BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: Petition by Tampa Electric Company for approval of plan to bring generating units into compliance with the Clean Air Act.

DOCKET NO.:

992014-EI

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN JOE GARCIA

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

PROCEEDINGS:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

7A**

DATE:

Tuesday, January 18, 2000

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY:

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STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Issue 1: Should TECO be required to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the shutdown/repowering of the Gannon Station?

Recommendation: Yes. To ensure that TECO selects the lowest cost option between purchased power and refurbishing Gannon, TECO should be required to issue an RFP in lieu of the repowering at the Gannon Station. The RFP should solicit proposals that minimize total costs, including the construction of transmission capacity, and ensure that the emission requirements of the CFJ are achieved or exceeded. The RFP results should be filed by May 1, 2000, in order to avoid any further delay in emission reductions that

<u>Issue 2</u>: Should this docket be closed? <u>Recommendation</u>: No. This matter is currently set for hearing May 30 through June 2, 2000. This docket must remain open until the conclusion of all post-hearing proceedings.

would otherwise result from TECO's Compliance Plan.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. We'll get started again.

Let me just announce that after this item, there are some customers from Shangri-La Utilities here, so we are going to try to take them up before lunch. So we'll take up Item 29 after 7A. Okay? So we'll begin.

Staff?

MR. BALLINGER: Commissioners, as you know, Item 7A was filed as an emergency to put on this agenda, and as such, in Staff's rush, there were a couple of minor errors that we found in the recommendation. I would like to go through those real quick.

First with you, on the background, on page 2, in that first paragraph, where it says, "The CFJ specifically requires," I would strike the word "the" and insert the word "to" between "TECO" and "engage."

On page 3, in the recommendation paragraph, the third line says "be required to issue an RFP for," strike the word "for" and insert "in lieu of the repowering." It's a little clearer that way. We didn't want to make it appear the recommendation was actual vendor

RFPs for the equipment. This is an "in lieu of the project" kind of a thing.

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Page 4, the -- right near the end of the page, "its plan to estimated," it should be "its plan is estimated."

And then on page 7, there's two corrections, and again, it's replacing that "for" with "in lieu of." On the last sentence of the first paragraph near the top of the page, "issue an RFP," strike the word "for" and insert "in lieu of." And down in the conclusions section, again strike the word "for" and insert "in lieu of."

Those changes don't change the tone of the recommendation. They are minor clarifications and oversights that we found later on.

To introduce this item, we are filing this recommendation now to avoid some controversy, hopefully, at the end of the hearing. Staff feels that the most compelling way to test a market for any major construction is to issue an RFP. This is the first time that a utility has asked for recovery of a major repowering project, and that's why we're bringing this to you now. As you know, Florida Power & Light is

doing a repowering at Fort Myers and planning one for Sanford. They have not yet asked for any cost recovery, so this is the first time that it has actually been requested of the Commission, and we felt it appropriate to bring it to you at this time.

If we were to wait until the end of the hearing and recommend issuing an RFP, it may really mess up the works and not allow for the agreement between TECO and DEP to go forward because of timing constraints. That's why we feel we should bring it to you now.

We understand that TECO is not required to issue an RFP for this type of project. Our bidding rule only applies to new generation or generation that would go under the Power Plant Site Act. As I understand, the proposed repowering of Gannon does not trigger the Power Plant Site Act, and therefore would not formally trigger our bidding rule.

Again, we're bringing it to you now to hopefully get an answer, should they issue an RFP or not, and avoid some confusion at the end of the hearing.

That's basically the summary of this, and

we're open for any questions you have.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I'm Lee Willis, representing Tampa Electric. With me today is John Ramil, the President of Tampa Electric, and Tom Hernandez, who is the Vice President of Regulatory.

I will present our argument that Staff's proposal to require Tampa Electric to issue an RFP in lieu of the Gannon project is illegal.

John Ramil and Tom Hernandez will explain to you why such an RFP process is both impractical and unnecessary.

First of all, let's look at what the Staff concedes in its recommendation and points that we agree with in the recommendation.

This recommendation concedes that there is no specific statute and there is no rule mandating an RFP in this circumstance. That's on page 3 of the recommendation.

It says further that the Gannon repowering project will not require a Power Plant Site Act need determination because there will be no net change in steam capacity at the Gannon Station. That's on page 5, and we agree with that.

The Commission's bid rule does not apply because Tampa Electric's petition is not a need petition. That's on page 6 of the recommendation, and we agree with that.

The recommendation also says that the bid rule only requires investor-owned utilities to issue an RFP for power plants subject to the Power Plant Site Certification Act. That's on page 6, and we agree with that.

Staff also says that Tampa Electric is not required by any current rules to issue an RFP for the repowering of Gannon. And that's on page 7, and we agree with that.

What we strongly disagree with, however, is whether this Commission has the authority to require bidding in lieu of the Gannon repowering project. It is our firm position that Staff's proposed action is illegal, as it would violate Section 120.569, decisions which affect substantial interests; Section 120.57, procedures for particular cases; and Section 120.54 with respect to rulemaking. We believe that in addition to procedural due process, that it would also be precluded by substantive due process, as I'll explain.

Tampa Electric cannot be required to bid this project as the only means of showing that the project is the most cost-effective without any rule on that subject, which you do not have, as Staff admits, or without an order entered after notice, opportunity for hearing, and the entry of a final order under the procedures required under the Administrative Procedures Act under the sections I've quoted to you.

You certainly have the authority after hearing to determine in this case whether Tampa Electric has shown what is the most reasonable and prudent alternative to replace the base load capacity provided by Tampa Electric's coal-fired Gannon Station, which also achieves the environmental benefits of the Consent Final Judgment which has been imposed upon Tampa Electric in the litigation process.

what is before you is a fundamental issue that was identified in the issue identification proceeding, that is, what is the most reasonable and prudent alternative. Without an applicable rule, you can't dictate that bidding is the only means of making such a showing. And after hearing, you could determine whether Tampa

Electric has met its burden, but you cannot decide that now without a duly adopted rule that bidding is the only means to show that.

It's inappropriate for you now to strip out one of the issues to be decided in this case at this preliminary stage to be summarily decided. Such an action obviously denies due process of law and is in direct violation of the statutes that I've quoted to you. There's no doubt that Staff's recommendation would deny due process of law under the Administrative Procedures Act.

Section 120.54 has an elaborate procedure which you're familiar with. You have rule development, you have discussions, hearings, opportunity for participation. That has not been done here.

As a general matter, moreover, as your Staff has stated to you, we are well aware of other repowering projects by other utilities that have not been required to bid. So this recommendation really is contrary to this Commission's practice of not requiring other projects to bid.

Section 120.57, on the other hand, dealing with cases involving substantial interests, says

that all parties shall have an opportunity to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues involved, to conduct cross-examination, submit rebuttal evidence, and submit proposed findings. You know that procedure. It has not been followed here.

staff's recommendation, if adopted, would summarily deny Tampa Electric's rights under Section 120.57 to meaningfully address such an issue in a duly noticed hearing. This summary jump to a conclusion is all the more inappropriate considering the fact that Tampa Electric's testimony in this case is not due for another ten days.

staff states as its authority for mandating an RFP the general provisions of Section 366.01 and 366.061. But these statutes don't authorize this Commission to suspend the Administrative Procedures Act or the due process provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. At best, these statutes provide some argument that a rule could be adopted at a future date.

But even in the bidding rule that you have on your books now, it was applied to future proceedings. It was not applied to the

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proceedings that were ongoing at the time. It was applied prospectively.

But at worst, these statutes cited by Staff do not provide a basis for a new rule of law covering repowering of existing generation. We don't believe these statutes give you that authority to mandate bidding for repowering projects.

The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that there can't be any compromise in due process on the footing of convenience or expediency or because of the natural desire to avoid delay when the minimal requirement of a fair hearing has been neglected. That was specifically addressed by the Court in Florida Gas Company vs. Hawkins, 372 So.2d 118, in 1979. In that case, the Commission concluded at the outset that it would dismiss the case because it didn't believe that going to hearing was going to grant a rate increase to Florida Gas Company.

In quoting a prior decision, the Court quashed this denial of due process, reversed the Commission, and quoted as follows: "We have held that where a rate, rule, or regulation is

made without statutory authority or without giving the carrier affected by it reasonable opportunity to be heard, or without obtaining or considering any substantial evidence where an investigation, inquiry, and evidence are necessary as a basis for the action taken, the proceeding is not had in due course of law, and this Court will not enforce it."

In the instant proceeding, the Staff erroneously is asking the Commission to decide the issue even before having an opportunity to see Tampa Electric's case. This is even more egregious than the situation before the Florida Gas-Hawkins court, in that testimony is not due for another ten days.

Commissioners, this situation is also very different than a situation involving capacity that hasn't been built. It's very different, because it involves existing assets of the company. We believe that Staff's recommendation would also violate substantive due process of law by causing a taking of Tampa Electric's property without due process of law. You don't have authority to take such an action which is, in effect, a forced divestiture. Such action

would violate both the State and Federal
Constitutions.

The Staff recommendation seeks to require

Tampa Electric to either shut down the plant and

purchase the power from another party -- bear

with me with this, because it does encroach on

Tampa Electric's property values -- or to

require bidding and sale or use by third parties

of the Gannon assets. Now, either one of those

propositions we believe would violate due

process.

You have a lot of power. You have a lot of power to supervise and control Tampa Electric.

But there's just so far that you can go, and you can't go as far as a taking of its property without due process of law. And this can occur, Commissioners --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Walk me through that, because you lost me there. How is asking you to go to bid a taking?

MR. WILLIS: What Staff is suggesting that we do is that Tampa Electric not repower, or consider proposals that we not repower this project, and thereby place it back in service in a useful way and to continue using that property

and not have it stranded, and purchase it elsewhere.

Now, Mr. Ramil and Mr. Hernandez will address to you some specific reasons why bidding is not practical here, why it won't work and why buying --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Right.

MR. WILLIS: But it would affect the property in such a way that it would require it to be shut down.

what we have done is, we have gone through environmental litigation, which is very complex and involved, and we are under a Consent Final Judgment to meet very strict environmental requirements. In order to do that, Gannon has to be repowered. In order to do that, when it's repowered, those assets will continue to be useful assets of the company.

So it is the natural effect of it. What it does is, if you deprive the owner of all economic, beneficial, productive use of the property, that is tantamount to a taking. If you --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That would almost beg that as we go forward on this case, we have to

allow you a -- we have to approve the case, and we have to approve what you say, because if not, it's a taking.

MR. WILLIS: Well, what I've said is that I believe that you procedurally go through the process of holding the hearing that you have scheduled in this docket for us to present to you the evidence of why we have done what we have done. But it is inappropriate for you to dictate to us now how that is to be done without any rule or order requiring that done, based on specific statutory authority. We believe that you can't just use implied authority for this.

where you begin to tread on fundamental rights, which we believe it is here, you must have strict interpretation of the statutes and the grant of power to you. And that's obviously not present here. We believe that the legislative silence in this regard is evidence that it has not been granted to you. Now --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Willis, let me ask you this question. Under your scenario, if we go to hearing and we take your evidence and we conclude that your alternative overstates the actual costs that could have been utilized to

reach the same conclusion, perhaps, but there's a different remedy, perhaps there's a purchase option or something else could be done, what happens at that point? Do we have the authority then to say, "You spent 500 million, but it could have been done for 490 million; therefore, we're only going to allow you recovery of 490 million"? Is that the remedy we have?

MR. WILLIS: Well, Commissioner, we have not even asked in this particular proceeding for any rate recovery or for you to conclude anything with respect to the cost of this project.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess I'm assuming that we go through your process, and at some point in the future there is some type of a proceeding, be it a rate case, a preliminary proceeding, whatever, that there are costs being requested to be recovered by some fashion. What is our remedy at that point?

MR. WILLIS: Well, I think at that time you have the authority to determine the amount that was honestly and prudently spent for the construction of these projects, or for whatever is before you. That's what the statute provides

for you, as opposed to ordering a particular

type of proof in advance to prove that to you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But I think the answer to his question is yes. If you spent \$500 million and we concluded that you could have done it for 490 and should have done it for 490, one of the remedies might be to say what moves into the rate base is only 490.

MR. WILLIS: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

MR. WILLIS: We believe that what Staff is recommending to you is way beyond your authority. It's not only beyond the authority here; it's beyond what has been done anywhere else in the country.

Now, there have been some instances where this has been looked at in other jurisdictions where they are considering the restructuring of the industry. But we believe that the required divestiture is something that is always voluntarily allowed in return for recovery of stranded assets or some sort of opt-in provision. We don't even have a legislative action here upon which to base such a radical departure.

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Based on these considerations, I urge that you deny Staff's recommendation on the grounds that it calls for an illegal result.

John Ramil will now address with you the reasons Tampa Electric strongly believes that bidding is impractical and unnecessary for the Gannon repowering project.

MR. RAMIL: Thank you, Lee, and good morning, Commissioners.

Commissioners, the Gannon repowering project is the centerpiece of a sensitive and carefully balanced environmental settlement with the Florida Department of Environmental Protection. Mr. Willis has explained that the action proposed by your Staff is not legal. I will explain to you why in the context of this environmental settlement, the prospective bidding to replace a key element is impractical and would frustrate achieving a solution that would accomplish the environmental certainty desired by Tampa Electric in this transaction and frustrate advancing the new state environmental policy desired by the DEP.

Commissioners, over the past several months, first in discussions with the EPA and

then with the DEP, it has become clear to me that the environmental agencies have an agenda to significantly reduce emissions from existing power plants. It's also clear that the public is interested in improving environmental quality.

Given these two realities, many weeks ago I authorized my staff to enter into settlement negotiations with the EPA. And as you may recall, once the EPA implemented their highly publicized national program with lawsuits and notices of violation, that triggered a 30-day period, a window for the State DEP under the state implementation plan to step in and seek a solution.

To the credit of the leadership of the State and the Florida DEP, they stepped in, and in a very proactive and solution-oriented manner, they were very clear in the emission reductions policies that they would require going forward, and they made very clear to us their expectations of Tampa Electric.

Accordingly, we made very clear that while we very much wanted to settle the environmental issues at hand, we also had to reliably and

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economically serve our customers, and that we took environmental compliance very seriously; thus, we would only commit to achievements that we could indeed accomplish.

Commissioners, in our negotiations with the DEP and in our continuing sensitive negotiations with the EPA, it became obvious that a repowering of Gannon Station with natural gas was not only essential to meeting their environmental expectations, but would be more reliable and less costly to our customers than additional environmental controls on the existing coal-fired boilers. As such, the Gannon repowering became the centerpiece of the agreement reached with the DEP.

Commissioners, as we finalized our agreement with the DEP and committed Tampa Electric to certain actions, as well as in setting the DEP's expectations, we relied heavily on this Commission's rules and its precedents. While the Commission's actions and rules make it abundantly clear that bidding will be required for new incremental capacity, that is not the case for existing asset modifications, repowerings, or fuel switching,

nor should it be. The issues to be considered are very different in those instances. In fact, for the specific instance of repowering, the Commission has never required bidding.

Given our experience in achieving this agreement with the DEP, which implements their new state environmental policy, the Commission — our experience has been that the Commission has been very wise not to have such a policy on bidding for repowerings.

In our agreement with the DEP, it's very clear what's expected of Tampa Electric and how the company must perform.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Ramil, let me interrupt you. You say that we have a policy. I'm not sure we even have a policy, because this is the first time it has come up. Are you aware of it having come up before?

MR. RAMIL: No. My point is that you're wise not to have a policy.

In our agreement with the DEP, it's very clear what's expected of the company and what we must do to perform. I do not believe that such a beneficial agreement could have been achieved if the vagaries and uncertainties associated

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with bidding and the introduction of third parties had to be considered.

Further, I urge the Commission not to jeopardize the agreement we have with the DEP or our ongoing discussions with the EPA by introducing the performance responsibility and timing uncertainties that will definitely arise if you require bidding in this instance.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Isn't there some protection, though, for you?

I mean, at least the way I read the Staff rec -- and I guess you're correcting my interpretation of what Staff recommended. To some degree, what they're trying to do is make sure that they've got an understanding of what the market is out there, an understanding of what cost is going to be passed on.

And I think that every bid that has been put out -- and Staff can correct me if I'm wrong. Every bid that has been put out for new generation in Florida has been won by the investor-owned utility of the state. So I guess that Staff's thinking was to have something to compare it by.

And it's sort of almost a safety valve for you, because clearly we've decided this way in the past. And my thinking is going along the lines of Commissioner Deason, that when we get to the end of this thing, that if Staff comes to the conclusion that this should have cost 470 million as opposed to the 500 you're billing us for, you're 30 million in the hole. However, if we went to the bidding process, there it is. We've got it there. You won that process. You explained to us why your bid is better. We're better served, Florida is protected, the ratepayers have something to compare by, and we have something to compare by. Doesn't it assure you that safety net?

MR. RAMIL: What you just described,
Mr. Chairman, I think is very appropriate and
very accurate if we're dealing with new
incremental capacity. But we're dealing with
effectively replacement capacity and projects
that are being done that have environmental
compliance requirements associated with them.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right, Mr. Ramil, then let's go the other way. Let's say that you're doing this, and you come in at 550

million. I don't know what the figure -- all I have is what Staff gave me. But you came in at 550 million. And Staff does an analysis across the country, and we come up with numbers through power projects that are going on in our state and others, and we say that the same amount of megawattage could have been done on a totally greenfield project for 450 million, so we've got a 100 million difference.

Now, I understand you've got an agreement there, but we're not privy to that agreement. We're not part of the people who designed that agreement. So clearly, you've got an agreement with the EPA, but my job is to take care of Florida ratepayers. And now we've got a variance. We did our study, and we come out 100 million from you are.

Aren't your shareholders in trouble then?

I mean, don't we put you in a difficult
situation when you try to slip this to the
ratepayers in some form, and we are sort of the
gatekeeper for that? Doesn't it put us in a
more difficult position and put you in a more
difficult position if we've got some discrepancy
on what we think should be charged off and what

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you think should be charged off?

MR. RAMIL: I think it puts you in the very position that you as the Public Service Commission of the State of Florida are in every day.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That's true.

MR. RAMIL: And it puts our shareholders at the risk that they're in every day. We have to take actions. You review the prudency. If your conclusions are that we have spent too much money implementing not only this project, but any project, then you have the right and the responsibility to disallow those dollars.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Why take that risk? Why deny the possibility of a cheaper alternative that I believe is almost impossible for someone to meet? I mean, clearly, you have existing assets. You have the advantage of being sited and permitted. You're in the ground already. You've got a whole series of things that work in your advantage in the case before us.

Why take that unnecessary risk? Why put your stockholders at that risk when putting it out to bid would probably find -- we would find ourselves -- you would probably be the low

bidder.

MR. RAMIL: Well, given that description, it might be a waste of time to put it out to bid. But assuming that it's not, we have confidence that we're going to do this very cost-effective and very efficient. And as you look over our shoulder, as you do in running all of our business, you're going to reach that same conclusion.

Commissioners, it's our intent to implement this agreement, which our Governor has appropriately described as historic, in a responsible and cost-effective manner. As I have publicly stated following the press conferences with this announcement, we would expect this plant to only have a very small impact on our electricity prices. We had forecast that to be in the 2 to 3% range.

However, Commissioners, as with all of our projects, and as we have been successful in the past, we will challenge each and every one of our employees to complete this project and bring it on line with no impacts to our customers.

Commissioners, we've achieved this beneficial and historic environmental agreement

with the DEP because we've committed Tampa 1 Electric to a certain course of action that we 2 believe is good for our customers and good for 3 Florida's environment. I urge you not to 4 jeopardize this settlement by introducing the 5 many uncertainties that would be created by 6 voting to require bidding in this particular 7 instance. 8 Commissioners, thank you for your time and 9 attention, and now I would like to introduce Tom 10 Hernandez. 11 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Ramil, before 12 Mr. Hernandez makes his presentation, do you --13 what is being repowered? 14 MR. RAMIL: Gannon Station, specifically 15 16 Units 3, 4, and 5. 17 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Three, 4 and 5 are going to be repowered, and then what happens to 18 1, 2, and 6? 19 20 MR. RAMIL: One, 2, and 6 will be shut 21 down. COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. One, 2, and 6 22 23 will be shut down. Do you know at this point how much 24

investment in the plants that are going to be

repowered exists today?

MR. RAMIL: Somewhere around \$100 million, I believe.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Thanks.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Hernandez?

MR. HERNANDEZ: Good morning. I want to address very briefly three points.

The first point is a key point that we will be providing in our testimony, the simple fact that Gannon Station is an essential facility with regards not only to the power supply in the state, but principally the transmission grid within the state.

My second point is to address real briefly Staff's bidding time line and the fact that it's not feasible given the circumstances and the timing issues involved.

And the last point is to briefly address the standard offer issue that was discussed earlier in another issue this morning, but it's an issue that Tampa Electric is ready to address today.

First off, the Gannon Station is critical to a reliable electric system for both Tampa Electric and the state. The transmission

effects of a shutdown of our strategically located Gannon Station are enormous. It could cost as much as \$400 to \$500 million to overcome the extraordinary overloads and voltage stability problems that would be imposed on Tampa Electric and the state, depending upon the location of any purchased power resources as an alternative. These costs are made up of transmission line construction, reactive power supply requirements, increased system losses.

In simple terms, Gannon Station is centrally located in the middle of our load center and provides about 30% of the total Tampa Electric energy and demand. For over 30 years, Tampa Electric and the statewide grid has been planned and built with Gannon resources located in our service territory. Shutting down the Gannon Station and replacing that capacity with purchased capacity would collapse both the Tampa Electric and statewide systems unless significant transmission assets are added.

Adding transmission capacity would likely be controversial and take an extensive amount of time, if it can be accomplished at all. These transmission additions would require

construction by other utilities. Remember the controversy surrounding the FPC proposed Tampa Springs to Kathleen line, which after 11 years and an escalation of the cost of construction to almost three times its original estimate, the project was ultimately abandoned.

Finally, the bidding process time line described by Staff in its recommendation is unrealistic, given the complexities of environmental compliance, Tampa Electric's system and statewide reliability concerns, and the significant costs associated with all other alternatives compared to our Gannon repowering project.

We are absolutely confident that our decision not to bid this project is the best decision for our customers, for all the reasons we will present in testimony and exhibits which are scheduled to be filed within ten days and will be fully tested in discovery and in the hearing process. We fully recognize that we must show that the Gannon repowering project is the most cost-effective alternative for Tampa Electric and its customers.

Mr. Willis and Mr. Ramil discussed the

legal and procedural and policy issues that support Tampa Electric's position related to soliciting alternatives to repowering Gannon Station. While we do not have a legal requirement to bid the project, we do have a requirement to have a standard offer available, so I'll address that point briefly.

Tampa Electric had worked with Staff in offering a standard offer based on the 2001 combustion turbine. We issued that standard offer and did not get any viable offers on that bid, and ultimately it was closed.

The next offer we put out was a 2003 combustion turbine to be sited at the Polk Power Station. Recently that proposal has now become void, since we did not again have any viable offers presented to us.

Our intent, and our intent has been all along that the incremental capacity associated with the Gannon repowering project will be eligible as the basis for a cogeneration standard offer. And given the time lines that we've established with the Commission Staff, our intent is to file that standard offer based on a portion of the incremental capacity as a result

of the Gannon repowering project. And the timing of that would suggest that we would be making that final between now and May of this year. So there is a piece of this project that will be based on a bid following the Commission's rules related to the standard offer.

And that concludes our initial summary of our presentation. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Mr. Hernandez, I have a brief question. Are there going to be transmission issues raised as a result of shutting down the three units?

MR. HERNANDEZ: Will there be transmission issues as a result of reduced -- or of shutting down the three units?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes

MR. HERNANDEZ: No, sir. Effectively, we're displacing approximately 1,200 megawatts of existing capacity. With the -- and that's Gannon Units 1 through 6 that are on line right now. With the repowering of Units 3, 4, and 5 in the configuration that we have proposed, effectively, we will have an incremental capacity of around 275 megawatts.

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So by the timing and the transition of that repowering, we will minimize any impact on the transmission issue, since we're going to phase and stage the repowering of those assets.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okav. I quess the other question I have would be for Mr. Ramil. You characterized the Staff's recommendation as having the effect of interrupting or disrupting the agreement. Could you -- well, let me ask it Isn't it also possible that that this way. recommendation could have the effect of enhancing the agreement, because essentially what it does is, it removes some possible ambiguity, and as termed by Commissioner Garcia, risk that will be there. When we look at your transaction and scrutinize it for purposes of prudency, doesn't it have the equal impact of enhancing your agreement?

MR. RAMIL: The agreement with the DEP addresses what the company must do for environmental compliance, and I see no way that bidding, with the issues that are brought in, the potential third parties that would come in, would make it any clearer or improve it in any way versus where it is now. It's very clear

what the responsibilities of the company are. 1 If third parties are introduced, it's not clear 2 what those responsibilities would become. 3 it's not clear what responsibilities might end up staying with Tampa Electric and which might 5 go to others, or if all the responsibilities 6 ultimately fall on Tampa Electric. 7 So you would also COMMISSIONER JACOBS: 8 advocate that those parties not be able to 9 participate in the hearing? 10 That --11 MR. RAMIL: No. Potential bidders 12 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: 13 could participate in the hearing? MR. RAMIL: I don't think there's anything 14 in that agreement that would prohibit that. 15 16 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: okay. I have one question, 17 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Hernandez. You indicated that there would 18 be 400 to 500 thousand -- a \$400 to \$500 million 19 20 impact on transmission? MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes, Commissioner. 21 22 COMMISSIONER CLARK: If it were not at the Gannon facility. You're assuming that there 23 would be no plants there? 24 25 MR. HERNANDEZ: The range -- the reason why I gave a range is that the full displacement of the 1,200 megawatts that are located would get you in the higher end. A partial displacement was proffered by Staff in the recommendation in terms of repowering some of the units and bidding out or having a purchase to supplement. The supply side needs of Tampa Electric would -- should be or could be considered. And so you still have transmission issues.

There's a minimum amount of capacity that's required right at that site. And it's not linear. The way I understand it is that there's plateaus that are reached, depending upon the capacity and the load and the wheeling of power through our system, given the fact that we're located centrally in south-central Florida. So it's not clear-cut, and that's why I gave a range.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, what do you assume -- where do you assume the generation would be coming from to derive that figure?

MR. HERNANDEZ: The estimate that was developed internally basically took a sampling of capacity throughout the state. So, if you will, it's kind of a weighted average versus --

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: You assumed that the capacity that isn't being met at the Gannon Station is met incrementally at other facilities.

MR. HERNANDEZ: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Because the actual transmission cost will depend specifically on the site of the source. If you have multiple sources, you could have compounding effects or offsetting effects. So what we did for that estimate was just basically develop capacity that was located -- dispersed throughout the state, and then accounted for losses, the transmission and wheeling costs, that type of thing.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioner, it's also clear that the impacts are not just on Tampa Electric. There are impacts on other systems which would require solutions by them, which could take an extremely long period of time under the best of circumstances with someone who was aggressively filing and making filings to correct the transmission effects. But transmission issues are extremely controversial, and it's a risk

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that should not be injected here.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you, Mr. Hernandez.

Mr. Wright?

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Robert Scheffel Wright, with the law firm of
Landers & Parsons, appearing today on behalf of
Calpine Eastern Corporation. I have some brief
legal argument to present, after which Mr. Bob
Carroll, a business representative of Calpine,
also has some brief comments to make regarding
the suggestion by the Staff or recommendation by
the Staff that there be an RFP.

First, while it's true that there's no specific statute and no specific rule requiring an RFP in this circumstance, the Staff is right: Your statutes charge you to broadly construe those statutes in the public interest, and the specific environmental cost recovery statutes at issue here charge you to evaluate proposals such as Tampa Electric Company has brought forward to you. The Staff's recommendation is that you require TECO to conduct an RFP as a test to provide additional evidence in evaluating, in carrying out your charge under the applicable statutes here.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Let me -- Staff, you state that precisely. Excuse me, Mr. Wright. You state specifically that this is just an additional test. You're still going to do what you always do when you're looking to see what something should cost?

MS. JAYE: Certainly, Mr. Chairman. I would like to point out -- and I believe this is in Staff's recommendation -- that this is a procedural recommendation. It is not a recommendation that we are saying will be a final order or there will be interlocutory appeals to be taken from it. Any number of things could come of it.

I would also like to point out in passing that Staff is not proposing a rule, nor does Staff believe that the effect of this recommendation would act as a rule.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. I don't know if that answered my question.

Mr. Ballinger, all I'm saying is that when I read the rec, I got a feeling that this is just in addition to what you normally do. This is sort of a safeguard step that you're taking.

MR. BALLINGER: Yes, sir. In fact, it's

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actually a way to, as you pointed out earlier, help lessen TECO's burden come time of the hearing. If we had an RFP in front of us with the results, we would feel more comforted that the market was thoroughly tested.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Let me -- Mr. Wright, excuse me for a second. And I'll probably ask this to TECO at some point. But what do we do if -- as we go in the hearing, let's say Mr. Wright's client joins this hearing, and then as part of its testimony, it files that it can do this for 20 cents on the dollar of what TECO is going to do, and it just puts together what seems to be a credible presentation of how it would be done. Doesn't that put us and TECO in a more difficult position?

MR. BALLINGER: Most certainly, yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have another question, since you've interrupted him. Has Staff looked at this from the standpoint that, assuming that an RFP is required or would be -- let's just assume an RFP is required. Is this a candidate for a waiver of that rule? Have you done that analysis? You've had other cases where they've come in to do an RFP, and you've

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said we agree it should be waived.

MR. BALLINGER: I don't know that we've waived the RFP rule yet. We had a request for it at one time by Gulf Power, and it was to waive a portion, some of the disclosure information.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. BALLINGER: And we required them to go ahead and do it per the rule.

You're really asking a difficult question.

You're asking me first to hypothesize that we
have a rule in place, which we don't, and then
to hypothesize --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But what you're recommending here is the same result. I guess what I'm trying to understand is how productive this would be.

MR. BALLINGER: I think it would be very productive, and in Staff's mind, very much along the lines — the same by rule. We're willing to let the utilities structure the RFP, request what they need, and evaluate the RFP. And if they conclude that they are the cheapest alternative, they have to show that burden at the hearing, and that's fine. But we feel

comforted then that at least the market was tested.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, let me ask you this. How would you take into -- would you agree that assuming no plants continue at Gannon or some lesser plant continues at Gannon, that would affect the transmission system?

MR. BALLINGER: Yes. And on that, it's a little troubling today. In the attachment to their petition, when they did a market analysis and stated in there that transmission would be impacted, and that's one reason purchased power would not be available, the number quoted was \$71 million of transmission impact, and today I hear 400 to 500 million.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.

MR. BALLINGER: I don't know which is the correct number.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. Depending on which one you believe, it might have a material effect on whether you think it's going to be futile or not.

MR. BALLINGER: And I think both of those numbers also assumed an all-or-nothing approach of totally shutting down Gannon. Staff

understands that they may need some generation there for voltage support. What other middle grounds are there? We don't know.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioner, this absolutely would be a grounds for waiver, for two reasons. One, the transmission impacts, which are tremendous, and the difference in those numbers can be explained. And secondly, because of the complex, overriding issue with respect to the Consent Final Judgment and Tampa Electric's complex environmental litigation that it's trying to settle.

This isn't just simply a case of determining to add power. It is complicated by those other factors. We are dealing with two powerful, very important agencies that regulate Tampa Electric with respect to environmental emissions and have crafted a settlement or negotiated a settlement and are in delicate negotiations trying to complete that.

This process, I promise you, complicates that. It makes it very difficult, and the benefits of that settlement are in jeopardy with this action.

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CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you, Mr. Willis. Did you want to add something, Tom, because you started --

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes, sir, Commissioner. Just to address Mr. Ballinger's concern about the two numbers, the 71 million that was shown on that chart, that was a chart of capital costs. The 71 million dealt with just the capital costs related to Tampa Electric.

In addition to that, there's another 50 million or so -- and I'll just use straight up numbers instead of a range, but approximately 50 million capital required for reactive power supply, and an additional \$160 million estimate related to system losses, some of them internal to Tampa Electric, but about two-thirds of it related to the state. And those losses, in our best estimate -- and this is on the total side now -- is roughly 160 megawatts. Then an additional wheeling cost of approximately 100 So if you take those costs and put million. them on a cumulative present worth revenue requirement basis, that's the range that I gave you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You're saying the

70 million is unique to Tampa Electric. The rest of it affects the whole system, and it would be borne by other utilities or other users of the --

MR. HERNANDEZ: Not entirely. There are some additional costs associated with losses on Tampa Electric's system. There's additional costs -- there's some additional capital that we didn't recognize in that initial estimate.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So you would share in that burden.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes. About -- looking at the numbers, approximately one-half of those costs are ours, and the balance is -- about 55% is the balance of the state, other systems.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Wright -- thank you.

Mr. Wright, I'm sorry for interrupting you.

MR. WRIGHT: Thanks. Before I return to the comments that I was previously in the process of making, I do want to make a couple of points in response to the intervening discussion, particularly the issues relating to the alleged transmission costs and the environmental amelioration issues.

These are factual issues that are

susceptible to being tried as issues of fact in the hearing. You don't know where the proposals for capacity to be supplied will come from. They may come from plants that are located transmission wise in exactly the same place electrically as the Gannon Station. Let the market work, and you'll see how resourceful competitors in a competitive wholesale market can be. But these are factual issues.

what I was saying is -- and this directly relates to questions posed to Ms. Jaye and answered by Ms. Jaye -- is this. You have an articulated policy in favor of bidding for new capacity.

This is a new circumstance, as the Staff correctly point out. This type of project, this massive repowering project was not foreseen at the time you adopted your bidding rule back in 1993. At most, this is not a rule, as Ms. Jaye correctly states. This is the incipient application of a previously articulated bidding policy to a new and heretofore unforeseen circumstance.

I think Mr. Willis mischaracterized the Staff's recommendation when he referred to the

RFP as the only means of meeting the requirement. I think the Staff's proposal is to require an RFP as an additional test on the prudence of TECO's proposal.

Remember, the issue before you today is not this ultimate ratemaking effect or anything else. It may become an issue what the best alternative in the public interest to meet these power supply requirements are in this hearing. But right now the issue before you all is whether to approve TECO's petition.

I don't agree with Mr. Willis's assertions that this creates a taking problem. I hadn't really thought that through, but at a minimum, I think that's speculative. I think there's a fairly serious proposition that you all's ability to regulate in the public interest would outweigh that so long as you've allowed them to recover any costs --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Wright, let me ask you about that.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Suppose we require them to do bidding. Will the analysis, or should the RFP properly include -- would it

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include additional costs -- in addition to just replacing the power, but would it include additional costs that result from, say, necessary transmission? And what about the investment currently in plant?

MR. WRIGHT: Two things. I think the Staff
-- I will tell you, I interpret the Staff's
intent -- in their recommendation where they say
the Commission could then make a decision using
the most compelling evidence to select the
lowest cost alternative, I interpret the Staff's
recommendation, which we support, to be to
consider all costs and make the selection of the
lowest cost alternative. And I will tell you, I
think you have authority under 366.04(5) to
require the installation of facilities pursuant
to proceedings as provided by law and the
allocation of costs accordingly.

But now I want to answer your other question about the --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, suppose --

MR. WRIGHT: I think --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Go ahead.

MR. WRIGHT: Let me just answer that. I'm not sure what the megawatts involved are, but I

would -- all I can say is, I know a fair amount I haven't conducted a specific about this. study of the book value versus the market value of TECO's Gannon Station, but I think it's highly likely that the market value of TECO's Gannon Station is greater then the \$100 million book value that Mr. Ramil articulated. You had another question, and I have some

more comments.

I quess that may be COMMISSIONER CLARK: true, assuming they can run it under EPA requirements.

MR. WRIGHT: Or assuming that if they divested it, if they sell it for 200 million, here's a \$100 million benefit there. Somebody else buys it and repowers it off rate base without TECO's ratepayers being on the hook for it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But you would agree with the notion that either the lack of value or the value of that plant should be included in their calculation of the least cost alternative?

I think the stranded cost MR. WRIGHT: exposure should be included.

> COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Wright, I hate to interrupt, but since you're already interrupted, you made a comment that the RFP should be required as an additional test of the reasonableness of TECO's proposal.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I thought that you also indicated that the Commission has authority -- and if this is incorrect, correct me. But I thought you said that the Commission has authority, broad authority to require that the lowest cost alternative be installed, or something along those lines.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's what I want to explore with you. Do we as a Commission have the authority to order TECO to -- in order to comply with the DEP requirements, that you shall enter into a contract with XYZ cogenerator to solve this problem, or do we say, "We expect you to look at the least cost alternative, and that's the standard we're going to hold you to.

Now, you go out and you -- as managers, you go out and you make that decision." And then after the fact, we review that and make a decision

what is appropriate for cost recovery, but we do not on the front end dictate how they're to meet that requirement. That's what I want to -- what is our authority?

MR. WRIGHT: In the first instance, the issue before you is TECO's petition for approval of its plan to satisfy environmental compliance. You are charged to evaluate that, and you have the specific authority to approve or deny it.

If you determine that their plan is not the most cost-effective alternative for ratepayers, then I would submit to you that your general obligation to regulate in the specific interest and the specific charge of the statute to consider the prudency of this would require you to deny their petition. It's not prudent, I would submit to you, if it's not the most cost-effective alternative.

Secondarily, if the question becomes how is Tampa Electric Company going to deal with the requirements of meeting its power supply requirements and complying with the DEP's requirements or what may ultimately become the EPA's requirements, I believe that you have the

authority, after proceedings as provided by You would have to go through the process of establishing notice and letting everybody know that this is what was going to be decided in thus and such proceeding. But I believe that you have the authority, and I think it's 366.04(5), to require the installation of facilities and to require the allocation of costs to the utilities affected in proportion to the benefits received. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that the grid bill authority?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that's basically for reliability purposes, is it not?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I think reliability is plainly at issue here. And I think it's a sequential analysis, Commission Deason, because you've got before you a petition for authority to go forward with a plan and asking you all, the Public Service Commission, for a determination that this plan is prudent and in the public interest.

Your Staff has suggested that some additional evidence be adduced in this

proceeding that will inform your decision as to whether it's prudent and in the public interest. If, given the opportunity to review all evidence, you determine that TECO's plan is not prudent and not in the public interest, then I think you're -- personally, I think you're obligated to deny it.

what happens next becomes a different question. What is TECO going to do faced with the DEP, or the EPA, or both of them, leaning on them to meet environmental compliance requirements? That poses a new question that may require the addition of some transmission facilities. It may require the addition of some power supply facilities in various locations.

But I submit to you, in that latter context, I think you probably have the authority to deal with that as well. That's what I'm saying.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But that would be in a subsequent proceeding? I guess for purposes of this proceeding --

MR. WRIGHT: Could it be in this proceeding? Is that your question?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No. I guess what I'm

trying to --

MR. WRIGHT: If it is a sequential analysis, could both of them be done in this proceeding? Probably.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you're saying we have the statutory authority in this proceeding as it's currently structured to require that there be an RFP, and then to order TECO to sign a contract as a result of that RFP and say this is what you shall do to meet your requirements under the consent decree or generally -- or any other requirement?

MR. WRIGHT: I think the answer to your question as you asked it, Commissioner Deason, is no. I think that under this proceeding as it is currently structured, the answer is no. I think that you could modify the proceeding and the scope of this proceeding to determine, as Staff has suggested that you do, what is the best alternative, all things considered, to protect Tampa Electric's ratepayers, to achieve lowest cost and reliable electric service, and to protect the environment of Florida. I think you could roll those issues into this proceeding, but they're not there today.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And where would we get the authority to roll those in? Under the grid bill authority?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because for there to be action that reduces the capability at the current Gannon Station would impose a reliability threat on the system?

MR. WRIGHT: Potentially the environmental requirements being applied to the Gannon Station could require shutdown or reduction in capacity, which creates reliability issues.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Wouldn't that assume then that DEP would require that, realizing there would be reliability threats, and perhaps a blackout in the entire state conceivably, that they would have to make that finding that the environmental impacts are more important than there being reliability threats to the transmission system in the state?

MR. WRIGHT: You all have an interesting shared responsibility with the DEP. I don't know that their decision would go that far, but they have said --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: How do we impose the

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grid bill authority then? The only way we can impose the grid bill authority is if you're assuming that the final requirements from DEP would impose reliability threats on the transmission system in the state.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, and if this plan is denied and TECO is required in some way to comply with these requirements, there are going to be further issues. Now, whether the DEP will go all the way to saying you have to shut these plants down, or you have to do something different, or what, or whether if EPA will get involved, you know, I don't know.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: What do we lose -let's say we don't roll the issue into this
proceeding, i.e., the issue of doing an RFP, but
we simply go and do a prudency test on the
company's proposal and make a determination on
that? What do we lose by not having done an RFP
up front, if anything?

MR. WRIGHT: We lose a whole lot of evidence as to how much the power could be supplied for and what the transmission requirements really might be, depending on what proposals wholesale competitive suppliers would

bring forward. And basically what you lose is knowledge and certainty that you made the right decision, Commissioner Jacobs.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Could we get that evidence into the hearing, prudency hearing?

MR. WRIGHT: How are you going to get it without an RFP?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I would assume you and your clients would intervene. I mean, I think that's one of the things the Staff in fact covers, is the notion that it could be done by intervention. People in the past have intervened in these types of proceedings and alleged that they could provide it cheaper.

MR. WRIGHT: Right.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: What's the difference?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: But haven't they intervened at the back end? And that's the only thing that worries me about --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Remember, this is a petition. This isn't moving it into rate base. As Mr. Wright pointed out, this is a petition. And why isn't the procedure -- what is -- is that procedure vehicle available for you to put

on the evidence that it's a more prudent action for the power to be supplied by others, in fact, a specific other, and on that basis we would deny the petition?

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, I think that the opportunity you suggest is available, but I think that the reason to do it via an RFP on the front end is the same reason that you require there to be an RFP on the front end of a project that is going to go in rate base and that is going to be permitted through a need determination in the Power Plant Siting Act.

And while we're on that point, I don't think there's any legitimacy to the argument that there's a difference that exists here because we're talking about a repowering that costs \$673 million versus a new greenfield plant that costs \$673 million. The ratepayers are going to see \$673 million, plus or minus, no matter how you cut it. And I don't think the argument that the existing facilities are there makes a whit of difference to the ratepayers, and accordingly, I don't think it should make any difference to you all.

So I think the rationale of having the

1 bidding rule for Power Plant Siting Act 2 jurisdictional projects is exactly applicable 3 to the situation at hand. COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, let me --4 5 MR. WRIGHT: You do it on the front end 6 because you get more and better evidence on the front end. 7 8 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Your view is that you 9 would get more and better evidence, but that intervention is also available. 10 11 MR. WRIGHT: I agree. COMMISSIONER CLARK: Now. let me ask one 12 13 further question. In your answer to 14 Commissioner Deason, you had indicated that you **1**5 don't think we can compel the signing of power 16 from another entity in this instance, that we 17 cannot compel them to take the power from 18 another entity. 19 MR. WRIGHT: I think what I said was as 20 this proceeding is currently structured. 21 I'm sorry. I didn't COMMISSIONER CLARK: 22 hear that. 23 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I'm curious, because I 24 think Commissioner Clark brings a good point.

You could bring this up later, but it almost

begs the question. That would mean that if you wish to participate in the possibility of building this generation, then you must intervene in this docket. So we have a possibility of 20 different merchant providers across the nation, and perhaps in the world there's 30 or 40, and they would all be required to come into this proceeding, to file record evidence that they could build this cheaper than FPL so that — not so they get a contract, not so that they have an opportunity to participate in some way, but just simply so they could prove that TECO's project isn't the right one.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes. And if I can digress on that for 20 seconds, that's exactly what happened to my client and Mr. McGlothlin's client in the Cypress Energy case seven -- going on eight years ago. We were allowed in to prove that FPL's proposal was not the best deal. We weren't allowed in to prove that ours is. That was the decision that was made. We lost three to two on motions to dismiss filed by FPL. You know, I didn't think it was right at the time, and I don't think it's right now. I think if you're going to be interested in the ratepayers'

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1 best interests, you need to get everything on 2 the table and go for it. 3 If I could finish --4 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Go ahead. I'm sorry. 5 But, Mr. Wright, what COMMISSIONER DEASON: is our statutory authority to do what you're 6 7 saying? MR. WRIGHT: I think it's the grid bill, 8 9 Commissioner Deason. COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's it, the grid 10 bill. 11 MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir, unless there's going 12 to be a disputed issue of fact as to whether 13 additional capacity is needed here. 14 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And what's our 15 16 authority --MR. WRIGHT: And if that's not true, then 17 maybe your grid bill authority is not triggered. 18 But the way your statute reads is, upon a 19 determination by the Commission after 20 proceedings as provided by law that a need 21 exists for additional capacity, et cetera, you 22 23 all can do something about it. 24 COMMISSIONER DEASON: In our current bidding rule, what is the authority for that 25

| 1 | rule? Is it is the Power Plant Siting Act? |
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| 2 | I'll just ask Staff to take a look at that. |
| 3 | MR. WRIGHT: I'm sorry. I don't know. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's fine. That's |
| 5 | probably an unfair question. |
| 6 | MR. WRIGHT: No, it's a fair question, and |
| 7 | I wish I knew, but I don't know it off the top |
| 8 | of my head. |
| 9 | COMMISSIONER DEASON: At some later time, |
| 10 | if Staff can just address that. |
| 11 | MR. BALLINGER: I believe it's under |
| 12 | 403.519. |
| 13 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: And I think also 366 |
| 14 | MR. WRIGHT: We can look it up in the rules |
| 15 | right now. |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Wright, we've really |
| 17 | interrupted you several times. Maybe we can go |
| 18 | forward and see if we can |
| 19 | MR. WRIGHT: I'll finish as quickly |
| 20 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. McGlothlin is |
| 21 | obviously waiting too. |
| 22 | MR. WRIGHT: I'll finish as quickly as I |
| 23 | can. Thank you. |
| 24 | I want to make some historical observations |
| 25 | regarding Mr. Hernandez's assertion that the |

bidding time line is not feasible. You all, this Public Service Commission has directly applicable experience that would demonstrate to you that the time line proposed by the Staff, which is about three and a half months from today, until May 1st, which is when they say the RFP results ought to be in, is entirely feasible. It has been done.

In December of 1990, after Florida Power Corporation revised its generation system planning processes to account for the problems experienced at Christmas of 1989, they discovered they needed lots of additional capacity. And in December of 1990, they determined that their best course of action was to issue an RFP, a request for proposals for power suppliers. They issued the RFP on January 11th. They had their bidders conference on January 18th. They received bids on February 7th. They hired National Economic Research Associates to evaluate the proposals and made the decisions as to whom they were going to award contracts to by March 1st, and they had signed contracts by March 15th.

That's less than three months. We're

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talking about three and a half months here.

This can be done.

Finally, trying to translate this into an issue where you would come back and look at this down the road after TECO spends money is, I would submit to you, the wrong inquiry. The issue before you and the inquiry that should be -- I think is before you is whether to approve TECO's petition. Your Staff have properly recommended that you get additional evidence relative to that petition. And in the simplest terms, what TECO is trying to do is shut out that additional relevant evidence that's directly pertinent to your charge pursuant to the statute at issue here to evaluate their proposal, determine whether it's prudent and cost-effective, and act in the ratepayers' best interests.

That's all my comments. Mr. Carroll just has some brief remarks from a business perspective.

MR. CARROLL: Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, my name, as Mr. Wright indicated, is Bob Carroll, and I'm with Calpine Eastern Corporation. I'll be very brief.

1 Calpine Eastern Corporation supports the Staff recommendation in this matter. As you are 2 3 probably aware, Calpine very recently announced 4 the development of two projects in the State of 5 Florida. One of those projects is a proposed 6 540 megawatt project with a direct interconnect 7 into TECO's system. Calpine anticipates that this project will be on line at least one year 8 prior to the time indicated in this matter in 9 10 the TECO plant. Calpine supports the Staff recommendation 11 and looks forward to participating in an RFP on 12 **13**

this matter. Calpine, like TECO, is confident of their ability to compete and looks forward to the opportunity to do so.

Thank you.

MR. HOWE: Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe with the Public Counsel's Office.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Howe, why don't we let the private companies go, and --

MR. HOWE: That would be fine.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Let's save you for last.

Mr. Green?

MR. GREEN: Good morning, Commissioners. Yes, it's still good morning.

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I'm Mike Green, vice president of Duke Energy North America, in charge of Florida operations. I appreciate the opportunity to make some brief comments here.

As probably you're not surprised, Duke
Energy supports the Staff proposal for
soliciting alternative proposals to the Gannon
repowering or in lieu of the Gannon repowering.

As you know, DENA, Duke Energy North

America, is in the business of building

cost-effective, reliable, and environmentally

sensitive power facilities. We are only

successful when we can offer the wholesale

capacity energy from those facilities at prices

cheaper than traditional power plants. That's

the only way we succeed.

You've heard from one other developer, and you'll probably hear from a couple others. All these developers are in the business of providing innovative solutions to energy problems.

A lot has been talked about the transmission system. Clearly, the transmission system issues has to be a part of the overall consideration of what is needed to resolve the

Gannon repowering issue.

Duke Energy North America is ready and willing to submit an alternative proposal. I agree with Mr. Wright that clearly the time frame proposed by Staff, by May 1st, is a doable time frame. Innovative solutions and alternatives can be designed, developed, and proposed in that time period.

I've heard several large numbers of money discussed today, some published, some unpublished, ranging from 500 and 400 and \$673 million. The bottom line is, it's a lot of money. It's not clear what all that covers just yet. But I respectfully submit that it only makes good sense that when you're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars that are going to be put on the risk investment profile of ratepayers of the state, that alternative solutions should be considered.

Again, Duke Energy supports the Staff recommendation and encourages the Commission to proceed as quickly as possible and solicit proposals such that the environmental benefits can be realized as quickly as possible.

Thank you for your time.

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MR. McGLOTHLIN: Commissioners, I'm Joe
McGlothlin. I'm representing Reliant Energy
Power Generation, Inc. today. Reliant Energy
this morning filed a petition to intervene in
this case. I'm here to support the Staff's
recommendation that you require TECO to issue an
RFP at this point. I've made a few notes --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. McGlothlin, let me ask you right before you get started so I won't interrupt you in the middle.

You're intervening. Commissioner Clark says that that would be the proper way to do this. Why isn't that the right way to do it?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: One big reason is a matter of timing. TECO represents that this case is time sensitive. I think one thing that would complicate the timing of this is a scenario in which you go to hearing, you adduce the evidence, you conclude based upon evidence at that time that TECO has not presented the most cost-effective alternative, and at that point you have to take the next step.

If you instead go to an RFP now, you will have at an early point much more and better information regarding what the competitive

market can provide as alternatives to what TECO has proposed. So I think you gain time, as well as you gain a situation in which the information is better because of the bidding format. I think if you have a situation where competitors are going head to head, including TECO, under a properly conducted bid, you will get the best evidence of what the market can afford, as opposed to, for instance, prefiled testimony where one competitor might want to hedge because he doesn't know what the other competitor is going to do in an open scenario like that. So I think you get better information sooner by going to an RFP.

It was suggested by TECO that by going to an RFP that the Commission would be jumping to conclusions. I think to the contrary, you're not forming any conclusions. You're telling the company that you expect the best available evidence on a critically important issue.

It was suggested that going to an RFP would be impractical. But for the reasons I just gave in answering the Chairman's question, it would be more impractical not to go to an RFP, because you would have the sequential problem.

And as did Mr. Wright, I want to refer you back to that FPL/Cypress case. In that case, Nassau Power and Arc Energy intervened and offered far more cost-effective gas-powered alternatives, and you turned down FPL and Cypress for two reasons, first because of the demonstration of cheaper alternatives, and secondly, you said you were dissatisfied by the fact that FPL had not scoured the universe of available alternatives before entering into a proposed contract with that IPP.

And that was the genesis of the bidding rule. And the purpose of the rule is to get that information up front. And by analogy, that can be done here, and I think you have authority to do it.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What is that authority, Mr. McGlothlin?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I think the Staff has identified it. In addition to the general obligation of utilities to act prudently, in the context of the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause and in the context of approving those plans, you have to determine whether the plan is prudent and in the public interest. And it's

only a logical extension of that to require the best proof of alternatives before making that decision and to do it in the timing sequence that makes the most sense, and that is to do it now and not later.

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Mr. Willis suggested that to go to an RFP would constitute a taking of property, and I think that is a particularly revealing argument. On the one hand, as Staff mentioned in its recommendation, attached to the petition is what purports to be some kind of market But if TECO is saying that to go to analysis. an RFP and to do anything other than approve its plans is a taking, that shows you -- I think it's a pretty good gauge of how seriously they've considered any alternative other than TECO providing the capacity, for the argument suggests that they are the only available contender for that opportunity. Alternatively, it suggests that they don't think they would win the RFP. Neither argument should persuade you to turn down the opportunity to tell the company to go to bidding at this point.

It was also suggested that this case is different because what we have here is existing

capacity, whereas the bidding is supposed to be earmarked for new capacity. As Mr. Wright says, half a billion dollars is half a billion dollars. But beyond that, TECO acknowledges that its proposal will end up in an incremental 300 megawatts or more of incremental new capacity.

TECO says that the Commission has authority to tell TECO that it's going to only allow a portion of the cost of this project if it goes forward, and at a different point, TECO says it has committed the company to a certain course of action in its consent. But I look at page 8 of that consent document, caption O, which says, "Tampa Electric Company's obligation to implement the emissions reductions and other requirements set forth herein will be conditioned on the receipt of necessary federal, state, and local environmental permits and acceptable regulatory treatment, including cost recovery by the Florida Public Service Commission."

So it appears to me that this delicate balance between two powerful agencies is being structured so that they don't have to do

anything without getting full cost recovery from you. So that suggests to me that if you deny their plan, they are very sensitive to the possibility of going forward in the face of that denial and would be given a powerful incentive to do what is prudent.

One more comment on that point. I do recommend that you go to an RFP. I think, however, that the RFP must contemplate the possibility that an alternative other than TECO's may be the lowest cost. I don't think you can realistically expect a good response to an RFP that is set up to be some sort of test on the reasonableness of the cost of TECO's proposal and how much you're going to disallow, if any.

There was a question about whether the existing costs belong in any evaluation. By their own plan, TECO proposes to retire three of those units. And I think when you look at the bid scenarios, you do take into account all costs. They would include any costs of identified and approved transmission constraints or transmission issues, and they would include recovery of prudently incurred costs. But I

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think beyond those parameters at this point, I don't think you should prejudge at all the extent to which those -- there would be any stranded costs or not.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask a question about that, because it seems to me if there are stranded costs, then what happens? Is it appropriate to be recovered from ratepayers, and if it is not, have you effectuated a taking?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I think if it's demonstrated that they were prudently incurred at the time, then TECO is entitled to recover it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So then wouldn't you have to include that in any cost of any alternative?

MR. McGLOTHLIN: If the judgment is made that they were prudently incurred, yes. I think they --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And you better do that at the same time so you know ultimately what the whole thing is going to cost.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I believe in evaluating the alternatives, you look at all the costs properly attributable to each one. I don't

think I'm disagreeing. I'm asking you not to prejudge what would be in one category or the other at the time.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: What did you -- you lost me. What do you mean by that?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But whether it's in one or the other, it is a cost that needs to be considered.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Right. All costs.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Now, bear in mind, with respect to the taking, we're talking today about \$673 million that hasn't been spent and a lot of plant that isn't on the ground, and there's no way to take that.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I'm just -- from the standpoint that you have investment in the plant that you might shut down if you do another alternative, in doing that alternative, you would consider the cost of shutting down that plant.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: I think that's right. I'm trying to think through it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And in fact, we do

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We've done that in oil backout and things 1 like that. When you determine the 2 cost-effectiveness, you look at those costs as 3 well. 4 MR. MCGLOTHLIN: I think I agree with you, 5 Commissioner. 6 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Susan, just so I 7 understand, what you're saying is that when we 8 would do that -- you might have lost me. 9 10 when you do that, you have to include all costs, 11 is what you're saying. 12 Yes. COMMISSIONER CLARK: 13 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Thank you. 14 helps to have that. 15 All right. Are you finished? 16 MR. McGLOTHLIN: Yes, sir. 17 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. 18 MR. WILLIS: I would just like to point out 19 that he has just introduced the issue of 20 stranded cost. Now, you would have to have a 21 specific statute to determine how you would deal 22 with stranded cost. And this is exactly what I 23 was talking about with respect to substantive 24 due process.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Willis, let me ask

you about that. We have had other cases where we have, in effect, substituted some power for existing power. And I guess the thing that comes to mind for me is oil backout, where you have, in effect, I guess repowered, and when you determine the cost-effectiveness of the new power, you determined the costs you will incur as a result of, in effect, retiring that or retiring part of the plant. Why isn't -- I mean, it's not really a stranded cost. It's part of the cost that you would look at in determining what is the least cost alternative. If it is the least cost alternative to shut down those plants and put a plant elsewhere, isn't that what we should be doing?

MR. WILLIS: Well, with respect to oil backout, oil backouts were utility proposals with respect to its property. They were not -- those were not ordered by the Commission. The Commission approved the proposal of a company pursuant to a petition.

And to state that you have the authority to then go forward and order us to deal with a particular party while shutting down our station and providing some sort of a stranded cost

recovery, I'm suggesting to you that that only could be done by statute. That is a huge leap in policy determination that could only be done by a statute which would give you the authority to take the property. You can't just take --

commissioner clark: Are you saying that -suppose we had a rate case, and we discovered it
was costing you ten cents a kilowatt-hour to
generate from one plant, and you could buy it
cheaper. We couldn't say to you, "You need to
shut down that plant and buy elsewhere or get
power some other way, and we will allow the
recovery of what is left in that plant"?

MR. WILLIS: I think you can make judgments with respect to the company's costs, but I don't believe that you can order us to shut the plant down and to buy the power from a particular source. You can make a judgment based on the investments and the decisions that the company has. And I would think that you would want to avoid stepping into the shoes of management and making decisions for management in this regard.

MR. RAMIL: Mr. Chairman, we've kind of been all over the map here, and I just feel the need to remind everybody that our environmental

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agreement specifically states that we shut down units at the Gannon site and replace that capacity with repowering units at the Gannon site, and then defines the very strict air emission from that site. It does not say to shut down the Gannon site and go replace that capacity at a new site with all the total environmental impacts associated with a new site.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Ramil, are you saying our only choice then is to allow you to go forward, and if there was an alternative that costs less, to simply allow you to go forward with the project and adjust the cost recovery?

MR. RAMIL: No. I'm saying that the environmental deal we've struck, which includes not only Gannon and Big Bend, is defined in that manner with the environmental agencies. To do something different would not be in compliance with that. You know, I don't know where we would find ourselves as a company at that point.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Then you're saying we have no choice.

MR. RAMIL: Well, this agreement, it's totally tied to repowering the existing plant at

1 Gannon.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And that's the only alternative available to us, and really, all we get to determine is price.

MR. RAMIL: That's the only alternative that has the environmental approvals. And, you know, how we go about doing it is the issue at hand here.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think we have the choice of denying it.

MR. RAMIL: Yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And then I guess all bets are off, and you start over again. And who knows what the outcome of that may be, but that is an alternative.

MR. RAMIL: An alternative is to deny it or to, you know, in regulating us as you normally do, take issue where it's appropriate for you to take issue.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Moyle.

MR. MOYLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Jon Moyle, Jr., appearing on behalf of PG&E Generating today. I have some general comments in support of the direction that Staff is heading in their recommendation.

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I think you've heard a lot of detailed discussion today. I would like to back up a step and I think try to put this in some perspective.

I always hear talk about the competitive, robust wholesale market that we have, that we support a competitive, robust wholesale market in the State of Florida. I think that these repowerings, the one that TECO is proposing and the ones that FP&L are proposing, present this Commission with an opportunity to test whether indeed we have a robust, competitive wholesale market.

Now, putting this and these others out to bid I think is wholly consistent with what you've done in your bid rule. I think it's wholly consistent with the statute. And, you know, sitting around looking, I was thinking, I'll bet the chairs that you all are sitting in and that we're sitting in were procured through an RFP process, through the state purchasing.

what we're talking about here is hundreds of million of dollars that ultimately could be borne by ratepayers. To me, to have a check on that cost by having the market look at the

request for proposals and submit bids is something that just makes sense.

Commissioner Deason, you asked a number of questions about do you have the authority to do this. I would argue that clearly you do, and you don't have to go any further than Staff's analysis where they say in Section 366.01 that the regulation of public utilities as defined herein is declared to be in the public interest. And then they go on and say that this shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of that purpose.

So picking up on the public interest and going over to page 4 of the Staff rec, it says that the Commission can review the plan to implement the Clean Air Act submitted by the utilities and determine whether the plans, including the costs necessarily incurred in implementing such plans, and the effect of rates resulting for such implementation, are in the public interest. That's the same public interest that 366.01 says should be liberally construed. So I think clearly you have the power to order this.

A couple of comments in response to some

arguments that were made. You know, the due process argument, we're here having a hearing today. There have been lots of arguments. I think due process is met. You know, if there is a decision adverse to TECO, they have appellate rights. You know, I'm not overly concerned about a due process argument.

The divestiture and taking argument that was made, I agree with Mr. McGlothlin's comments that that seems to almost be an admission that they're not going to win the RFP, that you're going to have to be in a divestiture situation, a taking situation. You know, that would raise some concern that that judgment may have already been made that this is not the least cost alternative. So we would urge that the market make that determination.

There has been a lot raised about the environmental agreement, the environmental agreement, that this is something that's required under the environmental agreement.

As you all are familiar, most of the new stuff that's going in the ground today is gas-fired, clean technology. I think that the DEP's concern is clean air for the State of

Florida. I don't see how they can have a huge concern if you are displacing what is going on at Gannon with something that is cleaner at another location. I think that is their overriding concern. And no one from DEP has appeared here today to say that if you took a direction that said we want to pursue alternatives that are cheaper and arguably cleaner, that that's going to somehow pose a huge problem to DEP.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Moyle, let me ask you about this. Would it be your understanding then -- let's assume we require the RFP, and it comes back, and it shows that it's more cost-effective to do something other than what's proposed in the agreement. Prior to going forward with that, would Tampa Electric Company have to go back to DEP and get that approved as a method of meeting this requirement?

MR. MOYLE: I'm not that conversant with the agreement. I suspect that they probably would. But I guess the point I was making is that if you go to DEP and say, "Look, the Florida Public Service Commission has said, consistent with their policy, that we need to

put this out to bid. If we get a responsive bid 1 that costs the ratepayers less and is cleaner, 2 will you go ahead and amend the agreement to say 3 that that's okay and we can go forward," I 4 suspect they would say, "Sure." 5 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: But how could --6 COMMISSIONER CLARK: How can we determine 7 if it's cleaner? Won't they have to make that 8 determination? DEP would have to make a 9 decision that the least cost alternative is also 10 11 the alternative that should be followed for environmental reasons. 12 13 14 15

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MR. MOYLE: Well, that's possibly true. But I think with respect to -- if you're looking at the RFPs that are coming in, and they're all gas-fired technology coming in, and TECO is doing a gas-fired technology --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I appreciate that, but we would still have to adduce the evidence. We just couldn't presume it would be better.

MR. MOYLE: Probably, yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: How would Mr. Ramil be able to, and TECO, how would they be able to negotiate if this is the position they're put in

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every time? In other words, they have a need -they have to reach a settlement. They've got
obligations that they've got to meet which are
separate and apart from the energy needs here.
How is he and his company able to meet those
obligations if you put them in this position?

He has negotiated a complex agreement. He comes before this body, and we're left, according to him, with a very simple yea or nay. We say, "It's too expensive. Go back," or "It should be less," or "This is what we think is fair." But you put him in a position where now he has negotiated a structured agreement with several agencies.

I might add that they have no power with this agency except what they've done in this agreement. This comes before us, and every time he comes before us, somebody adds something to that. You come up with a whole series of new structures, yet he still has an obligation to EPA and DEP to meet certain standards. Where does that put him?

MR. MOYLE: Well, it's a very complex matter. I'm not conversant with all the ins and outs of it. I think, from my understanding,

they've entered into an agreement with one party, which is DEP. EPA is not a party to that agreement. I think they still have outstanding issues there. So they are going to be confronted with having to deal with that issue and how that impacts their agreement. I think this is the same point.

I think you are in a position where -- I guess sort of to turn the question the other way, to say, you know, how are you going to then deal with situations like this if parties can go and negotiate agreements with other agencies that are outside your purview and then come to you and say, "You don't have really a whole lot of say in this thing. We've negotiated this agreement, and that's it."

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Don't we have what

Mr. Ramil says, the power to say no? I saw

Mr. Willis raise his hand. You would agree that

I have the power to say no to this agreement?

MR. RAMIL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Good.

MR. RAMIL: I would further say that you're right on target with respect to negotiations with the agencies. And it's even compounded,

because we have to bring EPA and the Department of Justice into the fold. And as you've probably read in some of the press, that's not easy, even when you're talking about environmental cleanup that you think everybody could agree on.

MR. MOYLE: And I'm not suggesting that you have to say no. I guess what I'm suggesting is that you have within your ability the mechanism to issue an RFP, which very well may result in a decision of saying yes to them and going forward with their project. But I just think it's a cleaner way to proceed, because you've let the market attest whether that is the --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: What if they put this out for RFP? What if we asked Mr. Ramil's company to put this out to bid, and Duke Power bids, and their bid is competitive. They're 3 or \$4 million, a little big higher. And we decide to go with Mr. Ramil. We figure, well, he's got a structured contract. He's got obligations to meet. He's done all this work. It's in the ground. It's a facility. We know where it is. We feel more comfortable.

wouldn't then you argue, well, you don't

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have a right to do that? Or would you argue his, you're doing a taking?

MR. MOYLE: Well, I think on a \$3 million difference, given the points that they're making with respect to some of the transmission issues, there's a lot that needs to be looked at. But that -- probably if you all are sitting in judgment of that and affirming that, I don't know that that's a particularly strong case.

It it's a \$300 million difference, based on what, say, Duke Energy or PG&E Energy would bid in there, then I would think that would be a much stronger case that we could bring before you and argue that they are not pursuing the least cost alternative.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Thank you.

MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Vicki Gordon Kaufman of the McWhirter Reeves law
firm. I'm here on behalf of the Florida

Industrial Power Users Group.

So far you've heard from Tampa Electric, and you've heard from a number of developers.

And as you know, FIPUG is a group of large industrial customers who are going to be footing a portion of the bill for whatever project Tampa

Electric ultimately does in this case. 1 2 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Doesn't Mr. McWhirter always refer to it as a small group of large 3 industrial customers? MS. KAUFMAN: I stand corrected, a small 5 group of large industrial customers. 6 MR. WILLIS: Could you tell us which 7 customers those are, Ms. Kaufman. 8 MS. KAUFMAN: No, I can't name the 9 customers. IMC-Agrico is one of them. 10 are a number of industrial customers in Tampa 11 Electric's service territory. 12 13 MR. WILLIS: I know, but we don't know 14 which ones you represent from time to time. 15 MS. KAUFMAN: Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to provide Mr. Willis with a list of the 16 17 FIPUG members. 18 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Willis, you may 19 cross-examine them if they intervene. 20 MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 21 The point I was going to make is that the 22 FIPUG members in Tampa Electric's service area 23 are going to be footing a large portion of the 24 We would suggest to you that you get all 25 the information in front of you before you make

a decision.

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we support the Staff's recommendation that you require Tampa Electric to issue an RFP so you can have those facts at the beginning of the process, as so many of the folks before me have already said. That's the time to look at all the information.

And I would think that you would want to have the whole universe of information in front of you in order to decide whether or not the plan that Tampa Electric has presented to you is the most prudent course and whether it is the most cost-effective for ratepayers, because at the end of the day, that's where your responsibility lies. And I think that the ratepayers will take some comfort in knowing that all options have been explored and at the end of the day they have been evaluated and the most prudent and cost-effective course has been followed.

So we suggest to you that you follow the Staff's recommendation. We also suggest to you, for the reasons that others have articulated so well, that this is well within your authority, and again that you would want to have these

facts before you when you look at this plan.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Ms. Kaufman, isn't it likely that your clients are going to want to have a say-so in how this is done? In other words, if we open up the process for a range of options as opposed to the relatively narrow options that are in the petition, aren't your clients concerned that there may be some issues raised, transmission issues, availability issues, a whole range of them that might occur as a result of doing it?

MS. KAUFMAN: Yes, I think my clients would be concerned, and they would want to see those options explored in the hearing. They have as much interest as anyone in being sure that they have a reliable source of capacity.

I think those are all issues that can be explored in the context of the hearing. And if there is a proposal presented, for example, that has a detrimental impact on transmission, that would be something that you would evaluate when you look at the various options.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I just have one question of Ms. Kaufman. And if anyone disagrees, I would like to hear from them.

1 You think we can do this. MS. KAUFMAN: Yes, ma'am. 2 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Require them to do an 3 RFP, but there's nothing in the law that 4 5 requires us to do that. We have authority to do it; we're not required to do it. And you're 6 7 saying as a matter of policy, that we should do 8 this. 9 MS. KAUFMAN: Yes, ma'am, that's what I'm 10 saying. I think as others have said, it's 11 certainly consistent with the policy that you 12 articulated when you adopted the bidding rule and with other dockets in which you have **13** 14 discussed the competitive nature of the **1**5 wholesale market. 16 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you. 17 MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you. 18 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Howe, while the 19 citizens are foremost in our mind, we saved you, 20 representing the citizens, for last to give us 21 your wisdom. 22 MR. HOWE: I'll be brief, Chairman Garcia. Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe with the 23 24 Public Counsel's Office. 25 I guess we took a fairly simplistic view of Staff's recommendation, which we support, and that being that in their petition, Tampa Electric is asking for the Commission to specifically determine that the conversion of the Gannon Station as it proposes is reasonable, prudent, and in the public interest. That's on page 15 of their petition.

In my view, the Staff is just, I believe, stating that for them to make a recommendation and for you to make a determination of public interest, you're going to have to consider the purchased power alternative. The RFP process will give you evidence of the highest quality on that subject, and for that reason alone, we support the Staff recommendation.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is one of the outcomes could be that we have them issue the RFP, we decide it's the most prudent -- it's the least cost alternative, and we simply deny the petition?

MR. HOWE: That would be a possible outcome, yes. That would be the most likely outcome if you were to determine that it was not the least cost alternative.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But then they would go

back and negotiate with DEP based on that decision.

MR. HOWE: They may negotiate. I do not know what would happen. But the Consent Final Judgment is contingent upon approval by this Commission and the allowance of cost recovery, which I might add, by cost recovery, they do not make any mention in the Consent Final Judgment of cost recovery through the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause. I think traditional rate case — a traditional rate case approach would also allow for cost recovery.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: While I've interrupted you, let me ask you another question. Assuming that we determine that it's not the least cost alternative, one of the things that could happen is that no repowering gets done, and TECO defends its position --

MR. HOWE: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: -- against allegations that it is violating the Clean Air Act.

MR. HOWE: That's certainly a possible outcome. And I don't --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Can we take those costs into account?

MR. HOWE: Which costs, sir?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: The costs of them not complying with these things.

MR. HOWE: Well, certainly. You can take all costs into consideration. That's one of the things that's going to have to come out in this case. We don't know what their testimony is going to look like. And I assume they will address all aspects of costs that they've considered in their testimony, and we'll meet that evidence as we see fit.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very well. Mr. Willis or Mr. Ramil, we've allowed -- I think seven of us have sort of piled on. If you want to make a quick comment, and then we'll open it up to the Commissioners if they have questions.

MR. WILLIS: Commissioner, what you've heard here is an attempt to mold this case into something that it isn't. This is not a Power Plant Siting Act case that then would require bidding. It is simply a petition to approve our comprehensive environmental plan to comply with the Clean Air Act.

You don't have the authority to order us to contract with a particular entity, with respect

to the questions that Commissioner Deason asked. You should not step into the shoes of management by ordering us to do a particular thing.

with respect to due process, there are due process issues all around. One would say that this hearing operates as due process. A quick reading of the statutes that I cited to you cites notice, evidence, hearings, briefs. That has not been done here. This is stripping out one issue to be decided on a quick basis or emergency basis prior to the time that evidence is presented.

You heard the statements that stranded costs would have to be considered. Well, I suggest to you that if you take a position which then puts the company in a position that its property is rendered stranded, without a specific statute --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Lee, you don't think you're putting the company in a really risky position, and Florida's ratepayers, if you --

MR. WILLIS: Absolutely not. Absolutely not.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: At the end of this

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period, at the end of this period, you go
through this entire proceeding, and we decide
no. We say, "Look, this is absurd." You know,
the company files -- the intervenors, or maybe
they all get together in a force of one, and
they file with us, and they say, "We could do
this for half," as an example.

MR. WILLIS: Right.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: And then this Commission, whose only responsibility is cost recovery in this case, we say no. Where are we then?

MR. WILLIS: Well, you're absolutely -- I do not say that you're placed in an impossible position at all. The decision that you would make today could very well, however, place Tampa Electric in a very difficult, if not impossible, situation.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Well, that's what I'm talking about. Forget -- for a moment, let's forget the ratepayers, except that those ratepayers are my concern in this decision, and I make a decision, and I say, my God, you know, Mr. Moyle's company or Mr. Moyle's associates have presented something that seems viable here to us. It hasn't even been scrutinized by you.

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I guess it would have to be scrutinized through testimony and whatever before us.

But nonetheless, we've got a substantial difference. And then I'm placed in the difficult position that I've put your company in a precarious position, because I deny this agreement. Obviously, you've got problems with EPA, and that puts you in a more difficult position, because we haven't approved that, so you're down to zero. We're six months down the road. Your stockholders are at risk. It may affect your stock values.

And clearly, my role is not specifically only the ratepayer. I mean, I have to look out for your interests too. I mean, part of it is to have a healthy investor-owned utility system in the state for our ratepayers. And so I'm left in a difficult position of voting out something that can be very Draconian in effect six months from now.

MR. WILLIS: Well, Commissioner, we have looked very carefully at all these alternatives. We are set to present to you the evidence of things that we've considered. It's due to be filed in nine days. You have a hearing

scheduled on this. And you can make those judgments, as we talked about earlier in this proceeding. I don't think that puts you in an impossible position at all. It puts you in a position you're in every day to look at the evidence and make decisions. And that's what we urge you to do.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Mr. Willis, aren't we now in a posture to basically do the same thing? We know that one company has intervened in this docket, and we suspect that others will. Aren't you going to have to ultimately engage in that very same discourse that you argue is ineffective?

MR. WILLIS: Well, Commissioner, we will have to consider whatever evidence is presented by the other parties in due course, to address that in our testimony that will be presented to you, and then that matter will be sorted out on a vote at an agenda conference after you've considered all the evidence and the briefs in the case.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Very well.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Commissioners?

| 1 | COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm sorry, but I had |
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| 2 | one question for Sheff. I was not on the |
| 3 | Cypress case, at least I don't think I was. Was |
| 4 | I on the Cypress case? |
| 5 | MR. WRIGHT: You were on the related cases, |
| 6 | Commissioner Clark. You were on the motions to |
| 7 | dismiss the Arc and Nassau petitions. |
| 8 | COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right, and they were |
| 9 | dismissed as being not a proper applicant. |
| 10 | MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am, that's correct. |
| 11 | COMMISSIONER CLARK: Thank you. |
| 12 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. |
| 13 | MR. WRIGHT: Can I say one thing about you |
| 14 | all's authority with respect to stranded cost |
| 15 | recovery? |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: You know what? No. |
| 17 | MR. WRIGHT: Okay. |
| 18 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: If someone has a |
| 19 | question, they can ask you. |
| 20 | Commissioners? |
| 21 | COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have you know, I |
| 22 | think there were good arguments on both sides. |
| 23 | I guess one of the things that's concerning me |
| 24 | the most is the fact that we have a sister |
| 25 | agency that is involved in this and has |
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negotiated what they think is a good settlement to address their concerns. And is our obligation to say, all right, let's look at that, and we'll see how -- we'll give it an assessment, and then we either approve it or don't approve it, and if it's not approved, then they go back and negotiate with the sister agency?

I have the concern that we have sort of competing interests here in what we're trying to accomplish. And if we say in these instances you have to issue an RFP, what does that do to an incentive to get -- the incentive or the leverage an environmental agency may have to get these companies to respond to environmental concerns?

MR. BALLINGER: Is that a question to Staff?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Sure.

MR. BALLINGER: I think I would agree with Mr. Moyle, what he said earlier, that DEP's concern is to clean up the air and the water. If there's another alternative to that that gets as clean or cleaner, they would probably be receptive to it.

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requires at least three legs to standing up, us being the third leg right now. And we are just now being faced with this question. We weren't involved in the process of negotiating the EPA or DEP settlement.

I think it also shows that any stool

But quite frankly, what we're trying to do is make your job easier at the conclusion of the hearing so you're not faced with the difficult task of forcing it back to a sister agency, that you've done all the information you need to up front, all the evidence to test the market so that at the conclusion of the hearing you have everything you need to make a decision.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm intrigued by the proposition that Commissioner Garcia raised. It just strikes me that if we were to go through this process, the company is sitting in the bird seat.

MR. BALLINGER: Well, they are, and they also take a substantial risk at the end of the hearing. But it does box the Commission into a very untenable position. On the one hand, you have a sister agency --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: But it's something you

can handle, Mr. Ballinger. If we say -- if we deny you today, it's something that you've handled and have done in the past. I mean, clearly, you're going to come up -- and they're going to argue, I know. But whatever it is, you're going to come up with some numbers, from the facts they do, and from your surveys and studies on the issue, and perhaps even Public Counsel finds a witness to argue with this, and I'm certain that one of these competitors. But you could make that determination without this.

MR. BALLINGER: I think so, yes.

commissioner Jacobs: What would we do to ensure that the bids we get are real bids?

We've already seen a price quoted from an independent power producer that was -- let me make sure I choose my words carefully here -- was favorable in terms other than cost. Okay. How do we make sure that if we're going to evaluate independent power producers' proposals here that they are very real numbers?

MR. BALLINGER: Quite frankly, it's not going to be our job to actually evaluate those. It's the utility's job to evaluate them. And they have the authority or the discretion to

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discard all of them and make that their case at the hearing, that Respondent A, B, and C was not viable for various reasons, and they have the burden of showing that reason.

That's how our current bidding rule works. The utility is actually controlling the RFP and deciding which is the best project. Then they present that evidence to the Commission and say, "Look, I went out, and I tested the market through an RFP. Here's the responses I got. None of them would satisfy the requirements at the same cost or less than mine because of A, B, C, and D." And then you have at least the evidence out there. You've beaten the bushes enough to see what is out there. You're not left with a wondering question, well, what if, you know, this project was out there. You went out and solicited proposals, presumably got the world to respond, but they the utility's management made the decision of which project is the best alternative, and they have that burden to present it to the Commission.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Ballinger, let me ask you this. If in fact there are viable projects out there or entities that can present

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viable projects -- and we've had Calpine say
they're building down in Auburndale. Then they
can come in in the hearing, present their case,
and if they persuade us, we deny the petition,
and then they have the ability to negotiate with
TECO to provide it.

MR. BALLINGER: I agree.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So why is one better than the other? Because if in fact they have those projects out there, they'll be in the case.

MR. BALLINGER: Here's my own personal I've been here almost 16 years, and I would have never thought I would see the day that TECO would go to repowering with gas at a unit. They're predominantly coal-based. That's been their company for years. This is a major change in philosophy, if you will, of the company. Staff is not wanting to derail that philosophy, if you will. And that's why we feel that the best way to do it, since there is an agreement in place, go ahead and issue an RFP now, let everybody take their best shot. utility then at least has gathered all the information. And, yes, it may not prove out at

the end of hearing, but they've done all the groundwork up front, so at least that question is removed.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask this. This is more telling them how to run their business than regulating them, because if there are entities out there who in fact believe they can provide the power and beat the price, including all implications of it, they'll be in the case.

MR. BALLINGER: Correct.

 COMMISSIONER CLARK: So that they can get that denied and they can be in a position to offer that power.

MR. BALLINGER: Which is exactly why --

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: And we have in fact -- what's different between the Cypress case and

now is that we have indicated that they can come

in as a merchant plant and get a certificate of

need.

MR. BALLINGER: But what was different in Cypress and the reason you denied FPL's petition was that you had alternatives in there that showed a least cost, and you were also dissatisfied with the process that FPL went through. So FPL had to go back and figure out

what to do to satisfy a need for power, and they came up with other alternatives.

Because the Commission didn't choose to be faced with that again, we initiated our bidding rule that said that when you come in here asking for basically a prudence approval of a new plant, you must issue an RFP first. We think that a similar policy should be applied here.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask Ms. Jaye something. Does our rule apply to this plant?

MS. JAYE: I don't believe it applies directly to the plant. I believe that a logical extension of the reasons the bidding rule was put into place to begin with would apply it to this point. But as it was initially proposed and adopted, it does not.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Then tell me, is there anything in the APA -- and I guess Mr. Willis cited those particular provisions -- that would not allow us to require a bidding because it's not part of the rule or because it's new policy? Is there any procedural barrier that we're going to encounter as a result of Chapter 120?

MS. JAYE: I do not believe there is a

procedural barrier, Commissioner, because I do not believe that Staff's recommendation and any vote that is made pursuant to that recommendation would affect a substantial interest of the company. We are not -- in the recommendation as Staff has proposed it, we are not proposing that the Commission decide right now on the petition itself, on its merits. We are saying let's get some more information, solicit some bids.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You're saying it's a piece of evidence we want you to --

MS. JAYE: There is a piece of evidence that we feel is -- it would make our job for all of us much easier and much cleaner up front, and we believe you would be presented with a replete record early on in the proceeding. We would all be in a better posture by the time it comes to hearing if we went ahead with the RFP process.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Let me ask you -- that's a good point. It brings up an interesting point that Susan just mentioned. We're putting out something. We're asking, we're requesting for a piece of evidence, for someone to file a piece of evidence.

Now, I'm Duke Power Partners, or whatever the name of the Florida subsidiary is. Why am I going to be providing evidence on a bid that even if my evidence is good, I can't win? In other words, there's nothing at stake. TECO has no obligation to grant this bid; correct? Staff wouldn't --

MR. BALLINGER: That's correct, but I think TECO's incentive is that they have an agreement with DEP and hopefully with EPA to get that monkey off their back to get some deal. So I think they do have an incentive to -- if they see a better alternative, to go ahead and do it. I could see that incentive out there to keep this process moving.

MS. JAYE: It is also part of our job at the Commission under 366.825 to take a look at what is presented by the company and all the evidence to ensure that it is a reasonable and prudent --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: You understand my point is that the incentive to participate in a bid whose only purpose is to structure a possible response makes that tenuous almost. I mean, you're bidding on a project that's not really up

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for bid, that's possibly up for bid, but this Commission hasn't ordered -- doesn't have a right to order them to build them that particular project.

MS. JAYE: Perhaps --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: TECO might have an interest in that project because it's much cheaper than what they have, but --

MS. JAYE: Certainly, Chairman. But the process as it would go through, assuming there were a bidder, assuming that first of all, we voted to allow this thing to be bid, if there were bidders who could do it for less, taking into account, of course, the value of the plant that is now in place, et cetera, taking into account all of these issues that are outstanding, including the transmission upgrade costs, et cetera, if there were a lower cost bidder out there who could meet the requirements for emissions controls, that lower cost bidder, it would seem to me, might have the security of knowing that that low cost bidder would be an option for the company at the end of all the evidence and after the votes were taken by the Commission, if the company were indeed denied.

1 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Got you.

2 Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm prepared to make a motion and see what the reaction is to it.

I guess in this instance, I would deny Staff. I would say we go forward on the petition, that there is opportunity in there for intervention, and that if it is not the best deal, it is in the merchant power community's interest to intervene to show that there's a better way to do this and that they can in fact supply the power. And I think we would be in the same place, because if we conclude that it is not a good deal, TECO still has to go back to our sister agency to negotiate a different deal if we say, "No, it doesn't work." And they will have that information. And if we had determined -- allowed the RFP process to go forward, they would still have to go back to present this as an alternative for it.

It's not clear to me that one is a superior way of proceeding. And I think we have an agency that has negotiated a settlement that they think is a good deal for the environment,

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and we should look at it.

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So I would move to deny Staff. But I would also ask Staff to look at the idea of requiring

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RFPs even for repowering.

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CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I'll second that, that

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part of it at least. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm attracted to that very idea. I see it here as nothing more than -- well, I shouldn't say nothing more, but essentially a procedural device to get evidence

into the record. And for that reason, I don't see all the harm in the position that the

company brings out. And already, I think the

proceedings are going to lend themselves to the

very exchange that an RFP would have brought

about anyway.

I am persuaded by the last point you made and another point, that whatever happens here, particularly if you begin to look at alternatives, there is the implication of the DEP's jurisdiction, and how do you resolve that in a meaningful way I think is an important question we have to address and consider. And simply doing an RFP and thinking that that does that I don't think is a reasonable result.

Additionally, I think the customers are going to have a concern about whatever option comes out the door of an RFP process as to issues that might be raised there. So even if we did an RFP and they came up with an alternative, I think there are going to be issues that get raised by those customers as to how well that suits their needs in the long term regarding TECO. So the bottom --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I agree with you. I would add to the notion that I'm not sure what we would accomplish by an RFP, in the sense that I do think if you don't build there, you have implications of transmission. And I'm not sure that in this case that if this were -- I'm not sure that in this case you would even decide that you would waive the RFP process, given what you have to deal with, that it's a settlement, that if you don't build it here, it raises transmission issues and those sorts of things.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: However, if -- I can second the motion, but I want to make sure that we are anticipating that DEP is either participating or involved in the proceeding, and number two --

1 MR. ELIAS: In which proceeding? 2 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: In the hearing that's 3 going to occur. 4 MR. ELIAS: I suspect not. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, we need to look 5 further out and make sure that all that gets 6 taken care of, because otherwise what we're 7 doing I think will frustrate the whole process. 8 And if we don't get DEP involved in the process, 9 10 then --CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Why aren't they involved? 11 I don't -- I understand his point, but why 12 13 wouldn't they be involved? MR. ELIAS: Well, I mean, the deal has been 14 presented. It's for us to pass on the 15 cost-effectiveness of it. 16 17 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, they may come in. We don't know if they wouldn't come in and 18 advocate that this is the right way to go. Are 19 they precluded from being a party in this case? 20 MR. ELIAS: You know, just thinking off 21 the top of my head, I don't know what 22 23 substantial interest the DEP --COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I'm not asking them 24 to come here to advocate for the stipulation 25

that they've reached. I'm asking them to be here in the event we choose some alternative. That's quite frankly what I'm thinking of. In the event we look at the options that are available to TECO --

MR. ELIAS: And in case --

commissioner Jacobs: Hear me out. In the event we look at options that are available to TECO and we say, "we don't think the one you've arrived at is the most cost-effective," they ought to be at the table at that point in time to look at or begin to look at alternatives to figure out whether or not they meet their objectives. Absent that, then they run the risk of us approving something for them that they don't think is good, and then this company has to go back to them and renew the process.

MR. ELIAS: Other alternatives are not on the table here. They're not the subject of this hearing. And short of --

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I understand. And I don't -- listen to me. I understand we're not here to determine what options DEP should choose to address the environmental concerns. What we are here to determine is what the least cost

options are for this company.

To the extent that they have asked us to approve one option and we say that that option, based on the input we get in our hearing, is not the most cost-effective, it automatically brings the question of other alternatives. And if they're not there at that moment, they run the risk of losing the opportunity on the front end to shape a new solution to their issue.

Sure, we could come out with our order, and then they come in and come up with a new option. And what happens then? We're back at step number one again. We come, we look at their new proposed solution, and we make a determination whether or not it's the most cost-effective. We eliminate all of that if they're here at the table. That's my suggestion.

MR. ELIAS: And let me understand better. You're saying they need to be at the table in the event that we don't approve this plan?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes.

MR. ELIAS: Okay. Because we've been asked to do three things: Find this plan reasonable, prudent, and in the public interest; specifically find that portion of the plan that

provides for the repowering of the six Gannon coal units into three natural gas units is reasonable, prudent, and in the public interest; and thirdly, find that the types of costs that -- or the costs that are associated with those plans are the types of costs that are eligible for cost recovery through the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause as provided for in Section 366.8255. It's an up or down proposition, and this is the whole ball of wax. I mean, short of a finding in a subsequent proceeding that when they actually went to spend the money, they didn't get the best deal on the prices, this is our chance to -- this is our look at this proposal.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I think what Commissioner Jacobs, though, is driving at -- and I understand where Staff is disagreeing with him -- is that if we were to be looking at other alternatives which are not in this case, because we're not asking them to go out and bid, so we're not looking at that evidence. We may have evidence filed by the intervenors, but we don't have that evidence before us. But we're not -- what Staff is trying to get at is, we're not

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going to craft any conclusion in this particular proceeding.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I know, I know.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: And I understand your point that if we were to say no for some other alternative, you would like to be able to weigh that alternative against a witness that said -- and you've asked that witness, "Well, did you see Calpine's filing? Do you think that's good for the State of Florida?" And I understand what you're trying to do. I just don't think that that's an issue that would ever be explored in this particular format.

MR. ELIAS: How we would get that evidence before the Commission in this proceeding I'm not really sure. How we would get someone from the environmental agency to say, "What do you think of this possibility --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I'll give you an example of how it could. Let me go with Commissioner Jacob's proposal.

Let's say we have this hearing and we start down this road, and Calpine intervenes, and Calpine files testimony, which I think they still can; correct?

MR. ELIAS: Yes. None of the testimony has
been --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: So Calpine files some testimony, and in their testimony they say, "Look, here's a 1,000 megawatt plant, and I can do this for 200 million less than TECO." Okay? And it's a plant. A plant is a plant, I guess, as a plant is a plant, but they're just charging less for the process. And they're in this hearing.

Well, Commissioner Jacobs' point is, well, how do I know that we're comparing apples to apples if I don't -- I've got one agreement which is structured around a particular set of environmental issues, and I don't have anyone that I can ask, because then TECO will argue, "That has nothing to do with this. This Calpine proposal is a greenfield project, doesn't affect cleanliness, doesn't affect the EPA, isn't an issue before you. You're comparing apples to oranges, and of course Calpine's is a lot cheaper, because they don't have the responsibilities and obligations that we do to the government."

And so Commissioner Jacobs is saying he

would like to -- I don't know. In theory, if we had another contract before us, I would like to be able to say to the DEP, say, "Well, you looked at both of them. Tell me why we're looking at apples and oranges." That's the only point he's trying to make. And if we were looking at different proposals, it would beg the question, because we're being asked for cost recovery on a particular issue, but it is contingent on the DEP; right?

MR. ELIAS: They've already signed off on it.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: They've already signed off on this particular issue. But I'm trying to put it in the context of a water case, you know, the classic argument, the gold plating argument. Okay? And here we are, we're having a hearing, but typically in water cases people don't join in to say, "Hey, this plant is gold plated. We shouldn't pay for this." Okay? And the only one that can tell me or make that distinction in terms of quality I would assume would be someone from DEP, because that's not our issue.

I've missed you. You've not getting me.

And it could be that I'm totally--

MR. ELIAS: I understand. It's just -it's a question of, one, are we going to be able
to get somebody to speak for the agency on a
particular point; and two, are we going to be
able to receive all this evidence, do all this
analysis, put all these competing proposals
together, and then have testimony or evidence
that you can consider in this proceeding filed
in time to go to hearing on May 28th without
someone saying, "Wait a second. When is all
this going to stop, and when is the record going
to be closed?" That's a big part of my
dilemma.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. You understand.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I think we're there already, but I won't belabor the point today. It's not really important to the issue today. I think we ought to have that discussion, though.

I'm still prepared to second the motion.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Commissioner Deason?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I have one question, pending question to Staff about the bidding rule authority. You look blank.

MR. ELIAS: Oh, I'm sorry. It was 403.519,

which is the need determination statute, and 366.051, which is the cogeneration and small power production statute that provides it's in the public interest.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. We have a motion and a second, and let me say I'm going to support the motion. And I -- for several reasons. I would just like to mention those.

But first of all, I think it's important for this Commission to encourage our regulated utilities where it's necessary to go out and negotiate with the environmental regulators. They may fruitful, and they may be not. But if we at this stage I think change the rules of that, it could be looked upon as being unconducive, if that's a word, to those type negotiations. And what I mean by that is, if we all of a sudden interpret our authority and our very limited bidding rule to now make it subject to repowerings, then that's a whole 'nother ball of wax.

And maybe that's good policy, but we need to -- if we're going to do that, we need to develop that in a rule proceeding where all of the impacts of that can be discussed and make

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sure that we do have the statutory authority to adopt such a rule, which I'm not sure that we do. But all that could be fleshed out in a rule proceeding.

Another thing I think we need to remember is that we're in a proceeding where the company has the burden of proof, and they're going to have to meet that burden. And maybe a good way to meet that burden would have been to have gone through an RFP process and said, "Look, Commission, see, we are the lowest. This is lowest cost option, because nobody else can even come close." They chose not to do that. And I'm not comfortable with us being in the position of dictating to a company how they have to go about presenting their case to meet their burden of proof to this Commission.

So for those reasons, I'm going to support the motion.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I incorporate those reasons into my motion. They were very well stated.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Yes, they were.

Commissioners, I'm not going to support the

motion. I think that what Staff is trying to do is safeguard the company here. I understand the company's position. I accept their rationale. It probably makes business sense. And we do put them in a difficult position. I just worry where we are in the long term by not considering all the options on the front end, because for some reason the wick has been lit here. You know, the fuse is burning on a series of agreements.

And I would rather have our Staff have all the record evidence, because I have yet to see in my tenure at this Commission, or evidence before that, that any of these bids has ever been won by an outsider. So it would be a good exercise. I think it would give TECO certain guarantees and give their ratepayers certain guarantees.

That said, I'm not uncomfortable with the position that the majority will take on this. I think it might have been a better option to go with Staff, and I think what Staff was trying to do is give us more options and more protection from the decision we'll make.

That said, there is a motion and a second.

| 1 | All those in favor signify by saying "aye." |
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| 2 | COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye. |
| 3 | COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. |
| 4 | COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Aye. |
| 5 | CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All those opposed, nay. |
| 6 | Nay. |
| 7 | (Conclusion of consideration of Item 7A.) |
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF FLORIDA:

COUNTY OF LEON:

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter translated under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 125 are a true and correct record of the aforesaid proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the foregoing matter.

DATED THIS 19th day of January, 2000.

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