

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: DOCKET NO. 001186-EI - Petition for approval

of new environmental programs for cost recovery through the Environmental Cost Recovery Clause by Tampa Electric Company.

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN J. TERRY DEASON

COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ

PROCEEDINGS:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

41**PAA

DATE:

Tuesday, October 17, 2000

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY:

MARY ALLEN NEEL

Registered Professional Reporter

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS
100 SALEM COURT
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301
(850)878-2221

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PARTICIPANTS:

JAMES D. BEASLEY, Ausley & McMullen, on behalf of Tampa Electric Company. MARLENE STERN, on behalf of the Commission Staff. JIM BREMAN, Commission Staff.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

<u>Issue 1</u>: Is Tampa Electric Company's Particulate Emission Minimization and Monitoring Program (PM Program) eligible for cost recovery through the ECRC? Recommendation: Yes.

<u>Issue 2</u>: Is Tampa Electric Company's Reduction of Nitrogen Oxide Emissions Program at Big Bend Units 1, 2, and 3 (NOX Program) eligible for cost recovery through the ECRC?

<u>Recommendation</u>: Yes.

<u>Issue 3</u>: Should this docket be closed?
<u>Recommendation</u>: Yes. This docket should be closed upon issuance of a consummating order unless a person whose substantial interests are affected by the proposed agency action files a protest within 21 days of the issuance of the proposed agency action order.

1 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Item 41. 2 MS. STERN: Item 41 is staff's 3 recommendation on TECO's petition for cost 4 recovery through the Environmental Cost Recovery 5 Clause. 6 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay, Mr. Beasley, are 7 you here to make a presentation or answer 8 questions? 9 MR. BEASLEY: Commissioners, James D. 10 Beasley with the law firm of Ausley & McMullen, representing Tampa Electric Company. With me is 11 12 Diedra A. Brown, who is the Director of 13 Regulatory Affairs for Tampa Electric. We are 14 in full agreement with the staff's 15 recommendation and are here only if you have any 16 questions for us. 17 CHAIRMAN DEASON: Very well. 18 Commissioners, questions? 19 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: There was a question 20 that I had on this. It's my understanding that 21 we're only voting here to determine the 22 eligibility of these costs and that we'll look 23 at the actual amounts later in the recovery 24 docket.

MR. BREMAN: That's correct. They will be

audited.

is, there was a compliance that was required based on standards that were set forth in the action that was filed by the federal agency. As I understood it at that time, the Company was under compliance, or arguably under compliance with the provision that applied to it. Is that correct? There was an argument about whether — I understand there was a point of dispute.

MR. BREMAN: The dispute was over the definition of a modification to a power plant.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right.

MR. BREMAN: And the EPA and the DEP argued in the terms that old power plants should conform to new requirements when they become modified. Essentially, these new projects achieved that same end.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Now, setting aside that dispute, when the Company decided to bring these plants into compliance, the standard that they agreed to adopt, is that what the law at that time required in terms of the emission requirements and technology, or did they agree to something in the consent decree that was

above and beyond what was provided by law at that time?

MS. STERN: Are you asking what TECO agreed to in its consent decree and how that compares to the law at the time the consent decree was signed?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right.

MS. STERN: I believe, and I hope TECO corrects me if I'm wrong, that the consent decree imposes more stringent standards that the Clean Air Act would have, because under the Clean Air Act, those plants were grandfathered, meaning that they don't have to meet all the requirements that newer plants have to meet. But once there was this alleged violation, I gather it is the policy somehow at the EPA that if you have a certain, you know, type of violation, what you do -- if they litigated it and went to court, the remedy would be come into compliance, lose your grandfathering status and come into compliance with what applies to all plants.

And what TECO essentially agreed to in its settlement agreement was, "We'll come into compliance, meet the compliance standards of the

newer plants. We don't want to litigate this, and we think we're going to lose the grandfathering status ultimately anyway. We think that's going to be phased out of the Clean Air Act."

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. That's all the questions I have.

CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Is there a motion?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I just have one

question. The two, the consent decree and the

final judgment, are they -- in relation to each

other, do they overlap, do they complement, or

is one wrapped around the other? I guess the

federal -- does the federal wrap around the

state?

MR. BREMAN: Which takes precedence? Is that your question?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Not which takes precedence. If I understand Ms. Stern's statement, they've decided to comply with the more stringent of the two, but are there places in the two judgments where --

MR. BREMAN: There's substantial overlap, and there is some higher level of degree of specificity in the consent decree. A lay person

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would say if you comply with the consent decree,
you certainly comply with the other one.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: All right. And taking that into consideration, are there economies picked up in the costs that are trying to be recovered in complying with one versus complying with the overall, or is that not even a question?

MR. BREMAN: I think there are certain differences between the two settlements, for example, something that's not on the table for us, for the decision today, regarding some expense levels that they must incur up to a certain amount. Those amounts are different between the two settlements, and the consent decree tends to have higher amounts. Therefore, if you comply with the consent decree, you would tend to overshadow the consent final judgment with the DEP.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I do have one more question kind of in line with that.

when we look at this standard that we've traditionally observed that says to comply with a governmentally imposed environmental

regulation, have we looked at -- does that

derive from something in the statute, or is it

-- it's pretty much pertaining to the government

actions towards the company, isn't it?

MR. BREMAN: It's in the definitions of the statute, 366.8255, and it's (1)(c) in the definitions.

MS. STERN: And the definition includes orders, and this is really an order.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Mr. Chairman, this is an interesting issue. I think the record on this is not for any particular debate or dispute. The concern I had is -- I believe the actions taken were to bring the company into compliance, and we'll get to look at to what extent the costs incurred were the best -- I struggle with this, because the thought occurs to me, are we going to have to sit here again? That really is my concern. This action I don't think is anything that we could take any particular dispute with, but I'm afraid that we may be sitting at this debate, at this discussion again.

And if that is the case, are we going to have basically the plate handed to us again?

And it will be very difficult for me to continue through this process if we're going to continue to see standards imposed for, basically what I'm hearing today, guaranteed recovery that we have very little voice in determining that, because if -- the company would have looked to plan out for what they saw the law to be, and I would have thought that we would have tried to adopt and embrace a positive planning procedure that would allow these costs to be managed better.

But when they come up like this and really off of fluid interpretations of the law, we have very little we can do on the back end to scrutinize that. And I'm struggling, because we have to figure out a better way of doing this. I don't know how that is. But we can't get to the back end and try and figure out how to scrutinize these costs, because we have very little leeway or flexibility in doing that. Yeah, we can do some scrubbing on the numbers — that's a pun on words, by the way.

But in my mind, we have to pursue a better route of doing this, and I don't know how we do this. It may take some discussions with the federal agencies and ourselves. But we need to

1 figure out how not to get to this point to try to manage these costs on the back end. 2 3 that's really my concern, one of the things I wanted to raise in the docket. 4 Having said that, I don't think that I 5 6 would oppose today staff's recommendation absent 7 raising that red flag. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Okay. Is that a motion 8 9 then to approve staff's recommendation? 10 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I so move. 11 COMMISSIONER JABER: Second. 12 CHAIRMAN DEASON: It's been moved and 13 seconded. All in favor say aye. 14 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: 15 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Aye. CHAIRMAN DEASON: Aye. Show then that 16 17 staff's recommendation on Item 41 is approved. (Conclusion of consideration of Item 41.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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4 STATE OF FLORIDA)

5 COUNTY OF LEON)

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I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 10 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative. employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 23rd day of October, 2000.

100 Salem Court

Tallahašsee, Florida (850) 878-2221 32301