 19 that the remaining life depreciation rate formula 20 measures the amount remaining to be recovered divided by 21 the number of years left in which to recover, is that 22 correct? 23 Α. Yes, I would agree with that. 24 **Q**. And the measurement of the amount remaining to 25 be recovered involves the reserve, is that correct? FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	A. Yes.									
2	Q. The relative adequacy of the reserve causes									
3	the remaining life depreciation rate formula to									
4	self-adjust, is that correct?									
5	A. Yes, I would agree with that.									
6	Q. So, if there is a reserve surplus, the									
7	depreciation rate would naturally be lower than it would									
8	be otherwise than it would otherwise be because a									
9	lesser amount is needed to be recovered in the future,									
10	is that correct?									
11	A. Yes, I would agree with that. In fact, we									
12	have quantified what we think that benefit is and									
13	provided it as an exhibit in my rebuttal testimony.									
14	Q. Certainly, and we will discuss that in a									
15	little more depth later. If the remaining life rates									
16	essentially correct the reserve over the average									
17	remaining life, do you consider this to be retroactive									
18	ratemaking?									
19	A. No, I do not.									
20	Q. Why do you not?									
21	A. Because the adoption of the depreciation									
22	parameters in this case where you talk about the average									
23	remaining life is recognizing those changes in estimates									
24	over a prospective period, over a future period.									
25	Q. I would like you to refer now to Page 30 of									
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1	your testimony.								
2	A. Page 30?								
3	Q. Page 30.								
4	A. I am there.								
5	Q. In particular, in your rebuttal testimony on								
6	Page 30 in Lines 3 through 5. Here you state that it is								
7	not unusual for the Commission to establish accelerated								
8	amortization schedules to address equipment or								
9	facilities specific reserve issues. Is that a fair								
10	encapsulation of what you discussed in those lines?								
11	A. Yes, it is.								
12	${f Q}$. If the amortization period matches the								
13	remaining service period of the related assets, would								
14	you characterize this as an accelerated amortization?								
15	A. I want to make sure I want to try to repeat								
16	that, if I could. If we if we depreciate the assets								
17	over their remaining useful life, is that accelerated.								
18	Maybe you should reask or rephrase that.								
19	Q. I can rephrase.								
20	A. Yes.								
21	Q. In this portion of your testimony you discuss								
22	how it is not unusual for this Commission to establish								
23	accelerated amortization schedules to address equipment								
24	or facilities specific reserve issues. Do you see that								
25	at the top of the page?								

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1	A. Yes, I do.								
2	${f Q}$. Thus, if the amortization period matches the								
3	remaining service period of the related assets, would								
4	this constitute or would you characterize this as								
5	accelerated amortization?								
6	A. No, I don't think I would.								
7	Q. Why is that?								
8	A. Well, if I understand what you are asking, if								
9	I am taking the net plant balance we talked earlier								
10	about that under the average remaining life it takes								
11	into consideration the initial investment in plant, the								
12	accumulated recoveries of that plant and recovers it								
13	over the remaining useful life, or the remaining service								
14	life. Then it seems to follow, then, that that is not								
15	an accelerated amortization. We are merely matching								
16	that expense over the period in which those assets will								
17	provide service.								
18	Q. I would like you to look a little further down								
19	on this page on Lines 17 through 18.								
20	A. Yes, I'm there.								
21	Q. In these lines you quote well, a little bit								
22	before that, in Lines 15 through 18, you quote from								
23	Order Number PSC-93-1839-FOF-EI, and in particular you								
24	assert that the quoted statement is the Commission								
25	staff's position, not the Commission's itself. Do you								
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1 see that? 2 Α. Yes, I do. Are you aware that on Page 4 of this order, 3 Q. the Commission ordered the corrective reserve transfers? 4 5 Α. Yes. 6 Now, Mr. Garrett, I know that you have Ο. previously stated that you are not a lawyer, and I'm not 7 asking you for a legal conclusion, but since the 8 9 Commission ordered the corrective reserve transfers in this order that you quote, the same transfers that you 10 11 characterize as merely, quote, the opinion of the 12 Commission staff at the time, end quote, wouldn't this 13 order imply that the Commission held the same position? 14 Yes, as it relates to the practice of reserve Α. 15 transfers, I would agree with that. 16 On the same page you go on to say, in Lines 18 Q. 17 through 23, that the Commission did not order a change 18 in customer rates as a means to correct reserve 19 variance. Do you see that? 20 Yes, I do. Α. Are you aware that the following year, 1994, 21 Q. 22 this Commission reset customer rates in Docket Number 23 930400, which considered the effects of the depreciation 24 study concluded in 1993? 25 No, I did not look at that. Α.

1 Q. Would you please refer to your Exhibit WG-2 2 attached to your rebuttal testimony? 3 Α. Yes, I am there. As you had discussed previously, this is a 4 Q. comparison of the terminal dates -- this exhibit 5 6 contains a comparison of the terminal dates for PEF's 7 2005 depreciation study and those contained in the 8 current depreciation study, is that correct? 9 Α. Yes. 10 Q. Did you perform a similar comparison of the 11 terminal dates from the company's 1997 depreciation 12 study and those contained in the current study? 13 Ά. No, I did not. 14 Just a few more questions. Mr. Garrett, is a Q. 15negative depreciation rate, in your opinion, a reversal 16 of depreciation expense? 17 Α. I am not sure what a negative depreciation 18 rate is other than perhaps, the -- I'm not sure I 19 understand what a negative depreciation rate would be. 20 You had previously conversed with 0. 21 Mr. Rehwinkel with respect to the possibility, the 22 theoretical possibility of a negative depreciation rate. 23 Do you recall that line of question? 24 I'm not sure I talked about a negative rate. Α. 25 I think we talked about a negative level of depreciation

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1	expense. That is my recollection.
2	Q. That is what I'm referring to.
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. Would you consider a negative rate of
5	depreciation expense would that be tantamount to a
6	reversal of depreciation expense?
7	A. Yes, it seems mechanically if I follow what
8	you are asking, is a negative rate would be the opposite
9	of depreciating an asset. Where you would have
10	depreciation expense, you would be increasing the asset
11	value.
12	Q. Yes. Then is it your opinion that a negative
13	depreciation rate, as you just stated, would that
14	theoretically constitute retroactive ratemaking?
15	A. I think without getting into ratemaking
16	concepts, I would say it is clear to me that if it is
17	the effect of a change in the estimate where you are
18	reducing current period depreciation expense to a
19	negative level, that that is a restatement or a
20	restatement of a prior period. The determination of
21	whether that is retroactive ratemaking it seems to me
22	depends if you consider that bringing into question the
23	level of revenues that were provided by or afforded by a
24	previous Commission action. So, clearly, it seems to me
25	that it qualifies as a restatement.

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MS. KLANCKE: Fair enough. Madam Chairman, I 1 2 have no further questions for this witness. 3 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you. Commissioner Skop. 4 5 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Madam Chair. 6 Good evening, Mr. Garrett. 7 THE WITNESS: Good evening. COMMISSIONER SKOP: I just have a few 8 9 follow-up questions for you on what has been a lengthy rebuttal testimony. Mr. Garrett, as controller you have 10 direct oversight of the regulatory accounting function, 11 12 correct? 13 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So you would be 1415 familiar with the concept of a true-up as it would 16 pertain to regulatory accounts? THE WITNESS: Yes, I am. 17 18COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Based on your 19 response to my prior question, do you believe that a 20 fully litigated rate case should essentially function as 21 the ultimate true-up for all regulatory accounts? 22 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I understand 23 completely the concept of an overall regulatory true-up. 24 I think earlier you had asked about the true-up for 25 change in plant lives, is that what you are asking?

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COMMISSIONER SKOP: Well, if I could --1 2 actually that is a good segue into explaining what I 3 mean. If I could call your attention to what was previously marked as Exhibit Number 316, which I believe 4 5 on the second page of that document -- on the second 6 page of that document -- if you don't have it, I can 7 wait a moment. 8 THE WITNESS: Yes. I don't think -- I'm not 9 sure what Exhibit 316 was. 10 COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Yes, of course. Thank 11 you. 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have it here. 13 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Are you on the 14second page, which is entitled Elimination of Reserve 15 Imbalances Through Other Than Remaining Life Recovery? 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 17 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, as part of 18 that exhibit, and you may agree or disagree with what is 19 on that page. But just looking at the first sentence 20 under the heading reserve transfers, do you see that? 21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 22 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And that sentence 23 As part of the review and approval of new reads: 24 depreciation rates, it is the practice of Florida PSC to 25 restate or rebalance the existing reserves in order to

eliminate differences between the book reserve and the theoretical reserve based on the new rates on an account by account basis. Is that correct? Is that what it reads?

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THE WITNESS: That is what it reads.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: So, going back to my prior question, again, do you believe that a fully litigated rate case should essentially function as the ultimate true-up for all regulatory accounts?

10 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know that I fully 11 agree with that. In the context of depreciation 12 expense, clearly it provides an opportunity to reset 13 rates based on the best available estimates that we 14 currently have. I think as I discussed earlier, I don't 15 think there is a need necessarily to -- based on a theoretical determination of what book reserves should 16 17 be, that is what should -- what the accumulated 18 depreciation should be based on those updated estimates, 19 that there is any need to true-up to that amount because 20 the average remaining life approach essentially 21 accomplishes that.

22 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Fair enough. 23 Again, I'm trying to just get a yes or no followed by an 24 explanation. I understand that you may disagree with a 25 subcategory under a central premise, but if you could

just state yes or no and then provide the explanation, I would be appreciative.

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Moving on. With respect to the subject of depreciation in itself, if a depreciation study resulted in a depreciation deficit, then Progress would seek to true-up the depreciation account by recovering the depreciation deficit amount from its ratepayers, correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I think that is correct. 9 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So, conversely, if 10 11 the depreciation study resulted in a theoretical depreciation surplus, then why would Progress not seek 12 to true-up the depreciation reserve imbalance by 13 crediting the depreciation reserve, thereby reducing the 14 15 near term rates of Progress customers as suggested by intervenor Witnesses Pous and Pollock? 16

THE WITNESS: Well, although I said that a 17 deficit, it would make sense that we would seek recovery 18 19 of that, I would add that it would be appropriate, unless there was some unusual circumstances, I will put 20 it that way, to recover that over the remaining life of 21 that group's assets. So, conversely, it is my position 22 23 that it would be appropriate to recognize the 24 theoretical surplus over the average remaining life of 25 those assets.

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COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. But with respect to the average remaining life of the assets, would you agree that taking action to reduce rates by the approach suggested by the intervenor witnesses would remedy the intergenerational inequity imbalance associated with the theoretical depreciation surplus?

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7 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know that I would agree with that. I think it actually will create a 8 9 prospective intergenerational inequity in that customers that received service over the period in which those 10reductions have been reflected, that is there has been a 11 12 recognition of lower depreciation expense. Once that 13 expires, it will cause future customers after that 14 period to pay or be required to be exposed to higher 15 depreciation levels.

16 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** All right. Absent impact 17 to cash flow and financing requirements, is there any 18 other reason not to lower rates for your current 19 customers by crediting the theoretical depreciation 20 reserve as suggested by OPC Witness Pous and FIPUG 21 Witness Pollock?

THE WITNESS: I think -- yes, I think there are reasons beyond the investment perspective which I don't want to discount, I think that is a significant consideration. As we just discussed a little bit about

the intergenerational inequity potential that exists, I challenge that that approach really effectively accomplishes a matching principle of recovering those assets, the remaining net book value of the assets that we have over the appropriate service life, and that we are matching that level of recovery that is fair and equitable to customers, both in the near term, but also in the long-term.

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9 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. But adopting the 10 approach suggested by OPC Witness Pous and FIPUG Witness 11 Pollock, wouldn't that -- if that approach were adopted, 12 wouldn't that be effectively analogous to a true-up in 13 favor of the ratepayers?

THE WITNESS: I think it would be a 14 15 significant windfall in terms of impact to customers in 16 the near term but at the expense of future customers. And as I mentioned, I think some of the impacts of what 17 a decrease of that magnitude would have on cash flow and 18 other investment parameters, I would leave that to other 19 20 witnesses to address. But, clearly, it seems to me that as we use the term pay me now or pay me later concept, 21 22 clearly, I think it would create that.

23 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Are you familiar 24 with the rebuttal testimony given by Progress Witness 25 Crisp in this rate case?

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1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am. COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. 2 And Mr. Crisp's rebuttal testimony took exception to the 3 useful life and retirement dates used my Witnesses Pous 4 5 and Pollock in their depreciation studies, correct? 6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 7 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Would you agree, would you not, that no harm would result from using the 8 useful life and retirement dates utilized by Witnesses 9 10 Pous and Pollock in their depreciation studies to the 11 extent that any difference or any -- excuse me, to the 12 extent that any differences in projected versus actual 13 values would be picked up as a true-up within the next 14 depreciation study? THE WITNESS: Yes. I think I would agree that 1516 because we conduct depreciation studies on a four-year cycle, that it would afford an opportunity to certainly 17 update those underlying estimates. I would point out, 18 19 as Mr. Crisp provided in rather lengthy cross, that 20 management believes that certainly through their planning process they are in the best position to know 21 22 those assets and what those useful lives are. 23 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. If I could next turn your attention to Page 13 of your rebuttal 24 25 testimony and focusing on Lines 3 through 10.

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1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am there. 2 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, your 3 rebuttal -- excuse me, your rebuttal testimony on these 4 lines discusses the depreciation rates approved by the 5 Commission within the 2002 settlement agreement, is that correct? 6 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, under the 2002 8 9 settlement agreement, Progress credited depreciation 10expense totaling \$250 million over four years, is that 11 correct? 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct. 13 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Is there any reason 14 why you omitted that relevant -- I mean, is there any reason why you omitted that relevant fact from your 15 16 testimony? 17 THE WITNESS: No, there was no particular 18 reason I didn't point that out. I think I assumed 19 people would have access to the stipulation and 20 settlement agreement. 21 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. If I could next 22 turn your attention back to Page 12 of your rebuttal 23 testimony, please. THE WITNESS: Yes, I am there. 24 25 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, you became

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controller for Progress on November 7, 2005, correct? 1 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct. 2 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, that was 3 obviously before the 2002 settlement, right -- I mean, 4 5 after. It was obviously after. THE WITNESS: It was after. 6 COMMISSIONER SKOP: I'm sorry. It's getting 7 8 late in the day. THE WITNESS: It was after. 9 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, that was 10 likely also after the 2005 settlement agreement, is that 11 12 correct? 13 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was. COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, in your 14 testimony on that page, generally Lines 3 through 12, 15 16 you were critical of the approach taken by the intervenor witnesses and would conclude that it was 17 improper to credit back the theoretical reserve back to 18 19 the customers, is that correct? 20 THE WITNESS: Yes. As it was characterized, 21 yes. COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. The reason I ask is 22 23 I want to make sure that I understand your testimony on this particular point. And in light of the 2002 24 25 settlement agreement, is it your testimony that it is

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okay to record a credit to depreciation expense within the context of a settlement agreement, but it is not appropriate to do the same to lower consumer rates in times of economic hardship within the context of deciding a rate case?

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THE WITNESS: No, that is not my testimony. 6 7 My testimony went to really two points. One, whether or 8 not in the context of a settlement there is some 9 precedent that is set, and that is why there is some 10 lengthy discussion about other Commission orders that would help frame the Commission's approach to 11 establishing depreciation levels. And, secondly, to the 12 13 question of whether or not under the proposals which are significantly higher in terms of value, the impacts to 14 15the company, whether or not those proposals represent an appropriate application of GAAP, Generally Accepted 16 17 Accounting Principles.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. But I want to 18 19 discuss the testimony that you omitted from your 20 rebuttal testimony, namely that under the 2002 settlement agreement, Progress credited depreciation 21 22 expense totaling \$250 million over four year. So what I 23 want to understand and have you reconcile for me is why it is appropriate to credit depreciation expense in the 24 25 context of a settlement agreement, but Progress is not

willing to do so now in the context of a rate case. Again, you are looking at the remaining life depreciation as the basis for why doing something that was done previously is not appropriate, where it would demonstratively benefit ratepayers by mitigating the

impact of the proposed rate increase.

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7 THE WITNESS: Again, I can't really speak to what the overall balancing of interests were in the 8 settlement for 2002. I can speak to the fact that, as I 9 pointed out in the cross, that there have been changes, 10 at least from my perspective, of certainly sensitivity 11 around the accounting issue of whether or not reserve 12 transfers, and that is what I think we are speaking of 13 here, that is a reduction in accumulated depreciation 14 15 expense is, in fact, acknowledged as generally accepted accounting principle. And I think we talked through the 16 cross process that between the issuance of Accounting 17 18 Standard 154, and also my conversations with our auditors, and my general knowledge of issues that have 19 20 been raised by the SEC staff on this matter, that it is 21 my opinion that it does not qualify for GAAP based on the, you know, the reasons I stated earlier, which are 22 largely again due to fundamental principles of applying 23 24 a change in an estimate over a prospective period, and 25 that being the useful life of the assets in this

situation.

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2 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** All right. Well, let's 3 further get into that, since you raised the accounting 4 standards. I guess some people have called me a rocket 5 scientist, and I am many things, but I am definitely not 6 an accountant, so I will seek your knowledge and 7 expertise in that regard. But when was Accounting 8 Standard 154 promulgated by FASB?

9 THE WITNESS: It was issued in May of 2005.
 10 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So that would be
 11 subsequent to the 2002 settlement agreement, is that
 12 correct?

THE WITNESS: That is correct.

14 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Would that have 15 significantly changed GAAP accounting for taking the 16 depreciation credit that may have been done in the 2002 17 settlement?

18 THE WITNESS: No, I don't -- I think it 19 clearly lays out what the principles are that are to be applied in change of estimates. I think, furthermore, I 20 21 would refer to guidance that has been issued by D&T, 22 and that we provided in discovery to staff, and also in 23 that concerns that the SEC staff have expressed about 24 transfers of depreciation reserves. And, again, I think 25 I can summarize that quite simply that there are very

rare circumstances under GAAP where the write-up of assets is appropriate. And that is essentially what we have before us, that is the reduction of accumulated depreciation reserves, which will have the effect of increasing asset values by up to \$646 million. And it is my testimony that that creates a problem from a GAAP perspective.

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8 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** But isn't GAAP based on a 9 matching principle, where you want to match expenses and 10 revenues, and just matching in general?

11 **THE WITNESS:** Yes, I would agree with that. 12 And 154, I think, speaks to that when it -- as it lays 13 out the recognition of a change in estimate for 14 depreciation over those asset lives, which would 15 accomplish, as you just mentioned, the matching 16 principle.

17 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Well, it is late, 18 and I am not going to venture a guess into what 19 accounting standard it might be numbered, but are you 20 familiar with mark to market accounting?

21 THE WITNESS: In some circumstances, yes.
22 COMMISSIONER SKOP: So, basically, adjustments
23 need to be made based on market value and other things.
24 That is, in essence, a matching principal in itself, is
25 that correct?

1 THE WITNESS: I don't know that I quite follow the analogy there, because we are not -- in the context 2 3 of these fixed assets, our property, we are not marking them to a market value, they are the historical costs, 4 5 the acquisition costs to those assets. The concept of 6 mark to market seems to certainly have applicability if 7 you are looking at fuel positions, derivative positions 8 in terms of marking those based on current market 9 values, but I'm not aware of any circumstance where that 10 would apply to fixed assets. 11 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** I know it wouldn't apply 12 to fixed assets, but I guess in relation to my prior 13 question, you mentioned that the effect of making an 14 adjustment or crediting depreciation expense by 15 \$640-something-million would effectively be writing up 16 the assets, is that correct? 17 THE WITNESS: That is correct. 18 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** All right. So that is 19 basically on the books increasing the value of that 20 property, right? 21 THE WITNESS: It is increasing the net book 22 value as the carrying value of those assets. 23 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. All right. I think 24 that is all my questions. I would just ask staff with 25 respect to Mr. Garrett's testimony in terms of the

1 documentation provided by their independent auditor and 2 the pronouncements that they may have provided in 3 evidence, if they could please provide a copy of that to my office. I would appreciate that. Thank you. 4 5 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Commissioner. 6 Commissioners, anything further from the 7 bench? 8 Redirect. 9 MR. WALLS: Yes, briefly. 10 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 11 BY MR. WALLS: 12 Mr. Garrett, you were asked a number of Q. 13 questions about the 2002 order approving the settlement 14 agreement by intervenors and Commissioner Skop. Do you 15 recall that? 16 Α. Yes. Was that paragraph dealing with depreciation, 17 Q. 18 was that one element of many elements in that settlement 19 agreement? 20 Α. Yes. Yes, it is. 21 0. And was there also revenue sharing in that 22 settlement agreement? 23 Yes, there was. Α. 24 And as a result of that settlement agreement, Q. 25 Progress Energy also had no set ROE, correct? FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 Α. Yes, that is correct. 2 Q. Okay. And how would you characterize the 3 result of the settlement agreement, does that involve 4 give and take between the parties? 5 Absolutely, and I think it is an attempt for Α. 6 all the parties to balance and mutually arrive at a 7 solution that best meets everyone's needs. 8 Ο. I think you were also asked a number of 9 questions about Exhibit Number 311, the excerpt from the 10 public utility depreciation practices, NARUC document 11 from August 1996 regarding the statement on 189 12 regarding the option of use of amortization over a short 13 period of time or remaining life technique as the two 14 most common options for eliminating a reserve imbalance. 15 Do you recall that? 16 Yes, I do recall that. Α. 17 I don't believe anyone asked you which one was 0. 18 the most appropriate to do in this case. Which one is? 19 Α. Well, again, my position is that if 20 depreciation -- if the intent of depreciation is to 21 fulfill the matching principle, that is to match the 22 cost, recognition of expense over the period that those 23 assets are used, that the most appropriate approach 24 would be to use an average remaining service life 25 approach.

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1	Q. I think this goes way back to Mr. Rehwinkel's								
2	questions early in the afternoon where he asked you with								
3	respect to Page 11, Lines 10 to 13.								
4	A. Yes, I'm there.								
5	${f Q}$. And he asked you whether any of the intervenor								
6	witnesses had used those terms, excess or surplus, to								
7	mean that PEF has overcharged and customers have								
8	overpaid depreciation expense. Do you recall that?								
9	A. Yes, I do recall that.								
10	Q. Were you here when, or did you hear Mr. Pous								
11	give his summary in this docket?								
12	A. Yes, I was.								
13	Q . Okay. Do you recall him saying, quote, at								
14	Page 2146, Lines 17 to 19 of the transcripts, the								
15	existence of a reserve imbalance, either positive or								
16	negative, indicates that past customers have paid either								
17	too much or too little?								
18	A. Yes.								
19	Q. And he also said at Page 2147, Lines 9 through								
20	14, under either calculation of excess reserve, the								
21	surplus level is massive and imposes an unreasonable and								
22	unacceptable level of intergenerational inequity on								
23	current customers who have paid far more for their use								
24	of the plant today than was either appropriate or								
25	equitable. Do you recall him saying that?								

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1	A. Yes.									
2	Q. Do you agree with those statements?									
3	A. No, I do not. I think customers have paid									
4	exactly what the Commission has established is the cost									
5	of service for depreciation, and that has been reflected									
6	in our accumulated depreciation reserves and serves to									
7	reduce the recovery of investments on a prospective									
8	basis.									
9	MR. WALLS: I have no further questions.									
10	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Exhibits.									
11	MR. WALLS: Yes. We would move Exhibits 225									
12	to 228 I'm sorry, 225 to 230.									
13	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Are there any objections?									
14	MR. REHWINKEL: No.									
15	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Without objection, show it									
16	done.									
17	(Exhibit Numbers 225 through 230 admitted into									
18	the record.)									
19	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Hang on a second before we									
20	go to the back pages.									
21	Mr. Rehwinkel, you have Exhibit 315 and 316.									
22	You are recognized.									
23	MR. REHWINKEL: I would move those.									
24	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Any objections?									
25	MR. WALLS: I have no objection to 315, but I									
	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION									

do have an objection to 316. 1 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Let's hear your 2 3 objection. MR. WALLS: The first page I believe is 4 5 already an exhibit because it was sponsored by Witness 6 Pous, if I am recalling correctly. MS. KLANCKE: That is correct. 7 MR. WALLS: So obviously that is already in 8 9 evidence. The other pages are not sponsored by any witness at all, and I don't know who prepared the 10 11 headings for these documents. Certainly no witness did 12 in this case, and I would object to those headings going in. I believe if OPC wants to brief these orders in 13 their brief, they will have the opportunity to do so. 14 15 MR. REHWINKEL: Mr. Chairman, I know when I am 16 beat, and I withdraw Exhibit 316. 17 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Rehwinkel. We will just modify it. Just take the 18 19 first page --20 MR. REHWINKEL: Actually, I think that I could just withdraw the exhibit. I don't know that it 21 22 really --23 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Withdrawn. Show it 24 done. 25 MR. REHWINKEL: I want Mr. Walls to be happy

1 at the end of this day. CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're such a nice guy, 2 Mr. Rehwinkel. 3 MR. WALLS: You can do other things to make me 4 5 happy. CHAIRMAN CARTER: Let me do something to make 6 7 the court reporter happy. I promised to give her a break because she is going to be with us for the 8 duration. We will come back at seven after. 9 10 (Recess.) CHAIRMAN CARTER: We are back on the record. 11 12 And when we last left we had completed Witness Garrett. 13 Call your next witness. 14 MR. WALLS: Progress Energy calls Dr. Michael 15 Vilbert. MICHAEL J. VILBERT 16 was called as a rebuttal witness on behalf of Progress 17 Energy Florida, and having been duly sworn, testified as 18 19 follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 20 BY MR. WALLS: 21 22 Mr. Vilbert, will you please introduce your Q. 23 yourself to the Commission and provide your business 24 address? 25 A. My name is Michael J. Vilbert. My business FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	address is 353 Sacramento Street, Suite 1140, San								
2	Francisco, California, 94111.								
3	Q. And who do you work for and what is your								
4	position?								
5	A. I am a principal of the Brattle Group, which								
6	is an economic consulting firm with offices in								
7	Cambridge, Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., San								
8	Francisco, California, London, Brussels, and Madrid.								
9	${f Q}$. And have you filed rebuttal testimony and an								
10	exhibit in this proceeding?								
11	A. Yes, I have.								
12	Q. And do you have your prefiled rebuttal								
13	testimony and exhibit with you?								
14	A. Yes.								
15	Q. Do you have any changes to make to your								
16	prefiled rebuttal testimony?								
17	A. No.								
18	Q. If I asked you the same questions in your								
19	prefiled rebuttal testimony today, would you give me the								
20	same answers?								
21	A. Yes.								
22	MR. WALLS: We request that Dr. Vilbert's								
23	prefiled rebuttal testimony be entered into the record								
24	as though read.								
25	CHAIRMAN CARTER: The prefiled testimony of								
	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION								

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Rebuttal Testimony of Michael J. Vilbert

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Q1. Please state your name and address for the record.

A1. My name is Michael J. Vilbert. My business address is The Brattle Group, 353 Sacramento Street, Suite 1140, San Francisco, CA 94111, USA.

Q2. Please describe your job and your educational experience.

A2. I am a Principal of The Brattle Group, ("Brattle"), an economic, environmental and management consulting firm with offices in Cambridge, Washington, London, San Francisco and Brussels. My work concentrates on financial and regulatory economics. I hold a B.S. from the U.S. Air Force Academy and a Ph.D. in finance from the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.

Q3. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A3. I have been asked by Progress Energy Florida, Inc. ("PEF" or "the Company") to respond to the testimonies of Mr. Daniel J. Lawton ("Lawton Testimony") on behalf of the Florida Office of Public Counsel ("OPC"), Mr. Jacob Pous ("Pous Testimony") on behalf of OPC and Mr. Jeffry Pollock ("Pollock Testimony") on behalf of The Florida Industrial Power Users Group ("FIPUG") regarding the appropriate regulatory treatment of the Company's estimated depreciation reserve variance. As a group, I refer to the testimonies of these individuals as the intervenors.

My focus is on whether there is any precedent either by other regulators or by the accounting profession to support the intevenors' proposal and whether the proposal represents good regulatory policy. In addition, I discuss the effect of the proposal on the Company's financial integrity and cost of capital. I am not reviewing or critiquing the depreciation studies of either the Company or the intervenors, and I accept as given the estimate from the Company's depreciation study of an amount of depreciation reserve variance. In particular, I am not disputing or estimating the useful lives of the

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Rebuttal Testimony of Michael J. Vilbert

Company's assets. I am not evaluating the return on equity ("ROE") estimates by either the Company or any other intervenors in this proceeding, but I do have some comments on the likely effect on the cost of capital of adoption of the intervenors' proposal to reverse the depreciation reserve.

Q4. Please summarize the parts of your background and experience that are particularly relevant to your testimony on these matters.

A4. Brattle's specialties include financial and regulatory economics as well as the gas and electric industries. I have worked in the areas of cost of capital, investment risk and related matters for many industries, regulated and unregulated alike, in many forums. I have testified or filed testimony on regulatory issues and on the cost of capital before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Arizona Corporation Commission, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia, the Tennessee Regulatory Authority, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, the Montana Public Service Commission, the South Dakota Utilities Board, the California Public Utilities Commission, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, the Canadian National Energy Board, Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, the Ontario Energy Board, the Régie de l'Énergie and the Labrador & Newfoundland Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities. I have not previously testified before the Florida Public Service Commission. Appendix A contains more information on my professional qualifications.

Q5. What have the intervenors proposed in this proceeding with regard to the estimated depreciation reserve variance?

A5. The Company's depreciation study estimates the depreciation reserve variance to be \$645,805,342, and the intervenors' estimates are even higher. The intervenors' proposal is designed to eliminate the \$645,805,342 estimated depreciation reserve variance over a four year period. The intervenors propose to reverse an amount of depreciation equal to the amount of estimated depreciation imbalance that has already been recovered from

customers in Commission approved rates and add it back to the rate base. Specifically, they propose to reduce the amount of depreciation currently in the Company's revenue requirement by \$161,451,336 per year offset by \$12,147,032 of additional return on rate base over each of the next four years. This latter amount includes return on equity, interest expense and income taxes. The ROE inherent in the recommended return is that of Dr. Randall Woolridge.¹

Q6. What is the Company's proposal with regard to the depreciation reserve variance?

A6. The Company's depreciation study shows that the depreciation reserve variance is caused by changes in depreciation estimates (e.g., service lives, average remaining life, net salvage) such as the increase in the estimated economic life of several coal generating plants and the Crystal River nuclear generating plant. As is standard in regulatory jurisdictions, the Company proposes to adjust the depreciation rate going forward to correspond to the increased estimated lives of the assets and other changes in depreciation estimates. The remaining amount of investment to be recovered from customers would be spread over the remaining estimated life of the assets. As a result, the depreciation charge in the revenue requirement would be reduced, but the reduction would be spread over a longer period than four years.

Q7. What is your conclusion on the appropriateness of the intervenors' proposal to reverse the level of depreciation recorded by the Company?

A7. The intervenors' proposal to reverse the depreciation reserve is counter to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") and is poor regulatory policy. When there are changes in depreciation estimates, for example, a change in an asset's expected useful life, GAAP recommends adjusting the depreciation rate going forward to correspond to the new life and recommends against any adjustment in the current balances of depreciation. I have found no regulatory precedent in other jurisdictions to reverse accrued depreciation, in part, probably because such a procedure is poor regulatory policy.

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¹ On page 4 of his direct testimony, Dr. Woolridge recommends an allowed ROE of 9.75 percent for the Company. On page 6 of Dr. Vander Weide's testimony, he recommends an ROE of 12.54 percent.

It is poor regulatory policy because it increases regulatory uncertainty in that past decisions can be altered based upon information not available at the time of the decision. Such a policy opens the door to endless debates about whether cash flows in previous periods should be adjusted because actual costs or revenues varied from forecasts. Increased regulatory uncertainty is likely to increase investors' required return. It is also poor regulatory policy because it will increase the level and variability of rates to customers over the long term at the expense of a temporary reduction in the revenue requirement thereby creating a class of "winners" versus a much larger class of "losers" among customers. It is also a particularly bad time to increase regulatory uncertainty, because the capital markets are only now beginning to emerge from a period of turmoil and increased investor risk aversion. Although the economy is showing signs of stabilizing, investors' risk aversion remains higher than it was prior to the current economic crisis. If adopted, the intervenors' proposal would weaken the Company's credit metrics at a time when it must access the capital markets to acquire the funds necessary to finance its forecasted capital investment program.

Q8. How does the current turmoil in the financial markets affect the cost of capital for a regulated utility?

A8. I discuss the effect of the credit crisis on the cost of capital in detail in Section III below, but in general, the cost of capital is higher for all companies today than it was before the crisis. The intervenors' proposal will substantially affect the Company's cash flow and its perceived risk. Because of the unusual conditions still prevailing today, it is a particularly poor time to increase investor uncertainty regarding recovery of their investment in the Company's assets.

Q9. How is your testimony organized?

A9. Section II on the theory and application of the concept of depreciation is divided into five subsections. The first describes the role of depreciation in the revenue requirement. Depreciation increases the revenue requirement but reduces the rate base so that under fair regulation both investors and customers are protected if depreciation rates turn out to

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be higher or lower than necessary to recover the investment over the expected useful life of the asset. I next discuss the lack of regulatory precedent for the intervenors' proposal. The third subsection describes why the Company would be inadequately compensated under the intervenors' proposal and shows how much the return would have to increase to provide adequate compensation. The fourth subsection shows that adoption of the intervenors' proposal is likely to increase the cost of capital for the Company because of increased regulatory uncertainty as well as due to the weakening of the Company's credit ratios. The final subsection explains why the intervenors' proposal is poor regulatory policy, in part, because it relies upon imposing 20-20 hindsight on previous regulatory decisions. *Section III* discusses current market conditions and the likely effect on the cost of capital. In particular, the recent turmoil in the financial markets has increased the cost of capital for all companies including utilities so this is a particularly inopportune time to adopt a proposal that increases regulatory uncertainty. *Section IV* provides my conclusions. *Appendix A* contains my resume.

II. DEPRECIATION THEORY AND APPLICATION

A. DEPRECIATION IN THE REVENUE REQUIREMENT

Q10. Please briefly review the role of depreciation in setting the revenue requirement for a regulated utility?

A10. In a regulated setting, depreciation is designed to recover the cost of an asset over its expected useful life as opposed to adding the full cost of the asset to the revenue requirement in the year of investment. The concept is to match the cost of the asset to the period of service.

Q11. How is the amount of depreciation for an asset determined?

A11. For regulatory purposes, assets are generally depreciated on a straight-line basis over their expected life. An estimate of salvage value, either positive or negative, is added to the total cost of the asset to be depreciated. There are a few points to note about

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depreciation. First, no matter what method is chosen or how long the estimated life, depreciation will never be greater than the amount of investment minus the estimated salvage value. If the estimated life is longer, the annual rate of depreciation is lower, but the total still adds to 100 percent. Second, it is not unusual for the useful life of assets to vary from expectations. For example, some assets will not last as long as expected and some will last much longer. Nor is it unusual for assets to be fully depreciated and remain used and useful. As a result, when companies perform depreciation studies, it is common that the expected lives of some assets will be modified. Third, depreciation reduces the rate base upon which a rate of return is earned.

Q12. How is a change in the expected life of an asset usually handled in regulatory settings?

A12. Usually, the rate of depreciation is adjusted so that the percentage of the asset remaining to be recovered is spread over the remaining estimated life of the asset. For example, an asset with an initial expected life of 10 years would have a straight-line depreciation rate of 10 percent per year. If its expected life were extended at the end of 5 years to a revised expected life of 15 years, a new, lower rate of depreciation would be appropriate. Specifically, at the 5 year point, half of the depreciation would have been recovered leaving half to be recovered in the remaining 10 years, or 5 percent per year. Alternatively if the revised life were shortened to 7 years, the depreciation rate would have to be increased to 25 percent to recover the full remaining amount of the investment.

Q13. Are customers harmed if the life of the asset is revised, particularly if the expected life of the asset is increased?

A13. No. Recovery of depreciation automatically has an offset for customers. The regulated company not only recovers its investment in assets that provide service to customers, it also earns a rate of return on the investment not yet recovered. Depreciation is the return of the investment. The rate of return on the investment is the weighted-average cost of debt and equity in the capital structure plus an allowance for income tax. Under fair regulation, the present value of the depreciation and return on the investment will equal

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the amount of investment. If the initial rate of depreciation turns out to be higher than required because the expected life is increased, customers save the return *on* the depreciation recovered. However, the present value of recovery is unchanged.² Only the timing of the cash flows is different.

Q14. How do regulators ensure that differences in the timing of the recovery of an investment do not raise the issue of intergenerational fairness?

A14. To begin with, there is no existing level of complete intergenerational fairness within the process of setting rates because the composition of the customers' group always changes over time. However, the primary reason offered by the intervenors for their proposal in this proceeding to reverse the depreciation already recovered is an appeal to intergenerational fairness, but their proposal actually creates a set of intergenerational winners and losers. Specifically, reversing the depreciation allowance over the next four years creates a group of customers that unfairly receive a rate reduction at the expense of customers who paid rates earlier or who will pay rates after the four year period. There is no reason that the depreciation reserve should be reversed over a four year period. That period is completely arbitrary. In fact, the only logical and completely fair way to deal with the issue is to adopt the Company's proposal to reset the depreciation rate based upon the remaining useful life of the assets whose expected useful lives and other depreciation parameters have changed. This again matches the remaining investment to be recovered to the expected life of the asset. This is, in fact, the way that changes in expected lives of depreciable assets are usually handled.

Q15. Do you agree that the existence of a depreciation reserve imbalance means that intergenerational unfairness has already occurred?

A15. No. The depreciation rates that were in place for the Company's assets were approved by the Commission based upon the best information available at the time. In other words, the depreciation rates were appropriately set and recovered in rates. The Company is not

² This assumes that the allowed rate of return is set equal to the cost of capital.

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accused of making an error in the calculation of the amount of depreciation, nor did the Company change its method of calculating depreciation. The primary reason for the depreciation reserve imbalance is that the depreciation estimates have changed over time, for example, estimated lives of some assets have been increased. It is only in retrospect that we forecast today that the depreciation rate was higher than necessary in the past, but that is fundamentally different than purposely creating a set of "winners" by reducing depreciation over the next four years at the expense of all future and past customers as would result from adoption of the intervenors' proposal.

Q16. Please summarize this section of your rebuttal.

A16. It is effectively impossible to forecast exactly the depreciation parameters, such as the useful life of depreciable assets, so revisions to the expected lives of some assets and net salvage parameters will be necessary each time a depreciation study is performed. Fortunately, depreciation automatically provides a benefit to customers in the form of a reduction in the return *on* the investment because depreciation reduces the rate base. This means that the fact that the depreciation rates were not perfectly matched to the actual useful life of the assets does not result in harm to rate payers because the present value of the amounts paid by customers will equal the amount of investment.

B. THERE IS NO ACCOUNTING OR REGULATORY PRECEDENT FOR THE INTERVENORS' PROPOSAL

Q17. Have you found any precedent for the depreciation recapture or reversal proposed by the intervenors in this proceeding?

A17. No. I have searched for decisions by other regulators in the U.S. that address the issue of how to treat depreciation on an asset whose estimated life changes at some point in its regulatory life. I am not aware of any jurisdiction that has implemented a policy of refunding a portion of the depreciation already collected in rates from customers. To my knowledge, all jurisdictions revise the depreciation rate to match the new estimated life of the assets. I also reviewed the accounting profession's treatment of changes to the useful

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⁴ FERC, "Uniform Systems of Accounts," Section 22, paragraph A.

⁵ FERC, "Order Authorizing the Acquisition of Jurisdictional Facilities," Docket Nos. EC08-33-000 and EC08-33-001, Issued March 31, 2008, p. 21-22, paragraph 62.

 rather than the use of estimates. This is consistent with financial accounting principles and with prior FERC decisions. For example, the FERC has rejected an agreement between parties to restate a utility's depreciation reserve stating:

Changes in depreciation estimates resulting from new information or subsequent developments or from better insight or improved judgment should be accounted for in the period of change and future periods, but not through retroactive restatement of prior period's depreciation amounts.⁶

Thus, FERC's position is clear and I have not found instances in which FERC reversed the depreciation or depreciation reserve because the service life of an asset was extended or any other depreciation estimate changed.

Q20. Please summarize the evidence you have that other state commissions do not reverse past depreciation.

A20. It is common for utilities to file depreciation studies and consequently depreciation rates for approval with regulatory commissions. As a result of such studies, the useful life or service life of major assets (or classes of assets) is updated to reflect up-to-date information. Therefore, depreciation rates are modified, so that the time horizon over which the remaining asset (or asset minus salvage value) is depreciated reflects the remaining service life. While such updates change the depreciation rates going forward, no attempt is made to reverse past depreciation. For example, in connection with Kansas City Power & Light's ("KCPL") expected expansion of the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant's useful life from 40 to 60 years, the Missouri Public Service Commission allowed KCPL to modify its depreciation rate going forward.⁷ Similarly, the Minnesota Public Service Commission recently approved Xcel Energy to recover the remaining net asset

⁶ FERC, "Order Affirming Initial Decision", Carnegie Natural Gas Company, Docket No. FA89-16-000, Issued August 7, 1992, p. 6-7.

⁷ Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, Report and Order, Case No. EO-2005-0329, Issue date, July 28, 2005, p. 30.

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value of its Prairie Island and Monticello nuclear plants over the extended service life of these assets.⁸

Q21. Do you have any comments on the Commission decisions cited by the intervenors as relevant?

Yes. While I leave the detailed comments to those more familiar with Florida regulatory A21. precedent, I observe that the decisions cited by intervenors tend to involve either a transfer between accounts rather than a reversal of the accumulated depreciation reserve and/or they involve unique circumstances that are not present in the current situation. Looking at the decisions cited by the Pous Testimony, I have the following observations. The Gulf Power Company, Marianna Electric Division and Tampa Electric Company decisions cited on p. 32 all pertain to a "reserve transfer" between accounts rather than a reversal of account balances. In addition, the Gulf Power decision, Order No. 19901, involves a change in methodology rather than estimates, and it is noteworthy that the decision ensured that the "Restated Reserve" equals the "Book Reserve" for plant sites, so no change was made to the total accumulated depreciation reserve. The General Telephone Co. decision specifically discusses the fast paced development in technology for telecommunications and the risk of stranded cost in its decision to shorten the time over which General Telephone's assets' are amortized.⁹ To summarize, these decisions from the Pous Testimony pertain to unique or different circumstances than what is being proposed by interveners.

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⁸ Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, "Order Amending Remaining Life of the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant," Docket No. E,G-002/D-03-230, January 5, 2004. See also Xcel Energy's Q2, 2009 10-Q and Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Staff Briefing Papers, June 25, 2009.

⁹ The decisions cited by the Pous Testimony are discussed in more detail in the Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Will Garrett ("Garrett Rebuttal").

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Q22. Do you have comments on the Pollock Testimony's reliance on a settlement?

A22. Yes. On page 50, the Pollock Testimony references a settlement that grants FPL "the option to amortize" an amount annually over the settlement period.¹⁰ First, a settlement is inherently different from a Commission order, and second, an option to amortize is different from requiring a company to reverse its accumulated depreciation. Without knowing the full details of the settlement, it is difficult to determine the comparability to the current matter.

Q23. How is a change in expected useful life or service life of a depreciable asset treated by the accounting profession?

A23. The accounting profession also alters the depreciation rates to reflect the revised estimate of the remaining useful life. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") are clear on this issue. As noted in the *Miller GAAP Guide*, "Estimates are necessary in determining depreciation and amortization of long-lived assets, …" and "[a] change in an accounting estimate is not accounted for by restating prior year's financial statements …"¹¹ To quote one of the most commonly used intermediate accounting textbooks in the U.S.:

[The company] should report this change in [useful life] estimate in the current and prospective periods. It should not make any changes in previously reported results. And it does not adjust opening balances nor attempt to "catch up" for prior periods.¹²

Thus, the Financial Accounting Standard Board ("FASB") has made clear that GAAP distinguishes between a change in accounting estimates such as a depreciation rate *and* a change in accounting principles or accounting errors. In the case of a change in accounting estimates (e.g., depreciation rates), the change is reflected prospectively

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¹⁰ Florida Public Service Commission, "Order Approving Stipulation and Settlement," Order No. PSC-05-0902-S-EI, Issued September 14, 2005, p. 3.

¹¹ Quoted from Jan R. Williams and Joseph V. Carcello, "Miller GAAP Guide," Aspen 2004, Chapter 1.

¹² Donald E. Kieso, Jerry J. Weygandt, and Terry D. Warfield, Intermediate Accounting, 12th Edition, Wiley 2008, p. 533.

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whereas a change in accounting principles or accounting errors are reflected retrospectively.¹³ To my knowledge, the accounting profession never suggests that accumulated depreciation should be reversed (other than in cases of restatements or a change of accounting principle).

Q24. Do you have other comments on the regulatory precedent of adopting the intervenors' proposal?

A24. Yes. Effectively, the intervenors' proposal amounts to a request to the Commission to reverse the previous decisions of the Commission. The depreciation expense recovered by the Company leading to the current depreciation reserve variance was approved by previous Commission decisions, and those decisions were based upon the best information available at the time. To reverse those decisions based upon information not available at the time of the previous decisions is a form of ex-post rate making. Worse, it sets a precedent that says no past regulatory decision is final even for the period of the decision. For example, a commission could decide that the allowance for O&M expense was too high (or too low) in a previous period because the actual expenses were less than (greater than) forecast and require a refund or surcharge. Such a policy would increase regulatory uncertainty from the investors' and the customers' points of view. Investors dislike uncertainty, and increased uncertainty would likely lead to an increase in the required cost of capital for the company. Customers seem to dislike uncertainty and volatility in rates as well.

C. THE INTERVENORS' PROPOSAL DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE COMPENSATION TO THE COMPANY

Q25. Please review the intervenors' proposal to reverse the depreciation "surplus."

A25. The intervenors propose to reduce the amount of depreciation in the Company's revenue requirement by \$161,451,336 per year and to add that amount to the rate base, and the reduction is to be offset by \$12,147,032 for an increase in return on rate base over each of

¹³ See Jan R. Williams and Joseph V. Carcello, Miller GAAP Guide, Chapter 1.

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the next four years.¹⁴ This latter amount includes return on equity, interest expense and income taxes which is sometimes called the before-tax weighted-average cost of capital, the BTWACC. The proposal is designed to reverse the \$645,805,342 of depreciation reserve variance estimated in the Company's depreciation study.

Q26. If adopted, does this proposal adequately compensate the Company?

A26. No. Under the intervenors' proposal, the Company's rate base will increase by the \$646 million amount of the estimated depreciation reserve, but the proposed allowed return of \$12 million is based upon $\frac{1}{2}$ of the first year's depreciation offset alone. At the end of the first year of the proposal, the Company's gross rate base will be \$161 million larger than at the start of the process which would require an increase in the return for interest, ROE and income taxes of more than \$24 million plus the additional \$12 million for the \$161 million of depreciation returned in the second year. At the end of the second year. the Company's rate base will be \$322 million larger requiring a return of \$48 million plus \$12 million for the \$161 million of deprecation return in the 3rd year and so forth. The result is that the company should be awarded an annual return of four times the initial proposal of \$12,147,032 or \$48,588,128 in each of the next four years to be adequately compensated for the increase in rate base. In other words, the return should be based upon approximately 1/2 of the estimated depreciation reserve. The actual situation is slightly more complicated than this because of deferred income taxes ("DIT").¹⁵ Table 1 below demonstrates how rates should be reflected considering the change in the rate base and DIT resulting from adding back book depreciation already taken.

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¹⁴ The ROE in the calculations is the 9.75 percent as recommended by Dr. Woolridge not the Company's requested ROE of 12.54 percent as recommended by Dr. Vander Weide. I do not endorse Dr. Woolridge's recommendation.

¹⁵ DIT is calculated as (tax depreciation minus book depreciation) times the marginal income tax rate. In Florida, accumulated DIT is used to adjust the weighted-average cost of capital as a source of capital that has no cost. The intevenors' proposal would increase DIT which would also reduce the weighted-average cost of capital instead of the rate base as illustrated in the example.

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letoT	8.249			1.942				
Year 4	5.161	S [.] 762	0.624	6.23	2.875	- 6.92	(5.401)	L'96E
Year 3	s [.] 191	£.861	8.625	62.3	1.972	45.0	(5.911)	5.762
Year 2	5.191	2.66	9'097	5.29	6.671	1.72	(#:461)	£.861
Г твэҮ	s.181	0.0	5.181	6.23	£.08	1.21	(5.941)	7.66
	[1]	[2] Rate Base	Year Rate Base [3]	Tax ("DTT") [4]	[5] Rate Base	Rate Base	[7] [7]	[8] [8]
	Depreciation		Unadjusted End of		Average	Return on	Net	End of Year Ra

Q27. Please describe the calculations in Table 1.

Column [1] shows the proposed reversal of depreciation of about \$161 million over each of the next four years, which generates an increase in DIT because book depreciation is effectively less than it was in the past. The reduction in the Company's revenue (\$161 million) minus the increase in return on rate base from column [6]. For ease of demonstration, I have used DIT to reduce rate base rather to adjust the weighted-average cost of capital as is the procedure in Florida, but effectively the result is the same. Note that the reduction in rates (i.e., the reduction in net cash flow in column [7]) declines over time as the amount of annual reversed depreciation accumulates in the rate base. Nowever, this is not the end of the story because the gross rate base is now about \$646 million greater than it would have been, and this increase must now be recovered over the million greater than it would have been, and this increase must now be recovered over the remaining life of the assets. The Pous Testimony notes that the remaining life is about 21 willion greater than it would have been, and this increase must now be recovered over the remaining life of the assets. The Pous Testimony notes that the remaining life is about 21 remaining life of the assets. The Pous Testimony notes that the remaining life is about 21 willion greater than it would have been, and this increase must now be recovered over the remaining life of the assets. The Pous Testimony notes that the remaining life is about 21 willion greater than it would be about a set of allowing the four years of the intervenors' proposal.

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Table	4

	Depreciation [1]	Beginning Rate Base [2]	Unadjusted End of Year Rate Base [3]	Deferred Income Tax ("DIT") [4]	Average Rate Base [5]	Return on Rate Base [6]	Net Cashflow [7]	End of Year Rate Base with DIT [8]
Year 5	38.0	396.7	358.7	14.7	377.7	56.8	94.8	373.4
Year 6	38.0	373.4	335.4	14.7	354.4	53.3	91.3	350.0
Year 7	38.0	350.0	312.0	14.7	331.0	49.8	87.8	326.7
Year 8	38.0	326.7	288.7	14.7	307.7	46.3	84.3	303.3
Year 9	38.0	303.3	265.4	14.7	284.4	42.8	80.8	280.0
Year 10	38.0	280.0	242.0	14.7	261.0	39.3	77.3	256.7
Year 11	38.0	256.7	218.7	14.7	237.7	35.8	73.8	233.3
Year 12	38.0	233.3	195.4	14.7	214.4	32.3	70.2	210.0
Year 13	38.0	210.0	172.0	14.7	191.0	28.7	66.7	186.7
Year 14	38.0	186.7	148.7	14.7	167.7	25.2	63.2	163.3
Year 15	38.0	163.3	125.4	14.7	144.3	21.7	59.7	140.0
Year 16	38.0	140.0	102.0	14.7	121.0	18.2	56.2	116.7
Year 17	38.0	116.7	78.7	14.7	97.7	14.7	52.7	93.3
Year 18	38.0	93.3	55.3	14.7	74.3	11.2	49.2	70.0
Year 19	38.0	70.0	32.0	14.7	51.0	7.7	45.7	46.7
Year 20	38.0	46.7	8.7	14.7	27.7	4.2	42.2	23.3
Year 21	38.0	23.3	(14.7)	14.7	4.3	0.7	38.6	0.0
Total	645.8	•	•	249.1	-			-
						28.7	66.7	

Q28. Please describe the calculations in Table 2.

A28. The recaptured depreciation must once again be charged to customers, but it is done over a 17 year period which is an estimate of the average remaining life of the assets.¹⁷ The depreciation expense in column [1] recovers the \$646 million of depreciation and column [6] displays the return on rate base. Column [7] shows the net cash flow in each of the next 17 years required to amortize the recaptured depreciation from the intervenors' proposal. In exchange for saving an average of about \$127 million for four years (average of column [7] in Table 1), the trade off is rates that are about \$67 million higher for 17 years (average of column [7] in Table 2). A graph of the change in rates due to the

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¹⁷ The 17 year period is for illustration purposes and is not intended to be an independent estimate of the average remaining life.

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intervenors' proposal is displayed in Figure 1 below, which shows how much more variable rates would be if the intervenors' proposal is adopted. Note that between year 4 and year 5, the revenue requirement would jump by about \$200 million.




Figure 1

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Q29. Is there an alternative to the additional rate of return you have estimated?

A29. There are two alternatives: 1) the Commission could deny the intervenors' proposal to reverse the depreciation reserve, or 2) the Company would be forced to file a rate case in each of the next four years to be adequately compensated. Clearly, denying the proposal is preferable.

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Q30. If the Company must be fairly compensated for the reversal of the depreciation reserve in the form of a higher return and increase in rates, how will customers be treated?

If the Company is fairly compensated through higher future rates, the customers will also A30. be treated fairly because the present value of the return on investment and the future depreciation allowance will equal the \$646 million reversal of the depreciation reserve. However, it is worth noting that in exchange for a temporary reduction in the average revenue requirement of about \$127 million over the next four years, future customers will pay a higher cost of service including the return of the \$646 million in depreciation that is the source of the temporary reduction in the revenue requirement. In addition, customers will have to pay a rate of return on that \$646 million so that rates will average about \$67 million higher at the beginning of the fifth year. Moreover, the cost of capital requested by the Company is higher than recommended by the intervenors. If the Company's requested cost of capital had been used in the analysis, the benefit to customers will be even lower, because customers receive a return on the depreciation already recovered equal to the cost of capital. The higher the allowed return, the greater the benefit in terms of cash flow from depreciation. If the Company is fairly compensated, the intervenors' proposal does not seem as beneficial to customers.

D. THE COST OF CAPITAL IS LIKELY TO INCREASE IF THE INTERVENORS' PROPOSAL IS ADOPTED

Q31. Please explain briefly why you believe that the Company's cost of capital would increase if the intervenors' proposal were adopted.

A31. There are two reasons why the cost of capital is likely to increase. First, investor uncertainty will increase because this proposal opens the door to reversing or revising previous Commission decisions for periods already past. No Commission decision will be seen as final. Second, the Company has plans for substantial capital investment going forward, in particular its planned new nuclear generation. The reduction of cash flow over the next four years means that the Company will have to go to the capital markets to

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acquire the funds necessary for its capital investment program to replace the lost cash flow from the intervenors' proposal as well as the additional funds necessary. This will result in higher transactions costs to acquire capital, because it will be necessary to acquire \$646 million more capital in the short term if the intervenors' proposal is adopted. Even more costly is likely to be the increase in the cost of capital for these new funds because the Company's credit metrics will be weakened compared to what they would have been without the depreciation reversal.

Q32. If the Company's debt rating were not downgraded, will its cost of debt still increase?

A32. Yes. Even if the Company's debt rating were not downgraded, its cost of debt is highly likely to increase because the reduction in cash flow will affect its credit ratios as Mr. Lawton acknowledges. All debt with a similar rating does not have the same yield. There are variances in the cost of debt based upon the underlying strength of the company even for companies with identical credit ratings. All else equal, a reduction in the strength of the Company's credit ratios will result in an increase in the cost of debt.

Q33. Do you have other comments on the effect on the Company's financial integrity?

A33. Yes. As acknowledged by Mr. Lawton,¹⁸ Progress Energy's financial ratios will decline if the proposal were implemented. According to Mr. Lawton's calculations, which I have not verified, the cash flow from operations to debt ratio drops substantially and is near the bottom of the range for a BBB-rated entity even if none of the other suggested changes to PEF's requested revenue requirement were made. If any other of the intervenors' suggested reductions were implemented, the effect could easily be a ratio outside the BBB-range. Using Mr. Lawton's figures, the cash flow from operations-to-debt (before and after tax) as well as the cash flow from operations-to-interest ratio will be below the BBB-range if the Company's request with the OPC's rate of return adjustments is implemented. It is important to note that the ratios that are below the BBB-range, by Mr.

¹⁸ Lawton Exhibit DJL-5 p. 1 of 2.

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Lawton's calculations, are the cash flow ratios which are the most important ratios for rating purposes. As Standard & Poor's ("S&P") has said "Cash is King."¹⁹ Solid cash flows are more important today than just a few years ago.

Q34. Why is an impact on cash flow ratios especially important in today's environment?

A34. There are at least two reasons why cash flows have become extremely important. First, the current economic environment increases the uncertainty of utilities' cash flows because the revenue stream may be more uncertain than usual and access to capital markets is more challenging. Second, Progress Energy, like many other utilities, has committed to investing in its infrastructure and will therefore need solid financial metrics to attract capital on reasonable terms.

Q35. What is the importance of PEF's credit metric?

A35. PEF needs to maintain its access to capital market under reasonable terms, and as S&P points out, cash flow is vital to ensure access. For example, many of the key ratios used by S&P in its evaluation of utilities are linked to cash flow,²⁰ and S&P recently opined that in times of financial turmoil,

 \dots a financial position, featuring strong debt service coverage and liquidity, can temporarily insulate utilities from each of these financial challenges.²¹

Debt costs have increased more for lower rated utilities than for higher rated utilities, so the costs associated with a weaker credit metric could be substantial. For example, recent yield data indicate that the cost of BBB- rated utility debt has increased substantially more than the cost of BBB+ utility debt. However, the most important reason to maintain solid debt coverage and cash flow is to ensure PEF's ability to maintain its access to

¹⁹ Standard & Poor's, "Corporate Ratings Criteria," 2008 p. 46.

²⁰ See, for example, Standard & Poor's, "Corporate Ratings Criteria," 2008 p. 52.

²¹ Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect, "U.S. Public Power Outlook: 2009 Could Provide Some Shocks," January 20, 2009, p. 5.

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capital markets in times when liquidity and market access remain fragile.²² In Moody's view, "the biggest near-term challenge [for utilities] is the need to maintain adequate sources of liquidity."²³

The Lawton Testimony acknowledges the importance of credit ratios. He calculates and provides four cash-based ratios in his exhibit DJL-5 but fails to acknowledge that the intervenors' proposal regarding the depreciation reserve variance in combination with any of a number of other intervenor proposals would result in PEF's credit metrics being below those required for an investment grade credit rating.

Q36. Please elaborate on the impact of the challenging economic environment.

A36. During times of financial crisis access to capital markets becomes more restrictive because investors require a higher return for any given level of risk. This happened in the U.S. in the summer and early fall of 2007 and also in the fall of 2008 as the amount of funds available to companies was reduced. Investors expect a return that is equal to the return on comparable risk investments. As the financial metrics of a company weaken, the required return increases because the company is perceived to be riskier. Cash flow is of utmost importance for bond holders, so stable and adequate cash flows are crucial for a company that seeks to raise debt capital on reasonable terms. In the current environment, the difference between the cost of debt for A-rated and BBB-rated utilities has increased. As the BBB-range is broad and lower rated utilities face a higher cost of debt, a decline in cash flow credit ratios could easily impact the cost of debt for the Company. An equally important consideration is the access to capital. In times of crisis, financial markets are more volatile, and access to credit is more limited. When the access to credit becomes limited, companies with weaker credit metrics are more affected than those with stronger credit metrics. It is therefore imperative that the Company maintains sufficiently strong credit ratios such that the Company can attract debt capital on reasonable terms. If

 ²² See, for example, FitchRatings, "U.S. Utilities, Power and Gas 2009 Outlook," December 22, 2008, p. 2.
 ²³ EUCI, "Utility Credit Risk," presented by Moody's, February 25, 2009. Quote from brochure.

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adopted, the intervenors' proposals would dangerously weaken the Company's credit metrics.

Q37. Please summarize this section.

A37. The Company's cost of debt and equity will both likely increase if the intervenors' proposal is adopted. The cost of debt will increase somewhat because the Company's credit ratios will be weakened, and the cost of equity will increase because of the heightened uncertainty regarding the possibility that previous Commission decisions could be reversed for historical periods. Finally, the Company will experience additional transaction costs to acquire additional capital to replace the cash flow lost if the proposal is adopted.

E. THE INTERVENORS' PROPOSAL IS NOT SOUND REGULATORY POLICY

Q38. Please explain why you believe that the adoption of the intervenors' proposal is not sound regulatory policy.

A38. There are at least four reasons why the intervenors' proposal is not sound regulatory policy. First, there is no other regulatory precedent supporting the proposal to reverse depreciation expense already recovered from customers. Second, the proposal is counter to GAAP. Third, the policy creates a small set of winners (i.e., customers over the next four years) at the expense of all past and future customers, and fourth, the intervenors' proposal is an application of 20-20 hindsight which will create unnecessary regulatory uncertainty.

Q39. Please discuss the fourth objection, the application of 20-20 hindsight.

A39. All regulatory decisions are made in the context of the information available at the time of the decision. The estimated lives and net salvage parameters and depreciation rates that have subsequently resulted in the estimated depreciation reserve variance were approved by the Commission based upon the best information available at the time. In the Company's current depreciation study, the estimated lives of some generating assets

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have been increased and other depreciation estimates (e.g., average remaining life, net salvage) have changed with additional experience and information over the four years since the last depreciation study, but that information was not available to the Commission when it made its previous decisions. Obviously, forecasts almost never exactly match actual outcomes, so a policy that recommends reviewing the outcome of past decisions and modifying them to match actual outcomes will result in endless debate about past decisions.

Moreover, there is no guarantee that the increase in the estimated lives of the assets that, in part, generated the depreciation reserve variance, will actually come to pass. It is not hard to imagine new regulations on the emission of carbon dioxide that could limit the useful lives of coal plants. Likewise, a similar reduction in life of older nuclear plants could occur.²⁴ If the lives were shortened, the excess depreciation reserve would quickly be reduced or disappear. Of course, regulators today have no way to know whether shortened lives will occur just as past regulators had no way to know that the current estimates of the useful lives of the assets would be increased. Any proposal that relies upon 20-20 hindsight is ill advised.

Q40. Do you agree with Mr. Pous' claim that the risk that the estimated lives of the generating plants will be shorter than current forecast is small?

A40. As I noted at the outset, I am not critiquing the depreciation studies of either the Company or the intervenors; however, as a matter of logic, the fact that there may be a low probability of a shorter life does not mean that there is a zero probability. Moreover, it is precisely because the future is unknown today that the depreciation reserve variance arose in the first place. Events unexpected today could result in the estimated lives of the generating plants being further revised, either longer or shorter, in future depreciation studies.

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²⁴ In fact the testimony of Mr. Jacob Pous, on p. 37, cites an example from the testimony of Mr. Earl Robinson of AUS Consultants who performed the depreciation study for the Company. If approval for the life extension for the Crystal River nuclear generating plant is not received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the reserve variance will largely disappear overnight.

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III. IMPACT OF CURRENT ECONOMIC TURMOIL ON THE COST OF CAPITAL

Q41. What is the topic of this section of your testimony?

A41. This section addresses the effect of the current economic situation on the cost of capital. Any proposal that weakens the Company's credit metrics during a time of market uncertainty and an increase in investor risk aversion should be carefully considered for its likely effect on the Company's cost of capital.

Q42. Please summarize the effect of current economic conditions on the cost of capital.

A42. The current economic situation in the U.S., as well as most of the rest of the world, is very uncertain for investors. Economic growth has slowed, and it is now negative in many countries. Stock markets worldwide have lost substantial value. In the U.S., for example, the S&P 500 fell more than 50 percent from its peak at the end of 2007, and the volatility of the index increased dramatically. (See Figures 2 and 3 below.) The likely result of the increased uncertainty is that investors' risk aversion has increased, which, in turn, means that the cost of capital is higher today than in the recent past.

Q43. What do you mean by the term investor "risk aversion"?

A43. Risk aversion is simply the recognition that investors dislike risk. A fundamental tenet of investing is that investors face a risk-return tradeoff in selecting from among the various investment options. Risk-averse investors can only be induced to accept more risk if the expected return is higher. When investors' risk aversion increases, the expected return (sometimes called the required return) increases for any level of risk.²⁵ In other words, the market risk premium ("MRP"), the premium required for an average risk stock, is higher today than it was in the recent past.

²⁵ Academic articles frequently use the term "coefficient of risk aversion" in conjunction with an assumption regarding investors' utility functions. In this testimony, I am using the term in a more generic sense.

A44.

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Q44. What evidence do you have that investors' risk aversion has increased?

A number of readily observable factors indicate an increase in investors' risk aversion. Unprecedented defaults in debt instruments that had previously been highly rated (AA or A), such as collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities, and the fall in value of most securities caused investors to seek investments that would preserve the value of their investments. As a result, there has been a "flight to safety" by investors seeking to maintain the value of their investments. In general, investors perceive bonds as less risky (safer) than equity and government bonds as safer than corporate bonds. As a result, the demand for bonds, particularly government debt, has increased substantially. In fact, at what *may* have been the height of the crisis, the yield on U.S. Treasury bills actually fell below zero!²⁶ The flight to safety had two other results. First, the yield spread between corporate bonds and government bonds has increased dramatically. Although the yield spreads have declined somewhat from their highest levels, they remain high by historical standards as can be seen in Table 3 below.

Table 3

(in pe	rcentage)		
Periods	A-Rated Utility and Government Bonds	BBB-Rated Utility and Government Bonds	Notes
Period 1 - Average Mar-2002 - Dec-2007	1.05	1.43	[1]
Period 2 - Average Aug-2008 - Aug-2009	2.38	3.26	[2]
Period 3 - Average Aug-2009	1.37	1.88	[3]
Period 4 - Average 15-Day (Jul. 31, 2009 to Aug. 24, 2009)	1.33	2.05	[4]
Spread Increase between Period 2 and Period 1	1.33	1.83	[5] = [2] - [1].
Spread Increase between Period 3 and Period 1	0.32	0.45	[6] = [3] - [1].
Spread Increase between Period 4 and Period 1	0.28	0.62	[7] = [4] - [1].

Average monthly yields for the indices were retrieved from Bloomberg as of August 25, 2009.

Second, the stock market plummeted in value as investors attempted to move out of investments considered risky and into those of lower risk. Increased risk aversion

²⁶ "Treasury Bills Trade at Negative Rates as Haven Demand Surges", by Daniel Kruger and Cordell Eddings, Bloomberg, December 9, 2008.

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
translates into a requirement for an investment to provide a higher expected return for a given level of risk. Under such circumstances, prices of investments fall until investors can again expect to earn their (now higher) required rate of return. Of course, part of the fall in prices is the result of a fall in expected cash flows, but it is also the result of increased risk aversion as indicated by the differential decrease in investments of different risk. It is only recently that the market has begun to recover some of its lost value.

Q45. How different is the overall economic environment now compared to other time periods in which you have testified?

A45. We now live in a very different economic environment compared to one or two years ago. The U.S. and world economies are in a state of recession triggered by the deep financial crisis that emerged from the housing bubble and from financial institutions' use of sophisticated structures that concealed the true risk faced by the investors. Stock markets are down, market volatility and the spread on corporate debt is high, and for most firms it has become extremely hard to gain access to external financing on reasonable terms.

More specifically, as Figure 2 below indicates, the S&P 500 index is down by approximately 27 percent compared to mid-2008 which is a recovery from its lowest point.

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on the S&P 500 index, over the period beginning in 2000 through August, 2009. Figure 3 below displays the market volatility, measured by the 10-day rolling volatility

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


Figure 3 S&P 500 Index's Annualized 10-Day Rolling Volatility from January 2000 to August 2009 to August 2009 Until relatively recently, average volatility was in the 20 percent range, but it spiked to over 100 percent in late 2008. Although volatility has decreased somewhat over the last several months, it is still somewhat higher than the average value for the 2003 to 2007 to 2007

The Federal Reserve's efforts to stimulate spending via interest rate cuts have resulted in the drop of the federal funds rate as indicated in Figure 4 below. The yield on Treasury bills is also at extraordinarily low levels with yields close to zero.

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


Figure 4 Federal Funds Effective Rate – January 2000 to August 2009

The lower yields on government debt, however, have not translated into lower yields on corporate debt (including the yields on investment grade utility bonds). As Figure 5 shows, the spreads over Treasury bonds for long-term A and BBB utility debt have declined but remain somewhat higher than before the credit crisis. Figure 6 displays the yields on A and BBB-rated utility debt relative to government bond yields.


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
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


Figure 6 US Bond Yields from January 2002 to August 2009

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Q46. Is the increase in investors' risk aversion from current economic conditions likely to be a temporary or permanent change?

A46. It is likely that some of the increase in risk aversion stems from the chaotic market conditions and will, I hope, be transitory in nature. There is, however, a strong possibility that there will also be a longer-term and perhaps permanent effect as market participants draw conclusions from the crisis on the fundamental risk-return characteristics of investment alternatives.

Q47. If some of the increase in the cost of capital is likely to be temporary, why should the Commission still take the increased cost of capital into consideration when judging the appropriateness of the intervenors' proposal?

Although I believe that some of the increase in the MRP is likely to be temporary, it is A47. very difficult to predict when the capital markets will return to more normal conditions, so it is difficult to predict when the market cost of risk will return to more normal levels. Even when market conditions are more normal, investors' risk aversion may remain higher well into the recovery period until their confidence fully returns. The federal government seems to recognize investors' fears, and it has signaled that it intends to overhaul the financial regulatory environment in order to restrict the behavior by financial institutions that led to the current crisis. While the success or failure of those actions are unlikely to be observed in the short- to medium-term, in the long run these measures may help alleviate investors concerns. However, it could easily be years before investors regain the confidence prevailing prior to the current crisis. In fact, there may be a "permanent" adjustment in risk tolerance now that investors realize that severe economic conditions are still possible even with the increased tools to manage the economy available to government. Therefore, I recommend that the Commission recognize the increased cost of capital stemming from the current market conditions makes adoption of the intervenors' proposal particularly risky at the current time.

Q48. Aren't the recent low realized returns on the market index a clear indication that market participants are willing to accept a lower expected return on their investments?

A48. Absolutely not. To the contrary – market values have been falling in order to allow an increase in the expected returns on investment. As risk aversion increases, *expected returns* must increase in order to induce investors to buy, so prices must fall. In other words, realized returns over the last few months are not indicative of investors' required rate of return. Investors have undoubtedly been disappointed recently. Bond investors are familiar with this process. As the general level of interest rates in the economy increases, the market price of a bond will decrease so that the yield-to-maturity will increase to the level required by the market. The same phenomenon occurs with equities as well. When the required return on investment increases, market prices must fall.

Q49. What do you conclude from the evidence on current economic conditions?

A49. The cost of capital is much higher today than in the relatively recent past. Although some of the increase in the MRP will, I hope, reverse when stable economic conditions return, it may be many years before investors' regain the level of confidence that will result in an MRP as low as immediately before the crisis. The intervenors' recommendation on depreciation will increase investor uncertainty and will increase the Company's cost of capital. The current conditions in the capital markets potentially make such a policy particularly costly.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

- Q50. Please summarize your conclusions with regard to the intervenors' proposal to reverse the estimated amount of the Company's depreciation reserve variance.
- A50. The intervenors' proposal to reverse the depreciation expense already recovered from customers should be rejected by the Commission. Under fair regulation, the present value of the cash flows from a faster or slower rate of depreciation is offset by a lower or

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higher return on rate base so that customers are automatically protected against changes in the estimation of the useful life of assets purchased to provide them service and other depreciation parameters. There is a timing difference in the cash flows from depreciation rates that turn out to be higher or lower than required. So some customers may turn out to have paid more or less than required during some period of time, but customers as a group are fully protected.

In this case, rate payers are likely to be worse off if the Commission were to adopt the intervenors' proposal because at a minimum transaction costs associated with acquiring new capital to finance planned capital investments will be higher. In addition, the proposal increases investor uncertainty and weakens the Company's credit metrics both of which are likely to increase its cost of capital. Debt costs will increase due to weaker credit ratios, and equity costs will increase due to heightened investor uncertainty regarding the permanence of previous regulatory decisions. If adopted, customers would also trade a temporarily lower rate for a higher long term rate and more variability in rates. In addition, although the proposal is justified on the basis of intergenerational fairness, the proposal itself creates intergenerational unfairness in that customers over the next four years receive a benefit at the expense of future customers and those historical customers no longer on the system.

Q51. Does this conclude your testimony?

A51. Yes.

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1	BY MR. WALLS:
2	Q . Dr. Vilbert, do you have a summary of your
3	testimony?
4	A. Yes, I do.
5	Q. Will you please provide that summary to the
6	Commission?
7	A. Yes.
8	The intervenors propose to eliminate the
9	depreciation reserve imbalance by reversing an amount of
10	depreciation expense in the company's revenue
11	requirement over a four-year period. Now, I believe the
12	proposal by the intervenors is poor regulatory policy.
13	It creates intergenerational inequity in the name of
14	intergenerational fairness. Specifically, it creates a
15	set of winners over the next four years at the expense
16	of all past and future customers. It also creates
17	regulatory uncertainty by setting a precedent that past
18	regulatory decisions are never final because results of
19	the decisions may be compared to actual outcomes.
20	Regulatory decisions made on the best
21	information available at the time should not be reversed
22	or adjusted after the fact just because expectations
23	differ from forecasts. Moreover, there is no regulatory
24	precedent that I have found that is similar to the
25	intervenors' proposal, and it is contrary to GAAP.
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The proposal by the intervenors does not adequately compensate the company. The intervenors' proposal to compensate the company only considers the first year's depreciation, i.e., about \$161 million, but the proposal envisions reversing \$645 million over four years. To compensate the company completely, the amount of compensation in rates for depreciation would have to be increased each year over the next four years, or the initial amount of the compensation should be based on \$322 million, one-half of the total to be returned.

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If adequately compensated, the proposal 11 12 results in more volatile rates and higher average 13 payments by customers than would be the case under the 14 company's proposal. The proposal by the intervenors would also likely increase the cost to customers 15 separately from the need to adequately compensate the 16 customers for the reversal of depreciation. This is 17 because the company's forecast of capital expenditures 18 is an excess of its cash flows. If you reduce their 19 20 depreciation cash flow, they will have to go to the 21 market to raise more debt and equity than they would 22 have to otherwise, and that has a transaction cost.

In addition, the loss of cash flow would weaken the company's credit metrics, which will have the effect of -- likely an effect of increasing the cost of

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debt for the company. In addition, there is an element of uncertainty stemming from the intervenors' proposal which may also increase the company's cost of capital, because decisions that were rendered in the past can be undone or reversed going forward.

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Finally, in that sense, the financial markets as we discussed earlier is just now starting to recover from the economic turmoil that we experienced, and it is a particularly bad time to increase uncertainty for a company that has to go to the capital markets to acquire capital to meet the investment needs of the company going forward.

13 Finally, this is a point that has not been to me addressed adequately or discussed enough, at least in 14 15 the time I have been sitting here. The proposal by the 16 intervenors is unnecessary in the sense that depreciation automatically protects customers. 17 Depreciation reduces rate base. It is as if the 18 19 customers are investing in these assets, and they get a 20 rate of return equal to what you would allow on the rate 21 base, including taxes, return, interest, and that automatically compensates the investors for a 22 23 depreciation rate that is higher or lower than it 24 ultimately turns out to be needed. And that concludes 25 my summary.

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MR. WALLS: We tender Dr. Vilbert for cross. 1 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you. 2 Mr. Rehwinkel, you're recognized. 3 MR. REHWINKEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 4 CROSS EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. REHWINKEL: 6 7 Q. Dr. Vilbert. 8 A. Yes. Good evening. My name is Charles Rehwinkel 9 **Q**. with the Public Counsel's Office. 10 A. Good evening. 11 12 Q. Who chose the timing of the filing of this rate case? 13 The company, as I understand it. 14 Α. 15 Can I ask you to turn, please, to Exhibit A-1 Q. of your testimony, please? 16 17 Yes. Α. And in Exhibit A-1 you list on Page A-6 all of 18 Q. the testimonies -- well, let me ask it this way. You 19 list testimonies that you provide, is that correct? 20 21 Α. Yes. 22 Okay. From there through the end of that Q. 23 exhibit, correct? 24 Α. Yes. 25 Q. Is this all of the times that you have FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	provided testimony?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. I have looked at each one of these
4	testimonies. I don't see any that say that you have
5	testified on depreciation specifically, is that correct?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Have you ever testified on so I would take
8	it from that that you have never been accepted as an
9	expert in depreciation matters in any regulatory
10	jurisdiction in this country?
11	A. Are you I don't know the answer in the
12	sense that are you asking me whether I have ever done a
13	depreciation study or whether I have ever used
14	depreciation analysis?
15	Q. No. I'm asking have you ever been accepted as
16	an expert in depreciation before a regulatory body in
17	this country?
18	A. Not on a depreciation study, no.
19	Q. Okay. On Page 2 of your testimony, at the
20	bottom, on Lines 27 and 28, you state there the
21	intervenors propose to reverse an amount of depreciation
22	equal to the amount of estimated depreciation imbalance
23	that has already been recovered from customers in
24	Commission approved rates and added back to the rate
25	base. Did I read that correctly?

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1	A. Yes.
2	Q. How does one recover a depreciation imbalance?
3	A. The company's proposed method is to recover
4	to change the depreciation rates over the remaining life
5	of the assets.
6	\mathbf{Q} . And that is a prospective approach, correct?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. I am focusing more on the grammar here of that
9	has already been recovered. How has a depreciation
10	imbalance already been recovered?
11	A. Perhaps I didn't say this as clearly as I
12	should have. What I meant was the proposal envisions
13	reversing the amount of depreciation expense that has
14	already been recovered from customers and adding it back
15	to the rate base. That is the proposal, as I understand
16	it.
17	Q. Page 3, if I could ask you to look there. You
18	state on Line 11 and 12, you start that sentence as is
19	standard in regulatory jurisdictions, the company
20	proposes to adjust the depreciation rate going forward
21	to correspond to the increased estimated lives of assets
22	and other changes in depreciation estimates. Is that
23	correct?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. What is your basis for saying, as is standard

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in regulatory jurisdictions?

As part of the process of trying to determine Α. whether this is good regulatory policy, I looked at 3 other jurisdictions in the United States starting with 4 FERC. The FERC's policy is consistent with the 5 company's proposal. I have looked at other states, not 6 every single state, but other decisions in other states 7 with similar sorts of circumstances where a nuclear 8 plant was extended in life and looked at how they 9 proposed to change depreciation rates. And in every 10 single instance in which I was able to find a decision, 11 12 they were consistent with the proposal of the company.

13 Q. Okay. So, I think you alluded to it in your 14 answer, you did not look at each and every regulatory 15 jurisdiction in this country, correct?

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That is correct. Α.

And that would include the District of 17 ο. Columbia, and however many there are in the state of 18 19 Louisiana, correct?

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Yes, that is correct. Α.

21 Q. You state on Page 3, Line 20, beginning on Line 20, that this proposal, the intervenors' proposal 22 to reverse depreciation reserve is counter to Generally 23 24 Accepted Accounting Principles, is that correct?

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Α. Yes.

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And what is your basis for saying it is 1 Q. 2 counter to GAAP? Again, as part of the process of understanding 3 Α. this proposal, I investigated what GAAP says about it, 4 and the way I read GAAP it says that if there is a 5 change in estimate as opposed to a change in accounting 6 principles, you recover it not looking backwards, but 7 you recover the change by looking forward. 8 Okay. And is that the same GAAP principle 9 Q. that Mr. Garrett testified to earlier today? 10 Yes. I think he was referencing SFAS 154 and 11 Α. 12 that is the same one, yes. 13 Okay. Well, let's turn to Page 9 of your Q. rebuttal testimony. Well, let's see, actually I wrote 14 that down wrong. Let's turn to Page 12 of your rebuttal 15 16 testimony. I'm there. 17 Α. Is this your discussion about how GAAP 18 Q. interacts with this issue in this case, starting on Line 19 8 forward onto the next page? 20 21 Α. Yes. Now, you don't cite SFAS 154 anywhere on this 22 Q. 23 page, do you? 24 No, I don't. I cite the Miller GAAP guide and Α. 25 then just last night I looked at the 2009 version of FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

this, and it cites SFAS 154. 1 All right. What I want to ask about is what 2 Q. is in your testimony here, and if I could ask you to 3 look at the Footnote 11 on Page 12. I think -- well, 4 you were in the room, were you not, when Mr. Garrett 5 testified about the effective date of SFAS 154, were you 6 7 not? 8 A. I was. And I think he stated, if I recall correctly, 9 0. that it was in May of 2005? 10 11 Yes, that's correct. Α. Now, you cited in Footnote 11 a 2004 GAAP 12 Q. quide, have you not? 13 Yes. And hearing the discussion of 154, I 14 Α. went and looked yesterday at GAAP 2009, and its language 15 16 is almost identical to this in this testimony. Okay. But there was no 154 in 2004, was 17 Q. there? 18 19 No. Α. Page 4, if you will, please. 20 Q. 21 Α. I'm sorry, what page? 22 Page 4. Q. I'm there. 23 Α. Actually, let's go back to Page 3, I 24 Q. 25 apologize. If I could get you to turn to 3.

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1	A. Yes.
2	${f Q}$. On Line 23, with respect to GAAP, you use the
3	word recommends, is that correct?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Okay. So you are saying that somehow you
6	can does GAAP opine on this specific issue as far as
7	you can tell?
8	A. Can you be specific about the specific issue
9	you have in mind?
10	Q. Well, the one you are here to testify on,
11	which would be that issue.
12	A. Yes, they are specific. However, there are
13	some caveats associated with the language in the GAAP
14	that has to do with whether or not there was a change of
15	accounting principle, or whether there was an error in
16	accounting, or some other factor that would then lead
17	you to go backwards in time and adjust the books looking
18	backwards versus a simple change in estimate, which is
19	forward-looking.
20	Q. Okay. Now, you are not an accountant,
21	correct?
22	A. That is correct.
23	Q. And you are not a CPA, of course, then, right?
24	A. No.
25	Q. And on Line 25 of Page 3 where you state you

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have found no regulatory precedent in other 1 jurisdictions to reverse accrued depreciation. With 2 regard to that statement, that would be with respect to 3 the number of jurisdictions that you did look at, 4 5 correct? Yes, that is correct. My staff and I tried to 6 Α. 7 do a thorough investigation to look for circumstances in 8 which depreciation was effectively reversed as opposed to changing depreciation rates going forward, and we 9 10 found no similar procedures. Okay. So, is it your testimony that you found 11 **Q**. no instance where accrued depreciation was reversed? 12 13 Under the circumstances of a change in Α. 14 estimate, that is correct. That is insofar as you looked at a particular 15 Q. 16 state, correct? 17Yes. As I fully agree there is a lot of Α. 18 states and a lot of decisions, and I'm sure I didn't 19 look at every one or even get close, but I tried to do a 20 thorough test. 21 Now, with respect to the state of Florida, did ο. 22 you look at all of the depreciation decisions in the 23 state of Florida? 24 Α. No, that role fell to Mr. Garrett that you had 25 a fairly extensive conversation with. I looked at the

ones that Mr. Pous cited thinking that that would be the 1 primary place to find something that would support the 2 procedure that he was recommending, and to my read of 3 those decisions, I don't see the similar situation. 4 Okay. On Page 4 of your rebuttal testimony on 5 Ο. Line 9 --6 7 Α. Yes. -- you state there that it is also a 8 Q. particularly bad time to increase regulatory uncertainty 9 10 because the capital markets are only now beginning to emerge from a period of turmoil and increased investor 11 12 risk aversion, is that correct? 13 Α. Yes. Now, you don't have -- you didn't do a similar 14 Q. analysis of the timing of this case with respect to the 15 16 impact that a \$500 million rate increase would have on 17 customers, did you? 18 I made no analysis of the impact of increased Α. 19 rates on customers, no. Okay. And on Page 4, Lines 21 through 23, you 20 Q. offer the opinion to the Commission that because of 21 22 unusual conditions still prevailing today, it is a particularly poor time to increase investor uncertainty 23 24 regarding recovery of their investment in the company's 25 assets, is that correct?

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1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Okay.
3	A. It is more or less redundant, isn't it?
4	Q. But you
5	A. Sorry about that.
6	Q. That's okay. And you may not have written it
7	with the same emphasis that I used on certain words, but
8	this only refers to the company's perspective, not the
9	customers' perspective, does it not?
10	A. I think I think that is not correct. The
11	reason is that if the company's cost of capital
12	increases, then ratepayers will ultimately have to pay
13	that cost of capital. So it is not in their interest,
14	the ratepayers interest, to have the cost of capital be
15	higher than it would otherwise be.
16	Q. Okay. You didn't do any analysis, sensitivity
17	analysis to determine how much customers need to pay in
18	order to get that opportunity to have the benefit of a
19	lower cost of money, did you?
20	A. I did not do an empirical analysis to estimate
21	it. I am simply opining that increasing uncertainty
22	will increase the cost of capital, even if it is only by
23	a little bit.
24	Q. Okay. I am interested, I guess, in your
25	opinion about the role of depreciation on Page 4, Lines
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26 through the end of that page and onto the next page. 1 You start off talking about the role of depreciation, if 2 I could characterize it that way, on Line 26. You say 3 the first describes the role of depreciation and the 4 5 revenue requirement. Depreciation increases the revenue 6 requirement, but reduces rate base, so that under fair regulation both investors and customers are protected if 7 depreciation rates turn out to be higher or lower than 8 necessary to recover the investment over the expected 9 10 useful life of the asset. Do you see that? 11 Α. Yes. 12 Is it your testimony here that the primary Q. 13 role of depreciation is to get the rate base down? 14 Α. No. 1'5Okay. Is that a goal of depreciation to ο. 16 reduce the rate base? 17 It is a result of depreciation. It reduces Α. 18 the rate base. The purpose of depreciation is to 19 recognize that an asset used to provide service 20 deteriorates over time and has some limited expected 21 life, useful life, and you recover the cost of the asset 22 over its useful life. 23 Is it your testimony that customers always Q. 24 benefit from higher depreciation rates, because higher 25 depreciation rates generate credits in the rate base?

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1	A. No.
2	Q. So on Page 7 of your rebuttal testimony, if I
3	could get you to look at the top, on Lines 1 through 4.
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. You say if the initial rate of depreciation
6	turns out to be higher than required because the
7	expected life is increased, customers save the return on
8	the depreciation recovered.
9	A. Yes, that's correct.
10	Q. Aren't you suggesting there that customers
11	benefit by higher depreciation rates?
12	A. No. If I may explain, the goal of
13	depreciation of the depreciation rate is to recover
14	the cost of the asset over its expected life. But, we
15	don't have crystal balls, so we don't know how long all
16	the assets are going to last, and so effectively what
17	ends up happening every time we do a depreciation study
18	the estimated lives of some assets turn out to be
19	different than we thought when we did it.
20	What I am saying is when you base depreciation
21	rates and a fair rate of return, the present value of
22	the sum of depreciation that you get for an asset and
23	the expected return or the return you receive on that
24	asset is equal to the cost of the asset that you start
25	with. And, so, in present value terms, the ratepayers

have paid present value of the assets and the company has received in rates the present value of the assets. If you change the depreciation schedule, what you have done is changed the time period over which these payments occur, but you have not changed the present value under fair regulation.

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Q. Do you think it is preferable, all things being equal, for depreciation rates to be higher than lower?

A. No. The goal of setting depreciation rate is
to spread the cost over the expected life of the asset.
Higher or lower doesn't come into that. You set rates
to recover the costs, and normally in regulation we set
it on a straight line basis, so we spread the cost
evenly over the life of the asset.

Q. I could have sworn you said in your opening
summary that depreciation protects customers because it
decreases rate base.

A. It does. I did say that, but it seems to be ignored in what I am listening to sitting in the audience, the idea that depreciation was somehow too high over the recent past and somehow ratepayers have been harshly disadvantaged by that. I don't believe that to be the case because, as I said, the sum of depreciation and return on the asset is equal to the

amount of money you spend to start with. And it is only a matter of timing, then, about how those cash flows are spread out through the life of the asset.

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Q. Is it your testimony here that it doesn't matter how large the theoretical depreciation reserve is relative to the accumulated depreciation reserve?

No. I'm not sure I have an opinion on how 7 Α. large or how out of sync the depreciation reserve could 8 be before it becomes some kind of problem that would 9 10 need to be addressed in terms of the intergenerational equity issue that has been raised here. However, the 11 proposal, as I understand it to the company from the 12 13 intervenors is guite different than changing the depreciation rates going forward. They are actually 14 15 going to reverse depreciation and build the rate base 16 back up to a higher level and you haven't added any new 17 plant to the system.

18 Q. You haven't performed any analysis, have you, 19 to determine -- well, let me ask it this way. You 20 didn't consider whether the depreciation reserve that is 21 at issue in this case is, to use your words, materially 22 out of sync, did you?

A. No. And keep in mind, as I understand the depreciation reserve imbalance that is at issue here, the way it came about was based upon a study done today

or during this proceeding, and it wasn't -- it's new 1 information. It is saying the lives of these assets 2 will be longer than we originally forecast; and, 3 therefore, we have collected more depreciation on those 4 assets based upon their older shorter life than is 5 necessary going forward. So that reserve imbalance is a 6 7 new phenomenon in that sense. So, what the proposal by the intervenors effectively does is say, well, the 8 Commission got it wrong when it set rates before. 9 We 10 need to go back and fix that, because the life turned out to be different than we thought four years ago. 11

Q. What would your recommendation be if the depreciation reserve theoretical -- if the theoretical depreciation reserve imbalance was twice what it is here? Would you say that there still should be nothing other than a remaining life treatment of that reserve imbalance?

No. I don't know the answer. The inherent in 18 Δ 19 your question is that there is some cut off above which the imbalance is too great to be recovered over the 20 remaining expected life of the assets. The principle 21 22 under which the company is operating is that these kinds of changes in reserve depreciation should be amortized 23 24 over the remaining life of the assets. That is the principle. How big an imbalance needs to be before some 25

other principle needs to be invoked, I don't have an 1 objective way to determine that. 2 You just know that in this case it hasn't 3 ο. reached that threshold, whatever it is? 4 5 I'm sorry, what? Α. You just know that in this case, this 6 **Q**. 7 imbalance has not reached that threshold, whatever it 8 may be, is that right? Effectively that is my judgment, yes. .9 Α. Okay. And how many depreciation reserve 10 Q. 11 imbalances have you evaluated as part of the testimony 12 that you have provided in the past? 13 Α. This is the first one. Okay. On Page 7, Lines 14 through 21, you 14 Ο. state there is no reason that the depreciation reserve 15 should be reversed over a four-year period. That period 16 is completely arbitrary. In fact, the only logical and 17 completely fair way to deal with the issue is to adopt 18 the company's proposal to reset the depreciation rate 19 based upon the remaining useful life of the assets whose 20 21 expected useful lives and other depreciation parameters 22 have changed. Did I read that correctly? 23 Yes. Α. Now, is it your testimony that PEF has always 24 Q. 25 followed this principle in addressing depreciation

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reserve imbalances? 1 No. I was here when the discussion of the 2 Α. previous settlement -- where they did something 3 different than this procedure that they are now 4 5 recommending in this case. Okay. And I think -- did you hear testimony 6 ο. about 1997 treatment and maybe that there were some 7 amortizations? 8 There was -- I understand that sometimes 9 Ά. depreciation reserves are shifted among accounts, and --10 So those would not have been logical or 11 Q. 12 completely fair when those were done? 13 Α. Those methods, the changing reserves among accounts, does not change the depreciation principle 14 going forward. It just reallocates the depreciation you 15 have calculated already among different accounts. 16 17 Q. Okay. It is fundamentally different than the 18 Α. 19 proposal in this proceeding. 20 Q. Now, as part of your testimony in the 21 preparation and the research you did for this case, you 22 did not come across any accounting guidance that said 23 that reserve transfers were violative of GAAP, did you? 24 No, I don't believe I did. Α. 25 Q. Okay. On Page 7 on Lines 20 and 21, you

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state, and, again, I think you are referring to the 1 portion of your testimony I just read, that this is, in 2 fact, the way that changes in expected lives of 3 depreciable assets are usually handled, is that correct? 4 You read it correctly. 5 Α. 6 0. And were you referring to that sentence that I read earlier, those couple of sentences I read in Lines 7 8 14 through 19? In most of the jurisdictions or in the 9 Α. jurisdictions that I found decisions addressing this 10 11 issue, the change in estimated life was -- in 12 depreciation was changed to recover the remaining 13 depreciation over the life of the asset. Okay. And I think you just answered this 14 Ο. 15 question, but when you say usually handled, that is 16 insofar as you researched it in the jurisdictions that 17 you looked at, correct? 18 Α. Yes. 19 And if I asked you the same question on Page Q. 20 8, Lines 25 through 27, where you state to my knowledge, 21 all jurisdictions revise the depreciation rate to match the new estimated life of the assets. That all 22 23 jurisdictions, again, should be qualified by to the extent you looked at those jurisdictions? 24 25 Yes. Had I found a jurisdiction that did it Α.

differently, I would have reported that fact. But I didn't find such a jurisdiction. Okay. And, again, on Page 8, Lines 27 through Ο. Page 9, Lines 1 and 2, when you testify about Generally Accepted Accounting Principles making it clear that such a change needs to be handled prospectively, not retroactively, you are referring to what you found in the Miller GAAP guide? Yes, and also the 2009 GAAP guide. I mean, I Α. read English. I'm not an accountant, but I read English, and the English says if it is a change in

12 estimate, do it forward.

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Okay. Now, you didn't make any judgment about 13 Q. how materiality might enter into the application of the 14 15 GAAP, that you -- the principles that you read about in 16 Miller GAAP guide, did you?

> Α. No.

Okay. Dr. Vilbert, if depreciation rates had 18 Q. been set in the past such that there was no theoretical 19 20 depreciation reserve, or there -- let me start again and 21 ask it this way. If depreciation rates had been set in 22 the past such that by the end of the next four-year 23 period the theoretical depreciation reserve essentially 24 equaled zero, wouldn't customers of PEF be facing a rate 25 base that will be the same as the rate base that would

1	result if	Mr. Pous' recommendation is adopted?
2	A.	I think so, if I followed your question. Can
3	I restate	what I think you said to be sure we are on the
4	same page?	
5	Q.	Yes, sir.
6	А.	I think you said that if the \$645 million had
7	not alread	y been collected in depreciation, the rate
8	base would	be \$645 million higher.
9	Q.	That is correct, yes.
10	A.	And the answer to that one is, yes, I believe
11	so.	
12		MR. REHWINKEL: Dr. Vilbert, thank you. Those
13	are all th	e questions I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
14		CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Mr. Rehwinkel.
15		Ms. Bradley, you're recognized.
16		CROSS EXAMINATION
17	BY MS. BRA	DLEY:
18	Q.	Just a question, a couple of questions, sir.
19	Would you	agree that a higher return on equity is not a
20	guarantee	of a higher credit rating?
21	А.	As a single stand-alone item
22	Q.	Yes.
23	A.	I would agree with that, yes.
24	Q.	Okay. Were you aware that the Legislature
25	granted so	me preconstruction costs for Progress for them
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1 to build their nuclear plant? I learned this, I believe, a couple of days 2 Α. 3 ago where, if I understand the proposal, they have CWIP in rate base where they get the actual costs of -- or 4 5 some of the costs recovered as opposed to capitalizing 6 them. 7 Q. And are you aware that the PSC granted some 8 interim rates for their Bartow plant? 9 Α. I was not aware. Okay. Is there any indication in the credit 10 ο. 11 market that they feel that the PSC does not provide the 12 money that the company needs? 13 Α. No. My testimony isn't that the Public 14 Service Commission is treating the company unfairly. Μv 15 testimony is that if the intervenors' proposal were 16 adopted, the cash flow to the company would be reduced, 17 that cash flow reduction would affect their credit metrics, their credit ratios that the investors look at 18 19 when determining whether to invest in the company. And 20 that then in turn reconfigured ratios would likely lead to increased cost of debt, as well as the possibility of 21 22 an increased cost of equity stemming from uncertainty 23 about whether or not decisions can be reversed by 24 looking backwards as opposed to going forward. 25 Would it be fair to say that if the PSC has **Q**.

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routinely granted the money it felt the company needed to do its buildings and other projects, that the investors would have some assurance that the PSC will grant the money they need for current projects and ongoing projects even if it is not everything they have asked for?

7 Α. It's not a yes/no question. That is a fairly 8 involved set of hypotheses, so let me try to answer it 9 this way. Regulatory certainty is certainly a factor in 10 investors' minds when they go to buy the securities of 11 regulated companies. In this case, the proposal to 12 reverse depreciation, as I mentioned earlier, if it is 13 done properly, the present value to the company and the 14 customers will be unaffected by changing the time 15 period. However, in the short-term, over the next four 16 years, your reducing -- this proposal, if adopted, would 17 reduce the cash flows to the company. That will weaken the credit metrics. That is a real effect even if 18 19 investors believe ultimately they will recover the money 20 at some future point.

Would it be fair to say, though, that the Q. credit rating and the risk involved is based more on the 23 PSC granting them the money they feel like they need to go forward with their projects versus just giving them whatever they want?

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1 Α. There is more -- I don't know whether that is 2 a yes/no question. There is more involved in credit 3 ratings than simply regulatory support. There is allowed rates of return, there is processes of recovery, 4 5 there is a certainty of recovery. All of those 6 things -- and allowed cash flows. All of those things 7 go into the credit rating. And so the simple support by 8 the regulator, while beneficial, is not sufficient, 9 particularly if you reduce the cash flows sufficiently 10 to weaken the credit ratings.

11 Q. Isn't a credit rating tied more to needs 12 versus wants?

13 Yes, I forgot to address that. I'm not Α. 14 advocating that the company should be able to come 15before the Commission and as much as they may like to, 16 get everything they ask for. There is always going to 17 be a give and take in this process. But the process, 18 the Commission is going to adjust or evaluate the 19 information to provide a fair rate of return, a fair 20 cost-recovery and all of those things. It is not 21 necessarily what the company exactly wants nor is it 22 likely to be the case that intervenors will get what 23 they want. It is somewhere in the middle generally.

Q. Were you aware of the testimony by some of the people that testified at the service hearings that they

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were investors and that they usually look at utilities, 1 especially those that are monopolies and that are 2 regulated utilities as being a fairly safe investment? 3 Oh, yes, I agree with that completely. Α. 4 MS. BRADLEY: All right. Thank you. No 5 6 further questions. 7 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Ms. Bradley. Ms. Kaufman. 8 9 MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 10 CROSS EXAMINATION 11 BY MS. KAUFMAN: I guess it is good evening, Dr. Vilbert. 12 Q. How 13 are you? 14 Α. Good evening. So far so good. 15 Okay. I am Vicki Kaufman, and I am here on Q. 16 behalf of the Florida Industrial Power Users Group, and 17 I have a couple of follow-up questions to what Mr. 18 Rehwinkel asked you, and then I've got just a few 19 questions of my own. 20 I thought I heard you say in response to one 21 of his questions that it is not in the ratepayers' 22 interest to have a higher cost of capital. Is that what 23 vou told him? 24 I don't think so. I think he asked me, or at Α. 25 least I thought he asked me, that it is in the interest FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

of the ratepayers to have a higher depreciation rate, which would then reduce the rate base. He interpreted what I said to mean that, and I disagreed with that conclusion.

Q. Okay. Thanks for clarifying that. I think
you also had a discussion with him about the fact that
you did not do an analysis or try to gauge the
materiality of the depreciation surplus, do you remember
that?

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Yes.

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Q. Okay. And I just want to be clear about that discussion that you had. Is it your testimony that there is some point at which the reserve might require some treatment other than what the company has suggested here, but we are just not at that point yet?

It is a very tough question to answer, I 16 Α. think, because as I said, inherent in that is a belief 17 that there is some sort of a bright line that you can 18 say if the reserve as a percentage of total plant or 19 20 some other measure is less than a certain amount we are okay, and if it is greater than a certain amount, we are 21 22 not okay, and we have got to do something different. Ι 23 don't know how you would draw that line, and so I don't 24 want to rule out the possibility that there is some 25 chance that you could be in such a world. But, in

general, I think you are better off adhering to 1 principles every time you make one of these kind of 2 decisions. If you adhere to the same principles each 3 and every time, that will pay off in the long run. 4 So is it your testimony that one should adhere 5 0. to the principles espoused by the company regardless of 6 the amount of the depreciation excess? 7 With all due respect, these are principles not 8 Α. that the company is following, but these are principles 9 that are not just espoused by them, but it's by GAAP, 10 it's by FERC, it's by most other regulatory 11 jurisdictions. I fully admit that I didn't check every 12 single one of them, but other regulatory jurisdictions. 13 And, again, you are asking me to give you a 14 15 magic number. I don't have that magic number. I'm not even sure how I would get there. To me to get to an 16 imbalance that is of the type you are talking about, you 17 would need to have an error, a clear error somehow as 18 19 opposed to a change in estimate of ongoing life. In this case, most of this results from a 20 change in the future life of the assets. You could not 21 22 have known that in the past or should not or did not 23 know that in the past. And, by the way, those estimates could be faulty in themselves. They could be longer or 24 25 shorter than the current estimate. The nuke could not

get extended in its life or some other aspect could 1 change that would cause it to close early. So we only 2 assume that it will make that length of life, as is the 3 same for the coal plants. 4 Okay. Now, I think I heard you now say that 5 Q. the only time you consider a treatment other than the 6 principles espoused in your testimony is if there had 7 been an error made by the company. Is that your 8 9 testimony? 10 Well, let me be clear. Α. I think that's a yes or no, and then you can 11 Q. explain. 12 13 No. Let me be clear. Α. 14 Q. Okay. 15 What I said was you are hypothesizing a -- I Α. don't know how to characterize it, a massive imbalance 16 in reserve. And the hypothesis -- my response to you is 17 I don't know how to set that magic number. And under 18 19 the due course of events, I would think you would not arrive at such a point unless you made an error. 20 The 21 only way I think you could get there is if somehow you made an error in the past. You made a false calculation 22 23 or something, added things wrong. You know, these 24 things happen. That is hypothesizing how you would get 25 there. Otherwise, the very careful depreciation studies

that are done every four years you would not expect to 1 reach the threshold level of massive, if you will, 2 whatever the characterization you want to make of it. 3 So whatever this magic number is, I'm just **O**. 4 trying to understand your position on this. There is 5 some point, and would you agree that that point requires 6 an exercise of judgment on the part of the regulators to 7 determine when that magic number has been reached or 8 that line has been crossed? 9 MR. WALLS: Objection, mischaracterizes his 10 11 testimony. 12 CHAIRMAN CARTER: To the objection, 13 Ms. Kaufman. 14 MS. KAUFMAN: I thought that that is what the witness talked about, a magic point at which the 15 imbalance might become great enough to have him veer 16 from his principles, and I was just trying to understand 17 18 how we might arrive at that. CHAIRMAN CARTER: Mr. Walls. 19 20 MR. WALLS: His testimony was there was no 21 magic number. CHAIRMAN CARTER: That is what I heard. 22 You 23 want to rephrase? 24 MS. KAUFMAN: I will try. 25 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Good.

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MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1 2 BY MS. KAUFMAN: Dr. Vilbert, would you agree with me that 3 Q. regardless of the reason for the -- for a reserve 4 excess, there may well be a point at which a treatment 5 6 other than that that you recommended would be 7 appropriate? As a theoretical matter, unlikely to occur 8 Α. under the system that you have in place, there probably 9 is some number beyond which you would say we need to do 10 something different going forward, and perhaps you would 11 want to fire your depreciation expert that you got in 12 13 the situation in the first place. But, I mean, 14 theoretically I quess there is some number out there 15 beyond which you would say things are just too out of control. But I don't think there is a magic number, and 16 I don't think you are there. I don't think you are 17 likely to get there if you do depreciation studies every 1819 four years. 20 And would you agree with me that at the end of Q. 21 the day it is the Commission that will make the judgment

about whether or not we are there?

A. Ultimately, the Commission has to make all of these judgments.

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Q. If you turn to Page 2 of your rebuttal

testimony at the bottom, the question begins on Line 22, 1 and I guess I should ask you this question first. Have 2 you reviewed Mr. Pollock's testimony on the depreciation 3 reserve issue? 4 5 Α. Yes. Okay. If you would look at your testimony 6 Ο. beginning on Line 22, and it actually goes over to the 7 next page. But at any rate, beginning on Line 25, you 8 say the intervenors' proposal is designed to eliminate 9 the \$645 million depreciation reserve variance over a 10 11 four-year period. Is that your testimony there? 12 Yes, that is the proposal I understand is the Α. 13 primary proposal. 14 That is not Mr. Pollock's proposal, is it? Q. 15 I understand now that he is talking about \$100 Α. 16 million a year over four years. 17 Q. Did you not understand that when you drafted your testimony? 18 No, I didn't. I thought it was -- I thought 19 Α. 20 they were all supporting the same sort of reduction. 21 Although the effect of his proposal is the same. Do you have a copy of Mr. Pollock's testimony? 22 Q. 23 Α. Not with me, no. MS. KAUFMAN: Mr. Walls, does somebody have a 24 25 copy? FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You may approach. 1 2 BY MS. KAUFMAN: Dr. Vilbert, you now have Mr. Pollock's 3 Q. testimony? 4 Yes, I do. 5 Α. If you take a look at Page 49 at the top, the 6 Q. 7 question actually begins on Line 1, and the answer continues through Line 10. If you would just take a 8 9 moment to review that. 10 Α. Yes. So you would agree with me that Mr. Pollock's 11 Q. 12 recommendation is not as you stated it on Page 2 of your 13 rebuttal testimony, correct? No, that is correct. And I understand that he 14 Α. 15 said it is now four years for the period. I understand 16 that was a correction he made while he was testifying. So instead of 300 million, it's 400, is my 17 18 understanding. 19 It would be until the next depreciation study 0. 20 is filed, is that what you understand? 21 Α. Yes. Okay. And so that would not eliminate the 22 Q. 23 \$645 million reserve surplus, would it? It would reduce it, but it would not eliminate it? 24 25 Well, that is correct. The principle inherent Α. FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

in that proposal is smaller in magnitude but identical
in approach to the one that I addressed.
Q. If you turn to your rebuttal, Page 7, please,

and take a look at Line 16. I think Mr. Rehwinkel talked to you a little bit about this section. Do you see the sentence that begins in the middle of Line 16, "In fact, the only logical and completely fair way to deal with the issue is to adopt the company's proposal." Do you see that?

Α.

I do.

Q. Is it your testimony that if the Commission adopts either Mr. Pollock's or Mr. Pous' recommendation that they will be acting illogically and unfairly?

I think they would treat some -- yes, I think 14 Α. they would treat some ratepayers unfairly, because you 15are creating by this proposal a set of winners over the 16 next four years at the expense of ratepayers from years 17 five and on, because rates will go up based upon a 18 19 temporary reduction in rates over the next four years. 20 I think it is illogical. Whether the Commission thinks 21 it is illogical, I guess I don't want to say that.

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Q. I think that was a highly diplomatic answer.

Dr. Vilbert, are you familiar with the NARUC public utility depreciation practices manual? I know that it was discussed with Mr. Garrett.

1	A. I know of its existence. I wouldn't say I am
2	an expert on it.
3	Q. I'm sorry, I didn't hear the last part.
4	A. I'm not an expert on what is in it.
5	Q. Have you reviewed it?
6	A. Not completely, no. I have read parts of it.
7	Q. Have you reviewed the portion that deals with
8	the treatment of theoretical reserve, or with
9	A. No.
10	Q. Excuse me.
11	A. No.
12	Q . You have not.
13	MS. KAUFMAN: Mr. Chairman, I know this is
14	already in evidence, and I apologize, I don't know what
15	the exhibit number is.
16	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Ms. Kaufman, it is 311.
17	MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
18	BY MS. KAUFMAN:
19	Q. Mr. Wright is going to hand you a copy, an
20	excerpt from this manual, and if you would flip over to
21	Page 188 at the bottom, it talks about treatment of
22	reserve imbalances.
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Okay. If you would just take a moment and
25	read just that last paragraph under the heading
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treatment of reserve imbalances to yourself.

2 Α. Yes. And would you agree with me that the NARUC 3 ο. depreciation practices manual sets out several ways to 4 deal with a reserve imbalance, one being the way the 5 company has suggested, and the other being that the 6 imbalance be amortized to the current depreciation 7 expense over a short period of time? 8 If I understand what it is saying, I think 9 Α. that is correct. I would note one thing, if I look --10 if I am understanding correctly, this document is a 11 12 1996 document, which was prior to the change in FASB 154, so this proposal would now be, as I understand it, 13 14counter to GAAP. So I quess I will stop there. 15 Are you aware that this is the current, even 0. 16 though it is from 1996, the current NARUC manual on 17 depreciation, or would you accept that, subject to 18 check? 19 I would accept that subject to check. Α. 20 If you turn to your testimony on Page 9 and Q. beginning at Line 3, they are talking about the lack of 21 22 regulatory precedent for the proposal that Mr. Pous or 23 Mr. Pollock have suggested, correct? 24 Α. I'm sorry --25 Q. I'm sorry, Page 9, Line 3.

May I amend my last answer? 1 Α. 2 Q. Of course you may. The only other thing I would note, when I was 3 Α. reading this quickly, it said should the imbalance be 4 5 amortized, debited, or credited to the current depreciation expense over a short period of time. The 6 way I read that, unless I am misunderstanding what this 7 is saying, that is different from the intervenors' 8 proposal to reverse the depreciation and rebuild the 9 rate base. But I may be reading it wrong, but that is 10 11 the way I read this. 12 Were you here for Mr. Garrett's 0. cross-examination? 13 14 I was. Α. Okay. And correct me if I'm wrong, but did he 15 Q. not agree that these were two different ways to treat a 16 reserve imbalance? 17 Yes. If I understand correctly what he said, 18 Α. 19 he agreed there were two different ways. One was the 20 remaining life, the other was a shorter period of time. 21 The distinction I'm drawing is whether or not you 22 actually reverse depreciation, because that to me is 23 quite different. 24 Well, this quote that we have just been Q. 25 looking at here says that the imbalance would be

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1	amortized, debited, or credited. Is that not what
2	Mr. Pollock and Mr. Pous are suggesting?
3	A. To the current depreciation and expense, but
4	not to increase rate base. That is the way I am reading
5	it. I could be wrong.
6	Q . Well, I guess it will speak for itself.
7	We were about to look at Page 9, starting at
8	Line 3.
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Okay. Are you there? And you talk about not
11	being able to find any precedent, and then you go on to
12	say, "Regulators in several states clearly rely on the
13	methodology proposed by the company." How many states
14	are you intending to refer to by several?
15	A. I think I list two or three in the process of
16	this, but it seemed we looked at lots of states and
17	found no ones that were counter to what I am saying
18	here. We only reported the ones that had decisions that
19	were of similar nature, which is to say a nuclear unit
20	got an extension of life, or a coal plant got an
21	extension of life as opposed to reporting every time we
22	could find something. So I don't know the number of
23	states, sorry.
24	Q. That's okay. You filed this on October 31st,
25	so about a month ago. And when you wrote this sentence

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several states, you were intending to refer to two or three states, or --

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A. In the process of doing this, we had already come across several, which, you know, three or four or five. And we continued the ongoing investigation to see if we found any until I filed it, and I just didn't go back and change and put the exact number here.

Q. And I am just trying to get a handle on what you meant when you wrote that. First you said two to three, then you said three, four, five. Do you have a ballpark of what you meant when you said several states?

A. What I thought I said was I referenced two or three state decisions, plus the FERC, plus GAAP, plus we looked to find if I could find anything counter to the procedures that I have discussed here, and was not able to, and so did not list the number of states or the number of negatives, I guess, if you will.

If you will flip over to Page 12 at the top. 18 Q. 19 And you're commenting on Mr. Pollock's discussion of the 20 settlement, and I guess we have already had some discussion about that earlier. And I think Commissioner 21 22 Skop discussed it with Mr. Garrett, if I recall 23 correctly. And I am correct, am I not, that as a result 24 of that settlement, the company took a charge to its 25 depreciation expense of \$250 million, correct? Is that

1 vour understanding? Yes, it is in the context of a settlement in 2 Α. which there was give and take on a number of issues. 3 But, yes, that is my understanding. 4 Absolutely. I totally agree with you. Are 5 Q. you aware that the Public Service Commission reviewed 6 7 and approved that settlement? 8 Α. Yes. Okay. So would you agree with me that the 9 0. Commission found that depreciation treatment appropriate 10 at that time? 11 In the context of the settlement as a whole, I 12 Α. 13 would agree with that, yes. And on the Commission, you would agree with me 14 0. that the Commission did not find any regulatory or other 15 impediments to approving those provisions in the 16 settlement? 17 I think the answer must be they did not, 18 Α. because they would not have approved it had they found 19 20 any impediments, or would have stated so, but I don't 21 know what they said other than the settlement itself. 22 On that same page beginning at Line 8, you Q. 23 say, "To quote one of the most commonly used intermediate accounting textbooks," and then you have a 24 quote there on Page 17 to 20. I'm just curious, is that 25

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quote specifically related to electric plants, or 1 regulated utilities, or is that a general statement from 2 this textbook? 3 It is a general statement from the textbook. 4 Α. 5 And then if you would flip over to Page 13, Q. 6 Line 25. And I just want the record to be clear. And 7 also take a look at Page 14, Lines 6 through 7. And, again, we now understand that your reference there to 8 9 the proposal of intervenors is not Mr. Pollock's 10 proposal, correct? 11 That is correct in terms of magnitude. In Α. 12 terms of all the other aspects of it, it is the same. 13 0. Flip over to Page 18, please. 14 Α. I'm there. And down at the bottom, beginning under the 15 Ο. 16 heading the cost of capital is likely to increase, take a look at Line 27. And you are talking -- actually, 26 17 18 and 27. You are talking about the company's plans for 19 substantial capital investment going forward and in 20 particular its planned new nuclear generation. Do you 21 see that? 22 Yes. Α. 23 Are you aware that the company has pushed out Ο. the date of its two Levy units by almost two years? 24 25 Α. No, I wasn't aware of the date, although that

does not surprise me. However, they are still in, as I 1 understand it, a negative cash flow situation, which is 2 to say that to meet all of their investment needs, they 3 are -- have negative cash flow. 4 Well, when you made this reference to planned 5 ο. new nuclear generation on Line 27, I assume, and correct 6 7 me if I'm wrong, that you were referring to the two 8 proposed Levy nuclear plants? I understand that the capital plan is 2-1/29 Α. billion going forward, or something like that over the 10 11 next few years. That is related to the nuclear plants? 12 Q. I don't know if it is -- I don't think it is 13 Α. 14 all nuclear plant. It is the sum of everything they are 15 doing. 16 Would you agree that a substantial portion may Q. 17 be related to the nuclear plants? 18 Α. Yes. And so if that project didn't go forward, the 19 Ο. 20 nuclear project, would that change some of the 21 recommendations you have in this paragraph? 22 To the extent that -- to the extent that their Α. 23 capital expenditures are lower, they would have to access the capital markets with less volume and less 24 25 frequency.

1 If you would look at Page 21, Line 9 is Q. 2 actually the question. And if you could keep your 3 finger there, and also flip over to Page 24, Line 7. And in both of those questions -- well, on the question 4 5 on Page 21 and in your answer you are discussing the 6 challenging economic environment. And then on Page 24 7 you are talking about current economic conditions, 8 correct? 9 Α. Yes. 10 Would you agree with me that Florida 0. 11 ratepayers are certainly facing challenging -- a 12 challenging economic environment? 13 I'm not sure what you mean by challenging. Α. 14 Things are not as economically healthy for the state of 15 Florida or the rest of the United States as they were a 16 few years ago, two years ago. So in that sense, it's 17 less beneficial to the economy than it was before, if 18 that is what you mean by challenging, higher 19 unemployment, so forth. 20 Q. Right. And I was just going to ask you if you 21 would accept, subject to check, that we have heard a lot 22 of testimony about the high unemployment and high 23 foreclosure rates that we have here in Florida. Are you 24 familiar with that? 25 Α. In general terms, yes, not the specifics.

1 Well, you don't -- I guess you would agree 0. 2 that Florida is facing -- Florida's consumers are facing 3 some difficult economical challenges due to the state of the economy? 4 5 I would say you could say that generally about Α. 6 most states in the country right now, yes. 7 0. Do you think that given some of the economic challenges that consumers face, and taking that into 8 9 account as we look at the depreciation surplus, that it 10 might be a reasonable approach to temper the company's 11 half a billion dollar rate increase by utilizing the 12 suggestion of Mr. Pollock and Mr. Pous in regard to this 13 \$645 million reserve surplus? 14 I don't know how to answer, whether it is a Α. 15 yes or no, so I will say I don't know to start with. 16 First of all, this section that you just were 17 referencing deals with the cost of capital. And the 18 cost of capital is estimated in the capital markets, and 19 whether the economy is booming or not doing well, the 20 theory of the Hope case and Bluefield is that you award 21 the cost of capital and you don't consider whether 22 ratepayers are unemployed currently or not. The cost of 23 capital is the cost of capital. 24

With respect to depreciation and other rates, I think the issue is less clear. Certainly, I think

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considering whether the ratepayers can afford to pay the rates that you set is an important consideration in determining what to do. However, in this case, you are talking about simply moving money around in time for a short-term benefit. And in my experience there is almost always the case in every proceeding I think I have ever been in that the two sides are saying similar things to what is being said here.

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In one case the ratepayers are saying we can't 9 possibly pay these higher rates even when the stock 10 market was over 10,000 or whatever. And on the other 11 hand, the company is saying we need these costs to cover 12 our costs. So I think it is a slippery slope to go down 13 to say that you are going to make a judgment on how to 14 recover depreciation simply because you currently have 15 an economic situation that you believe will get better 16 in the future. 17

You have already recovered this money from customers. They are going to amortize the imbalance over the remaining life of the assets. This is new information. To me, policy-wise, you are better off treating it as you've treated it in the past.

Q. And I guess one final question. I assume that you would agree that in the context of the half a billion dollars that is being requested by the company

here that the Commission should look to do whatever it can to mitigate the impact of such a large increase on ratepayers?

Yes, I think such considerations is things 4 Α. 5 that the Commission should always consider, but they 6 also have to balance, as I'm sure they well know, that 7 the company needs to recover its costs. There are 8 principles about how you recover depreciation and all of 9 those sorts of things that I am simply suggesting you 10 don't want to disrupt for short-term goals.

And so I quess if I can paraphrase what you Q. are saying, at the end of the day it is up to the 13 Commissioners, and thank goodness not to you or I, to balance what essentially are competing interests here?

15MR. WALLS: Objection, asked and answered. MS. KAUFMAN: I don't believe that I asked 16 17 that and I don't believe that he answered it.

18 MR. WALLS: What you wanted to do was rephrase 19 what he just said.

20 CHAIRMAN CARTER: All right. All right. Ask 21 your question.

BY MS. KAUFMAN:

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My question was, Dr. Vilbert, I am assuming Q. that you would agree that at the end of the day and at the end of this case, it is up to the Commissioners to

1	balance the competing interests of the company versus
2	the impact on the ratepayers, to take all those factors
3	into account?
4	A. Yes. And I don't want to be too flippant, but
5	that is why they pay them the big bucks to make these
6	kinds of decisions.
7	CHAIRMAN CARTER: They are not that big.
8	MS. KAUFMAN: I don't know if they would agree
9	with that, but
10	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Strike that.
11	MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you very much,
12	Dr. Vilbert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Ms. Kaufman.
14	Mr. Wright, you're recognized.
15	MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
16	you for your patience. I just wanted to borrow
17	Ms. Kaufman's copy of an exhibit before I proceeded and
18	made a lot of noise.
19	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Hang on a second. Mr. Brew,
20	did you want okay.
21	Mr. Wright.
22	MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
23	CROSS EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. WRIGHT:
25	Q . Good evening, Dr. Vilbert.
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1 Α. Good evening. 2 We met earlier. I'm Schef Wright, and I Q. 3 represent the Florida Retail Federation in this case. Ι 4 have a few questions for you. First, as a general proposition, would you 5 agree that the ideal state of the world would be where 6 7 the depreciation rates always matched the actual asset lives? 8 9 Α. Yes. 10 I would like to ask you a couple of questions Q. 11 about the little exhibit that I handed you, which has 12 been numbered Exhibit 311. 13 Α. Yes. 14 Q. And Ms. Kaufman directed your attention there 15 to the suggestion on Page 189, I think, where it says, 16 "The use of an annual amortization over a short period 17 of time, or the setting of depreciation rates using the 18 remaining life technique are two of the most common 19 options for eliminating the imbalance." Do you remember 20 that? 21 Α. Yes. Would you agree that this statement in a 22 Q. 23 publication of the National Association of Regulatory 24 Utility Commissioners evidences regulatory acceptance of 25 amortization over a short period of time?

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1	A. I don't know. They certainly list it as an
2	option. I don't know whether that means they are taking
3	a position on that or not.
4	Q. Well, they are not saying it is a no-no, are
5 .	they?
6	A. Not in the three pages that you have handed
7	me, but
8	${f Q}$. Okay. You and Ms. Kaufman also discussed
9	briefly a couple of settlements involving Progress
10	Energy Florida and also involving Florida Power and
11	Light Company, I think, in which the utilities involved
12	agreed as part of the settlement, or we agreed that they
13	would, and they agreed to amortize certain amounts of
14	depreciation surplus over short periods of time,
15	correct?
16	A. Yes, within the context of the settlement.
17	Q. And they did that by effecting a credit
18	against depreciation expense and a debit to the bottom
19	line depreciation reserve, correct?
20	A. If I have my debits and credits right, it is
21	my understanding that they increased the depreciation
22	decreased depreciation reserve and decreased
23	depreciation expense. Reserve went up.
24	Q. Expense went down?
25	A. Yes.
	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Q. Thank you. Surely you would agree that that evidences the fact that the Florida Public Service Commission has accepted this as a valid regulatory accounting practice?

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5 I'm not sure you can get to that conclusion Α. 6 from a settlement, because in my experience, most times 7 settlements have language, and I understand this 8 particular one did not, that it does not set a regulatory precedent in any way. Because the way that 9 10 these settlements work out is there is a lot of horse trading going on back and forth. Various things are 11 12 done. And so normally you don't rely on these things as regulatory precedent. And whether that means that it 13 14 would also be acceptable regulatory accounting-wise, I 15 think is a similar sort of situation.

Q. Well, understanding that you are not an accountant nor a certified public accountant, I do want to ask you do you think the Florida Public Service Commission would have approved such a practice, albeit as part of a settlement, if they believed that it were contrary to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?

A. My expectation, without knowledge, would be that they would not, and I would also note that I think Mr. Garrett said the accounting principles have changed since the time of the settlement such that today it

would likely not be consistent with GAAP. 1 Well, are they still -- as far as you know, 2 Q. 3 aren't the utilities involved still operating under settlements approved by this Commission -- that the 4 5 Commission approved in 2005? 6 Α. I believe that is correct. 7 I know you have talked more than you wanted to Q. 8 about materiality, but I want to just touch on it The NARUC manual states the following: 9 briefly. "Whereas, the judgment of materiality is subjective, if 10 11 further analysis confirms a material imbalance one 12 should make immediate depreciation accrual adjustments." 13 That is right on Page 189, and it is right before what 14 we talked about a minute ago. 15 I found it. Α. 16 Q. Okay. Does the name Lewis Powell mean 17 anything to you? 18 Α. I don't think so. 19 Mr. Powell was formerly a justice of the 0. 20 United States Supreme Court, and I believe that he wrote 21 the opinion -- I apologize, I don't remember the case. 22 But I believe he wrote some oft quoted opinion in a case 23 involving pornography. And he said, to the effect of, I 24 can't define it, but I know it when I see it. Do you 25 remember that?

Yes. And now that you bring my attention to 1 Α. who you are talking about, yes, I know who you are 2 3 talking about. So my guestion for you here is do you think 4 0. the Florida Public Service Commission would know an 5 6 imbalance when it saw it, a material imbalance when it 7 saw it? In the context of their job, I would think so. 8 Α. However, I continue to bring you to the distinction that 9 I think is important and that is the reversal of the 10 11 rate base so that you increase the rate base. That to 12 me is a big distinction, and I realize that you are 13 going to show me the settlement, again, but --14Well, the Commission approves settlements that Q. 15 involve debits to the bottom line depreciation reserve, 16 correct? 17 Α. Yes. 18 Q. And is that the practice that you are 19 characterizing as a reversal of depreciation? 20 Α. Yes. 21 I want to talk about your testimony regarding Q. increased regulatory uncertainty. The Public Service 22 23 Commission in a different order -- the Florida Public Service Commission in a different order made the 24 25 following statement: Reserve imbalances are primarily a

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1 matter of differences in current and past projections. 2 Such deficiencies should be recovered as fast as 3 possible, unless such recovery prohibits the company 4 from earning a fair and reasonable return on its 5 investments. Do you think that is sound regulatory 6 policy, Dr. Vilbert? 7 MR. WALLS: I am going to object to the 8 question since the context is not provided in which that 9 was made. 10 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Rephrase. 11 MR. WRIGHT: Well, he has talked extensively 12 about what he considers to be poor regulatory policy. I 13 have read him a statement of regulatory policy, which, 14 in fact, is a statement made by this Commission. And 15 I'm asking him does he consider that policy statement to 16 be poor regulatory policy. That is a fair question with 17 or without context. 18MR. WALLS: I believe it is an unfair question 19 since the context is important to understand in which 20 statement that policy was made. 21 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Ms. Brubaker. 22 MS. BRUBAKER: Could I ask that the statement 23 be repeated? I'm sorry. 24 MR. WRIGHT: Sure. The quoted statement is 25 this, and I could just as easily take the quotes off and

ask him the question, but here it is. Reserve 1 imbalances are primarily a matter of differences in 2 current and past projections. Such deficiencies should 3 be recovered as fast as possible, unless such recovery 4 5 prohibits the company from earning a fair and reasonable 6 return on its investment. MS. BRUBAKER: It seems to me that Mr. Wright 7 is asking -- is quoting this as essentially a generic 8 statement of policy and is asking the witness his 9 opinion of whether this is sound regulatory policy. If 10 11the witness is able to answer it, I think he may do so. 12 If more context is needed, he can certainly request it. 13 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Overruled. You may proceed. 14 BY MR. WRIGHT: 15 Do you want me to read it one more time, Dr. 16 Q. Vilbert? 17 18 I think I have the gist. So, no, thank you. Α. 19 You are putting -- you are putting a statement in front 20 of me and saying is this fair regulatory policy. I think in general you want to correct the imbalance. 21 As 22 quickly as possible sort of implies there is limits on 23 how fast you can do it. In this case they said they 24 want to make sure they earn their allowed rate of 25 return. That seems to be a reasonable constraint to me.

However, to really respond fully to how good a policy this is or isn't, I think I need to understand better the context in which it was uttered. Because those words that you talk about, fast as possible and other aspects of it, I think are only meaningful in the context in which that statement was made.

Q. Okay. I am not going to belabor that, but I do want to loop back to regulatory uncertainty and certainty. I think that you and I would both agree that investors like certainty, yes?

A. Yes.

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Q. Okay. Wouldn't investors be comfortable with a regulatory policy that assured that the utility would be able to recover deficiencies or negative imbalances in their depreciation reserve on a symmetric basis with the amortization of positive imbalances or surpluses in the regulatory deficiency -- in the regulatory -- I'm sorry, in the reserve account?

A. As a general principle, I would agree that
 investors would like such a principle.

21 **Q.** You talk on Page 4 about your suggestion that 22 the intervenor witnesses' proposals would create a class 23 of winners versus a much larger class of losers among 24 customers. And that is at Lines 8 and 9 on Page 4 of 25 your rebuttal testimony. Are you with me?

1 Α. Yes. 2 Q. Thanks. How did you -- well, let me ask it 3 this way. Did you evaluate or calculate the numbers of 4 customers in the class of winners versus the class of 5 losers? 6 Α. No. But as a general view, if you look at my 7 Figure 1, which is Page 12, I think. No, it is Page 17. 8 Q. I see it. 9 If you believe that these -- this imbalance Α. 10 should generally be recovered over 21 years, which is an 11 estimate that I got, I believe, from the company or 12 Mr. Pous, you see that for four years you have a group 13 of people who get a rate decrease at the expense of 17 14 years worth of customers who get a rate increase. To me 15 that means that the winners are far fewer in numbers 16 than the losers from this policy. 17 Q. Did you make any consideration of the 18 customers over previous time from today backwards who 19 paid in the money that created the surplus? 20 Α. In this calculation I did not. However, I 21 would note that the intervenor proposal doesn't say we 22 need to reduce rates for people who paid in such that 23 the depreciation is higher today than it was. They want 24 to give it to the people from years one through four, 25 which may have very little to nothing to do with the

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people who actually made the payments in the past. Now, likely most of the ratepayers are similar, but it is not an exact match.

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Q. Wouldn't you agree that there is likely to be
a better match with the customers -- of the customers in
years one through four going forward with the previous
customer population than the batch of customers from
year five through 21 with the batch of previous
customers?

A. Yes. In general, you would expect the
customer turnovers to accumulate over time so that the
longer you are from the event the more different your
customer base will be.

14 Q. Do you have any knowledge about what the 15 attrition or turnover among Progress Energy Florida's 16 customers is?

A. No direct knowledge. I read something in one
of the pieces of testimony, I think an estimate of
30 percent or something like that, but that was just my
memory from reading. As a cumulative, I believe, over
several years.

22 Q. I think you are right. I think it was23 cumulative 33 percent over 20 years.

Are you aware of any consumer party in this case -- do you know who the consumer parties in this

1 case are? 2 Not directly. I know the titles that you have Α. 3 given me. 4 Okay. Would you agree, subject to check, that 0. 5 the Office of the Public Counsel, the Public Counsel of 6 Florida represents all customers in all rate classes? 7 Α. That would be my understanding. 8 Q. And the Attorney General, similarly in this 9 case represents all customers, correct, would you agree 10 with that? 11 Α. Yes. 12 Q. Okay. And Ms. Kaufman's client, the Florida 13 Industrial Power Users, represents industrial customers? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Q. And my client, the Florida Retail Federation, 16 not surprisingly represents retail customers, would you 17 agree with that? 18 Α. That would be my expectation. 19 Q. Now, no consumer party in this case supports 20 Progress' proposal, do they? 21 Α. Not to my knowledge. 22 0. I just want to ask you a few more questions, 23 Dr. Vilbert. Really, these go to your summary 24 statements on Page 33 of your testimony. Beginning at 25 Line 7 -- and I am going to break this down into FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	component parts you make the statement, "In this
2	case, ratepayers are likely to be worse off if the
3	Commission were to adopt the intervenors' proposal
4	because at a minimum transaction costs associated with
5	acquiring new capital to finance planned capital
6	investments will be higher."
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. That is your statement?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. By the transaction costs, do you mean
11	basically that the debt issuance or equity flotation
12	type costs?
13	A. Yes, to replace the money that is reduced from
14	your revenue requirement, and particularly depreciation,
15	which is a non-cash expense, you would now have to go to
16	the market to make your investments to either get debt
17	or equity and that will cost you money.
18	Q. Okay. Have you done any analysis of what that
19	transaction cost impact might be?
20	A. No. There are estimates that are available in
21	the finance literature, and it depends on the size of
22	the issuance, and so forth, but it is anywhere from, you
23	know, 3 to 10 percent. Depending on the size, it could
24	be a significant expense. For a company this size it is
25	likely to be a lower range lower end of the range.

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Q. Slightly further down you make the statement that the proposal increases investor uncertainty, and we talked about that, so I'm not going to ask about that now. But you go on to say that the proposal weakens the company's credit metrics. My question for you is did you do any analysis of the impact of the intervenors' proposals on the company's credit metrics?

I looked at the analysis done, I think, by 8 Ά. Mr. Lawton on the credit ratios, and he shows they 9 But his ratios are a single issue view. То 10 weakened. 11 the extent that there are other things that the company 12 has requested that does not get approved, the ratios 13 would be further weakened. And my point is that weakened credit ratios will inevitably lead to higher 14 15 cost of debt than if you had stronger credit ratios. 16 But I haven't tried to estimate how big the effect will 17 be --

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Q. It was --

A. -- in dollars, sorry.

20 **Q.** I apologize, I thought that you had finished 21 your answer.

A. I thought I had, too, so we were both missingthings.

24 **Q.** In the next line you make the statement that 25 debt costs will increase. Have you done an analysis of

1 the impact on debt costs? 2 Α. This is a theoretical view that says that 3 investors care about the strength of the credit ratios. Weaker credit ratios will cost you more in debt. 4 5 I don't think I asked you this guestion, if I 0. 6 did, I ask your forgiveness in advance. This is the 7 question. Do you know how many customers there are on 8 Progress -- served by Progress Energy Florida? 9 Α. Not the total number of customers. It's a 10 large number. 11 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. That is all the 12 questions I have, Mr. Chairman. 13 Thank you, Dr. Vilbert. 14 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Mr. Wright. 15 Staff, you're recognized. 16 MR. YOUNG: No questions. 17 Commissioner Skop. 18 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 19 Good evening, Mr. or Dr. Vilbert. 20 THE WITNESS: Good evening. 21 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Just a few follow-up 22 questions on your rebuttal testimony. On Page 3, Line 23 3, you discuss the company's revenue requirement and the 24 impact of reducing the depreciation, and then you 25 indicate that it is offset by approximately

\$12.1 million. Can you explain that briefly? 1 2 THE WITNESS: Yes. The intervenors' proposal, as I understand it, recognizes that the rate base will 3 increase by the amount of depreciation that is reversed. 4 In the first year it is \$161 million, approximately, of 5 depreciation that is going to be added back to the rate 6 base. And in recognition of that, they use a half a 7 year convention and apply their recommended rate of 8 return to approximately \$80 million to end up -- and 9 10 that return includes interest, return on equity, and taxes, and they end up with \$12 million, approximately, 11 12 in return. 13 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So that is 14 basically adopting the proposal, I believe, of OPC 15Witness Pous, is that correct, combined with the ROE 16 recommended by Dr. Woolridge? 17 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right. 18 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. All right. I guess 19 in the interest of fairness, I have asked the questions 20 to the other intervenor witnesses with respect to their 21 testimony on depreciation, so I want to give you the opportunity to respond to the same question. Why should 22 23 this Commission find your testimony more persuasive and 24 adopt it over that offered by Witness Pous and also by 25 Witness Pollock?

THE WITNESS: I think this question gets to the heart of what I am here for. To me, there is a number of things to keep in mind. One is that reversing depreciation that the Commission authorized based upon the best available information at the time they made the decision effectively reverses a decision that the Commission made in the past.

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I think it is also true, as I mentioned earlier, that there will be a set of winners. The people over the next four years will have lower rates than they would have had had they amortized the surplus over the remaining life of the assets, at the expense of future ratepayers who will pay higher costs than they would have paid had they not done that procedure.

15 It also has the effect of making rates more 16 variable, because as you saw on that Figure 1, we go 17 from a negative to a positive in one year of about 18 \$200 million effectively in the rates. I think that 19 GAAP is fairly clear if you read the FAS 154 that says that if you change the life you should recover it over 20 21 the future new revised life. So all of those reasons 22 are ones that I would put forward as a reason not to 23 adopt the intervenor proposal.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Very well. If I could turn your attention now to Page 4 of your rebuttal

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testimony, please.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 COMMISSIONER SKOP: And generally at Lines 16 4 through 23, and also Lines 9 through 11, you discuss I 5 believe from the company's and investors' perspective 6 why regulatory uncertainty would be bad given the 7 current economic or prevailing economic conditions, is 8 that correct?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. This section of my 10 testimony was focused primarily on the cost of capital, 11 because I believe that not only do you have an effect on 12 depreciation, you potentially could effect the cost of 13 capital, both either through weakened credit ratios or 14 because you have increased perceived uncertainty by 15 investors.

16 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Now, also on Line 17 11 of that page, you indicate that although the economy 18 is showing signs of stabilizing. So, essentially, 19 although your testimony looks at it through the eyes of 20 the company and prospective investors of the company and 21 the impact that might incur, your testimony also 22 inherently recognizes the poor economy, is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, sir, I do.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: And so given the poor economy, would you agree that considerations as to the

ratepayer are important in terms of addressing the 1 merits of the proposed rate increase, is that correct? 2 THE WITNESS: Yes. As I mentioned earlier, I 3 think there is potentially a slippery slope here if you 4 5 start trying to say, well, are these times much better or much worse than on average; and, therefore, should we 6 make judgments that we wouldn't otherwise make based 7 upon that, I fear that that doesn't lead you in a good 8 direction. But, of course, you always have to consider 9 whether the ratepayers can pay the rates that are being 10 11 required. 12 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Moving to Page 7 of 13 your rebuttal testimony, Lines, generally, 5 through 21. 14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 15 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** You address generally 16 the -- excuse me, the intergenerational fairness 17 argument, is that correct? THE WITNESS: Yes, at a high level. 18 19 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And on Lines 11 20 through 12, you discuss what you deem to be a set of intergenerational winners and losers, is that correct? 21 22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 23 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Does the graph 24 reflected on Page 17 illustrate that effect? 25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Which is Figure 1, as you 1 2 have previously referenced, is that correct? THE WITNESS: Yes, it does. 3 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And on Lines 14 and 4 15 of the same page, you state, "There is no reason that 5 6 the depreciation reserve should be reversed over a 7 four-year period, " correct? 8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 9 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Would a potential reason be to mitigate the impact of the proposed rate increase 10 11 on consumers? 12 THE WITNESS: You can select a period of time 13 that you want to change depreciation rates, but four 14 years seems arbitrary to me but for the fact that 15 potentially you might have another depreciation study to look at in four years. But other than that, I see no 16 17 reason for it to be four years, or ten years, or any 18 other particular number. 19 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Moving to -- bear 20 with me for one moment, please. Moving to Page 8, Line 21 27 and the following Page 9, Lines 1 and 2, you discuss 22 the application of GAAP to the proposed change 23 recommended by the intervenors, is that correct? 24 THE WITNESS: Yes. 25 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Now, I guess as you have

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previously stated, you are not an accountant nor a CPA, is that correct?

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3 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct.
4 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. What did you rely
5 upon in formulating your testimony as to the
6 applicability or inapplicability of that financial
7 accounting standard as it pertains to the adjustment
8 recommended by the intervenors?

9 **THE WITNESS:** Well, fortunately, within my 10 office we have two Ph.D finance and accounting people, 11 one of whom was a professor and taught accounting for 12 many years. And I told them about this problem, and 13 asked them to help me reach a judgment on what GAAP 14 would say about it. And after talking to them in 15 general terms, general accounting principles lays out 16 how a change in the estimated life should be handled 17 according to GAAP.

18 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. I guess that's at 19 least for me, you know, an important consideration. It 20 gives me some pause. Because, again, I'm not an 21 accountant, but I'm trying to understand some of the 22 testimony that has been provided as to that single 23 issue. So I think the issue somewhat turns on how you 24 interpret that standard to apply to what the intervenors 25 propose. But I will accept, as you stated, that in your

1 opinion GAAP does not provide for making the adjustment as requested by the intervenors, is that correct? 2 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is the determination 3 4 that I arrived at. 5 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Next, turn your 6 attention to, I believe, Page 14 -- actually, excuse me, 7 let me move forward in the interest of time back to --8 forward to Page 17, please. 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 10 COMMISSIONER SKOP: And on Figure 1, do you 11 see that? 12 THE WITNESS: Yes. 13 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** And I note that the colors 14 reflected in the graph certainly aren't the school 15 colors of Air Force Tuffs or Fort Warton (phonetic), 16 correct? 17 THE WITNESS: No, I don't think quite so. 18 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. All right. With 19 respect to the graph as shown, which I believe 20 illustrates from your perspective what would happen if 21 the intervenors' proposal is adopted, does that -- I 22 mean, is that an apples-to-apples comparison to the 23 extent that the analysis provided does not recognize any 24 further additions to plant during years five through 21? 25 THE WITNESS: That's a good question. This is

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a stand-alone analysis as you were focusing solely on
 the \$645 million proposal.

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COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. The orange and blue caught my eye. Let's be clear. All right. Now, in that analysis, does that also turn upon using OPC or Witness Woolridge's recommended ROE of 9.75 in any way?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, it does. The magnitudes of 8 the bars would be different. In particular, the 9 magnitudes of the year one through four would be less, 10 and the magnitudes of the years five through 21 would be 11 greater if you were to award a rate of return on equity 12 greater than 9.75.

13COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. I'm sorry. I14didn't hear the last part of that. Can you --

15 **THE WITNESS:** If you were to award an allowed 16 return on equity greater than 9.75, then the bars would 17 be of different magnitude, and in particular they would 18 be higher in the positive years and lower, less negative 19 in the early one through four years.

20 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. So they would 21 increase in the out years in terms of revenue 22 requirement based on the higher ROE?

THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct.
 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, I guess
 subject to check, would you agree, and if you don't have

1 knowledge, fine, but essentially with respect to ROE in this particular case, 100 basis points is approximately 2 3 equal to \$51.6 million? THE WITNESS: I think I heard that number said 4 5 earlier, and I think that is my memory of what was said, 6 in that range. 7 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So there is some 8 form of correlation between the awarded ROE and what 9 would result from the figure shown on Figure 1, is that 10 correct? 11 THE WITNESS: Yes. COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, one of the 12 13 issues that you raised I believe on Page 20 is the 14 impact on cash flow that would result from crediting the 15 theoretical depreciation surplus back to the ratepayers, 16 is that correct? 17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 18 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Now, certainly 19 going back to the question, the difference between 20 Dr. Woolridge's proposed ROE, which OPC has advocated 21 for, and others that the company has requested, there is 22 a significant spread there, but certainly ROE impacts 23 cash flow, is that correct? 24 THE WITNESS: Yes. 25 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And if I could -- I

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think I've got two more additional questions. Page 22,
 Lines 12 through 20.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. You discuss why in 4 your opinion the adoption of the intervenors' proposal 5 is not sound regulatory policy. And I would like to 6 briefly explore those four reasons that you cite there 7 with you. On Line 15, for the first reason, you cite 8 9 there is no other regulatory precedent supporting the 10 proposal to reverse depreciation expense already recovered from customers. Would you agree that in the 11 12 context of the 2002 settlement agreement, the company 13 credited approximately \$250 million of depreciation over 14 four years?

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THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. So there is some 17 form of precedent, albeit via settlement agreement that 18 was approved by the Commission, but perhaps not in a 19 direct order, but there is some sort of precedent. 20 Wouldn't you concede that point?

21 **THE WITNESS:** I concede that that happened 22 within the context of the settlement, yes, sir.

23 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. All right. So 24 moving on to the second point, you state at Line 16, the 25 proposal is counter to GAAP. I guess since you are just

relying on your own opinion, you can't say that with certainty that it is counter to GAAP, is that correct? THE WITNESS: It is my opinion based upon the

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documents that I reviewed, but I am not an accountant, and ultimately that decision would have to be rendered by the company and its accountants. It is my opinion, yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. For your third 8 reason starting at Line 17, the policy would create a 9 small set of winners at the expense of past and future 10 customers. I guess with respect to the winners shown on 11 Figure 1 -- and, again, that figure is subject to change 12 depending upon adopted -- or the ROE that is adopted by 13 the Commission in some form, so there is some 14 sensitivity there. But given the difficult economic 15 times and all things being equal, would it not be 16 appropriate to consider addressing the near term 17 intergenerational argument that would effectively 18 mitigate in some form part of the proposed rate increase 19 20 for consumers now rather than not making the choice as 21 you have proposed?

THE WITNESS: The short answer is yes. If I may expand just briefly. First of all, I don't believe the intervenors' proposal fully compensates the company the way it is set up right now, because the amount of

return abstractly from whether you set it at 1 2 Dr. Woolridge's estimate or Dr. Vander Weide's estimate, 3 the proposal as it is set up now only recognizes depreciation in the first year. So if you were to do it 4 correctly, so that the company -- the present value of 5 6 the payments received is equal to \$645 million, that would alleviate some of the concern. But there is still 7 going to be this excess cost that you will get from 8 transaction costs from issuing new debt and equity and 9 potentially weakened credit metrics and these other 10 costs, as well, and so in some sense in the long run, 11 ratepayers actually pay a bit more than they would have 12 to pay otherwise. 13

14 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. In that analysis 15 did you consider anything other than the intervenors' 16 recommendation? Did you consider something perhaps less 17 than that, the balancing, if you will, or was it more of 18 an all or nothing analysis?

19 **THE WITNESS:** My analysis was based, as was 20 brought up, on the \$645 million. I think the principles 21 of Mr. Pollock's recommendation are identical. The 22 magnitude is different, and so the impact is less.

23 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. For your fourth 24 point, beginning at Line 18 on Page 22 of your rebuttal 25 testimony, you state that the adoption of the

intervenors' proposal would be an application of 1 20/20 hindsight, which would create unnecessary 2 regulatory uncertainty. Can you defend that statement 3 in light of what was actually approved by the Commission 4 in terms of the 2002 settlement agreement? 5 THE WITNESS: Well, I can certainly try. 6 7 The idea that I have in mind is that this Commission made a judgment about appropriate depreciation rates and 8 set them into motion for recovery from ratepayers. As 9 far as I understand, there has been no allegation that 10 the rates that were set were not just and reasonable, 11 that they were not based upon the best available 12

13 information at the time, all of the things that you 14 would think would go into setting rates that are just 15 and reasonable.

At this point, effectively what the 16 intervenors' proposal does, as far as I can see, is to 17 say that those judgments were not correct. We are going 18 to reverse them. We are going to add back to the rate 19 base \$645 million of depreciation that has already been 20 recovered from ratepayers, because we believe that -- we 21 have found out today or in this proceeding that the 22 23 lives were longer than we had before.

This sets a precedent to me that you can now go back and question any decision that was made by this

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Commission, and say, well, it didn't turn out like you 1 thought. We need to go back and fix that. I think that 2 gets you into endless fights about these sorts of 3 4 issues. COMMISSIONER SKOP: But --5 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioner, how much more 6 7 do you have? 8 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Probably three brief 9 questions. CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Well, we may stay a 10 little longer than --11 12 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. I would appreciate 13 it. 14 Dr. Vilbert, just quickly, on Page 33 of your rebuttal testimony, Lines 15 and 16. Do you see that? 15 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 17 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. You indicate that the intervenors' proposal is justified on the basis of 18 19 intergenerational fairness, yet the proposal itself 20 creates, I guess, intergenerational fairness in the 21 future, is that correct? 22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 23 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. But certainly you 24 seem to suggest that there would be some merit in -- or 25 it is justified of looking at this intergenerational FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 fairness argument that is raised by the intervenors, is 2 that correct? 3 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I would go there. I think intergenerational fairness is a tough thing 4 5 because it is always going to be unfair. Some set of 6 customers leave, some set of customers arrive. It is 7 not possible to achieve perfect intergenerational 8 fairness. So worrying too extremely about it does not 9 make sense to me. 10 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Just one final question. 11 I guess I saw from your bio that you are a former 12 fighter pilot in the Air Force. So, I don't know if you 13 have any experience with the defense industry, but have 14 you ever heard of the expression there is no such thing 15 as a free ham sandwich? 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. The way I say that is 17 there is no such thing as a free lunch. 18 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. Same difference. Ι 19 guess as I heard you previously testify that the 20 Commission is called upon to make very difficult 21 judgment calls, is that correct? 22 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. 23 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So given what was 24 done in the previous settlement agreements, and what has 25 changed with the current situation we are facing and the

consumers are facing, would it be fair to say that the 1 prevailing economic conditions have declined 2 significantly since 2002? 3 THE WITNESS: I don't know the definition of 4 5 significantly, but as a general statement, yes, we are 6 less well off economically today than then. 7 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And would you go so 8 far as to say we are in a deep recession? 9 THE WITNESS: Well, as an economist, the 10 latest forecast I saw is that we are actually coming out of the recession now, but we certainly have been in one. 11 12 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. All right. So, 13 again, just applying the discretion of the Commission, could you -- could you see that difficult judgment 14 15 choices might need to be made in light of ensuring 16 affordable rates, as you have previously alluded to? THE WITNESS: Absolutely. I don't think I 17 18 would want to have your job. Some tough decisions. COMMISSIONER SKOP: All right. Thank you, 19 20 sir. I appreciate your testimony, Dr. Vilbert. And, 21 like I say, I wanted to give you the same opportunity as 22 I gave the other intervenors to state your case. Thank 23 you. 24 Thank you. I appreciate it. THE WITNESS: 25 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you. Thank you, FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1 Commissioner. Commissioners, anything further from the 2 3 bench? Redirect. 4 MR. WALLS: No redirect. 5 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Exhibits. 6 MR. WALLS: There is just one; 231 we would 7 move in. 8 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Are there any objections? 9 Without objection, show it done. 10 (Exhibit Number 231 admitted into the record.) 11 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Anything further for this 12 13 witness? MR. WALLS: Can he be excused? 14 CHAIRMAN CARTER: You may be excused. 15 See you guys at 9:30 in the a.m. 16 17 (Hearing adjourned at 8:08 p.m. Transcript continues in sequence with 18 19 Volume 24.) 20 21 22 23 24 25 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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2	STATE OF FLORIDA)
3	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
4	COUNTY OF LEON)
5	I INE ENUDOR DDD Chief Hearing Deportor
6	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Hearing Reporter Services Section, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard
7	at the time and place herein stated.
8	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the
9	same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true
10	transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
11	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor
12	am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I
13	financially interested in the action.
14	DATED THIS 5th day of October, 2009.
15	Ca Junit
16	JANE FÄUROT, RPR
17	Official FPSC Hearings Reporter (850) 413-6732
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