BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

ORIGINAL

IN RE: Application for a rate increase by SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC.

DOCKET NO. 920199-WS

COPY

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER LUIS J. LAUREDO COMMISSIONER JULIA L. JOHNSON

PROCEEDING:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

25A**

DATE:

November 23, 1993


PLACE:

106 Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY:

JANE FAUROT

Notary Public in and for the State of Florida at Large



ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.
100 SALEM COURT
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
(904) 878-2221

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PARTICIPATING: Kenneth A. Hoffman, Esquire, representing Southern States Utilities, Inc. Ms. Fox, representing COVA, Cypress and Oak Villages Association. Michael Gross and Michael Twomey, representing Office of Attorney General and Citrus County. STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS Issue 1: Recommendation that Citrus County's request for order argument be granted. Issue 2: Recommendation that the utility's Motion to Vacate Stay be granted and the utility be required to post a bond in the amount of at least \$3,000,000. Issue 3: Recommendation that Citrus County's Motion For Reduced Interim Rates, Recalculated Bills, Refunds and Penalties be denied.

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. BEDELL: Item 25A is Staff's recommendation to grant Southern States motion to vacate automatic stay. This is a post-hearing motion and participation is limited to the parties. This Commission has concurrent jurisdiction with the appellate court to rule on this motion pursuant to Appellate Rule 9.310. believes that under the PSC Rule 25-22.061(3)(a) the Commission does not have discretion in the decision to vacate a stay where the utility posts good and sufficient security in the form of a bond or corporate undertaking. Staff is prepared to go through the recommendation issue-by-issue. However, the first issue Staff has recommended that oral argument on the pending motions be granted, and there are parties present to address the Commission. Mr. Twomey and Mr. Gross are co-counsel for Citrus County. Mr. Ken Hoffman is present for the Company. There are four representatives of COVA who are here. There is also a representative of Springhill Civic Association here which was not a party to the original proceeding.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Commissioners, do you want to go ahead and address Issue 1, which is the question of allowing oral argument?

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I move Staff.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Without objection. With no objection, then we will grant Staff's recommendation to allow oral argument. And since, Mr. Hoffman, this is your motion, is it not? You may go first.

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MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, my name is Kenneth A. Hoffman, I'm with the Messer Vickers firm, Post Office Box 1876, Tallahassee, Florida, 32302, and I'm appearing on behalf of Southern States Utilities.

Commissioners, the issue before you today is really very simple. The issue is whether or not you should grant Southern States' motion to vacate the automatic stay, which was triggered by an appeal filed by Citrus County and Cypress Oak and Villages Association, who I'll refer to as COVA. The reason that the issue is simple is because you have a rule, and the rule is mandatory in nature. It says that in cases involving a rate increase, an appeal of that increase by a public body, such as Citrus County, there are two things that happen. The first thing that happens is the appeal by the public body triggers an automatic stay. The second thing that happens is that the automatic stay must, must be vacated if the utility files a motion asking you to vacate the stay, which we have, and post a good and sufficient bond or corporate

undertaking and, yes, we have a bond on file with the Commission.

In this case, as I said, we filed the motion to vacate the stay, and our bond is in excess of \$5.9 million. Under your rule, which is not discretionary, but it's mandatory in nature as the Staff points out in their recommendation, the motion to vacate the automatic stay must be granted. Now, I think that is the primary principle that you have to keep in mind during the discussion today. Now, I'm going to briefly go through with you some of the pertinent background facts of this matter. And the reason I'm going to do that is because in some of the pleadings that have been filed by Citrus County and COVA, they keep saying that Southern States has violated the automatic stay, and that is simply inaccurate. It's false. It's untrue. And I'm going to give you the factual scenario, which is undisputed, which will lead you to the same conclusion that those allegations are untrue.

Now, on March 22nd of this year, 1993, the Commission entered its final order approving the uniform rates for Southern States Utilities. Citrus County and COVA then timely filed a request for reconsideration challenging the uniform rates. Under your rule, Rule 25-22.060(1)(c), those motions for

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reconsideration did not automatically stay the effectiveness of the March 22nd final order. However, Citrus County or COVA could have filed a motion requesting the Commission to stay the effectiveness of that final order and the uniform rates, which may or may not have been granted. The fact of the matter is no request was ever made of that nature. Thus, as of March 22nd, Southern States had the legal authority to implement the newly authorized uniform rates so long as Southern States obtained approval of the tariff sheets reflecting the new rates. However, because the Company was aware that the motions for reconsideration challenging the rate structure had been filed, in order to avoid customer confusion should those motions be granted, Southern States refrained from submitting the tariff sheets to implement the new rates until the decision was made on the motions for reconsideration. That decision denying the motions for reconsideration was made on July 20th of this year.

Under Section 367.084 of the Florida Statute, as pointed out by your Staff, as a matter of law, July 20, 1993 is the effective date of the denial of Citrus County's and COVA's motion for reconsideration challenging the uniform rates under the file and suspend law.

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Thereafter on August 13th, of 1993, Southern

States filed its tariff sheets reflecting the uniform rates. Copies of those tariff sheets were served on all parties, including Citrus County and COVA.

Subsequently, in August and September, Southern States filed corrections to the tariff sheets. Again, serving copies on all parties, including Citrus County and COVA. The tariff sheets were approved by the Division of Water and Wastewater effective September 15th, of 1993.

On October 8th, of 1993, Citrus County and COVA filed a notice of appeal. By that time, October 8th, Southern States had already completed 49 billing cycles under the new rates, billing cycles applicable in all but four of the counties in which Southern States provides service in this docket. But because the notice of appeal that Citrus County and COVA filed on October 8th was legally defective, they filed a second notice of appeal titling it an amended notice of appeal, in which they added the Public Service Commission as an appellee. That was filed on October 12th. Therefore, Citrus County and COVA legally perfected their appeal on October 12th of 1993. By that time, Southern States had completed 51 billing cycles under the new rates. Again, in 17 out of the 21

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effected counties in this docket.

Citrus County and COVA recently filed their third notice of appeal on November 18, 1993. Now, as a matter of law, their appeal was perfected on October 12th. One week later, on October 19th, 1993, Southern States filed a motion to vacate the automatic stay triggered on October 12th. That filing was made with the Commission. In its motion to vacate the automatic stay, Southern States suggested in its motion that a bond is not necessary because the appeal taken by Citrus County and COVA, if it is limited only to rate structure issues, is revenue neutral in terms of total revenue requirements.

However, we do not know at this point, sitting here today, if Citrus County or COVA will also challenge other findings of the Commission in this docket which do have a direct revenue requirements impact. In addition, yesterday I received a copy of a notice of appeal filed by the Office of Public Counsel. Since the Office of Public Counsel took no position on rate structure issues, it's clear that their appeal will deal directly with findings of the Commission which have a revenue requirements impact.

Southern States presently has a bond on file with the Commission in an amount in excess of \$5.9 million.

That bond was initially posted after the approval of interim rates. It was renewed and is now effective through September 4th, of 1994. In light of the appeal, the notice of appeal filed by the Office of Public Counsel, we believe that the Staff's recommendation that the bond that we have posted remain on file and be renewed if the appeal goes beyond September of 1994, we believe that recommendation is reasonable. However, as I will mention to you in a few moments, we believe that a corporate undertaking would save money for the Company and still adequately protect our customers.

Commissioners, the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Citrus County and COVA elected not to request a stay from this Commission. And, instead, waited until the uniform rates became effective and were billed before filing an appeal, and that appeal does get them an automatic stay, at least on a temporary basis. Make no mistake about it, Southern States was authorized to and began billing these new rates before that automatic stay went into effect. Again, those final rates were effective and 51 systems had already been billed before that automatic stay was triggered. Most importantly, under your Rule 25-22.061(3)(a), you must vacate the automatic stay.

You must lift the automatic stay, since Southern States has filed a motion requesting you to lift the automatic stay, and presently has a bond on file effective through September 4th of 1994 which would cover any obligations of Southern States to make refunds to customers should the appellate court reverse the Commission.

We support and believe under your own rules you must approve the Staff recommendation to grant Southern States motion to vacate the automatic stay, and to deny Citrus County's motion for reduced interim rates pending judicial review and imposition of penalties against Southern States.

And one final point, I had mentioned a corporate undertaking. Posting of a bond is an expensive proposition. Southern States paid close to \$30,000 to renew the bond on file with the Commission, and does have an opportunity to obtain a partial refund on the premium paid if the Commission substitutes a corporate undertaking for the bond requirement while this cases on appeal. Southern States has over \$70 million in equity, and is certainly capable of making good on any refunds without the necessity of a guarantee bond. So we are also asking that you condition the lifting of the stay upon the posting of a corporate undertaking in

lieu of the bond presently on file with the Commission.

Thank you, Commissioners.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, Ms. Fox will go first.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Ms. Fox.

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MS. FOX: Thank you. I represent COVA, Cypress and Oak Villages Association, which is a party here. These are the people who will actually be bearing the effect of this rate increase.

First, I would like to say that we disagree categorically with virtually everything Mr. Hoffman had To go back, historically, COVA did file a to say. motion for reconsideration, so did the Office of Public Counsel, so did Citrus County, so did SSU and various other parties. Commissioner Clark, herself, also subsequently filed a sua sponte Commission motion for reconsideration on certain points. SSU filed a motion to stay the effective date of the automatic rates in April of this year. That's in a package that has been handed out to you. On June 8th, 1993, this Commission entered an order granting stay of Order Number PSC-93-0423. The order states, I'm just going to read the concluding sentence, "Based on the foregoing, SSU's motion for stay of Order Number PSC-93-0423 pending the disposition of all motions for reconsideration is

hereby granted."

So I submit to you that we have a problem with not just one stay, but two stays. The stay was already in effect by this Commission's order of June 8th, that stay was effective from June 8th through November 2nd, 1993, when this Commission disposed of the last of the pending motions for reconsideration. We also have the stay that is in effect as a result of the Florida appellate rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida which are binding, of course, on this tribunal that was effective as of October 8th, and continues to be in effect through this date. And I respectfully disagree with Mr. Hoffman on the effective date of our filing of the notice of appeal. Any deficiencies, if he deems there were any, in the form of the notice are not substantive and are not jurisdictional.

The next point I would like to address is the issue of our knowledge, as it were, of SSU's imminent implementation of the final rates. I believe by the fact that the stay was in effect and the final order disposing of the motions for reconsideration that neither COVA nor Citrus County had reason to suspect that the final rates might be implemented without our knowledge. To the best of our knowledge, the first bills went out approximately October 16th, and we have

witnesses here to testify to that, should that become an issue in dispute. SSU contends that it had already begun processing these sometime prior, and I am not in a position to dispute that, but only to state that they were mailed out to the customers October 14th, approximately. At that point certainly they could have withdrawn them and respected the automatic stay that was then in effect, and had been in effect for already a week at that point. In fact, at the time they began sending the modified bills to the customers, both stays remained in effect.

The appeal was filed on October 8th because COVA and Citrus County learned right around October 1st that SSU and the Staff were planning to implement the final rates. We found this out, essentially, by accident. Michael Gross who was new to the case at that point talked to Ms. Bedell, got a copy of the Staff approval letter. You will note that none of the parties were copied on the letter by which the Staff approved the final rates. We later attempted to clarify what was going on. On two occasions -- this is documented in the correspondence that has been passed out to you -- the first time was after the August 30th Agenda Conference in which this Commission voted to open an investigation into the uniform rate issue. Then again

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on October 5th, Mr. Twomey wrote to Mr. Hoffman and asked him what the utility's plans were, that we had heard something to the effect that they were planning to implement the rates. We found out on October 8th that SSU was planning on implementing the rates when Mr. Hoffman sent us a letter to that effect. We filed our notice of appeal that day.

The notice of appeal states that the final agency action that we are appealing was the March 22nd order which was placed in effect by the Staff's approval of the tariff sheets which was, in effect, final agency action, even though the orders on motion for reconsideration had not yet been issued. On that day there was a meeting here with the Staff and SSU in which we gave them a copy of the notice of appeal, told them it had been filed. They still had a week before any bills had been sent out to honor the automatic stay. They didn't do so. They are sitting before you in flagrant violation of the Supreme Court rules.

SSU has not presented you with any justification for its haste in implementing these rates. As I said, the motions for reconsideration were not disposed of, and, in fact, Commissioner Clark's sua sponte motion wasn't even considered until the October 12th Agenda Conference. That was the last of the motions for

reconsideration to be taken up. And the order then was issued 20 day after that, November 2nd, 1993, which, by the way, explains the latest amendment to the notice of appeal was to advise the court of the entry of that order.

SSU has stated in its affidavit before the Commission that they essentially had no idea that COVA or Citrus County were planning to appeal this order. And if it's necessary, I would like to read the Commission a statement that was presented on the record from me, COVA's appellate attorney, concerning the appeal, essentially asking this Commission to consider it on investigation before the courts had to consider it on appeal.

In addition, Mr. Twomey's correspondence with Mr. Hoffman, copies of which you have in front of you, also reference the imminent appeal. For these reasons — SSU says that the Staff was authorized to implement the rates because the motions for reconsideration don't act as an automatic stay under Rule 25-22.060(c), and that COVA and Citrus County never sought such a stay. I point out to you, we didn't have to. They had already sought the stay. The Commission had already ordered a stay. The Commission never lifted the stay.

Under the circumstances, the argument that's

presented by SSU and the Staff borders on being misleading, since they failed to advise you of the stay that you had already entered. Staff has said, and SSU has argued in its motion that there is no irreparable harm to any party by what is in effect two months between September 15th and the present date, or the date this Commission issues an order on the automatic stay, that we are not harmed by this two-month period in which they have implemented the final rates in violation of not only your order, but the Supreme Court rules. Well, I would like to remind you that this is going to cost my clients, COVA, \$100,000 in two months. The annual cost to them is about \$600,000. It's going to cost the customers in Springhill about \$300,000. It's going to cost other customers about \$400,000. A total of about \$800,000 in two months. This is not a de minimis issue. I believe that term was used in their filings.

There is a statement in the Staff recommendation that is on the bottom of Page 9, and it says essentially that Citrus County placed the utility in an untenable position by waiting months to file the notice of appeal and invoke the automatic stay. I submit to you that just the opposite is true. Ordinarily, the appeal time doesn't begin to run until the motions for

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reconsideration are disposed of, that's stated right up front in the appellate rules. The order is not deemed rendered for appeal purposes until that point.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But can't the rates go into effect?

MS. FOX: If you're speaking hypothetically, if there were no stay order?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm speaking of the statute that says -- the statute says in term of taking an appeal, you have to wait until the order is out. But doesn't it also say the rates can be implemented?

MS. FOX: Well, I believe Mr. Gross is going to address that in a little more detail, but I think on that procedural point, I think the statute runs up against the Supreme Court rule. And since it is a procedural issue, the Supreme Court rule will probably govern. And I also think there are due process problems with implementing them at a time when the aggrieved party is unable to take an appeal. Because that leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction, in effect, to grant any relief for the period prior to the finality of the order.

But without getting into that hypothetical issue,

I was addressing Staff's statement that the County

somehow placed the utility in an untenable position by

delaying filing of the notice of appeal. And, as I said, just the opposite is true. We had no notice or no reason to believe that the Staff was going to administratively approve these final rates. Remember, COVA and Citrus County are parties to this docket and are entitled to notice and a hearing whenever our rights are being effected.

The rule that the Utility and the Staff rely on, of course, no longer applied. That went out on June 8th when the Commission, itself, stayed the rates. We submit that SSU has placed itself in an untenable position by violating the Commission order, or violating the Supreme Court rule, and that this Commission should not reward it by either using that fact as a ground for lifting the stay, or by attempting to protect SSU from the results of its own conduct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you a question on that point.

MS. FOX: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: In a nutshell, what I understand you to say is that under your interpretation of applicable procedural rules here at the Commission, and at the court, that Southern States implemented the rates before they were authorized to do so, or should have.

MS. FOX: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And that that should be a basis

-- and that Southern States should not now be rewarded
by vacating the automatic stay. I guess my question is
isn't the question before us today just whether the
automatic stay should be vacated and what does -whether or not we agree or disagree whether the rates
were implemented before they should have, what bearing
does that have if we agree with Mr. Hoffman's argument
that the rule is very specific that says if a bond is
posted, that we don't have the discretion, according to
our rule, that the stay has to be vacated.

MS. FOX: Let me just make two points in response to that. One is that both SSU and the Staff, as I read their respective pleadings, have used this idea that it would confuse the customers to rescind the rates now. Used that to sort of bootstrap them into keeping the rates into effect. And I submit that would be rewarding, essentially, a violation of your order, a violation of the appellate rules, and I don't think you should do that.

But, secondly, just sticking to the merits of whether or not the automatic stay should be vacated, I disagree with Mr. Hoffman that the stay is nondiscretionary, that the lifting of the stay is

nondiscretionary. I think that in itself would be in violation of the Supreme Court rules which state that when a governmental agency appeals an order, they are entitled to an automatic stay. Then the Commission can consider lifting that stay on good and sufficient grounds presented by the utility within its sound discretion. So, the nondiscretionary nature of the lifting of the stay that has been presented to you, I think is an erroneous interpretation of your rules, because it would run up against the Supreme Court rules. In the exercise of your sound discretion, I would like to simply say that there is no party before this Commission who bears the financial impact of these final rates who has asked you to put them into effect.

It is a revenue neutral issue to the utility. They are entitled to collect the same amount of money one way or the other. The effect on the customers, though, is to force certain customers to pay more to subsidize other customers. We submit to you that the Staff has essentially no position to advocate on this issue, because it benefits some customers, it harms others. And what the appeal is all about is the legality and fairness of those rates. The OPC has essentially admitted it has got a conflict of interest on this issue, and has no position.

The only parties directly impacted by this issue 1 are here begging you to leave Citrus County's automatic 2 stay in effect, that is the automatic stay that is 3 granted under the Florida appellate rules while this 4 case is on appeal. We don't think there is an 5 alternative to propose some kind of unconscionable 6 In the meantime, this Commission has opened an 7 investigation docket to review the fairness of the 8 There is a bill pending in the uniform rates. 9 legislature which could preclude you from adopting 10 The appellate court is going to examine uniform rates. 11 the notice legality, fairness issues related to these 12 We submit to you a better course, instead of 13 rates. lifting the stay now, is to let these matters take 14 their course with the stay in effect, to do otherwise 15 is going to create the perception among the customers 16 who get an interim subsidy that somehow they get a rate 17 increase at the end of the day, and that simply 18 wouldn't be true. 19

That would simply confuse and complicate the issues in this docket unnecessarily. Those customers have no right to ask or require COVA and other customers to subsidize their rates. In fact, no customer did ask you to do that. The Commission Staff brought it up. SSU didn't ask you to do it. The

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Commission Staff brought it up on cross examination.

And, of course, you know the history on how that became

the Commission's final order.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Ms. Fox, I don't want to relitigate the case. We are here on a very narrow question, let's stick to that.

MS. FOX: My point was simply that there is nobody before this Commission who is bearing the financial impact of these that wants these rates put into effect. The only parties you have before you are the ones that will be irreparably harmed in the interim.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: How are they irreparably harmed if there is a bond posted?

MS. FOX: Well, I have some representatives of COVA here who could address that. But if the rates go into effect, these customers rates are going to jump from about \$440 on an annual basis to 750. It's an increase of about \$315 on an annual basis. And they, of course, would have to be paying that in the interim. These people are on limited incomes, a lot of them are retirees on social security, this amounts to something like half of a monthly social security check. These people would have to modify their life style substantially to accommodate these, and there is no way you can go back and change that by giving them a refund

two years from now. And in the meantime, SSU would be absorbing a huge unfunded liability, because they can't go back and surcharge the customers who paid too little, if this is reversed on appeal.

I would also, I meant to point out earlier that the bond that has been posted in the rate case doesn't cover this. They have not posted an appeal bond. Therefore, they haven't even met the requirement for lifting the stay under your rule. We don't know whether they could get an appeal bond, given the type of this liability. That is my answer to your question.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Mr. Gross.

MR. GROSS: Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission. I'm Michael Gross here on behalf of the Attorney General's office representing Citrus County. Before I present the argument that I prepared, I would like to highlight some of the issues that have just been discussed, and there are some questions directed to some of the issues. But I think we have to be careful not to forget that on June 8th, 1993, the Commission entered its own order granting SSU's motion for a stay of the order of March 22nd, 1993 approving statewide uniform rates. And that is something that just simply can't be overlooked. Moreover, the notice of appeal that was filed on October 8th is totally

adequate notice of appeal sufficient to invoke the automatic stay provided by the Supreme Court rules. I know of no rule of law, nor has any opposing party pointed one out, nor has the Staff, that rendered the initial notice of appeal deficient to invoke the automatic stay simply because the Public Service Commission was not named as an appellee. That was a strategic decision that was made. So it's our position that the automatic stay was invoked on October 8th, 1993.

Now there is some question as to whether the Commission has the discretion to keep the stay intact in the event that SSU posts an adequate bond. I would first like to point out that the Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure regarding stays pending review, Rule 9.310(b)(2) explicitly states on motion the lower tribunal or the court may extend the stay, impose any lawful condition or vacate the state. This rule of the Florida Supreme Court which prevails over any rule on procedure that is in the PSC rules gives this tribunal the discretion to extend the stay.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you a question about that. We have adopted rules dealing with stays. And in that rule we set out the criteria under which the stay will be lifted. Are you saying that we cannot

have a rule that limits our discretion on a case-by-case basis? We can't pass a rule that says if you meet these circumstances, the stay will be lifted? We can't exercise our discretion through rulemaking?

MR. GROSS: I think that the Commission has the power to establish criteria for lifting the stay, but the Supreme Court has given you the authority to extend the stay. In other words, it's simply not true that you don't have authority to extend the stay.

again, and it was one I asked Ms. Fox. I want to know if -- we have a rule, and as I understand Mr. Hoffman's argument, we have no discretion. He has met the criteria in the rule. My question is can we, as the Commission, in implementing the Supreme Court's rule that gives us, the lower tribunal, the authority to vacate a stay, can we state in a rule if you meet this criteria you shall be entitled to having that stay vacated, can we do that? I would like a yes or no, and then an explanation.

MR. GROSS: I would say no, I would say the answer is no, for the reason that there are numerous cases that have held that even when the legislature attempts to encroach upon the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court that those statutes are invalid. And

what can't be done by statute certainly can't be done by rule.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: How have we encroached on their authority?

MR. GROSS: Well, you are taking the position by rule that you do not have the authority to extend the stay be setting forth criteria that limit that authority, that criteria that categorically, if meant, entitle the movant to a lifting of the stay.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So our rule is invalid.

I think to the extent that it MR. GROSS: Right. attempts to limit authority given to the agency by the Supreme Court, it is an encroachment on the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority. This is not the only answer to this question, though. The rule that we are talking about is 25-22.061(3)(a) which indicates that a stay may be vacated if a sufficient bond is posted when you're dealing with a rate increase case, and also in a situation where a public body has invoked the automatic stay. Although it's conceded that rate increase is a component of this appeal, the primary thrust of this appeal is a policy decision that changes the ratemaking concept never before implemented in this state, and that shifts at least one of the issues here to 25-22.061(3)(b), which indicates that where a nonrate

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increase issue is appealed, there is much more discretion and much more latitude given to, by this rule, reserved to the Commission to determine whether to require a bond, or no bond at all, or any lawful conditions. And this is the case that because it has a rate increase component but a primary thrust, that is, a non-rate issue, doesn't squarely fit in either (3)(a) or (3)(b).

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Can I ask you a question about your appeal. Did your appeal specifically state what -- your point on appeal? I know sometimes that is done.

MR. GROSS: No, it does not. It is an appeal of the order, so the rate increase component is certainly still a viable issue on appeal.

Also, though, after considering the public interest here versus the harm, and I'm going to go into that in a little more detail, there is a question about whether any bond could be adequate, even under (3)(a) of your rule. So I don't think it is a foregone conclusion that if a bond is posted that the Commission mandatorily must lift the stay, that is simply not the case. By the Supreme Court rule, by the fact that this particular appeal doesn't squarely fit in either Sub A or Sub B of the stay lifting rule, and the question of

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whether any bond would be adequate, even under Sub A. But I would like to go back and also point out why the misconduct of SSU in violating the Commission's stay order, especially when they are the ones who asked for the stay, and also violating the automatic stay, that is relevant because the integrity and the credibility of the Company have now been put into question. that is an issue that is relevant to lifting the stay and letting the Company move forward. Also, there is another motion pending asking for penalties and sanctions to be assessed for a violation. So this is relevant, and this is why I'm going to proceed with some argument on these issues. I mean, SSU's motion itself, being entitled a motion to vacate automatic stay necessarily concedes that there is an automatic stay in effect, as we speak. SSU's argument in its pleadings is essentially that we already started the billing process, and it would be a tremendous inconvenience to stop now. But inconvenience is not an excuse for violation of a Commission order, violation of a Supreme Court rule. And to lift the stay on such grounds would be to award SSU for its misconduct. SSU and the Staff, which joins with SSU in opposing the stay took a very aggressive position in precipitating the implementation of the uniform rates. On September

15th, the tariff approval letter to SSU was not copied to Citrus County, and the letter on its face shows that it wasn't copied to anybody. And this is the very event which triggered SSU's authority to implement the new rates, and it was effectuated without notice to Citrus County, a certainly interested party. And this is a procedure which is inherently unfair and raises serious due process questions, and which accounts for some of the delay in the appeal process. Improper lack of notice.

It is also SSU's and Staff's aggressive actions which created a situation where the stay would now cause SSU inconvenience. In any case, there are 30 days to appeal. And it is a better practice followed by a majority of attorneys to exercise caution and wait out the appeal period before acting on a judgment. knew that the order on reconsideration was imminent, that the Commission could rule at any time. And it is presumptively aware of this when it implemented the rates. It knew that the order on reconsideration could be entered at any time, and that there were appellate rights which would invoke an automatic stay. And it took the risk which it now complains about, which are the consequences of its own aggressive actions. Now, SSU has also, in my opinion, shown arrogance and

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judicial disrespect and contempt for a rule of the Florida Supreme Court and moreover in arguing in its pleadings and filing affidavits that it could not foresee this appeal when it, in fact, has filed a motion and was granted a stay by the Public Service Commission.

In its motions for stay, SSU argued the strong policy of the Commission in favor of granting stays, and in its motion -- and the Commission in its order acknowledged that it would be senseless and wasteful to require action which would have to be undone when the order on reconsideration could have an impact on that action. This is precisely Citrus County's argument today. We agree with the arguments that SSU made when it requested a stay.

Now, there are some specific concerns of the Staff that I would like to address that are in the Staff recommendation. The Staff points out that if the stay is lifted, but the order of March 22nd approving the statewide uniform rate is reversed, then SSU, while it would not have overcollected, it would have to refund to customers who overpaid, which is a risk incurred by SSU. And this would have to come out of their assets. This would not come from money that could be put aside from overpayments or overcollections. But the Staff's

response to that is SSU has elected to take that risk. The Staff admits SSU's risk, but indicates that that is really up to SSU to determine whether it should take that risk. But it is submitted by Citrus County that the Public Service Commission as a regulator has the duty to protect SSU from its own financial indiscretions, and to assure to the ratepayers the solvency of their utility company. You know, there is some responsibility of a regulator to look at that, and I think this would go without saying.

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The other scenario pointed out by Staff is that if the stay remains intact, but the order approving the uniform rates is affirmed, contrary to the Staff recommendation, at least my interpretation of it, SSU would not have to refund to customers who paid more under the interim stand-alone rates. The stay merely delays the new rate structure going into effect without risk to SSU. The net effect is that if the stay remains in effect, there is no risk to SSU, the revenue requirements will have been met during the pendency of the appeal while the stay is in effect. But if the stay is lifted, there is risk to SSU that it will have to pay back money to ratepayers who have overpaid when SSU has not overcollected. So it's not just the risk of those fixed income people who will have to advance

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money and incur that hardship which may be irreparable because a belated refund may be too little, too late.

Also another argument to keep the stay in effect is that the current rate structure which would be in effect, and when I say current rate structure, I acknowledge that the uniform statewide rates have been implemented, but the stand-alone rate structure that we are asking be reinstated during the pendency of the appeal is noncontroversial. It has been tried and proven and well established legally. Whereas the effect of lifting the stay is to allow a new, conceptually new controversial rate concept to go into effect when there is a potential for reversal on appeal, and a reevaluation and a reversal of the Commission's position after the investigative docket. And it just makes no sense to move forward aggressively when there is no harm to the utility during the pendency of the appeal, if it is a revenue neutral issue.

Now, it is not really relevant to Citrus County's argument as to whether an oral announcement at an Agenda Conference as to a ruling renders the rates effective or not, because there was an order staying the order of March 22nd, '93 in effect. It is Citrus County's position that that stay, the stay of that

November 2nd, I thought it was November 3rd, 2nd or 3rd, when the order on reconsideration was reduced to writing. But at the earliest, it was October 12th that there was an oral ruling on the last of the motions for reconsideration involving the interim refund. And the order of June 8th staying the uniform statewide rates made it clear that that stay would be in effect until all motions for reconsideration were disposed of.

I also know of no rule of law that would allow the rates to go into effect, notwithstanding the statute and the rule when the order has not been reduced to writing, and is not appealable. I mean, that is a heads I win, tails you lose situation, where you can't seek relief from it, but we are going to go ahead with the adverse decision.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you a question. I thought -- I haven't looked at it recently, but I thought there was a provision in the statutes that addresses that specifically. It gives us 20 days to get an order out, but it doesn't -- it allows the rates to go into effect upon the vote.

MR. GROSS: I would like to pull that section.

MS. BEDELL: Can I read that to you?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes.

MS. GROSS: I would like to pull that --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: She is going to read it.

MS. BEDELL: Section 367.084 on rate adjustment orders, at the end of that section it says, "Such an order," that is, a rate adjustment order, "is not considered rendered for purposes of appeal, rehearing, or judicial review until the date the copies are mailed as required by this section. The provision does not delay the effective date of the order. Such an order is considered rendered on the date of the official vote for the purposes of 367.081(6), which is --" .081 is the rate relief section, and Paragraph 6 is the one that addresses our time frames for entering an order.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So it's considered rendered on the date of the vote?

MS. BEDELL: Yes.

MR. GROSS: I would like to respond to that. I have found my copy, and I am prepared to respond to that. Firstly, the Supreme Court rules provide the definition of rendition. Once again, this statute is very suspect. If it is interpreted as encroaching upon the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority on the definition of rendition, that's point number one. Now, the second point is this definition of rendition cross references 367.081(6). It says, "Such an order is

considered rendered on the date of the vote for the purposes of 367.081(6) for a very limited purpose."

And if you go back and look at that Subsection 6, it has to do with certain time constraints that are imposed upon the Public Service Commission and consequences that would fall upon the Public Service Commission if they don't meet those time constraints.

And I think what this is saying is that for the limited purposes of determining whether the Commission has lived up to its time obligations --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is that the eight-month time clock?

MR. GROSS: Yes. Rendition is --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you this. If we don't live up to the eight-month time clock, can't the utility implement the rates that they petitioned for? It has always indicated to me that's the drop dead date. And one of two things happens. The rates that we approved by the vote, if you don't read it that way then the utility has the authority to put into effect the rates it asked for.

MR. GROSS: I'm not going to dispute that. But getting into the definition of rendition, I think it is limited to that purpose. But this is getting far afield. Because even -- let's assume, arguendo, that

Staff's position is correct, that the oral vote of the Commission on October 12th on the last motion for reconsideration lifted the previous stay order of June 8th. SSU would still have been in violation of that stay order of June 8th as well as the automatic stay for several days. And that is very questionable as to the propriety of implementing the rates when there hasn't been a written order on reconsideration at that point.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You read me, or Ms. Fox read me the final paragraph on that order staying. And does it say until all motions for reconsideration are disposed of?

MR. GROSS: Yes. I will read the sentence again.

Based upon the foregoing, SSU's motion for stay of
order number, et cetera, pending the disposition of all
motions for reconsideration is hereby granted.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And it's your view that disposition means a written order.

MR. GROSS: Yes, it is. A written appealable order, and that is what is intended by the Florida Appellate rules. And it seems to me that any rule or statute that is interpreted, and I agree that this is ambiguous, and I would urge an interpretation that will save the constitutionality of the statute and the rule,

that it be interpreted in a limited manner so that it does not encroach upon the rules of the Supreme Court, and it doesn't allow implementation of rates for which there is no order, no appealable order.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Gross, I hope that you're about to wrap up.

MR. GROSS: In conclusion, the uniform statewide rates remain controversial. The status quo, which we are asking for, that is, you know, reinstating interim stand-alone rates is noncontroversial. There is a risk both to the customers and to SSU if the uniform rates remain in effect during the pendency of the appeal, if there is a reversal on appeal. There is also a motion asking for penalties and sanctions to be imposed on SSU, and we are submitting that that be given due consideration for the unilateral disregard of the automatic stay and the Commission's own order by SSU. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you. Mr. Twomey, I'm going to ask you that if you have got new points and new areas, to please express those to the Commission.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir, that was my intention. I appreciate your concern.

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to object. We have already heard from Counsel for Citrus County,

1 that's Mr. Gross.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Twomey, you're representing the same client?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, sir, I am. And I just said at your direction that I would be brief.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: If you can address your remarks to areas that have not been covered, I will entertain those. But if we get repetitious, I'm going to ask you to --

MR. TWOMEY: Thank you, sir, I will.

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman -- excuse me. Before he is brief, maybe -- we have heard a lot from the attorneys from the other side on this, and I will not have that much in rebuttal. But there is something that I want to point out, and it may cut short Mr. Twomey a little bit. There has been a critical and I hope inadvertent misrepresentation of this stay order. And if you will allow me, I will very briefly tell you what it is. Or if you want me to wait, I will wait until he is done.

MR. TWOMEY: That's fine with me, Mr. Chairman, if it is fine with you and it will speed things up.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, if it has the possible benefit of speeding things up, please proceed, Mr. Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: The order is in response to a motion 1 filed by Southern States Utilities, I'm reading you 2 from the motion, quote, "Southern States," quote, 3 "Hereby requests the Commission to enter a stay of that 4 portion of Order Number PSC-93-0423-FOF-WS requiring a 5 refund with interest of the difference between б originally approved and revised interim rates pending 7 disposition of all motions for reconsideration filed in 8 this proceeding. Order issued June 8th, 1993, ordered 9 by the Florida Public Service Commission that the 10 motion for stay of Order Number PSC-93-0423-FOF-WS 11 pending the disposition of all motions for 12 reconsideration filed by Southern States Utilities, 13 Inc. is hereby granted." It was a specific request to 14 stay that portion of the final order pertaining to a 15 16 requirement to refund the difference between the revised interim rates and the final rates. 17 request, it did not grant a stay of the uniform rates 18 authorized by the final order. Thank you. 19

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Twomey.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate that I don't think that you can, nor should you have the ability to limit your discretion with respect to requirement imposed by the rule fo the Florida Supreme Court.

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Notwithstanding that, the question becomes, and you raised this early on, Mr. Chairman, don't you have before you the question of whether you should lift the stay. Now, as pointed out by Ms. Fox, you've got no one here that bears any financial responsibility for these rates in anyway asking you to lift the stay so that the uniform rates can be imposed. To the contrary, you have repeatedly had customers who were forced to bear the subsidies imposed by these rates asking you, begging you, soliciting that you not. And in just a minute I would like your leave to read this letter from Senator Brown-Waite.

On the other side you have the utility who didn't ask for the rates. You have the Staff who is pushing this thing. One has to ask why the headlong rush to impose uniform rates that will harm some people, we say irreparably. The very rates that are the subject of the appeal, and the very rates that this Commission has graciously agreed to review during its investigation to determine whether they are legal, to determine whether their implementation, their imposition on these customers is, in fact, in the public interest.

Now, the status quo is the situation that exists with the interim rates. As you know, the interim rates already require some of these customers to bear

subsidies over and above the stand-alone rates. They are being harmed now. I think I heard a snort from the audience back there earlier when Ms. Fox made the representation that some of these retirees, some of these people on social security, some of these elderly people, these customers that will be forced to bear the subsidy will be harmed by this. I'm not sure who the person was back there, probably a person with a well-paying job. But be that as it may, there is nothing to be gained by imposing these rates pending the outcome of the appeal, pending the outcome of your investigation.

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Now, even if your rule is without discretion, that is, if you have tied your own hands -- and I don't have the cite, but I think there is case law to the effect that under certain circumstances you're not bound by your own rules, procedural rules. But even if you are bound by the rule and you have no discretion whatsoever to consider this and consider extending the stay, you have to ask yourself is there an adequate and sufficient bond. In fact, you have to ask yourself is it possible to structure an adequate and sufficient bond that will protect those parties that are bound to be hurt by this. I would submit to you, we submit to you that it cannot. As pointed out by Ms. Fox, the

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bond that is apparently in effect that Mr. Hoffman referred you to is for purposes of interim rates, collection pending final. It does not have the terms and conditions that any reasonable surety would want to look at before they posted a bond in this case.

Keep in mind that up until this time the Company was collecting interim rates that exceeded what they They were holding some of that money got on final. subject to refund, whether a bond was issued or not under those circumstances, and what premium was due was one question. Under the uniform rates, if they are imposed, it will be revenue neutral for the Company. The money that some customers are forced to pay in subsidies won't be kept by the company in some pot that they can give back, it will be spent for the benefit of those customers receiving the subsidy. We submit to you that the company not only does not have a bond that can -- that is applicable to the appeal, but that no reasonable surety would issue one. And then, secondly, while it's apparently true that in the past that the Commission has denied the ability of this company to have money subject to refund pursuant to a corporate undertaking, the Commission in reaching its determination should analyze how much money would be at risk during the pendency of the appeal and the

investigation and consider what the effect would be on the company's financial integrity if it were forced to make these payments out of its equity, inasmuch as it cannot go back and retroactively bill any of its customers for it. And you have to ask yourself, Commissioners, I would submit, why is the utility willing, when it's a revenue neutral issue, when it did not ask for these rates in the first place, why is it willing to subject itself to the potential of having to pay out shareholder's equity to support the implementation of these rates.

Now, I'm not going to go into it, but I'm not sure if it is --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm confused as to the point you're making. You're saying we should not -- assuming that we would lift the stay, we should not accept a corporate undertaking.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. I'm saying you should not accept a corporate undertaking.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: They should have to file a bond.

MR. TWOMEY: They should have to file a bond.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Because it doesn't meet any of the financial viability criteria?

MR. TWOMEY: Yes. And I am saying further that I

don't think you can construct a bond that will protect the interests of the customers who have to pay the subsidy. If you approve the uniform rates, there is going to be one group of customers out here, the customers of Sugar Mill Woods and Springhill, for example, who will have to pay more than their fair share, Commissioner, that is, more than under stand-alone rates. The Company won't be able to keep that money because it will go to support the rates of the customers who are receiving the subsidy. If a year passes and this goes by, and the Company's sales figures are accurate in the rate case, it will only have enough money to meets its expenses and recover its return on equity authorized by the Commission.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But your appeal does not address any change in revenue. Your appeal addresses where you get that revenue from.

MR. TWOMEY: Yes, ma'am. And I'm not being sufficiently clear, obviously, because what I'm saying to you is that because it's revenue neutral, I would say to you, "Why is the Company running headlong into doing this, because they don't gain anything from it?" But more importantly, the customers that pay too much, if the Commission's order is reversed on appeal, or if the Commission after its investigation determines that

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the uniform rates shouldn't be imposed, those customers who paid too much are going to have to have refunds. They are going to have to receive refunds back to the level of what their stand-alone rates would be, or whatever the ultimate rates are. And I'm saying to you, "Where is the money going to come from?" can't go back and allow a utility to retroactively bill the customers who receive the benefit of the subsidies, that is against the law, plus it would be a real shock for them getting a benefit, and then doubling back. I'm suggesting to you that -- I'm telling you, I believe, that the Company, while it has a bond that it obtained from a surety based on certain representations of how much it would collect during the pendency of the rate case, and what might have to be refunded, I don't think Mr. Hoffman is telling you that he has talked to a surety, and he is saying to these people, "We have got a revenue neutral issue here. We are going to collect a bunch of money, and if we lose on appeal we are going to have to give two, three, four whatever the millions are back, and you are going to have to pay it. And the odds on being reversed on appeal, or through the investigation are 50/50, or whatever they are." The bigger point is that even if you could do all of that, I'm suggesting to you that given the pendency of

the investigation, given the pendency of the appeal, it is fundamentally unfair to make these retirees, people on fixed incomes and the like, pay these things because they will be irreparably damaged, even if they get the money back later.

Now, I thank you for your time. I would like to read Senator Brown-Waite's letter and I will be finished. The letter is dated November 22, 1993. It is to Chairman Deason.

"Dear Mr. Deason: Due to a previous commitment, I am unable to attend the Commission meeting scheduled for tomorrow, November 23rd. However, I do want to share my thoughts and comments with the Commission. Therefore, this fax is being sent today, and the hard copy will follow.

Southern States Utilities customers were delighted when the Commission agreed to investigate how the statewide rates for SSU customers came about. I believe it would be unfair to those SSU customers for you to now sanction the same rates being questioned by Docket No. 930880-WS. Therefore, I'm requesting that the motion to vacate the stay not be granted. I disagree that the Company will not be harmed because there is an alternative available to implement the continuation of the interim rates or to apply the

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.

Company applied for stand-alone rate which will have the same revenue result.

Please read this letter into the record at the Commission meeting. I urge that the Commission not agree with the Utility's motion to vacate. Very truly yours, Jenny Brown-Waite, State Senator, District 10."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Thank you, Mr. Twomey.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you one question.

As I understand -- would you read the last sentence in the middle paragraph. Does that mean that she does believe that the Utility will be harmed? "I disagree that the Company will not be harmed."

MR. TWOMEY: Well, I'm not exactly positive what she is saying here. What I think she is saying is something that we have alluded to, or tried to allude to, and that is that if this company has to pay the premium, which we submit would be high compared to regular bonds, has to pay the premium or has to out of its own shareholder's equity pay for the cost of a refund to these customers, that it could harm its financial integrity, that is what I think she is saying. I don't know.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Mr. Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman, I'm going to be very

brief, just kind of run through a few points. The first thing I will say to you is that I want to remind you, despite all of the discussion that you have heard, this is a very limited legal issue. I pointed out to you previously that Counsel for COVA and Citrus County have misrepresented, and I presume inadvertently, misrepresented the ruling of the Commission in Order No. PSC-93-0861-FOF-WS which, in fact, granted Southern States' request for a partial stay of the final order. And in that motion Southern States had requested for a stay only of the requirement that we refund the difference between the revised interim rates and final rates, and that motion was granted by this order. That is the first thing.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, that was pending disposition of all petitions for reconsideration. What petitions for reconsideration?

MR. HOFFMAN: Motions for reconsideration had been filed by Citrus County, COVA, Southern States, Public Counsel, and I think that Hernando County may have asked for something at a very late point in time.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: But it was just for -- the stay was just applicable to the requirement to refund the difference between final and interim?

MR. HOFFMAN: Absolutely. That was specifically

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what was requested, and it was the motion that was Secondly, I believe it was Ms. Fox, Counsel granted. for COVA, said that they found out on October 8th, or shortly before October 8th, that the Company was going to implement the rates. Don't get me wrong, I don't think that this has anything to do or is even relevant to your decision in this matter, but I want the record to be clear. Mr. Twomey approached me after the agenda on the new rate structure docket and asked me what our intentions were and what we would be willing to do. And I got back with him I would say about ten days later and told him that the Company intended to implement the uniform rates. Subsequently, I got a call from Mr. Gross, I told him the same thing. got a letter from Mr. Gross. And I said, "Well, why do they keep asking me the same thing?" And I guess that was, you know, I thought it might be, but that was part of their strategy was to somehow build up some type of argument based on discussions with me rather than going to you, rather than going to the Commission. And it's in their package. This time I sent them a written letter saying, "No, the Company intends to implement the uniform rates."

So that's factually what happened on that, and I will go back to the first point because I think it's

very important. The Company did not violate an order of the Commission. They also mentioned they had no reason to believe Staff would administratively approve the rates. Well, I don't know why they would think that, because that's what Staff always does. There is a final order issued, those tariff sheets are submitted by the utility, and they are stamped approved by the Division of Water and Wastewater, not by the Commission. That's the Commission's practice. That's how it's done.

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They talk about the utility's headlong rush. The utility has not been in a headlong rush. I would submit to you this utility has not been arrogant. attorneys have not been arrogant. If this utility was in a headlong rush, this utility would have attempted to implement these uniform rates directly after the final order as it was authorized to do and could have done unless a stay was requested by COVA and Citrus County, and granted by the Commission. But we didn't do that, we waited. And why did we wait, because we didn't want to have different rates within a short period of time going out to our customers. waited until a decision was made on the motions for reconsideration. They have talked about fixed incomes, and, I mean, they are completely off the issue here,

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respectfully, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, but I would submit to you there are customers with fixed incomes on most all of our systems that we serve in this state.

We have asked you for a corporate undertaking. think that it is appropriate in this case. Mr. Twomey says, with no support whatsoever, that he doesn't believe that a bond could be issued to protect customers on this appeal. There is no support for that We have a bond on file with the Commission. statement. If the Commission approves Staff's recommendation, which directs the utility to have the nature of that bond changed, to change it from interim, to protect customers during the interim on interim rates versus protecting the customers on appeal, that can be done and it can be done quickly. And I think that's all I have on rebuttal, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you a question.

There has been a lot said today about the fact that the rates themselves are revenue neutral, it's just a question of rate structure and whether they are going to be system-specific or if they are going to be uniform rates; do you agree with that characterization? Is that accurate that Southern States will be receiving the same dollars of revenue, it's just a question of which rate structure?

MR. HOFFMAN: If what, if the interim rates are implemented?

CHAIRMAN DEASON: We have before us the question of whether we are going to vacate the stay or not.

Regardless of whether the stay is vacated or not, is Southern States going to receive the same dollar of revenue from its customers?

MR. HOFFMAN: There is a difference.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: There is a difference, because if the stay is vacated what rates will you collect?

MR. HOFFMAN: The final rates, which subject to check, Mr. Chairman, amounts to a rate increase of approximately \$6.7 million. And if the automatic stay is enforced, if it's not vacated and you then go to our revised interim rates, I believe that, subject to check, that revenue requirement is at 6.4 million. It's a different number. But I would reiterate to you that we do not believe there is any discretion and that the rule is mandatory. But that's my answer to your question, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me ask you this. If the stay is vacated, do you agree that Southern States is putting itself at risk to make those customers whole whose rates are higher under statewide rates?

MR. HOFFMAN: No, I don't. But I don't think that

the Commission needs to resolve that issue today. Because in our opinion, Mr. Chairman, we believe that on a rate structure appeal, where we are implementing the rates authorized by the Commission, in an appeal which would be strictly revenue neutral, that the Company does not place itself at risk. However, if we are wrong in that position, and the first District Court of Appeal reverses the Commission, there will be a corporate undertaking or a bond on file with this Commission to protect the customers in the event we are wrong.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Now, is that protection just for the difference in revenue amounts and not customer-specific?

MR. HOFFMAN: I think it could be tailored by the Commission, Mr. Chairman. I think that the Staff recommendation recommended a bond amount which would protect the customers of the systems who are currently paying higher rates under the uniform rates.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, do you agree that if the stay is vacated there are going to be customers that are going to be paying more under statewide rates?

MR. HOFFMAN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And if the stay is vacated and the appeal is successful on COVA and Citrus County's

part, you're saying there is not going to be a refund to those customers who are paying more?

MR. HOFFMAN: Our position that we have taken, Mr. Chairman, is that there is not a refund. And I think I have already explained to you why. But what I'm saying to you is we do not dispute, particularly now that Public Counsel has filed an appeal and they are going to put revenue requirements at issue, we do not dispute the need for corporate undertaking or bond at this point of this proceeding and we are willing to make sure that it's posted.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: But that is a question of overall revenue requirements, not customer-specific rates?

MR. HOFFMAN: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Does Staff agree with that?

MS. BEDELL: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Surely this has come up before where we have had a rate design at issue. Maybe it's not come up, maybe not in water and sewer.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I can't remember in the past where we had a rate design at issue after the final decision of the Commission.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, the fact of the matter is it's not at all clear as to whether or not there

would be a refund for those people who overpaid based on -- who would pay more under statewide rates than stand-alone.

MR. WILLIS: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: It's not at all clear that it just wouldn't be from a going-forward standpoint that you would address the rates, and the rates that were in effect is water under the bridge.

MR. WILLIS: I agree with you, Commissioner, it's not clear at all.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: So how do we make these people whole? Or we can't.

MR. WILLIS: Well, Commissioner, I think if there is protection in place, whether it be a corporate undertaking or a bond, which we are recommending a bond, those customers will be held whole. I mean, if someone in the future dictates that those customers who are paying more now under uniform rates than they would be under stand-alone are deserving of a refund, then those customers would receive a refund with interest.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's the part that's not clear, that we have never addressed before when it's an issue of money between customers and not the overall revenue what you do.

MR. WILLIS: (Indicating yes.)

MR. HILL: The customers are going to be protected. There is not a doubt in my mind about that. It's the Company that's going to be at risk, and I won't try to drag this out to explain it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But I think that Commissioner Johnson is correct, is that the customers as a whole are protected, but not individual customers that under statewide rates are paying more than they would under stand-alone.

MR. HILL: I believe that if the courts say -COMMISSIONER CLARK: A bond doesn't address that
at all.

MR. HILL: I understand. And if the courts say that you cannot do what you have done, then you have got to go back to a system-specific rate and revenue requirement. That's where you have to go, there is no other place to go. And we may end up arguing with the utility over refunds, but there isn't a doubt in my mind that if we are reversed on that and have to redo it, they have collected money they should not have collected and it will have to be refunded. And the Company will end up on the short end of it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, they have collected money they should have recovered from the wrong people.

MR. HILL: Absolutely, and they will have no way

to go back to the right people and collect those funds.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Unless you do an adjustment on a going-forward basis to remedy that, but I'm not sure you can.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And what Mr. Hoffman is saying, it's his opinion that the Company is not putting itself at risk, it does not have the liability to make the customer-specific whole. Their only requirement is to make customers as a general body of ratepayers whole. That is, if they have collected more total revenue than what they are authorized as a result of the final decision on appeal, they are liable for that, but they are not liable to make specific customers whole.

MR. HILL: And while that's an interesting argument, I think that if indeed we are overturned by the courts, then the revenue requirements fall out on a system-specific basis, and I think the Company will be on shaky ground with that argument and will lose money.

MS. BEDELL: May I make a suggestion? In terms of trying to make a determination of what the Company may have to do in terms of a refund, under both the appellate rule on stays -- it provides that you can set conditions for the stay, or for vacating the stay it would seem to me. If you set a condition related to how, you know, the end result when the appellate court

makes a final decision.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I understand what you're saying, but wouldn't it be unfair to Southern States to say that we are going to vacate the stay and put you at risk for making those customers who pay more, but we are not going to give you the opportunity to recoup from those customers who should have paid more but who did not pay more? Isn't that a very difficult position to put the Company in?

MS. BEDELL: Yes, I think so. The whole situation is difficult.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Oh, I agree with that. I think you can get a unanimous decision on that right now. I think even the parties would stipulate to that.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Hoffman, how would you respond to the argument posed by opposing counsel that Rule 25-22.061(3) does not include a mandatory nature behind it, and that that would be a constitutional violation?

MR. HOFFMAN: The first time I've heard it is today. If they are saying that the word shall does not include a mandatory nature, I can only tell you that my common meaning of that word in the research I've done on statutory interpretation tells me they are wrong. I think Commissioner Clark summed it up, she said to Mr.

Gross you are saying that we have an illegal rule, or an invalid rule. I disagree with that. I think the Commission has a valid rule, and that that rule is within its discretion.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And, Commissioner Johnson, if memory serves me correct, we were encouraged by the court, and I'm not sure if it was the Supreme Court, it may have been. They got tired of dealing with motions to vacate stays, and they told us -- how did they tell us? In oral argument I can recall some pointed questions being why don't you have any rules that state the circumstances under which a stay will be granted so that they don't have to deal with it again. That doesn't dispose of the question as to whether we did it right, but it was certainly my recollection that the court was tired of dealing with the stays and wanted us to deal with them.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Do we have the option of letting them deal with it?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think they would admonish us for not doing what the rule said we should do.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Commissioners, I think we need to move along. If we are ready for a motion now, fine, if we're not, I suggest we just take a ten-minute recess and come back and then dispose of this as

quickly as possible. What's your pleasure? In other words, let's move along one way or the other.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Chairman, I don't see that we have any discretion, and I agree with Commission Staff on this point. I think we set out the rules that indicate that a posting of a bond will allow us a vacation of the stay, and as Mr. Hoffman pointed out, the Commission order, which did concern me, only provided for a stay of refund of the interim rates, it wasn't with respect to the implementation of the rates. And for that reason I would move Staff on all three issues.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Second.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: It has been moved and seconded.

Let me state right now that I'm going to vote against the motion. I am persuaded by the argument that we are moving into a new area here where there are differences between rates for different customers in different areas, and that in my opinion we should keep the status quo, which are interim rates, and let the court give the guidance to the Commission that it sees fit. I don't see where -- even though there is going to be a bond posted, it's not going to be for the purposes of making individual specific customers whole, it's going to be for the purpose of making customers as a total

rate paying body whole. And that's really not the main crux of this appeal, so I would oppose that. But, anyway, we have a motion and a second --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Chairman, can I just ask a question? The concern I have is the interim rates don't generate the rates that we concluded they were entitled to. I mean --

CHAIRMAN DEASON: The interim rates, what are the differences between the interim rates and the final rates that have a statewide rate structure? Very minimal, is it not?

MR. TWOMEY: They generate more, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: That's what I thought. I thought it was either minimal or it either generated more. What's the case, Mr. Hoffman?

MR. HOFFMAN: My understanding is that as revised, the interim rates as revised after Commissioner Clark's motion for reconsideration is a total revenue requirement increase of 6.4 million as opposed to 6.7 million final rates.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Which is the final rates?
MR. HOFFMAN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: I consider that difference to be pretty inconsequential given the magnitude of the real issue, which is the rate structure involved. I would

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just keep interim rates.

Moved and seconded, all in favor say aye.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Aye.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: All opposed nay. Nay.

MR. TWOMEY: Mr. Chairman, pardon me. Can we ask that either you make it clear in your vote that you are ordering the Company to establish a bond that would hold -- the customers would have to pay the subsidies whole if there is a reversal on appeal, or conversely that you make it clear that you accept that there is no way to make these customers whole, assuming a reversal on appeal, and that you're not going to do anything about it. I mean, it's not clear to me which way you come down on that. That you're going to accept the Company's argument that they will make all the customers whole on a revenue basis, but that the people that pay too much, if there is a reversal, it's too bad except on a going-forward basis. I'm asking you to make it clear that you're telling them they have to get that kind of bond, or make it clear that you're not.

MR. HOFFMAN: Mr. Chairman, let me object. I don't think Mr. Twomey is being very clear. I think that the Staff's recommendation is clear. And I think that we can have that -- we already have a bond on

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file. We can get the nature of the bond changed to fit what is required in the Staff recommendation, and I think that that dollar amount will be sufficient to meet either consequence. We are sitting here speculating about what may happen on appeal. We simply don't know. I mean, I know the staff has estimated \$3 million, but that is based on the rate design issue alone. I don't know what else Public Counsel may raise that may have a revenue requirement impact. And I think this is unnecessary, and I object to it, and I think it makes the issue more cloudy.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, Mr. Hoffman, I think not only is it relevant, it is critical to know what the nature of the motion is and what is being done. Now, I'm not on the winning side of the motion, so I don't know how to clarify it, because I'm not even supporting it. If the Commissioners wish to clarify it, they will have the opportunity now.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have moved Staff recommendation. Now, the issue of whether or not a refund will be due to the customers I don't think is before us right now.

MS. BEDELL: What is before you is a decision about whether there is good and sufficient security for anything that may be coming down the pipeline.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Now, will the bond cover that? Let me just ask the question. Without deciding the issue as to whether or not there will be a refund to only those customers who are overcharged, and not a making up of that revenue from the other customers. Let's assume that our order is that you will only refund to those who are overcharged. Will the bond cover that?

MS. BEDELL: Yes.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, we believe the bond will cover it. It's just like any rate case, it will have to be reviewed at the end of one year to see if -- you know, we don't know how long the appeal is going to be, but it will have been reviewed after one year, and if the appeal is not done, it will have to be up for whatever amount we believe it will have to be protected.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Let me make sure that we are clear. What you're saying is that if that is the final decision, the bond is adequate?

MR. WILLIS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: But that is not the position the company is arguing, they're saying it is not their belief they are putting themselves subject to that liability.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I thought that point was 1 made painfully clear what the Company thought, but 2 Staff sufficiently satisfied me that it was something 3 that we could make those customers whole, and perhaps 4 that is something that we should definitely have 5 written in the order. 6 MS. BEDELL: That is what we had in mind in terms 7 of coming up with a dollar number. That is the 8 9 direction we headed in to come up with some recommendation on a dollar amount. Mr. Chairman, we 10 need to know if you are dissenting on Issue 2 only, or 11 12 on Issue 2 and 3. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Well, let's take a look at that. 13

Issue 3 is Citrus County's motion for MS. BEDELL: the penalties and the reduction in rates, refund of bills.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. We already disposed of Issue 1.

MS. BEDELL: Yes, sir.

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CHAIRMAN DEASON: I'm dissenting on Issue 2, but I'm agreeing with Staff on Issue 3.

MS. BEDELL: Thank you.

MR. GROSS: This is an appealable order to the First District Court of Appeal, so we need an order so that we can avoid some of the problems we have had in

the past, and also the provisions in the bond are going to be of interest to the First District Court of Appeal as to whether there was an adequate bond in compliance with the Commission's rule. Even if it is determined to be mandatory, there is still that --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Doesn't the bond have to cover the whole amount of the rate increase, so therefore it covers anything --

MR. HOFFMAN: Commissioner Clark, I think that every issue in the rate case is put at issue in the appeal, I think it would.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: All we need to do at this point is make sure that the total amount of the bond is sufficient to cover the total amount of the rate increase, because it's still at issue, and covered in that is the amount of any refund that would be due, if it is decided that a refund is due to those people who paid more under statewide rates than they would have paid under stand-alone rates. And it's my understanding from the Staff that it does, and that is what we need to decide today.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: And an order will be forthcoming, and it will describe what the Commission did.

MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. HUFFMAN: Thank you,

1 2 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 3 4 STATE OF FLORIDA) COUNTY OF LEON) 5 I, JANE FAUROT, Court Reporter, do hereby certify 6 that the foregoing proceedings was taken before me at the 7 time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes 8 were thereafter translated under my supervision; and the 9 foregoing pages are a true and correct record of the 10 11 proceedings. I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, 12 employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor 13 relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or 14 15 financially interested in the foregoing action. DATED THIS 30 day of November, 1993. 16 17 18 19 JANE 100 Salem Court 20 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 21 (904) 878-2221 22 SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME THIS November, 1993, IN THE CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, COUNTY OF LEON, 23 24