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July 3, 2017

VIA: ELECTRONIC FILING

Ms. Carlotta S. Stauffer Commission Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Re:

Analysis of IOUs' hedging practices

FPSC Docket No. 170057-EI

Dear Ms. Stauffer:

Attached for filing in the above docket on behalf of Tampa Electric Company are the following:

- 1. Prepared Direct Testimony of J. Brent Caldwell
- 2. Prepared Direct Testimony of David E. Bly

Thank you for your assistance in connection with this matter.

Sincerely,

James D. Beasley

JDB/pp Attachment

cc: All Parties of Record (w/attachment)



BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 170057-EI

IN RE: ANALYSIS OF IOU'S HEDGING PRACTICES

TESTIMONY

OF

J. BRENT CALDWELL

FILED: JULY 3, 2017

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

J. BRENT CALDWELL

Q. Please state your name, address, occupation and employer.

A. My name is J. Brent Caldwell. My business address is 702

N. Franklin Street, Tampa, Florida 33602. I am employed
by Tampa Electric Company ("Tampa Electric" or "company")
as Director, Fuel Planning and Services.

Q. Please provide a brief outline of your educational background and business experience.

A. I received a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology in 1985 and a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering in 1988 from the University of South Florida. I have over twenty years of utility experience with an emphasis in state and federal regulatory matters, fuel procurement and transportation, fuel logistics and cost reporting, and business system analysis. In October 2010, I assumed responsibility for long-term fuel supply planning and procurement for Tampa Electric's generating stations.

- Q. Have you previously testified before the Commission?

- A. Yes. I have submitted written testimony in the annual fuel docket since 2011. In 2015, I testified in Docket No. 150001-EI on the subject of natural gas hedging. I also have testified before the Commission in Docket No. 120234-EI regarding the company's fuel procurement for the Polk 2-5 Combined Cycle ("CC") conversion project.
- Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

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A. The purpose of my testimony is to address key issues identified at a May 17, 2017 issue identification meeting among the Staff, the investor-owned electric utilities ("IOUs") and various intervenors. The issues primarily have to do with whether it is in the consumers' best interests in Florida for the IOUs to continue natural gas financial hedging activities and, if so, whether any changes should be made to the manner in which the IOUs conduct their financial hedging activities. Also at issue is the appropriate regulatory implementation process for any changes that are deemed appropriate. Finally, the remaining issue is whether a hedging opt out tariff should be offered to large-demand customer classes of the IOUs.

Q. Please provide a brief background regarding natural gas financial hedging in Florida and the current status of that hedging.

A. Financial hedging of natural gas prices by the IOUs has been a subject of serious consideration by the Commission dating back to 2001. The Commission has a long-standing goal of mitigating the volatility of natural gas prices and the impact of that volatility on customers' utility bills. In recent years declining natural gas prices, while a good thing overall for utility customers in Florida, have given rise to hedging settlement losses, which have become the focus of many affected persons.

The issue of hedging losses has been prominent in recent fuel adjustment proceedings. In the 2016 fuel proceeding, the Commission approved a joint proposal of the IOUs to reduce the level of their financial hedging. The companies jointly proposed a reduction in the percentage of volume hedged under the previous plan in April 2016. After the Commission's decision to approve that plan, the

 $^{^{1}}$ Hedging practices were initially approved by Order No. PSC-02-1484-FOF-EI, issued October 30, 2002 in Docket No. 011650-EI. Also see Tampa Electric's post-workshop comments filed in Docket No. 170057 on March 6, 2017 for a more detailed description of the Commission's consideration of hedging practices since 2002.

order was protested and the change was not implemented.²

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Q. Please describe subsequent events regarding hedging, given the protest of the utilities' proposal to reduce their level of hedging.

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On October 24, 2016, Tampa Electric as well as the other Α. investor owned utilities ("IOUs"), Florida Power & Light ("FPL"), Gulf Power Company ("GPC") and Duke Energy ("DEF"), Florida entered into Stipulation and а Settlement Agreement with OPC, Florida Industrial Power Users Group ("FIPUG") and Florida Retail Federation ("FRF"). Under the terms of the agreement, the IOUs agreed to put in place a 100 percent moratorium on any new hedges, effective immediately upon the Commission's approval of the Agreement with that moratorium extending through the calendar year 2017.

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Q. What else was included in the agreement?

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A. The agreement called for a workshop or workshops to consider the alternatives to prospectively resolve the

² Order No. PSC-16-0247-PAA-EI granting investor-owned utilities' joint petition for approval of modifications to risk management plans, issued June 27, 2016 in Docket No. 160096-EI was protested by OPC's petition protesting and requesting evidentiary hearing on PAA Order PSC-16-0247-PAA-EI, submitted July 15, 2016. Docket No. 160096-EI was subsequently consolidated with the fuel docket-- No. 160001-EI.

hedging issues, including but not limited to a riskresponsive approach, a reduction in current levels of hedging and hedging durations, and use of different financial hedging instruments altogether. The stated goal was either establishing a basis for the IOUs to present risk management plans for the 2018 period that all stakeholders could agree upon or not object to, reaching some other resolution of the hedging issues identified in Docket 160001-EI. The agreement was approved by the Commission on December 5, 2016, with the issuance of Order No. PSC-16-0547-FOF-EI.

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Q. Have there been any workshops?

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Yes, On January 10, 2017, representatives from the IOUs, Α. Staff and intervenors attended the informal workshop at the Commission. The subject of the workshop was presentation about the hedging proposal recommended by Staff witness Gettings in his testimony filed in the 2016 fuel docket. Mr. Gettings described his model, analysis and details of his proposal results, and answered questions from the companies and intervenors. The purpose of Mr. Gettings' four-stage hedging proposal mitigate price volatility while limiting hedging losses. The workshop was followed with the utilities and

intervenors having opportunities to explore Mr. Gettings' model through questions and interaction.

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Another workshop was scheduled for February 21, 2017 to allow the parties to provide feedback on the Staff proposal as well as alternative hedging proposals. The utilities presented a joint hedging proposal to use outof-the-money ("OTM") call options instead of the previously employed swaps. The OTM call option approach serves as an effective method of achieving price spike protection that is significantly less complex than the Gettings model and at the same time, allows customers to participate in downward market price movements during periods of declining natural gas prices. With the OTM call option approach, utilities will sustain not settlement losses. Each of the IOUs provided an analysis of the costs and potential effectiveness of the OTM call option hedging strategy and answered questions about their analyses and the proposed implementation of this strategy.

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Interested parties submitted post-workshop comments following the February 21, 2017 workshop.³

 $^{^3}$ Tampa Electric submitted its post-workshop comments in Docket No. 170057-EI on March 6, 2017.

Hedging Goals

Q. How does Tampa Electric view the goals of the hedging program at present?

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Α. Tampa Electric has heard the Commission's comments to the effect that financial hedging provides valuable price volatility mitigation to customers, both over the years and in the most recent two fuel hearings. The company has also heard the concerns expressed by both the Commission and other parties to the docket, that the costs, settlement losses on financial swaps, are too expensive. These losses represent the lower prices that customers could have paid in recent years as fuel prices went down, if they were fully exposed to market fuel volatility. Therefore, the company anticipates the goals of a successful hedging program at the present time will be (1) to mitigate fuel price volatility by constraining upward fuel price movements and (2) to maintain the ability to participate in fuel markets when prices are

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declining.

Q. In light of the issues relative to hedging settlement losses, do you believe it is in the consumers' best interests for the IOUs to continue natural gas hedging activities?

A. Yes, I do. As I stated earlier, the Commission has studied financial hedging of natural gas prices very carefully since the early 2000's and has consistently found that hedging has been beneficial to consumers in Florida. However, I recognize the focus on protecting against the effects of price volatility has shifted to a dual focus on protection against price spikes and the avoidance of hedging losses.

Q. If hedging is determined to be in the consumers' best interests, what changes, if any, should be made to the manner in which electric utilities conduct their natural gas financial hedging activities?

A. If the Commission determines that hedging should continue, but modified to mitigate hedging losses, there appear to be two options for consideration. The first is an approach proposed by witness Gettings and the second is the OTM call option approach advanced by the IOUs at a February workshop earlier this year.

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Gettings Hedging Proposal

Q. What is the proposal recommended by witness Gettings as a substitute to the utilities' previous risk management plans? A. Witness Gettings calls his proposal a risk responsive hedging plan. It differs from previous utility risk management plans as it uses a Value-at-Risk ("VaR") model to determine when to execute new hedges as well as when to liquidate, or protect with options, hedges currently held. The Gettings proposal requires the company to establish tolerances for hedge losses and to formulate a strategy of prescribed responses to defend those tolerances against risk conditions in the market. This approach does not eliminate the potential for hedging losses.

The Gettings approach utilizes four types of natural gas hedges. The first type of hedge is a programmatic hedge, in which swaps are executed for a portion of the portfolio for an extended period forward throughout the calendar year, regardless of market conditions. These types of programmatic hedges are exactly the type utilized in the utilities' previous Risk Management plans. Their purpose in the Gettings approach is to assure some price volatility protection and to limit the volume of hedges required under the defensive strategy.

The second type of hedge is a defensive hedge in which swaps are executed after a market price movement causes

a cost threshold chosen by the utility to be breached within the VaR model. The purpose of this type of hedge is to provide protection against upside price movement with a utility-defined loss threshold.

The third type of hedge utilized in the Gettings program is the contingent hedge. This type of hedge is initiated after market price movements cause a utility-defined hedge loss tolerance to be breached within the VaR model. This type of hedging strategy consists of suspending hedges, the use of options as a means to constrain hedging losses, and the ability to unwind existing hedges.

The fourth type of hedge utilized under the Gettings approach is the discretionary hedge. This type of hedging occurs when the prices are deemed attractive by the risk manager. Mr. Gettings did not encourage this type of hedging; however, he does not preclude it.

Q. Are there any costs to implement the proposal suggested by witness Gettings?

A. Yes, the costs are expected to be substantial to design, develop and implement new functions and tools to run the VaR model and generate required reporting in the Energy

Trading and Risk Management system. Additional personnel are expected to be needed to maintain and run the Gettings hedging program. Each of these needs will cause an incremental cost and require significant time to implement the hedging strategies recommended by witness Gettings.

OTM Call Option Hedging Proposal

Q. Please describe the utility proposal.

A. During the February 2017 workshop, the utilities proposed an OTM call option approach as an alternative to the Gettings approach. The OTM call option is a financial instrument that requires the purchaser to pay an upfront premium in return for the ability to receive payment if the future price of an underlying asset rises above a strike price that is higher than the current market for that asset.

OTM call options protect against a defined level of upward price movement. Options expiring in the money provide price protection while options expiring out of the money do not result in any costs beyond the premium cost already incurred. Similar to an insurance premium cost, the options cost is "sunk" and provides a benefit only when

needed, in this instance when fuel prices have exceeded a defined cost threshold, or the strike price for which the options were purchased. In addition, customers are not limited from participating in downward price movements when market fuel prices decline.

The testimony of Tampa Electric witness David E. Bly describes in greater detail the OTM call option proposal, potential benefits and risks of the program, and Tampa Electric's expected implementation if the program is approved.

Evaluation of Alternatives

Q. Is it your opinion that the OTM call option program would provide customers with protection against price volatility, protection against extreme upward price movements, and the ability to fully participate in downward fuel price movements?

A. Yes, it is. The OTM call option approach will protect customers from spikes in natural gas prices and provide some associated price volatility mitigation. And, consistent with the new objective of participation in downward price movements as expressed by various parties in this and the annual fuel docket, the OTM call option

approach will allow participation in declining prices.

Q. How do you expect the price protection provided by the OTM call option program to compare to that provided by the Gettings hedging approach?

A. I believe that the OTM call option approach would be more beneficial for IOU customers. First and foremost, the call option approach will achieve the two key goals of hedging as we perceive them to be. The call option approach will protect customers from price spikes in the natural gas market. The call option approach will also avoid hedging settlement losses when the price of natural gas declines, which is the major criticism the intervenors have lodged against the previous swaps-based hedging program.

Mr. Gettings' approach would <u>continue</u> the use of swaps which would continue to expose customers to potential hedging settlement losses.

The call option approach will also be far less complicated, less costly to implement, less confusing, and likely less contentious than the risk responsive proposal advanced by Mr. Gettings. The call option

approach will be quicker and easier to implement, audit and otherwise regulate than the Gettings proposal. I believe the OTM call option approach is the best alternative for achieving the dual objectives of price spike protection and allowing customers to participate in downward price movements.

When it was proposed, the call option approach had the unanimous support of the investor-owned electric utilities who will be required to implement the hedging approach the Commission ultimately approves.

The companies' back-testing analysis has shown that the OTM call option approach would have had lower settlement losses than the legacy swaps program over the last 12 years. However, the volatility mitigation would not have been as effective as that of the legacy swaps program. Therefore, with the changing objectives of a hedging program going forward, Tampa Electric believes that any departure from the hedging model previously approved by the Commission prior to the moratorium should favor the OTM call option approach discussed above.

Q. If changes are made to the conduct of natural gas financial hedging activities, what regulatory

implementation process is appropriate?

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Α. As I previously stated, the call option approach will be quicker and easier to implement, audit and otherwise regulate than the Gettings proposal. In particular, I believe it will require up to two years to implement the Gettings approach. The company will need to hire individuals with specific skillsets, implement and test new features in the Energy Trading and Risk Management System, and, most importantly, determine the VaR model thresholds and receive approvals from internal oversight committees and the Commission for these thresholds.

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Hedging Opt-Out Proposal

Q. Should a hedging opt-out tariff be offered for each IOU's large-demand customer classes?

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A. No. Tampa Electric does not purchase natural gas or any other generation fuel for different customer classes or a particular customer class. Hedging is not performed for individual customer classes. If hedging is appropriate, it is appropriate for all customer classes. Implementation of any such opt-out program would be fraught with challenges, confusion, litigation and claims

of discrimination by others who might want to opt out. Similarly, those challenges and confusion would be compounded over time as customer decisions change, e.g., when prices spike if those that originally chose to "opt out" want to opt back in to take advantage of protection that hedges are affording other customers.

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Summary

Q. Please summarize your direct testimony.

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Α. Tampa Electric recognizes and appreciates the Commission's serious study of issues relating to the hedging of natural gas purchases. The benefits of hedging have been recognized by the Commission for many years. Tampa Electric recognizes that the issue of hedging settlement losses has come into focus in recent years, owing to the decline in natural gas prices. The company recognizes that the original hedging goal also mitigating volatility in natural gas prices has been linked to a second goal of avoiding hedging settlement losses, given the decline in natural gas prices in recent To achieve these dual goals, a change may be years. warranted in the hedging practices previously approved by the Commission. Between the risk responsive management approach advanced by Mr. Gettings and the OTM

call option hedging proposal advanced by the IOUs during recent workshops, the latter appears to be the "best fit" for a regulated utlity. The OTM call option approach will continue to meet the Commission's goal of mitigating price volatility of natural gas and its impact on customers' costs by providing protection against price spikes while at the same time enabling utility customers to participate in declines in natural gas pricing without suffering hedging settlement losses. Finally, a hedging opt-out provision for large industrial customers is not appropriate for the reasons described above.

Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

15 A. Yes, it does.



BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 170057-EI

IN RE: ANALYSIS OF IOU'S HEDGING PRACTICES

TESTIMONY

OF

DAVID E. BLY

FILED: JULY 3, 2017

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

DAVID E. BLY

Q. Please state your name, address, occupation and employer.

A. My name is David E. Bly. My business address is 702 N. Franklin Street, Tampa, Florida 33602. I am employed by TECO Services, Inc. ("TSI") as Director, Independent Risk Oversight. I have responsibility for the Middle Office oversight function for Tampa Electric and other utilities serviced by TSI. My department handles areas such as deal confirmation, valuation, credit management, risk reporting, and compliance with pertinent market rules and regulations.

Q. Please provide a brief outline of your educational background and business experience.

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A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business
Administration from the University of Florida, majoring
in Finance. I also received a Master of Science degree in
Applied Finance from the University of Colorado - Denver.
I have nearly 20 years of experience working in risk

management and energy markets for utilities in multiple jurisdictions.

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to explain how an out-of-the-money ("OTM") call option hedging strategy would work, describe the benefits of using OTM call options to mitigate fuel price volatility, and discuss the company's concerns about the hedging strategies recommended by staff's witness Gettings in the 2016 fuel adjustment docket.

Q. Please describe the OTM call option hedging strategy proposed by the investor-owned utilities ("IOUs") in an earlier workshop in this docket.

A. The utilities propose to purchase OTM call options to hedge a defined percentage of expected natural gas burn, at a defined price level (+X percent) above the then-expected market prices of natural gas, for a defined forward period.

Q. Are there portions of the OTM call option strategy that

Tampa Electric would apply differently than the other

utilities?

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Α. Yes, possibly. The OTM call option proposal allows individual Florida utilities the flexibility to specify company-specific items in their respective management plans. Each utility would utilize this process to obtain approval from the Commission for its individual risk management plan. Tampa Electric expects it would request Commission approval of the following variables in annual risk management plan: the percentage its projected natural gas volume to be hedged, the strike price set point (e.g., X percent above current market prices), a maximum options premium budget (not to be exceeded without Commission approval), and time period for which hedges will be executed.

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Q. How would using OTM call options benefit customers?

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- A. OTM call options are a risk-responsive natural gas hedging alternative with the following characteristics:
 - Options provide financial protection against a defined level of upward movement in natural gas market prices.
 - Options expiring in the money provide protection from natural gas market price increases.

Options expiring out of the money do not result in any additional costs other than the option premium.

- Option costs are "insurance premiums" for their protection against price spikes.
- Customers have 100 percent participation in downside price movements when market prices of natural gas decline.
- OTM call options do not result in settlement losses when market prices of natural gas decrease.
- Q. Are these benefits unique to the OTM call option strategy?
- A. The OTM call option strategy is unique in that it is the only proposed strategy that will not result in settlement losses when market prices decrease.
- Q. Are there risks associated with using OTM call options to hedge fuel prices?
- A. It could be argued that there is a risk associated with utilities expending significant dollars on premiums to purchase OTM call options and subsequently not collecting any settlement dollars to offset those losses. However, as stated previously, the option premiums are akin to insurance premiums. That is, a defined sum spent to

protect against an uncontrollable risk. Therefore, the option premium dollars are truly managing risk and not creating incremental risk.

Q. Are these risks unique to the OTM call options approach?

A. The OTM call option approach is the only one which requires an upfront cost. However, as stated previously, it is also the only proposal to ensure no hedging losses.

Q. Please describe your impressions of the hedging strategies suggested by witness Gettings.

A. From a purely quantitative perspective, there are aspects of the Gettings approach that appear to be an improvement over the utilities' prior hedging strategy. The use of current market factors as a decision point for placing hedges is not without merit. However, Tampa Electric is primarily concerned with the degree of complexity of the Gettings model, the lack of specificity about how the model would be implemented as well as the cost of implementation. The Gettings proposal requires daily monitoring and decision-making about whether to add or eliminate hedge positions, based on the results of a Value at Risk ("VaR") model the utility must maintain. The

results of a VaR model can vary significantly depending on the types of model parameters assigned to it. Things such as historical or implied volatility, the holding period of the portfolio, confidence level, decay factor of previous prices, and other factors all play a critical role in the model's results. Different utilities may choose slightly different parameters, or could be constrained in the choices they make by the technology or system they utilize to run the model. Tampa Electric has concerns about how to manage the type of model Mr. Gettings recommends and how to defend this model and resulting decisions from later criticisms or hindsight review if outcomes are deemed unfavorable.

Q. Please describe any concerns you have about following the hedging strategies recommended by witness Gettings.

A. First, implementing the Gettings VaR model would require a substantial commitment of time and resources. Additional time would be needed for model testing, report building, and then to analyze and establish appropriate boundaries, thresholds, or percentages that affect the types and amounts of hedges to be undertaken.

My main concern surrounds the contingent hedging strategy within the Gettings approach. While the purpose of that strategy is plain - to limit downside price losses associated with previously established positions - it can be construed as trading around a hedge position. The utilities have historically avoided any activity that could be construed as "trading" and have only focused on hedging the underlying risk, i.e., the risk of upward price movements. I believe the contingent portion of the Gettings approach takes us closer to the "trading" realm.

Another concern is that in times of high market volatility, there is the potential for the Gettings approach to signal that the utility should simultaneously execute both defensive hedges and contingent hedges. Those two strategies are in complete opposition to one another. While the utilities could state in advance which strategy they would employ in case of that conflict, the very nature of the conflict itself, and the accompanying decisions the utility would have to make in a volatile market, make the approach less than optimal.

Finally, one of the parties' and Commission's recent main concerns about natural gas hedging is the potential for downside market price movements to result in settlement

losses. This risk is not eliminated by adopting the hedging strategies suggested by witness Gettings. On the contrary, since swaps are used as the primary hedging tool under the Gettings approach, losses are certain to occur in times of falling prices.

Q. How would the use of OTM call options compare to the Gettings approach to hedging fuel price volatility?

A. OTM call options would achieve much of what the Gettings approach attempts to accomplish, limiting upside price spikes while preserving downward price movements for the benefits of customers, with much less complexity and a quicker timeline to implement. The OTM call option proposal could be implemented as soon as the Commission approved the company's revised risk management plan, while the Gettings proposal would require one to two years to implement.

Q. Please summarize your direct testimony.

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A. Tampa Electric believes the OTM call option proposal is a much simpler method to achieve the same goals as the staff proposal set forth in Mr. Gettings prior testimony in the fuel adjustment docket. The OTM call option

proposal will mitigate upward price spikes, and it will be less expensive when compared to swap settlement losses experienced by the utilities under their prior hedging approach. It will provide that protection with a zerodollar limit on settlement losses, a much lower limit on settlement losses than would be achieved under the Gettings proposal. Mr. Gettings introduced the concept of an "efficient frontier" for the aspects of risk reduction and cost-effectiveness. However, these two aspects cannot be assessed in a vacuum. Other important aspects such as implementation timeline and costs, ongoing complexity and administration, and ease of reporting and monitoring must be carefully considered. This raises the question of the appropriate balance to achieve costeffective hedging. Tampa Electric does not believe it is in customers' best interests to spend additional money and time implementing a more complex methodology such as the Gettings proposal, when the OTM call option proposal is likely to yield very similar results over time. Tampa Electric believes the OTM call options proposal strikes the right balance of protection against price spikes, zero exposure to settlement losses, and reasonable option premium costs for that price spike protection.

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Additionally, Tampa Electric has a very important concern

about the Gettings proposal. The Gettings approach is vaguely defined and leaves its interpretation and implementation far too open; and it would call for implementation decision-making at various undefined points moving forward. This is very disconcerting to Tampa Electric and could make it very complex for other parties and the Commission, in the regulatory review process, to ascertain whether the model has been complied with.

Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?

A. Yes, it does.