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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:)	Docket No. 990691-TE
)	D
Petition by IGC TELECOM GROUP, INC.)	
for Arbitration of an Interconnection)	Filed September 7, 1999
Agreement with BELLSOUTH)	
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. Pursuant to)	
Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications)	
Act of 1996.)	
)	

ICG TELECOM GROUP, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE

ICG Telecom Group, Inc. (ICG) hereby files this motion to strike a portion of Alphonso J. Varner's direct testimony on the grounds that it is outside the scope of the issues framed by ICG's petition and BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.'s (BellSouth's) response to the petition, and is therefore an illegally impermissible attempt to expand the matters properly before the Commission. For these reasons, ICG requests that the testimony beginning on line 10 at page 24 continuing to line 25 at page 36 of Mr. Varner's testimony, inclusive (copy attached as Exhibit 1), be stricken.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE

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1777	The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act) provides that parties involved in negotiating an
OA: DZ. BAR	interconnection agreement may petition the state commission to arbitrate disputed issues. Section 252
- Cal-	(b)(4) of the Act clearly states that during arbitration "the State commission shall limit its
VAN TH	consideration of any petition to the issues set forth in the petition and in the response."

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ICG's Petition for Arbitration delineates twenty-six issues, the first of which focuses on the reciprocal compensation issue that arose during negotiations. Issue One -- taken directly from ICG's petition -- asks, "Until the FCC adopts a rule with prospective application, should dial-up calls to Internet service providers (ISPs) be treated as if they were local calls for purposes of reciprocal compensation?" In BellSouth's Response to ICG'c Petition for Arbitration, BellSouth stated its position:

No. The FCC's recent Declaratory Ruling, FCC 99-38 in CC Docket Nos. 96-98 and 99-68, released February 26, 1999 ("Declaratory Ruling"), confirmed unequivocally that the FCC has, will retain, and will exercise jurisdiction over ISP traffic. In short, the FCC determined that ISP traffic is interstate traffic, not local traffic. Under the provisions of the 1996 Act and FCC rules, only local traffic is subject to reciprocal compensation obligations. Thus, reciprocal compensation is not applicable to ISP-bound traffic. Clearly, treating ISP calls as local calls for reciprocal compensation purposes is inconsistent with the law and is not sound public policy.

Nowhere in its response does BellSouth suggest that <u>BellSouth</u> should be compensated by <u>ICG</u> as a consequence of ISP traffic. This is not surprising, inasmuch as BellSouth never advanced such a theory and never asserted such a claim during negotiations with ICG.

However, in prefiled direct testimony, Mr. Varner characterizes ISP traffic as "exchange access service" that BellSouth and ICG jointly provide to "carriers." Extending this premise further, he postulates that the revenues ICG collects from its ISP customers should be shared with BellSouth.

Because the assertion that BellSouth should be compensated by ICG for ISP traffic was never discussed in negotiations, never raised in ICG's petition, and never mentioned in BellSouth's response to ICG's petition, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 prohibits this Commission from considering the contention. Accordingly, the sections of Mr. Varner's testimony that treat this claim should be

stricken.1

WHEREFORE, ICG moves this Commission for an Order striking the portions of BellSouth witness Alphonso J. Varner's testimony designated herein.

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¹ To be clear, the filing of this motion on legal grounds does not imply that ICG acknowledges any substantive merit in Mr. Varner's new "construct." To the contrary, ICG regards the argument as a specious attempt to distract the Commission from the authority and need to fashion in this proceeding a mechanism that includes ISP traffic for purposes of reciprocal compensation for costs incurred in handling calls by creating the appearance that a countervailing argument exists. In view of the time frames involved, ICG necessarily will address the fallacies in BellSouth's argument in rebuttal testimony prior to the decision on this motion. However, this motion is the appropriate vehicle for a ruling on the separate principle that the material is unrelated to the issues allowed to be arbitrated by the 1996 Act.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ICG Telecom Group, Inc.'s Motion to Strike has been furnished by (*) hand-delivery or United States mail this 7th day of September, 1999 to:

*Lee Fordham Florida Public Service Commission Division of Legal Services 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Gunter Building, Room 370 Tallahassee, FL 32399

Nancy B. White Michael P. Goggin c/o Nancy Sims BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. 150 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Joseph A. McGlothlin

1	Diagram D is different from Diagram C in only one respect. The IXC has been
2	replaced by an ISP. The network used to transport ISP-bound traffic is exactly
3-	the same network used to deliver traffic to IXCs. However, rather than through
4	receipt of normal switched access charges, the LEC is compensated for the
5	access service it provides to the ISP by the business rates it charges the ISP.
6	The important point is that both IXCs and ISPs receive the same service and,
7	although they are charged different prices, the prices they pay are designed to
8	cover the same costs. That cost is the full cost of providing service to them.
9	en e
10 Q.	WHAT DOES BELLSOUTH CONSIDER TO BE THE APPROPRIATE
11	COMPENSATION MECHANISM FOR ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC?
12	
13 A.	In its Comments and Reply Comments to the FCC's Notice of Proposed
14	Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-68, In the Matter of Inter-Carrier
15	Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic ("Inter-Carrier Compensation NPRM"),
16	BellSouth puts forth its proposal for the appropriate inter-carrier compensation
17	mechanism. (See Exhibit AJV-3) BellSouth's proposal is guided by and is
18	consistent with FCC precedent regarding inter-carrier compensation for jointly
19	provided interstate services. BellSouth's proposal recognizes, as does the
20	FCC, that the revenue source for ISP-bound traffic is derived from the service
21	provided to the ISP. (See In the Matter of Access Charge Reform, Price Cap
22	Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Transport Rate Structure
23	and Pricing and End User Common Line Charges, CC Docket Nos. 96-262,94-
24 '	1, 91-213 and 95-72, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 15982, 16133-16134
25	(1007)) Equally important. RellSouth's proposal ties the level of inter-carrier

1		compensation directly to the level of compensation that each carrier derives
2		from the jointly provided service.
3 -	-	
4		Exhibit AJV-4 to my testimony consists of two diagrams illustrating the
5		consistency of compensating carriers for access traffic based on the revenue
6		that is derived from the jointly provided service. Diagram E illustrates a call
7		that originates on a LEC's network and is delivered to an IXC/ISP, and shows
8		that the IXC/ISP pays the LEC for access services to cover the cost of getting
9		the traffic to the IXC/ISP. Diagram F illustrates an IXC/ISP-bound call that
10		originates on a LEC's network and interconnects with another carrier's
11		network (ICO/CLEC) for routing of the call to the IXC/ISP. In this situation,
12		the IXC/ISP is the other carrier's customer. The revenue this other carrier
13		receives from the IXC/ISP for access services covers the cost of delivering the
14		traffic to the IXC/ISP.
15		
16	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW ICG REQUESTS THAT IT BE
17		COMPENSATED FOR ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC.

A. Exhibit AJV-5 to my testimony consists of a Diagram G which illustrates ICG's request that BellSouth pay reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic where the ISP is ICG's customer. It is obvious from this diagram that ICG is simply attempting to augment the revenues it receives from its ISP customer at the expense of BellSouth's end user customers. In other words, paying ICG reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic would result in

BellSouth's end user customers subsidizing ICG's operations. Indeed, the

1		FCC has recognized that the source of revenue for transporting ISP-bound
2		traffic is the access service charges that ISPs pay. ICG receives this payment
3-		from its ISP customers. There is no legal or policy basis for ISPs to be
4		subsidized simply because they choose a different carrier to provide their
5		access service.
6		
7	Q.	WHY IS AN INTER-CARRIER COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENT
8		APPROPRIATE FOR ISP TRAFFIC?
9		
10	A.	The interstate access connection that permits an ISP to communicate with its
11		subscribers falls within the scope of exchange access and, accordingly,
12		constitutes an access service as defined by the FCC:
13		Access Service includes services and facilities provided for the
14		origination or termination of any interstate or foreign
15		telecommunications. (Emphasis added)
16		The fact that the FCC has exempted enhanced service providers, including
17		ISPs, from paying interstate switched access charges does not alter the fact that
18		the connection an ISP obtains is an access connection. Instead, the exemption
19		limits the compensation that a LEC in providing such a connection can obtain
20		from an ISP. Further, under the access charge exemption, the compensation
21		derived by a LEC providing the service to an ISP has been limited to the rates
22		and charges associated with business exchange services. Nevertheless, the
23		ISP's service involves interstate communications. The ISP obtains a service
24		that enables a communications path to be established by its subscriber. The
25		ISP, in turn, recovers the cost of the telecommunications services it uses to

1		deliver its service through charges it assesses on the subscribers of the ISP's
2		service.
3 -	_	•-
4		Where two or more carriers are involved in establishing the communications
5		path between the ISP and the ISP's subscriber, the access service to the ISP is
6		jointly provided. Such jointly provided access arrangements are not new or
7		unique nor are the associated mechanisms to handle inter-carrier compensation
8		The services ISPs obtain for access to their subscribers are technically similar
9		to the line side connections available under Feature Group A. For such line
0		side arrangements, the FCC has relied on revenue sharing agreements for the
1		purpose of inter-carrier compensation. The long history and precedent
2		regarding inter-carrier compensation for interstate services are instructive and
3		relevant to the FCC's determinations in this proceeding.
4		
5	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN FURTHER WHY A SEPARATE SHARING PLAN IS
6		NEEDED FOR ACCESS SERVICE PROVIDED TO ISPs?
7		
8	A.	The need for a separate sharing plan is created by the FCC's decree that the
9		price charged for access service provided to ISPs is the business exchange rate.
20		Unlike other switched access services, which are billed on a usage-sensitive
1		basis, business exchange service prices are flat-rated.
22		
23		Because non-ISP switched access service is billed on a usage-sensitive basis, it
4		is relatively easy for each carrier to be compensated for the portion of the
5		access service that it provides. Generally, there are two methods used for such

compensation. Under the first method, each carrier bills the IXC directly for the portion of access service provided. For example, for originating access, the originating LEC bills the IXC for the switching and for the portion of transport that the originating LEC provides, and the terminating LEC bills the IXC for the portion of transport that it provides. Under the second method, the terminating LEC bills the IXC for all of the access service, and the originating LEC bills the terminating LEC for the portion of access services that it provides.

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With ISP traffic, these methods are unworkable. Since the ISP is billed business exchange service rates, only one LEC can bill the ISP. Also, since the rate paid by the ISP is a flat rate charge designed for another service, i.e., business exchange service, there is no structural correlation between the cost incurred by the LEC and the price paid by the ISP. However, the business exchange rate paid by the ISP is the only source of revenue to cover any of the costs incurred in provisioning access service to the ISP. Therefore, a plan to share the access revenue paid by the ISP among all the carriers involved in sending traffic to the ISP is needed.

Q. DOESN'T BELLSOUTH COVER THE COST OF ORIGINATING TRAFFIC
TO ISPs FROM ITS OWN END USERS?

Α.

No, nor would it be appropriate to do so. Again, ISPs purchase access services, albeit at business exchange rates. The local exchange rates paid by end user customers were never intended to recover costs associated with providing

1		access service and were established long before the Internet became popular.
2		
3-	Q.	YOU HAVE STATED THAT IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE
4		COMMISSION TO ADDRESS ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC IN THE CONTEXT
5		OF SECTION 251 OF THE ACT. SHOULD THE COMMISSION
6	٠	ADDRESS ISP-BOUND TRAFFIC AS ACCESS TRAFFIC?
7		
8	A.	If the Commission wishes to address this issue at all in this arbitration, it
9		should be in the context of an interim compensation mechanism for ISP-bound
10		access traffic. As I have stated previously, only local traffic is governed by
11		Section 251 of the Act. ISP-bound traffic is not local traffic but is instead
12		access traffic under the jurisdiction of the FCC. Therefore, the Commission
13		could address ISP-bound traffic as access traffic by establishing an inter-carrier
14		compensation mechanism. Such a mechanism would be interim until such
15		time as the FCC completes its rulemaking proceeding on inter-carrier
16		compensation.
17		
18	Q.	SHOULD THIS COMMISSION ADOPT AN INTERIM INTER-CARRIER
19		COMPENSATION MECHANISM PRIOR TO THE FCC COMPLETING ITS
20		RULEMAKING PROCEEDING, WHAT DOES BELLSOUTH PROPOSE AS
21		AN APPROPRIATE INTERIM MECHANISM?
22		
23	A.	BellSouth proposes an interim flat-rated sharing mechanism that is based on
24	-	apportionment of revenues collected for the access service among the carriers
25		incurring costs to provide the service. The revenue to be apportioned among

1	carriers is the charge for the business exchange service that the 131 pays.
2	Typically, the ISP purchases Primary Rate ISDN ("PRI") service as the
3-	business exchange product used to provide the access service. BellSouth
4	believes that, in the interim, a flat-rated compensation process is appropriate
5	since the revenues collected are based on flat-rated charges. Exhibit AJV-6
6	attached to this testimony is BellSouth's Proposed Interim ISP Inter-Carrier
7	Access Service Compensation Plan ("Interim Plan").
8	
9	In describing BellSouth's Interim Plan, I use the term "Serving LEC" to refer
10	to a LEC that has an ISP as an end user customer and the term "Originating
11	LEC" to refer to a LEC whose end user customers originate traffic that is
12	delivered to the Serving LEC's network and is bound for an ISP. BellSouth's
13	Interim Plan takes into account the following facts:
14	1) Only the Serving LEC bills the ISP for access service. The ISP is billed
15	at rates established by the Serving LEC;
16	2) The FCC has limited the price for an ISP dial-up connection to the
17	equivalent business exchange service rate;
18	3) the Originating LEC incurs costs to carry ISP-bound traffic to the
19	Serving LEC;
20	4) the Originating LEC has no means to recover its costs directly from the
21	ISP (unless, of course, the Originating LEC and the Serving LEC are
22	one in the same); and
23	5) The Originating LEC must recover its costs, to the extent possible,
24	from the Serving LEC.
25	

1		BellSouth's Interim Plan presumes that all LECs who serve ISPs will
2		participate in the plan. Otherwise, only those parties that will benefit will
3-	-	participate - i.e., a LEC that originates more ISP-bound traffic than it
4		transports to an ISP will be a net receiver.
5		
6	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE SPECIFICS OF BELLSOUTH'S INTERIM
7		PLAN.
8		
9	A.	BellSouth's Interim Plan contains the following steps that are further described
0		in Exhibit AJV-6:
1		(1) Each Serving LEC will be responsible for identifying all minutes of use
2		("MOUs") which are ISP-bound that each Originating LEC delivers to
13		the Serving LEC's network;
4		(2) each trunk (DS0-equivalent) will be assumed to carry 9,000 MOUs on
15		average per month (equates to 150 hours per trunk per month);
16		(3) based on ISP-bound MOUs identified by the Serving LEC and provided
7		to the Originating LEC, the Originating LEC will calculate the quantity
18		of DS1 facilities required to transport the Originating LEC's ISP-bound
19		traffic to the Serving LEC as follows:
20		(ISP-bound MOUs / 9,000 MOUs per trunk / 24 trunks per DS1);
21		(4) Serving LEC will advise Originating LECs of the average PRI rate
22		charged to ISPs. The Serving LEC can use either its tariffed rate or the
23		average rate actually charged to ISPs;
24		(5) Originating LEC calculates compensation due to it by the Serving LEC
25		as follows:

1		(Quantity of DS1s x Serving LEC's PRI rate x sharing percentage);
2		(6) Originating LEC bills the Serving LEC on a quarterly basis; and
3-		(7) The ISP-bound MOUs and the PRI rates as reported by the Serving
4		LEC are subject to audit by the Originating LEC(s). The amount of
5		compensation could be affected by results of an audit.
6		
7		To the extent two parties have additional issues, contract negotiations between
8		the parties can determine other terms and conditions. For example, due to
9		technical capabilities, the two LECs may agree that the Originating LEC will
10		dentify the ISP-bound minutes of use.
11		
12	Q.	WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR USING 9,000 MOUs AS THE AVERAGE
13		MONTHLY USAGE PER TRUNK?
14		
15	A.	Nine thousand (9,000) MOUs is a proxy that was used by the FCC for FGA
16		access before actual usage could be measured. Further, this average level of
17		usage has been used in other situations as a proxy for IXC usage.
18		
19	Q.	WHAT SHARING PERCENTAGE DOES BELLSOUTH PROPOSE BE
20		APPLIED TO THE SERVING LEC'S REVENUES TO COMPENSATE
21		BELLSOUTH FOR ITS NETWORK USED TO CARRY ISP-BOUND
22		TRAFFIC?
23		
24	A.	BellSouth proposes a sharing percentage of 8.6% that will be applied to the
25		Serving LEC's ISP revenues to calculate the compensation due BellSouth

when BellSouth is an Originating LEC. Likewise, when BellSouth is the Serving LEC, BellSouth proposes that a sharing percentage of 8.6% will be applied by the Originating LEC(s) when calculating compensation BellSouth owes.

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Q. HOW DID BELLSOUTH DETERMINE THE SHARING PERCENTAGE IT PROPOSES?

A. BellSouth's calculation of its sharing percentage is shown in Exhibit AJV-7 attached to this testimony. First, BellSouth considered that switching, transport and loop costs are incurred to carry traffic from the Originating LEC's end office to the ISP location. Since the Serving LEC incurs the loop cost between its end office and the ISP location, the Serving LEC should retain revenues to cover its loop cost. However, switching and transport costs are jointly incurred by both the Originating LEC and the Serving LEC.

Therefore, BellSouth believes that an appropriate sharing percentage is developed by determining the ratio of switching and transport costs to total costs (switching, transport and loop), and then dividing that percentage by two since each carrier bears a portion of the switching and transport cost. In order to determine the ratio, BellSouth looked to the Benchmark Cost Proxy Model ("BCPM") results filed in Florida in the Universal Service Fund proceedings. The average, statewide voice grade loop, switching and transport capital costs produced by BCPM are \$14.62, \$2.90 and \$.14, respectively. Therefore, the loop capital cost represents 82.8% of the total average statewide capital cost,

1		which means that the switching and transport capital costs represent 17.2% of
2		the total capital cost. Again, dividing the 17.2% by two in order to account for
3_		the fact that both carriers incur switching and transport costs results in a
4		sharing percentage of 8.6%.
5		
6		BellSouth also reviewed ARMIS data and determined that the relationship
7		between loop, switching and transport investment as reported in ARMIS is
8		very similar to the relationship calculated from the BCPM results. The ARMIS
9		data shows that, for 1998, in Florida, total loop investment was
10		\$7,381,715,000, switching investment was \$989,297,000 and transport
11		investment was \$182,062,000 resulting in ratios of 86.30% for loop, 11.57%
12		for switching and 2.13% for transport which are close to the ratios that result
13		from the BCPM data.
14		
15	Q.	DOES BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSED SHARING PERCENTAGE ONLY
16		APPLY TO TRAFFIC IT ORIGINATES TO A SERVING LEC?
17	•	
18	A.	No. When BellSouth is the Serving LEC and a CLEC's end users call an ISP
19		served by BellSouth, BellSouth should compensate the CLEC. BellSouth
20		proposes to use the same method and sharing percentage (8.6%) to compensate
21		the CLEC as it proposes for billing the CLEC.
22		
23	Q.	WHAT IMPACT WOULD BELLSOUTH'S PROPOSAL HAVE ON A CLEC
24		SUCH AS ICG?
25		

As an example, I will assume that ICG serves its ISP customers with PRI A. 1 service which is equivalent to a DS1 (24 DS0s). Further, I will assume that 2 ICG charges its ISP customers a market-based rate of \$850 per month per PRI. 3-If BellSouth as the Originating LEC generates 55 million ISP-bound MOUs per 4 month to ICG, then the amount of monthly compensation that BellSouth's 5 proposal would result in ICG owing to BellSouth is calculated as follows: 6 55,000,000 / 9000 / 24 = 254.63 DS1s 7 $254.63 DS1s \times $850.00 \times .086 = $18,613.45$ 8 At a PRI rate of \$850, ICG will collect \$216,436 in revenue from its ISP 9 customer(s) just for the traffic originated by BellSouth. Total compensation 10 ICG owes to BellSouth for the 55,000,000 MOUs BellSouth originated to ICG 11 would be \$18,613.45. 12 13 HOW DOES YOUR PROPOSAL AFFECT THE RELATIVE COST Q. 14 RECOVERY OF THE LEC'S INVOLVED IN PROVIDING THE ACCESS 15 SERVICE? 16 17 Since the FCC has ordered that ISPs are to be provided service at business 18 Α. exchange rates, the fact is that when the access service is provided by a single 19 LEC to the ISP, the rates it charges the ISP are typically not fully 20 compensatory. This situation arises because the ISP is being charged a flat rate 21 charge (which was intended for another service) for a high volume usage-22 sensitive service. Under BellSouth's sharing proposal, each carrier should 23 recover roughly the same percentage of its costs. For example, if the carrier 24 would have recovered 50% of its costs if it served the ISP alone, the underlying

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1		premise of this proposal is that each carrier should recover roughly 50% of its
2		costs.
3_		
4	Q.	SHOULD THIS PLAN BE CONTINUED ONCE THE FCC ESTABLISHES
5		A USAGE-BASED COMPENSATION MECHANISM?
6		
7	A.	Probably not. The need for this plan was created by the fact that ISPs currently
8		pay business exchange rates for access service. Should the FCC change the
9		application of access charges to ISPs or establish a different compensation
10		mechanism, this plan should be re-evaluated.
11		
12	Q.	IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS WHAT ACTION ARE YOU
13		RECOMMENDING TO THE FLORIDA PSC?
14		
15	A.	The FCC has determined that ISP-bound traffic is interstate and has asserted
16		jurisdiction. This issue is not subject to arbitration under Section 252 of the
17		Act. Parties should be instructed to negotiate a revenue sharing arrangement
18		for this traffic just as has been done for jointly-provided access service since
19		divestiture. If those negotiations are not fruitful, however, they should be
20		referred to the FCC. Should, however, this Commission adopt an interim inter-
21		carrier compensation mechanism prior to the FCC completing its rulemaking
22		proceeding, BellSouth recommends the Commission adopt the Interim Plan
23		mechanism outlined above.
24		

25