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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE LEGAL OPERATIONS AGENCY

October 16, 2013

USAF Utility Law Field Support Center 139 Barnes Drive Tyndall AFB FL 32403

Ms. Ann Cole, Director Office of Commission Clerk 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

REDACTED

COMMISSION

Re: Docket No. 130140-EI

Dear Ms. Cole,

Enclosed please find an original and 15 copies for each of the pre-filed testimony of Mr. Greg Meyer and Mr. Mike Gorman, consultants at Brubaker and Associates, Inc., representing Federal Executive Agencies (FEA).

Additionally, FEA is filing a notice of intent to file confidential information in Mr. Meyer's testimony. The confidential information was obtained via Citizen's Request For Production of Documents #162. I have included the documents in a separate enclosure and labeled them "CONFIDENTIAL". Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

s/cct CHRISTOPHER THOMPSON, Maj, USAF Staff Attorney

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BEFORE THE

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In Re: Petition for Rate Increase by Gulf Power Company

Docket No. 130140-El

Direct Testimony and Schedules of

Greg R. Meyer

On behalf of

Federal Executive Agencies

PUBLIC VERSION

Denotes Redacted Information

October 16, 2013



Project 9823

1		BEFORE THE
2		FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3		
4		In Re: Petition for Rate Increase) by Gulf Power Company) Docket No. 130140-El
5)
6		Direct Testimony of Greg R. Meyer
7	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
8	Α	Greg R. Meyer. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140,
9		Chesterfield, MO 63017.
10		
11	Q	WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?
12	Α	I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and an Associate with the
13		firm of Brubaker & Associates, Inc., energy, economic and regulatory
14		consultants.
15		
16	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
17		EXPERIENCE.
18	Α	This information is included in Appendix A to my testimony.
19		(8)
20	Q	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
21	Α	I am appearing in this proceeding on behalf of the Federal Executive Agencies
22		("FEA"). The FEA purchases substantial amounts of electricity from Gulf Power
23		Company ("Gulf Power" or "Company") and the outcome of this proceeding will
24		have an impact on their cost of electricity

1	Intro	oduction
2	Q	WHAT AMOUNT OF INCREASE HAS GULF POWER REQUESTED?
3	Α	The overall increase requested by Gulf Power is \$74.4 million in base revenues.
4		
5	Q	PLEASE IDENTIFY THE WITNESSES PRESENTING TESTIMONY ON
6		BEHALF OF THE FEA AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE AREAS THAT EACH
7		WILL ADDRESS.
8	Α	The FEA will sponsor two witnesses, Mr. Michael Gorman and myself. Mr.
9		Gorman will present testimony on cost of capital. I will address other revenue
10		requirement issues.
11	(is	
12	Q	DO YOU BELIEVE THAT GULF POWER'S PROPOSED OVERALL INCREASE
13		OF \$74.4 MILLION IS REASONABLE?
14	Α	No. Based on the testimony of Mr. Gorman and myself, I believe that Gulf
15		Power's claimed revenue requirement and revenue deficiency are significantly
16		overstated.
17		
18	Q	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
19	Α	I am providing testimony which will address several adjustments to Gulf Power's
20		revenue requirement. I am proposing:
21		 An adjustment to Gulf Power's residential revenues;
22		2. An adjustment to Gulf Power's level of Production O&M expense;
23 24		An adjustment to Gulf Power's proposed annual accrual for property damage (storms); and
25		4. A discussion of Gulf Power's proposed level of rent expense.

1 I have prepared a table which lists each of the revenue requirement adjustments 2 the FEA is proposing in Gulf Power's filed case and the value of each 3 adjustment. Following Table 1 is a short description of the adjustments. 4 TABLE 1 5 Revenue Requirement Adjustments 6 Value Description (\$/Million) 7 1. Return on Equity \$24.0 8 2. Gulf Power's Capital Structure 25.5 9 3. Residential Revenues 1.8 4. Production O&M Expenses 5.7 10 5. Storms 5.5 11 6. Total Reduction \$62.5 12 1. Return on Equity - Mr. Gorman is proposing a 9.45% return on equity 13 ("ROE") as compared to Gulf Power's requested 11.50% ROE. 14 2. Capital Structure - Mr. Gorman is proposing adjustments to Gulf Power's 15 capital structure to properly reflect the inclusion of no-cost capital amounts. 16 3. Residential Revenues - I am proposing to increase the usage per customer for the 2014 forecasted test year. 17 18 4. Production O&M Expenses – I am proposing to reduce the level of Production 19 O&M expenses for the forecasted test year. 20 5. Storms - I am proposing to continue the current accrual level for property 21 damages as a result of storms. 22 The fact that I do not address a specific revenue requirement issue 23 should not be interpreted as approval or acceptance by the FEA of any position

taken by Gulf Power unless I state otherwise.

24

25

2	Q	PLEASE EXPLAIN THIS ISSUE.
3	Α	Gulf Power has used its forecast of the 2014 kWh sales as the basis for
4		developing residential revenues for the test year in this case. As part of this
5		process, Gulf Power has developed a monthly forecasted usage per customer
6		per billing day, which it multiplies by its forecasted level of customers and the
7		billing cycle days per month.
8		
9	Q	DO YOU AGREE WITH GULF POWER'S FORECAST OF MONTHLY
10		RESIDENTIAL USAGE PER CUSTOMER PER BILLING DAY?
11	Α	No I believe the monthly levels are understated. The usage per residential
12		customer does not reflect Gulf Power's expectation regarding the economic
13		recovery of its service territory.
14		
15	Q	WHAT IS GULF POWER'S EXPECTATION REGARDING THE ECONOMIC
16		RECOVERY?
17	Α	On page 3 of Schedule F-8 of Gulf Power's Minimum Filing Requirements, the
18		Company states that it projects that the economy in its service area will begin
19		recovery in 2013 and continue until economic indicators either return to or
20		exceed 2006 pre-recession levels by the end of 2015.
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

Residential Revenues

1	Q	DOES GULF POWER'S FORECAST OF MONTHLY RESIDENTIAL USAGE
2		PER CUSTOMER PER BILLING DAY REFLECT THIS CONTINUED
3		RECOVERY?
4	Α	No. The monthly residential usage per customer for 2014 shows an increase
5		over 2013 levels for January through April. However, the 2014 monthly
6		residential usage per customer per billing day for May through December of 2014
7		is less than the 2013 values for the same period.
8		
9	Q	HOW DO THE 2013 MONTHLY KWH SALES PER CUSTOMER PER BILLING
10		DAY COMPARE TO THE 2014 VALUES?
11	Α	Schedule GRM-1 shows the monthly residential usage per customer per billing
12		day for 2013 and 2014, the difference and the percentage difference.
13		
14	Q	WHAT AFFECT DOES THE FORECASTED DECLINE FROM 2013 TO 2014 IN
15		RESIDENTIAL MONTHLY USAGE PER CUSTOMER PER BILLING DAY
16		HAVE ON KWH SALES AND REVENUES?
17	Α	Although the monthly differences appear small, the affect on annual revenue is
18		significant. The decline in April through December residential monthly usage per
19		customer per billing day from 2013 to 2014 results in a reduction in revenue of
20		over \$1.8 million.
21		
22	Q	ARE YOU PROPOSING AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE 2014 CUSTOMER
23		USAGE FORECAST?
24	Α	Yes. In line with Gulf Power's own expectations about the economic recovery of
25		its service territory, the 2014 monthly customer usage amounts for May through

1		December should at least equal the 2013 level's for the same period. Therefore, I
2		recommend substituting the 2013 May through December customer usage
3		amounts for the forecasted 2014 levels. This adjustment increases the 2014 test
4		year residential sales by 41,866,372 kWh.
5		
6	Q	HOW DOES THIS AFFECT TEST YEAR MARGINAL REVENUES?
7	Α	The current marginal residential energy rate, as shown on page 1 of
8		Schedule A-2 is 4.313¢/kWh. As a result of my recommended adjustment,
9		residential revenues increase by \$1,805,670. The effect on revenue requirement
10		in this case is a decrease of \$1,805,670 as a result of my adjustment.
11		
12	Proc	luction O&M Expenses
13	Q	HAS GULF POWER PROPOSED TO INCREASE ITS PRODUCTION
14		EXPENSES FROM THE LEVEL INCURRED IN THE HISTORICAL YEAR
15		ENDED 2012?
16	Α	Yes. Gulf Power's witness, Raymond W. Grove, prepared direct testimony which
17		proposes to increase production expenses by approximately \$5.5 million.
18		
19	Q	WHAT WAS THE LEVEL OF PRODUCTION EXPENSE INCURRED IN 2012
20		AND FORECASTED FOR THE PROJECTED TEST YEAR OF 2014?
21	Α	The actual amount of production expense incurred in 2012 was \$101.2 million.
22		The 2014 projected test year amount is \$106.7 million.
23		
24		
25		

1	Q	DO YOU BELIEVE THE \$5.5 MILLION INCREASE PRODUCES A
2		REASONABLE LEVEL OF PRODUCTION EXPENSE?
3	Α	No. I believe Gulf Power's proposed increase is excessive. Therefore, I am
4		proposing that the level of production expense proposed by Gulf Power be
5		reduced by \$5.7 million.
6		
7	Q	WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS?
8	Α	I have reviewed the historic cost data provided by Mr. Grove and attached as
9		Schedule 7 to his direct testimony. Based on that review, I believe Gulf Power's
10		proposed production expense level of \$106.7 million is overstated. Schedule 7
11		breaks out the level of production expense by baseline expenses and outage
12		expenses. Both of these categories of expense have large increases for the
13		2014 test year compared to the historical actual level of expenses. Furthermore,
14		a review of Gulf Power's projected level by production expenses from its last rate
15		case reveals that Gulf Power has historically over-forecasted these expenses.
16		
17	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE BASELINE OF
18		PRODUCTION EXPENSES.
19	Α	As Mr. Grove stated on page 14 of his direct testimony:
20 21 22 23 24		Baseline expenses are costs required to conduct the day-to-day operation and maintenance of the generating equipment and auxiliary equipment and facilities. Baseline expenses include all labor, material and other expenses, such as contracts for maintaining grounds, janitorial services, and other services.
25		

WHAT ARE THE HISTORIC AND FORECASTED LEVELS OF BASELINE

PRODUCTION EXPENSES?

Q

I have prepared Schedule GRM-2 which shows the historic and forecasted levels of baseline production expenses. As this schedule shows, the 2013 and 2014 levels of Baseline Materials and Baseline Other expenses has been significantly increased from the actual levels experienced by Gulf Power dating back to 2008.

The forecasted level of Baseline Materials expense reflects increases from 17.5% to 56.9% above the actual 2008 through 2012 levels. The Baseline Materials expenses do not exhibit a steady increase in the level of expense, but instead have both increased and decreased from year to year during the 2008 through 2012 historical period. However, in no year has the level of expenses changed as much as the forecasted increase from 2012 to 2013. In fact, the level of change forecasted from 2012 to either 2013 or 2014 is more than the difference between the lowest and highest levels of expenses that occurred during the 2008 through 2012 historical period (2009 compared to 2011).

The Baseline Other expenses increase by \$5.6 and \$6.8 million from the actual amount recorded in 2012 to the levels forecast in 2013 and 2014, respectively. An annual increase of the magnitude forecasted by the Company has only occurred once during the 2008 through 2012 historical period (2009 to 2010). Baseline Other expenses also do not exhibit a steady increase in the total level of expense. Like Baseline Materials expenses, Baseline Other expenses have both increased and decreased from year to year during the 2008 through 2012 historical period.

In summary, I believe the level of Baseline Materials and Baseline Other expenses forecasted for 2014 is overstated.

1 Q DID YOU REVIEW GULF POWER'S FORECASTED LEVEL OF BASELINE

2 EXPENSES FROM ITS LAST RATE CASE?

Yes. I reviewed Mr. Grove's direct testimony from the last case (Docket No. 110138-EI). In that case, Mr. Grove forecasted the following levels of baseline production expenses. I have prepared Table 2 which compares Gulf Power's forecasted level of expense to the actual levels recorded on Gulf Power's books for 2011 and 2012.

8

9

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TABLE 2 Forecasted Levels vs. Actual Levels Budget Actual Budget Actual Description 2011 2011 2012 2012 Baseline Materials \$ 9,526 \$ 8,514 \$ 8,734 \$ 7,843 Baseline Other 47,485 47,393 47,544 44.846 Baseline Labor 30,077 27,779 30,828 28,150 Total Baseline \$87,088 \$83,686 \$87,106 \$80,839 Source: Docket No. 110138-EI, Exhibit No. (RWG-1), Schedule 7

15 16

17

18

19

The above table reveals that Gulf Power over-forecasted the baseline production expenses in its previous case for years 2011 and 2012. Including over-forecasted expenses in rates provides a benefit to shareholders as it provides more certainty that the authorized rate of return will be achieved.

20 21

22

23

24

25

Q

A

PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR REVIEW OF THE OUTAGE EXPENSES.

I reviewed the level of outage expenses from 2008 through the forecast test year of 2014. As expected, the level of outage expense fluctuates each year. This review also revealed that different units exhibit different outage expenses and the number of days that a unit is offline for maintenance will also vary. However, I

did notice that the level of outage expenses for 2013 is drastically lower than the actual levels or the amount forecasted for 2014. I am concerned that the level of 2014 may be inflated due to the extremely low level of expenses forecasted for 2013. I have included Table 3 to show the levels of outage expense. The level of expense fluctuations shown in this table suggest that significantly higher maintenance expenses in 2011 and 2012 may have allowed a drastically lower level to be realized in 2013. This drastically low level of maintenance in 2013 would likely result in inflated levels in 2014.

TABLE 3

Levels of Outage Expense

Year	Outage Expense
2008 (A)	\$ 13,014
2009 (A)	\$ 14,183
2010 (A)	\$ 10,871
2011 (A)	\$ 26,206
2012 (A)	\$ 20,109
2013 (F)	\$ 2,420*
2014 (F)	\$17,221*
A) = Actual F) = Forecaste	ed

Source: Docket No. 130140-EI

Exhibit No. ____ (RWG-1), Schedule 7

^{*}Adjusted for Scholz excluded.

Baseline Production

Expense

\$ 8,514

47,393

29,476

\$85,383

1	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR ADJUSTED LEVEL OF
2		BASELINE PRODUCTION EXPENSE OF \$100.9 MILLION.
3	Α	I reflected the highest historic levels of Baseline Materials and Baseline Other
4		expenses incurred in 2011. I then added the forecasted 2014 level of Baseline
5		Labor to those totals to arrive at the level of baseline production expenses.
6		Table 4 shows the breakdown of the level of baseline expenses.
7		TABLE 4
8		
9		Breakdown of the <u>Level of Baseline Expenses</u>
10		FEA Proposed

Source: Schedule GRM-2

Description

Baseline Materials

Baseline Other

Baseline Labor

Total Baseline

11

12

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To this baseline's total, I propose to add the 2014 forecasted level of outage expense as adjusted (\$17,221). I also propose to add the expenses for special projects and reflect the adjustments for Scholz, Perdido and Wholesale. After summing all of these amounts, I propose a total production O&M level of \$101.0 million.

I believe this to be a conservative total as I have not proposed to adjust the forecasted level of outage expenses. I contend that the significant volatility exhibited during the 2008 through 2012 historical and 2013 forecasted periods would support a normalized level rather than the 2014 forecasted level. I have

1		not proposed such an adjustment for outage expenses, but believe the
2		Commission could justifiably reduce my proposed level even further.
3		
4	Stor	<u>ms</u>
5	Q	IN ITS DIRECT TESTIMONY, GULF POWER HAS REQUESTED AN
6		INCREASE OF \$5.5 MILLION IN THE PROPERTY DAMAGE ANNUAL
7		ACCRUAL. DO YOU AGREE THAT AN ANNUAL PROPERTY DAMAGE
8		ACCRUAL OF \$9 MILLION IS REASONABLE?
9	Α	No. I am proposing that Gulf Power's annual property damage accrual should
10		remain at the current level of \$3.5 million.
11		
12	Q	WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR POSITION?
13	Α	On page 29 of the Report and Order in Gulf Power's last rate case, Docket
14		No. 110138-EI (Order No. PSC-12-0179-FIF-EI), the Commission had the
15		following conclusion:
16 17 18 19 20 21 22		On balance, we find that the record supports maintaining the existing annual accrual at \$3.5 million. No pressing need has been identified to warrant an increase in the accrual at this time. As such, we find that a \$3.5 million accrual coupled with the 2011 year-end reserve level of approximately \$31 million will be sufficient to cover the costs of most, but not all storms. If circumstances change, it will be appropriate to revisit this decision in a future proceeding.
23		In that rate case, the Commission also determined that target reserve
24		levels should be increased to \$48 to \$55 million. Since the Commission decision
25		

1	in Docket No. 110138-EI, the circumstances have not changed and this
2	Commission should continue the annual accrual of \$3.5 million.
3	In 2012, Gulf Power did not record storm charges which were greater
4	than the \$3.5 million annual accrual. Thus, the reserve level grew to a 2012 year
5	ending balance of \$32 million. Gulf Power has projected that at the end of 2014,
6	the reserve level will be approximately ********** Therefore, the reserve
7	level will have *********************************** from the end of 2011 through
8	December 2014. In Gulf Power's last rate case, the Commission's finding that a
9	reserve level of \$31 million will be sufficient to cover the costs of most, but not all
10	storms is still valid today. ************************************
11	**********************
12	continues to support the Commission's previous finding that \$3.5 million is an
13	appropriate level for the property damage annual accrual.
14	
15 Q	IS THE \$3.5 MILLION ANNUAL ACCRUAL A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF
16	FUNDING TO COVER MOST STORM CHARGES WHICH HAVE
17	HISTORICALLY OCCURRED DURING A YEAR?
18 A	Yes. In response to Citizens' Interrogatory 162, the history of storm charges was
19	presented back to 1985. The current level of \$3.5 million annual accrual would
20	************************
21	*************************
22	***********
23	
24	
25	

1	Q	HAS THE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED ANY GUIDELINES RELATED TO
2		STORM RESTORATION COSTS?
3	Α	Yes. The Commission has established the following three guidelines for storm
4		restoration costs:
5 6		 An annual property damage accrual adjusted over time as circumstances change;
7		2. A reserve adequate to a ccommodate most, but not all, storm years.
8 9		A provision for utilities to receive surcharges for the recovery of costs that exceed the reserve.
10		
11	Q	PLEASE COMMENT ON EACH GUIDELINE.
12	Α	The current annual funding level of \$3.5 million is a sufficient funding level. In
13		Docket No. 010949-EI, the Commission found that the level of the accrual be
14		sufficient to cover annual damages and promote growth in the reserve. Since the
15		annual accrual level has been \$3.5 million beginning in 1997, Gulf Power has
16		**************************
17		***********************
18		Therefore, Guideline 1 has been satisfied with the annual funding of \$3.5 million.
19		The reserve level is projected to *********************** from Gulf
20		Power's last rate case through December 2014. The current storm reserve level
21		would ************************************
22		*****************************
23		******************************
24		******************************
25		*********************************** the existing \$3.5 million level is an adequate

1		ongoing annual accrual. Furthermore, the ***********************************
2		******* the Commission's reserve
3		range of \$48 to \$55 million that is supported by the current level of annual
4		accrual.
5		Finally, the Commission has authorized ratepayer surcharges when storm
6		costs have exceeded what was in the storm reserve. This proactive action by the
7		Commission demonstrates that it intends to provide timely rate recovery of storm
8		costs to utilities in Florida. In addition, Gulf Power can also use proceeds from
9		insurance claims to offset its storm costs.
10		
11	Q	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR POSITION.
12	Α	I recommend that the Commission continue the \$3.5 million annual accrual. This
13		level **********************************
14		****************************
15		********* Finally, the Commission has taken a proactive approach to
16		extraordinary storm cost recovery through the use of surcharges.
17		
18	Tran	smission Rent Expense
19	Q	DO YOU SUPPORT THE LEVEL OF TRANSMISSION RENT GULF POWER
20		HAS INCLUDED IN THE 2014 TEST YEAR?
21	Α	No. The level of transmission rent expense is significantly higher than the
22		amount experienced during 2012.
23		
24		*
25		

HOW DO THE 2013 AND 2014 FORECASTED LEVELS OF TRANSMISSION Q 2 RENT EXPENSE COMPARE TO THE HISTORIC LEVELS EXPERIENCED BY 3 **GULF POWER?** Table 5 illustrates the significant growth in transmission rent expense from 2008 4 A through the 2012. Gulf Power has forecasted this expense to increase by \$4.3 5 million in 2013 and \$7.9 million in 2014. 6 7 TABLE 5 8 Significant Growth in Transmission Rent Expense 9 **Outage Expense** Year 10 2008 319,000 \$ 11 2009 \$ 1,487,000 12 2010 \$ 2,531,000 2011 \$ 2,497,000 13 \$ 5,508,000 2012 14 2013 \$ 9,812,000 2014 \$13,386,000 15 16 17 18 Q HAS GULF POWER PROVIDED ANY EXPLANATION FOR THE SIGNIFICANT 19 INCREASE IN TRANSMISSION RENT EXPENSE? In its Minimum Filling Requirements at page 1 of Schedule C-8, Gulf Power 20 Α provided the following "detail of changes in expenses" regarding transmission 21 22 rent expense. 23 24 25

1				Test Year	Prior Year	Increase/	Decrease)	
2		Acct <u>No.</u>	Account	Ended 12/31/14	Ended 12/31/13	Dollars (000s)	Percent %	Reason(s) for Changes
3		567	Trans. Rent	\$13,386	\$9,812	\$3,574	36.42%	See Note 7
4		Note 7:	\$3,574,000 increa	ase in new proj red through the	ects within Trans purchased pow	smission Ren er capacity c	at 115KV. Cert	ain transmission ause.
5			Schedule	C-8 also list	ts Company v	witnesses	Grove, Erick	son, McQuagge
6		an	d Caldwell as r	esponsible f	or this portion	of the Mir	nimum Filing	Requirements.
7								
8	Q	DO	O ANY OF TH	E GULF PO	OWER WITN	ESSES LI	STED ON S	SCHEDULE C-8
9		PF	ROVIDE AN	EXPLANAT	ION FOR T	HE SIGN	IIFICANT II	NCREASES IN
10		TF	RANSMISSION	RENT E	EXPENSE,	EITHER	HISTORICA	LLY OF AS
11		FC	DRECASTED?					
12	Α	No	D .					
13								
14	Q	W	HAT ARE YO	U RECOMM	ENDING WI	TH REGA	RD TRANSI	MISSION RENT
15		EX	(PENSE?					
16	Α	1	recommend th	at the Com	mission requ	ire Gulf P	ower to pro	ovide a detailed
17		ex	planation and	supporting d	ocumentation	that justifi	es the signif	icant increase in
18		tra	ansmission rent	t. Forecaste	d increases i	n expense	of such mag	gnitude must not
19		be	included in rat	es without a	dequate justi	fication.		
20								
21	Q	D	DES THIS CO	NCLUDE YO	UR DIRECT	TESTIMO	NY?	а
22	Α	Ye	es, it does.					
23								
24								

1		Qualifications of Greg R. Meyer									
2	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.									
3	Α	Greg R. Meyer. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140,									
4		Chesterfield, MO 63017.									
5											
6	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR OCCUPATION.									
7	Α	I am an Associate in the field of public utility regulation with the firm of Brubaker									
8		& Associates, Inc. ("BAI"), energy, economic and regulatory consultants.									
9											
10	Q	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND									
11		EXPERIENCE.									
12	Α	I graduated from the University of Missouri in 1979 with a Bachelor of Science									
13		Degree in Business Administration, with a major in Accounting. Subsequent to									
14		graduation I was employed by the Missouri Public Service Commission. I was									
15		employed with the Commission from July 1, 1979 until May 31, 2008.									
16		I began my employment at the Missouri Public Service Commission as a									
17		Junior Auditor. During my employment at the Commission, I was promoted to									
18		higher auditing classifications. My final position at the Commission was an									
19		Auditor V, which I held for approximately ten years.									
20		As an Auditor V, I conducted audits and examinations of the accounts,									
21		books, records and reports of jurisdictional utilities. I also aided in the planning of									
22		audits and investigations, including staffing decisions, and in the development of									
23		staff positions in which the Auditing Department was assigned. I served as Lead									
24		Auditor and/or Case Supervisor as assigned. I assisted in the technical training									

of other auditors, which included the preparation of auditors' workpapers, oral and written testimony.

During my career at the Missouri Public Service Commission, I presented testimony in numerous electric, gas, telephone and water and sewer rate cases. In addition, I was involved in cases regarding service territory transfers. In the context of those cases listed above, I presented testimony on all conventional ratemaking principles related to a utility's revenue requirement. During the last three years of my employment with the Commission, I was involved in developing transmission policy for the Southwest Power Pool as a member of the Cost Allocation Working Group.

In June of 2008, I joined the firm of Brubaker & Associates, Inc. as a Consultant. Since joining the firm, I have presented testimony and/or testified in the state jurisdictions of Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri and Washington. I have also appeared and presented testimony in Alberta and Nova Scotia, Canada. These cases involved addressing conventional ratemaking principles focusing on the utility's revenue requirement. The firm Brubaker & Associates, Inc. provides consulting services in the field of energy procurement and public utility regulation to many clients including industrial and institutional customers, some utilities and, on occasion, state regulatory agencies.

More specifically, we provide analysis of energy procurement options based on consideration of prices and reliability as related to the needs of the client; prepare rate, feasibility, economic, and cost of service studies relating to energy and utility services; prepare depreciation and feasibility studies relating to utility service; assist in contract negotiations for utility services, and provide technical support to legislative activities.

1	In addition to our main office in St. Louis, the firm has branch offices in
2	Phoenix, Arizona and Corpus Christi, Texas.
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FPSC Docket No. 130140-El Federal Executive Agencies Witness: Greg R. Meyer Schedule GRM-1

GULF POWER COMPANY Docket No. 130140-EI

kWh Sales/Customer/Billing Day

Line	Description	January (1)	February (2)	March (3)	<u>April</u> (4)	<u>May</u> (5)		<u>July</u> (7)	August (8)	September (9)	October (10)	November (11)	December (12)
1	2013	37.60	36.05	30.29	27.65	31.63	43.64	50.90	51.56	47.57	38.28	28.89	31.84
2	2014	38.14	36.47	30.54	27.75	31.58	43.45	50.59	51.17	47.07	37.67	28.19	31.04
3	Difference	0.54	0.42	0.25	0.10	-0.05	-0.19	-0.31	-0.39	-0.50	-0.61	-0.70	-0.80
4	% Difference	1.44%	1.16%	0.83%	0.37%	-0.16%	-0.43%	-0.61%	-0.76%	-1.05%	-1.58%	-2.43%	-2.51%

FPSC Docket No. 130140-EI Federal Executive Agencies Witness: Greg R. Meyer Schedule GRM-2

GULF POWER COMPANY Docket No. 130140-EI

Historic and Forecasted Levels of Baseline Production Expense

Line	Description	Actual 2008 (1)		Actual 2009 (2)	20	Actual 2010 (3)		Actual 2011 (4)		Actual 2012 (5)	Fo	recasted 2013 (6)	Fo	2014 (7)	2008 - 2012 Average (8)	
1	Baseline Materials	aterials \$ 7,288 \$ 6,376		\$	7,762	\$ 8,514		\$	7,843	\$	10,321	\$	10,006	\$	7,557	
2	Baseline Other	40,727		37,820		46,923		47,393		44,846		50,381		51,593		43,542
3	Baseline Labor	27,328 25,769 27,2		27,237	27,779		28,150			29,009	a 	29,476	-	27,253		
4	Total Baseline	\$ 75,343	\$	69,965	\$	81,922	\$	83,686	\$	80,839	\$	89,711	\$	91,075	\$	78,351

Source: Exhibit No. ____ (RWG-1), Schedule 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES' TESTIMONY has been furnished to the following by electronic mail this 16th day of October, 2013:

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In Re: Petition for Rate Increase by Gulf Power Company

Docket No. 130140-EI

Direct Testimony and Exhibits of

Michael P. Gorman

On behalf of

Federal Executive Agencies

October 16, 2013



the Direct Testimony of Michael P. Gorman Page Gulf Power's Proposed Capital Structure......11 Return on Equity Summary43 QUALIFICATIONS OF MICHAEL P. GORMAN.......Appendix A Exhibit MPG-1 through Exhibit MPG-18

Table of Contents to

1		BEFORE THE
2		FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3		
4		In Re: Petition for Rate Increase by Gulf Power Company Docket No. 130140-EI
5		
6		
7		Direct Testimony of Michael P. Gorman
8	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
9	Α	Michael P. Gorman. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road,
10		Suite 140, Chesterfield, MO 63017.
11		
12	Q	WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?
13	Α	I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and a Managing Principal
14		of Brubaker & Associates, Inc., energy, economic and regulatory consultants.
15		
16	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
17		EXPERIENCE.
18	Α	This information is included in Appendix A to my testimony.
19		
20	Q	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
21	Α	I am appearing in this proceeding on behalf of the Federal Executive Agencies
22		("FEA").
23		
24		
25		

1	Q	WHAT IS THE SUBJECT OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
2	Α	My testimony will address Gulf Power Company's ("Gulf Power" or "Company")
3		overall rate of return including return on equity, capital structure and embedded
4		debt cost.
5		
6		SUMMARY
7	Q	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATIONS.
8	Α	I recommend the Florida Public Service Commission ("Commission") award Gulf
9		Power a return on common equity of 9.45%, which is at the approximate midpoint
10		of my estimated range of 9.10% to 9.85% (Exhibit MPG-1), and an overall rate of
11		return of 4.74%.
12		My recommended return on equity and proposed capital structure will
13		provide Gulf Power with an opportunity to realize cash flow financial coverages
14		and balance sheet strength that conservatively support Gulf Power's current
15		bond rating. Consequently, my recommended return on equity represents fair
16		compensation for Gulf Power's investment risk, and it will preserve the
17		Company's financial integrity and credit standing.
18		I will also respond to Gulf Power witness Dr. James H. Vander Weide's
19		proposed return on equity of 11.50%. His recommended return includes a
20		leverage adjustment of 70 basis points and flotation cost adder of about 24 basis
21		points. For the reasons discussed below, Dr. Vander Weide's recommended
22		return on equity is excessive and should be rejected.
23		
24		
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Q HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE GULF POWER'S CURRENT MARKET COST OF 1 2 EQUITY? 3 Α I performed three versions of the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model, Risk 4 Premium ("RP") study, and Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") to a proxy 5 group of publicly traded companies that have investment risk similar to Gulf 6 Power. Based on these assessments, I estimate Gulf Power's current market 7 cost of equity to be 9.45%. 8 **Electric Utility Industry Market Outlook** 9 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY. 10 11 A I begin my estimate of a fair return on equity for Gulf Power by reviewing the 12 market's assessment of electric utility industry investment risk, credit standing, 13 and stock price performance in general. I used this information to gauge the 14 market's perception of the risk characteristics of electric utility investments in 15 general, which is then used to produce a refined estimate of the market's return 16 requirement for assuming investment risk similar to Gulf Power's utility 17 operations. 18 Based on the assessments described below, I find the credit rating 19 outlook of the industry to be strong and supportive of the industry's financial 20 integrity, the industry has ample access to low-cost capital to support rate base 21 investments, and electric utilities' stocks have exhibited strong and stable price 22 performance over the last several years.

Moreover, the electric utility industry in general is in a large capital

expenditure portion of its cycle, which is creating significant demands for external

capital in order to support large capital improvement programs. Credit rating

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agencies and market participants have embraced the utilities' need for significant amounts of external capital by meeting the capital market demands of electric utilities at near historical low capital market costs. All of this supports my belief that Gulf Power should have sufficient access to capital to support its major capital program, and relatively moderate capital costs are currently available and expected to be available for the next several years. Based on this review of credit outlooks and stock price performance, I conclude that the market continues to embrace the electric utility industry as a safe-haven investment, and views utility equity and debt investments as low-risk securities. PLEASE DESCRIBE ELECTRIC UTILITIES' CREDIT RATING OUTLOOK. Electric utilities' credit rating outlook has improved over the recent past and is stable. Standard & Poor's ("S&P") recently provided an assessment of the credit rating of U.S. electric utilities. S&P's commentary included the following: Effect on ratings Notwithstanding the slow economic recovery, credit quality in the domestic utility industry has continued a long shift to greater stability, and even modest improvement in some cases, especially as many companies re-emphasize their core competencies. **Industry Ratings Outlook** Good access to funding expected to continue

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Liquidity is adequate for most utilities and investor appetite for

utility debt remains healthy, with deals continuing to be

oversubscribed at very attractive rates. The amount of medium- to long-term debt and hybrid securities issued through the three months ended March 31, 2013 was about \$8.7 billion. Credit fundamentals indicate that most, if not all, utilities should continue to have ample access to funding sources and credit. The relative certainty of financial performance provided by the regulatory framework under which utilities operate, their effective monopoly position, long-lived assets, and the financing necessary to fund these assets are all factors that make the utility sector attractive to investors. These elements have also helped utilities more effectively manage their rate-relief needs and mitigate the effect of sizable rate increases on customers.

Similarly, Fitch states:

Rating Outlook

Flat Growth Base Case: Fitch Ratings expects overall stable ratings for issuers within the U.S. Power and Gas Utility sector in 2013 despite modest deterioration in operating environment.

* * *

Stable Regulation but Authorized ROEs Trending Down

Fitch expects the downward pressure on authorized ROEs for regulated utilities to persist in tandem with falling interest rates in the economy. Lower ROEs are also associated with features increasingly common in tariff structures that minimize cash flow

¹Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct: "Industry Report Card: Stable-To-Modestly Improved Industry Outlook Supports Ratings For U.S. Regulated Electric, Gas, And Water Utilities," April 19, 2013 at 3-4 and 6-7, emphasis added.

volatility. Many state regulators are awarding lower ROEs as an offset to awarding special tariff mechanisms such as revenue decoupling, forward test year, rate-adjustment trackers[,] etc.

Strong Liquidity Conditions to Prevail

Fitch expects the power and gas utility sectors to continue to enjoy strong capital market access. Low interest rates due to accommodative monetary policies by the Fed continue to bring down the cost of debt for companies, which represents a significant expense item for the capital-intensive utility sector. Since 2006, interest expense has declined almost 150 bps for the typical utility holding company as financing costs for new debt issuance is at historic lows and these companies have unprecedented access to the capital and bank markets.²

The Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") also opined as follows:

Steady Industry Fundamentals

Indeed, broad global macroeconomic forces have been the principle [sic] driver of utility stock returns in recent years, relative to other market sectors. Investors now take mostly as a given the industry's reasonably strong business fundamentals. Utilities are undertaking sizeable and wide-ranging capital investment programs that include distribution network upgrades, Smart Grid investments, a significant boost in the pace of transmission investment, rising emissions-related capex driven by the need to

²FitchRatings: "2013 Outlook: Utilities, Power, and Gas," December 7, 2012 at 1, 6-7 and 10, emphasis added.

comply with EPA regulations, and generation investments in select power markets.

* *


Credit analysts are generally positive on the industry's ability to finance an aggressive pace of investment, noting that while it is now cash flow negative on an annual operating basis, its balance sheets are generally strong and utilities have access to a diverse range of funding sources. The industry weathered the storm of the 2008/2009 financial crisis by postponing optional capex projects and finding cost savings where possible without jeopardizing service quality. Today's economic backdrop is much improved from that period, and with interest rates at multi-decade lows and investors of all types hungry for yield, the capital markets are wide open for most economic sectors, including utilities. The execution risk inherent in managing large, complex construction projects in a way that addresses the interests of both shareholders and regulators seems far more pronounced than financing risk.³

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE ELECTRIC UTILITY STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS.

As shown in the graph below, the EEI has recorded electric utility stock price performance compared to the market. The EEI data shows that its Electric Utility Index has outperformed the market in downturns and trailed the market during recovery. This supports my conclusion that utility stock investments are

³EEI Q3 2012 Financial Update "Stock Performance" at 5, emphasis added.

regarded by market participants as a moderate to low-risk investment.



EEI describes electric utility stock price/valuation as sustainable:

Mixed Valuation Signals

The broad market's gains during Q3 along with the EEI Index's flat performance removed some of the richness to utility share valuations that several analysts noted at the end of Q2. Indeed, the magnitude of underperformance for the first nine months of 2012 is similar to that which occurred during the same period of 2009, after markets bottomed and then recovered from the losses produced by the financial crisis. As the market recovery continued in 2010, with 14% to 17% gains, the staid utility sector's 7% return could not keep pace. Yet when 2011 produced worries of economic slowdown, the worsening of the European debt crisis and the summer's woefully

memorable deficit gridlock and S&P downgrade of U.S.

2 Treasury debt in August — along with sharply falling interest rates — the EEI Index powered forward with a 3 4 20% return against single-digit gains across the broader markets 6 With the industry business models now set on regulated or 7 mostly regulated structures, and with slow growth in 8 earnings and dividends as the main appeal for investors, 9 such periodic reversals of fortune, driven by changing 10 economic prospects and investor sentiments, seem likely 11 to continue. Interest rates are now at multi-decade lows 12 and while analysts still cite utility price/earnings ratios as 13 above average, 4% dividend yields give utility shares 14 considerable price support relative to the lower yields 15 available from bonds.4 16 17 Q WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT TAKEAWAY POINTS FROM THIS 18 ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY CREDIT AND 19 INVESTMENT RISK OUTLOOKS? 20 Α Credit rating agencies consider the electric utility industry to be stable and 21 believe investors will continue to provide an abundance of capital to support

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utilities' large capital programs and at moderate capital costs. All of this supports

the continued belief that electric utility investments are generally regarded as

safe-haven or low-risk investments, and the market embraces low-risk

⁴Id. at 6, emphasis added.

1		investments - like	e utility investments. The demand for low-risk investments will
2		provide funding fo	or electric utilities in general.
3			
4	Gulf	Power's Invest	ment Risk
5	Q	PLEASE DESCR	RIBE THE MARKET'S ASSESSMENT OF GULF POWER'S
6		INVESTMENT RI	SK.
7	Α	The market asse	ssment of Gulf Power's investment risk is described by credit
8		rating analysts' re	eports. Gulf Power has a "Stable" corporate bond rating from
9		S&P and Moody's	s and is "A" and "A3," respectively.
10		Specificall	y, S&P states the following:
11		Ra	tionale
12		<u>Bu</u>	siness Risk: Excellent
13		•	Construction of two new nuclear units at Georgia
14			Power Co. and an integrated gasification combined
15			cycle (IGCC) power plant at Mississippi Power Co.
16			introduces significant construction risk, on a
17			consolidated basis
18		•	Regulated utility operations that span four states, serve
19			a large customer base and contribute more than 90%
20			of operating income
21		•	Operations in jurisdictions with generally constructive
22			regulatory environments providing for timely investment
23			recovery
24			
25			

1		 Prudent and largely conservative financial risk
2		management and generally effective handling of
3		regulatory risk
4		Financial Risk: Significant
5		 Large capital spending program for system expansion
6		and environmental compliance can pressure financial
7		profile absent timely rate relief
8		Ongoing need for external financing
9		Generally stable debt leverage
10		 Dividend payout ratio remains high in light of planned
11		capital spending program ⁵
12		
13	Gulf	Power's Proposed Capital Structure
14	Q	WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS THE COMPANY REQUESTING TO USE TO
15		DEVELOP ITS OVERALL RATE OF RETURN FOR ELECTRIC OPERATIONS
16		IN THIS PROCEEDING?
17	Α	Gulf Power's December 2014 forecasted regulatory capital structure, as
18		supported by Gulf Power witness Ms. Susan D. Ritenour, is shown below in
19		Table 1.
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⁵Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect Summary: "Gulf Power Co.," March 21, 2013 at 2.

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Gulf Pov	TABLE 1 wer's Proposed tal Structure	
Description	Regulatory Capital Structure (1)	Investors' Capital <u>Structure</u> (2)
Long-Term Debt	36.36%	45.46%
Short-Term Debt	1.47%	1.83%
Preference Stock	4.20%	5.25%
Common Equity	37.96%	47.46%
Customer Deposits	1.11%	
Deferred Income Taxes	20.17%	(<u>=42</u>
FASB 109 Deferred Taxes	-1.37%	
Investment Tax Credit	0.10%	-
Total Capital Structure	100.00%	100.00%

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IS GULF POWER'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE REASONABLE?

No. Gulf Power's proposed capital structure misallocates customer-supplied capital in the development of the overall rate of return for jurisdictional operations. In reconciling its jurisdictional rate base with its jurisdictional capital structure, Gulf Power allocates pro forma rate base adjustments to the capital structure by spreading these adjustments equally over both investor-supplied capital and customer-supplied capital.

Customer-supplied capital includes deferred taxes and customer deposits. Deferred taxes are a zero-cost capital component, and customer deposits have a relatively low interest rate as prescribed by the Commission. These low-cost customer-supplied capital components should be used

1		exclusively to fund jurisdictional rate base. If they are not, then a portion of the
2		customer-supplied low-cost capital components will be used to benefit investors
3		rather than exclusively jurisdictional customers.
4		
5	Q	HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO ADJUST THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED
6		CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
7	Α	The Company develops its proposed capital structure on its Schedule D-1a, page
8		1. On that schedule under column 6, the Company proposes to spread its pro
9		rata adjustments equally over investor capital and customer-supplied capital.
10		recommend to modify this spread of pro rata adjustments to only investor-
11		supplied capital. All customer-supplied capital should be fully allocated to
12		jurisdictional cost of service to ensure customers get full benefit of the low-cost
13		capital they provide the Company.
14		I developed this revised capital structure on my Exhibit MPG-1. As
15		shown on this exhibit, this revised capital structure mix produces a common
16		equity ratio of total capital of 31.43%. In comparison, the Company's proposed
17		capital structure produces a common equity ratio of 37.96%. Again, the
18		difference in capital structures reflects my recommendation to allocate 100% of
19		the customer-supplied low-cost capital to jurisdictional cost of service.
20		
21	Q	WHY SHOULD CUSTOMERS RECEIVE THE FULL BENEFIT OF CUSTOMER-
22		SUPPLIED CAPITAL?
23	Α	Customers should receive the full benefit of customer-supplied capital because
24		this is actual cash proceeds provided to the Company from customers that have
25		been retained by the Company to fund its invested cost of utility operations.

Accumulated deferred income taxes reflect the Company's collection of 1 2 income tax expense, from customers that temporarily exceeds its current income 3 tax liability. 4 As the Company's income tax liability comes due over time, the deferred 5 tax collections will ultimately be paid to government taxing authorities. In the 6 interim, the Company is permitted to retain the prepaid tax accruals as zero-cost 7 capital which is used to fund plant and equipment. 8 Since customers provide the deferred tax proceeds, customers should 9 receive the full benefit of the cost savings. 10 Customer deposits are also funds available to the Company to support its 11 investment in utility plant and equipment. These funds do have a prescribed 12 interest rate which is included in Gulf Power's cost of service. Since customers 13 provide this capital, and actually provide a return on the capital by recovery of 14 customer deposit expense in Gulf Power's cost of service, these funds should be 15 fully reflected as a source of capital available to support Gulf Power's invested 16 capital cost. 17 18 Q WHAT IS YOUR PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN THIS PROCEEDING? 19 Α My proposed capital structure is shown below in Table 2. 20 21 22 23 24 25

1					
2		TABLE 1			
3		Gulf Power's Proposed Adjusted Capital Structure			
4				Regulatory	
5			Description	Capital Structure	
6			Long-Term Debt	30.11%	
7			Short-Term Debt	1.21%	
•			Preference Stock	3.48%	
8			Common Equity	31.43%	
9			Customer Deposits	1.88%	
0			Deferred Income Taxes FASB 109 Deferred Taxes	34.03% -2.30%	
10			Investment Tax Credit	0.16%	
11			Total Capital Structure	100.00%	
12			Source: Exhibit MPG-1.		
13		L			
14	Q	WILL YOUR I	PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTU	RE SUPPORT GULF POWER'S	3
15		FINANCIAL II	NTEGRITY AND CREDIT RATING	?	
16	Α	Yes. As I wi	Il discuss later in my testimony, r	my proposed capital structure is	3
17		consistent with	h Gulf Power's current credit ratin	g and will support Gulf Power's	3
18		financial integr	rity.		
19					
20			RETURN ON EQUIT	<u>Y</u>	
21	Q	PLEASE DES	CRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY A "	UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON	1
22		EQUITY."			
23	Α	A utility's cost	of common equity is the return inv	vestors require on an investmen	t
24		in the utility. I	nvestors expect to achieve their re	eturn requirement from receiving	J
25		dividends and	stock price appreciation.		

1	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING A REGULATED
2		UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.
3	Α	In general, determining a fair cost of common equity for a regulated utility has
4		been framed by two hallmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Bluefield
5		Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679
6		(1923) and Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
7		These decisions identify the general standards to be considered in
8		establishing the cost of common equity for a public utility. Those general
9		standards provide that the authorized return should: (1) be sufficient to maintain
10		financial integrity; (2) attract capital under reasonable terms; and (3) be
11		commensurate with returns investors could earn by investing in other enterprises
12		of comparable risk.
13		
14	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE METHODS YOU HAVE USED TO ESTIMATE GULF
15		POWER'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.
16	Α	I have used several models based on financial theory to estimate Gulf Power's
17		cost of common equity. These models are: (1) a constant growth Discounted
18		Cash Flow ("DCF") model using consensus analysts' growth rate projections; (2)
19		a constant growth DCF using sustainable growth rate estimates; (3) a multi-stage
20		growth DCF model; (4) a Risk Premium model; and (5) a Capital Asset Pricing
21		Model ("CAPM"). I have applied these models to a group of publicly traded
22		utilities that I have determined share investment risk similar to Gulf Power's.
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Risk Proxy Group

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2	Q	HOW DID YOU SELECT A UTILITY PROXY GROUP SIMILAR IN
3		INVESTMENT RISK TO GULF POWER TO ESTIMATE ITS CURRENT
4		MARKET COST OF EQUITY?
5	Α	I relied on an electric utility proxy group that I determined to be comparable in
6		investment risk to Gulf Power. My recommended proxy group is the same proxy
7		group used by Gulf Power's witness Dr. Vander Weide to estimate Gulf Power's
8		return on equity. However, I removed Entergy Corp. and TECO Energy because
9		it was involved in merger or acquisition activities. Entergy Corp. has requested
10		regulatory authorization to spin off its transmission assets to ITC Holdings in
11		exchange for stock in ITC Holdings. TECO Energy announced a proposed
12		acquisition of New Mexico Gas on May 28, 2013. Fitch has noted this acquisition
13		to be significant and has placed TECO Energy on Credit Watch.
14		
15	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOUR PROXY GROUP IS
16		REASONABLY COMPARABLE IN INVESTMENT RISK TO GULF POWER.
17	Α	The proxy group is shown in Exhibit MPG-2. This proxy group has an average
18		corporate credit rating from S&P of "BBB+," which is lower than S&P's corporate
19		credit rating for Gulf Power of "A". The proxy group's corporate credit rating from

The proxy group has an average common equity ratio of 45.1% (including short-term debt) from SNL Financial ("SNL") and 49.1% (excluding short-term debt) from *The Value Line Investment Survey* ("Value Line") in 2012. The proxy

Moody's of "Baa2" is also lower than Gulf Power's corporate credit rating from

Moody's of "A3." The bond rating indicates that the proxy group has greater

investment risk than Gulf Power.

group's common equity ratio is comparable to my recommended common equity ratio of 47.5% for Gulf Power.

I also compared Gulf Power's business risk to the business risk of the proxy group based on S&P's ranking methodology. Gulf Power has an S&P business risk profile of "Excellent," which is identical to the S&P business risk profile of the proxy group. The S&P business risk profile score indicates that Gulf Power's business risk is comparable to that of the proxy group.

Based on total bond rating, financial risk and operating risk, Gulf Power has slightly lower risk than the proxy group. Nevertheless, the parameters are reasonably comparable to the investment risk of Gulf Power, and this proxy group can be used to estimate a fair return on equity for Gulf Power. However, because of Gulf Power's slightly lower investment risk, a return on equity slightly below that which would be appropriate for the proxy group would be a reasonable risk-adjusted return for Gulf Power.

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Discounted Cash Flow Model

17 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL.

18 A The DCF model posits that a stock price is valued by summing the present value
19 of expected future cash flows discounted at the investor's required rate of return
20 or cost of capital. This model is expressed mathematically as follows:

⁹S&P ranks the business risk of a utility company as part of its corporate credit rating review. S&P considers total investment risk in assigning bond ratings to issuers, including utility companies. In analyzing total investment risk, S&P considers both the business risk and the financial risk of a corporate entity, including a utility company. S&P's business risk profile score is based on a six-notch credit rating starting with "Vulnerable" (highest risk) to "Excellent" (lowest risk). The business risk of most utility companies falls within the lowest risk category, "Excellent," or the category one notch lower (more risk), "Strong." *Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect:* "Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded," May 27, 2009.

1		$P_0 = D_1 + D_2 \dots D_{\infty}$ where (Equation 1)
2		$\overline{(1+K)^1} \overline{(1+K)^2} \qquad \overline{(1+K)^{\infty}}$
3		P ₀ = Current stock price
4		D = Dividends in periods 1 - ∞
5		K = Investor's required return
6		This model can be rearranged in order to estimate the discount rate or
7		investor-required return, "K." If it is reasonable to assume that earnings and
8		dividends will grow at a constant rate, then Equation 1 can be rearranged as
9		follows:
10		$K = D_1/P_0 + G (Equation 2)$
11		K = Investor's required return
12		D_1 = Dividend in first year
13		P ₀ = Current stock price
14		G = Expected constant dividend growth rate
15		Equation 2 is referred to as the annual "constant growth" DCF model.
16		
17	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF
18		MODEL.
19	Α	As shown in Equation 2 above, the DCF model requires a current stock price,
20		expected dividend, and expected growth rate in dividends.
21		
22	Q	WHAT STOCK PRICE HAVE YOU RELIED ON IN YOUR CONSTANT
23		GROWTH DCF MODEL?
24	Α	I relied on the average of the weekly high and low stock prices of the utilities in
25		the proxy group over a 13-week period ending on September 20, 2013. An

average stock price is less susceptible to market price variations than a spot price. Therefore, an average stock price is less susceptible to aberrant market price movements, which may not be reflective of the stock's long-term value.

A 13-week average stock price reflects a period that is still short enough to contain data that reasonably reflect current market expectations, but the period is not so short as to be susceptible to market price variations that may not reflect the stock's long-term value. In my judgment, a 13-week average stock price is a reasonable balance between the need to reflect current market expectations and the need to capture sufficient data to smooth out aberrant market movements.

Q

WHAT DIVIDEND DID YOU USE IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

I used the most recently paid quarterly dividend, as reported in *Value Line*.⁷ This dividend was annualized (multiplied by 4) and adjusted for next year's growth to produce the D₁ factor for use in Equation 2 above.

Q

WHAT DIVIDEND GROWTH RATES HAVE YOU USED IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

There are several methods that can be used to estimate the expected growth in dividends. However, regardless of the method, for purposes of determining the market-required return on common equity, one must attempt to estimate investors' consensus about what the dividend or earnings growth rate will be, and not what an individual investor or analyst may use to make individual investment decisions.

⁷The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

As predictors of future returns, security analysts' growth estimates have been shown to be more accurate than growth rates derived from historical data.⁸ That is, assuming the market generally makes rational investment decisions, analysts' growth projections are more likely to influence observable stock prices than growth rates derived only from historical data.

For my constant growth DCF analysis, I have relied on a consensus, or mean, of professional security analysts' earnings growth estimates as a proxy for investor consensus dividend growth rate expectations. I used the average of analysts' growth rate estimates from three sources: Zacks, SNL, and Reuters. All such projections were available on September 24, 2013, and all were reported online.

Each consensus growth rate projection is based on a survey of security analysts. There is no clear evidence whether a particular analyst is most influential on general market investors. Therefore, a single analyst's projection does not as reliably predict consensus investor outlooks as does a consensus of market analysts' projections. The consensus estimate is a simple arithmetic average, or mean, of surveyed analysts' earnings growth forecasts. A simple average of the growth forecasts gives equal weight to all surveyed analysts' projections. Therefore, a simple average, or arithmetic mean, of analyst forecasts is a good proxy for market consensus expectations.

⁸See, e.g., David Gordon, Myron Gordon, and Lawrence Gould, "Choice Among Methods of Estimating Share Yield," *The Journal of Portfolio Management*, Spring 1989.

1	Q	WHAT ARE THE GROWTH RATES YOU USED IN YOUR CONSTANT
2		GROWTH DCF MODEL?
3	Α	The growth rates I used in my DCF analysis are shown in Exhibit MPG-3. The
4		average growth rate for my proxy group is 5.04%.
5		
6	Q	WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?
7	Α	As shown in Exhibit MPG-4, the average and median constant growth DCF
8		returns for my proxy group are 9.09% and 9.12%, respectively.
9		
10	Q	DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT
11		GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?
12	Α	Yes. The constant growth DCF analysis for my proxy group was based on an
13		average long-term sustainable growth rate of 5.04%. This growth rate slightly
14		exceeds my estimate of a maximum long-term sustainable growth rate of 4.9%
15		which I discuss later in this testimony. Hence, I believe the constant growth DCF
16		analysis produces slightly higher but still reasonable return estimates. To
17		enhance the accuracy of my recommended return on equity I have also
18		incorporated two alternative DCF models as discussed below.
19		
20	Q	WHAT IS YOUR ESTIMATE OF A MAXIMUM LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE
21		GROWTH RATE?
22	Α	A long-term sustainable growth rate for the utility stock, or any Company
23		investment, cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which it sells its
24		goods and services. Hence, a reasonable proxy for the long-term maximum
25		sustainable growth rate for a utility investment is best proxied by the projected

long-term Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). *The Blue Chip Financial Forecasts* projects that over the next 5 and 10 years, the U.S. nominal GDP will grow in the range of 4.8% to 5.0%. As such, the average growth rate over the next 10 years is around 4.9%, which I believe is a reasonable proxy of long-term sustainable growth.

In my multi-stage growth DCF analysis, I discuss academic and investment practitioner evidence that accepts the projected long-term GDP growth outlook as a maximum sustainable growth rate projection. Hence, recognizing the long-term GDP growth rate as a maximum sustainable growth is logical, and generally consistent with academic and economic practitioner accepted practices.

A

Sustainable Growth DCF

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU ESTIMATED A SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE FOR YOUR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH DCF MODEL.

A sustainable growth rate is based on the percentage of the utility's earnings that is retained and reinvested in utility plant and equipment. These reinvested earnings increase the earnings base (rate base). Earnings grow when plant funded by reinvested earnings is put into service, and the utility is allowed to earn its authorized return on such additional rate base investment.

The internal growth methodology is tied to the percentage of earnings retained in the company and not paid out as dividends. The earnings retention ratio is 1 minus the dividend payout ratio. As the payout ratio declines, the earnings retention ratio increases. An increased earnings retention ratio will fuel

1		stronger growth because the business funds more investments with retained
2		earnings.
3		The payout ratios of the proxy group are shown in my Exhibit MPG-5.
4		These dividend payout ratios and earnings retention ratios then can be used to
5		develop a sustainable long-term earnings retention growth rate. A sustainable
6		long-term earnings retention ratio will help gauge whether analysts' current three-
7		to five-year growth rate projections can be sustained over an indefinite period of
8		time.
9		The data used to estimate the long-term sustainable growth rate is based
10		on the Company's current market to book ratio and on Value Line's three- to five-
11		year projections of earnings, dividends, earned returns on book equity, and stock
12		issuances.
13		As shown in Exhibit MPG-6, page 1, the average sustainable growth rate
14		for the proxy group using this internal growth rate model is 5.04%.
15		
16	Q	WHAT IS THE DCF ESTIMATE USING THESE SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM
17		GROWTH RATES?
18	Α	A DCF estimate based on these sustainable growth rates is developed in Exhibit
19		MPG-7. As shown there, a sustainable growth DCF analysis produces proxy
20		group average and median DCF results of 9.10% and 8.72%, respectively.
21		
22	Mult	i-Stage Growth DCF Model
23	Q	HAVE YOU CONDUCTED ANY OTHER DCF STUDIES?
24	Α	Yes. My first constant growth DCF is based on consensus analysts' growth rate
25		projections, so it is a reasonable reflection of rational investment expectations

over the next three to five years. The limitation on the constant growth DCF model is that it cannot reflect a rational expectation that a period of high/low short-term growth can be followed by a change in growth to a rate that is more reflective of long-term sustainable growth. Hence, I performed a multi-stage growth DCF analysis to reflect this outlook of changing growth expectations.

Q

Α

WHY DO YOU BELIEVE GROWTH RATES CAN CHANGE OVER TIME?

Analyst projected growth rates over the next three to five years will change as utility earnings growth outlooks change. Utility companies go through cycles in making investments in their systems. When utility companies are making large investments, their rate base grows rapidly, which accelerates their earnings growth. Once a major construction cycle is completed or levels off, growth in the utility rate base slows, and its earnings growth slows from an abnormally high three- to five-year rate to a lower sustainable growth rate.

As major construction cycles extend over longer periods of time, even with an accelerated construction program, the growth rate of the utility will slow simply because rate base will slow, and the utility has limited human and capital resources available to expand its construction program. Hence, the three- to five-year growth rate projection should be used as a long-term sustainable growth rate but not without making a reasonable informed judgment to determine whether it considers the current market environment, the industry, and whether the three- to five-year growth outlook is sustainable.

1	Q	IS THE USE OF A MULTI-STAGE DCF MODEL SUPPORTED IN ACADEMIC
2		AND INDUSTRY LITERATURE?
3	Α	Yes. In his book New Regulatory Finance, Dr. Roger Morin states the following:
4		Dividends need not be, and probably are not, constant from period
5		to period. Moreover, there are circumstances where the standard
6		DCF model cannot be used to assess investor return
7		requirements. For example, if a utility company is in the process
8		of altering its dividend payout policy and dividends are not
9		expected to grow at the same rate as earnings during the
10		transition period, the standard DCF model is inapplicable. This is
11		because the expected growth in stock price has to be different
12		from that of dividends, earnings, and book value if the market
13		price is to converge toward book value.
14		* * *
15		A Non-Constant Growth DCF model is appropriate whenever the
16		growth rate is expected to change, and the only way to produce a
17		change in the forecast payout ratio is by introducing an
18		intermediate growth rate that is different from the long-term growth
19		rate, as in the previous example.9
20		
21	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF MODEL.
22	Α	The multi-stage growth DCF model reflects the possibility of non-constant growth
23		for a company over time. The multi-stage growth DCF model reflects three
24		growth periods: (1) a short-term growth period, which consists of the first five
	Vienn	⁹ New Regulatory Finance, Roger A. Morin, PhD, 2006 Public Utilities Reports, Inc., na, Virginia, pp. 264 and 267.

years; (2) a transition period, which consists of the next five years (6 through 10); and (3) a long-term growth period, starting in year 11 through perpetuity.

For the short-term growth period, I relied on the consensus analysts' growth projections described above in relationship to my constant growth DCF model. For the transition period, the growth rates were reduced or increased by an equal factor, which reflects the difference between the analysts' growth rates and the long-term sustainable growth rate. For the long-term growth period, I assumed each company's growth would converge to the maximum sustainable long-term growth rate.

Q

WHY IS THE GDP GROWTH PROJECTION A REASONABLE PROXY FOR THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE?

Utilities cannot indefinitely sustain a growth rate that exceeds the growth rate of the economy in which they sell services. Utilities' earnings/dividend growth is created by increased utility investment or rate base. Such investment, in turn, is driven by service area economic growth and demand for utility service. In other words, utilities invest in plant to meet sales demand growth, and sales growth, in turn, is tied to economic growth in their service areas.

The Energy Information Administration ("EIA") has observed that utility sales growth tracks, albeit is lower than, the U.S. GDP growth, as shown in Exhibit MPG-8. Utility sales growth has lagged behind GDP growth for more than a decade. As a result, nominal GDP growth is a very conservative proxy for electric utility sales growth, rate base growth, and earnings growth. Therefore, the U.S. GDP nominal growth rate is a conservative proxy for the highest sustainable long-term growth rate of a utility.

1	Q	IS THERE RESEARCH THAT SUPPORTS YOUR POSITION THAT, OVER
2		THE LONG TERM, A COMPANY'S EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS CANNOT
3		GROW AT A RATE GREATER THAN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?
4	Α	Yes. This concept is supported in both published analyst literature and academic
5		work. Specifically, in a textbook entitled "Fundamentals of Financial
6		Management," published by Eugene Brigham and Joel F. Houston, the authors
7		state as follows:
8		The constant growth model is most appropriate for mature
9		companies with a stable history of growth and stable future
10		expectations. Expected growth rates vary somewhat among
11		companies, but dividends for mature firms are often expected to
12		grow in the future at about the same rate as nominal gross
13		domestic product (real GDP plus inflation). 10
14		
15	Q	IS THERE ANY ACTUAL INVESTMENT HISTORY THAT SUPPORTS THE
16		NOTION THAT THE CAPITAL APPRECIATION FOR STOCK INVESTMENTS
17		WILL NOT EXCEED THE NOMINAL GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?
18	Α	Yes. This is evident by a comparison of the compound annual growth of the U.S.
19		GDP compared to the geometric growth of the U.S. stock market. Morningstar
20		measures the historical geometric growth of the U.S. stock market over the
21		period 1929-2012 to be approximately 5.6% and an inflation rate of 3.0%.11
22		
23		

Fundamentals of Financial Management, Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, Eleventh Edition 2007, Thomson South-Western, a Division of Thomson Corporation at 298.
Morningstar 2013 Valuation Yearbook at 23.

During this same time period, the U.S. nominal compound annual growth of the U.S. GDP was approximately 6.3%. 12

As such, the compound geometric growth of the U.S. nominal GDP has been less than the nominal growth of the U.S. stock market capital appreciation. This relationship shows the U.S. GDP is a conservative estimate of long-term sustainable growth.

Q

A

HOW DID YOU DETERMINE A SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE THAT REFLECTS THE CONSENSUS OF THE MARKET?

I relied on the consensus analysts' projections of long-term GDP growth. *The Blue Chip Financial Forecasts* publishes consensus economists' GDP growth projections twice a year. These consensus analysts' GDP growth outlooks are the best available measure of the market's assessment of long-term GDP growth. These analyst projections reflect all current outlooks for GDP, as reflected in analyst projections, and are likely the most influential on investors' expectations of future growth outlooks. The consensus economists' published GDP growth rate outlook is 5.0% to 4.8% over the next 10 years.¹³

Therefore, I propose to use the consensus economists' projected 5- and 10-year average GDP consensus growth rates of 5.0% and 4.8%, respectively, as published by *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, as an estimate of long-term sustainable growth. *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*' projections provide real GDP growth projections of 2.8% and 2.5%, and GDP inflation of 2.1% and 2.2%¹⁴ over the 5-year and 10-year projection periods, respectively. This consensus GDP

¹²U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, December 2012.

¹³Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2013 at 14.

¹⁴GDP growth is the product of real and inflation GDP growth.

1		growth forecast represents the most likely views of market participants because it
2		is based on published consensus economist projections.
3		
4	Q	DO YOU CONSIDER OTHER SOURCES OF PROJECTED LONG-TERM GDP
5		GROWTH?
6	Α	Yes, and these sources corroborate my consensus analysts' projections. The
7		U.S. EIA in its Annual Energy Outlook projects real GDP out until 2040. In its
8		2013 Annual Report, the EIA projects real GDP through 2040 to be in the range
9		of 2.0% to 2.9%, with a midpoint or reference case of 2.5%. 15
10		Also, the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") makes long-term
11		economic projections. The CBO is projecting real GDP growth of 2.6% to 2.2%
12		during the next 5 and 10 years, respectively, with GDP price inflation of 2.0%. 16
13		The CBO's real GDP projections are higher than the consensus, but its GDP
14		inflation is lower than the consensus economists.
15		The real GDP and nominal GDP growth projections made by the U.S. EIA
16		and those made by the CBO support the use of the consensus analyst 5-year
17		and 10-year projected GDP growth outlooks as a reasonable market assessment
18		of long-term prospective GDP growth.
19		
20	Q	WHAT STOCK PRICE, DIVIDEND, AND GROWTH RATES DID YOU USE IN
21		YOUR MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?
22	Α	I relied on the same 13-week stock price and the most recent quarterly dividend
23		payment data discussed above. For stage one growth, I used the consensus

 ¹⁵DOE/EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2013 With Projections to 2040, April 2013 at 56.
 ¹⁶CBO: The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023, February 2013 at 64.

analysts' growth rate projections discussed above in my constant growth DCF 1 2 model. The transition period begins in year 6 and ends in year 10. For the 3 long-term sustainable growth rate starting in year 11, I used 4.9%, the average of 4 the consensus economists' 5-year and 10-year projected nominal GDP growth 5 rates. 6 7 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF 8 MODEL? As shown in Exhibit MPG-9, the average and median multi-stage growth DCF 9 A 10 returns on equity for my proxy group are 8.97% and 9.01%, respectively. 11 PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS FROM YOUR DCF ANALYSES. 12 Q 13 The results from my DCF analyses are summarized in Table 3 below: 14 TABLE 3 15 Summary of DCF Results 16 17 Description <u>Average</u> 18 Constant Growth DCF Model (Analysts' Growth) 9.10% 19 Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth) 9.10% 20 Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model 8.97%

Risk Premium Model

21

22

23

24 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM MODEL.

25 A This model is based on the principle that investors require a higher return to

assume greater risk. Common equity investments have greater risk than bonds because bonds have more security of payment in bankruptcy proceedings than common equity and the coupon payments on bonds represent contractual obligations. In contrast, companies are not required to pay dividends or guarantee returns on common equity investments. Therefore, common equity securities are considered to be more risky than bond securities.

This risk premium model is based on two estimates of an equity risk premium. First, I estimated the difference between the required return on utility common equity investments and U.S. Treasury bonds. The difference between the required return on common equity and the Treasury bond yield is the risk premium. I estimated the risk premium on an annual basis for each year over the period 1986 through June 2013. The common equity required returns were based on regulatory commission-authorized returns for electric utility companies. Authorized returns are typically based on expert witnesses' estimates of the contemporary investor-required return. I selected the period 1986 through June 2013 because public utility stocks consistently traded at a premium to book value during that period. This is illustrated in Exhibit MPG-10, which shows that market to book ratio since 1986 was consistently above 1.0. This is an indication that the commission-authorized returns on equity were positively received by the market.

The second equity risk premium estimate is based on the difference between regulatory commission-authorized returns on common equity and contemporary "A" rated utility bond yields. Over this period, regulatory authorized returns were sufficient to support market prices that at least exceeded book value. This is an indication that regulatory authorized returns on common

equity supported a utility's ability to issue additional common stock without diluting existing shares. It further demonstrates that utilities were able to access equity markets without a detrimental impact on current shareholders.

Based on this analysis, as shown in Exhibit MPG-11, the average indicated equity risk premium over U.S. Treasury bond yields has been 5.35%. Of the 28 observations, 22 indicated risk premiums fall in the range of 4.41% to 6.31%. Since the risk premium can vary depending upon market conditions and changing investor risk perceptions, I believe using an estimated range of risk premiums provides the best method to measure the current return on common equity using this methodology.

As shown in Exhibit MPG-12, the average indicated equity risk premium over contemporary Moody's utility bond yields was 3.95% over the period 1986 through June 2013. The indicated equity risk premium estimates based on this analysis primarily fall in the range of 3.03% to 4.89% over this time period.

Q

A

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THESE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON A TIME PERIOD THAT IS TOO LONG OR TOO SHORT TO DRAW ACCURATE CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING CONTEMPORARY MARKET CONDITIONS?

No. Contemporary market conditions can change dramatically during the period that rates determined in this proceeding will be in effect. A relatively long period of time where stock valuations reflect premiums to book value is an indication that the authorized returns on equity and the corresponding equity risk premiums were supportive of investors' return expectations and provided utilities access to the equity markets under reasonable terms and conditions. Further, this time

period is long enough to smooth abnormal market movement that might distort equity risk premiums. While market conditions and risk premiums do vary over time, this historical time period is a reasonable period to estimate contemporary risk premiums.

The time period I use in this risk premium study is a generally accepted period to develop a risk premium study using "expectational" data. Conversely, studies have recommended that use of "actual achieved return data" should be based on very long historical time periods. The studies find that achieved returns over short time periods may not reflect investors' expected returns due to unexpected and abnormal stock price performance. However, these short-term abnormal actual returns would be smoothed over time and the achieved actual returns over long time periods would approximate investors' expected returns. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that averages of annual achieved returns over long time periods will generally converge on the investors' expected returns.

My risk premium study is based on expectational data, not actual returns, and, thus, need not encompass very long time periods.

O

Α

BASED ON HISTORICAL DATA, WHAT RISK PREMIUM HAVE YOU USED TO ESTIMATE GULF POWER'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

The equity risk premium should reflect the relative market perception of risk in the utility industry today. I have gauged investor perceptions in utility risk today in Exhibit MPG-13. On that exhibit, I show the yield spread between utility bonds and Treasury bonds over the last 34 years. As shown on this exhibit, the average utility bond yield spreads over Treasury bonds for "A" and "Baa" rated

utility bonds for this historical period are 1.55% and 1.96%, respectively. The utility bond yield spreads over Treasury bonds for "A" and "Baa" rated utilities during June 2013 are 1.06% and 1.58%, respectively.

A current 13-week average "A" rated utility bond yield of 4.73%, when compared to the current Treasury bond yield of 3.71% as shown in Exhibit MPG-14, page 1 implies a yield spread of around 1.02%. This current utility bond yield spread is lower than the 34-year average spread for "A" utility bonds of 1.55%. Similarly, the current spread for the "Baa" utility yields of 1.55% is lower than the 34-year average spread of 1.96%.

These utility bond yield spreads are clear evidence that the market considers the utility industry to be a relatively low-risk investment and demonstrates that utilities continue to have strong access to capital.

Q

Α

HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE GULF POWER'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY WITH THIS RISK PREMIUM MODEL?

I added a projected long-term Treasury bond yield to my estimated equity risk premium over Treasury yields. The 13-week average 30-year Treasury bond yield, ending September 20, 2013 was 3.71%, as shown in Exhibit MPG-14, page 1. *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts* projects the 30-year Treasury bond yield to be 4.20%, and a 10-year Treasury bond yield to be 3.20%. Using the projected 30-year bond yield of 4.00%, and a Treasury bond risk premium of 4.41% to 6.31%, as developed above, produces an estimated common equity return in the range of 8.61% (4.20% + 4.41%) to 10.51% (4.20% + 6.31%). My risk premium estimates fall in the range of 8.61% to 10.51%.

¹⁷Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, September 1, 2013 at 2.

I next added my equity risk premium over utility bond yields to a current 13-week average yield on "Baa" rated utility bonds for the period ending September 20, 2013 of 5.23%. Adding the utility equity risk premium of 3.03% to 4.89%, as developed above, to rated bond yield of 5.23%, produces a cost of equity in the range of 8.26% (5.23% + 3.03%) to 10.12% (5.23% + 4.89%).

WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RETURN FOR GULF POWER BASED ON

YOUR RISK PREMIUM STUDY?

Q

A

My recommendation considers both utility security risk and market interest rate risk. Current interest rate spreads suggest the market is embracing utility investments as relatively low-risk investment alternatives. This is clearly evident from the low utility bond spreads relative to Treasury bonds currently compared to the historical time period studied. (See Exhibits MPG-13 and MPG-14). Also, the market is pricing "A" utility bonds to produce lower yields compared to general corporate "A" bonds. On average over time, "A" utility bond yields are higher than "A" corporate bond yields, but not currently. (*Id.*) All of this supports my conclusion that the utility industry is perceived as a low-risk stable investment.

On the other hand, the Federal Reserve has been procuring long-term Treasury and collateralized bonds in an effort to stimulate the U.S. economy. This stimulus has reduced long-term interest rates. This government stimulus initiative is expected to be suspended in the near future. The suspension of the Federal Reserve's stimulus in long-term interest rate markets could cause long-term market interest rates to increase. As such, I believe there is additional risk

in long-term interest rate markets created by this Federal Reserve stimulus policy.

I recommend giving more weight to the high-end of my risk premium results to reflect the greater market interest rate risk in the current market. I propose to provide 75% weight to the high-end of my risk premium estimates and 25% to the low-end of my risk premium estimates. Providing more weight to the high-end risk premium captures the greater market interest rate risk. This results in a risk premium estimate over Treasury bond yields of 10.04%, 18 and a risk premium estimate over "A" utility bond yields of 9.66%. 19

My risk premium analysis produces a risk premium in the range of 9.66% to 10.04%, with a midpoint of 9.85%.

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Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")

14 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CAPM.

A The CAPM method of analysis is based upon the theory that the market-required rate of return for a security is equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk premium associated with the specific security. This relationship between risk and return can be expressed mathematically as follows:

$$R_i = R_f + B_i \times (R_m - R_f)$$
 where:

20 R_i = Required return for stock i

 $R_f = Risk-free rate$

 $R_m = Expected return for the market portfolio$

 $B_i = Beta - Measure of the risk for stock$

 $^{^{18}75\% \}times 10.51\% + 25\% \times 8.61\% = 10.04\%$.

 $^{^{19}75\% \}times 10.12\% + 25\% \times 8.26\% = 9.66\%$.

The stock-specific risk term in the above equation is beta. Beta represents the investment risk that cannot be diversified away when the security is held in a diversified portfolio. When stocks are held in a diversified portfolio, firm-specific risks can be eliminated by balancing the portfolio with securities that react in the opposite direction to firm-specific risk factors (e.g., business cycle, competition, product mix, and production limitations).

The risks that cannot be eliminated when held in a diversified portfolio are non-diversifiable risks. Non-diversifiable risks are related to the market in general and are referred to as systematic risks. Risks that can be eliminated by diversification are regarded as non-systematic risks. In a broad sense, systematic risks are market risks, and non-systematic risks are business risks. The CAPM theory suggests that the market will not compensate investors for assuming risks that can be diversified away. Therefore, the only risk that investors will be compensated for are systematic or non-diversifiable risks. The beta is a measure of the systematic or non-diversifiable risks.

Q

PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CAPM.

A The CAPM requires an estimate of the market risk-free rate, the company's beta, and the market risk premium.

Q WHAT DID YOU USE AS AN ESTIMATE OF THE MARKET RISK-FREE

22 RATE?

As previously noted, *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*' projected 30-year Treasury bond yield is 4.20%.²⁰ The current 30-year Treasury bond yield is 3.71%, as

²⁰Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, September 1, 2013 at 2.

1		shown in Exhibit MPG-14, page 1. To produce a conservative estimate, I used
2		Blue Chip Financial Forecasts' projected 30-year Treasury bond yield of 4.20%
3		for my CAPM analysis.
4		
5	Q	WHY DID YOU USE LONG-TERM TREASURY BOND YIELDS AS AN
6		ESTIMATE OF THE RISK-FREE RATE?
7	Α	Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
8		government, so long-term Treasury bonds are considered to have negligible
9		credit risk. Also, long-term Treasury bonds have an investment horizon similar to
10		that of common stock. As a result, investor-anticipated long-run inflation
11		expectations are reflected in both common-stock required returns and long-term
12		bond yields. Therefore, the nominal risk-free rate (or expected inflation rate and
13		real risk-free rate) included in a long-term bond yield is a reasonable estimate of
14		the nominal risk-free rate included in common stock returns.
15		Treasury bond yields, however, do include risk premiums related to
16		unanticipated future inflation and interest rates. A Treasury bond yield is not a
17		risk-free rate. Risk premiums related to unanticipated inflation and interest rates
18		are systematic or market risks. Consequently, for companies with betas less
19		than 1.0, using the Treasury bond yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the
20		CAPM analysis can produce an overstated estimate of the CAPM return.
21		
22	Q	WHAT BETA DID YOU USE IN YOUR ANALYSIS?
23	Α	As shown in Exhibit MPG-15, the proxy group average Value Line beta estimate
24		is 0.74.

HOW DID YOU DERIVE YOUR MARKET RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATE?

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I derived two market risk premium estimates, a forward-looking estimate and one based on a long-term historical average.

The forward-looking estimate was derived by estimating the expected return on the market (as represented by the S&P 500) and subtracting the riskfree rate from this estimate. I estimated the expected return on the S&P 500 by adding an expected inflation rate to the long-term historical arithmetic average real return on the market. The real return on the market represents the achieved return above the rate of inflation.

Morningstar's Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2013 Classic Yearbook estimates the historical arithmetic average real market return over the period 1926 to 2012 as 8.7%.21 A current consensus analysts' inflation projection, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, is 2.2%.22 Using these estimates, the expected market return is 11.10%.²³ The market risk premium then is the difference between the 11.10% expected market return, and my 4.20% risk-free rate estimate, or approximately 6.9%.

The historical estimate of the market risk premium was also estimated by Morningstar in Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2013 Classic Yearbook. Over the period 1926 through 2012. Morningstar's study estimated that the arithmetic average of the achieved total return on the S&P 500 was 11.8%, 24 and the total return on long-term Treasury bonds was 6.1%.25 The indicated market risk

²¹Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Classic Yearbook at 88.

²²Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, August 1, 2013 at 2.

²³{ [(1 + 0.087) * (1 + 0.022)] - 1 } * 100.

²⁴Morningstar, Inc. Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Classic Yearbook at 87.

premium is 5.7% (11.8% - 6.1% = 5.7%). The average of my market risk premium estimates is 6.3% (6.9% to 5.7%).

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Q HOW DOES YOUR ESTIMATED MARKET RISK PREMIUM RANGE COMPARE TO THAT ESTIMATED BY MORNINGSTAR?

Morningstar's analysis indicates that a market risk premium falls somewhere in the range of 6.0% to 6.7%. My market risk premium falls in the range of 5.7% to 7.0%. My average market risk premium of 6.4% is in the middle of Morningstar's range.

Morningstar estimates a forward-looking market risk premium based on actual achieved data from the historical period of 1926 through 2012. Using this data, Morningstar estimates a market risk premium derived from the total return on large company stocks (S&P 500), less the income return on Treasury bonds. The total return includes capital appreciation, dividend or coupon reinvestment returns, and annual yields received from coupons and/or dividend payments. The income return, in contrast, only reflects the income return received from dividend payments or coupon yields. Morningstar argues that the income return is the only true risk-free rate associated with Treasury bonds and is the best approximation of a truly risk-free rate.²⁶ I disagree with this assessment from Morningstar, because it does not reflect a true investment option available to the marketplace and therefore does not produce a legitimate estimate of the expected premium of investing in the stock market versus that of Treasury bonds. Nevertheless, I will use Morningstar's conclusion to show the reasonableness of my market risk premium estimates.

²⁶Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook at 55.

Morningstar's range is based on several methodologies. First, Morningstar estimates a market risk premium of 6.7% based on the difference between the total market return on common stocks (S&P 500) less the income return on Treasury bond investments. Second, Morningstar found that if the New York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE") was used as the market index rather than the S&P 500, that the market risk premium would be 6.5%, not 6.7%. Third, if only the two deciles of the largest companies included in the NYSE were considered, the market risk premium would be 6.0%. ²⁷

Finally, Morningstar found that the 6.7% market risk premium based on the S&P 500 was influenced by an abnormal expansion of price-to-earnings ("P/E") ratios relative to earnings and dividend growth during the period 1980 through 2001. Morningstar believes this abnormal P/E expansion is not sustainable.²⁸ Therefore, Morningstar adjusted this market risk premium estimate to normalize the growth in the P/E ratio to be more in line with the growth in dividends and earnings. Based on this alternative methodology, Morningstar published a long-horizon supply-side market risk premium of 6.0%.²⁹

To again be conservative in the CAPM estimate, I will use the higher 6.7% market risk premium in my CAPM study as opposed to the 6.4% that I calculated independently.

²⁷Morningstar observes that the S&P 500 and the NYSE Decile 1-2 are both large capitalization benchmarks. *Id.* at 54.

²⁸Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook at 54.

"Id.

Q 1 WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS? 2 Α As shown in Exhibit MPG-16, based on Morningstar's market risk premium of 3 6.7%, a risk-free rate of 4.20%, and a beta of 0.74, my CAPM analysis produces 4 a return of 9.14%, rounded to 9.10%. 5 Return on Equity Summary 6 7 Q BASED ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY 8 ANALYSES DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHAT RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY DO 9 YOU RECOMMEND FOR GULF POWER? 10 Based on my analyses, I estimate Gulf Power's current market cost of equity to 11 be 9.45% 12 TABLE 4 13 Return on Common Equity Summary 14 Description Results 15 DCF 9.10% 16 Risk Premium 9.85% 17 CAPM 9.10% 18 19 My recommended return on common equity is 9.45%. My recommended 20 return on equity is in the range of approximately 9.10% to 9.85%. The low-end 21 recommended return of 9.10% is based on my DCF and CAPM return estimates. 22 The high-end is supported by my risk premium result, 9.85%. 23 24 25

Financial Integrity

2	Q	WILL YOUR RECOMMENDED OVERALL RATE OF RETURN SUPPORT AN
3		INVESTMENT GRADE BOND RATING FOR GULF POWER?
4	Α	Yes. I have reached this conclusion by comparing the key credit rating financial
5		ratios for Gulf Power, at my proposed return on equity and capital structure, to
6		S&P's benchmark financial ratios using S&P's new credit metric ranges.
7		
8	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MOST RECENT S&P FINANCIAL RATIO CREDIT
9		METRIC METHODOLOGY.
10	Α	S&P publishes a matrix of financial ratios that correspond to its assessment of
11		the business risk of the utility company and related bond rating. On May 27,
12		2009, S&P expanded its matrix criteria ³⁰ by including additional business and
13		financial risk categories. Based on S&P's most recent credit matrix, the business
14		risk profile categories are "Excellent," "Strong," "Satisfactory," "Fair," "Weak," and
15		"Vulnerable." Most electric utilities have a business risk profile of "Excellent" or
16		"Strong." The financial risk profile categories are "Minimal," "Modest,"
17		"Intermediate," "Significant," "Aggressive," and "Highly Leveraged." Most of the
18		electric utilities have a financial risk profile of "Aggressive." Gulf Power has an
19		"Excellent" business risk profile and a "Significant" financial risk profile.
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³⁰S&P updated its 2008 credit metric guidelines in 2009, and incorporated utility metric benchmarks with the general corporate rating metrics. *Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect*: "Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded," May 27, 2009.

Q 1 PLEASE DESCRIBE S&P'S USE OF THE FINANCIAL BENCHMARK RATIOS 2 IN ITS CREDIT RATING REVIEW. 3 A S&P evaluates a utility's credit rating based on an assessment of its financial and 4 business risks. A combination of financial and business risks equates to the 5 overall assessment of Gulf Power's total credit risk exposure. S&P publishes a 6 matrix of financial ratios that defines the level of financial risk as a function of the 7 level of business risk. 8 S&P publishes ranges for three primary financial ratios that it uses as 9 guidance in its credit review for utility companies. The three primary financial ratio benchmarks it relies on in its credit rating process include: (1) Total Debt to 10 11 Total Capital; (2) Debt to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 12 Amortization ("EBITDA"); and (3) Funds From Operations ("FFO") to Total Debt. 31 13 14 Q HOW DID YOU APPLY S&P'S FINANCIAL RATIOS TO TEST THE REASONABLENESS OF YOUR RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATIONS? 15 16 I calculated each of S&P's financial ratios based on Gulf Power's cost of service Α 17 for its retail jurisdictional electric operations. While S&P would normally look at total consolidated Gulf Power financial ratios in its credit review process, my 18 19 investigation in this proceeding is not the same as S&P's. I am attempting to 20 judge the reasonableness of my proposed cost of capital for rate-setting in Gulf 21 Power's retail regulated utility operations. Hence, I am attempting to determine 22 whether my proposed rate of return will in turn support cash flow metrics, balance 23 sheet strength, and earnings that will support an investment grade bond rating 24 and Gulf Power's financial integrity for those operations.

³¹Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded," May 27, 2009.

1 Q DID YOU INCLUDE ANY OFF-BALANCE SHEET DEBT EQUIVALENTS? 2 Α Yes. As shown on page 3 of my Exhibit MPG-17, I included \$1.3 million of 3 off-balance sheet debt equivalents including purchased power agreements and 4 operating leases and their associated interest and depreciation expenses. I 5 included these debt equivalents in my credit metric calculations. 6 PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF THIS CREDIT METRIC ANALYSIS 7 Q 8 FOR GULF POWER. 9 Α The S&P financial metric calculations for Gulf Power at a 9.45% return are 10 developed on Exhibit MPG-17, page 1. Gulf Power's adjusted total debt ratio is approximately 47%. This is at the 11 12 low end of the "Aggressive" utility guideline range of 50% to 60%. This total debt 13 ratio will support an investment grade bond rating. 14 As shown in Exhibit MPG-17, page 1, column 1, based on an equity 15 return of 9.45%, Gulf Power will be provided an opportunity to produce a debt to 16 EBITDA ratio of 3.0x. This is at the low end of "Significant" guideline range of 17 3.0x to 4.0x.³² This ratio also supports an investment grade credit rating. 18 Finally, Gulf Power's retail operations FFO to total debt coverage at a 19 9.45% equity return would be 24%, which is also within S&P's "Significant" metric 20 guideline range of 20% to 30%. The FFO/total debt ratio will support an 21 investment grade bond rating. 22 At my recommended return on equity of 9.45% and proposed capital 23 structure, Gulf Power's financial credit metrics are supportive of its current 24 investment grade utility bond rating.

³²Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded," May 27, 2009 at 4.

1	RES	PONSE TO GULF POWER WITNESS DR. JAMES VANDER WEIDE	LF									
2	Q	WHAT IS DR. VANDER WEIDE'S RETURN ON EQUIT	DR.									
3		RECOMMENDATION?										
4	Α	Gulf Power's rate of return witness, Dr. Vander Weide, recommends a return on										
5		equity of 11.5%. His recommended return is based on an estimated return for										
6		his proxy group of 10.8% including a flotation cost adder of about 24 basis points,										
7		plus a leverage adjustment of 70 basis points. The leverage adjustment is base	djus									
8		on Dr. Vander Weide's belief that Gulf Power has greater financial risk than the	/eide									
9		proxy group.										
10												
11	Q	HOW DID DR. VANDER WEIDE DEVELOP HIS RETURN ON EQUIT	VA									
12		RANGE?										
13	Α	Dr. Vander Weide developed his return on equity recommendation by applying	le de									
14		the DCF, Risk Premium and CAPM models to a utility proxy group. Dr. Vande	remi									
15		Weide arrived at his recommendations by reviewing Gulf Power's business	t hi									
16		operations, market conditions, and utility industry trends at the time of his filing.	et co									
17												
18	Q	PLEASE SUMMARIZE DR. VANDER WEIDE'S PROPOSED RETURN O	ARI									
19		EQUITY FOR GULF POWER.	JLF									
20	Α	As shown below in Table 5, his analyses produce an average return on equity of	in T									
21		10.8% without his CAPM return estimates, and 10.7% including all of his results	s CA									
22		However, as I demonstrate below, Dr. Vander Weide's DCF and RP studies, wit	mon									
23		reasonable adjustments, produce a return on equity for Gulf Power of	stm									
24		approximately 9.25%.	25%									

TABLE 5 Gulf Power's ROE Analysis Vander Weide Model Proposed Adjusted Constant Growth DCF 10.4% 9.10% Ex Ante Risk Premium 11.2% 9.40% Ex Post Risk Premium 10.8% 9.00% 9.1% CAPM Historical 10.4% CAPM DCF 10.7% 9.1% Point Estimate 10.8% 9.0% Leverage Adjustment 0.7% Reject Recommendation 9.25% 11.5%

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HOW DID DR. VANDER WEIDE DEVELOP HIS LEVERAGE ADJUSTMENT?

Sources: Vander Weide Direct at 50.

He develops this on his Exhibit ____ (JVW-1), Schedule 9. On that schedule, he develops a post-tax cost of equity using his proposed 10.8% cost of equity, and the market weighted average capital structure for his proxy group. This produced a weighted average cost of capital, post-tax, of 7.17%.

He then estimated the return on common equity that would produce the same post-tax weighted average cost of capital (7.17%) when applied to Gulf Power's book value capital structure. As shown on his Schedule 9, a return on book value equity at 11.5% would produce the same post-tax cost of equity on Gulf Power's book value capital structure, as he produced using the market value capital structure of his proxy group.

Q WHY IS DR. VANDER WEIDE'S PROPOSED LEVERAGE EQUITY RETURN 1 2 ADDER UNREASONABLE? 3 Α The leverage adjustment increases the return on equity to reflect Gulf Power's 4 greater book value financial risk compared to the market value financial risk of 5 the proxy group. However, such an adjustment to the equity return is erroneous 6 for at least two reasons. 7 First, Dr. Vander Weide's contention that an adjustment should be made 8 for differentials in book value and market value financial risk is without merit. The 9 implicit premise of Dr. Vander Weide's leverage adjustment is that financial risk is 10 measured differently using book value capitalization versus market value 11 capitalization. This premise is without merit, because the Company's financial 12 risk is tied to both its book value capitalization which in turn drives its market 13 value capitalization. They are not separate risk factors. 14 Second, Dr. Vander Weide's proposed leverage adjustment is really 15 nothing more than a flawed market-to-book ratio adjustment. The leverage 16 equity return adder results in an excess return on incremental utility plant 17 investments. 18 For these reasons, the leverage adjustment is without merit, and should 19 continue to be rejected by the Commission just as it was in Gulf Power's last rate 20 case. 21 22 23 24

1	Q	WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A COMPANY DOES NOT HAVE DIFFERENT
2		FINANCIAL RISK WHETHER IT IS MEASURED ON BOOK VALUE OR
3		MARKET VALUE CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
4	Α	The company's financial risk concerns its ability to meet its financial obligations.
5		Its ability to meet its financial obligations is tied to its ability to reliably produce
6		internal generation of earnings and cash to pay its financial obligations. A
7		company does not have one level of financial risk based on its book value capital
8		structure, and another level of financial risk based on its market value capital
9		structure.
10		
11	Q	HOW DOES BOOK VALUE LEVERAGE ESTABLISH A COMPANY'S
12		FINANCIAL RISK?
13	Α	Book value leverage represents the utility's contractual obligations to pay debt
14		interest and principal payments. These book value financial obligations must be
15		paid from utility operating cash flows.
16		In generating free cash flow, the utility must make debt interest payments
17		from operating income, and produce net cash flow after interest payments are
18		made to support debt principal payments, construction expenditures, and to pay
19		common dividends. Internal cash flows must support book value leverage. If
20		cash flows are not adequate to meet book value obligations, the company can be
21		forced into default. Financial risk concerns the likelihood a utility cannot pay
22		these financial obligations.
23		The market value capital structure leverage does not measure whether a
24		utility's earnings and free cash flow will cover its contractual financial obligations.
25		These cash flows do drive stock valuations which produce the market

capitalization structure. Nevertheless, the resulting stock valuations and market capitalization do not describe how reliably the internally generated cash flows will cover the fixed financial obligations of the company.

For these reasons, the financial risk is best described by the book value financial obligations in relationship to the cash flows produced on the company's books and records.

Q

Α

IS GULF POWER'S FINANCIAL RISK COMPARABLE TO THAT OF THE PROXY GROUP?

Yes. All factors considered by market participants indicate Gulf Power's financial risk is comparable to, if not lower than, that of the proxy group. This is evidenced from the following: The best indicator of total financial risk for any company is in its bond ratings. The Company's bond ratings from S&P and Moody's are "A" and "A3", respectively. When determining its ratings, S&P tends to look at it from the view of a consolidated basis, where as Moody's, while taking the ability to move capital between subsidiaries and the parent into consideration, tends to base its ratings on an individual operating subsidiary basis. Of my 28-company proxy group, there is only one company that has as high of a bond rating from Moody's as Gulf Power, and that is Wisconsin Energy Corporation. The proxy group's average bond rating from Moody's, which is shown on my Exhibit MPG-2, is "Baa2". Gulf Power's "A3" rating is two notches higher than the group average. The only company in the proxy group with an "A" rating from S&P, which is also the highest rating within the group and the same as Gulf Power's S&P rating, is Southern Company, Gulf Power's parent holding company. This

1 evidence suggests that Gulf Power, in fact, has less financial risk than that of the 2 proxy group, contrary to the belief Dr. Vander Weide. 3 Secondly, as shown on my Exhibit MPG-2, Gulf Power has a common 4 equity ratio of approximately 47.5% on an investor supplied basis (inclusive of short-term debt). The average common equity ratio of my 28-company proxy 5 6 group from SNL is 45.1%. This is approximately 240 basis points less than that 7 of the Company's. In fact, out of the 28 companies in my proxy group, only ten have a thicker common equity ratio than that of Gulf Power. It should be noted 8 9 that each of those ten companies also have a lower bond rating from both S&P 10 and Moody's than that of Gulf Power. It is prudent to compare the Company's 11 47.5% common equity ratio to the proxy group's common equity ratios provided by SNL because it includes short-term debt in its capital structure calculations. 12 13 These factors indicate that Gulf Power's financial risk is lower than that of 14 the proxy group, not higher as Dr. Vander Weide erroneously concludes. 15 16 Q WHY WILL DR. VANDER WEIDE'S LEVERAGE RETURN ADDER PROVIDE 17 EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION ON INCREMENTAL UTILITY PLANT 18 INVESTMENTS? Because it will provide Gulf Power an excessive risk adjusted return on 19 Α 20 incremental plant investments, I will use Dr. Vander Weide's DCF results to 21 illustrate this point. 22 If Gulf Power were to repurchase its own stock, it would expect to earn a

market-based return of 10.80% based on Dr. Vander Weide's unadjusted DCF

results. However, if the Commission accepted Dr. Vander Weide's leverage

23

adjusted return, it could earn a return on incremental utility plant investments of 11.50% (the 10.80% plus 0.7% leverage adjustment).

If the utility was considering its options for reinvesting its retained earnings, it could be faced with the alternative investments of: (1) repurchase its own stock at a 10.80% return, or (2) invest in new utility plant at a 11.50% return. These are comparable risk investments because utility plant investments drive earnings, and earnings drive dividends and stock price. Under Dr. Vander Weide's proposal, the utility would be encouraged to gold-plate utility plant investment because it would be provided with an above-market risk adjusted return on such investments. Providing a utility an incentive to earn more than a fair risk adjusted return on utility plant investments will result in rates not being just and reasonable.

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PLEASE DESCRIBE DR. VANDER WEIDE'S DCF ANALYSIS.

Dr. Vander Weide applied the traditional DCF model to a utility proxy group.

Based on his utility group, his DCF study produces a return on equity of 10.4%.

(Vander Weide Direct at 32 and Exhibit____ (JHV-1), Schedule 1).

Q DO YOU TAKE ISSUE WITH DR. VANDER WEIDE'S DCF ANALYSES?

Yes. I have several major issues concerning his DCF analyses. First, Dr. Vander Weide's constant growth DCF study is overstated because the analysts' three- to five-year growth rates he uses are not reasonable estimates of long-term sustainable growth. The constant growth DCF model used by Dr. Vander Weide requires an estimated long-term sustainable growth. In contrast, the analysts' growth rates he relies on reflect only the outlooks over the next three to

five years. To the extent the analysts' growth rate estimates are not reasonable estimates of long-term sustainable growth, then the DCF return estimate he produces from this study is not reliable. Because the analysts' growth rates exceed a reasonable estimate of long-term sustainable growth, Dr. Vander Weide's DCF return estimate is inflated and should be rejected.

Second, I believe his DCF return estimate is unreasonable because he relies on a quarterly compounding version of the DCF model. For the reasons set forth below, the quarterly compounding of the DCF model overestimates a utility's cost of capital because it provides utilities with an opportunity to earn the dividend reinvestment return twice: first, through authorized returns on equity and earnings to the utility, and a second time after dividends are actually paid to investors and reinvested in alternative investments to the utility stock the dividend was earned upon.

Third, Dr. Vander Weide includes a flotation cost adjustment, which increases the DCF return by approximately 24 basis points. Finally, Dr. Vander Weide's data included in his study reflected three months of data ending February 2013 (Vander Weide Exhibit___ (JHV-1), Schedule 1, page 2. This data is stale and does not reflect current market costs. Excluding the three adjustments I made to Dr. Vander Weide's proxy group and eliminating the companies currently involved in merger and acquisition activity, my updated DCF return estimates for his proxy group are approximately 9.1%. This result excludes reliance on excessive growth rates, and on the overstatement of Gulf Power's cost of capital by including the quarterly compounding component and

³³ Exhibit MPG-5.

excluding the flotation cost adjustment which has not been shown to truly reflect Gulf Power's actual cost of issued stock to the public.

Q

PLEASE DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE DR. VANDER WEIDE'S THREE- TO FIVE-YEAR ANALYSTS' GROWTH RATE PROJECTIONS ARE NOT REASONABLE ESTIMATES OF LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE GROWTH.

As shown on his Exhibit___ (JHV-1), Schedule 1, the growth rates from his proxy group in every instance but a few exceed the projected nominal growth of the U.S. GDP. As stated above, consensus economists' projections of long-term growth for the U.S. GDP are around 4.9%. In contrast, Dr. Vander Weide's 30 utility company proxy group has an average growth rate of 5.6%.

I explained above that both practitioners and academics support the notion that long-term sustainable growth cannot be greater than the economy in which the company sells its goods and services. Growth can exceed the service area economic growth over short periods of time, but over the long-term the expectation that the growth will exceed the economy in which it sells its services is not rational nor reasonable. Because Dr. Vander Weide's growth rates exceed a maximum sustainable long-term growth, his DCF results are inflated and unreliable. The analysts' growth rates Dr. Vander Weide relies on reflect only the growth outlooks over the next three to five years. The constant growth DCF model requires a growth rate that can be sustained indefinitely. To the extent the analysts' 3-5 year projected growth rate estimates are not reasonable estimates of long-term sustainable growth, then the DCF return estimates Dr. Vander Weide produces are inflated and not reliable.

Q 1 WHY IS A QUARTERLY COMPOUNDING ADJUSTMENT TO A DCF RETURN 2 ESTIMATE NOT REASONABLE? 3 A Including the quarterly compounding adjustment to Gulf Power's authorized 4 return on equity is inappropriate. If a quarterly compounding adjustment is added 5 to a DCF return estimate, shareholders will be permitted to earn the dividend 6 reinvestment return twice: (1) through the higher authorized return on equity, 7 and (2) through actual receipt of dividends and the reinvestment of those 8 dividends throughout the year. This double counting of the dividend 9 reinvestment return is not reasonable and will unjustly inflate Gulf Power's rates. 10 Q PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY THE QUARTERLY COMPOUNDING RETURN 11 12 SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN GULF POWER'S AUTHORIZED RETURN 13 ON EQUITY. 14 A Simply put, the quarterly compounding component of the return is not a cost to 15 the utility. Only the utility's cost of common equity capital should be included in 16 the authorized return on equity. 17 This issue surrounds whether or not the DCF return estimate should 18 include the expectations by investors that they will receive cash flows within the 19 year, that can be reinvested in other investments of comparable risk, and thus 20 the cash flows will produce compounded returns throughout the year. The 21 relevant issue for setting rates is whether or not that reinvestment return is a cost 22 to the utility. It is not! 23 The reinvestment return is not a cost to the utility and therefore should not 24 be included in the authorized return on equity. While it is reasonable for 25 investors to expect to have the opportunity to earn the compounded return

produced by cash flows received within the year, the compound return is not paid to investors by the utility.

Q

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CAN YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE OF WHY THE COMPOUNDING RETURN ESTIMATE IS NOT A COST TO THE UTILITY?

Yes. I will provide two examples to help illustrate this point. First, consider the cost to the utility of an outstanding utility bond. Most utility bonds pay a coupon every six months. The utility annual cost paid to the bond investor is the sum of the two semi-annual coupon payments. A bond investor expects to receive the semi-annual coupon payments from the utility, but also has an opportunity to reinvest the first coupon payment for the remaining six months of the year to enhance his end-of-year return. This compound return component is, however, not a cost to the utility because the utility does not pay the extra return.

For example, assume Gulf Power has an outstanding bond with a face value of \$1,000, at an interest rate of 6% which is paid in two semi-annual \$30 coupon payments. Gulf Power's cost of this bond is 6%. This 6% cost to Gulf Power is based on a \$30 coupon payment paid in month 6 and month 12 for an annual payment of \$60 relative to the \$1,000 face value of the bond. However, the bond investor would have an annual expected return on this bond of 6.1%. This annual expected return would be realized by receiving the first \$30 semi-annual coupon payment from Gulf Power and reinvesting it for the remaining six months of the year. This would produce \$0.89 of semi-annual compounding return (\$30 x [(1.06)^{1/2} - 1]). Hence, the bond investor would receive \$60 from Gulf Power, and \$0.89 from investing the first coupon for a total annual return of 6.09%, or 6.1%.

Importantly, if Gulf Power were to recover a 6.1% cost of this bond in its cost of service, and paid that return out to the bond investor, then the bond investor would receive \$60.89 from Gulf Power, rather than the \$60.00 actual cost, but the bond investor could still reinvest the semi-annual coupon, now \$30.89 for the remaining six months of the year. This would provide the investor with the reinvestment return twice, once from utility ratepayers, and a second time after the semi-annual coupon payment was paid and reinvested.

Reflecting this compounding assumption in the authorized return on equity therefore will double count the reinvestment return opportunity.

Q

DOES THIS EXAMPLE ALSO APPLY TO UTILITY STOCK INVESTMENTS?

Yes. Assume now that an investor purchased Gulf Power stock for \$100, and expects to receive four quarterly dividends of \$1.50, or \$6.00 per year. The expected cost to the utility of this dividend payment over the year would be \$6.00, or 6.0%. However, the expected effective yield of the dividend to investors would be 6.13% because the quarterly dividends could be reinvested for the remaining term of the year. Hence, the expected end-of-year value of those four \$1.50 quarterly dividend payments to the investor would be \$6.13. Again, the utility pays \$6.00 of annual dividends. The \$0.13 is not paid to investors from the utility, but is rather earned in the other investments that earn the same return, which the dividends were invested in throughout the year.

Importantly, the reinvestment return of the dividends is not paid by the utility, and therefore is not part of the utility's cost of capital. Again, if this dividend reinvestment return is included in the utility's authorized return on

 $^{^{34}1.5 \}times (1.06)^{.75} + 1.5 \times (1.06)^{.5} + 1.5 \times (1.06)^{.25} + 1.5 = $6.13.$

1		equity, then investors will receive the dividend reinvestment return twice, once
2		through the authorized return on equity, and a second time when dividends are
3		actually received by investors and reinvested.
4		
5	Q	DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS CONCERNING DR. VANDER WEIDE'S
6		FLOTATION COSTS ADJUSTMENT?
7	Α	Yes. Dr. Vander Weide increased his DCF results to account for flotation costs.
8		This was done by adjusting the yield by 1 minus a flotation cost allowance of 5%.
9		(Direct at 29 and Schedule 1 at 21). This adjustment created a flotation cost
10		adder of 24 basis points.
11		
12	Q	DO YOU AGREE WITH DR. VANDER WEIDE'S FLOTATION COST
13		ESTIMATE?
14	Α	No. Dr. Vander Weide's flotation cost estimate is flawed and it should not be
15		taken into consideration when determining a fair return for Gulf Power.
16		Flotation costs are a legitimate cost of doing business. However, flotation
17		costs should only be included in the development of cost of service under two
18		conditions. First, the Company has to demonstrate what its actual flotation costs
19		are, and prove they are reasonable. It is not appropriate to approximate flotation
20		costs for utility companies and build those approximated costs into a utility's cost
21		of service. Costs should be known and measurable and should be verifiable and
22		most importantly should be shown to be reasonable before they are included in
23		cost of service. This is not possible if a utility's flotation costs are approximated,
24		as Dr. Vander Weide has done.

1		Second, and more important, Gulf Power is not a publicly traded
2		company. Rather, it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway.
3		Hence, Gulf Power does not incur costs related to selling common stock to the
4		market. Gulf Power's common equity capital comes from two sources:
5		(1) retained earnings, which incur no flotation costs, and (2) equity infusion from
6		its parent company.
7		Therefore, Dr. Vander Weide's adder to account for flotation costs should
8		be disregarded and not considered in determining Gulf Power's return on equity.
9		
10	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE DR. VANDER WEIDE'S EX ANTE RISK PREMIUM
11		METHODOLOGY.
12	Α	Dr. Vander Weide estimated a DCF return on a proxy group of electric
13		companies relative to the utility bond yield with a rating of "A." Based on this
14		study, Dr. Vander Weide asserts that his risk premium estimate was 4.62% for
15		this historical period based on prospective DCF return estimates relative to bond
16		yields.
17		To this estimated market risk premium of 4.62%, he added a projected
18		"A" rated Moody's bond utility yield of 6.55%. He then concluded that this
19		produced a return on common equity of 11.2%. (Vander Weide Direct at 35).
20		
21	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ISSUES YOU HAVE WITH DR. VANDER WEIDE'S
22		EX ANTE RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.
23	Α	I believe Dr. Vander Weide's estimated market risk premium from his ex ante risk
24		premium study represents a very high-end estimate of an appropriate risk
25		premium for this proceeding. However, because bond yields are relatively low

currently, it can be used to produce a reasonable return on equity estimate for Gulf Power. Also, Dr. Vander Weide's projected "A" rated utility yield is highly problematic.

Q

A

WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE ACCURACY OF FORECASTED INTEREST RATES IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC?

Over the last several years, observable current interest rates have been a more accurate predictor of future interest rates than economists' consensus projections. Exhibit MPG-18 illustrates this point. On this exhibit, under Columns 1 and 2, I show the actual market yield at the time a projection is made for Treasury bond yields two years in the future. In Column 1, I show the actual Treasury yield and, in Column 2, I show the projected yield two years out.

As shown in Columns 1 and 2, over the last several years, Treasury yields were projected to increase relative to the actual Treasury yields at the time of the projection. In Column 4, I show what the Treasury yield actually turned out to be two years after the forecast. Under Column 5, I show the actual yield change at the time of the projections relative to the projected yield change.

As shown in this exhibit, over the last several years, economists consistently have been projecting that interest rates will increase. However, as demonstrated under Column 5, those yield projections have turned out to be overstated in virtually every case. Indeed, actual Treasury yields have decreased or remained flat over the last five years, rather than increase as the economists' projections indicated. As such, current observable interest rates are just as likely to predict future interest rates as are economists' projections.

1	Q	CAN DR. VANDER WEIDE'S EX ANTE RISK PREMIUM STUDY BE REVISED
2		TO PRODUCE A MORE REASONABLE RESULT?
3	Α	Yes. Applying his equity risk premium estimate of 4.62% to the current
4		observable "A" rated utility bond yield of 4.73% produces a return on equity of
5		9.36%, rounded to 9.40% for Gulf Power.
6		
7	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE DR. VANDER WEIDE'S EX POST RISK PREMIUM
8		METHODOLOGY.
9	Α	In Dr. Vander Weide's ex post risk premium methodology, he compared the
10		historical realized return on the S&P 500 relative to estimated changes in bond
11		price for an "A" rated utility bond. He performed a second ex post risk premium
12		analysis comparing the historical achieved return on the S&P Utility Index,
13		relative again to changes in "A" rated utility bond yields.
14		Based on this analysis, Dr. Vander Weide estimates an equity risk
15		premium in the range of 4.4% (based on S&P 500) to 3.7% (based on utility
16		yields).
17		He then applies this estimated equity risk premium to his projected "A"
18		rated utility bond yield of 6.55% to produce an estimated equity risk premium in
19		the range of 10.3% to 10.9% with a midpoint of 10.6% before his 24 basis points
20		flotation cost adder. (Vander Weide Direct at 40).
21		
22	Q	DO YOU BELIEVE THAT DR. VANDER WEIDE'S EX POST RISK PREMIUM
23		RECOMMENDATION IS REASONABLE?
24	Α	No, for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier, his projected "A" rated utility
25		hand yield of 6.55% substantially exceeds current observable utility hand yields

of 4.36%. While these bond yields are low, Dr. Vander Weide's projected yield is abnormally high. Reflecting just the high-end of his estimated equity risk premium using his ex post risk premium study of 4.4%, with current bond yields of 4.73%, would indicate a fair return on equity for Gulf Power in this case of 9.03%, rounded to 9.0%. Accordingly, Dr. Vander Weide's recommended return on equity with this methodology substantially overstates current observable market costs.

Q

Α

PLEASE DESCRIBE DR. VANDER WEIDE'S CAPM STUDIES.

Dr. Vander Weide performed a historical DCF study based on a market risk premium of 6.7%, a risk-free rate of 5.25%, and beta estimate of 0.73. This study produced a return on equity estimate of 10.14%. (Vander Weide Direct at 44). Then he added a 24 basis point flotation adder, which increased his CAPM return from 10.14% to 10.38%, rounded to 10.4%.

Dr. Vander Weide also performed a DCF-based CAPM study, where he estimated the market risk premium using a DCF return on the S&P 500. Based on that study, Dr. Vander Weide estimated a market risk premium of 7.2%, and use of his risk-free rate of 5.25%, and beta estimate of 0.73, produced a CAPM return estimate of 10.5% increased to 10.7% including a 24 basis point flotation cost adder. (Vander Weide Direct at 48).

1	Q	DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS ABOUT DR. VANDER WEIDE'S
2		HISTORICAL AND DCF-BASED CAPM RETURN ESTIMATES?
3	Α	Yes. I have two issues. First, his risk-free rate of 5.25% is inflated and
4		unreliable and should be disregarded. Second, his inclusion of flotation cost has
5		not been shown to be cost justified for Gulf Power and should be disregarded.
6		
7	Q	HOW DID DR. VANDER WEIDE DERIVE HIS RISK-FREE RATE OF 5.25%?
8	Α	He derived a forecasted yield of a Treasury bond rate based on data he gathered
9		from Value Line, EIA and other sources. Specifically, he relies on a Value Line
10		forecast of 10-year Treasury note of 4.2% and adds a spread of 80 basis points
11		to produce his estimated forecasted yield on a long-term Treasury bond of
12		around 5%.
13		He uses an EIA forecasted 10-year Treasury bond yield of 4.7%, and
14		adds the 80 basis point spread to produce a forecasted long-term Treasury bond
15		yield of 5.5%. His point estimate of 5.25% is the midpoint of his forecast using
16		these Value Line and EIA projected 10-year Treasury bond yields.
17		
18	Q	IS DR. VANDER WEIDE'S PROJECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE
19		REASONABLE?
20	Α	No. He has not shown that his projected Treasury bond yields reflect current
21		capital market participants' outlooks, and therefore are not a general assessment
22		of independent market analysts' assessment of Gulf Power's market cost of
23		capital. A more balanced methodology would be to use The Blue Chip Financial
24		Forecasts' consensus economists' projected Treasury bond rates. This is a
25		source I used as an independent assessment of what market participants believe

1		Treasury bond rates will be two years out. Based on that assessment, a
2		Treasury bond rate of 4.2% is appropriate.
3		
4	Q	HOW WOULD DR. VANDER WEIDE'S CAPM STUDIES CHANGE IF THE
5		BLUE CHIP FINANCIAL FORECASTS' PROJECTED TREASURY BOND
6		RATE OF 4.1% WAS USED?
7	Α	Using a risk-free rate projection of 4.2%, a beta estimate of 0.73, and market risk
8		premium of 6.7% indicates a CAPM return estimate of 9.10%.
9		
10	Q	DID DR. VANDER WEIDE ALSO PERFORM A DCF CAPM ANALYSIS USING
11		A REVISED BETA ESTIMATE OF 0.89?
12	Α	No. However, Dr. Vander Weide states that the CAPM analysis overstates the
13		return estimates when the beta coefficient exceeds 1.0 and understates the
14		results when it is below 1.0. Hence, he finds it appropriate to adjust Value Line's
15		beta based on the ratio relationship of the S&P 500 risk premium of 5.78% and
16		the risk premium on Treasury yields of 5.14%.
17		
18	Q	IS DR. VANDER WEIDE'S 0.89 ADJUSTED BETA APPROPRIATE FOR
19		MEASURING GULF POWER'S COST OF EQUITY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
20	Α	No. While I do agree that the CAPM theory typically adjusts betas for producing
21		a reliable CAPM return estimate, Dr. Vander Weide is adjusting an adjusted beta
22		which already reflects the expectation of betas converging toward the mean over
23		time. Therefore, Dr. Vander Weide's adjustment to the Value Line adjusted
24		betas double-counts this beta adjustment necessary to produce a reliable CAPM
25		return estimate

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1		This deficiency of the CAPM analysis has been well documented in
2		financial literature and many investors' services such as Value Line and
3		Bloomberg have estimated adjusted betas. Dr. Vander Weide then concludes
4		that the actual utility beta of 0.73 was understated and proposes to use his
5		adjusted beta of 0.89. This conclusion is not supportable.
6		
7	Q	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
8	Α	Yes, it does.
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1		Qualifications of Michael P. Gorman
2	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
3	Α	Michael P. Gorman. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road,
4		Suite 140, Chesterfield, MO 63017.
5		
6	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR OCCUPATION.
7	Α	I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and a Managing Principal
8		with Brubaker & Associates, Inc., energy, economic and regulatory consultants.
9		
10	Q	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND WORK
11		EXPERIENCE.
12	Α	In 1983 I received a Bachelors of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from
13		Southern Illinois University, and in 1986, I received a Masters Degree in
14		Business Administration with a concentration in Finance from the University of
15		Illinois at Springfield. I have also completed several graduate level economics
16		courses.
17		In August of 1983, I accepted an analyst position with the Illinois
18		Commerce Commission ("ICC"). In this position, I performed a variety of anal-
19		yses for both formal and informal investigations before the ICC, including:
20		marginal cost of energy, central dispatch, avoided cost of energy, annual system
21		production costs, and working capital. In October of 1986, I was promoted to the
22		position of Senior Analyst. In this position, I assumed the additional respon-
23		sibilities of technical leader on projects, and my areas of responsibility were
24		expanded to include utility financial modeling and financial analyses.

In 1987, I was promoted to Director of the Financial Analysis Department. In this position, I was responsible for all financial analyses conducted by the staff. Among other things, I conducted analyses and sponsored testimony before the ICC on rate of return, financial integrity, financial modeling and related issues. I also supervised the development of all Staff analyses and testimony on these same issues. In addition, I supervised the Staff's review and recommendations to the Commission concerning utility plans to issue debt and equity securities.

In August of 1989, I accepted a position with Merrill-Lynch as a financial consultant. After receiving all required securities licenses, I worked with individual investors and small businesses in evaluating and selecting investments suitable to their requirements.

In September of 1990, I accepted a position with Drazen-Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("DBA"). In April 1995, the firm of Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("BAI") was formed. It includes most of the former DBA principals and Staff. Since 1990, I have performed various analyses and sponsored testimony on cost of capital, cost/benefits of utility mergers and acquisitions, utility reorganizations, level of operating expenses and rate base, cost of service studies, and analyses relating industrial jobs and economic development. I also participated in a study used to revise the financial policy for the municipal utility in Kansas City, Kansas.

At BAI, I also have extensive experience working with large energy users to distribute and critically evaluate responses to requests for proposals ("RFPs") for electric, steam, and gas energy supply from competitive energy suppliers. These analyses include the evaluation of gas supply and delivery charges, cogeneration and/or combined cycle unit feasibility studies, and the evaluation of third-party asset/supply management agreements. I have participated in rate

cases on rate design and class cost of service for electric, natural gas, water and wastewater utilities. I have also analyzed commodity pricing indices and forward pricing methods for third party supply agreements, and have also conducted regional electric market price forecasts.

In addition to our main office in St. Louis, the firm also has branch offices in Phoenix, Arizona and Corpus Christi, Texas.

Q

Α

HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED BEFORE A REGULATORY BODY?

Yes. I have sponsored testimony on cost of capital, revenue requirements, cost of service and other issues before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and numerous state regulatory commissions including: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and before the provincial regulatory boards in Alberta and Nova Scotia, Canada. I have also sponsored testimony before the Board of Public Utilities in Kansas City, Kansas; presented rate setting position reports to the regulatory board of the municipal utility in Austin, Texas, and Salt River Project, Arizona, on behalf of industrial customers; and negotiated rate disputes for industrial customers of the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia in the LaGrange, Georgia district.

1	Q	PLEASE	DESCRIBE	ANY	PROFES	SSIONAL	. RE	EGISTRAT	IONS	OR
2		ORGANIZA	ATIONS TO W	HICH Y	OU BELO	NG.				
3	Α	I earned th	ne designation	of Char	rtered Fin	ancial Ar	nalyst	("CFA") fr	om the	CFA
4		Institute.	The CFA cha	rter was	awarded	l after su	ıccess	fully comp	oleting	three
5		examinatio	ns which co	vered t	the subje	ect areas	s of	financial	accou	nting,
6		economics	, fixed income	e and e	equity val	uation ar	nd pro	ofessional	and e	thical
7		conduct. I	am a member	of the C	FA Institut	e's Finan	icial A	nalyst Soc	iety.	
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Rate of Return Adjusted Capital Structure 2014 Test Year

Line	Description	An	nount (000) (1)		Specific ljustments (2)	Pro Rata djustments (3)	System Adjusted (4)	Allocation (5)	Jui	ris Adjusted Amount (6)	Weight (7)	Cost (8)	Weighted Cost (9)
1	Long-Term Debt	\$	1,281,856	\$	(103,347)	\$ (600,313)	\$ 578,196	0.9809660	\$	567,191	30.11%	4.96%	1.49%
2	Short-Term Debt	\$	51,663	\$	(4,154)	\$ (24,200)	\$ 23,309	0.9809660	\$	22,865	1.21%	0.82%	0.01%
3	Preferrence Stock	\$	147,998.0	\$	(11,941)	\$ (69,305)	\$ 66,752	0.9809660	\$	65,481	3.48%	6.00%	0.21%
4	Common Equity	\$	1,332,898	\$	(102,440)	\$ (626,775)	\$ 603,683	0.9809660	\$	592,193	31.43%	9.45%	2.97%
5	Customer Deposits	\$	35,350	S		\$ -	\$ 35,350	1.0000000	\$	35,350	1.88%	2.30%	0.04%
6	Deferred Income Tax	\$	707,553	\$	(53,944)	\$ -	\$ 653,609	0.9809660	\$	641,168	34.03%	0.00%	0.00%
7	FASB 109 Deferred Taxes	\$	(47,899)	\$	3,652	\$ 120	\$ (44,247)	0.9809660	\$	(43,405)	-2.30%	0.00%	0.00%
8	Investment Tax Credit	\$	3,492	\$	(375)	\$ 	\$ 3,117	0.9809660	\$	3,058	0.16%	7.07%	0.01%
9	Total	\$	3,512,911	\$	(272,549)	\$ (1,320,593)	\$ 1,919,769		\$	1,883,901	100.00%		4.74%

Investor Capital Structure

			Investor C		Pro-Rata		
Line	Description	An	nount (000)* (1)	Weight (2)	Allocation (3)		
10	Long-Term Debt	\$	1,178,509	45.46%	\$	(600,313)	
11	Short-Term Debt	\$	47,509	1.83%	\$	(24,200)	
12	Preferrence Stock	\$	136,057	5.25%	\$	(69,305)	
13	Common Equity	\$	1,230,458	47.46%	\$	(626,775)	
14	Total	\$	2,592,533	100.00%	\$	(1,320,593)	

Source:

MFR Schedule D-1a.

^{*} Sum of Columns 1 and 2, Lines 1 through 4.

Proxy Group

		Credit	Ratings ¹	Common	S&P Business	
Line	Company	S&P (1)	Moody's (2)	SNL 1 (3)	Value Line ² (4)	Risk Score ³ (5)
		1.7	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	BBB+	Baa1	54.1%	56.3%	Strong
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	A-	Baa1	46.1%	48.4%	Excellent
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	BBB	Baa2	44.3%	49.4%	Excellent
4	Black Hills Corporation	BBB	Baa3	48.3%	56.8%	Excellent
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	A-	Baa2	30.5%	34.0%	Excellent
6	CMS Energy Corporation	BBB	Baa3	29.7%	31.6%	Excellent
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	A-	Baa2	32.6%	38.2%	Excellent
8	DTE Energy Company	BBB+	Baa1	47.6%	51.2%	Strong
9	Duke Energy Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	50.1%	52.9%	Excellent
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	BBB	Baa3	46.9%	54.4%	Excellent
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	BBB-	Baa2	50.0%	53.1%	Strong
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	A-	Baa1	52.1%	60.4%	Excellent
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	A-	Baa1	37.0%	40.9%	Strong
14	Northeast Utilities	A-	Baa2	49.7%	55.4%	Excellent
15	NorthWestern Corporation	BBB	Baa1	43.5%	46.2%	Excellent
16	OGE Energy Corp.	A-	Baa1	43.6%	49.3%	Excellent
17	Otter Tail Corporation	BBB	Baa3	54.4%	54.4%	Strong
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	BBB+	Baa3	44.4%	52.7%	Excellent
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	52.9%	55.4%	Excellent
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	BBB	Ba1	45.5%	48.7%	Excellent
21	Portland General Electric Company	BBB	Baa1	51.1%	52.9%	Excellent
22	SCANA Corporation	BBB+	Baa3	42.0%	45.6%	Excellent
23	Sempra Energy	BBB+	Baa1	43.5%	46.7%	Strong
24	Southern Company	Α	Baa1	43.8%	47.3%	Excellent
25	Vectren Corporation	A-	N/A	44.0%	49.6%	Excellent
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	BBB	Baa2	45.4%	48.8%	Excellent
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	A-	A3	43.9%	48.0%	Excellent
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	A-	Baa1	44.6%	46.7%	Excellent
29	Average	BBB+	Baa2	45.1%	49.1%	Excellent
30	Gulf Power Company	A^4	A3 ⁴	47.5% ⁵		Excellent

Sources:

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on September 24.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

³ S&P RatingsDirect: "U.S. Regulated Utilities, Strongest To Weakest,"July 30, 2013.

⁴ Teel Direct at 18.

⁵ Teel Direct at 23.

Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates

		Za	cks	SI	NL	Reu	Average of	
		Estimated	Number of	Estimated	Number of	Estimated	Number of	Growth
Line	Company	Growth %1	Estimates	Growth %2	Estimates	Growth %3	Estimates	Rates
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	6.00%	N/A	6.00%	1	6.00%	1	6.00%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	5.27%	N/A	4.40%	2	5.40%	2	5.02%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	3.87%	N/A	4.00%	5	4.06%	7	3.98%
4	Black Hills Corporation	4.00%	N/A	5.00%	2	4.00%	1	4.33%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	5.30%	N/A	4.70%	3	4.50%	5	4.83%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	5.85%	N/A	5.80%	3	5.87%	4	5.84%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	5.82%	N/A	6.70%	2	6.66%	4	6.39%
8	DTE Energy Company	4.64%	N/A	4.50%	2	4.60%	3	4.58%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	3.69%	N/A	3.60%	3	3.85%	7	3.71%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	6.49%	N/A	6.20%	3	6.43%	3	6.37%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	2.40%	N/A	2.40%	1	3.70%	2	2.83%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	5.00%	N/A	5.50%	2	5.00%	1	5.17%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	6.19%	N/A	6.30%	3	6.10%	5	6.20%
14	Northeast Utilities	7.85%	N/A	8,10%	3	7.19%	6	7.71%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	4.50%	N/A	6.00%	3	N/A	N/A	5.25%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	5.53%	N/A	5.40%	3	4.55%	2	5.16%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	5.02%	N/A	4.80%	5	3.82%	5	4.55%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	4.59%	N/A	4.60%	5	4.72%	4	4.64%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	7.77%	N/A	7.80%	3	6.43%	3	7.33%
21	Portland General Electric Company	5.90%	N/A	5.90%	2	6.22%	4	6.01%
22	SCANA Corporation	4.70%	N/A	4.30%	2	4.83%	3	4.61%
23	Sempra Energy	4.95%	N/A	2.90%	1	2.90%	1	3.58%
24	Southern Company	4.44%	N/A	4.10%	4	4.54%	6	4.36%
25	Vectren Corporation	5.00%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.00%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	3.37%	N/A	2.50%	3	2.50%	3	2.79%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	5.38%	N/A	5.30%	3	5.21%	3	5.30%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	4.34%	N/A	4.20%	4	5.45%	5	4.66%
29	Average	5.11%	N/A	5.04%	3	4.98%	4	5.04%

Sources:

¹ Zacks Elite, http://www.zackselite.com/, downloaded on September 24, 2013.

² SNL Interactive, http://www.snl.com/, downloaded on September 24, 2013.

³ Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/, downloaded on September 24, 2013.

Constant Growth DCF Model (Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates)

Line	Company	13-Week AVG Stock Price ¹ (1)	Analysts' Growth ² (2)	Annualized <u>Dividend³</u> (3)	Adjusted Yield (4)	Constant Growth DCF (5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$49.75	6.00%	\$1.90	4.05%	10.05%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$50.99	5.02%	\$1.88	3.87%	8.90%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$44.48	3.98%	\$1.96	4.58%	8.56%
4	Black Hills Corporation	\$50.38	4.33%	\$1.52	3.15%	7.48%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$23.76	4.83%	\$0.83	3.66%	8.50%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	\$27.19	5.84%	\$1.02	3.97%	9.81%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	\$58.69	6.39%	\$2.25	4.08%	10.47%
8	DTE Energy Company	\$67.92	4.58%	\$2.62	4.03%	8.61%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	\$68.12	3.71%	\$3.12	4.75%	8.46%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$22.99	6.37%	\$0.87	4.03%	10.40%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	\$25.66	2.83%	\$1.24	4.97%	7.80%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.74	5.17%	\$2.72	4.87%	10.04%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	\$82.44	6.20%	\$2.64	3.40%	9.60%
14	Northeast Utilities	\$42.25	7.71%	\$1.47	3.75%	11.46%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	\$41.31	5.25%	\$1.52	3.87%	9.12%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	\$35.88	5.16%	\$0.84	2.45%	7.61%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	\$28.67	N/A	\$1.19	N/A	N/A
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$19.56	4.55%	\$1.08	5.77%	10.32%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$55.98	4.64%	\$2.18	4.07%	8.71%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$22.69	7.33%	\$0.66	3.12%	10.46%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$30.07	6.01%	\$1.10	3.88%	9.88%
22	SCANA Corporation	\$49.41	4.61%	\$2.03	4.30%	8.91%
23	Sempra Energy	\$84.27	3.58%	\$2.52	3.10%	6.68%
24	Southern Company	\$43.21	4.36%	\$2.03	4.90%	9.26%
25	Vectren Corporation	\$34.39	5.00%	\$1.42	4.34%	9.34%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$31.97	2.79%	\$1.36	4.37%	7.16%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	\$41.57	5.30%	\$1.53	3.88%	9.17%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$28.57	4.66%	\$1.12	4.10%	8.77%
29	Average	\$43.60	5.04%	\$1.66	4.05%	9.09%
30	Median					9.12%

Sources

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on September 25, 2013

² Exhibit MPG-3.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

Payout Ratios

		Dividend	s Per Share	Earnings	s Per Share	Payout Ratio	
Line	Company	2012	Projected	2012	Projected	2012	Projected
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$1.84	\$2.20	\$2.58	\$3.75	71.32%	58.67%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$1.80	\$2.20	\$3.05	\$4.00	59.02%	55.00%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$1.88	\$2.30	\$2.98	\$3.75	63.09%	61.33%
4	Black Hills Corporation	\$1.48	\$1.70	\$1.97	\$3.00	75.13%	56.67%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$0.81	\$1.00	\$1.35	\$1.75	60.00%	57.14%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	\$0.96	\$1.30	\$1.53	\$2.00	62.75%	65.00%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	\$2.11	\$2.70	\$2.75	\$3.75	76.73%	72.00%
8	DTE Energy Company	\$2.42	\$3.15	\$3.88	\$4.75	62.37%	66.32%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	\$3.03	\$3.35	\$3.71	\$5.00	81.67%	67.00%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$0.86	\$1.20	\$1.35	\$2.00	63.70%	60.00%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	\$1.24	\$1.30	\$1.68	\$1.75	73.81%	74.29%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	\$2.72	\$2.90	\$3.67	\$4.25	74.11%	68.24%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	\$2.40	\$3.60	\$4.56	\$6.50	52.63%	55.38%
14	Northeast Utilities	\$1.32	\$1.80	\$1.89	\$3.25	69.84%	55.38%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	\$1.48	\$1.80	\$2.26	\$3.00	65.49%	60.00%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	\$0.80	\$1.25	\$1.79	\$2.25	44.69%	55.56%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	\$1.19	\$1.30	\$1.05	\$2.00	113.33%	65.00%
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$1.08	\$1.16	\$1.24	\$1.70	87.10%	68.24%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$2.67	\$2.60	\$3.50	\$4.25	76.29%	61.18%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$0.58	\$1.08	\$1.31	\$2.15	44.27%	50.23%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$1.08	\$1.25	\$1.87	\$2.25	57.75%	55.56%
22	SCANA Corporation	\$1.98	\$2.25	\$3.15	\$4.00	62.86%	56.25%
23	Sempra Energy	\$2.40	\$3.00	\$4.35	\$5.50	55.17%	54.55%
24	Southern Company	\$1.94	\$2.30	\$2.67	\$3.25	72.66%	70.77%
25	Vectren Corporation	\$1.41	\$1.60	\$1.94	\$2.70	72.68%	59.26%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$1.32	\$1.52	\$2.15	\$2.70	61.40%	56.30%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	\$1.20	\$2.00	\$2.35	\$3.00	51.06%	66.67%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$1.07	\$1.35	\$1.85	\$2.25	57.84%	60.00%
29	Average	\$1.61	\$1.97	\$2.44	\$3.23	66.74%	61.14%

Source:

The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

Sustainable Growth Rate

						3 to 5 Yea	r Projections					Sustainable
		Dividends	Earnings	Book Value	Book Value		Adjustment	Adjusted	Payout	Retention	Internal	Growth
Line	Company	Per Share (1)	Per Share (2)	Per Share (3)	Growth (4)	(5)	Factor (6)	(7)	Ratio (8)	(9)	Growth Rate (10)	(11)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$2.20	\$3.75	\$36.50	3.67%	10.27%	1.02	10.46%	58.67%	41.33%	4.32%	6.17%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$2.20	\$4.00	\$34.50	4.08%	11.59%	1.02	11.83%	55.00%	45.00%	5.32%	6.04%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$2.30	\$3.75	\$38.00	3.91%	9.87%	1.02	10.06%	61.33%	38.67%	3.89%	4.22%
4	Black Hills Corporation	\$1.70	\$3.00	\$33.25	3.59%	9.02%	1.02	9.18%	56.67%	43.33%	3.98%	4.52%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$1.00	\$1.75	\$12.25	4.02%	14.29%	1.02	14.57%	57.14%	42.86%	6.24%	6.60%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	\$1.30	\$2.00	\$16.25	6.09%	12.31%	1.03	12.67%	65.00%	35.00%	4.44%	5.36%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	\$2.70	\$3.75	\$25.50	6.80%	14.71%	1.03	15.19%	72.00%	28.00%	4.25%	7.51%
8	DTE Energy Company	\$3.15	\$4.75	\$53.00	4.38%	8.96%	1.02	9.15%	66.32%	33.68%	3.08%	4.24%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	\$3.35	\$5.00	\$63.75	1.89%	7.84%	1.01	7.92%	67.00%	33.00%	2.61%	2.64%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$1.20	\$2.00	\$25.00	2.82%	8.00%	1.01	8.11%	60.00%	40.00%	3.24%	3.26%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	\$1.30	\$1.75	\$20.75	4.97%	8.43%	1.02	8.64%	74.29%	25.71%	2.22%	5.05%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	\$2.90	\$4.25	\$50.50	5.39%	8.42%	1.03	8.64%	68.24%	31.76%	2.74%	3.46%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	\$3.60	\$6.50	\$52.75	6.84%	12.32%	1.03	12.73%	55.38%	44.62%	5.68%	7.35%
14	Northeast Utilities	\$1.80	\$3.25	\$34.75	3.39%	9.35%	1.02	9.51%	55.38%	44.62%	4.24%	4.38%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	\$1.80	\$3.00	\$31.25	4.49%	9.60%	1.02	9.81%	60.00%	40.00%	3.92%	4.53%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	\$1.25	\$2.25	\$19.25	6.58%	11.69%	1.03	12.06%	55.56%	44.44%	5.36%	6.21%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	\$1.30	\$2.00	\$18.00	4.52%	11.11%	1.02	11.36%	65.00%	35.00%	3.97%	5.98%
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$1.16	\$1.70	\$21.50	2.15%	7.91%	1.01	7.99%	68.24%	31.76%	2.54%	2.56%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$2.60	\$4.25	\$43.25	3.62%	9.83%	1.02	10.00%	61.18%	38.82%	3.88%	4.40%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$1.08	\$2.15	\$23.60	3.31%	9.11%	1.02	9.26%	50.23%	49.77%	4.61%	4.62%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$1.25	\$2.25	\$26.75	3.18%	8.41%	1.02	8.54%	55.56%	44.44%	3.80%	4.88%
22	SCANA Corporation	\$2.25	\$4.00	\$40.75	5.30%	9.82%	1.03	10.07%	56.25%	43.75%	4.41%	6.64%
23	Sempra Energy	\$3.00	\$5.50	\$52.00	4.16%	10.58%	1.02	10.79%	54.55%	45.45%	4.91%	5.52%
24	Southern Company	\$2.30	\$3.25	\$25.75	4.07%	12.62%	1.02	12.87%	70.77%	29.23%	3.76%	5.23%
25	Vectren Corporation	\$1.60	\$2.70	\$23.00	4.37%	11.74%	1.02	11.99%	59.26%	40.74%	4.88%	5.86%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$1.52	\$2.70	\$29.65	5.31%	9.11%	1.03	9.34%	56.30%	43.70%	4.08%	4.60%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	\$2.00	\$3.00	\$21.25	3.32%	14.12%	1.02	14.35%	66.67%	33.33%	4.78%	4.78%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$1.35	\$2.25	\$23.00	4.80%	9.78%	1.02	10.01%	60.00%	40.00%	4.00%	4.62%
29	Average	\$1.97	\$3.23	\$31.99	4.32%	10.39%	1.02	10.61%	61.14%	38.86%	4.11%	5.04%

Cols. (1), (2) and (3): The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

Col. (4); [Col. (3) / Page 2 Col. (2)] ^ (1/5) - 1.

Col. (5): Col. (2) / Col. (3).

Col. (6): [2 * (1 + Col. (4))] / (2 + Col. (4)).

Col. (7): Col. (6) * Col. (5).

Col. (8): Col. (1) / Col. (2).

Col. (9): 1 - Col. (8).

Col. (10): Col. (9) * Col. (7). Col. (11): Col. (10) + Page 2 Col. (9).

Sustainable Growth Rate

		13-Week Average	2012 Book Value	Market to Book		n Shares				
Line	Company	Stock Price ¹ (1)	Per Share ² (2)	Ratio (3)	2012 (4)			S Factor ³ (7)	V Factor ⁴ (8)	<u>s • v</u>
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$49.75	\$30.48	1.63	39.40	45.50	2.92%	4.77%	38.74%	1.85%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$50.99	\$28.25	1.81	110.99	116.00	0.89%	1.60%	44.60%	0.71%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$44.48	\$31.37	1.42	485.67	505.00	0.78%	1.11%	29.48%	0.33%
4	Black Hills Corporation	\$50.38	\$27.88	1.81	44.21	45.70	0.67%	1.20%	44.66%	0.54%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$23.76	\$10.06	2.36	427.44	433.00	0.26%	0.61%	57.65%	0.35%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	\$27.19	\$12.09	2.25	264.10	274.00	0.74%	1.66%	55.54%	0.92%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	\$58.69	\$18.35	3.20	576.00	620.00	1.48%	4.74%	68.73%	3.26%
8	DTE Energy Company	\$67.92	\$42.78	1.59	172.35	190.00	1.97%	3.13%	37.02%	1.16%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	\$68.12	\$58.04	1.17	704.00	710.00	0.17%	0.20%	14.79%	0.03%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$22.99	\$21.75	1.06	153.53	156.00	0.32%	0.34%	5.39%	0.02%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	\$25.66	\$16.28	1.58	97.93	124.50	4.92%	7.75%	36.55%	2.83%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.74	\$38.84	1.51	77.90	83.50	1.40%	2.11%	33.88%	0.72%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	\$82.44	\$37.90	2.18	424.00	455.00	1.42%	3.09%	54.02%	1.67%
14	Northeast Utilities	\$42.25	\$29.41	1.44	314.05	319.00	0.31%	0.45%	30.39%	0.14%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	\$41.31	\$25.09	1.65	37.22	39.00	0.94%	1.55%	39.26%	0.61%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	\$35.88	\$14.00	2.56	197.60	203.00	0.54%	1.39%	60.98%	0.84%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	\$28.67	\$14.43	1.99	36.17	40.00	2.03%	4.04%	49.66%	2.01%
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$19.56	\$19.33	1.01	230.02	255.00	2.08%	2.11%	1.17%	0.02%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$55.98	\$36.20	1.55	109.74	115.00	0.94%	1.45%	35.33%	0.51%
20	PNM Resources. Inc.	\$22.69	\$20.05	1.13	79.65	80.00	0.09%	0.10%	11.62%	0.01%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$30.07	\$22.87	1.31	75.56	89.50	3.44%	4.53%	23.95%	1.08%
22	SCANA Corporation	\$49.41	\$31.47	1.57	132.00	160.00	3.92%	6.16%	36.31%	2.24%
23	Sempra Energy	\$84.27	\$42.42	1.99	242.37	250.00	0.62%	1.24%	49.66%	0.61%
24	Southern Company	\$43.21	\$21.09	2.05	867.77	930.00	1.39%	2.86%	51.19%	1.46%
25	Vectren Corporation	\$34,39	\$18.57	1.85	82.20	87.00	1.14%	2.11%	46.00%	0.97%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$31.97	\$22.89	1.40	126.50	135.00	1.31%	1.83%	28.40%	0.52%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	\$41.57	\$18.05	2.30	229.04	227.50	-0.13%	-0.31%	56.58%	-0.18%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$28.57	\$18.19	1.57	487.96	515.00	1.08%	1.70%	36.34%	0.62%
77		420,01		1,01	107.00	0.0.00	1.0070	1.10.70	00.0470	0.0270
29	Average	\$43.60	\$26.00	1.75	243.76	257.26	1.40%	2.36%	38.50%	0.96%

Sources and Notes:

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on September 25, 2013

² The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

³ Expected Growth in the Number of Shares, Column (3) * Column (6).

⁴ Expected Profit of Stock Investment, [1 - 1 / Column (3)].

Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth Rate)

<u>Line</u>	Company Stock Price (1)		Sustainable Growth ² (2)	Annualized <u>Dividend</u> ³ (3)	Adjusted Yield (4)	Constant Growth DCF (5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$49.75	6.17%	\$1.90	4.05%	10.22%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$50.99	6.04%	\$1.88	3.91%	9.95%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$44.48	4.22%	\$1.96	4.59%	8.81%
4	Black Hills Corporation	\$50.38	4.52%	\$1.52	3.15%	7.67%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$23.76	6.60%	\$0.83	3.72%	10.32%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	\$27.19	5.36%	\$1.02	3.95%	9.31%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	\$58.69	7.51%	\$2.25	4.12%	11.64%
8	DTE Energy Company	\$67.92	4.24%	\$2.62	4.02%	8.26%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	\$68.12	2.64%	\$3.12	4.70%	7.34%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$22.99	3.26%	\$0.87	3.91%	7.17%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	\$25.66	5.05%	\$1.24	5.08%	10.13%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.74	3.46%	\$2.72	4.79%	8.25%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	\$82.44	7.35%	\$2.64	3.44%	10.79%
14	Northeast Utilities	\$42.25	4.38%	\$1.47	3.63%	8.01%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	\$41.31	4.53%	\$1.52	3.85%	8.38%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	\$35.88	6.21%	\$0.84	2.47%	8.68%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	\$28.67	5.98%	\$1.19	4.41%	10.39%
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$19.56	2.56%	\$1.08	5.66%	8.23%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$55.98	4.40%	\$2.18	4.07%	8.46%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$22.69	4.62%	\$0.66	3.04%	7.66%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$30.07	4.88%	\$1.10	3.84%	8.72%
22	SCANA Corporation	\$49.41	6.64%	\$2.03	4.38%	11.02%
23	Sempra Energy	\$84.27	5.52%	\$2.52	3.16%	8.67%
24	Southern Company	\$43.21	5.23%	\$2.03	4.94%	10.17%
25	Vectren Corporation	\$34.39	5.86%	\$1.42	4.37%	10.23%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$31.97	4.60%	\$1.36	4.45%	9.05%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	\$41.57	4.78%	\$1.53	3.86%	8.64%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$28.57	4.62%	\$1.12	4.10%	8.73%
29	Average	\$43.60	5.04%	\$1.66	4.06%	9.10%
30	Median					8.72%


Sources

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on September 25, 2013

² Exhibit MPG-6, page 1.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

Electricity Sales Are Linked to U.S. Economic Growth



Note:

1988 represents the base year. Graph depicts increases or decreases from the base year.

Sources:

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Edison Electric Institute, http://www.eei.org.

Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model

		13-Week AVG	Annualized	First Stage	Second Stage Growth				Third Stage	Multi-Stage	
Line	Company	Stock Price1	Dividend ²	Growth ³	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9	Year 10	Growth ⁴	Growth DCF
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$49.75	\$1.90	6.00%	5.82%	5.63%	5.45%	5.27%	5.08%	4.90%	9.19%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$50.99	\$1.88	5.02%	5.00%	4.98%	4.96%	4.94%	4.92%	4.90%	8.80%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$44.48	\$1.96	3.98%	4.13%	4.28%	4.44%	4.59%	4.75%	4.90%	9.26%
4	Black Hills Corporation	\$50.38	\$1.52	4.33%	4.43%	4.52%	4.62%	4.71%	4.81%	4.90%	7.94%
5	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$23.76	\$0.83	4.83%	4.84%	4.86%	4.87%	4.88%	4.89%	4.90%	8.55%
6	CMS Energy Corporation	\$27.19	\$1.02	5.84%	5.68%	5.53%	5.37%	5.21%	5.06%	4.90%	9.07%
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	\$58.69	\$2.25	6.39%	6.14%	5.90%	5.65%	5.40%	5.15%	4.90%	9.31%
8	DTE Energy Company	\$67.92	\$2.62	4.58%	4.63%	4.69%	4.74%	4.79%	4.85%	4.90%	8.86%
9	Duke Energy Corporation	\$68.12	\$3.12	3.71%	3.91%	4.11%	4.31%	4.50%	4.70%	4.90%	9.36%
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$22.99	\$0.87	6.37%	6.13%	5.88%	5.64%	5.39%	5.15%	4.90%	9.25%
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	\$25.66	\$1.24	2.83%	3.18%	3.52%	3.87%	4.21%	4.56%	4.90%	9.35%
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.74	\$2.72	5.17%	5.12%	5.08%	5.03%	4.99%	4.94%	4.90%	9.84%
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	\$82.44	\$2.64	6.20%	5.98%	5.76%	5.55%	5.33%	5.12%	4.90%	8.54%
14	Northeast Utilities	\$42.25	\$1.47	7.71%	7.24%	6.78%	6.31%	5.84%	5.37%	4.90%	9.25%
15	NorthWestern Corporation	\$41.31	\$1.52	5.25%	5.19%	5.13%	5.08%	5.02%	4.96%	4.90%	8.84%
16	OGE Energy Corp.	\$35.88	\$0.84	5.16%	5.12%	5.07%	5.03%	4.99%	4.94%	4.90%	7.36%
17	Otter Tail Corporation	\$28.67	\$1.19	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.90%	N/A
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	\$19.56	\$1.08	4.55%	4.61%	4.66%	4.72%	4.78%	4.84%	4.90%	10.57%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$55.98	\$2.18	4.64%	4.68%	4.72%	4.77%	4.81%	4.86%	4.90%	8.92%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$22.69	\$0.66	7.33%	6.93%	6.52%	6.12%	5.71%	5.31%	4.90%	8.46%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$30.07	\$1.10	6.01%	5.82%	5.64%	5.45%	5.27%	5.08%	4.90%	9.01%
22	SCANA Corporation	\$49.41	\$2.03	4.61%	4.66%	4.71%	4.76%	4.80%	4.85%	4.90%	9.13%
23	Sempra Energy	\$84.27	\$2.52	3.58%	3.80%	4.02%	4.24%	4.46%	4.68%	4.90%	7.76%
24	Southern Company	\$43.21	\$2.03	4.36%	4.45%	4.54%	4.63%	4.72%	4.81%	4.90%	9.67%
25	Vectren Corporation	\$34.39	\$1.42	5.00%	4.98%	4.97%	4.95%	4.93%	4.92%	4.90%	9.26%
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$31.97	\$1.36	2.79%	3.14%	3.49%	3.85%	4.20%	4.55%	4.90%	8.80%
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	\$41.57	\$1.53	5.30%	5.23%	5.16%	5.10%	5.03%	4.97%	4.90%	8.86%
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$28.57	\$1.12	4.66%	4.70%	4.74%	4.78%	4.82%	4.86%	4.90%	8.95%
29 30	Average Median	\$43.60	\$1.66	5.04%	5.02%	5.00%	4.97%	4.95%	4.92%	4.90%	8.97% 9.01%

Sources:

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on September 25, 2013

² The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.


³ Exhibit MPG-4.

⁴ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2013 at 14.

Docket No. 130140-EI Common Stock Market / Book Ratio Exhibit MPG-10, Page 1 of 1

Gulf Power Company

Common Stock Market/Book Ratio



Equity Risk Premium - Treasury Bond

<u>Line</u>	Year	Authorized Electric Returns ¹ (1)	Treasury Bond Yield ² (2)	Indicated Risk <u>Premium</u> (3)
1	1986	13.93%	7.80%	6.13%
2	1987	12.99%	8.58%	4.41%
3	1988	12.79%	8.96%	3.83%
4	1989	12.97%	8.45%	4.52%
5	1990	12.70%	8.61%	4.09%
6	1991	12.55%	8.14%	4.41%
7	1992	12.09%	7.67%	4.42%
8	1993	11.41%	6.60%	4.81%
9	1994	11.34%	7.37%	3.97%
10	1995	11.55%	6.88%	4.67%
11	1996	11.39%	6.70%	4.69%
12	1997	11.40%	6.61%	4.79%
13	1998	11.66%	5.58%	6.08%
14	1999	10.77%	5.87%	4.90%
15	2000	11.43%	5.94%	5.49%
16	2001	11.09%	5.49%	5.60%
17	2002	11.16%	5.43%	5.73%
18	2003	10.97%	4.96%	6.01%
19	2004	10.75%	5.05%	5.70%
20	2005	10.54%	4.65%	5.89%
21	2006	10.36%	4.99%	5.37%
22	2007	10.36%	4.83%	5.53%
23	2008	10.46%	4.28%	6.18%
24	2009	10.48%	4.07%	6.41%
25	2010	10.34%	4.25%	6.09%
26	2011	10.22%	3.91%	6.31%
27	2012	10.00%	2.92%	7.08%
28	2013 ³	9.80%	3.14%	6.66%
29	Average	11.34%	5.99%	5.35%

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Jan. 85 - Dec. 06, and July 9, 2013, excluding the VA cases, which are subject to a 200 basis point adjustment for certain generation assets.

² St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/. The yields from 2002 to 2005 represent the 20-Year Treasury yields obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank.

³ The data includes the period Jan - Jun 2013.

Equity Risk Premium - Utility Bond

<u>Line</u>	Year	Authorized Electric Returns ¹ (1)	Average "A" Rated Utility Bond Yield ² (2)	Indicated Risk <u>Premium</u> (3)
1	1986	13.93%	9.58%	4.35%
2	1987	12.99%	10.10%	2.89%
3	1988	12.79%	10.49%	2.30%
4	1989	12.97%	9.77%	3.20%
5	1990	12.70%	9.86%	2.84%
6	1991	12.55%	9.36%	3.19%
7	1992	12.09%	8.69%	3.40%
8	1993	11.41%	7.59%	3.82%
9	1994	11.34%	8.31%	3.03%
10	1995	11.55%	7.89%	3.66%
11	1996	11.39%	7.75%	3.64%
12	1997	11.40%	7.60%	3.80%
13	1998	11.66%	7.04%	4.62%
14	1999	10.77%	7.62%	3.15%
15	2000	11.43%	8.24%	3.19%
16	2001	11.09%	7.76%	3.33%
17	2002	11.16%	7.37%	3.79%
18	2003	10.97%	6.58%	4.39%
19	2004	10.75%	6.16%	4.59%
20	2005	10.54%	5.65%	4.89%
21	2006	10.36%	6.07%	4.29%
22	2007	10.36%	6.07%	4.29%
23	2008	10.46%	6.53%	3.93%
24	2009	10.48%	6.04%	4.44%
25	2010	10.34%	5.46%	4.88%
26	2011	10.22%	5.04%	5.18%
27	2012	10.00%	4.13%	5.87%
28	2013 ³	9.80%	4.20%	5.60%
29	Average	11.34%	7.39%	3.95%

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Jan. 85 - Dec. 06, and July 9, 2013, excluding the VA cases, which are subject to a 200 basis point adjustment for certain generation assets.


² Mergent Public Utility Manual, Mergent Weekly News Reports, 2003. The utility yields for the period 2001-2009 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record. The utility yields from 2010-2013 were obtained from http://credittrends.moodys.com/.

³ The data includes the period Jan - Jun 2013.

Bond Yield Spreads

			Public Utility Bond				Corporate Bond			Utility to Corporate		
Line	Year	T-Bond Yield ¹ (1)	A ² (2)	Baa ² (3)	A-T-Bond Spread (4)	Baa-T-Bond Spread (5)	Aaa ¹ (6)	Baa ¹ (7)	Aaa-T-Bond Spread (8)	Baa-T-Bond Spread (9)	Baa <u>Spread</u> (10)	A-Aaa Spread (11)
1	1980	11.30%	13.34%	13.95%	2.04%	2.65%	11.94%	13.67%	0.64%	2.37%	0.28%	1.40%
2	1981	13.44%	15.95%	16.60%	2.51%	3.16%	14.17%	16.04%	0.73%	2.60%	0.56%	1.78%
3	1982	12.76%	15.86%	16.45%	3.10%	3.69%	13.79%	16.11%	1.03%	3.35%	0.34%	2.07%
4	1983	11.18%	13.66%	14.20%	2.48%	3.02%	12.04%	13.55%	0.86%	2.38%	0.65%	1.62%
5	1984	12.39%	14.03%	14.53%	1.64%	2.14%	12.71%	14.19%	0.32%	1.80%	0.34%	1.32%
6	1985	10.79%	12.47%	12.96%	1.68%	2.17%	11.37%	12.72%	0.58%	1.93%	0.24%	1.10%
7	1986	7.80%	9.58%	10.00%	1.78%	2.20%	9.02%	10.39%	1.22%	2.59%	-0.39%	0.56%
8	1987	8.58%	10.10%	10.53%	1.52%	1.95%	9.38%	10.58%	0.80%	2.00%	-0.05%	0.72%
9	1988	8.96%	10.49%	11.00%	1.53%	2.04%	9.71%	10.83%	0.75%	1.87%	0.17%	0.78%
10	1989	8.45%	9.77%	9.97%	1.32%	1.52%	9.26%	10.18%	0.81%	1.73%	-0.21%	0.51%
11	1990	8.61%	9.86%	10.06%	1.25%	1.45%	9.32%	10.36%	0.71%	1.75%	-0.29%	0.54%
12	1991	8.14%	9.36%	9.55%	1.22%	1.41%	8.77%	9.80%	0.63%	1.67%	-0.25%	0.59%
13	1992	7.67%	8.69%	8.86%	1.02%	1.19%	8.14%	8.98%	0.47%	1.31%	-0.12%	0.55%
14	1993	6.60%	7.59%	7.91%	0.99%	1.31%	7.22%	7.93%	0.62%	1.33%	-0.02%	0.37%
15	1994	7.37%	8.31%	8.63%	0.94%	1.26%	7.96%	8.62%	0.59%	1.25%	0.01%	0.35%
16	1995	6.88%	7.89%	8.29%	1.01%	1.41%	7.59%	8.20%	0.71%	1.32%	0.09%	0.30%
17	1996	6.70%	7.75%	8.17%	1.05%	1.47%	7.37%	8.05%	0.67%	1.35%	0.12%	0.38%
18	1997	6.61%	7.60%	7.95%	0.99%	1.34%	7.26%	7.86%	0.66%	1.26%	0.09%	0.34%
19	1998	5.58%	7.04%	7.26%	1.46%	1.68%	6.53%	7.22%	0.95%	1.64%	0.04%	0.51%
20	1999	5.87%	7.62%	7.88%	1.75%	2.01%	7.04%	7.87%	1.18%	2.01%	0.01%	0.58%
21	2000	5.94%	8.24%	8.36%	2.30%	2.42%	7.62%	8.36%	1.68%	2.42%	-0.01%	0.62%
22	2001	5.49%	7.76%	8.03%	2.27%	2.54%	7.08%	7.95%	1.59%	2.45%	0.08%	0.68%
23	2002	5.43%	7.37%	8.02%	1.94%	2.59%	6.49%	7.80%	1.06%	2.37%	0.22%	0.88%
24	2003	4.96%	6.58%	6.84%	1.62%	1.89%	5.67%	6.77%	0.71%	1.81%	0.08%	0.91%
25	2004	5.05%	6.16%	6.40%	1.11%	1.35%	5.63%	6.39%	0.58%	1.35%	0.00%	0.53%
26	2005	4.65%	5.65%	5.93%	1.00%	1.28%	5.24%	6.06%	0.59%	1.42%	-0.14%	0.41%
27	2006	4.99%	6.07%	6.32%	1.08%	1.32%	5.59%	6.48%	0.60%	1,49%	-0.16%	0.48%
28	2007	4.83%	6.07%	6.33%	1.24%	1.50%	5.56%	6.48%	0.72%	1.65%	-0.15%	0.52%
29	2008	4.28%	6.53%	7.25%	2.25%	2.97%	5.63%	7.45%	1.35%	3.17%	-0.20%	0.90%
30	2009	4.07%	6.04%	7.06%	1.97%	2.99%	5.31%	7.30%	1.24%	3.23%	-0.24%	0.72%
31	2010	4.25%	5.46%	5.96%	1.21%	1.71%	4.94%	6.04%	0.69%	1.79%	-0.08%	0.52%
32	2011	3.91%	5.04%	5.56%	1.13%	1.65%	4.64%	5.66%	0.73%	1.75%	-0.10%	0.40%
33	2012	2.92%	4.13%	4.83%	1.21%	1.91%	3.67%	4.94%	0.75%	2.01%	-0.11%	0.46%
34	2013 ³	3.14%	4.20%	4.72%	1.06%	1.58%	3.92%	4.82%	0.78%	1.68%	-0.10%	0.28%
35	Average	7.05%	8.60%	9.01%	1.55%	1.96%	7.87%	8.99%	0.82%	1.94%	0.02%	0.73%

Yield Spreads Treasury Vs. Corporate & Treasury Vs. Utility



¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.

² Mergent Public Utility Manual, Mergent Weekly News Reports, 2003. The utility yields for the period 2001-2009 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record. The utility yields from 2010-2012 were obtained from http://credittrends.moodys.com/.

³ The data includes the period Jan - Jun 2013.

Treasury and Utility Bond Yields


<u>Line</u>	<u>Date</u>	Treasury Bond Yield ¹ (1)	"A" Rated Utility Bond Yield ² (2)	"Baa" Rated Utility Bond Yield ² (3)
1	09/20/13	3.77%	4.79%	5.27%
2	09/13/13	3.84%	4.85%	5.37%
3	09/06/13	3.87%	4.86%	5.37%
4	08/30/13	3.70%	4.67%	5.17%
5	08/23/13	3.80%	4.79%	5.32%
6	08/16/13	3.86%	4.83%	5.39%
7	08/09/13	3.63%	4.61%	5.17%
8	08/02/13	3.69%	4.63%	5.18%
9	07/26/13	3.61%	4.62%	5.13%
10	07/19/13	3.56%	4.62%	5.12%
11	07/12/13	3.64%	4.76%	5.28%
12	07/05/13	3.68%	4.82%	5.38%
13	06/28/13	3.52%	4.67%	5.23%
14	Average	3.71%	4.73%	5.26%
15	Spread To Treasury		1.02%	1.55%

Sources

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org.

²http://credittrends.moodys.com/.

Trends in Bond Yields




Sources:


Merchant Bond Record.

www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.

St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/



Yield Spread Between Utility Bonds and 30-Year Treasury Bonds



Merchant Bond Record.

www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.

St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/

Value Line Beta

Line	Company	Beta
1	ALLETE, Inc.	0.70
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	0.75
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	0.70
4 5	Black Hills Corporation CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	0.80 0.80
6	CMS Energy Corporation	0.75
7	Dominion Resources, Inc.	0.70
8	DTE Energy Company	0.75
9	Duke Energy Corporation	0.60
10	Great Plains Energy Inc.	0.80
11	Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.	0.70
12	Integrys Energy Group, Inc.	0.90
13	NextEra Energy, Inc.	0.70
14	Northeast Utilities	0.75
15	NorthWestern Corporation	0.70
16	OGE Energy Corp.	0.75
17	Otter Tail Corporation	0.90
18	Pepco Holdings, Inc.	0.75
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.70
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	0.95
21	Portland General Electric Company	0.75
22	SCANA Corporation	0.65
23	Sempra Energy	0.80
24	Southern Company	0.55
25	Vectren Corporation	0.75
26	Westar Energy, Inc.	0.75
27	Wisconsin Energy Corporation	0.65
28	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.60
29	Average	0.74

The Value Line Investment Survey, August 2, August 23, and September 20, 2013.

CAPM Return

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	Market Risk <u>Premium</u>
1	Risk-Free Rate ¹	4.20%
2	Risk Premium ²	6.70%
3	Beta ³	0.74
4	CAPM	9.14%

¹ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; September 1, 2013, at 2.

Morningstar, Inc. Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Classic Yearbook at 88, and Morningstar, Inc. Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook at 54 and 66.

³ Exhibit MPG-15

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics

		Cos	Retail	S&P Ben	chmark ^{1/2}	
<u>Line</u>	Description		Amount (1)	Significant (2)	Significant (3)	Reference (4)
1	Rate Base	\$	1,883,901			Schedule A-1.
2	Weighted Common Return		4.49%			Page 2, Line 4, Col. 4.
3	Pre-Tax Rate of Return		9.91%			Page 2, Line 5, Col. 5.
4	Income to Common	\$	84,495			Line 1 x Line 2.
5	EBIT	\$	186,754			Line 1 x Line 3.
6	Depreciation & Amortization	\$	104,505			Schedule C-1.
7	Imputed Amortization	\$	9,385			Page 4, Line 11, Col. 1.
8	Deferred Income Taxes & ITC	\$	12,686			Schedule C-1.
9	Funds from Operations (FFO)	\$	211,071			Sum of Line 4 and Lines 6 through 8.
10	Imputed Interest Expense	\$	1,313			Page 4, Line 10, Col. 1.
11	EBITDA	\$	301,957			Sum of Lines 5 through 7 and Line 10.
12	Total Debt Ratio		47%	45% - 50%	50% - 60%	Page 3, Line 4, Col. 2.
13	Debt to EBITDA		3.0x	3.0x - 4.0x	4.0x - 5.0x	(Line 1 x Line 12) / Line 11.
14	FFO to Total Debt		24%	20% - 30%	12% - 20%	Line 9 / (Line 1 x Line 12).

Sources:

Note:

Based on the July 2013 S&P metrics, Gulf Power has an "Excellent" business profile and a "Significant" financial profile.

¹ Standard & Poor's: "Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded," May 27, 2009.

² S&P RatingsDirect: "U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities, Strongest to Weakest," July 30, 2013.

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics (Pre-Tax Rate of Return)

<u>Line</u>	Description	<u>Ar</u>	nount (000) (1)	Weight (2)	Cost (3)	Weighted Cost (4)	Pre-Tax Weighted <u>Cost</u> (5)
1	Long-Term Debt	\$	567,191	45.46%	4.96%	2.25%	2.25%
2	Short-Term Debt	\$	22,865	1.83%	0.82%	0.02%	0.02%
3	Preferrence Stock	\$	65,481	5.25%	6.00%	0.31%	0.31%
4	Common Equity	\$	592,193	47.46%	9.45%	4.49%	7.33%
5	Total	\$	1,247,730	100.00%		7.07%	9.91%
6	Tax Conversion Factor*						1.6340

Sources:

Exhibit MPG-1.

^{*} Schedule A-1.

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics (Financial Capital Structure)

<u>Line</u>	Description	Amount (000) (1)		Weight (2)	
1	Long-Term Debt	\$	567,191	45.41%	
2	Short-Term Debt	\$	22,865	1.83%	
3	Off Balance Sheet Debt*	\$	1,276	0.10%	
4	Total Debt	\$	591,332	47.34%	
5	Preferrence Stock	\$	65,481	5.24%	
6	Common Equity	\$	592,193	47.41%	
7	Total	\$	1,249,006	100.00%	

Sources:

Exhibit MPG-1.

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics (Off-Balance Sheet Debt)

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Ar</u>	mount (000) (1)	Reference (2)
	Jurisdictional Allocator			
1	Jurisdictional Rate Base	\$	1,883,901	Schedule B-1.
2	Total Company Rate Base		1,919,769	Schedule B-1.
3	Allocation Factor		0.981317	Line 1 / Line 2.
	Total Company ¹			
4	Operating Leases	\$	812	
5	Imputed Interest Expense	\$	38	
6	Imputed Amortization Expense	\$	372	
7	Purchase Power Agreements	\$	465	
8	Imputed Interest Expense	\$	1,300	
9	Imputed Amortization Expense	\$	9,191	
	Jurisdiction Allocation			
10	Imputed Interest Expense	\$	1,313	Line 4 * Lines 6 and 9.
11	Imputed Amortization Expense	\$	9,385	Line 4 * Lines 7 and 10.

Source:

¹ Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect, "Gulf Power Co.," September 28, 2011 at 5.

Accuracy of Interest Rate Forecasts (Long-Term Treasury Bond Yields - Projected Vs. Actual)

		Prior Quarter	ublication Dat Projected	Actual Yield in Projected	Projected Yield Higher (Lower)	
Line Dat	Date	Actual Yield	Yield	Projected Quarter	Quarter	Than Actual Yield
Line	Date	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
427		rwisewii)	******	74744	rwawa n	
1	Dec-00	5.8%	5.8%	1Q, 02	5.6%	0.2%
2	Mar-01	5.7%	5.6%	2Q, 02	5.8%	-0.2%
3	Jun-01	5.4%	5.8%	3Q, 02	5.2%	0.6%
4	Sep-01	5.7%	5.9%	4Q, 02	5.1%	0.8%
5	Dec-01	5.5%	5.7%	1Q, 03	5.0%	0.7%
6	Mar-02	5.3%	5.9%	2Q, 03	4.7%	1.2%
7	Jun-02	5.6%	6.2%	3Q, 03	5.2%	1.0%
8	Sep-02	5.8%	5.9%	4Q, 03	5.2%	0.7%
9	Dec-02	5.2%	5.7%	1Q, 04	4.9%	0.8%
10	Mar-03	5.1%	5.7%	2Q, 04	5.4%	0.3%
11	Jun-03	5.0%	5.4%	3Q, 04	5.1%	0.3%
12	Sep-03	4.7%	5.8%	4Q, 04	4.9%	0.9%
13	Dec-03	5.2%	5.9%	1Q, 05	4.8%	1.1%
14	Mar-04	5.2%	5.9%	2Q, 05	4.6%	1.4%
15	Jun-04	4.9%	6.2%	3Q, 05	4.5%	1.7%
16	Sep-04	5.4%	6.0%	4Q, 05	4.8%	1.2%
17	Dec-04	5.1%	5.8%	1Q, 06	4.6%	1.2%
18	Mar-05	4.9%	5.6%	2Q, 06	5.1%	0.5%
19	Jun-05	4.8%	5.5%	3Q, 06	5.0%	0.5%
20	Sep-05	4.6%	5.2%	4Q, 06	4.7%	0.5%
21	Dec-05	4.5%	5.3%	1Q, 07	4.8%	0.5%
22	Mar-06	4.8%	5.1%	2Q, 07	5.0%	0.1%
23	Jun-06	4.6%	5.3%	3Q, 07	4.9%	0.4%
24	Sep-06	5.1%	5.2%	4Q, 07	4.6%	0.6%
25	Dec-06	5.0%	5.0%	1Q, 08	4.4%	0.6%
26	Mar-07	4.7%	5.1%	2Q, 08	4.6%	0.5%
27	Jun-07	4.8%	5.1%	3Q, 08	4.5%	0.7%
28	Sep-07	5.0%	5.2%	4Q, 08	3.7%	1.5%
29	Dec-07	4.9%	4.8%	1Q, 09	3.5%	1.4%
30	Mar-08	4.6%	4.8%	2Q, 09	4.0%	0.8%
31	Jun-08	4.4%	4.9%	3Q, 09	4.3%	0.6%
32	Sep-08	4.6%	5.1%	4Q, 09	4.3%	0.8%
33	Dec-08	4.5%	4.6%	1Q, 10	4.6%	0.0%
34	Mar-09	3.7%	4.1%	2Q, 10	4.4%	-0.3%
35	Jun-09	3.5%	4.6%	3Q, 10	3.9%	0.8%
36	Sep-09	4.0%	5.0%	4Q, 10	4.2%	0.8%
37	Dec-09	4.3%	5.0%	1Q, 11	4.6%	0.4%
38	Mar-10	4.3%	5.2%	2Q, 11	4.3%	0.9%
39	Jun-10	4.6%	5.2%	3Q, 11	3.7%	1.5%
40	Sep-10	4.4%	4.7%	4Q, 11	3.0%	1.7%
41	Dec-10	3.9%	4.6%	1Q, 12	3.1%	1.5%
42	Mar-11	4.2%	5.1%	2Q, 12	2.9%	2.2%
43	Jun-11	4.6%	5.2%		2.8%	2.5%
44		4.3%	4.2%	3Q, 12	2.9%	1.3%
	Sep-11			4Q, 12		
45	Dec-11	3.7%	3.8%	1Q, 13	3.1%	0.7%
46 47	Mar-12	3.0%	3.8%	2Q, 13	3.2%	0.7%
48	Apr-12	3.1%	3.9%	3Q, 13		
49	May-12 Jun-12	3.1%	3.7%	3Q, 13 3Q, 13		
50	Jul-12	2.9%	3.6%	4Q, 13		
51	Aug-12	2.9%	3.4%	4Q, 13		
52	Sep-12	2.9%	3.4%	4Q, 13		
53	Oct-12	2.8%	3.4%	1Q, 14		
54	Nov-12	2.8%	3.4%	1Q, 14		
55	Dec-12	2.8%	3.4%	1Q, 14		
56	Jan-13	2.9%	3.4%	2Q, 14		
57	Feb-13	2.9%	3.5%	20, 14		
58	Mar-13	2.9%	3.6%	2Q, 14		
59	Apr-13	3.1%	3.7%	3Q, 14		
60	May-13	3.1%	3.7%	3Q, 14		
61	Jun-13	3.1%	3.7%	3Q, 14		
62	Jul-13	3.1%	4.0%	40, 14		
63	Aug-13	3.2%	4.1%	4Q, 14		
64	Sep-13	3.2%	4.2%	4Q, 14		

Source:
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Various Dates.
* Col. 2 - Col. 4.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES' TESTIMONY has been furnished to the following by electronic mail this 16th day of October, 2013:

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