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September 1, 2017

VIA: ELECTRONIC FILING

Ms. Carlotta S. Stauffer Commission Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Re:

Analysis of IOUs' hedging practices

FPSC Docket No. 20170057-EI

Dear Ms. Stauffer:

Attached for filing in the above docket, on behalf of Tampa Electric Company, is the Rebuttal Testimony of J. Brent Caldwell.

Thank you for your assistance in connection with this matter.

Sincerely,

James D. Beasley

JDB/pp Attachment

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Rebuttal Testimony, filed on behalf of Tampa Electric Company, has been furnished by electronic mail on this 1st day of September 2017 to the following:

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 20170057-EI

IN RE: ANALYSIS OF IOU'S HEDGING PRACTICES

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

J. BRENT CALDWELL

FILED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2017

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 1 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 2 3 OF J. BRENT CALDWELL 4 5 Please state your name, business address, and position 6 with Tampa Electric Company. 7 8 My name is J. Brent Caldwell. My business address is 702 9 Α. N. Franklin Street, Tampa, Florida 33602. I am employed 10 11 by Tampa Electric Company ("Tampa Electric" or "company") as Director, Portfolio Optimization. 12 13 14 Q. Are you the same J. Brent Caldwell who has sponsored Prepared Direct Testimony in this proceeding? 15 16 Α. Yes I am. 17 18 Has your job description, education, or professional Q. 19 20 experience changed since your most recent testimony? 21 Yes, my duties and responsibilities have changed as I 22 23 took on a different role within the Wholesale Power, Planning, and Fuels Department. In July 2017, I assumed 24 the position of Director, Portfolio Optimization, where 25

I am responsible for the unit commitment of Tampa Electric's generation assets and oversee the company's power and natural gas trading activities.

Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?

A. My rebuttal testimony addresses shortcomings in the substance and recommendations of witness Michael A. Gettings, testifying on behalf of the Commission's Staff. I also take issue with the recommendation of witness Jeffry Pollock, testifying for the Florida Industrial Power User's Group ("FIPUG") that financial hedging of natural gas purchases be offered as an optional service.

Q. Have you reviewed the rebuttal testimony submitted in this proceeding by Dr. Detlef Hallermann on behalf of Tampa Electric, Florida Power & Light Company and Duke Energy Florida?

A. Yes I have, and I agree with Dr. Hallermann's rebuttal testimony.

Gettings' Hedging Proposal

Q. Please describe your understanding of how Mr. Gettings' hedging proposal would operate.

A. Labeled a risk responsive risk management plan, the main difference of the Gettings proposal from that which the Florida IOUs have used in recent years is Mr. Gettings use of a Value-at-Risk ("VaR") model to determine when to execute new hedges as well as when to liquidate, or protect with options, hedges currently held. The details of Mr. Gettings proposal are described in my Direct Testimony at pages 9 through 11.

Difficulties with the Gettings Proposal

Q. What concerns does Tampa Electric have with respect to Mr. Gettings' proposal?

A. Tampa Electric is primarily concerned with the degree of complexity of Mr. Gettings model, the lack of specificity about how the model would be implemented as well as the cost of implementation.

The Gettings proposal requires frequent monitoring and decision-making about whether to add or eliminate hedge positions, based on the results of a VaR model the utility must maintain. Tampa Electric has concerns about how to manage the model, how long it would take to react to changes in the model analytics, and how to defend this model and resulting decisions from later criticisms or second-

quessing if outcomes are deemed unfavorable.

The Gettings proposal involves the use of a complex model with significant administrative and implementation costs. The necessary knowledge and systems to audit and review the utility programs are substantial. The program includes multiple decision points and utility discretion, including triggers for simultaneous defensive and contingent hedging.

Mr. Lawton, testifying on behalf of the Office of Public Counsel, agrees with criticisms of the Gettings proposal, concluding that Mr. Gettings risk responsive financial hedging proposal should be rejected in that such a program will likely lead to more uncertainty, more litigation, and potentially more costs. (Direct Testimony of Daniel J. Lawton, p. 6)

Benefits of OTM Call Option Hedging Proposal over the Gettings

19 Approach

Q. Do you believe the investor owned utilities' proposed OTM call option approach would better serve electric customers in this state than the Gettings proposal?

A. Yes I do. Tampa Electric believes the OTM call option proposal is a much simpler method to achieve similar results

to those achieved by the staff proposal. The OTM call option proposal will mitigate upward price spikes, and it will be less expensive when compared to swap settlement losses under certain market conditions, as has been shown when applying the method to the previous 12 years of data. While premiums will be incurred, the OTM call option strategy will provide that protection with a zero-dollar limit on settlement losses, a much lower limit on settlement losses than would be achieved under the Gettings proposal.

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The OTM call option hedging proposal is better aligned with what customers would likely expect from a hedging program. The OTM call option proposal is similar to insurance against dramatic price spikes while the Gettings proposal is a trading scheme. The utilities' proposal pays a premium to cap the price customers pay for natural gas during a rare, but usually dramatic, price spike. The Gettings model uses VaR, mark-to-market, tolerances, contingencies, and other sophisticated financial derivative concepts to trade based on expectations of market movements. The Gettings model is well-suited for utility hedging, as is further discussed in the testimony of witness Dr. Hallerman.

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Other important aspects of implementing the Gettings proposal such as timeline and costs, ongoing model

complexity and administration, and ease of reporting and monitoring must be carefully considered. This raises the question of the appropriate balance to achieve costeffective hedging. Tampa Electric does not believe it is in customers' best interests to spend additional money and time implementing a more complex methodology such as the Gettings proposal, when the OTM call option proposal is likely to yield very similar results over time. Tampa Electric believes the OTM call options proposal strikes the right balance of protection against price spikes, zero exposure to settlement losses, and reasonable option premium costs for that price spike protection.

Tampa Electric has a final and very important concern about the Gettings model. The Gettings model is vaguely defined and leaves its interpretation and implementation far too open; and it would call for implementation decision making at various undefined points moving forward. This is very disconcerting to Tampa Electric and would make it virtually impossible for the Commission, in the regulatory review process, to ascertain whether the model has been complied with. When coupled with staff witness Cicchetti's statement that "...prudence will be determined by what was known, or should have been known, at the time decisions were made..."

(pg 24, lines 9 and 10, emphasis added), the numerous

decision points and methodologies sound like a formula for endless litigation over whether utilities have acted prudently in administering such a model.

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Advantages of the OTM Call Option Hedging Strategy Alternative

Q. What are the advantages of the utilities' proposed OTM call option hedging strategy versus Mr. Gettings approach?

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A. The IOUs' proposed OTM call option strategy will achieve the goals of eliminating hedging settlement losses associated with the previous financial model for hedging natural gas purchases while at the same time providing continued protection of its customers from price spikes in the natural gas market.

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The OTM call option model will certainly be easier to administer than the Gettings model. It will also be quicker to implement. During the course of the hedging workshops it appeared the IOUs would require up to two years to implement the Gettings model whereas the OTM call option model could implemented promptly after receiving Commission be approval. The Gettings model also requires frequent monitoring and decision-making about whether to add or eliminate hedge positions, based on the results of a VaR

model the utility must maintain. Tampa Electric has concerns about how to manage the model, how long it would take to react to changes in the model analytics, and how to defend this model and resulting decisions from later criticisms or second-guessing if outcomes are deemed unfavorable.

The OTM call option strategy will not require the costly system additions and modifications and additional personnel required to implement and administer the Gettings model. The OTM call option strategy will result in easier tracking and reporting and, therefore, less expensive implementation and administrative costs, when compared to the Gettings model.

The OTM call option model will require fewer guidelines from the Commission than the Gettings model. It will also be easier to revisit and modify or disassemble if it is shown not to be working as designed. All of these factors strongly suggest that the Commission would be well advised to authorize the IOUs to implement the OTM call option model over the more complex Gettings model.

The OTM call option proposal will not allow settlement losses, unlike fixed price swaps. The Gettings model will

continue to utilize the fixed price swaps that have been criticized in the utility programs for leading settlement losses when the market experience is a period of sustained decreasing prices; therefore, the Gettings model will result in swap settlement losses. As the companies discussed at the February 21, 2017 workshop, the results of back testing showed the OTM call option model to be a less costly alternative to the Gettings model in many years. The OTM call option model is also less costly than the fixed price swaps hedging model during a period of declining market prices.

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Finally, utilizing OTM call options is a non-speculative approach to hedging that can be readily implemented and is straightforward to audit. And, since the Commission will be approving the budget for call option premiums, all parties will be aware of the maximum total cost for the price spike protection provided.

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Rebuttal to Witness Jeffry Pollock's Testimony

Q. Please explain your concerns regarding the testimony of FIPUG witness Jeffry Pollock to the effect that financial hedging of natural gas purchases should be offered as an "optional service" to which customers can "opt in".

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A. I disagree with FIPUG's proposal. It is interesting that FIPUG has renamed its proposal an optional service to which customers can opt in, when previously FIPUG has urged that its members be able to "opt out" of paying for the costs and receiving the benefits of financial hedging of natural gas. Regardless of the marketing title FIPUG wishes to assign to its proposal, its efforts are not appropriate.

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First of all, if hedging is a desirable tool to mitigate against natural gas price volatility, it provides this desirable trait to all customers, not just certain customer classes. Moreover, an opt-in (or opt-out program for industrial customers) would be confusing and costly to administer. IOUs do not purchase generation fuel for particular classes of customers, but do so collectively for all customers. Such a change would require costly system, reporting, and accounting changes. It would be difficult to administer a program where customers in different rate classes were charged different fuel rates based on a decision to opt-in or opt-out of hedging year by year. Since hedges have typically been placed, one, two or even three years ahead of the period in which fuel costs are incurred, there would need to be a significant lag when a customer decided to change their hedging status. This would make an opt-in (or opt-out) program even more cumbersome to track and administer. Finally, if the IOUs' proposed OTM call option hedging strategy is approved, it will eliminate settlement losses associated with the previous hedging model that is subject to the current moratorium and replace it with a less expensive strategy that is also able to mitigate the effects of price increases. The magnitude of recent settlement losses is the chief criticism FIPUG has raised regarding the financial swaps hedging model currently in moratorium. Approval of the OTM call option model will eliminate the basis for that criticism.

Summary

Q. Please summarize your testimony.

A. I would urge the Commission not to adopt the complex risk responsive risk management plan proposed by Mr. Gettings. Mr. Gettings proposal requires frequent monitoring and decision making about whether to add or eliminate hedge positions, based on the results of a VaR model utilities would have to maintain. Tampa Electric has genuine concerns about how to manage the model, how long it would take to react to changes in the model analytics, and how to defend this model and resulting decisions from later criticisms or second guessing if outcomes are deemed unfavorable. The OTM

call option proposal of FPL, Duke and Tampa Electric is a much simpler method for achieving the same goals achieved by the Staff's proposal. The OTM call option proposal will mitigate upward price spikes and illuminate settlement losses, which have been one of the chief criticisms of the swaps based hedging procedures previously utilized by the IOUs in Florida.

Finally, my rebuttal testimony points out the shortcomings of the opt-in (or opt-out) program advanced by FIPUG's witness Jeffry Pollock. FIPUG's primary objection to financial hedging of natural gas purchases - settlement losses - would be eliminated by the IOU's proposed OTM call option hedging strategy.

Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?

A. Yes, it does.