

RUTLE , ECENIA, UNDERWOOD, PURNELL & HOFFMAN

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW

STEPHEN A. ECENIA
KENNETH A. HOFFMAN
THOMAS W. KONRAD
R. DAVID PRESCOTT
HAROLD F. X. PURNELL
GARY R. RUTLEDGE
R. MICHAEL UNDERWOOD

POST OFFICE BOX 551, 32302-0551
215 SOUTH MONROE STREET, SUITE 420
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301-1841

TELEPHONE (904) 681-6788
TELECOPIER (904) 681-6515

GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTANT
AMY J. YOUNG

**ORIGINAL
FILE COPY**

May 23, 1994

Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director
Division of Records and Reporting
Florida Public Service Commission
101 East Gaines Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

HAND DELIVERY

Re: Docket No. **881074-TP**

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Enclosed herewith for filing in the above-referenced docket on behalf of Teleport Communications Group, Inc. are the original and fifteen copies of the prefiled direct testimony of Steven C. Andreassi.

Please acknowledge receipt of these documents by stamping the extra copy of this letter "filed" and returning the same to me.

Thank you for your assistance with this filing.

ACK 1 RECEIVED & FILED

Sincerely,

AFA 2

APD 1
EPSC-BUREAU OF RECORDS

Kenneth A. Hoffman
Kenneth A. Hoffman

CAF
CMU *Reitz*
KAM/r1

CTR _____
cc: All Parties of Record

LEG *Congress*

LIN *6 Verig*

OPC _____

ROB _____

SEC 1

WAS _____

OTH _____

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

05035 MAY 23 88

FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director
Page 2
May 23, 1994

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing prefiled direct testimony of Steven C. Andreassis submitted on behalf of Teleport Communications Group, Inc. was furnished by U. S. Mail to the following, this 23rd day of May, 1994:

Patrick K. Wiggins, Esq.
P. O. Drawer 1657
Tallahassee, FL 32302

Lee Willis, Esq.
MacFarlane, Ausley, Ferguson &
McMullen
P. O. Box 391
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Michael Tye, Esq.
106 East College Avenue
Suite 1420
Tallahassee, Florida 32301-7733

Everett Boyd, Esq.
P. O. Box 1170
Tallahassee, FL 32302

Beverly Menard
c/o Richard Fletcher
106 East College Avenue
Suite 1440
Tallahassee, Florida 32301-7704

David Erwin, Esq.
P. O. Box 1833
Tallahassee, FL 32302-1833

Vicki Kaufman, Esq.
315 S. Calhoun Street
Suite 716
Tallahassee, FL 32301

Interexchange Access Coalition
c/o Wiley Law Firm
Rachel Rothstein
1776 K. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

Ms. Janis Stahlhut
Vice President of Regulatory
Affairs
Time Warner Communications
Corporate Headquarters
300 First Stamford Place
Stamford, CT 06902-6732

Richard Melson, Esq.
P. O. Box 6526
Tallahassee, FL 32314

Office of Public Counsel
111 West Madison Street
Suite 1400
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400

Douglas S. Metcalf
Communications Consultants,
Inc.
631 S. Orlando Avenue
Suite 250
P. O. Box 1148
Winter Park, Florida 32790-1148

Marshall Criser, III
Southern Bell Telephone Co.
150 S. Monroe Street
Suite 400
Tallahassee, FL 32301-1556

Benjamin H. Dickens, Jr.
Florida Ad Hoc
Telecommunications Users
Blooston, Mordkofsky, Jackson &
Dickens
2120 L. Street, N.W.
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20037-1527

Ms. Blanca S. Bayo, Director
Page 3
May 23, 1994

Jodie Donovan, Esq.
Teleport Communications Group
One Teleport Drive
Staten Island, NY 10311

Donna Canzano, Esq.
Division of Legal Services
101 East Gaines Street
Room 212
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

By: Kenneth A. Hoffman
KENNETH A. HOFFMAN, ESQ.

**ORIGINAL
FILE COPY**

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. ANDREASSI
BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
ON BEHALF OF
TELEPORT COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC.
DOCKET NOS. 921074-TP, 930955-TL, 940014-TL, 940020-TL,
931196-TL AND 940190-TL

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE
05035 MAY 23 8
FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

1 attorneys on general state and federal policy
2 proceedings in which TCG is participating.

3 Q. WHAT IS YOUR BACKGROUND PRIOR TO JOINING TCG?

4 A. From 1991 to 1993, I worked for Rochester Telephone
5 Corporation as a Network Planner and Marketing
6 Analyst. I was responsible for projects related to
7 pricing and products provided by Rochester's long
8 distance affiliate, RCI. From 1989 to 1991, I
9 worked as a Budget Forecaster and Financial Planner
10 for Highland Telephone Company, another Rochester
11 Telephone subsidiary. I received a Master of Arts
12 in Economics from Pennsylvania State University in
13 1989. I received my Bachelor's degree in Economics
14 from Indiana University of Pennsylvania in 1987.

15 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS
16 PROCEEDING?

17 A. I will address the issues related to expanded
18 interconnection for switched access set out in the
19 order establishing issues in these dockets. I will
20 testify that expanded interconnection for switched
21 access is in the public interest and that the
22 potential revenue impact on the local exchange
23 companies ("LECs") should not be serious. I will
24 also outline certain items of concern to TCG in the
25 LECs' special access expanded interconnection
26 tariffs filed in Phase I of Docket 921074-TP.

1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE TCG'S INTEREST IN THIS PROCEEDING.

2 A. TCG's affiliate, TCG America, is certified to

3 operate as an Alternative Access Vendor ("AAV") in

4 Florida. It therefore has a significant interest

5 in having the opportunity to interconnect with the

6 LECs to carry interexchange carrier ("IXC")

7 intrastate traffic from the LEC's switch to the IXC

8 point of presence ("POP") in addition to carrying

9 interstate traffic from the LEC switch to the IXC

10 POP as mandated by the Federal Communications

11 Commission ("FCC").

12 Q. IS THE FLORIDA COMMISSION PROPOSING FULL SWITCHED

13 ACCESS COMPETITION IN THIS PROCEEDING?

14 A. No. Like the FCC's order implementing switched

15 access expanded interconnection, an order in this

16 docket will open up only a fraction of the

17 intrastate switched access market to competition.

18 Because of this, the LECs will not lose significant

19 revenues and should not receive excessive pricing

20 flexibility.

21 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEAN.

22 A. The LECs charge IXCs for switched access service

23 based on three rate elements. The Carrier Common

24 Line ("CCL") element recovers the non-traffic

25 sensitive costs associated with the LEC's local

26 exchange loop between the customer and the LEC

1 central office. The Local Switching element
2 recovers the traffic sensitive costs associated
3 with the LECs' switch. The Local Transport element
4 recovers the LEC's costs for carrying the IXC's
5 traffic from the central office to the IXC's POP.
6 Local Transport consists of two different types of
7 facilities: "Direct Trunked" services, which use
8 dedicated facilities that run from the IXC POP
9 directly to the final end office, and "Tandem
10 Trunked" services, which use dedicated facilities
11 that run from the IXC POP to the tandem switch, and
12 then shared transport facilities that run from the
13 tandem switch to the final end offices. The local
14 transport rate element also includes costs
15 associated with the tandem switch. It is important
16 to note that the only piece of switched transport
17 AAVs can provide are the dedicated trunk portions
18 of local transport. Additionally, at the FCC, the
19 local transport component of switched access also
20 includes a "Residual Interconnection Charge" which
21 recovers, through a usage sensitive charge that is
22 applied much like the local switching element, a
23 substantial portion of local transport revenues.

24 Q. CAN YOU MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DIRECT TRUNKED
25 LOCAL TRANSPORT?

26 A. Yes. Direct trunked local transport switched

1 access facilities are simply dedicated point to
2 point high volume facilities. Although telephone
3 companies offer these services within "switched
4 access" service categories, the economic and
5 technical nature of direct trunk local transport
6 circuits are really indistinguishable from special
7 access/private line services. Like special
8 access/private line services, direct trunked local
9 transport is provided between two discrete points,
10 the IXC POP and the telephone company central
11 office. There is actually no "switching" or call
12 routing involved in direct trunked local transport.
13 Moreover, IXCs need the quality, reliability and
14 diversity of competitive alternatives for these
15 critical facilities. Therefore, opening the local
16 transport market to competition by permitting AAVs
17 to interconnect to the LEC facilities at its
18 central office is in the public interest.

19 Q. WILL THE LECS FACE SERIOUS FINANCIAL HARM IF THE
20 COMMISSION PERMITS AAVS TO PROVIDE THIS PIECE OF
21 SWITCHED ACCESS?

22 A. I do not believe so. The LECs should not be
23 seriously harmed financially if AAVs interconnect
24 to provide the local transport piece of switched
25 access because, as I explained above, it is just
26 one piece of the switched access market. After

1 charging CCL, local switching, transport and the
2 Residual Interconnection Charge ("RIC"), the LECs
3 earn annual revenues exceeding \$11 billion in the
4 interstate switched access market. The dedicated
5 trunk portion of the local transport segment of
6 interstate switched access accounts for
7 approximately \$418 million of this \$11 billion
8 market or 3.8%. The impact of intrastate Local
9 Transport Restructuring ("LTR") may be even smaller
10 than that of interstate LTR. BellSouth's
11 intrastate local switched access rate is \$.0544 per
12 minute of use on an originating call. This is
13 comprised of a carrier common line charge of \$.0260
14 per minute, a local switching charge of \$.0130 per
15 minute and a local transport charge of \$.0154 per
16 minute. Thus carrier common line accounts for
17 47.79% of switching revenues, local switching
18 accounts for 23.90% of switching revenues and local
19 transport accounts for 28.31% of total switching
20 revenues. So as a starting point, less than a
21 third of all switched access revenues even fall
22 under the heading local transport. Of course, not
23 all local transport revenue will be open to
24 competition under LTR. As an example, a typical
25 DS0 can carry 9000 minutes of use per month. A DS1
26 can carry 24 DS0 channels or 216,000 minutes of use

1 a month and a DS3 can carry 672 DS0 channels, or
2 6,048,000 minutes of use per month. Total monthly
3 switching revenues generated by a DS1 and a DS3
4 would be \$11,750.40 and \$329,011.20 respectively.
5 Of that, the local transport charge accounts for
6 \$3,326.40 of the DS1's revenues and \$93,139.20 of
7 the DS3's revenues. The only portion of local
8 transport that would be open to competition,
9 however, is the dedicated facility between the LEC
10 end office and the IXC POP. Currently, BellSouth
11 charges \$140.90 for an intrastate special access
12 DS1 and \$2800.00 for an intrastate private line
13 DS3. These changes represent the only revenue at
14 risk to the LECs. Put in its proper perspective,
15 the DS1 charge equates to a mere 1.2% of total
16 switching revenue and only 4.24% of local transport
17 revenue attributable to that facility. Similarly,
18 the DS3 rate accounts for .85% of total switching
19 revenue and 3.01% of the local transport revenue
20 generated by such a facility. These results assume
21 that the remaining Local Transport revenues are
22 recovered through a RIC charge or tandem switching
23 charge as is the case with the FCC's local
24 transport restructuring.

25 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION IMPOSE THE SAME OR DIFFERENT
26 FORMS AND CONDITIONS OF EXPANDED INTERCONNECTION

1 THAN THE FCC?

2 A. The Commission should simply order the LECs to use
3 for switched access expanded interconnection the
4 rates and rate structures they established for
5 their interstate switched tariffs, which were in
6 turn structured on their interstate special access
7 interconnection tariffs, and to mirror any changes
8 in those interstate rates. The rate elements for
9 switched access interconnection are the same as the
10 rate elements for special access interconnection.
11 These same rate elements apply whether the AAV is
12 interconnecting with the LEC to provide interstate
13 or intrastate services. This makes sense since the
14 same LEC facilities are used for both interstate
15 and intrastate services. These elements for the
16 collocation space are the cross-connect, floor
17 space, power, cable and conduit, and various non-
18 recurring charges. The elements for the local
19 access service, itself, consist of interoffice
20 mileage and a charge for the entrance facility to
21 the IXC POP (The LECs referred to this element as a
22 channel termination in their interstate special
23 access interconnection tariffs). It is unnecessary
24 and inefficient to re-litigate a rate structure
25 which has already been implemented.

26 Q. IS THE OFFERING OF DEDICATED AND SWITCHED SERVICES

1 BETWEEN NON-AFFILIATED ENTITIES BY NON-LECs IN THE
2 PUBLIC INTEREST?

3 A. Yes. In order to bring the benefits of competition
4 to Florida telecommunications users, the Commission
5 should permit AAVs to offer these services. TCG is
6 not prohibited from providing dedicated service
7 between affiliated entities in any state in which
8 it currently operates. TCG is authorized to
9 provide intraLATA toll and Centrex via resold local
10 exchange facilities in multiple jurisdictions. In
11 Illinois, TCG cannot switch local calls between
12 unaffiliated users since this would constitute
13 local exchange service. TCG, instead, hands the
14 local call off to the LEC for completion. While
15 TCG supports the removal of restrictions on an
16 AAV's ability to provide all services, including
17 local exchange service, it believes that
18 immediately permitting AAVs to provide dedicated
19 private line service between unaffiliated users,
20 intraLATA toll (which the Commission already
21 permits) and Centrex via resold local exchange
22 company facilities will greatly enhance the
23 competitive environment in the state. The
24 Commission should also consider opening a generic
25 docket to investigate local exchange competition.
26 Authorization of AAVs to provide these services

1 will bring real benefits to Florida
2 telecommunications users. First, TCG and other
3 AAVs will build the local fiber optic
4 infrastructure without the need for any special
5 incentives which may be sought by the incumbent
6 LECs and which transfer risks to ratepayers.
7 Second, even where competition has already
8 encouraged the telephone companies to match AAV
9 reliability, diversity and other service factors,
10 AAVs still offer what the telephone company cannot
11 -- operational and strategic security. Operational
12 security for telecommunication users, including
13 large and small businesses, means having the
14 ability to acquire diverse, redundant routing and
15 switching service from two independent local
16 networks as insurance against network failure or
17 disaster. Businesses also use the services of AAVs
18 to gain the strategic security which comes from
19 using a telecommunications provider which does not
20 compete in their core business. AAVs provide these
21 same benefits to customers purchasing both private
22 line and competitive switched services.
23 Authorizing AAVs will bring these competitive
24 benefits to Florida, which by definition cannot be
25 provided by the incumbent LEC.

1 Q. THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED PRELIMINARY ISSUES
2 REGARDING WHICH LECs SHOULD PROVIDE SWITCHED ACCESS
3 INTERCONNECTION, FROM WHAT FACILITIES AND TO WHOM.
4 DOES TCG HAVE A POSITION ON THESE ISSUES?

5 A. TCG believes the Commission should order the LECs
6 which filed intrastate special access
7 interconnection tariffs to simply mirror these
8 tariffs by filing tariffs offering switched access
9 interconnection at the same facilities, available
10 to the same entities. The Commission must also
11 require these LECs to provide switched access
12 interconnection at their tandem facilities.

13 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE TANDEM INTERCONNECTION.

14 A. TCG believes the purpose of interconnection is to
15 bring the benefits of competition and choice to a
16 wide number of telecommunications users. Because
17 interconnectors will not be able to establish
18 collocation arrangements in every end office, they
19 need to collocate at LEC tandem facilities in order
20 to handle traffic to end offices where they are not
21 collocated. The LEC should be required to unbundle
22 tandem signalling and permit competition for tandem
23 routed traffic. LECs should provide two types of
24 tandem interconnection with the appropriate
25 signalling. In one type of tandem interconnection,
26 the interconnector would use its own switching

1 facilities to replace the LEC tandem switch. The
2 interconnector needs tandem-type signalling at the
3 end office, so that it can carry calls of multiple
4 carriers over a single trunk group -- the
5 equivalent of the LECs' common transport element.
6 This will permit direct tandem competition only for
7 the limited number of end offices where the
8 interconnector has a presence.

9 The second form of tandem competition involves the
10 interconnector locating facilities in the LEC
11 tandem office, thereby replacing the dedicated
12 facility from the IXC POP to the LEC tandem. This
13 provides for direct competition for this dedicated
14 link. From a signalling perspective this should be
15 no different than an ordinary "direct trunk"
16 connection to an end office since TCG would use
17 separate trunks for each IXC connection at the
18 tandem.

19 To the extent that there is a rate difference
20 between tandem switched transport, DS1 trunked
21 transport and DS3 trunked transport, the difference
22 should be limited, starting at the existing price
23 floor, to the rate differences already existing in
24 the LECs' interstate tariffs for these services.

25 Q. DOES CHAPTER 364, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALLOW THE
26 COMMISSION TO REQUIRE EXPANDED INTERCONNECTION FOR

1 SWITCHED ACCESS?

2 A. Yes. Chapter 364 allows the Commission to require
3 expanded interconnection for switched access for
4 the same reasons it allowed the Commission to order
5 special access interconnection. It directs the
6 Commission to encourage cost-effective innovation
7 and competition in the telecommunications industry
8 if so doing will benefit the public by making
9 modern and adequate telecommunications services
10 available at reasonable prices. Collocation and
11 interconnection are essential elements of full and
12 effective competition in local telecommunications
13 markets and they will bring the benefits of
14 competition to the public which I discussed above.

15 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION REQUIRE PHYSICAL AND/OR
16 VIRTUAL COLLOCATION FOR SWITCHED ACCESS EXPANDED
17 INTERCONNECTION?

18 A. The Commission should require physical collocation,
19 or if it permits virtual collocation, require that
20 it be provided in a manner that is the technical,
21 economic and operational equivalent of physical
22 collocation. Moreover, the availability of
23 physical collocation is essential to promoting a
24 competitive market, and unless LECs are obligated
25 (or volunteer) to provide reasonable physical
26 collocation, the Commission should provide no

1 pricing flexibility for them.

2 Q. SHOULD COLLOCATORS BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW LECs AND
3 OTHER PARTIES TO INTERCONNECT WITH THEIR NETWORKS?

4 A. No. TCG takes the same position on this issue that
5 it took in Phase I of this docket. As monopoly
6 providers of essential bottleneck facilities, LECs
7 need to be required to provide physical collocation
8 to interconnectors. However, non-dominant,
9 competitive carriers need no such requirement. As
10 competition for switched services develops, a
11 competitor would be foolish to reject a collocation
12 request and the associated revenues. The potential
13 interconnector will simply move on to the next
14 provider. For this reason, a requirement that
15 collocators should provide interconnection to the
16 LECs and other parties is unnecessary, a
17 determination which the FCC also found to be true.

18 Q. SHOULD THE PROPOSED INTRASTATE PRIVATE LINE AND
19 SPECIAL ACCESS EXPANDED INTERCONNECTION TARIFFS BE
20 APPROVED?

21 A. To the extent that these tariffs mirror the LECs'
22 interstate tariffs, they should be approved,
23 subject to future modification as the FCC completes
24 its investigation. However, BellSouth's tariff
25 does not comply with the Commission's order in
26 Phase I of 921074-TP because the company does not

1 tariff a DSO interconnection service. This service
2 must be included before the Commission approves
3 BellSouth's tariff.

4 The Commission must also ensure that the LECs'
5 tariffs do not contain unreasonable warehousing
6 provisions. BellSouth's tariff is also not in
7 compliance on this issue since the company must
8 give an interconnector at least 60 days before
9 requiring it to forfeit space. TCG believes the 60
10 day provision to be unreasonable and believes it
11 will permits the LECs to force collocators to order
12 connections, thus triggering pricing flexibility.
13 TCG has asked for reconsideration of this
14 provision. In any case, BellSouth indicates the
15 collocator must place equipment in its space within
16 30 days of being notified to do so by the company.
17 See Section E & B 20.1.5(C)(3)(g). GTE reserves
18 the right to require collocators to relinquish
19 space which it has not used "within a reasonable
20 time." Section 17.7.2(E). BellSouth must change
21 its 30 day provision to 60 days and GTE should
22 specify, "within a reasonable time, to be no less
23 than 60 days from the notification date" in order
24 to bring both tariffs into compliance with the
25 existing order.

26 Q. SHOULD THE LECS' PROPOSED INTRASTATE SWITCHED

1 ACCESS INTERCONNECTION TARIFFS AND LOCAL TRANSPORT
2 RESTRUCTURE TARIFFS BE APPROVED?

3 A. These tariffs should be approved to the extent that
4 they mirror the LECs' interstate tariffs.

5 Q. SHOULD THE LECs BE GRANTED ADDITIONAL PRICING
6 FLEXIBILITY?

7 A. No. The pricing flexibility granted to the LECs by
8 the FCC is adequate. The LECs should not be
9 permitted excessive pricing flexibility. At the
10 interstate level, the RIC is expected to be about
11 80% of the LECs' local transport revenue, which has
12 totaled over \$4 billion annually. Given the
13 substantial RIC revenues guaranteed to the LECs,
14 the risk of anti-competitive pricing on the
15 remainder of the local transport circuit is high.
16 A LEC could choose to price its transport services
17 at a small fraction of their true cost, hold on to
18 100% of the market, and suffer a very small decline
19 in revenues. This same scenario is true at the
20 state level again, assuming the existence of an
21 intrastate RIC. Giving the LECs additional
22 pricing flexibility will substantially increase the
23 risk of these pricing abuses.

24 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION MODIFY ITS PRICING AND RATE
25 STRUCTURE REGARDING SWITCHED TRANSPORT SERVICE?

26 A. As I explained above, the Commission should mirror

1 the FCC's rate structure for switched access
2 expanded interconnection at the interstate level.
3 Different rate levels for interstate and intrastate
4 transport are appropriate only to the extent that
5 different interstate and intrastate tariff rates
6 apply for equivalent DS1 and DS3 special access
7 services.

8 Q. SHOULD THE COMMISSION'S IMPUTATION GUIDELINES BE
9 MODIFIED TO REFLECT A REVISED TRANSPORT STRUCTURE?

10 A. The Commission should apply its imputation
11 guidelines to the LECs' local transport rates since
12 the local transport portion of switched access
13 service will be competitive once switched access
14 interconnection is implemented. The goal of
15 imputation is logical, the cost to the AAV to
16 collocate with the LEC cannot be more than what the
17 LEC would charge the IXC customer for the end-to-
18 end service, including the LEC's own costs for
19 central office space and power, intraoffice cross
20 connections, electronics, and space.

21 The difference between what an AAV has to pay the
22 LEC and what the LEC would charge the customer for
23 end-to-end service represents the margin available
24 to an interconnector to pay for its electronics,
25 network, administrative and overhead costs. This
26 difference is the key measure of whether the LECs'

1 switched access interconnection tariffs present a
2 realistic market opportunity, and whether they will
3 permit a competitive market to develop. An
4 effective imputation policy would require LECs to
5 impute to their end-to-end service the costs they
6 impose on interconnectors to collocate in their
7 bottleneck facilities.

8 Q. SHOULD THESE DOCKETS BE CLOSED?

9 A. Once expanded interconnection for special and
10 switched access services is fully implemented
11 through reasonable, economically viable tariffs,
12 the Commission can permit these dockets to become
13 inactive. It should not close them, however, but
14 leave them open for parties to raise
15 interconnection problems.

16 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

17 A. Yes.