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Adam Teitzman, Commission Clerk  
Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services  
Florida Public Service Commission  
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard  
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 20210015-EI  
Petition by FPL for Base Rate Increase and Rate Unification

Dear Mr. Teitzman:

Attached for filing on behalf of Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL") in the above-referenced docket are the Rebuttal Testimony and Exhibits of FPL witness Scott R. Bores.

Please let me know if you should have any questions regarding this submission.

(Document 13 of 15)

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Wade Litchfield". The signature is fluid and cursive.

R. Wade Litchfield  
Vice President & General Counsel  
Florida Power & Light Company

RWL:ec  
Attachment  
cc: Counsel of Record

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**BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF SCOTT R. BORES**

**DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI**

**JULY 14, 2021**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2

3 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

4 **A.** My name is Scott R. Bores. My business address is Florida Power & Light  
5 Company (“FPL” or “the Company”), 700 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach,  
6 Florida 33408.

7 **Q. Have you previously submitted direct testimony in this proceeding?**

8 **A.** Yes.

9 **Q. Are you sponsoring or co-sponsoring any rebuttal exhibits in this case?**

10 **A.** Yes. I am sponsoring the following rebuttal exhibits:

- 11
  - SRB-12 – 2024 and 2025 High-Level Revenue Requirements
  - SRB-13 – FPL Productivity Savings

12 I am co-sponsoring the following exhibit:

- 13
  - LF-10 – FPL’s Notice of Identified Adjustments filed May 7, 2021 and  
14 Witness Sponsorship, filed with the rebuttal testimony of FPL witness  
15 Fuentes.

16 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

17 **A.** The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to rebut the incorrect assertions from  
18 numerous intervenor witnesses regarding: (1) the reliability of the forecast FPL  
19 proposes to use to set rates for 2023 (OPC witness Smith); (2) the propriety of  
20 and need for the 2023 Subsequent Year Adjustment (“2023 SYA”) (OPC  
21 witnesses Smith and Lawton); (3) FPL’s increasing revenue requirements in  
22 2024 and 2025 (FEA witness Gorman); (4) the Reserve Surplus Amortization  
23

1 Mechanism (“RSAM”) in the past and how it will be used under FPL’s four-  
2 year rate plan (OPC witnesses Smith and Lawton); (5) FPL’s need for  
3 accelerated amortization of unprotected excess accumulated deferred income  
4 taxes (“EADIT”) (OPC witness Smith) and the proposed tax reform mechanism  
5 as necessary components of the four-year proposal (FIPUG witness LaConte  
6 and OPC witness Smith); (6) the value of the consummation payment as part of  
7 the overall Scherer 4 transaction (OPC witness Smith, FIPUG witness LaConte,  
8 FEA witness Gorman); and (7) recovery of Directors and Officers Liability  
9 (“DOL”) insurance expense (OPC witness Smith).

10 **Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.**

11 A. Intervenor witnesses attempt to cast doubt over FPL’s forecast of years beyond  
12 2022, but make no genuine effort to provide a valid basis for their assertions.  
13 The Minimum Filing Requirements (“MFRs”) developed to support the 2022  
14 Test Year and 2023 SYA were subject to the same rigorous forecasting process  
15 resulting in forecasts of revenue requirements and are reasonable and reliable  
16 for setting base rates in this proceeding. The forecast demonstrates that the  
17 2023 SYA is necessary to avoid falling more than 100 basis points below the  
18 allowed midpoint return on equity (“ROE”), and approving it is consistent with  
19 Florida Public Service Commission (“Commission”) policy and past practice.  
20 In addition, FPL has provided evidence showing that its continued investments  
21 for customers in 2024 and 2025 increase the revenue requirements in those  
22 years, even though FPL’s four-year plan does not seek any general rate  
23 increases after 2023. The RSAM, acceleration of unprotected EADIT to 2024

1 and 2025 and tax reform mechanism are therefore necessary to manage the  
2 revenue deficiency and the numerous uncertainties and risks over the period of  
3 FPL's four-year rate plan.

4  
5 The financial results from 2017 through 2020 belie the claim by various  
6 intervenor witnesses that the RSAM was utilized solely as a mechanism to earn  
7 at the top-end of the allowable ROE range. Rather, FPL's superior management  
8 of costs and productivity improvements created the value that enabled FPL to  
9 earn at the top of the approved ROE range in the past, and the financial scenarios  
10 for 2024 and 2025 indicate that the RSAM will not drive FPL to earn at the top  
11 of the range during the four-year term. In fact, FPL will need to use about  
12 \$1.345 billion of the proposed \$1.48 billion Reserve Amount simply to earn at  
13 the midpoint in 2024 and 2025, leaving only about \$135 million over the entire  
14 four year period to manage through the many risks associated with multi-year  
15 "stay outs." The Reserve Amount is therefore insufficient to absorb a change  
16 in the corporate tax rate. The tax mechanism proposed by FPL, which is  
17 substantially similar to mechanisms previously approved by the Commission,  
18 is a necessary component of the four-year plan.

19  
20 Additionally, OPC witness Smith's and FEA witness Gorman's recommended  
21 disallowance of the \$100 million consummation payment related to Scherer  
22 Unit 4 is confiscatory. The \$100 million consummation payment to JEA is a  
23 necessary investment to unlock \$583 million of projected CPVRR savings for

1 customers. FPL should be allowed to include that payment within rate base and  
2 earn a fair return like any prudent investment made for the benefit of customers.

3

4 Finally, the Commission should reject OPC witness Smith's recommendation  
5 that 50% of DOL insurance expense should be disallowed in order to reflect an  
6 allocation to shareholders. This insurance is a prudent cost to attract and retain  
7 skilled leadership, is part of conducting business for a large corporation and has  
8 been historically part of FPL's cost of service.

9

## 10 II. 2023 SUBSEQUENT YEAR ADJUSTMENT

11

12 **Q. Are the Company's forecasts for 2023 reasonable and reliable for setting**  
13 **rates in this proceeding?**

14 A. Yes. Similar to the 2022 projected test year, the basis and process used in  
15 developing the 2023 forecasts are robust and reasonable, and the resulting  
16 forecasts of revenue requirements can be relied upon for rate setting. FPL's  
17 forecasts are the products of a rigorous process involving a multi-year planning  
18 horizon that I describe in great detail in my direct testimony.

19 **Q. Did the circumstances surrounding the 2020 pandemic make estimates**  
20 **beyond 2022 unreliable?**

21 A. No. OPC witness Lawton suggests that the 2020 pandemic somehow  
22 invalidated estimates beyond 2022. However, nothing about the forecast  
23 process for the 2023 SYA diverges from the process used to forecast 2021 and

1 2022. To the contrary, the Company followed the same rigorous process and  
2 the underlying work and support for each of these forecasts share a common  
3 platform and approach, equally appropriate for 2023 as for 2021 and 2022. Mr.  
4 Lawton does not point to anything about the 2020 pandemic that would impact  
5 the 2023 forecast differently than the forecast for 2021 or 2022.

6 **Q. Has the economic outlook already changed from the time you prepared the**  
7 **forecast for 2022 and 2023?**

8 A. Yes. The economic landscape has begun to change since FPL filed its rate case,  
9 but, ironically, those changes indicate that FPL will likely need *more* revenues  
10 in future periods to earn a fair and reasonable return. Pursuant to the four-year  
11 proposal described by FPL witness Barrett, FPL takes on the responsibility to  
12 manage through these increases in the cost of doing business, not only in the  
13 2023 SYA, but also through each year of the four-year proposal as I will discuss  
14 in more detail.

15 **Q. Has the Commission previously approved the use of subsequent year**  
16 **adjustments?**

17 A. Yes. Order Nos. 13537, PSC-92-1197-FOF-EI, and PSC-93-0165-FOF-EI are  
18 examples of instances in which the Commission approved the use of “two fully  
19 projected test years” in rate cases for FPL, Florida Power Corporation, and  
20 Tampa Electric Company, respectively.



1 **Q. Is the Company’s request for a 2023 SYA appropriate and consistent with**  
2 **Commission policy?**

3 A. Yes. Use of the Company’s proposed 2023 subsequent year to approve the  
4 2023 SYA in this proceeding is appropriate under Commission Rule 25-6.0425  
5 and represents an efficient and reasonable basis upon which to establish rates  
6 for the Company. The justification for the 2023 SYA is especially critical in  
7 this case due to FPL’s commitment to forgo general base rate increases in 2024  
8 and 2025 upon approval of its four-year plan. OPC witness Lawton’s attempt  
9 to apply an “extraordinary circumstances”<sup>1</sup> threshold requirement for  
10 subsequent year adjustments is contrary to precedent and undermines the  
11 Commission’s goal to set rates on a going forward basis that will enable a utility  
12 to recover its costs and earn a fair and reasonable return. This principle has  
13 been addressed by the Florida Supreme Court which stated in a 1985 challenge  
14 to a Commission order granting FPL a rate increase in 1984 with a subsequent  
15 year adjustment for 1985:

16 At the heart of this dispute is the authority of [the] PSC to  
17 combat “regulatory lag” by granting prospective rate  
18 increases which enable utilities to earn a fair and reasonable  
19 return on their investments. We long ago recognized that  
20 rates are fixed for the future and that it is appropriate for [the]  
21 PSC to recognize factors which affect future rates and to  
22 grant prospective rate increase based on these factors.  
23

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<sup>1</sup> Direct Testimony OPC witness Lawton at Page 15, Line 15 through Line 21.

1 **Q. Why is the 2023 SYA necessary, and why is it good public policy?**

2 A. As demonstrated in the Company's filing, FPL projects a \$605 million revenue  
3 deficiency in 2023.<sup>2</sup> Without the 2023 SYA, the Company projects its ROE in  
4 2023 will fall more than 100 basis points, putting it below the bottom of the  
5 allowed range. On one hand, OPC witness Smith asserts that 2023 SYA is not  
6 necessary, but on the other hand, his own calculations indicate that the  
7 Company has a \$457 million<sup>3</sup> revenue deficiency and will be unable to earn a  
8 reasonable return in 2023.

9  
10 Additionally, OPC witness Smith's assertion that the 2023 SYA is not good  
11 public policy ignores the realities of running a regulated utility. The 2023 SYA  
12 allows the Company to avoid filing another rate case in 2022 for new base rates  
13 effective in January 2023. Filing back-to-back rate cases would require FPL to  
14 expend significant time and resources – time that is better spent finding  
15 additional ways to create value for FPL's customers. Through a series of multi-  
16 year rate plans, FPL has been able to prepare, file and execute base rate  
17 proceedings occurring infrequently (every three or four years), without building  
18 a large permanent staff devoted to processing rate cases, in part because the  
19 filings have been infrequent. In addition, FPL has utilized the time between  
20 those rate cases to find significant costs efficiencies that accrue to the benefit  
21 of customers in the form of a lower rate case request and lower rates over the  
22 long-term. If base rate proceedings were to become an annual requirement,

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<sup>2</sup> Exhibit LF-12, Page 1 of 6, to FPL witness Fuentes's Rebuttal Testimony.

<sup>3</sup> Exhibit RCS-3, Schedule A, line 8, column E to OPC witness Smith's Direct Testimony

1 customers would bear additional costs and the Company would be investing  
2 significant resources into rate proceedings instead of finding additional  
3 opportunities to drive out significant cost and create long-term value for  
4 customers. Certainly, such an approach also is directly counter to the multi-  
5 year plans that have been approved by the Commission and which have worked  
6 exceptionally well for customers for more than 20 years, as discussed at greater  
7 length by FPL witness Barrett.

8 **Q. Will the Commission maintain the ability to oversee FPL’s earnings in**  
9 **2023 and future years in the absence of back-to-back rate cases?**

10 A. Yes. FPL is required to submit to the Commission earnings surveillance reports  
11 (“ESR”) on a monthly basis. These reports set forth the level of FPL’s earnings  
12 and other financial results. The Commission utilizes the ESRs to ensure that  
13 FPL is not earning above the allowed ROE range and has the authority to initiate  
14 an earnings investigation when appropriate. Through this robust process, the  
15 ESRs effectively and efficiently have served to protect customers and the  
16 Company during multi-year rate plans and “stay outs,” and it will serve the  
17 same function during the 2023 subsequent year and remainder of the four-year  
18 rate plan being proposed in this proceeding.

19 **Q. How does the 2023 SYA impact the Company’s earnings?**

20 A. FPL is not petitioning for an increased ROE in the subsequent year. The 2023  
21 SYA would set rates at the midpoint ROE authorized by the Commission. The  
22 mathematical fallout is that the 2023 SYA is midpoint seeking, and OPC  
23 witness Lawton’s suggestion that the 2023 SYA will serve only to increase

1 equity earnings is just not true. Conversely, without a subsequent year  
2 adjustment, the Company's ROE will fall below the proposed authorized range,  
3 meaning the Company will be unable to earn a fair return and would be forced  
4 to return to the Commission a few months from now to seek an incremental  
5 base rate increase to be effective January 1, 2023.

6

7 **III. 2024 AND 2025 REVENUE REQUIREMENTS**

8

9 **Q. Has FPL supported its position that it will experience a revenue deficiency**  
10 **in 2024 and 2025?**

11 A. Yes. FEA witness Gorman's rejection of FPL's four-year plan on the grounds  
12 that the Company did not produce a full set of MFRs for each year overlooks  
13 information FPL has produced in this proceeding and misconstrues the nature  
14 of FPL's four-year proposal. In responses to various interrogatories, the  
15 Company has provided high-level base scenario projections that indicate FPL's  
16 base rate revenue requirements are projected to grow in excess of \$500 million  
17 per year in both 2024 and 2025 as a result of FPL's continued investment for  
18 the benefit of customers. Exhibit SRB-12 provides a high-level revenue  
19 requirement calculation for 2024 and 2025. Even after accounting for  
20 additional base revenues projected to be received under FPL's proposed  
21 SoBRA mechanism, and assuming approval of the Company's requested base  
22 revenue increase in 2022 and 2023, FPL projects incremental revenue  
23 requirements of \$433 million in 2024 and \$911 million in 2025 to earn at the

1 proposed midpoint return on equity, or a total of \$1.345 billion. This will leave  
2 only approximately \$135 million of the Reserve Amount remaining for FPL to  
3 utilize to manage uncertainty and risk in the business, which represents  
4 approximately only 0.4% of total base revenues over the four-year rate plan  
5 time period, hardly the shareholder benefit claimed by intervenor witnesses.

6 **Q. What types of uncertainties and risks will the Company need to manage?**

7 A. As OPC witness Lawton points out, there is an unusually high degree of risk  
8 and uncertainty surrounding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the  
9 economy over the longer term, including the impact on productivity, the labor  
10 force, and technological innovation – all factors which FPL relies on to drive  
11 further efficiency and execute its capital plan for the benefit of customers.  
12 Additionally, OPC witness Lawton argues that the Company did not consider  
13 “more rapid recovery and the influences of recent fiscal and some monetary  
14 initiatives.”<sup>4</sup> To the contrary, as discussed by FPL witness Park, FPL has  
15 considered these initiatives and other market dynamics as part of the four-year  
16 plan, and it is the exact reason FPL is asking for the flexibility afforded under  
17 the RSAM. For example, IHS Markit, FPL’s third-party source for economic  
18 projections, reflected much higher current and long-term inflation assumptions  
19 in their June 2021 forecast than FPL utilized in preparation of their forecasts  
20 over the four-year plan. Additionally, on June 16, 2021, the Federal Open  
21 Market Committee, a committee that conducts monetary policy for the United  
22 States central bank, raised its inflation expectations and announced that it may

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<sup>4</sup> Direct Testimony OPC witness Lawton at Page 9, Line 1 through Line 2.

1 need to increase interest rates earlier than expected. These are significant  
2 changes that occurred only a few months after the Company's base rate filing  
3 and highlight the potential risks and uncertainties the Company will assume as  
4 part of the four-year rate plan. To be able to assume that uncertainty and  
5 provide the significant benefits of rate stability and predictability to its  
6 customers, FPL requests approval of all the elements outlined in the four-year  
7 rate plan and described in witness Barrett's direct testimony.

8 **Q. Why is FPL proposing to accelerate the amortization of unprotected**  
9 **EADIT amortization into 2024 and 2025?**

10 A. The Company's proposed four-year rate plan, as described in detail in FPL  
11 witness Barrett's direct testimony, will enable FPL to forgo general base rate  
12 increases in both 2024 and 2025 while providing customers with rate stability  
13 and certainty through at least January 2026. The accelerated amortization of  
14 unprotected EADIT, which is classified as a regulatory liability, is an essential  
15 element of the four-year proposal. Although accelerating EADIT amortization  
16 in 2022 and 2023 as proposed by OPC witness Smith would reduce the revenue  
17 deficiency in the projected test year and the subsequent year, it would have the  
18 negative consequence of increasing the revenue requirements in both 2024 and  
19 2025, thereby no longer allowing FPL to commit to the Four-Year Rate Plan.  
20 The acceleration of unprotected EADIT amortization into 2024 and 2025 is  
21 necessary for FPL to be able to earn a fair and reasonable return while managing  
22 risks and uncertainties over the four-year term.

1           **IV. RESERVE SURPLUS AMORTIZATION MECHANISM**

2

3   **Q. Please describe how FPL intended to utilize the RSAM at the time it**  
4   **entered into the 2016 Settlement Agreement?**

5   A. Under the 2016 Settlement Agreement, FPL agreed to no general base rate  
6   increases in 2019 or 2020, even though it planned to continue making long-term  
7   investments for the benefit of customers. The flexibility under the RSAM  
8   allowed FPL to make these investments, manage the uncertainty in the business  
9   and defer cash rate increases, which provided an immediate benefit to  
10   customers in the form of base rate stability and lower rates. And, as evidenced  
11   by the terms to which the parties agreed in 2016, it was always the intent of the  
12   signatories that FPL would in fact utilize the entire \$1.25 billion reserve  
13   established in that Agreement.

14   **Q. Did FPL use RSAM to “pay” for Hurricane Irma restoration costs and**  
15   **thereby burden future customers with a cost that current customers should**  
16   **pay?**

17   A. Absolutely not. OPC witness Smith is incorrect in his assertion. FPL did not  
18   pay for Hurricane Irma restoration costs with RSAM. FPL has yet to find a  
19   vendor who will accept RSAM as payment for anything. Contrary to this  
20   mischaracterization, the costs of Hurricane Irma restoration were funded by  
21   internal cash flow and liquidity including cash flow generated by the income  
22   tax revenue requirement savings associated with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of  
23   2017. This essentially is the same treatment OPC agreed to with Duke Energy

1 Florida (Order No. PSC-2018-0103-PCO-EI; Order No. PSC-2019-0232-AS-  
2 EI). RSAM was employed, as allowed by the 2016 Settlement Agreement, to  
3 partially offset the book expense of Hurricane Irma. Three items were  
4 simultaneously true: 1) tax savings paid for storm costs over roughly the same  
5 period as would have been the case with a storm surcharge; 2) the amount of  
6 RSAM used through the settlement period was essentially as expected by all  
7 parties to the agreement (though in fact a bit less as evidenced by the estimated  
8 \$346 million remaining at the end of 2021); and 3) FPL was able to provide an  
9 extra year of deferral of a base rate increase.

10 **Q. Please explain how the RSAM allowed FPL to make the investments you**  
11 **described and how that impacted FPL's earnings.**

12 A. The intervenors' repeated assertions that FPL used the RSAM to earn at the top  
13 of the range are, at best, uninformed. FPL's continued capital investments in  
14 2019 and 2020, which I describe in my direct testimony, occurred despite the  
15 lack of general base rate increases in those years. Yet, investment of that capital  
16 for the benefit of customers resulted in incremental revenue requirements in  
17 both 2019 and 2020. FPL utilized the RSAM approved under the 2016  
18 Settlement Agreement to amortize the established \$1.25 billion surplus reserve  
19 in order to earn at the *midpoint ROE*. Contrary to what intervenor witnesses  
20 would like the Commission to believe, as demonstrated in Exhibit SRB-13, the  
21 \$1.25 billion RSAM approved in the 2016 Settlement Agreement would not  
22 have been sufficient to allow FPL to earn anywhere near the top of the allowed  
23 ROE range.



1 **Q. If FPL utilized amortization of the reserve established under the 2016**  
2 **Settlement Agreement to earn at the midpoint ROE, how was FPL able to**  
3 **earn near or at the top of the ROE range during the term of the 2016**  
4 **Settlement Agreement each year?**

5 A. Over the term of the 2016 Settlement Agreement, FPL worked diligently on  
6 identifying and implementing productivity savings. Specifically, as shown in  
7 Exhibit SRB-13, since 2017 FPL has been able to generate approximately \$1.1  
8 billion in productivity savings. It is these savings that have allowed FPL to earn  
9 above the midpoint ROE, a position that FAIR witness Devlin supports as  
10 reasonable<sup>5</sup>, and not the use of the RSAM. Without these productivity savings,  
11 which continue to benefit customers and have reduced the O&M included  
12 within FPL's 2022 Test Year and 2023 SYA, FPL would have earned about 100  
13 basis points less than it did during each year from 2017 through 2021.

14  
15 Exhibit SRB-13 clearly demonstrates that it was the productivity improvements  
16 that allowed FPL to earn near the top of the range, and that FPL only utilized  
17 the RSAM to add an average of four basis points of ROE above the midpoint.  
18 In fact, FPL did not utilize all of the \$1.25 billion afforded under the 2016  
19 Settlement Agreement, but rather that customers have retained the benefit of  
20 the \$346 million of surplus that FPL has forecast to remain at the end of 2021.

21

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<sup>5</sup> Direct Testimony FAIR witness Devlin at Page 25, Line 5 through Line 8.

1 FPL’s actual earned return was not, by any means, a “guaranteed” return, as  
2 Mr. Smith states on Page 12 of his direct testimony. Instead, it was the result  
3 of substantial efforts made by FPL to improve long-term productivity. What  
4 FPL has done is beyond what a prudent utility does, as discussed by FPL  
5 witness Reed and reflected in FPL’s significantly higher performance compared  
6 to its peers.<sup>6</sup> In addition, customers will realize the benefits of this O&M  
7 productivity in not only the current base rate request, but for the foreseeable  
8 future.

9 **Q. Will the RSAM work in a similar manner under FPL’s current Four-Year**  
10 **Rate Plan?**

11 A. Yes. As noted in my testimony above, FPL will be utilizing the flexibility  
12 awarded under the RSAM to avoid cash rate increases, offer rate stability and  
13 manage the uncertainty and risk that is inherent in a four-year proposal.  
14 Approximately 90% of the requested RSAM amount is needed to allow FPL to  
15 earn at the midpoint ROE in 2024 and 2025, leaving the \$135 million remaining  
16 amount to manage the business and absorb higher costs that are most certainly  
17 going to present themselves as a result of rising inflation and interest rates. This  
18 means that if FPL wants the opportunity to earn at the top of the allowed ROE  
19 range, it must find further efficiencies and productivity improvements in the  
20 business. This is the benefit of the four-year proposal in that customers get rate  
21 stability for an extended period of time, and there is incentive for FPL to focus  
22 on further cost efficiencies that will accrue to the benefit of customers at the

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<sup>6</sup> Exhibits JJR-3 through JJR-14 to FPL witness Reed Direct Testimony.

1 time rates are next reset. Just like under the 2016 Settlement Agreement, the  
2 RSAM as part of the current four-year proposal does not guarantee FPL earns  
3 at the top of the allowed ROE range, but affords FPL the opportunity should it  
4 continue to find cost efficiencies and create long-term value for the benefit of  
5 customers.

6

7

## V. SCHERER UNIT 4 RETIREMENT

8

9 **Q. FPL is requesting regulatory asset treatment for the unrecovered net book**  
10 **value of Scherer Unit 4. Why is it appropriate for FPL to earn a return on**  
11 **this asset?**

12 A. Scherer Unit 4 has been a valuable component of FPL's generation fleet for  
13 over 30 years and provided customers with reliable electricity; however, it is no  
14 longer economical to operate given FPL's efficient and modern generation  
15 fleet. Like any prudent investment that has served for the benefit of customers,  
16 FPL should be entitled to earn a return on its investment. Furthermore, the  
17 economic analysis which yielded \$583 million of projected CPVRR savings for  
18 customers includes the impact of establishing regulatory assets for the  
19 remaining unrecovered book value and recovery over ten years. Lastly, it can  
20 be argued that the disallowance of a return on the unrecovered book value of  
21 Scherer Unit 4 would be penalizing the Company for finding creative ways to  
22 reduce costs and would disincentivize the Company from seeking similar  
23 customer-value driven opportunities in the future.

1 **Q. In order to retire Scherer Unit 4, FPL had to make a consummation**  
2 **payment to JEA. Why is it appropriate for FPL to include this amount in**  
3 **retail rate base?**

4 A. The retirement of Scherer Unit 4 is projected to yield \$583 million of CPVRR  
5 savings for customers inclusive of the \$100 million consummation payment to  
6 JEA. FPL owns a 76.36% undivided interest in Scherer Unit 4 with the  
7 remaining 23.64% undivided interest owned by JEA. As discussed by FPL  
8 witness Forrest, FPL does not have the ability to retire its percentage ownership  
9 of Scherer without the agreement of JEA and absent the consummation payment  
10 to JEA, FPL would not have been able to jointly retire this unit to create the  
11 projected \$583 million of savings for FPL customers. The consummation  
12 payment is like any other prudent investment that yields customer benefits and  
13 FPL should be entitled to earn a return on that investment.

14 **Q. Is it appropriate to assume that FPL customers will be exposed to higher**  
15 **fuel costs as a result of the Scherer Unit 4 retirement? Additionally, is it**  
16 **appropriate to remove fuel savings from the Scherer Unit 4 CPVRR**  
17 **analysis?**

18 A. No. Contrary to what OPC witness Smith seems to believe, and as further  
19 discussed by FPL witness Forrest, it would not be appropriate to assume that  
20 FPL customers would be exposed to higher fuel costs as a result of the Scherer  
21 Unit 4 retirement. The Company plans on replacing the generation associated  
22 with the retirement of Scherer Unit 4 with efficient combined cycle upgrades  
23 and more importantly, with zero-cost fuel and emissions-free solar. This

1 replacement generation has already been factored in the CPVRR analysis that  
2 results in the \$583 million of projected savings to FPL customers. Additionally,  
3 it would be very inappropriate to selectively choose one variable in the CPVRR  
4 analysis that provides customer benefit and ask that it be ignored as there is a  
5 remote possibility a portion of the savings may not materialize. It is also  
6 important to note that there are assumption changes that could increase the  
7 CPVRR benefit for customers, including higher emissions or coal compliance  
8 costs. FPL includes its best estimate of fuel projections in all resource planning  
9 work and CPVRR calculations including those utilized in need determinations,  
10 SoBRAs, and other proceedings before the Commission.

11

## 12 VI. TAX LAW

13

14 **Q. Please reiterate FPL's proposal as it relates to a potential change in tax law**  
15 **during the Four-Year Rate Plan.**

16 A. FPL's 2022 Test Year forecast and 2023 SYA are based on current tax law.  
17 Should there be a change in tax law either during or after the conclusion of the  
18 rate case, FPL proposes to adjust base rates for the impact of the new tax  
19 legislation. The calculation of the required change in base rates will be  
20 submitted to the Commission for review within 90 days of the enactment of the  
21 new tax law. FPL is not asking for any adjustment in base rates prior to a change  
22 in tax law, it is simply seeking a mechanism to allow for an adjustment to base

1 rates should new tax laws be enacted that change FPL's cost of service during  
2 the term of FPL's four-year proposal.

3 **Q. Should FPL include the impact of any new tax law in its earnings**  
4 **surveillance reports and offset with RSAM, as suggested by OPC witness**  
5 **Smith?**

6 A. Absolutely not. A potential change in the income tax rate will significantly  
7 impact revenue requirements. The Company's four-year rate plan, and the  
8 \$1.48 billion of RSAM, an essential component of this plan, do not contemplate  
9 any potential impacts due to changes in tax law and FPL cannot absorb the  
10 corresponding significant increase to revenue requirements.

11 **Q. Does FPL agree that its proposal for an adjustment to base rates should**  
12 **apply to either an income tax rate increase or decrease?**

13 A. Yes. FPL commits to adjust base rates for any change in tax law, whether it is  
14 an income tax rate increase or decrease.

15

16 **VII. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY EXPENSE**

17

18 **Q. Do you agree with OPC witness Smith's proposed adjustment to reduce**  
19 **DOL insurance expense by 50% to reflect an allocation to shareholders?**

20 A. No. DOL insurance is an essential and prudent cost to attract and retain skilled  
21 leadership and is appropriately included in the Company's determination of  
22 revenue requirements in this case. DOL insurance is a necessary part of  
23 conducting business for a large corporation. In light of the growing risk

1 exposures related to corporate governance, it would be impossible to attract and  
2 retain experienced directors and officers without the protections offered by the  
3 DOL program.

4 **Q. Should the Commission include FPL's requested expense for DOL**  
5 **insurance in its revenue requirement calculation?**

6 A. Yes. DOL insurance directly benefits customers and is a necessary and  
7 reasonable expense for FPL to provide service to its customers.

8 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

9 A. Yes.

Docket No. 20210015-EI  
High-Level 2024 & 2025 Revenue Requirements  
Exhibit SRB-12, Page 1 of 1

**High-Level 2024 & 2025 Revenue Requirements**  
(\$ Millions)

Line	Description	2023	2024	2025	Reference
<b>FPSC Adjusted Rate Base</b>					
1	Capital Expenditures	\$ 7,056	\$ 7,355	\$ 7,325	FIPUG INT No. 43
2	Less: SPPC Capital Expenditures	\$ 1,268	\$ 1,311	\$ 1,035	Docket No. 20200071-EI, Exhibit MJ-1, Appendix C (FPL); Docket No. 20200070-EI, Exhibit MS-1, Appendix C (Gulf).
3	Adjusted Capital Expenditures	\$ 5,789	\$ 6,044	\$ 6,290	
4	Average Depreciation Rate <sup>1</sup>		2.87%	2.87%	Exhibit KF-3(B), Page 24 of 47
5	Annual Depreciation & Amortization	\$ 2,429	\$ 2,599	\$ 2,776	MFR C-01 SYA
<b>6</b>	<b>FPSC Adjusted Rate Base</b>	<b>\$ 59,605</b>	<b>\$ 62,923</b>	<b>\$ 66,314</b>	MFR B-01 SYA
<b>7</b>	<b>FPSC Adjusted Rate Base - Incremental Growth</b>		<b>\$ 3,318</b>	<b>\$ 3,391</b>	
8	Pre-Tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)		8.88%	8.99%	MFR D-01 SYA - As adjusted
9	Property Tax Rate		1.75%	1.75%	MFR F-08 SYA
<b>10</b>	<b>Revenue Requirement Multiple</b>		<b>10.63%</b>	<b>10.74%</b>	
<b>11</b>	<b>Revenue Requirement - Capital Initiatives</b>		<b>\$ 523</b>	<b>\$ 541</b>	
<b>Operating Expenses</b>					
12	CPI Index		2.1%	2.2%	Staff INT No. 151
13	2024 and 2025 FPSC Adjusted O&M Expense	\$ 1,380	\$ 1,409	\$ 1,440	MFR C-01 SYA
<b>14</b>	<b>FPSC Adjusted O&amp;M Expense - Incremental</b>		<b>\$ 29</b>	<b>\$ 31</b>	
<b>15</b>	<b>Total Revenue Requirements - Incremental</b>		<b>\$ 552</b>	<b>\$ 572</b>	
16	Less: SoBRA Revenue Requirements		\$ 140	\$ 140	Test Year Notification filed on January 11, 2021
<b>17</b>	<b>Net Revenue Requirements - Incremental</b>		<b>\$ 412</b>	<b>\$ 432</b>	
18	Annual Surplus		\$ 412	\$ 844	
19	Surplus - Rate Base Impact		\$ 22	\$ 67	
20	Total Annual Surplus		\$ 433	\$ 911	
<b>21</b>	<b>Total Cumulative Surplus<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>\$ 433</b>	<b>\$ 1,345</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Based on the RSAM parameters as proposed by FPL witness Ferguson

<sup>2</sup> Assumes approval of the Company's requested base revenue increase in 2022 and 2023 and an 11.5% midpoint return on equity





## FPL Productivity Savings

YEAR	ROE (%)			O&M (\$ MILLIONS)			ROE O&M	ROE SURPLUS & OTHER
	ACTUAL <sup>1</sup>	MIDPOINT <sup>2</sup>	DIFFERENCE	ESTIMATED <sup>3</sup>	ACTUAL <sup>4</sup>	DIFFERENCE		
2017	11.08%	10.55%	0.53%	\$1,420	\$1,325	\$ (95)	0.48%	0.04%
2018	11.60%	10.55%	1.05%	\$1,472	\$1,262	\$ (210)	0.96%	0.09%
2019	11.60%	10.55%	1.05%	\$1,501	\$1,216	\$ (285)	1.17%	-0.12%
2020	11.60%	10.55%	1.05%	\$1,531	\$1,236	\$ (295)	1.08%	-0.03%
2021	11.60%	10.55%	1.05%	\$1,562	\$1,311	\$ (250)	0.83%	0.22%
<b>Average</b>	<b>11.50%</b>		<b>0.95%</b>			<b>\$ (1,136)</b>	<b>0.90%</b>	<b>0.04%</b>

O&M productivity was the key driver of FPL's ability to earn at the top of the allowed ROE range.

<sup>1</sup> 2017-2020 actual average ROE per the December ESR Schedule 1, Page 1 of 1. 2021 average ROE per the 2021 Forecasted ESR Schedule 1, Page 1 of 1.

<sup>2</sup> The 2017-2020 midpoint ROE per the December ESR Schedule 4, Page 1 of 2. 2021 midpoint ROE per the 2021 Forecasted ESR Schedule 3, Page 1 of 1.

<sup>3</sup> 2017-2020 projected base O&M per FPL's response to OPC's First Set of Interrogatories No. 3, Attachment No. 1 in Docket No. 160021-EI. 2021 projected Base O&M assumes a 2% growth vs. 2020 Base O&M.

<sup>4</sup> Base O&M per MOPR Page 9. Excludes Revenue Enhancement and adjusted for storm costs. MOPR Page 9 for 2016-2020 provided in response to OPC's First Request for Production of Documents Supplemental Request No. 53 and OPC's First Request for Production of Documents Supplemental Request No. 46.