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COMMISSION CLERK

January 28, 2011

)90539-GV

Ms. Ann Cole Commission Clerk Office of the Commission Clerk Florida Public Service Commission Capital Circle Office Center 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

> Docket No. 090539-GU Re:

> > In re: Petition of Miami-Dade County through The Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department for Approval of Special Gas Transportation Service Agreement with Florida City Gas

> > > Sincerely,

Dear Ms. Cole:

RAD _cc:

ADM ____ OPC ____

SSC ___

CLK _

Pursuant to the Order Establishing Procedure in the above referenced docket, enclosed please find fifteen (15) copies of rebuttal testimony and one (1) copy of the Certificate of Service for the following witnesses: (1) Brian P. Armstrong; (2) Joseph A. Ruiz, Jr.; (3) Jack Langer; and (4) Fred Saffer.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

COM_ Henry N. Gillman **Assistant County Attorney** ÆCR. GCL . All Parties of Record

> 2000BSNORM-SR-DATE 00705 JAN 28 = FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition of Miami-Dade County through The Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department for Approval of Special Gas Transportation Service Agreement with Florida City Gas

Docket No. 090539-GU

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the Rebuttal

Testimony of Joseph A. Ruiz, Jr., Jack Langer, Fred Saffer and Brian

Armstrong on behalf of Miami-Dade County, have been furnished by hand

delivery or overnight mail this 28th day of January, 2011 to the following:

Anna Williams, Esq. – Via hand delivery Martha Brown, Esq. – Via hand delivery Office of General Counsel 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Anwillia@PSC.State.FL.US MBrown@PSC.State.FL.US (Florida Public Service Commission)

Floyd R. Self, Esq. – Via hand delivery Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, FL 32308 Fself@lawfla.com (Florida FCG)

> 000 MENT NEMPER DATE 00705 JAN 28 =

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

Mr. Melvin Williams – Via overnight mail 933 East 25th Street Hialeah, FL 33013

<u>Mwilliam@aglresources.com</u>
(Florida FCG)

Shannon O. Pierce, Esq. – Via overnight mail Ten Peachtree Place, 15th floor Atlanta, GA 30309

<u>Spierce@aglresources.com</u>
(AGL Resources, Inc.)

Respectfully submitted,

R. A. CUEVAS, JR.

Miami-Dade County Attorney

By:

Henry N. Gillman Assistant County Attorney Florida Bar No. 793647

Stephen P. Clark Center

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition of Miami-Dade County through
The Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department
for Approval of Special Gas Transportation
Service Agreement with Florida City Gas

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

BRIAN P. ARMSTRONG

ON BEHALF OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY WATER AND SEWER DEPARTMENT

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00705 JAN 28 = FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF BRIAN P. ARMSTRONG ON BEHALF	OF
MIAMI-DADE WATER AND SEWER DEPARTMENT	

Q: ARE YOU THE SAME BRIAN P. ARMSTRONG WHO SUBMITTED DIRECT
TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY IN THIS
PROCEEDING?

A. Yes, I am.

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Q. DO YOU WISH TO REBUT ANY PART OF THE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF FCG WITNESSES BERMUDEZ AND WILLIAMS?

Yes, I will focus on three issues. The first point, while Mr. Williams and Ms. Bermudez repeatedly suggest that their interest in forcing Miami-Dade to pay higher rates under the GS1250K rate schedule than the rates FCG agreed to accept in the 2008 Agreement is premised on the best interests of FCG's other customers, they say nothing about the inequity of FCG forcing those same other customers to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars annually to FCG, an amount nearly twice the highest cost of service which FCG has been able to manufacture, relating to its service to Miami-Dade. Second, FCG's witness Williams proclaims that this Commission must allow FCG to collect the CRA, retroactively, from other customers if it approves the 2008 Agreement. According to Mr. Williams at page 16 of his direct testimony, "[f]or the Commission to enforce the terms of the [2008 Agreement], it must find that the rate and its below cost discount is reasonable and in the public interest and that the difference between the rate and the applicable tariff rate is These are not separate and distinct recoverable through the CRA Rider. findings, but inextricably intertwined." This is a theory of Commission rate-setting responsibility which neither I nor Miami-Dade's other rate-making and cost of service expert, Fred Saffer, have ever heard of in the more than 65 years of combined service and involvement in

utility rate-making.

The Commission is not required to allow FCG to recover from other FCG customers the difference, if any, between the 2008 Agreement rates and its true incremental cost of service if the 2008 Agreement is approved. I would ask Mr. Williams to consider whether the Commission can order FCG to refund, retroactively, revenue received over the past few years from the FCG customers through the CRA mechanism if such revenues were above FCG's costs and/or the receipt of such funds was not justified.

In any evidentiary proceeding, the Commission considers the facts and circumstances presented to it -- for instance, facts regarding the utility's entry.

circumstances presented to it -- for instance, facts regarding the utility's entry into contracts for construction, emergency services, maintenance, materials and supplies, or any host of goods or services -- and addresses these facts and circumstances based on whether the utility has acted reasonably and prudently, in addition to determining whether the costs identified in such agreements are just and reasonable. A Commission finding of mismanagement, lack of prudence, or unreasonable acts associated with one customer is not "inextricably intertwined" with the utility's ability to recover associated costs or investments from the utility's other customers.

Contrary to the testimony of Mr. Williams, the Commission is not required to make FCG whole despite the utility's mismanagement. In fact, it is not even necessary to establish utility mismanagement, which FCG admits exists in this proceeding, for the Commission to require FCG to absorb the difference, if any, between the revenue generated under the 2008 Agreement and FCG's true incremental cost to serve Miami-Dade.

I call the Commission's attention to the Commission's order in FCG's last rate

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proceeding in Docket No. 030569 where the Commission imputed nearly \$300,000 of revenue to FCG after finding that

"unmaterialized projections represent a business risk of the Company that is more appropriately borne by its stockholders, rather than by its ratepayers."

Of further note, the amount of the revenue which the Commission imputed was equal to the amount by which FCG's cost to build and operate a new pipeline exceeded the revenue generated by the pipeline. The Commission ordered that FCG's shareholders absorb these costs and that they should not be passed on to FCG's other customers. Miami-Dade believes that it would be appropriate for the Commission to apply the same reasoning and remedy in this proceeding. The Commission also has required Gulf Power Company to refund \$2.2 million to customers after finding that the utility's management acted imprudently when it renewed a coal supply contract that required the utility to pay high prices.

The Commission did not relieve the utility of its obligations under the coal supply contract or reduce the contract rate which Gulf Power had to pay for coal under the contract. The Commission's finding of imprudent utility decisionmaking and the resulting refund order were upheld on appeal.

As another example, this Commission found, at the urging of Commission Staff, that the management of Aloha Utilities, Inc. failed to meet the burden of proving prudent utility decision-making in relation to the utility's purchase of an administrative building. Commission Staff testified that it was incumbent on the utility's management to "submit documentation to show that the steps the utility undertook and its final actions were prudent." Also, the Commission has penalized West Florida Natural Gas Corporation for mismanagement and

misrepresentation regarding a take-or-pay contract with the utility's largest customer. Neither Mr. Saffer nor I are aware of any precedent where a utility has admitted that it failed to comply with its own tariff requirements and admitted that it failed to engage in prudent and reasonable management practices, and was then rewarded by the regulator with higher rates.

My third point. Both of FCG's witnesses admit to FCG's faulty management practices and unreasonable actions in regard to this proceeding and the 2008 Agreement. In stark contrast to these admissions of FCG mistakes, FCG admits in its original petition supporting Commission approval of the 2008 Agreement that "Miami-Dade negotiated the agreement at arm's length with FCG and Miami-Dade County approved the agreement as being in the best interest [of] Miami-Dade County and its citizenry." Miami-Dade has done nothing wrong and is entitled to receive the benefit of its bargain with FCG as contained in the 2008 Agreement. The Commission can approve the 2008 Agreement but deny FCG the ability to recover from other customers any difference between FCG's true incremental cost of service and the revenue generated under the 2008 Agreement.

The Commission's choice is not limited, as Mr. Williams suggests, to either (1) approving the 2008 Agreement and allowing CRA recovery from other FCG customers or (2) rejecting the Agreement. As I demonstrated in my direct testimony, FCG already appears to have treated its other customers miserably by recovering enormous amounts from those customers through the CRA mechanism above FCG's cost of serving Miami-Dade.

Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER FACTS WHICH THE COMMISSION SHOULD CONSIDER REGARDING FCG's SUGGESTION THAT THE

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COMMISSION	HAS N	O AUTI	HORITY	TO	REJECT	THE	200
AGREEMENT U	UNLESS	IT ALSO	ALLOW	S FC	G TO CON	NTINU	E TO
APPLY A CRA 1	RIDER T	O THE BI	LLS OF C	THE	R CUSTON	MERS?	,

- Yes. It appears that CRA recovery may not have been available to FCG when it first entered the 1998 Agreement. FCG's management made a reasonable and prudent decision to enter the 1998 Agreement without a CRA in place. This leads Miami-Dade to wonder why the Commission initiated a CRA recovery mechanism for FCG thereafter which apparently includes the service rendered to Miami-Dade under the 1998 Agreement? It is readily apparent that FCG was recovering from other customers under the CRA Rider far in excess of the revenue generated under the 1998 Agreement and far in excess of even FCG's inflated cost of service.
- Q. MS. BERMUDEZ SUGGESTS AT PAGES 19-20 OF HER DIRECT TESTIMONY THAT "PURSUANT TO [FCG'S] TARIFF AND COMMISSION RULES, [FCG IS] PROHIBITED FROM OFFERING SERVICE BELOW [FCG's] COST OF SERVICE. IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR ALL OF THE REST OF [FCG's] CUSTOMERS, TO SUBSIDIZE SERVICE TO [MIAMI-DADE]." DO YOU AGREE WITH MS BERMUDEZ?
- A. I agree that it is not appropriate for the rest of FCG's customers to pay for FCG's mismanagement. However, that is all I agree with in Ms. Bermudez' statement. The KDS rate schedule imposes obligations on FCG management to conduct an incremental cost of service study, to insure that capital requirements associated with service to customers are addressed, and finally the basic principles of utility regulation impose on FCG an obligation to act reasonably, prudently and

in the exercise of best management practices when providing services to customers pursuant to its tariff.

Miami-Dade agrees that FCG's other customers should not have been paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to FCG for years through the CRA mechanism when such charges never were supported by FCG's cost of transporting Miami-Dade's gas over two miles of incremental FCG pipe.

In this regard, Mr. Williams' suggestion at page 7 of his direct testimony that FCG attempted to terminate the Amendment to the 1998 Agreement as quickly as it could "rather than making a bad situation any worse on our general body of ratepayers" also defies belief. In my opinion, FCG's recovery of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year from other FCG customers through the CRA mechanism constituted an abuse of those customers, which includes the customers of the Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Department. This abuse should be considered by this Commission when evaluating how to respond to FCG's numerous admissions of bad management, mistakes, flawed analyses, and omissions with regard to Miami-Dade and the 2008 Agreement.

Q. CAN YOU SUMMARIZE YOUR REBUTTAL TO FCG'S WITNESSES?

Yes. My rebuttal to FCG's testimony can be summarized as follows: (1) FCG's President signed a contract with Miami-Dade; (2) FCG acknowledges that it failed to comply with its tariff requirements by not conducting an incremental cost of service study before signing the contract; (3) FCG admits that it exercised poor management -- in negotiating the 2008 Agreement, in evaluating the impact of the 2008 Agreement on FCG and its other customers, in not having proper management procedures in place to evaluate the 2008 Agreement's rates and other terms, and other acknowledged instances of poor

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1	utility practice; (4) for nearly 3 years FCG has refused to conduct a true
2	incremental cost analysis as required by its tariff and as any professional utility
3	management would conduct prior to entering a long-term agreement with its
4	largest transportation customer; (5) FCG presents testimony from witnesses who
5	do everything possible to deny substantial knowledge of or involvement in the
6	negotiation of the 2008 Agreement while the Commission apparently will hear
7	nothing from any FCG managers and employees with more substantive
8	knowledge about the circumstances pertinent to the negotiation and terms of the
9	2008 Agreement; (6) FCG's cost of service witness apparently never conducted
10	a true incremental cost of service study before; and (7) FCG inexplicably
11	interprets its tariff and Commission rules as providing absolution for FCG
12	mismanagement and violations of its tariff as well as the means for enabling
13	FCG to escape its contractual obligations rather than traditional utility
14	regulation which holds the utility accountable for the utility's tariff non-
15	compliance and rule violations.
16	FCG's admitted mismanagement and tariff violations should be resolved by the
17	Commission approving the 2008 Agreement, including the rates agreed to by
18	the parties, and not the rejection of the 2008 Agreement as desired by FCG. It
19	there is an under-recovery of FCG's costs, which Miami-Dade is of the opinior
20	there is not, FCG and its shareholders, not FCG's other customers, should pay
21	for it. Any payments made by Miami-Dade to FCG above the 2008 Agreement
22	rates should be refunded to Miami-Dade.
23	It also must be noted that the sincerity of Mr. Williams' concern for the general
24	body of FCG's ratepayers is belied by his demand that if the 2008 Agreemen
25	rates are approved, this Commission must authorize FCG to retroactively

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recover money from such other customers and must allow FCG to do so through the CRA mechanism.

Miami-Dade's witnesses have demonstrated the abuse which was inflicted upon FCG's other customers through this CRA mechanism in past years, in addition to the abuse inflicted upon Miami-Dade by FCG's unilateral imposition of its GS1250K tariff on Miami-Dade. Mr. Williams wishes to continue such abuse. FCG chose the path it has taken. I can think of no reasonable explanation for such path and the corresponding mismanagement, admitted by FCG, which would permit FCG to retroactively recover from other customers phantom costs in such a manner as would violate the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking.

Q. IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD IT BE PROPER FOR THE COMMISSION TO ACCEPT INTO EVIDENCE ANY TRUE INCREMENTAL COST OF SERVICE INFORMATION OR STUDY WHICH FCG MAY PRODUCE SUBSEQUENT TO FILING ITS PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS DOCKET?

No. FCG's direct testimony reveals that FCG has long been aware of the difference between an incremental cost of service analysis and an allocation of costs and investments from a utility's total company embedded cost of service study. This issue has been one of the primary sources of contention between the parties for a long time, and long before FCG submitted its pre-filed direct testimony.

The testimony of FCG's witnesses makes clear that FCG has made a conscious decision not to perform an incremental cost of service analysis. Miami-Dade notes that subsequent to the filing of FCG's direct testimony, Commission Staff

has served FCG with interrogatories and document requests which appear to specifically address the information necessary to calculate a true incremental cost of service. FCG has refused to provide this information to Miami-Dade despite Miami-Dade's requests since FCG initially notified Miami-Dade of Commission Staff's alleged opposition to approval of the 2008 Agreement. I note that Commission Staff repeatedly has made clear that its initial opinions were conditioned on the assumption that the information provided by FCG was correct -- which it is not. It would be absolutely prejudicial to allow FCG to lay in wait until its rebuttal testimony, or until providing responses to Commission Staff requests for the information necessary to calculate the utility's true incremental cost of service to Miami-Dade, before presenting such information for the consideration and analysis of the Commission or Miami-Dade. The information necessary to calculate FCG's true incremental cost of service was available to FCG, and only FCG, throughout the period of this dispute and until FCG filed its direct testimony. It is my opinion and experience in utility regulatory matters, generally, and before this Commission specifically, that Commission precedent and notions of procedural due process and fairness requires that FCG be foreclosed from attempting to provide such information at the hearing to be held in this proceeding.

O. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

A. Yes, it does.

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