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March 2, 2010

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Ms. Ann Cole Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services Florida Public Service Commission Betty Easley Conference Center 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Room 110 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

PECEIVED-FPSC

Re: Docket No. 090505-EI; Review of Replacement Fuel Costs, Associated with the February 26, 2008 Outage on Florida Power & Light Company's Electrical System

Dear Ms. Cole:

On behalf of Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL"), I am enclosing for filing in the above docket the original and fifteen (15) copies of errata sheets for the pre-filed direct testimony and rebuttal testimony of FPL witness J. A. Stall.

Please feel free to contact me at the phone number above should you have any questions.

Sincere Khn P. Butler

Enclosures cc: Parties of Record (w/ enc.)

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{COM} \searrow \\ \text{APA} \\ \text{ECR} & 2 \\ \text{GCL} & 1 \\ \text{RAD} & 6 \\ \text{SSC} \\ \text{ADM} \\ \text{OPC} \\ \text{CLK} & 1 \\ \end{array}$

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FPSC-COMPLISSION CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Docket No. 090505-EI

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished electronically and by United States Mail this 2^{nd} day of March 2010, to the following:

Lisa Bennett, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 LBENNETT@PSC.STATE.FL.US

J.R. Kelly, Esquire Charles J. Rehwinkel, Esquire Charles Beck, Esquire Office of Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Street, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 Attorneys for the Citizens of the State of Florida Kelly.jr@leg.state.fl.us Rehwinkel.charles@leg.state.fl.us Beck.charles@leg.state.fl.us Cecilia Bradley Senior Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - PL01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 cecilia.bradley@myfloridalegal.com

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By:

John T. Butler Florida Bar No. 283479

ERRATA SHEET

(X) DIRECT TESTIMONY, OR () REBUTTAL TESTIMONY (PLEASE MARK ONE WITH "X") WITNESS: J. A. Stall

PAGE # LINE # CHANGE

6 17-20 Add the following:

A. There were two plant shutdowns that extended the outage for Unit <u>4.</u> When Unit 4 was returning to service, <u>on February 28, 2008 there</u> was an automatic shutdown of the turbine due to reverse power protection. The turbine was shut down safely. Operators began the startup sequence again approximately eight hours later. On February <u>29, 2008</u>, the water level in one of the four steam generators exceeded 75%. Plant operators initiated a manual reactor shutdown as required by plant procedure. The plant was shut down safely after the manual reactor shutdown.

Q. What was the cause of the automatic shutdown of the turbine on February 28, 2008?

<u>A.</u> A relay for a protective circuit did not function properly, and a contact failed closed, which caused an automatic shutdown of the turbine.

Q. What was the cause of the relay malfunction?

A. This relay had a mechanical issue that was identified during postfailure testing by the Company's test laboratory in West Palm Beach. The malfunction was a random mechanical failure. A replacement relay was tested to ensure it did not have a similar issue and was placed in service for Unit 4, after which it worked properly. Additionally, the same relay for Unit 3 was tested and no further issues have occurred.

Q. You stated that the second shutdown was due to the water level in one of the four steam generators exceeding 75%. What influences the water level in the steam generators?

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1	amount of time was required to implement the RPI repair following
2	the Flagami Transmission Event.

3 Q. What extended the outage for Unit 4?

There were two plant shutdowns that extended the outage for Unit Α. 4 4. When Unit 4 was returning to service, on February 28, 2008. 5 there was an automatic shutdown of the turbine due to reverse 6 power protection. The turbine was shut down safely. Operators 7 began the startup sequence again approximately eight hours later. 8 On February 29, 2008, the water level in one of the four steam 9 generators exceeded 75%. Plant operators initiated a manual 10 reactor shutdown as required by plant procedure. The plant was 11 shut down safely after the manual reactor shutdown. 12

Q. What was the cause of the automatic shutdown of the turbine on February 28, 2008?

- A relay for a protective circuit did not function properly, and a contact
 failed closed, which caused an automatic shutdown of the turbine.
- 17 **Q.** What was the cause of the relay malfunction?

 A. This relay had a mechanical issue that was identified during postfailure testing by the Company's test laboratory in West Palm
 Beach. The malfunction was a random mechanical failure. A
 replacement relay was tested to ensure it did not have a similar

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issue and was placed in service for Unit 4, after which it worked
 properly. Additionally, the same relay for Unit 3 was tested and no
 further issues have occurred.

Q. You stated that the second shutdown was due to the water
 level in one of the four steam generators exceeding 75%.
 What influences the water level in the steam generators?

4

A. The main generator loading rate impacts the steam generator water
 level and fluctuations. The loading rate is governed by a complex
 interaction of various plant conditions. Because of this complexity, a
 reactor shutdown because of high steam generator water level
 occurring during plant restart is not an unusual event.

13 Q. What was the duration of the outages for Unit 3 and Unit 4?

A. The total outage duration, including the equipment issues that emerged independently of the transmission incident, was approximately 158 hours for Unit 3 and 107 hours for Unit 4.

Q. Are these types of outage durations unusual to you based on
 your experience in the nuclear industry?

A. No. While our goal is to run the nuclear units for their entire 18 month fuel cycle in order to maximize the fuel cost savings for

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ine shutdown and" after W

5 9 Add "an automatic turbine shutdown and" after While the restart of Unit 4 was delayed by

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ERRATA SHEET

() DIRECT TESTIMONY, OR (X) REBUTTAL TESTIMONY (PLEASE MARK ONE WITH "X")

WITNESS: J. A. Stall

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Q. Was FPL prudent in conducting the outages following the initial 48 hours
 after both Turkey Point units were shut down as a result of the Flagami
 Transmission Event?

Α. Yes. The Unit 3 outage, including the repair of the Rod Position Indicator 4 (RPI) system, was prudently planned in advance and was well executed. The 5 RPI work was planned and staged, parts were procured, and work packages 6 were created assuming an unscheduled repair opportunity would arise. These 7 prudent planning activities resulted in a well-conducted repair and plant 8 restart. While the restart of Unit 4 was delayed by an automatic turbine 9 shutdown and a manual reactor shutdown, such activities are not unusual. 10 The outage time beyond the 48 hour time frame was not the result of 11 inappropriate or imprudent actions on FPL's part. 12

13 Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?

14 A. Yes.

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