STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

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VOLUME 1 Pages 1 - 112

COPY

GTE FLORIDA, INC.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 99-5368RP

VS. PSC DOCKET NO. 980253-TX

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Petitioner, CASE NO. 99-5369RP

VS. PSC DOCKET NO. 980253-TX

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

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IN RE:

Final Administrative Hearing

BEFORE

Ella Jane P. Davis

Administrative Law Judge

DATE:

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

TIME:

Commenced at 9:30 a.m. Concluded at 5:20 p.m.

concluded at 3.20 p.

LOCATION:

2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Room Tallahassee, FL

REPORTED BY:

SANDI DIBENEDETTO-NARGIZ

Certificate of Merit

Certified Realtime Reporter

Notary Public - Florida

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC. 100 SALEM COURT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 850/878-2221

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APPEARANCES:

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REPRESENTING BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS:

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REPRESENTING PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION:

MARTHA BROWN, ESQUIRE
MARY ANN HELTON, ESQUIRE
Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, FL 32399

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Let us be in order. We are here before the Division of Administrative

Hearings in Tallahassee, Florida, on the case of GTE Florida, Inc., versus Florida Public Service

Commission and BellSouth Telecommunications versus

Florida Public Service Commission. Thesse are

DOAH cases consolidated 99-5368RP and 99-5369RP.

I am Ella Jane Davis, I am the administrative law judge assigned to this cause.

May I have appearances of those of you who are here.

MS. CASWELL: Kimberly Caswell for GTE.

THE COURT: Is your address on the notice of hearing?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: Madam Court Reporter, do you have that?

REPORTER: Yes.

THE COURT: Would you fill it in, please.

And on behalf of BellSouth?

MS. CASWELL: It's Michael Goggin. I am sure his address is also on the notice, but I can't tell you what it is.

THE COURT: On behalf of the Public Service

Commission.

MS. BROWN: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is Martha Carter Brown, and with me is Mary Ann Hilton. We are associate general counsels for the Division of Appeals at the Florida Public Service Commission. I have Mr. Goggin's address.

THE COURT: Well, that is not really a problem. We need to have Mr. Goggin as opposed to his address. I am not trying to be ugly here. I have no problem with waiting. Mr. Goggin is from out of town?

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you know if he is in town?

MS. CASWELL: I believe he is.

THE COURT: This isn't the easiest address to locate.

MS. CASWELL: Right. I asked him where it was yesterday. He knew the address, but I am not sure if he knew where the building was.

THE COURT: I am reluctant to proceed with any, even with the pending motion or even opening exercises until we see Mr. Goggin. How about it if we take a recess, now that we are opened, and see if you all can find him. Chances are he is

having the same problem everybody else does in finding this address.

(Brief recess.)

MR. GOGGIN: I am Michael Goggin.

THE COURT: We are all reconvened,

Mr. Goggin is with us. I think I saw you give your card to the court reporter. Would you like simply to enter your name and address as your appearance?

MR. GOGGIN: Yes, I would, thank you.

THE COURT: Very well.

Yesterday afternoon we had a conference call that was truncated. That conference call was designed for me to address the prehearing stipulations which indicated that there would be a motion in limine filed. I was informed at that time that no motion in limine was going to be forthcoming.

Is that everybody's representation,
Ms. Caswell?

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

THE COURT: And Ms. Brown?

MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Goggin?

MR. GOGGIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I do have, however, GTE's motion for protective order. It seems appropriate to take that up at this time because there seems to be some confusion as to what the representations were in the motion.

1.

Have the parties reached an agreement that this is an appropriate order for me to enter?

MS. CASWELL: I believe we have, Your Honor. I have spoken to Martha and I believe she, after reviewing the portions of the transcript of the depositions that were labeled confidential, she would agree to hold those as confidential.

And in addition, if there are going to be confidential numbers disclosed during the hearing, she agreed we can clear the hearing room of those people who are not parties or who have not signed agreements.

MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor, I had the opportunity this morning to review the exhibits that I had not had the opportunity to review before. I have also had the opportunity to hear from Ms. Caswell the specifics of the portions of the depositions that she considered to be confidential.

I agree, and I agree to hold them

confidential to be treated as Your Honor sees fit.

2.1

THE COURT: Mr. Goggin, do I understand that the petitioners have entered into a separate contract for this protective measure?

MR. GOGGIN: Your Honor, first of all, I would like to apologize for also missing the teleconference yesterday. I was stuck in the air.

THE COURT: We were having one of our rare rains in Tallahassee.

MR. GOGGIN: But we have no objection to the granting of the order. We have apparently received a copy of the protective agreement. I have not yet seen it yet, but I am sure that it is in a form that we can agree with.

In any event, we agree to treat any information designated by GTE as confidential confidential and pursuant to the direction of the court.

THE COURT: There being agreement among the parties, it would appear to me the only thing left for me to work out is thelogistics of this. I understand what I am being asked to do is to ensure the protection of certain trade secrets and business documentation in three forms: Portions of Martin and Tuttles depos, have they been

transcribed?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, Your Honor, I have looked over Tuttle again, and I agreed with the witness that nothing in there will be confidential, so it's just portions of the Martin deposition. And in particular I think there are four numbers, they are market share numbers and line numbers, I believe.

I expect those numbers will come out during the hearing as well.

I have an exhibit that reflects those numbers, but I may not introduce it if it's just easier to have the information elicited --

THE COURT: I am not trying to control the presentation of your case. I am trying to figure out how I can ensure the protection that the parties all seem to be in agreement is appropriate under the law and based on the requirements of Scientific Games against Dittler Brothers, I am going to figure out how to do that, I hope.

I gather that the Tuttle deposition, no one has any problems with. There are portions of the Martin deposition, has it been filed?

MS. BROWN: No, Your Honor, it has not.

THE COURT: If it has not been filed, there

is nothing I can do about it.

MS. BROWN: Exactly. I was going to mention I really don't anticipate at this point using them. Something may come up, but I can assure the court that I will avoid the use of the numbers, if I need to.

THE COURT: Very well. That takes us then to the second item. What I gather is Ms. Martin's exhibit concerning third-party research and this infringes on an agreement with the market research firm; is that correct?

MS. CASWELL: Yes. GTE considers that information confidential as well. Those are the same numbers that are in the deposition.

THE COURT: I gather this is a demonstrative exhibit?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, it's just a one-page -it's just a piece of paper.

THE COURT: Then that should not be too hard to protect. That can be resolved by sealing in the file, and since all exhibits remain with me until they are -- if transferred under final order appeal -- they will remain in the sealed envelope.

Now, as to all testimony of Martin and Tuttle, is there a way that this can be

accomplished without having to clear the courtroom?

MS. CASWELL: I believe so. I think the testimony will come in tomorrow, and I believe by that time there won't be anybody in the room that isn't covered by the protective order.

THE COURT: I am not too sure how you expect me logistically to do that, ma'am, but let me make a suggestion. There are several ways you can accomplish this.

One is to submit portions of deposition and the deposition be admitted in evidence in lieu of live testimony and sealed.

Another way, of course, is to clear the courtroom.

I would prefer not to have to go through the entire audience and ask people to designate in a public hearing whom they are here representing.

It may be we have somebody that just wandered off the street who is interested in telephones. I don't know.

But in order to avoid as much interruption as possible, if you can at least organize your direct evidence and cross examination and rebuttal of -- will it be both Ms. Martin and

Ms. Tuttle?

MS. CASWELL: No, only Ms. Martin, and I believe it's possible to introduce the deposition transcript in lieu of public testimony.

THE COURT: The public has right to know virtually everything that goes on in these proceedings with the exception of those items that are clearly trade secrets; and where you have a separate marketing agreement, then I am satisfied that it meets the test of Scientific Games, Inc., vs. Dittler.

But I don't want to go any further into restricting access to information than is absolutely necessary.

MS. BROWN: We have no disagreement with introducing the depositions into the record in lieu of live testimony.

THE COURT: That presumably is something you all can work out in recesses. You have the gist of what my ruling is with regard to the request for protective order.

It will be, I guess, GTE's duty to watch vigilantly to make certain that these things don't come out, and alert me when you think it is necessary.

Now, there are no other pending motions? 1 2 MS. BROWN: We have a motion for official recognition. It's a stipulated motion. I don't 3 4 know if you want to take that up at present. THE COURT: Let's wait until we -- it isn't 5 filed yet? 6 MS. BROWN: Yes, it has been filed. was --9 MS. HELTON: Filed on the 21st of April, unless my secretary messed up. 10 THE COURT: There are many things that I 11 find have not reached me, but if you would like to 12 bring me a copy, we'll file it in open court. 13 you want me to cite the rule for that, I don't 14 remember it. 15 MS. HELTON: I don't know if I ever knew it. 16 THE COURT: Are GTE and BellSouth satisfied 17 that you have seen everything here? 18 19 MS. CASWELL: Yes. 20 MR. GOGGIN: Yes. THE COURT: Do you want the opportunity to 21 look at it now to be certain I have everything, 22 23 and if there is no objections, to these being officially recognized? 24

MR. GOGGIN: Your Honor, from looking at the

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list that was presented to us, it appeared that all of the items that they had included in their official recognition list are decisions of administrative bodies or courts that are published decisions, and under the circumstances we don't think that there will be any objection to having it be officially recognized.

THE COURT: Under our rule these are mandatory recognition. My concern only is that if -- if requested. My only concern is you may want to be certain I have all the pages that you all have seen and agreed to and that there are no gaps.

MR. GOGGIN: We'll assume that they are all there.

THE COURT: Very well. Pursuant to the parties' agreement and pursuant to the rule on official recognition and statute, I will take official recognition of respondent, Public Service Commission's motion for official recognition by date of April 21, 2000, not knowing when it may have been stamped in with the clerk, and we'll label it copy I have been provided officially recognized, rather than labeling it for filing with the clerk of the division.

If you have any concerns about filing with the clerk of the division, you may need to take that up with her.

Was there something else?

MS. CASWELL: I do have something. I was not sure if I needed to file a motion for official recognition.

I too have some state decisions that I would like to be officially recognized if that's the procedure. I plan to probably use these in briefs. I discussed it with the lawyers from PSC and Mr. Goggin, and I understand they don't have any problem with officially recognizing these documents. If I could move now for official recognition.

THE COURT: Mr. Goggin, have you seen these?

MR. GOGGIN: I have not, but I am familiar

with the authorities she cited in past filings GTE

has made, and I guess for BellSouth's part, I

would like to request if there is no objection

from the Commission or from GTE, that we be

permitted to cite the same authorities that we

cited below before the Commission, which were

published opinions from other state commissions

and published opinions from courts of Florida and

the courts of the United States.

MS. CASWELL: One thing I need to point out, is there is a California decision at the bottom of the pile. When I asked for that to be copied, I got only part one. The Fresh Look discussion is in part 3, I will bring that tomorrow.

THE COURT: It's labeled -- you need part 3 of 9?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, that was part 1, I believe, and I need part 3. Some of those cases are very lengthy.

The Fresh Look discussion is very brief. In those instances I tried to note that on the cover page. I have done that for everybody's copies.

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, we have no objection to the official recognition of these documents. We think it demonstrates the use of Fresh Look throughout the telecommunications regulatory community, and we are happy to have them in the record.

THE COURT: There being no opposition, I would mark these as officially recognized as well. Due to the voluminous nature of these items, it is going to be very difficult for me to indicate for purposes of the transcript precisely what is

included in here.

I think that's about the best that I can do for you. The request to supplement, the way I do that, you show it to everybody else; if there is no objection, when we reconvene after some recess, we'll take it up then as long as it doesn't interrupt testimony.

MS. CASWELL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Goggin, as to your request to cite items that were cited before the Commission in public hearing, how am I going to limit that and know what that is?

Let me explain my view of this, and it will make it easier for you to respond and also make it easier for everyone else.

Normally, for purposes of citing legal authority, you can cite legal authority in your proposed conclusions of law more or less with impunity. The question is whether or not I can find it and have access to it, and everyone knows whether or not that is the decision you have cited.

So if you are talking about something in a standard federal or state reporter, I don't think we have a problem.

You just do it.

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But if we are talking about something that I have no access to, which in some instances, particularly considering the Division of Administrative Hearings and my access to West Law is vastly truncated by construction going on in my office, I would appreciate having hard copies.

Now, let me ask Ms. Caswell and Ms. Brown, is there -- and Ms. Helton, if I forget to name you, it's not because I am ignoring you. It's just we are not going to spend as much on this transcript as perhaps we have to. We are going to try to avoid costing the people any more money than necessary.

Would anyone have objections that if a proposed final order is filed by Mr. Goggin on behalf of BellSouth, that citations therein simply be attached?

MS. BROWN: We have no objection, Your Honor, we'll do the same.

MR. GOGGIN: Your Honor, given the voluminous nature of the citations, the cite of authority, would it be acceptable to exclude those authorities that are readily available in state or federal reporters --

THE COURT: Surely.

MR. GOGGIN: -- court cases.

THE COURT: Surely. I am not telling you you have to. I am giving all the parties an opportunity to do this, if what you want to refer to is not in those matters officially recognized.

MR. GOGGIN: I understand. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else we need to take up?

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I don't know if this is the appropriate time. We have several stipulated composite exhibits. Would you like to wait to do that?

THE COURT: Not quite yet. Any other preliminary matter?

MS. BROWN: Nothing.

THE COURT: Then if you would, be at ease.

I take a little bit longer to open than some other folks and this can be very irritating to some and is sometimes nice for others. And you are all entitled to whatever your opinion is on this.

My view is the purpose of these hearings is in order to determine the truth. Consequently, making things difficult on the lawyers, witnesses, or me serves no good purpose.

I would like to give you a little bit of an overview of where we may be going with this.

You all have four days reserved for this case and you indicated in your prehearing stipulation that you may be able to get done in three. Since this case was scheduled, however, I have been appointed to the Second Circuit Professionalism Committee which has decided to meet between noon and 1:30 on Thursday.

Therefore, I want to give you some warning.

I am going to, unless we are at an extremely touchy juncture of evidence, going to declare a lunch recess from 11:30 until 2:00 on Thursday so that I can attend that committee meeting.

In the event that we are at a crucial juncture, if any of you feel that, speak up, we are not going to divide out or prejudice anybody by breaking in the middle of witness testimony or anything like that, but having that information may make it easier for you to govern whatever evidence you are putting on.

Additionally, I recognize I assume at least that you all know that the duty to go forward in this case is upon the petitioners. After the petitioners' case in chief is presented, subject

-- yes, ma'am?

MS. BROWN: I didn't want to break your thought.

THE COURT: You look anxious.

MS. BROWN: I am anxious. I am, and I am anxious because we and the parties have agreed that the Commission will present its case first. We have done that to accommodate our private witnesses who have agreed on their own time to testify before this proceeding. And therefore, we were hoping to get through the Commission's witnesses today.

MS. CASWELL: I would also point out -THE COURT: You understand the '99 act
requires the petitioners to go forward.

MS. BROWN: Well, Your Honor, the way we understood that was that they were -- they would be going forward by filing their petition, by giving their opening statements.

We have the burden of proof, as I understand it, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that our rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and they would have the opportunity after we went to fully present their case.

THE COURT: You folks stipulated to this order of proof?

MS. CASWELL: It wasn't exactly a stipulation. I was not entirely sure what the order would be. I had never done one of these cases. I looked to the Commission, and it was their understanding that they went first and we agreed that was fine, with the additional understanding that they had some witnesses that could only testify today.

We, too, have one of our witnesses, one of our three cannot be here until tomorrow. So --

THE COURT: I guess the question is are you stipulating to this order of proof now?

MS. CASWELL: I am willing to stipulate to it.

MR. GOGGIN: Yes.

THE COURT: The Commission really wants to do this?

MS. BROWN: I understand the risks. We are doing it to accommodate our witnesses. We were hoping to reserve an opportunity for rebuttal. I was going to bring that up later. I will bring it up now in response to your question.

THE COURT: If you go first, I assume you

are entitled to rebuttal. I gather the 1 stipulation is that that's how we are going to do. Is that your stipulation? 3 MS. CASWELL: I had not contemplated the rebuttal part of the stipulation earlier, but I 5 suppose that's fine. б THE COURT: Mr. Goggin? MR. GOGGIN: Could you clarify what you 8 meant by rebuttal? Are you talking about just 9 10 rebuttal in terms of the opening statements or --11 THE COURT: No, sir. 12 MR. GOGGIN: -- putting on rebuttal testimony --13 14 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. GOGGIN: -- at the end of our case? 15 16 MS. BROWN: Yes. 17 MR. GOGGIN: We are prepared to stipulate to 18 that. If the parties are willing to 19 THE COURT: 20 stipulate this, I am willing to go along with it. But beats me. 21 22 That being the case, the agency will put on 23 its case in chief first, subject to cross 24 examination and objection by petitioners.

When the agency has rested, the petitioner

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will have an opportunity to put on their case in chief.

I assume that since you all have been working together for a number of months, you all can figure out what order you are going to go in, whether it will be GTE and then BellSouth or vice versa. What I will not permit is double teaming in cross examination or presentation.

However, if you choose to put on the same witnesses and each of you examine, then it has to be in the appropriate order, the order that you have agreed and it's not going to shift back and forth as we go.

When the petitioners have completed their case in chief, the agency will have an opportunity to come back and do rebuttal.

And ma'am, let me explain that I take a very narrow view of rebuttal. It is not an opportunity to retry your case in chief all over again. It is only an opportunity to address those matters that have come up and could not have been addressed previously in response to the case in chief of petitioners.

Now, when we get to the conclusion of all evidence, I usually do what I refer to as asking

my four infamous questions. I tell you up front what I am going to do, then I do it, then I ask if you understand it. This is in the nature of telling you what I am going to do, so you will have an opportunity during this lengthy hearing to consult with one another and come up with answers that are agreeable to all of you if it's possible to do so.

And my questions will be: Do any of you wish to have oral closing argument? As you know you have an absolute right to oral opening argument if you choose to make it, you have an absolute right to oral closing argument if you choose to make it.

But very often folks want to waive oral closing argument, and so I ask. It is not -- by asking it, it is not my intent in any way to push you one way or the other. It is to give you the opportunity to make your own individual judgment calls.

I will then ask if any of you wish to provide a transcript? And perhaps when I finish this little spiel, if you have already made the decision that you want to provide a transcript, you will tell me that, it makes it easier for

everybody along the way.

But by asking if you wish to provide a transcript, again, I am not trying to lure you into doing that. I'm grateful to have them, but I don't solicit them.

Finally, I will ask if any of you wish to do proposed final orders. This may seem like a facetious question in a case of this magnitude that's gone on this long, but it is my duty to ask you that.

And then and only then does the fourth question come into play which is: How long do you need to do the proposed final order if you choose to do it? That is probably where you all will want to consult with one another so that you can reach an agreement.

If you all can reach an agreement of more than the 10 days provided by law, then provided it is not excessive in my opinion, it is my usual procedure to grant it. You all know your schedules far better than I do.

I don't have any rule of thought in that respect. If you want to stipulate to a time less than 10 days, however, and I have had that happen twice in 15 years, much to my astonishment, then I

may have some additional questions for you as to why and under what circumstances.

But I am guessing perhaps from experience and not from knowledge that in a trial that is going to take the better part of three and probably four days, you aren't going to want to do these in less than 10 days.

Very well. Is there anything else that I can offer that will make this easier on any of you?

MR. GOGGIN: Your Honor, I have a procedural question.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. GOGGIN: Earlier you mentioned that you would not permit double teaming or doubling up on a witness. And you mentioned opening and closing arguments. I guess the assumption of the parties going in is that we were three parties.

What I am wondering is whether it is your intention to permit only one of the petitioners to question a witness presented by the staff or whether, in fact, both parties would have an opportunity to question the witness.

THE COURT: No, I am not trying to make this unfair. I am trying to make it orderly. Each of

you represent individual parties. That's entirely appropriate. But each of you will complete your cross examination before the other one begins.

MR. GOGGIN: Okay.

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MS. CASWELL: I do have one question.

THE COURT: Sometimes when I speak it's about as clear as mud, but was there anything that was not understandable about the last or additional question you wanted to ask?

MR. GOGGIN: You prefaced that by saying we worked together for sometime. I wanted to make clear we and BellSouth intend to try the case separate from GTE.

THE COURT: I don't doubt that, but you all have been very reasonable in discovery schedule and everything. If there is an opportunity to compliment lawyers, I like to do it.

MS. CASWELL: I have a question on question number 2, whether we wish to provide a transcript; because of my inexperience if I requested a transcript of the court reporter, is the procedure that we get the transcript and we provide it to you?

THE COURT: Well, let me explain what the statute provides, and then you may make certain

judgment calls on your own.

The statute provides that if you file a transcript with the division for my use in the course of my preparing the final order, you do not have to pay for a transcript for any other party. But the transcript provided to me is filed with the clerk and becomes the official transcript of these proceedings.

What you all do about ordering your individual transcripts is a business arrangement you have with the court reporter that I have nothing to do with. Did that answer --

MS. CASWELL: I think so.

MS. BROWN: Perhaps I can shed some light on it.

It's the Commission's practice to provide the transcript to you. We are providing the court reporter. We will provide the transcript for your benefit. If the parties want a copy, they will have to ask the court reporter.

MS. CASWELL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let me also indicate when a transcript is provided, it's my habit to enter automatically a post hearing order that tells you when it's been filed. This doesn't make a whole

lot of difference to those of you in Tallahassee, but it may make a lot of difference for those of you out of town. It avoids the need to keep calling the clerk of my court or the division to find out when the transcript has been filed so you start counting the first day whenever your proposed final orders are due.

The problem, of course, is as the mails have deteriorated, the entry of that order and mailing for five days under Florida law, three days under federal law, doesn't always get it to folks in time so that they have a lot of time to do the proposed final order.

But since a transcript will be filed, that post hearing order will automatically be entered, and it's a standard order and there is nothing magic about it. It just cites to the rules for how you go about doing a proposed final order. It will tell you when the transcript has been stamped in filed by the clerk. Is that helpful?

Any other -- I hesitate to use this term -- housekeeping duty we need to take up?

Very well. Are we ready for opening?

MS. BROWN: We are, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

MS. BROWN: Would you like the Commission to go first? I am prepared to do that.

THE COURT: You folks stipulated as to who would go forward. That does not change the burden of proof or the duty of direct evidence. But yes, ma'am, you proceed.

MS. BROWN: All right. This is a rule challenge to the Commission's recently proposed Fresh Look rules that have a reasonable long history with the Commission --

THE COURT: I don't mean to throw you off, but I just remembered one additional thing I normally do and I would like to ask counsel --

MS. BROWN: That's fine.

objection, if someone has a clean copy of your pretrial stipulation, I would appreciate it if it could be tendered to the court reporter so she will have the spelling of all witnesses' names. That will save you some money in causing to ask spelling of witnesses names, and it will also give her some of the terms that you all are using which are anagrams for things you all understand.

Let me also suggest I have no objection to you treating evidence as if you think I am as dumb

as a post. You folks have been living with this case for several months. I have not. I am a blank sheet. I am not associated with the Commission. I am not associated with any party. The things that may seem extremely common and normal to you will not seem common and normal to me.

So feel free to use real words as well as letters and anything else you feel is necessary to make your best case and best presentation.

Ms. Brown, you may continue.

MS. BROWN: Thank you, Your Honor.

The Commission's proposed Fresh Look rules cite as specific authority section 364.01, Florida Statutes, and section 364.19, Florida Statutes.

Section 364.01 entitled the powers of the commission, legislative intent, states at subsection 4 that the Commission shall exercise its exclusive jurisdiction in order to protect public health, safety and welfare, by ensuring that basic local telecommunications services are available to all customers in the state at reasonable prices.

Subsection B of that rule encourages direct
-- directs the Commission to encourage competition

through flexible regulatory treatment among providers of telecommunication services in order to ensure the availability of the widest possible range of consumer choice in the provision of all telecommunication services.

That subsection of the rule also directs the Commission to promote competition by encouraging new entrants into telecommunications markets, and by allowing a transitional period in which new entrants are subject to lesser regulatory oversight and local exchange telecommunications companies.

Section 364.19, Florida Statutes, states that the Commission may regulate by reasonable rules the terms of telecommunications service contracts between telecommunications companies and their patrons.

These rules specifically encourage -- direct and mandate the Commission to oversee the development of a competitive market in the State of Florida.

The Commission in these rules has used a regulatory tool entitled Fresh Look in order to help accomplish those processes.

The Fresh Look rule protects the public

health, safety, and welfare by ensuring basic local telecommunications services are available to all consumers. It encourages competition through developing the widest possible range of customer choice and it encourages new entrants into the markets.

That is the legal basis for the proposed rules. At this hearing we will demonstrate through the testimony of our witnesses that the Commission's rules were based on competent, substantial evidence; that they are a valid exercise of legislative authority; that they are not arbitrary and capricious.

First, we will set the regulatory stage for the court giving the historical background of the Fresh Look rule as a regulatory tool at the Commission, and at the other federal agencies, to develop competition, to bridge the gap between prior monopoly provision of an essential utility service to a more competitive market.

It gives a boost to the process. It furthers the goal of a fully effective competitive market in Florida.

Then we will provide testimony from a competitive telecommunications provider, Time

Warner Telecom, the original petitioner in rule making before the Commission, to explain why a Fresh Look rule would benefit them.

Following that, we will provide the testimony of a small business customer,
Mr. Larson, small Internet service provider in Tallahassee, who will explain why this rule will benefit his business.

Thereafter we will provide testimony from the Public Service Commission's staff member who worked on the rule and who will provide detailed explanation of the basis for this particular exercise of this Fresh Look rule.

And we will conclude with two staff members who developed the two statements of estimated regulatory costs that were provided by the Commission in this rule-making proceeding, an extensive rule-making proceeding that has an extensive record that we will propose be part of this record.

We think at the conclusion of our evidence today and at the conclusion of our discussions of the many legal issues that come up, we will be able to convince you that this rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Thank you.

THE COURT: You folks wish opening at this time?

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CASWELL: The Commission's stated purpose of the Fresh Look rule is to, quote, enable alternative local exchange carriers to compete for existing incumbent local exchange carrier customer contracts covering local telecommunications services offered over the public switched network which were entered into prior to switch-based substitutes for local exchange telecommunications services.

The Commission set June 30, 1999, as the date before which there were not switch-based substitutes for the ILECs local contracts services. So the relevant question at least in determining whether the rule is arbitrary or supported by the evidence is whether that is true.

Were there no alternatives for these services prior to June 30, 1999?

Most of the testimony in this hearing will go to the factual issue. We will demonstrate there were in fact substitutes for the ILECs local

services long before June 30, 1999. Applying these facts to the law then compels the conclusion that the Fresh Look rule is arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

But even though most of the hearing will focus on this point, it's important to keep in mind that this is just one aspect of this challenge. The legal issues will mostly be left to the briefs. But I would like to discuss those issues briefly at this point so we don't lose sight of their critical importance.

One of the key legal questions here is whether the Commission even has the authority to adopt a Fresh Look rule. The answer to that question is no.

The Commission attempts to rely on the statute that says it can regulate by reasonable rules the terms of telecommunication service contracts between companies and their customers.

This reliance is misplaced. The Fresh Look rule isn't a reasonable regulation of contract terms. It's an abrogation of lawful, valid contracts without any regard for the actual contract terms themselves.

There is nothing in the statute that gives the Commission this extreme authority. In fact, the legislature in 1995 revised the statute to expand the ILEC's ability to use the kind of term and volume discounts we are talking about here without any need to show any level of competition.

The Commission's claimed basis of authority must be particularly closely scrutinized in this case because it's trying to do something unconstitutional. Florida courts tolerate almost no contract impairment, let alone the drastic impairment the Fresh Look rule would work, and it is wrong as a matter of law that contracts and regulated industries are undeserving of constitutional protection.

The constitutional problem with the Fresh

Look rule is so obvious and so serious that the

legislature, through its joint administrative

procedures committee, asked the Commission to

reconcile the rule with Florida's contract laws,

and because the rule also reaches back to affected

existing contracts the committee further asked the

Commission to explain what statutory authority

would justify such a retroactive effect.

To our knowledge, the Commission never

responded to the committee. Since the Commission gets its authority from the legislature, we believe this is a serious lapse. Although the legality of the rule was intensely debated during the proceeding and although the Commissioners time and again expressed concern about the legality of the rule, the JAPC letter was never even entered into the record. So the parties had no opportunity to comment on it during the rule-making process.

We believe the Commission's treatment of the letter was a material failure to follow applicable rule-making procedures which require that all inquiries from standing legislative committees be entered into the rule-making record.

In sum, after this hearing it will be clear that there is no evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that there were no substitutes for the ILECs contract services before June 30, 1999. And after considering the legal briefs, it will be that much more apparent that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Goggin?

MR. GOGGIN: Good morning, I will try not to

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be overly repetitive.

BellSouth agrees with much of what GTE said this morning. As you know, BellSouth contends that the adoption of the Fresh Look rules would be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

The proposed rules will permit certain business customers of BellSouth, GTE, and Sprint the right to unilaterally rescind their term agreements without paying the full termination liability to which they freely agreed.

The Commission contends that the rules are justified because the contracts purportedly were signed when customers did not have competing alternatives from which to choose and the contracts purportedly prevent competing providers who are known as alternative local exchange companies, or ALECs, from competing for such business customers.

BellSouth contends that the Commission lacks statutory authority to adopt such rules. Indeed the rules would amount to retroactive rule making because they permit the abrogation of existing agreements that were freely bargained for after the parties began to perform.

The Commission can point to no statute which would authorize such rule. The Commission relies upon two provisions for its authority to adopt these proposed rules. Section 350.127 subparagraph (2) is a general grant of rule-making authority.

Section 364.19 states that the Commission may regulate the terms of telecommunications contracts between telecommunications companies and their customers.

Granted, this is a grant of rule-making authority to determine the terms of contracts, but does not say that the Commission has the right to authorize the abrogation of those contracts after they have been formed and after the companies have begun to perform under those agreements.

The Commission states it is exercising this statutory authority to implement 364.19 which permits the regulation of contract terms and 364.01 which confers general powers on the Commission and expresses the intent of the legislature.

Ms. Brown, a moment ago, cited a number of statutory provisions under 364.01, specifically subparagraphs (a), (b), and (d), but she failed to

mention two other subparagraphs of 364.01 which apparently would be contravened by this rule. Subparagraph (e) states that the Commission should encourage all providers in telecommunication services to introduce new or experimental telecommunications services free of unnecessary regulatory restraints, and subsection (g) requires the Commission to ensure that all providers of telecommunications services are treated fairly by preventing anti-competitive behavior and eliminating unnecessary regulatory restraints.

Nothing in the general provisions cited by the Commission authorizes the Commission to adopt rules that permit the abrogation of contracts.

When the legislature determined in 1995 to open local telemarkets to competition, it did away with rate-of-return regulation and specifically encouraged the formation of precisely these sort of contracts the Commission seeks to abrogate by these rules.

Although BellSouth's rates were capped, the legislature in section 364.051 subparagraph (6) specifically provided that nothing in the new price cap regulations should prevent companies like BellSouth from meeting competition by

offering volume or term discounts using individual contracts.

That is precisely this sort of contract the Commission is trying to undo through these rules.

If the legislature intended to authorize the Commission to pass rules designed to abridge the precise sort of agreements the legislature intended to encourage, it would have done so expressly.

The Commission's attempt to stretch the general grants of power and rule-making authority to permit the adoption of these rules is not only contrary to the intent of the legislature as expressed in the price regulations statute, but it's also contrary to section 120.536.

In relevant part, that provision states no agency shall have the authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation, and we'll later show it's not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation, and is not arbitrary and capricious. Nor shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. We submit that section 364.01

is such a statute.

It's not surprising that the legislature granted no expressed authority to adopt rules that would abridge existing contracts. The contract clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions would prohibit such rules. The rules would clearly impair the obligation of contracts in the language of the contracts laws.

No state may take administrative action that substantially impairs a contractual obligation unless the action is justified as a reasonable and necessary means to achieve an important public purpose.

The evidence in this case will show that the action here will be neither reasonable nor necessary. It is not reasonable because it applies to contracts that were won in a competitive marketplace when its stated purpose is to permit customers to have access to competitive alternatives. And it is not necessary because the other purpose of the rule is designed to allow competing providers of telecommunications services the opportunity to compete for these customers or to encourage entry from competing providers as will be shown entering into this market has

exploded over the past four years.

There were six providers of alternative local exchange service in 1996, within less than a year of the time that the federal telecommunications act was passed. By 1998, there were 51 providers of alternative local exchange service in Florida according to the Commission's own competition report. And by mid 1999 that number had risen to over 80. Clearly such a rule is not necessary to encourage the entry of competing providers in telecommunications services.

These rules are neither reasonable nor necessary and actually are contrary to the intent of the legislature. For these reasons the proposed rules violate the Commission's grant of rule-making authority and in large modify and contravene the statutes that purportedly it would implement. In addition the rules are arbitrary, capricious, are not supported by substantial competent evidence and imposes substantial costs on BellSouth and other incumbent local exchange companies or ILECs, when a less costly alternative -- no rule -- has already accomplished the purported objectives.

BellSouth and GTE produced evidence during the hearing in this matter demonstrating that the contracts that would be abrogated by these rules were the product of competition. In fact, the witnesses from BellSouth and GTE were the only witnesses that appeared at any time during the proceedings who are actually parties to the contracts that will be affected.

At the last agenda conference in this matter there was one customer who appeared, but his complaint was not that the customer -- that the contracts he entered into were formed at the time when he had no competing alternatives. His complaint was that he had signed a series of contracts that rolled over, and he felt that he could not switch providers without terminating all of them, which he felt would be too costly for him to do.

So it was not the absence of competing alternatives that was frustrating, it was the presence of competing alternatives and his inability to economically terminate the contracts to which he had freely agreed.

This rule also can be demonstrated to be arbitrary and capricious because the rule only

affects contracts with three telecommunications providers in Florida: GTE, Sprint, and BellSouth.

Competing providers of telecommunications services also use term contracts that have termination provisions that require customers to pay termination charges if they terminate the contracts early. There is no reason to believe that a new entrant, a new ALEC, would be any less burdened or barred from competing for the business of a customer if that customer happened to have a contract with some other telecommunications company other than these three that have been named, and yet only ILEC contracts would be affected.

Second, the rule only affects contracts entered into before June 30, 1999, not because the Commission determined that competition did not exist prior to that date, but because there was no data regarding how many contracts had been entered into after that date.

Moreover, as my colleague from GTE has mentioned, the Commission failed to follow proper rule-making procedures. The Administrative Procedures Committee asked for information

regarding the constitutionality of the rule and whether it would violate the prohibition against retroactive rule making. To our knowledge, no such information was provided.

So in summary, BellSouth believes that the rules clearly should be rejected. There is no statutory authority to adopt them. The rules, if adopted, would be unconstitutional.

The rules are not supported by competent substantial evidence.

The adoption of the rules was arbitrary and capricious.

And the rule imposes regulatory costs on BellSouth, on GTE and on Sprint which could be reduced by the adoption of a less costly alternative, no rule.

And finally, the agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rule-making procedures in section 120.52.

THE COURT: Very well. We ready for evidence?

MS. BROWN: We are, Your Honor. Would this be appropriate time to move to mark our stipulated composite exhibits?

THE COURT: Sounds fine to me.

MS. HELTON: In the box I put on your table there, there is a stipulated exhibit list that has -- it should be there for everyone -- that has -- a separate number has been given to each exhibit. These are --

THE COURT: Have they already been marked in the prehearing order?

MS. HELTON: That's correct. What this is is the documents that make up the record before the Commission, each one of those has been identified separately. They are stipulated Exhibit Numbers 1 through 65.

THE COURT: Very well. And it doesn't really matter except for marking purposes. You are calling them stipulated exhibits. Are they being offered jointly by all the parties? Is that what is going on here?

MS. HELTON: Yes.

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

THE COURT: Very well. Normally the way I do this is to mark in the lower right-hand corner any exhibits that come into evidence. Since these are stipulated, I will be happy to indicate these have been admitted in evidence, if that is your stipulation.

MS. HELTON: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. CASWELL: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. GOGGIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

THE COURT: Normally I instruct the court reporter, and I will do so now, for any items that come in or for any items that are marked, if you would please, ma'am, on the table of exhibits at the commencement of the transcript, if you would have the number of the exhibit, however I mark it, the description of what it is, and then a column for the page at which it is marked, followed by a column for the page at which it is admitted.

I, for years, thought that was the way all court reporters did it, but I understand that there is now some leeway. I am instructing you I don't allow the leeway.

However I will not ask the court reporter go through reproducing this item, which is the list of stipulated exhibits, and I will be happy to call them stipulated exhibits.

What I will suggest is at the conclusion of hearing, if you all would remind me, I will tender my copy of this to the court reporter to be inserted in the table of contents for the exhibit

-- part of the exhibit list within the transcript. 1 Is that acceptable, Ms. Brown? 2 MS. BROWN: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Ms. Helton. I apologize. MS. HELTON: Yes, Your Honor. She already 5 has a copy in the box. I could also e-mail the 6 list to her. 7 THE COURT: If she has a copy, that's fine. 8 Is that acceptable? 9 10 MS. CASWELL: Yes. 11 MR. GOGGIN: Yes. 12 MS. CASWELL: I do have one point to raise at this point. 13 14 I had understood that we all agreed that the 15 Commission's transcript from the agenda 16 conferences would be included as stipulated 17 exhibits. And I don't see them in here. I see the hearing transcripts but I don't see the other 18 19 four. 20 MS. HELTON: I think you are right, we had 21 agreed to that. They must not have been in the 22 record then. I am not sure --23 MS. BROWN: They should have been in the 24 record. We will see to that this afternoon.

MS. CASWELL: I could read those transcript

dates and titles into the hearing, into the record at this time if it's appropriate. If not, we can wait until we get -
THE COURT: I am not sure what you are

THE COURT: I am not sure what you are asking me, ma'am. You folks can't just agree to get the exhibits and admit them a few hours down the road?

MS. BROWN: We can, yes.

MR. GOGGIN: There were a number of hearing transcripts that -- agenda transcripts that did not apparently get in the files of the Commission.

THE COURT: In other words, you have other exhibits you stipulated to that aren't here and you want to submit them. Do you need a recess to find them?

MS. CASWELL: No, I have them here, we just don't have copies of them apparently.

MS. BROWN: We are uncertain of why they are not in there. They should be in there. We'll see

THE COURT: Your agreement is that they can come in?

MS. BROWN: Yes.

THE COURT: And --

MS. BROWN: We want them in.

THE COURT: After the next recess, the 1 Commission will find those and make them available to petitioners? 3 MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. We'll try to do that by tomorrow, if that is suitable. 5 THE COURT: Naturally you all have looked at 6 7 them. Then they will be offered as joint exhibits. 8 9 MR. GOGGIN: I don't think there is any 10 objection to having them offered as exhibits. 11

MR. GOGGIN: I don't think there is any objection to having them offered as exhibits. It may present a practical problem if, for example, Ms. Caswell wants to cross examine a witness and there is only one copy of the transcript here. That's what we are trying to anticipate.

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THE COURT: I don't hear anyone asking me for a recess in order to do this now. Perhaps if it becomes a problem, we can take it up then.

MS. BROWN: I would appreciate that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This is no different than an agreement to submit exhibits out of order.

MS. BROWN: Thank you. If that's convenient for everyone and we will, this morning when we recess, try to get copies.

THE COURT: I understand the agency is going

to complete its case today?

MS. BROWN: We are going to try, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what you may want to do is not rest until tomorrow morning after you all have had an opportunity to look at everything, and that logistically will solve everybody's problem, I think, will it not?

MS. CASWELL: That's fine with me.

THE COURT: Mr. Goggin?

MR. GOGGIN: That's fine.

THE COURT: Ms. Brown, Ms. Helton?

MS. HELTON: Could we break for maybe five minutes to talk to the other parties to determine -- I am not sure that I ever received a copy of the agenda transcript. So I don't know. We might need to borrow theirs to make copies.

THE COURT: I think you all need to recess to discuss this. Let's see if you can solve it with runners back to your offices. We'll take a 15-minute recess.

(Brief recess.)

THE COURT: We'll reconvene. I gather you folks have worked out your problems with the other potential joint exhibits, and those will be submitted at some later time in the hearing?

MS. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. 1 MS. CASWELL: Yes. 2 MR. GOGGIN: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Are we ready to proceed? 4 MS. BROWN: We are, Your Honor, the 5 Commission calls Sally Simmons. 6 THE COURT: Ms. Simmons, my remarks right 7 now are not directed just to you. I am operating 8 on the assumption that there are some other folks 9 in this room who are going to testify. 10 However, for right now you are the one I 11 need to pay attention to. 12 Under Florida law you have an opportunity to 13 either swear or affirm to tell the truth. 14 either case you are under penalty of perjury if 15 you do not tell the truth in these proceedings. 16 Do you have a religious objection to swearing? 17 THE WITNESS: No, I do not. 18 19 Thereupon, SALLY SIMMONS 20 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 21 22 was examined and testified as follows: THE COURT: Could we have your full name. 23 THE WITNEESS: Sally Ann, A-n-n, Simmons, 24 S-i-m-m-o-n-s. 25

1	THE COURT: You may inquire.
2	DIRECT EXAMINATION
3	BY MS. BROWN:
4	Q State your business address for the record,
5	please.
6	A 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee,
7	Florida. Zip is 32399.
8	Q By whom are you employed, Ms. Simmons?
9	A The Florida Public Service Commission.
10	Q In what capacity?
11	A I am one of the two bureau chiefs in the
12	division of telecommunications.
13	Q How long have you been so employed?
14	A I have been employed with the Commission
15	eight or nine years, and I have been in my present
16	capacity since 1995.
17	Q What are generally the duties of a bureau
18	chief in the bureau of telecommunications?
19	A In my area, I am responsible I am
20	responsible for the basically the policy setting,
21	market analysis, areas such certification and tariffs.
22	It covers a broad range of duties.
23	Q What did you do before you came to work for
24	the Commission?
25	A I worked for 16 plus years with various

portions of the Bell system and one of the surviving companies, Bell Atlantic.

Q In what capacity there?

- A I worked in a number of positions: In product line management, and also that involved some financial planning and also rate and tariff type work.
 - Q What is your educational background?
- A I have Bachelor's and Master's degrees in economics from Virginia Tech.
- Q Thank you. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
- A The purpose of my testimony in this proceeding is to provide a historical background and also to provide the rationale of the Fresh Look policy.
- Q How has telecommunications regulation changed over time in the years that you have been involved?
- A The regulation has changed significantly over time. Originally it was very much a monopoly rate of return regulated environment. Over time, competition has been introduced in various areas, initially covering such areas as long distance and pay telephones.

And as there has been more and more areas opened up to competition, there has been more reliance

on using price regulation as opposed to rate-of-return regulation as a transitional mechanism.

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Q You stated just a minute ago that competition has been introduced in phases. What has been the cause of the introduction of competition in phases?

A I think it's generally been an acknowledgment because of pressures from certain types of firms that it's possible in some aspects that there is an actual monopoly, and as these conclusions have been reached, more and more areas have been opened up to competition.

Q What are the statutory frameworks for the development of competition in telecommunications?

A Okay. I guess a couple of the most major changes to take place in 1995 in this state, Florida Statutes were rewritten, specifically Chapter 364, to allow alternative local exchange companies to begin operating effective 1-1-96; and also shortly thereafter in February of 1996, the new federal Telecommunications Act was signed into law that contained similar provisions as in Florida law for opening up the local markets.

Q Can you explain for our general understanding here the difference between the terms

ALECs and ILECs?

A Yes. ALECs is a term used in Florida and it stands for alternative local exchange company. ILEC stands for incumbent local exchange company. And both of those types of companies provide local telephone service over the public switch network.

- Q Before alternative local exchange companies appeared on the scene, were incumbent local exchange companies subject to competition?
 - A Yes, they were in certain areas.
- Q Can you describe the nature of that competition?

A Yes. I guess first there was competition from long distance companies. Perhaps let me clarify. Let me not say first, but there was competition from long distance companies. They competed for short distance toll service that was also offered by the local exchange company.

In addition, there were alternative access vendors who provided alternatives to the LEC's dedicated services, and dedicated services were designed to handle high volume voice and data communications between preestablished points.

As an example, a bank might use dedicated services to tie together its various branches.

So I have mentioned the alternative access vendors, the long distance companies.

The third area where there was competition is that customer premises equipment vendors provide a partial alternative to a service that the LECs provide frequently referred to as CENTREX. It had different names depending on the company, but that's pretty much a generic name.

And the customer premises equipment vendors provided many of the same functions through something called a PBX. PBX stands for private branch exchange. And through a PBX, a customer could, for instance, have communication between stations on their own premises, they also had a number of calling features, all within this piece of customer premises equipment but was still a monopoly, however, and was something that only the local exchange companies could provide was the connection to the outside world.

So the PBXs were a partial substitute for the LECs CENTREX.

Q Did they provide dial tone?

A That's correct, the local exchange company did provide the dial tone, in either case, whether it be CENTREX or PBX. So if you wanted to communicate with the outside world, it was necessary to have dial

tone from the local exchange company.

Q What options did the incumbent local exchange companies have to compete with these alternative providers?

A The Commission allowed the local exchange company to compete in a few ways. Subject to the Commission's approval, the local exchange company could lower their regular month-to-month rates; they could offer something called tariff term plans, or they could offer something called contract service arrangements.

I also need to add that if a customer wanted a nonstandard type of offering, the local exchange company could provide that through something called a special assembly.

Q What is the tariff term plan?

A A tariff term plan calls for the rate to depend on the period of time to which the customer commits to providing -- not providing -- taking service from the local exchange company. And the longer the service commitment, the lower the monthly rate.

Q Why don't you take a minute to describe or define the word tariff so that we can understand the term plan in that connection?

A Yes. A tariff in the context of telecommunications is maybe a little bit different from

how a layman thinks about a tariff.

A tariff, I like to think of it as simply a large catalog of the company's various offerings, rates, terms, conditions. And it is to a large extent fairly legal in nature, I mean in terms of the wording, it's not a layman friendly document.

Q What is the significance of the tariff in telecommunications regulation?

A The tariff is significant because basically it is the contract between the customer and the company.

Q What influence does the Florida Public Service Commission have over tariffs?

A Let me take you back in time because the situation has changed a little bit.

Prior to the rewrite of Chapter 364, in 1995, the Commission approved all of the tariff filings before they went into effect.

Now --

Q Let me stop you there for a minute. If the Commission had not approved a tariff, what would be the effect of that for the company?

A They were not allowed to offer the item to the customer.

Q Thank you.

A At that time. Now, with the rewrite to Chapter 364, during 1995, local exchange companies were allowed to elect a new form of regulation called price regulation effective 1-1-96.

Under this new scheme -- and all the major local exchange companies did elect very quickly, they had all elected -- GTE, BellSouth, and Sprint had all elected by January 3, 1996; and by doing that, some new provisions in the statute then became applicable. And that is it was no longer necessary for the companies, specifically local exchange companies, to have prior approval from the Commission. The filings were made, they were presumed valid, and they went into effect really on fairly short notice periods.

Q Okay.

A Now the thing about it, though, is the Commission still retained jurisdiction to ensure that the local exchange company did not engage in any anti-competitive act or unreasonably discriminate among customers, similarly situated customers that is.

And there have been a few instances where the Commission's staff has taken tariffs that are presumptively valid and they have brought them before the Commission over a concern that perhaps the filing perhaps did violate one of those principles I just

mentioned.

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Q Under the current form of price cap regulation, can price cap regulated telecommunications companies provide services that are not tariffed, that are not filed with the Commission?

A There are certain offerings that are not regulated by the Commission. Certain nonregulated type of offerings, can be things like customer premises equipment, voice mail, Internet, those type of things.

So there are certain items not regulated by the Commission, but to the extent the particular item is regulated by the Commission in any form, it needs to be in the tariff.

Q What about basic local exchange telecommunications services?

A Those particular offerings and prices are contained in the tariff.

Q And they must be filed with the Commission?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Now that you have explained a little bit about tariffs and the regulatory importance of them, why don't you go back and explain again what a tariff

A A tariff term plan? It's simply a plan where the rate the customer pays depends on the length

of the service commitment. And the longer the service commitment that the customer makes with the company, then the lower the monthly rate will be.

Q Okay.

A And these are in the tariff as the word suggests.

Q Why would an ILEC offer a tariff term plan?

A An ILEC might offer a tariff term plan to respond to competition or they may do it to reduce financial risk.

Q All right. Will you explain for us what a contract service arrangement is?

A Yes, a contract service arrangement was originally only offered subject to the Commission's authorization for those services which were susceptible to uneconomic bypass.

Now, uneconomic bypass refers to a situation where a competitor can offer service at a price below the local exchange company's tariffed rate but above the local exchange company's cost.

So there was concern if there was not some flexibility to offer contract service arrangement, there was concern that captive customers might have to basically make up for this loss.

Q Why would an ILEC, an incumbent local

exchange company, offer a contract service arrangement?

A They would do so in response to competitive pressure. Typically that would be the typical reason.

And going back to what I said earlier, competitive pressures have changed over time.

Initially we saw areas becoming vulnerable such as long distance, particularly the LECs short distance toll, pay phones, dedicated type services. So it has changed over time. And in response to those new competitive pressures, the local exchange company has had an increasing interest in offering contract service arrangements.

Another thing I should mention about contract service arrangements is that when the statute was rewritten in 1995, that is the Florida Statute, Chapter 364, it was written into the statute that the local exchange company had the opportunity to respond to competition through offering contracts, I think Mr. Goggin mentioned that earlier.

I think the important point, though, to keep in mind is that the Commission retained jurisdiction to ensure that the local exchange company did not engage in any anti-competitive act or unreasonably discriminate among similarly situated customers.

Q What sort of requirements does the

Commission have for information regarding contract service arrangements?

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A The Commission does require that the companies provide reports on a periodic basis, I believe it's quarterly, indicating what contract service arrangements have been provided, basically what a customer would have paid under the tariff rate, what they paid under the contract, that type of information, the duration of the contract.

Q Now, let me -- these two types of contracts that you have been discussing, the tariff term plan and the contract service arrangements, are these two types of contracts covered by the Commission's proposed Fresh Look rules?

A Yes. Yes, they are.

Q Would you agree that ALECs can offer alternatives to LECs service offerings which were not previously possible?

A Yes. Yes, I would agree with that.

Q What are the new competing alternatives that LECs, ALECs can offer now?

A ALECs can offer basically switched local service that they could never before offer in competition with the local exchange company. And by switched local service what I am referring to is the

basic dial tone that allows a customer to communicate with anyone else who has a telephone.

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Q Is that different than the services that alternative access vendors offer?

A Very much so. The alternative access vendors previously, and it was actually back to the first of 1992, had authority to offer local dedicated services. However, that involved communication between preestablished points.

What we are talking about now is being able to pick up the phone, get a dial tone and being able to call anyone with another phone. Previously you could only get that dial tone from a local exchange company. Now additional alternatives have emerged because of alternative local exchange companies.

Q What else does the local switch service that ALECs offer include?

A In addition to the dial tone, being able to communicate with anyone basically that has a telephone, there are also certain calling features that are available through the local exchange company's central office such as things like call waiting, call forwarding, speed dialing, toll restriction. So there are certain features available through the local exchange company's central office that also fall under

the term local switched service.

Q In a general, broad sense, what is the purpose of a Fresh Look policy?

A Generally, the purpose of a Fresh Look policy would be to afford customers an opportunity to terminate a contract without significant financial consequences in order to consider alternatives that have emerged or have arisen due to a new form of competition.

Q And what is the new form of competition today that this Fresh Look policy would cover?

A In the current context, we are dealing with now alternative local exchange companies being able to offer options in terms of the LECs local switched services.

So there is now another class of companies that you could get this basic local service from as well as these calling features that I talked about that heretofore you could not obtain from anyone but the local exchange company.

Q Has the Commission ever instituted a Fresh Look policy in the past?

A Yes. In 1994, the Commission did adopt a Fresh Look policy in the context of expanded interconnection.

Expanded interconnection allowed alternative access vendors to place transmission equipment in the local exchange company's central offices. And it made it easier for alternative access vendors to offer their services that -- made it easier than it had previously been.

Q And how did that Fresh Look policy make -- affect the authorized -- the expanded interconnection regulation?

A You are talking about what was the effect of the Fresh Look policy?

Q Yes.

A All right. The effect was to allow customers who had contracts for dedicated services with the local exchange company, it gave them a window during which they could opt out of the contract and pay a reduced termination liability. That termination liability was calculated based on repricing the contract to reflect a term that was actually used.

This is something that was sanctioned both by the Florida Public Service Commission, was also sanctioned by the Federal Communications Commission.

So there is precedent for a Fresh Look. As I say, it goes back to 1994, authorized by both Florida Commission and the FCC.

Q And what was the general rationale that the Commission and the Federal -- the FCC used to permit a Fresh Look policy for AAVs?

A The rationale really was we have a new class of competitors, alternative access vendors, had been difficult without the expanded interconnection for them to offer service. This was a way of providing a boost to allow them to offer service, and in their case was dedicated service more readily than they could have done previously.

Q In the current case, is the rationale for having a Fresh Look policy comparable to the rationale that the Commission used in instituting a Fresh Look policy for expanded interconnection?

A Yes, and I would say the rationale is similar and perhaps even more compelling in this situation because in the case of the alternative access vendors and the expanded interconnection, Fresh Look was provided because the companies, the AAVs, now had an easier way of providing service.

In the current context, prior to ALECs being authorized, there was no other class of company that could even provide local switched service.

So I think the rationale is even perhaps more compelling in this situation.

Would you say that -- I think -- would you 1 say that this rule is directed -- is this rule directed 2 more toward consumers than it is toward the companies 3 themselves? I would agree with that. Really, the bottom 5 line is what's best for the customers. And this is an 6 opportunity to give customers an opportunity to avail 7 themselves of new alternatives that were not 8 9 necessarily there previously. MS. BROWN: Thank you. Your Honor, that 10 concludes my testimony. I tender the witness for 11 12 cross examination. THE COURT: GTE? 13 CROSS EXAMINATION 14 15 BY MS. CASWELL: 16 Good morning, Ms. Simmons. Q 17 You have been in the telecommunications industry for quite a while; correct? 18 Α 19 Yes. 20 Did you help formulate the staff recommendation on Time Warner's petition when it was 21 first filed in February of 1998? 22 Yes, I did. 23 Α 24 And based on your long experience, is it

true that you as well as the other staff saw no

compelling need to institute a Fresh Look proceeding?

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I would like to make
an objection that these questions appear to be
outside the scope of Ms. Simmons' testimony.

MS. CASWELL: They are going to the rationale for the Fresh Look policy which I think

THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.

A Could you repeat the question?
BY MS. CASWELL:

Q Based on your experience, you, as well as the other staff, didn't see a compelling need to institute a Fresh Look proceeding; is that right?

A I did recommend denying the request. I did indicate -- I did indicate in that recommendation that I felt that there was some instances where a Fresh Look would be warranted.

Q Did you also indicate in your recommendation of March '99 -- March 1998 -- that staff believed it was reasonable to expect that telecommunications managers would have considered the possibility of future alternatives for local switch service and would have considered this factor when agreeing to the term of the contract?

A I did say that, yes.

Q And did staff also question the basic premise that CSAs are a barrier to competition?

A I did state that. Let me mention, however, in response all these questions that reasonable minds may differ on that point, but I did say that. Yes.

Q Thank you. And again, at the March 10th, 1998, agenda, did you tell the Commission that it was important to keep in mind that it was large business and government customers who would be signing the contracts at issue?

A I did say that. I would like to add that there are customers besides the type you just mentioned that could be affected. For instance, with the tariff term plans, that would not necessarily be exclusively those large business and government customers.

Q But the rule doesn't make any distinction as between large and small customers for purposes of exercising the Fresh Look opportunity; does it?

A I will be honest, I hesitate answering that because I really was not involved with this once the matter went to hearing.

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, if I might interrupt. I wasn't -- I did not understand we would have quite so many cross examination questions for impeachment purposes on the

documents that were questioned, and I don't have a 1 copy of them. 2 MS. CASWELL: I don't really think they are 3 impeachment questions. THE COURT: There hasn't been any 5 6 impeachment. She asked questions that the witness has answered directly. 7 MS. BROWN: All right. But if we are going 8 9 to get there, I really would like a copy of the 10 transcript. THE COURT: Get where, ma'am? 11 To impeachment questions. MS. BROWN: 12 In the event the witness denies 13 THE COURT: 14 something and it's necessary for impeachment, then 15 we will follow the normal impeachment proceeding 16 and you may look over her shoulder at the deposition, if that's what we are going from. 17 MS. BROWN: 18 Thank you. BY MS. CASWELL: 19 20 Is Walter D'Haeseleer your supervisor? 0 21 A He is not my immediate boss. 22 What is his position? Q He is director of the division of 23 telecommunications. 24

Do you recall that he reminded the

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Commission at the March 10 agenda that the customers at issue were big commercial users, sophisticated users, and not mom-and-pop operations.

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I object to that. I think that's hearsay.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MS. CASWELL:

Q Going back to your February 1998 regulation, staff recommendation, didn't staff express the view that the already existing contract resale requirement gave the ALECs another entry strategy which staff believed further mitigated the need for Fresh Look?

A Yes, I did indicate that would be a mitigating factor. However, that might not necessarily be a controlling factor.

Q Can you describe the Commission's resale requirement that staff referred to in that?

A I can in general terms. I don't recall exactly when it was authorized.

Q Okay.

A But in general terms, resale simply is an obligation to resell an item. It doesn't matter what it is, it's an obligation to resell it to an ALEC and provide a wholesale discount. That's in general what resale is.

Q To your knowledge, would that resale requirement include the contract service arrangements, ICBs, and tariff term plans we are talking about here today?

A I believe that's consistent with the Commission's decisions.

- Q Is that resale requirement still in effect?
- A Yes.

- Q As a result of the Commission's denying staff's recommendation not to go to rule making, staff was obliged to draft a proposed Fresh Look rule; is that correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q And the first version of that rule said that contracts entered prior to January 1, 1997, would be available for Fresh Look. Is that also true?
- A I guess I am pausing because you are going to the specifics of the Fresh Look provision which really isn't -- is not the scope of my testimony today.
- Q Actually it's the specifics of the staff recommendation that I think you had some role in. You can correct me if I am wrong, but I am referring to the recommendation. I think it's November 19, 1998, and your name is on the recommendation.

And that's the recommendation where staff

recommended that contracts entered into prior to

January 1, 1997, would be eligible for Fresh Look.

And I can show you a copy of the recommendation if your counsel doesn't have it.

A Okay. I agree that there was an 1-1-97 date listed.

Q And that recommendation, which staff proposed that January '97 date, stated that the purpose of the Fresh Look was to enable ALECs to compete for existing LEC customer contracts covering local telecommunications services offered which were entered into prior to -- and it goes on.

That purpose didn't change throughout the course of the proceeding; did it?

A I can't speak to that. I was not involved in this matter once the Commission set it for hearing.

MS. BROWN: I would like to make two objections.

One, I do believe it is outside the scope of Ms. Simmons' testimony.

Two, I am not sure where that -- the questions regarding the initial rule in this matter are relevant to whether the rule that the Commission has proposed is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

THE COURT: Well, ma'am, I think we have gone outside the scope. I can require petitioners to bring this witness back in their case in chief. And if your objection on that basis is made timely next time, that would probably be my ruling.

However, the questions have been asked and answered. If we are going down the trail of a prior rule draft other than the one that is at issue, ma'am, I think that's irrelevant. You have more questions for this witness?

MS. CASWELL: Yes.

BY MS. CASWELL:

Q When staff chose the date for Fresh Look availability, did it believe that consideration more relevant than the level of competition in the market was awareness of customers, customer's awareness of competition, impending competition; is that right?

MS. BROWN: I raise my same objection. I think we are still talking about a previous rule draft.

MS. CASWELL: No, I am not. But as we -- I can tell you where in the transcript Commissioner

THE COURT: Ma'am, I can't tell from your question. I am going to sustain the objection.

Please make it smaller than a bread box so the witness knows what you are talking about.

MS. CASWELL: Okay.

THE COURT: So I do, too.

BY MS. CASWELL:

Q Do you recall when the Commission adopted the Fresh Look rule, the current version, the existing version, did you recall that Commissioner Clark offered that awareness of competition was one of the rationales behind the rule, behind the choice of the June 30 date?

A I really don't recall.

MS. BROWN: I hate to object again. It's hearsay. It's outside the scope of Ms. Simmons. She can't answer. She doesn't recall.

THE COURT: Sustained.

A I don't know.

BY MS. CASWELL:

Q I think you just testified that the rule was intended to benefit customers; is that right?

A Yes, maybe with a qualifier. It's got to be something that is reasonable. The idea, once again, behind a Fresh Look in any context is to afford customers an opportunity to consider new alternatives that have come about due to a new form of competition.

Q Did any customers testify at the

rule-making hearing? 1 I repeat, I was not present at the 2 rule-making hearing. I was not involved once this 3 matter was set for hearing. Do you know what economic criteria, if any, the Commission considered when choosing the June 30, 6 7 1999, date? It was, once again, done after my 8 involvement with this rule. 9 MS. CASWELL: I am sorry, Martha, will Anne 10 Marsh be offered to answer these sorts of 11 questions? 12 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, yes, we have a 13 witness, as I think I said in my opening 14 statement, who can provide testimony on the 15 specific procedures the Commission used in 16 17 adopting or proposing the present rule. MS. CASWELL: Will she also testify to 18 19 rationale because --MS. BROWN: Yes. 20 21 MS. CASWELL: Okay. BY MS. CASWELL: 22 I believe you discussed in your testimony 23

that the long distance market was open to competition

some time ago. Were you referring to both the

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intraLATA and interLATA long distance markets?

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A I was speaking generally. Of course, it occurred first in the interLATA and progressed to intraLATA.

- Q The interLATA would generally be the interstate market, if we could call it that for purposes of the hearing, just to --
- A I am not sure I would agree to that. I don't know that it's critical.
- Q I don't think it's critical either. What I was going to ask you is: Is it your understanding that that interLATA market has been competitive for some time?
- A I am not sure how to answer that question.

 There are a number of providers, there may be a question as to the competitiveness of it, but there are a number of providers.
- Q Do you know what AT&T's market share is in that market today?
 - MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I am object to that on relevance grounds.
 - MS. CASWELL: The Commission has with its rule indicated that the market for local switch services was not competitive prior to June 30, 1999. I am trying to understand the indicators,

competitive indicators they used and compare it to other markets which are deemed competitive by federal regulators and most state regulators is probative of the question whether the market we are looking at is competitive or not.

THE COURT: I understand this witness did not participate in any of the public hearings or in the final draft of the rule.

How does what she knows about one competitor's market share have anything at all to do with the promulgation of the proposed rule?

MS. CASWELL: I will withdraw the question.

I think it may be appropriate for Ms. Marsh.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MS. CASWELL:

Q I think, Ms. Simmons, that you discussed competition between PBX system vendors and CENTREX which would be an ILEC's service; is that correct?

A Yes, I did.

Q And I think you also mentioned that PBXs were a partial substitute for the ILEC's CENTREX services; is that right?

A Yes, I did.

Q Didn't the Commission in 1994 decide that CENTREX systems were in direct competition with PBX

systems for medium and large-sized customers?

A That wouldn't surprise me, but I could not absolutely confirm that.

Once again, I reiterate that the CENTREX was

-- I am sorry, the PBX was only a partial substitute

because the dial tone or the link with the outside

world, you still had to get that from the local

exchange company if you had a PBX.

Q I believe you also testified that while the 1995 legislative revisions gave the ILECs the opportunity to offer contracts included volume and term discounts, the Commission still retained its jurisdiction to determine whether the ILECs' actions were anti-competitive; is that right?

A Yes, I did say that.

Q Did the Commission at any time review any of the ILECs' contracts at issue here to determine if they were anti-competitive?

A I can only recall that coming up on one occasion, and actually it was -- I am not certain of the timing, whether it was pre or post the change in the state law.

But normally, we would investigate upon a complaint the matter of -- of whether or not a contract was unduly discriminatory or anti-competitive.

And the Commission has been generally aware 1 that the ILECs were using termination liability 2 provisions in their tariffs and their contracts; is 3 that right? 4 Α Yes. 5 And at no time did the Commission prohibit 6 such provisions; is that correct? 7 That's correct. But bear in mind that the 8 whole environment does change over time. 9 Is it your opinion that termination 10 liability provisions are anti-competitive in themselves 11 so that all these contracts with these provisions are 12 anti-competitive? 13 I can't answer that. 14 MS. BROWN: I object. I think it's beyond 15 the scope of Ms. Simmons' testimony. 16 THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 17 18 Α Please repeat the question. THE COURT: Was there another objection, 19 ma'am? 20 MS. BROWN: No, Your Honor. 21 22 BY MS. CASWELL: Is it your view that all of the contracts 23 containing termination liability provisions are 24

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anti-competitive?

A I wouldn't believe so, but once again, I have to reiterate, circumstances can change. As a general rule, I would say they are not. But circumstances can change.

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- Q You discussed in 1994 a decision, I believe it was '94, in which the Florida Commission adopted a Fresh Look rule and expanded interconnection which was borrowed from the FCC's similar rule; is that correct?
- A Yes, it was going on about the same time as I recall both here in Florida and at the FCC.
- Q Do you recall under the FCC decision and the subsequent FPSC decision what triggered the availability of the Fresh Look opportunity?
 - A The specific trigger?
- Q Well, let me put it this way. Wasn't it triggered by the availability of expanded interconnection arrangements that the state and federal commission had just ordered?
 - A Yeah, I think I stated that previously.
- Q Do you recall was the Fresh Look window 180 days long?
- A I haven't studied it in any detail and don't recall.
- Q I think you also pointed out that the FCC as well as the FPSC required contract repricing in those

instances, did you not? 1. Yes, I did mention that. 2 The Fresh Look rule before us today doesn't 0 3 require repricing for all contracts; does it? That is really beyond the scope of my 5 testimony. I think Ms. Marsh can answer that. 6 MS. CASWELL: Thank you. That's all I 7 have, Ms. Simmons. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Goggin. 9 CROSS EXAMINATION 10 BY MR. GOGGIN: 11 12 0 Ms. Simmons, you mentioned that you have both a Bachelor's and Master's degree from Virginia 13 Tech; is that right? 14 15 А Yes. 16 I am a fellow Virginian. I share what might 17 have been your disappointment on New Year's. You described earlier in your testimony how 18 competition evolved in long distance, speaking 19 20 specifically of intrastate toll services, pay telephone 21 services, and later certain substitutes for certain 22 services offered by local exchange companies; is that correct? 23 24 Α Generally speaking. I did mention

alternative access vendors offering dedicated services,

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in addition to what you just mentioned.

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Q These areas of competition began to emerge at a time when BellSouth and GTE and others were subject to monopoly rate of return regulation; is that correct?

A Yes and no. I say -- the answer pretty much is yes. However, there was also a -- BellSouth was under a sharing plan such as when their earnings exceeded a certain amount, they were shared in some proportion, I don't remember how, between the company and their customers.

Q That would be --

A There was a form of incentive regulation that went beyond the traditional rate-of-return regulation that applied to BellSouth.

Q But the term uneconomic bypass is a term that arises in the context of rate of return regulations; is it not?

A I would say that's where it was first used.

I don't know that I would say that's the exclusive use of it, but that's where it was first used.

Q In a competitive market, we might call uneconomic bypass competition; is that correct?

A Economic bypass?

Q Uneconomic bypass.

No, I don't think I would agree with that. Α 1 What is it about bypassing BellSouth's 2 network that would be uneconomic? 3 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I object to that It's outside the scope of Ms. Simmons' 6 testimony. MR. GOGGIN: I believe Ms. Simmons testified 7 earlier that economic bypass had something to do 8 with the fact that there would be revenues that 9 would not be realized by the monopoly provider of 10 service, and that the revenue shortfall would be 11 borne by the customers of the monopoly service 12 13 provider. 14 What I am tying to get at is her definition 15 of uneconomic bypass. She began to define --16 THE COURT: I will permit that question. 17 The question is -- could you repeat? I am 18 sorry. I want to make sure I understand what you are 19 asking. 20 BY MR. GOGGIN: What is it about bypassing monopolies' 21 Q

Q What is it about bypassing monopolies facilities that is uneconomic?

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A The term uneconomic bypass is defined simply as a situation where a competitor can offer service at a price lower than the LEC's tariffed rate which

presumably was set by a regulator, we are talking in a monopoly regulatory environment. So a competitor could offer service at a price that is lower than the tariffed rate but above the local exchange company's cost. That's what is considered uneconomic bypass.

Q In a competitive market, this would be considered efficient; would it not?

MS. BROWN: Objection. Outside the scope.

THE COURT: Overruled.

A Could you say that again?
BY MR. GOGGIN:

Q In a competitive market, an offer by a competitor to provide service that is a substitute or even a partial substitute at a price lower than the price currently being paid would be considered efficient; would it not?

A I am still struggling with your question --

Q Asa --

A -- to understand.

Q As a matter of economics, would that be considered price competition, what you just defined, a competitor offering same service for a lower price than the tariffed price?

A Let me try to answer it this way.

What I just described was uneconomic bypass,

in a more competitive situation, if the rate that is charged, the tariffed rate, if the tariffed rate is not subject to approval of the regulatory body, then I would agree with you, it's economic bypass.

- Q You testified before that this uneconomic bypass was the reason that contract service arrangements were permitted; is that correct?
 - A That was the original reason, yes.
 - Q Are there other reasons that have occurred?
 - A Well --

- O Or arisen since then?
- A I would say that one obvious one is that it's permitted under Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, for local exchange companies under price regulation to meet competition via offering contracts. So that is specifically mentioned in the statute.
- Q It was your testimony also, was it not, that a tariff is tantamount to a contract between a carrier and its customer; is that correct?
 - A Yes. Yes, I did say that.
- Q It would be similar to a form contract offered to all potential customers; correct?
 - A Yes, I believe so.
- Q Containing terms and conditions including price?

A I believe so, yes.

Q And I think you described a tariff term contract as a contract under which a customer may pay a lower rate than the ordinary tariffed rate in exchange for an agreement to a longer term; is that correct?

A I can't agree to that because the term plans are, in fact, in the tariff. And it's merely a matter if you agreed to a longer term, you get a lower rate than the normal month-to-month rate which is also in the tariff.

All these rates are in the tariff when you are talking about a term plan, a tariffed term plan.

Q So a business customer, for example, who wanted to buy a multiple line offering, might be able to purchase that service at a month-to-month rate under BellSouth's tariff?

A They are often month-to-month rates as well as rates that vary depending on whether you are committing to taking service for say two or three, maybe even five years, for a variety of different rates.

Q Would you disagree with the statement that the tariff term plans are an alternative to other offers, other price plans BellSouth offers under its tariff?

A I would agree with that.

Q And the choice as to whether to accept the tariff term plan or to purchase from the month-to-month tariff, for example, would be made by the customer; would it not?

- A It's the customer's choice, yes.
- Q And this tariff term plan would be a term discount as the Florida Statute chooses that term?
 - A I am sorry, could you repeat that?
 - Q Let me rephrase it.

You mentioned before Chapter 364 permits the offering of contract service arrangements.

That same subsection I believe you are referring to states that -- and this is 364.051 subparagraph (6) -- "that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the local exchange telecommunications company from meeting offerings by any competitive provider, the same or functional equivalent nonbasic services, in a specific geographic market or to a specific customer by deaveraging the price of any nonbasic service, packaging nonbasic services together, or with basic services, using volume discounts and term discounts and offering individual contracts."

Would a tariff term plan qualify as a term

discount for purposes of the statute?

A Yes, I would say so. If I remember correctly, there is more following the portion you just read.

Q I will read the remainder. "However, the local exchange telecommunications company shall not engage in any anti-competitive act or practice nor unreasonably discriminate among similarly situated customers."

A Yes, that's how I remembered it.

Q A tariff, to the extent that it's offered to all similarly situated customers, would not be discriminatory; would it?

A I guess on the surface it appears the answer is yes. However, we have had situations where we have had filings that while they might appear as to treat all customers in the same way, we have had at least an instance or two where we have felt that wholesale customers would have been disadvantaged.

So by virtue of having the offering in the tariff does not necessarily mean it's nondiscriminatory.

And I mean, it often means that, but I am just saying there are isolated cases where we have seen an offering that might be okay at the retail level, but

when you look at the consequences of the item being resold and how effectively an ALEC can use the resold offering, we have on occasion come to the conclusion that the offering is discriminatory or anti-competitive. So it is possible.

Q So does the Commission review tariff term plans to determine whether they are nondiscriminatory at the time they are filed?

A Not presently. As I mentioned, when the statute was rewritten in 1995, and once a local exchange company elected price regulation which became available as of 1-1-96, the Commission no longer really approves these plans. They are presumed valid, they go into effect. To the extent the Commission has any concerns about them, they are dealt with after they go into effect typically.

- Q But the Commission retains jurisdiction to challenge such a tariff if it believed it were discriminatory, for example?
 - A Yes, on occasion we have.
 - Q And also if it were anti-competitive?
 - A That's correct.
- Q To your knowledge, are any of the tariff term arrangements that would be subject to these rules the product of tariff term -- excuse me, tariff term

plans that have been deemed anti-competitive or discriminatory?

A I really can't answer that. That's beyond the level of my understanding.

- Q Getting back to contract service arrangements, you testified that the purpose of these was to permit incumbent companies to meet competitive offerings; is that correct?
 - A You said tariff term plans?
 - Q No, contract service arrangements.
 - A Contract service arrangements?
 - Q Going back to contract service arrangements.
- A Yes, I did say it was -- they were offered originally to help address situations of uneconomic bypass, where there was a competitor, the competitor could offer service at a price lower than the tariff rate but above the LEC's cost, and that was the original reason for contract service arrangements.
- Q Would it be safe to assume then for a contract service arrangement entered into prior to the 1995 act, that it was offered to meet a competing alternative?
- A Competing alternative of some sort, right.

 As I discussed, competition emerged in phases.
 - Q I think you said that CENTREX substitutes

through PBX services were not a complete substitute for local exchange services; is that correct?

A Yes, I did say a PBX was not a complete substitute because it did not afford the link or provide the link with the outside world; that still had to come from the local exchange company.

Q But a customer might reasonably view
PBX-based services as a substitute for a great many
services offered by a local exchange company, correct?

MS. BROWN: Objection. It calls for speculation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. GOGGIN:

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Q As an economist, how does one or one with a background in economics, how do you analyze whether something is a substitute?

A You look at to what extent the item performs similar functions. I mean, that's -- that would be one of the things I would look at; functionality, and also I would probably look to some extent at the pricing as well.

Q Is there a difference between the demand side substitutability and supply side substitutability?

A I have been outside the realm of academia for some time, and I wouldn't attempt to answer that.

Q You mentioned that the Commission's orders permit the resale of contract service arrangements as well as tariff term plans; isn't that correct?

A Yes.

Q I apologize for the disjointed nature of this, but much of the ground was already covered.

You spoke of new alternatives that, if you will allow me, were a more perfect substitute for the local exchange service that arose subsequent to 1995.

A Were a perfect substitute?

Q Switched local exchange service, as opposed to a partial substitute which is how you described PBX-based services, this was a more perfect substitute, complete substitute, if you will?

A I would say certainly the alternative local exchange company can offer the link with the outside world which could not be done previously. As I mentioned before, it used to be that the local exchange company was the only one that could provide the dial tone that would allow you to call anyone with a telephone.

Q Okay.

A So it's true that piece of it is now something that can be provided through an alternative local exchange company.

Q Can we go back just for a minute to the PBX-based services. Apart from the dial tone and the interconnection with the rest of the switch network, what services can be provided by PBX-based services?

A I do not have in-depth knowledge of PBX.

It's my understanding that most of the central office features that are available through the LEC would be available through a PBX, but I cannot give you any specifics.

Q Okay. We'll get to that through a different person.

Wouldn't it be safe to assume that if a CSA existed that had been entered into prior to 1995, that had been entered into in response to a competitive alternative?

A That's true, but keep in mind the competitive alternatives keep changing.

And no one in that time frame you are talking about, no one else besides the LEC could offer dial tone.

Q In the period after the 1995 act was passed, competitors began to emerge that could offer dial tone; isn't that correct?

A ALECs were able to offer dial tone. I can't comment about anything more than that in terms of the

timing, but they were allowed to provide it.

Q You mentioned the Fresh Look rule that was adopted in 1994 regarding alternative access vendors.

In 1994, local exchange companies were subject to rate return regulation as monopolies; isn't that correct?

A That's correct, with the caveat that I am not sure how to characterize the incentive plan BellSouth was operating under. It was rate of return, but there was a provision whereby if the company earned in excess of certain levels, the earnings above a certain point were shared between the company and the customers.

And I believe at some point, earnings above certain -- some level had to be returned completely to customers -- is my recollection.

So I am just not sure how to characterize that regulatory plan BellSouth was operating under.

Q I understand from what you have said that you are not an attorney; correct?

A That's correct.

Q Do you have an understanding of whether under Chapter 364 as it existed in 1994, BellSouth was subject to rate-of-return regulation?

MS. BROWN: Objection. Outside the scope. She said she is not an attorney.

1 THE COURT: Overruled.

A I honestly don't recall how the statute was written at that time.

BY MR. GOGGIN:

Q Okay.

A I can't say with certainty.

Q In talking about the previous Fresh Look rule, I believe you stated that a comparable rationale would apply here, but it would be more compelling because in that context, the rule was designed to take advantage of improved alternative access, wherein in this context no switch service had been offered before; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q When you say no switch services had existed before, before when?

A It's very difficult for me to talk in terms of specific dates. I would say the law has changed at certain points. This is an evolutionary kind of process.

There is a definite lag in terms of people becoming aware that the world has changed as far as telecommunications.

It definitely takes a while for companies to get established, so it's very hard for me to give you

hard, fast dates.

Q You also said that you didn't have any role in the development or adoption of the rule past the original recommendation of the rule making, is that correct? Let allow me to amend -- the original recommendation against the rule making; is that correct?

A I had involvement until such time as the Commission set the matter for hearing, and then I was not involved thereafter.

Q Okay. In the time that you had involvement, did the Commission interview or take statements from any of the parties to the contracts that would be affected by the rule?

A I honestly don't recall who appeared at the agenda conferences.

I think it's fair to say that any conversations -- well, I think it's fair to say there were no conversations other than the ones that took place at the agenda conferences, and I don't remember who was there.

Q So there were no investigations performed prior to the hearing, for example, to determine whether or not customers who were parties to these contracts had switched base alternatives from which to choose at

the time the contracts were entered into?

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A There were no discussions with customers while I was involved. We did do some inventory work on the contract service arrangement reports. I recall that going on, but there were no discussions with customers.

Q Similarly, there were no discussions with customers who had entered into agreements prior to 1995 as to whether the services that they were offered by competing providers were viewed by them as substitutes for BellSouth services?

A I think I said we didn't have any conversations with customers while I was involved. So I can't really answer, nothing to relay.

Q Getting back to the question of reselling CSAs and tariff term plans, do you have an understanding of the orders that permit such resale?

A I have a general understanding.

Q Would it be accurate to say that ALEC has the right to resell an existing CSA or tariff term plan, in other words, to step into the shoes of the carrier that is currently providing service under the contract?

A That's true, and there would need to be a wholesale discount provided as well for the costs

avoided by selling wholesale rather than retail.

Q When you say a wholesale discount, what you are referring to is the price charged by BellSouth or GTE to the company that is reselling the service; right?

A Yes.

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Q Is the reseller, the ALEC, permitted to pass all or part of that wholesale discount along to the customer?

A They obviously price it however they think best, to try to take advantage of what market opportunity they see. And obviously they try to cover their costs. Other than that, it's their call.

Q Under a resale arrangement, would the reseller also be permitted to provide its own customer service?

A Yes.

Q So a customer who is currently a party to a CSA or tariff term plan, theoretically, at least, could receive service from a different carrier for precisely the same services at a lower price with potentially better customer service; isn't that correct?

A I can't --

MS. BROWN: Objection. Calls for speculation.

1 A -- comment.

THE COURT: Asked and answered, she can't answer.

BY MR. GOGGIN:

Q Do you have any knowledge of any regulatory or economic barriers that would prevent an ALEC from competing for new business from a business customer in Florida?

A I wouldn't want to attempt to answer that.

I mean, there are so many factors that would go into
that. I really couldn't answer that.

Q Fair enough. When you described the rationale of the rule earlier, I believe you said that the rule was designed to do two things. One was to permit customers to have a choice of alternatives that had not previously existed, but also to give ALECs a chance to compete for the business of existing customers; is that correct?

A I think I described it slightly differently than what you just did.

Q Please describe it in your own words.

A Okay. I would describe the purpose of a Fresh Look policy is to allow a customer to consider new alternatives that have arisen due to a new form of competition.

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Q If a customer had an ALEC offering switch-based services as an alternative at the time it entered into the contract, would the justification that you just stated suggest that Fresh Look would be appropriate to the extent that additional ALECs have now entered the market and are offering switch-based services?

A That goes beyond what I can answer. We are getting into judgment calls and Ms. Marsh, I think, is the appropriate witness to address why the Commission chose to handle it the way it did.

Q Okay. Do you know of any reason why an ALEC could not, at the time the rule was proposed, compete for additional business from existing BellSouth customers, additional business meaning additional lines, other services to the customer might want?

A I am not absolutely certain how to answer that question. There may -- I have been led to believe that there may be some dependencies in that you may need to have all your lines from one company.

For instance, if a customer has hunting arrangements where basically a hunting arrangement is a situation where a customer or an end user dials a particular number and it routes between numbers. There may be a whole series of numbers.

I am not sure if such an arrangement is operative, if you have some of your lines provided by one company and some of the lines provided by another company.

Q Do you know whether PBX can replicate that hunting feature you just described?

A It wouldn't surprise me, but I do not -- I really -- my understanding of PBX is very cursory. I have never been involved in regulating them and consequently, my knowledge of them is very superficial.

Q Would it be safe to say that a customer could take advantage of a new competitive alternative by waiting for the term of its current contract to elapse, and then signing a contract with a competing provider?

A That could be done. The question I think from the standpoint of regulatory policy, is that appropriate or not? But yes, that could be done.

Q Couldn't a customer also simply switch carriers and pay the termination rates that it agreed to?

A Conceivably. But once again, to what extent does the termination liability represent a barrier? I am not sure how to answer your question. I mean, yes, they could pay. Is that a feasible option? I think

it's hard to say.

Q One would need to speak with the customer to determine whether that was so; isn't that correct?

A Right, I just don't know. It would depend on circumstances.

MR. GOGGIN: I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Redirect?

MS. BROWN: No redirect, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ma'am, you may return to your seat.

(Witness excused.)

THE COURT: It seems a reasonable time to take lunch. Do you have witnesses available?

MS. BROWN: We do, but it's my understanding they are available at a later date.

THE COURT: We'll take lunch. It may be that you folks have a misapprehension as to how much evidence is necessary in a rules case or how diverse the evidence may be in a rules case.

In looking at your prehearing stipulation, it appears to me that challenge 1 may simply be addressed by comparing the statutes and the rules with legal argument.

And I am not sure where the petitioners are going with regard to challenge item number 6, if

the only material failure by the Commission to follow applicable rule-making procedures that is going to be presented refers to the JAPC letter, you may be able to stipulate that the JAPC letter was not submitted or published, and that may be all you need.

MS. BROWN: May I address that?

THE COURT: Not quite yet, ma'am.

If there is more that you wish to cover under that, petitioners certainly have that right, as does the agency. But it appears to me that by reversing the normal order of proof, you folks may think you have to go into things that, in fact, you really do not need to in order to get where you want to go.

I am just throwing these out as items that you may want to consider in planning your respective strategy because all the evidence that you are used to presenting to the Public Service Commission is probably not relevant in a rule challenge. It is the rule only that we are concerned with.

Now, Ms. Brown, is there something other than -- can I help you with?

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, I will work with the

parties to stipulate to the issues regarding the JAPC letter.

THE COURT: I don't need to know what you plan to do. You folks have an hour recess. If you need more than an hour recess, just send somebody in to let me know and we'll be at ease. If you folks can work something out, fine. If not, we'll proceed as is.

MR. GOGGIN: Your Honor, we had a bit of confusion when you describing before the items for which evidence needs to be presented. Were you discussing the disputed issues of fact?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. GOGGIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: On page 2, you have essentially reiterated the items raised by both petitioners in their petitions. Item 1 is whether or not the proposed rules would exceed the powers, functions, and duties delegated to the Commission by the legislature, and would, indeed, violate the Florida and United States constitutions.

That is normally purely a legal argument with very little evidence involved, if any.

And the other item I was referring to, and perhaps I have misapprehended where you were both

going with the respective -- the three of you going with your respective openings, but if, in fact, Roman Numeral VI there, refers only to the JAPC letter, it seems to me that you all can stipulate whether who saw it, who didn't see it, where it comes in or doesn't come in, and may be able to avoid having to put on a great deal of evidence.

If that involves something additional that was not done, that is not covered somewhere else with regard to some of these other items, then obviously you have a lot to go through. But some of these things I think you are making hard on yourselves.

It's up to you all to decide. I am not trying to tell you how to run your cases, but you all may want to talk about this with regard to your respective strategies over lunch, is all I am suggesting.

(Luncheon recess.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF FLORIDA:

| COUNTY OF LEON:

I, SANDRA L. DiBENEDETTO-NARGIZ, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter translated under my supervision; and the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 112 are a true and correct record of the aforesaid proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the foregoing action.

DATED THIS 30th DAY OF APRIL, 2000.

SANDRA L. DIBENEDETTO-NARGIZ 100 SALEM COURT TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 (850) 878-2221