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1	FT.ORTDA	BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
2	In the Matter o	
3	III the Matter o	DOCKET NO. 130188-EM
4	COMPLAINT REGAR	
5	RATE STRUCTURE REGIONAL UTILIT	
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13	PROCEEDINGS.	COMMISSION CONFERENCE AGENDA
14	TROUBLE TROUB.	ITEM NO. 3
	COMMISSIONERS	CHATDWAN ADE CDANAM
15	PARTICIPATING:	CHAIRMAN ART GRAHAM COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR
16		COMMISSIONER RONALD A. BRISÉ COMMISSIONER EDUARDO E. BALBIS
17		COMMISSIONER JULIE I. BROWN
18	DATE:	Thursday, March 13, 2014
19	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148
20		4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida
21	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR
22	THIOTHER BI.	Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6732
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay. Let's cycle back around to Item Number 3.

MS. BARRERA: Good morning, Commissioners.

This docket concerns the complaint filed by customers of Gainesville Regional Utilities containing certain allegations about Gainesville's rates, wholesale contract with Alachua, a proposed rate structure, and the rate structure in existence at the time the complaint was filed in July of 2013. Gainesville filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The complainants filed a response, and we are here on the motion to dismiss.

Staff recommends dismissal with prejudice those portions of the complaint over which the Commission has no jurisdiction, which are the rates and the wholesale contract. And staff also recommends dismissal without prejudice of the portion of the complaint regarding rate structure and to allow -- if the complaint is dismissed, to allow the complainants to file a complaint within 15 -- an amended complaint within 15 days, or a complaint within 15 days.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, staff.

Commissioners, Issue Number 1, oral arguments.

I'm inclined to grant the five-minute oral arguments.

If I don't hear any opposition, we'll go with that.

We'll start with Mr. Skop. I will let you know when you have about a minute left, and then you can kind of draw your conclusions.

MR. SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a point of information, since GRU is the movant, perhaps it would be more appropriate for Mr. May to speak to GRU's motion first and allow us the opportunity to respond.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Mr. May, if that's okay.

MR. MAY: That would be fine, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning. I'm Bruce May with the law firm of Holland and Knight. Our firm represents the City of Gainesville, which does business as the Gainesville Regional Utilities. With me this morning is Ms. Shayla McNeill; she is to my left. Ms. McNeill is the city's in-house utility counsel.

As you listen to the arguments today,

Commissioners, please keep in mind that the city is a

municipal utility governed by local elected officials.

The city has a strong interest in making sure that it

listens to and understands the concerns of its customers

and hopes that those concerns can be amicably resolved.

However, when a customer files a legal action against

the city based upon pleadings which do not comply with

Florida law, the city has no choice but to point out

these legal deficiencies and seek dismissal. That's where we find ourselves today.

I would also ask that you keep in mind that this agency does not have jurisdiction over the city's revenue requirement, nor does it have jurisdiction over the level or the dollar amount of the city's rates.

Under Florida law, the city's revenue requirement and its rates are set solely by the city commission of Gainesville, elected officials, but only after the city commission receives extensive public input during numerous public hearings.

With that said, Commissioners, the city supports your staff's recommendation. And just as we pointed out in our motion to dismiss, your staff has recommended that the petition be dismissed for three basic reasons. First, it is filled or replete with claims that the city's rates are too high and its wholesale contracts and wholesale rate structure are improper. The Supreme Court has ruled that those claims are clearly outside the Commission's jurisdiction over municipals. Therefore, those claims should be dismissed.

The second deficiency is that the petition targets a fiction. The petition is largely dedicated to vilifying a proposed two-tiered rate structure that the

city actually never adopted and simply doesn't exist.

This is a classic strawman argument and should be dismissed.

Third, the petition makes conclusory allegations about the inadequacies of the city's existing rate structure without providing the Commission or the city with the requisite notice of what the petitioners believe those inadequacies are.

The petition also fails to put the Commission and the parties on notice as to what specific relief is being requested. Those are material defects, Commissioners, under Florida's Administrative Procedures Act. As your staff recommendation reflects, the petition has serious flaws and you really have no discretion today but to dismiss it, just as your staff recommends.

Before I conclude, I want to briefly address an erroneous argument that surfaces in the petitioner's response to our motion to dismiss. Counsel suggests that the petition he filed somehow entitles his clients to a formal evidentiary hearing. That's incorrect. In its response to our motion to dismiss, the petitioners mention that the petition was filed pursuant to Section 120.569. But what the petitioners do not advise the Commission of is that that statute was amended in

1998 to make it clear that the right to an administrative hearing is not automatic.

Prior to 1998, it was fairly common practice for agencies to immediately commence formal evidentiary hearings simply based on vague or speculative petitions in hopes that those defects would be cured later during the evidentiary hearing by motion practice before the administrative law judge or the hearing officer. This often left agencies such as yourself and other parties to the proceeding in the difficult position of having to speculate on what the hearing was all about. This led to prolonged disputes over unnecessary issues, it led to inordinate delays, and it ultimately increased costs.

Formal evidentiary hearings are expensive propositions. To correct this problem, the legislature amended Section 120.569 to require, to require an agency like you to, quote, closely review the petition at the front end of the process, and to dismiss the petition at the front end of the process if it is based on conclusory allegations, speculative injuries, and rates that simply don't exist.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Mr. May, you have a minute left.

MR. MAY: Okay. Your staff recommendation complies with that statutory mandate to the letter. As

staff explains, the petition was filed well before the
city finalized its rate structure and filed it with the
Commission. Because petitioners jumped the proverbial
gun, their pleadings make repeated allegations directed
at a rate structure that was never actually adopted by
the city.

As your staff correctly points out, the allegations are far too speculative and the relief requested is far too vague to entitle petitioners to an evidentiary hearing. The petition itself needs to be dismissed as a matter of law.

Going forward, Commissioners, if counsel is intent on pursuing this matter any further, he needs to amend his petition to cure these serious defects.

That's precisely what the law requires, and that's what your staff has recommended. Thus, we would respectfully request that you adopt or approve staff's recommendation. Thank you.

I'll be available after Mr. Skop makes his presentation to answer any questions.

MR. SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Commissioners. Nathan Skop appearing on behalf of Eye

Associates of Gainesville, LLC, and Debra Martinez.

Mr. May raised some points, and I'd like the opportunity to briefly respond. As to the staff

recommendation, given the significant amount of time that has passed since the filing of our petition, nearly seven months, my clients support the staff recommendation subject to comment and clarification. My clients are certainly willing to amend the complaint to update the ultimate facts supporting the stated cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

It's important to recognize, however,

Commissioners, and Mr. Chairman, that the petitioners

cause of action in this docket is, has been, and always

will be about GRU's retail rate structure, retail

electric rate structure. The petition filed by the

petitioners was the initiation of formal proceedings

pursuant to Rule 25-22.306, Florida Administrative Code.

In a subsequent filing, the Commission reclassified the petition as a complaint and revised the docket title. The petition itself is supported by the signatures of 112 GRU customers, and docket correspondence letters exist from a state representative who is also a GRU customer, and a congressman who also has constituents that live in GRU's service territory.

But getting to the point, the Commission clearly has jurisdiction over the retail electric rate structure of a municipal utility pursuant to Sections 366.02(2) and 366.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes. GRU would

seek to have this Commission render the statutory jurisdiction meaningless.

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I think it's fair to say -- and, Mr. May, feel free to opine -- but I think that it's fair to say that the parties and PSC staff would all likely agree that the Commission does have jurisdiction over GRU's retail electric rate structure. And the standard of review that this Commission should apply in reviewing the complaint was that in order to sustain a motion to dismiss, the moving party must show that accepting all allegations as true and in favor of the complainant, that the petition still fails to state cause of action for which relief may be granted. GRU's motion fails to meet this burden. Applying the standard of review to petitioner's complaint, the GRU motion to dismiss should be denied because the petition was facially sufficient and stated a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

There's two issues. There's the existing rate structure and proposed rate structure. Clearly there were inequities in the rate structure. I think a lot of this can be solved by amending the complaint.

My clients are somewhat puzzled, however, by the staff recommendation to grant GRU's motion to dismiss with prejudice on the nonjurisdictional issues

which my clients never sought to litigate in this docket. The petitioners have the right to plead the ultimate facts necessary to establish a stated cause of action upon which relief may be granted by this Commission, and in this case that's GRU's retail electric rate structure.

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The disputed issues of material fact and relief sought in the petition did not raise nor request any relief whatsoever on the nonjurisdictional issues.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the nonjurisdictional issues upon which relief was not sought seems equally moot.

Commissioners, the nonjurisdictional issues which GRU complains upon in their motion were pled as relevant facts within the background, background section of the petition. These relevant facts are aggravating factors demonstrating why review of the inequities within GRU's retail electric rate structure are critically important. So to make this analogy, it is well known that GRU currently has the highest electric rates in the State of Florida. And if the Commission could take official recognition of this well-known fact, then certainly a litigant should be able to plead a relevant fact in the context of establishing the stated cause of action related to GRU's retail electric rate

1 structure.

So, again, I think that the relief sought here was to review the rate structure. The material issue or disputed issues of material fact were all related to GRU's retail electric rate structure. So with respect to the relief sought, again, my clients are perfectly happy to amend the complaint pursuant to the staff recommendation.

Again, we would like to put this in a hearing posture, conduct some discovery, put on some testimony, and ultimately the Commission would have the authority, at least in our opinion, based upon the reading of the statute, to issue an order directing GRU, if it was proven is based on the evidentiary record, to address the inequalities within their retail electric rate structure.

I don't believe that this Commission could order GRU how to accomplish that, because rate structure and rates are inextricably intertwined. But certainly if inequities exist within the statutory jurisdiction that this Commission enjoys on the electric retail rate structure, then that's an issue squarely within the Commission's jurisdiction. And 93,000 GRU customers, including my clients, are looking to this Commission for assistance in resolving those inequities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Skop.

Commissioners? Commissioner Brown.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you. A couple of questions for Mr. May.

Could you tell us what the status is of the city commission ordinance? Has it been codified and issued by the city clerk?

MR. MAY: Commissioner Brown, this petition that's before you today was filed well in advance of the city finalizing its rates. The city actually filed its rates, finalized its rates in August of last year. And in accordance with your rules under Chapter 25-9, filed the rate structure and the rates with you and your staff at the end of last year.

The utility has received -- this is outside of the -- obviously outside of the four corners of the pleadings, but just to answer your question, the utility has received a letter from your staff which has administratively approved the rate structure. So that's where we are today. To answer your question, yes, they have, and it has been filed and it has been approved by your staff administratively.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: This may be a question for you or Mr. Skop regarding the existing rate

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structure and how it differs from the previous rate structure. Can you or Mr. Skop explain to us how they differ?

MR. MAY: The rate structure that the City of Gainesville has filed is essentially the same rate structure that has been on file for the last seven years, and it has been approved each year by this Commission.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Okay.

MR. SKOP: Mr. Chair. And to Commissioner
Brown's question, I would agree that it is a rate
structure. However, the inequities that exist within
that rate structure are disputed issues of material
fact. And I know that our original petition, again,
looked at the existing and the proposed rate structure.
The existing had inequities. It's our belief that the
implemented rate structure has those same inequities.
And notwithstanding Commission staff's administrative
approval action, again, what we're trying to do is
address and litigate the inequities within the retail
electric rate structure, and I think that's a credible
difference.

And one thing that I did not mention previously, but it was in Docket 080665-EI, in re, approval of long-term agreement for full requirement

electric service with Lee County Electric Cooperative,
that was an instance where the PSC had both rate
structure and rate jurisdiction, but it was asked to
look at FPL's proposed wholesale contract with Lee
County. And staff actually issued recommendations that,
you know, kind of pierced that veil a little bit to take
a look at some of the impact on the various rate classes
of customers as a result of that contract.

So it's not unprecedented, at least in my opinion, for the Commission to look there. And in this case it's a municipal, which makes it more difficult, because the Commission does not have rate jurisdiction. But the rate structure is an issue, and the rate structure inequities are aggravated by some of these nonjurisdictional issues that were merely pled as ultimate facts in relation to support the stated cause of action.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Mr. Skop, in the oral argument you stated, you seemed to be inclined to support the staff recommendation to come back and amend the complaint, is that correct?

MR. SKOP: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Okay. Because I think there's some validity in the fact that the complaint didn't really specify what the inequities are. I think

1	it needs to be more clear, so I thank you.	
2	CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Other Commissioners?	
3	Okay. I'd like to entertain a motion.	
4	Commissioner Brown.	
5	COMMISSIONER BROWN: I move staff	
6	recommendation.	
7	CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It has been moved and	
8	seconded, staff recommendation.	
9	Commissioner Edgar, did you have any comments?	
10	COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I was going to make a	
11	motion.	
12	CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay. It has been moved and	
13	seconded, staff recommendation on all issues on Item	
14	Number 3. Any further discussion?	
15	Seeing none, all in favor say aye.	
16	(Vote taken.)	
17	CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Any opposed?	
18	By your action you've approved staff's	
19	recommendation.	
20	MS. BARRERA: Thank you.	
21	MR. MAY: Thank you, Commissioners.	
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON)
4	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Hearing Reporter
5	Services Section, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk, do
6	hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I
8	stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct
9	supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative,
11	employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties'
12	attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.
13	DATED THIS 20th day of March, 2014.
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15	Cana Januart
16	JANE FAUROT, RPR
17	Official FPSC Hearings Reporter (850) 413-6732
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