BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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| In re: Complaint by Chris Rosa against Duke Energy Florida, LLC. | DOCKET NO. 20220058-EIORDER NO. PSC-2022-0307-PAA-EIISSUED: August 19, 2022 |

The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:

ANDREW GILES FAY, Chairman

ART GRAHAM

GARY F. CLARK

MIKE LA ROSA

GABRIELLA PASSIDOMO

NOTICE OF PROPOSED AGENCY ACTION

ORDER DENYING FORMAL COMPLAINT

AND

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

BY THE COMMISSION:

 NOTICE is hereby given by the Florida Public Service Commission that the action discussed herein denying the formal complaint is preliminary in nature and will become final unless a person whose interests are substantially affected files a petition for a formal proceeding, pursuant to Rule 25-22.029, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.).

Background

 On September 29, 2020, Ms. Chris Rosa (Ms. Rosa) filed informal complaint number 1349979E, alleging improper billing against Duke Energy Florida, LLC. (Duke) with the us. Ms. Rosa alleges that her account was wrongfully billed when Duke mistakenly did not remove her from the Budget Billing Program (Budget Billing) after renewable generation equipment was installed at her home.

 After a thorough review, our Division of Consumer Assistance and Outreach (CAO) staff closed Ms. Rosa’s informal complaint on January 19, 2022, concluding that Duke did not violate any of our rules or its tariffs in the handling of this matter.

 On March 14, 2022, Ms. Rosa filed a formal complaint with us against Duke, alleging the same material facts as contained in her informal complaint. Ms. Rosa’s formal complaint again alleged improper billing by Duke, specifically that Ms. Rosa does not owe Duke “past due” charges.

 On March 25, 2022, Duke filed a Motion to Dismiss (Motion) Ms. Rosa’s formal complaint. Duke states that Ms. Rosa’s complaint fails to cite any statute, rule, or order which Duke allegedly violated and should, therefore, be dismissed for failing to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 25-22.036, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). Duke further contends that the complaint, even when read in the light most favorable to Ms. Rosa, fails to specify a cause of action or the relief being sought and should, therefore, be dismissed.

We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 366.04, Florida Statutes (F.S.).

Decision

1. **Duke's Motion to Dismiss**

 To sustain a motion to dismiss, the moving party must show that, accepting all allegations as true, the petition fails to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.[[1]](#footnote-1) The moving party must specify the grounds for the motion to dismiss, and all material allegations must be construed against the moving party in determining if the petitioner has stated the necessary allegations. A sufficiency determination is confined to the petition and documents incorporated therein and the grounds asserted in the motion to dismiss.[[2]](#footnote-2) All allegations in the petition must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the petitioner in order to determine whether there is a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.[[3]](#footnote-3)

 Ms. Rosa alleges that her account was wrongfully billed when Duke did not remove her account from Budget Billing status after renewable generation equipment was installed at her home on June 17, 2019.

 Duke alleges that Ms. Rosa’s complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements for a formal complaint because it does not “identify the rule, order, or statute that Duke allegedly violated, nor does she describe any actions taken on behalf of Duke that constitute a violation of any rules, statutes, company tariff, or [our] Orders.” As such, Duke contends that it cannot “adequately research, prepare and formulate a defense.” For formal administrative proceedings authorized by Chapter 120, F.S., the Uniform Rules of Procedure contained in Chapter 28-106, F.A.C., apply. In addition to the Uniform Rules which govern all administrative proceedings, we have adopted specific procedural rules to govern proceedings before it, which are contained in Chapter 25-22, F.A.C. As cited by Duke, Rule 25-22.036, F.A.C., requires that a formal complaint must contain:

1. The rule, order, or statute that has been violated;
2. The actions that constitute the violation;
3. The name and address of the person against whom the complaint is lodged; and
4. The specific relief requested, including any penalty sought.

 Duke’s Motion alleges that between June 2019 and March 2021, Ms. Rosa and Duke were in regular communication regarding a number of billing charges, billing statements reflecting those charges, and outstanding balances that had allegedly gone unpaid, i.e., an unpaid balance of $370.04 as of April 2021. Ms. Rosa appeared to believe that her account would be automatically removed from Budget Billing after her net metering started in June 2019. When Ms. Rosa contacted Duke regarding the bills still showing her Budget Billing status, she alleges that a Duke representative advised her not to remove the account from Budget Billing because she would eventually have a credit deferred balance. Duke has no record of this conversation. Duke’s records show Ms. Rosa made a request to remove her account from Budget Billing on December 31, 2019. The account was removed from Budget Billing that same day and the deferred credit balance was applied to the account balance.

 Duke’s Motion further alleges that our CAO staff has reviewed the substance of Ms. Rosa’s complaint during an informal complaint process and concluded that Duke did not violate any of our rules or its tariffs in the handling of this matter. However, Duke’s Motion acknowledges Ms. Rosa’s disagreement with how Duke characterizes the material facts that are the basis of Ms. Rosa’s formal complaint. Further, it appears as if Ms. Rosa also disagrees with how our CAO staff characterizes the material facts that are the basis of her complaint in this matter.

 We have previously held pro se litigants such as Ms. Rosa to a relaxed pleading standard, in order to prevent delay and promote resolution of litigants’ claims.[[4]](#footnote-4) We find that the petition states a cause of action – a dispute with respect to Duke’s billing – that is within our jurisdiction as provided in Section 366.04(1), F.S.

 We find that the facts and law in this docket are sufficiently developed and a complaint in strict compliance with the rule is not necessary in order for us to make a decision at this time. The extensive documentation in this docket, including the informal complaint files, Ms. Rosa’s formal complaint, Duke’s Motion to Dismiss, and the documented correspondence between our staff and Ms. Rosa provides significant information about Ms. Rosa’s factual assertions and requested relief. We find that this information is sufficient to allow us to make a decision on the substance of Ms. Rosa’s complaint, and we do not believe it would be an efficient use of the parties’ resources to require Ms. Rosa to amend her complaint merely to comply with the technical pleading rules. Therefore, we deny Duke’s Motion to Dismiss. Instead, we will make a decision on the substance of Ms. Rosa’s complaint, as discussed in the next section of this order.

1. **The Disposition of Ms. Rosa's Complaint**

 In her formal complaint, Ms. Rosa asserts that she “does not owe any ‘past due’ amounts. Every single month Duke has been paid for the actual kwh and taxes used by the undersigned.”

 The following list is a summary of all of the investigative activity that has been performed on behalf of Ms. Rosa in an effort to address the substance of her complaint.

1. On or about September 29, 2020, Ms. Rosa filed a complaint with us, stating her account had been removed from the Budget Billing Program (“Budget Billing”), and Duke continued to bill her account for past-due amounts. Ms. Rosa believed the unpaid balance is a result of Duke keeping her account in Budget Billing after her renewable generation equipment was installed. Ms. Rosa further claimed Duke provided incorrect information while her account was on Budget Billing and requested a bill clarification. Ms. Rosa disputed the bill dated September 25, 2020 for the amount of $507.01 and sought a credit adjustment for that amount. Ms. Rosa’s complaint was assigned No. 1349979E.
2. On June 17, 2019, Duke installed a bi-directional meter at Ms. Rosa’s address. At the time, Ms. Rosa was participating in Budget Billing. The billing statements from June 2019 – December 2019 were estimated due to a locked gate but were updated once actual readings were received. During this time period, Duke only received three (3) payments to Ms. Rosa’s account, and her account had not had a zero balance since August 7, 2019. Ms. Rosa remained on Budget Billing until December 31, 2019, when she contacted Duke regarding the estimated bills and requested to be removed from Budget Billing.
3. On January 9, 2020, Duke issued a re-billed final Budget Billing/net metering statement, which included $61.71 in current charges, $8.36 in late fees, $701.29 past due balance, and a Budget Billing deferred credit balance of $212.59. The Budget Billing credit balance was applied to Ms. Rosa’s account and resulted in a new account balance of $558.77. Duke received payments from Ms. Rosa during the first six (6) months of 2020; however, those payments only included the current charges on the account which resulted in a balance forward on each statement. An additional four (4) late fees in the amount $28.03 were waived.
4. On June 18, 2020, Duke and Ms. Rosa entered into an agreement for the $365.04 balance due that allowed Ms. Rosa to pay 12 monthly installments of $30.42. No payment for the monthly installment was received for July and August 2020, so the agreement was canceled and the entire past due balance of $365.04 was charged back to Ms. Rosa’s account along with an unpaid balance of $12.53 for a total balance of $377.57.
5. On December 28, 2020, three (3) more late fees were waived, and on April 7, 2021 Duke waived two (2) additional late fees incurred for February and March 2021. Duke advised us it was willing to create an agreement for payment of the remaining unpaid balance, which at the time was $370.04.
6. On April 8, 2021, our CAO staff mailed a letter to Ms. Rosa that included five (5) tables with data reflected on the billing statements from January 2019 through March 2021 to clarify the information regarding the unpaid balance of $370.04. Ms. Rosa responded to our CAO staff’s letter and indicated she never asked for nor agreed to an installment plan and she was never advised to request Duke to terminate Budget Billing after the bi-directional meter was installed. Additionally, Ms. Rosa claimed she was advised by Duke to stay on Budget Billing because she would eventually receive a credit because her consumption was lower due to net metering. Ms. Rosa claims on December 31, 2019, a Duke representative suggested she be removed from Budget Billing, and another representative told her to only pay current charges on her account.
7. Our CAO staff reviewed the 23 months from June 2019 (when net metering billing commenced), to April 2021, and found Ms. Rosa’s account had been billed for the difference between energy used and energy received. Ms. Rosa made 16 payments, and Duke waived 11 late fees for a total of $69.73. Duke has no record of advising Ms. Rosa to remain on Budget Billing. Based on the information available for review, our CAO staff determined that Duke did not violate any of our rules or its tariff in the handling of Ms. Rosa’s issue.

 Although Ms. Rosa’s formal complaint was filed after our CAO staff closed Complaint No. 1349979E, she provided no new evidence for our consideration in this matter. Therefore, the only evidence currently available to support Ms. Rosa’s complaint has already been reviewed by our CAO staff, who determined that Duke did not violate any of our rules or its tariff in the handling of Ms. Rosa’s issue.

We find that a thorough and complete investigation of this matter was conducted and that Duke has complied with its tariff and all applicable statutes and rules. Based on the information obtained by us, it appears that Ms. Rosa was properly billed in accordance with Duke’s tariffs along with our rules and statutes. Ms. Rosa has presented no documentation or evidence that supports her contention that she was improperly billed by Duke. Furthermore, it does not appear that Duke has violated any jurisdictionally applicable provision of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Administrative Code, or its tariff in the handling of Ms. Rosa’s account. Therefore, we deny Ms. Rosa’s formal complaint; she should pay any outstanding account balances currently owed to Duke.

 Based on the foregoing, it is

 ORDERED by the Florida Public Service Commission that Duke Energy Florida, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied. It is further

 ORDERED that Chris Rosa’s formal complaint is denied. It is further

 ORDERED that the provisions of this Order, issued as proposed agency action, shall become final and effective upon the issuance of a Consummating Order unless an appropriate petition, in the form provided by Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code, is received by the Commission Clerk, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, by the close of business on the date set forth in the “Notice of Further Proceedings” attached hereto. It is further

 ORDERED that in the event this Order becomes final, this docket shall be closed.

 By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 19th day of August, 2022.

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|  | /s/ Adam J. Teitzman |
|  | ADAM J. TEITZMANCommission Clerk |

Florida Public Service Commission

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Copies furnished: A copy of this document is provided to the parties of record at the time of issuance and, if applicable, interested persons.

RPS

NOTICE OF FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OR JUDICIAL REVIEW

 The Florida Public Service Commission is required by Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, to notify parties of any administrative hearing or judicial review of Commission orders that is available under Sections 120.57 or 120.68, Florida Statutes, as well as the procedures and time limits that apply. This notice should not be construed to mean all requests for an administrative hearing or judicial review will be granted or result in the relief sought.

 As identified in the body of this order, our action denying Chris Rosa’s formal complaint is preliminary in nature. Any person whose substantial interests are affected by the action proposed by this order may file a petition for a formal proceeding, in the form provided by Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code. This petition must be received by the Office of Commission Clerk, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, by the close of business on September 9, 2022. If such a petition is filed, mediation may be available on a case-by-case basis. If mediation is conducted, it does not affect a substantially interested person's right to a hearing. In the absence of such a petition, this order shall become effective and final upon the issuance of a Consummating Order.

 Any objection or protest filed in this docket before the issuance date of this order is considered abandoned unless it satisfies the foregoing conditions and is renewed within the specified protest period.

 Any party adversely affected by the Commission's procedural or intermediate action in this matter may request: (1) reconsideration within 10 days pursuant to Rule 25-22.0376, Florida Administrative Code, if issued by a Prehearing Officer; (2) reconsideration within 15 days pursuant to Rule 25-22.060, Florida Administrative Code, if issued by the Commission; or (3) judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court, in the case of an electric, gas or telephone utility, or the First District Court of Appeal, in the case of a water or wastewater utility. A motion for reconsideration shall be filed with the Office of Commission Clerk, in the form prescribed by Rule 25-22.060, Florida Administrative Code. Judicial review of a preliminary, procedural or intermediate ruling or order is available if review of the final action will not provide an adequate remedy. Such review may be requested from the appropriate court, as described above, pursuant to Rule 9.100, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

1. *See Varnes v. Dawkins*, 624 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Varnes* at 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *See, e.g., Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach*, 471 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); *Kest v. Nathanson*, 216 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); *Ocala Loan Co. v. Smith*, 155 So. 2d 711, 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *See* PSC-2020-0469-FOF-EI, issued November 23, 2020, in Docket Nos. 20200030-EI, *In re: Complaint by Juana L. Del Rosario against Florida Power & Light Company regarding backbilling for alleged meter tampering*. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)