

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN RE: DOCKET NO. 001556-TL - Petition by Verizon

Florida, Inc. for declaratory statement on applicability of Section 364.336, F.S., and Rule 25-4.0161, F.A.C., Regulatory Assessment

Fees.

BEFORE: CHAIRMAN E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ

COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI

PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER: 3

DATE: Tuesday, January 2, 2001

PLACE: 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

TRANSCRIBED BY: MARY ALLEN NEEL

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PARTICIPANTS:

KIM CASWELL, Verizon Florida, Inc.
DALE MAILHOT, Commission Staff.
HAROLD MCLEAN, Counsel to the Commission.
CHRIS MOORE, on behalf of the Commission Staff.

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

Issue 1: Should the Commission issue a declaratory statement that Verizon is not required to pay regulatory assessment fees on the directory advertising revenues booked by its affiliate company? Recommendation: No. The Commission should issue a declaratory statement that Verizon is required to pay regulatory assessment fees on the directory advertising revenues from the directories for areas within its certificated territory.

<u>Issue 2</u>: Should this docket be closed?

<u>Recommendation</u>: Yes. If the Commission votes to dispose of the petition for declaratory statement the docket should be closed.

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CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. That brings us back to Item 3.

MS. MOORE: Commissioners, Item No. 3 is the petition for declaratory statement by Verizon Florida, Inc., formerly GTE Florida. Verizon has asked the Commission to declare that it is not required to pay regulatory assessment fees on its yellow page advertising revenues, revenues that are billed and collected by Verizon, but which are booked by its directory affiliate. Verizon argues that the revenues are not its own, but belong to the affiliate, and therefore it shouldn't have to pay regulatory assessment fees on those amounts.

The Commission has previously treated yellow page revenues as revenues of the telecommunications company, even though there is an affiliate involved, and it did so in a 1989 show cause order stating that the telecommunications company cannot circumvent the regulatory assessment fee statute by redirecting the revenues to an affiliate.

Historically, they've been considered the telecommunications company's revenues for both regulatory assessment fee purposes and for

ratemaking. The fact that Verizon is not rate regulated doesn't change the -- there's nothing in the RAF statute, the regulatory assessment fee statute that has changed, and price regulated companies are not exempt from that statute. The Commission has considered the revenues those of the company because they're made possible and integrally related to its business of providing local exchange service.

In sum, staff doesn't believe that Verizon has shown any circumstances or changes in circumstances or the law that would justify the Commission changing its policy.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That completes your summary?

MS. MOORE: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Very well. The Company is here to address this issue?

MS. CASWELL: Yes. Commissioners, the question in this case is whether Verizon Florida is required to pay regulatory assessment fees only on its own revenues or whether it needs to pay a fee on the revenues of its directory affiliate as well.

Mr. Christian has passed out the relevant

statutes so you can follow along with the legal argument, which is very simple and straightforward.

section 364.336 of the Florida Statutes states that each telecommunications company licensed in this state must pay the Commission a fee each year on its gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business. Commission Rule 25-4.0161, which implements the statute, reflects the same language.

It's a basic principle of statutory construction that if the language of a statute is unambiguous, then there's no need to look beyond the statute to interpret it. In this case, there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. The regulatory assessment fee can be collected only from certificated telecommunications companies and only on the revenues they earn in this state. So only Verizon Florida, a certificated telecommunications company, must pay a fee, and only on the revenues Verizon Florida itself earns in this state.

Verizon Florida does not earn or book any directories revenues. Rather, Verizon

Directories pays Verizon Florida for the services it performs under contract.

Staff, however, takes the position that Verizon Florida must pay a fee not only on its own revenues, but on the revenues of its directories affiliate. In other words, Verizon Florida has to pretend it has earned and booked these revenues for purposes of calculating its fee.

There is no basis in Section 364.336 to require any company to pay a regulatory assessment fee on other companies' revenues. Indeed, staff doesn't base its position on the statutory language itself, and instead it points to a case from 1989 concerning United Telephone. Staff says the factual circumstances in that case are no different than the ones presented here and that Verizon hasn't cited any change in law that would dictate a different result.

Staff may be right about the similarity of the facts of the United case and this one, but staff is not correct about Verizon's failure to cite any change in law that would dictate a different result. On the contrary, the change that Verizon cites could hardly be more dramatic, and that is, in 1995 the Florida Legislature dramatically overhauled Chapter 364 to open the local exchange to competition. In return, ILECs were given the opportunity to elect price regulation, thus doing away with traditional rate-of-return regulation.

Verizon became a price capped carrier on January 1st, 1996. With that election, Verizon was exempted by statute from earnings regulation and the requirements of all the statutes associated with that type of regulation, including Section 364.037, which requires imputation of directories revenues for ratemaking purposes.

Again, the date on the United case is 1989, several years before the advent of price regulation here. The United case was never litigated, but the show cause and settlement orders there were ostensibly a function of the Commission's ratemaking authority. The show cause order indicated that the directories revenues should be attributed to United to prevent the circumvention of regulatory assessment fees through, quote, a redirection of

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revenues to affiliated companies. This is the same rationale the staff uses in its analysis here.

In fact, it goes even further, stating that Verizon Florida's dealings with its directories affiliate is not an arm's-length transaction.

This is rate case language, pure and simple.

The staff is recommending an affiliate adjustment for purposes of calculating the regulatory assessment fee.

Verizon vigorously disputes the staff's conclusions about Verizon Florida's relationship with its directories affiliate. Verizon's contracts with all its affiliates fully comply with the FCC's affiliate transactions rules, and Verizon Florida is not redirecting revenues anywhere. It doesn't earn any revenues from directories other than those it obtains from providing services under contract.

In any event, the nature of Verizon

Florida's relationship with its affiliates is

not a relevant consideration here. First and

foremost, the regulatory assessment fee statute

gives you no discretion to include affiliate

revenues in a telecommunications carrier's fee

calculation. As you know, the Commission only has the authority delegated to it by the Legislature, and the law is very clear that if there is any doubt about the existence of a power, the further exercise of that power should be arrested.

In addition, the Commission cannot engage in the kind of ratemaking analysis that is reflected in the recommendation. This would violate the legislative prohibition on applying ratemaking treatment to price capped carriers, including the explicit prohibition on directories revenues imputation.

Under staff's analysis, you would be permitted to direct any telecommunications carrier to include in its fee base any or all of the revenues of any of the carrier's affiliated companies. So before you vote today, you should ask yourself whether you're sure the Legislature has given you this broad discretion, and you should be able to clearly identify the source of that discretion in the statute.

Staff recommends that if you wish to re-evaluate your longstanding policy on imputation of directories revenues, then you

should hold a hearing to develop a record to support the change. But that kind of hearing won't answer the question we've asked in our petition, which is whether you have the legal authority to maintain the policy in the first place. A hearing about Verizon's relationship with its affiliate would assume you have the authority to continue to make an affiliate adjustment for purposes of calculating the fee base.

If you want a legal brief to further explore the issue we've raised, we would be happy to provide it, and you can defer this matter until you've had an opportunity to further examine the legal issues we've raised. But a hearing about Verizon's affiliate relationships isn't going to help you rule on the petition for declaratory ruling.

Verizon urges you to deny the recommendation and find that the statute did not require Verizon Florida to pay a regulatory assessment fee on revenues that it neither earns nor books in this state.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Commissioners?

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I have a question. Could you walk me through how your directory process is handled?

As I understand it, there is a separate affiliate; correct?

MS. CASWELL: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And that affiliate actually publishes the directory?

MS. CASWELL: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And the advertising in that directory is billed by that affiliate?

MS. CASWELL: What happens is that we have a contract -- Verizon Florida, the ILEC, has a contract with the directories affiliate to perform certain functions, such as billing and collection, for the advertising in the directories, so that Verizon, the ILEC, earns only the revenues that it is due under that contract. There are no other revenues. Verizon Florida doesn't keep any revenues. It doesn't book any revenues. It doesn't make anything other than what it makes under the contract with Directories. And Directories has these sorts of contracts with other non-affiliated entities as well, so it's the same sort of relationship.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: You're only acting as a

1 billing agent for your directory --2 MS. CASWELL: Yes. There may be other functions they perform, but billing and 3 4 collection is the primary feature, I believe, of that contract. 5 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Those revenues are booked 6 7 totally absent whatever fee, processing fee is paid to the ILEC? They're booked totally to the affiliate? 9 MS. CASWELL: They're booked by the 10 11 directories company because it's the directories 12 company that earns those revenues. The ILEC 13 does not earn any revenues other than what it does under the contract. 14 15 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Now, you argue that 16 364.037, I believe --17 MS. CASWELL: Yes. 18 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: -- controls? 19 MS. CASWELL: Well, I mean, what controls 20 here is 364.336, which is the regulatory --CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. 21 22 Right. 23 MS. CASWELL: Yes. That's the regulatory assessment fee statute, and that's very clear. 24 25 And I've got the most relevant portions

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underlined. It says each telecommunications company licensed or operating under this chapter has to pay a fee on its gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business.

The directories company is not a telecommunications company under the definition in Chapter 364, and Verizon Florida doesn't book any operating revenues from the directories So all we need to do is look at this statute to determine what your decision should be.

In the past, we were under the belief that staff had -- this has been going on for quite some time. United raised the issue in 1989. raised the issue in 1996. Each time we raised the issue, we were told that staff was going on the directories revenue imputation statute, which was 364.037. And you also have a Commission rule which -- I'll have to cite to 25-4.0405, which is not included in your it. packet. That governs the ratemaking treatment for telephone directory advertising revenues and expenses. We had been told that staff was using that statute and that rule to impute the revenues, to continue to make us impute the

1 revenues.

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This recommendation, however, says, "No, that's not staff's view. We're just going on the precedent under the statute and the Commission's general authority to do this sort of thing."

so if you don't have 364.037 working -- and you do not, because we're exempt from that under the price cap statute -- then what authority do you have? I don't find any.

Again, we need to look to the language of the statute. And staff, in my opinion, does not do that at all in the recommendation. They ignore the language of the statute, and you can't do that. You've got the discretion only that the Legislature has given you, and nothing more.

And I don't know if the United decision was ever correct, but certainly in the wake of the price cap regulation, the Commission and the Legislature's explicit directive that you cannot apply ratemaking treatment, and the explicit prohibition on directories revenues imputation, there is absolutely no basis to continue to impute those directories revenues to Verizon,

the ILEC, for any purpose, including the regulatory assessment fee calculation. It's a strict legal issue.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Chairman, I have a question of staff, if I --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Go ahead.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Ms. Caswell several times now I think has made the argument that you can't read into the statute more than the authority that was given to you by the Legislature. Can you just briefly comment on what you think the plain meaning of the statute is?

MS. MOORE: Well, I think it does give the Commission the authority and the discretion to determine what revenues are -- to determine how gross operating revenues from intrastate business are to be calculated. And in doing that, I don't think that the corporate restructuring can dictate what the Commission interprets the revenues to be.

Those were -- prior to Section 364.037 being adopted, the Commission always treated all, 100% of the revenues from advertising revenues as those of the telecommunications

company. And when .037 was adopted, that merely took some of those profits away for the benefit of the shareholders. I think the Commission has stated that it was an incentive to -- a profit-making incentive. But the Commission has always said that it had the authority, and I think it does under the statute, to determine how the gross operating revenues are calculated.

Ms. Caswell, let me ask you this question. As I understand your argument, you're indicating that since Verizon, the incumbent LEC, is now exempt, since it is no longer subject to rate-of-return regulation, it is exempt from the requirement to impute directory advertising revenues, and because of that, then the Commission no longer has the legal authority to include directory advertising as part of your revenue for calculation of regulatory assessment fees; is that correct?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, that's how it's stated in the petition, because 364.051, which is the price regulation statute, specifically exempts price capped carriers from 364.037. I --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask you,

we no longer have any jurisdiction at all over the establishment of your rates.

MS. CASWELL: Correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So we have no jurisdiction over making a calculation as to what your intrastate revenues are, or your intrastate rate base, or your authorized rate of return? What's the difference -- under that argument, it seems to me that you could just as well argue that we have no jurisdiction over any of your revenues for calculation --

MS. CASWELL: You have jurisdiction to calculate the fee basis on my revenues, what it says here, its gross operating revenues, which means the ILEC's gross operating revenues.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And we defer to you to make that definition as to what constitutes your revenue?

MS. CASWELL: No. We look at the statute where it says each telecommunications company, and you look at me, the ILEC, the telecommunications company, and you look at my revenues. But you don't have a basis for looking at the revenues of my affiliate, because that's not a telecommunications company, and I

don't book any of those revenues.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But we do require you to publish and distribute -- and you may have an affiliate do it, but it is your, the incumbent LEC's responsibility to publish and distribute, according to our rule and requirement, a directory listing to each subscriber.

MS. CASWELL: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And you're the one -you choose then to use that as a basis to sell
advertising and to gain greater revenue;
correct?

MS. CASWELL: Verizon, the affiliate, uses the directory to sell advertising.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And because you decide to provide this regulated service -- and I know yellow page advertising is not regulated per se.

MS. CASWELL: Correct.

commissioner deason: You are not required to do that, but you are required to publish and distribute the directory listings. Because of that regulated requirement, and you choose to have an affiliate do that, and there are revenues derived from that process, we have to

ignore that when it comes to regulatory assessment fees because you choose to have an affiliate do that.

MS. CASWELL: Yes, because those are not my revenues. Those are not revenues of the telecommunications affiliate -- I'm sorry. Those are not revenues of the telecommunications carrier, and I do not book those revenues. So, yes, it's my view that you cannot take those into consideration when calculating the fee.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So anytime you set up a separate affiliate to do anything, well, then the company is exempt from regulatory assessment fees?

MS. CASWELL: That may well be true.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So what if you start
-- you set up a separate affiliate to provide
private line service?

MS. CASWELL: Then that would be a tel -well, when you say private line, I mean, we're
talking about a telecommunications service here;
correct? I mean, most of the things that come
before you will be telecommunications services.
So if I put like my long distance in a separate
affiliate, that's a telecommunications service,

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and you're going to get regulatory assessment fees on that.

The regulatory assessment fees are tied to the costs of regulating telecommunications companies, because that's what's under your jurisdiction. They're not tied to regulating non-telecommunications companies, because that would make no sense. Those companies are not under your jurisdiction.

Directories has been a special case,
because when divestiture occurred, the thinking
was that this would be an implicit subsidy for
-- to prop up the --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask this question. What if -- the way you define telecommunications services then, if you set up a separate affiliate to do repair work on your network, okay, and the customers are charged for like a repair on inside wire or something, would that be exempt then from regulatory assessment fees?

MS. CASWELL: It probably would. If you -COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because that's a
repair, and it doesn't meet the definition of
telecommunications --

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MS. CASWELL: It's not a telecommunications service, because you don't regulate inside wire. You may regulate repairs, though. You know, I would have to think about that. But, yes, if it's non-telecommunications service --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Are there examples besides directories where we are not imputing revenues from affiliates, customer services?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, lots of examples. We've got, you know, data -- well, it used to the GTE Data Services, GTE Supply, GTE Communications Company. We have those, you know, affiliates now under the name of Verizon, and none of those get imputed, just like you don't impute any of the revenues of any of the ALECs' affiliates. You make those sorts of adjustments in rate cases. In our 1992 rate case, for instance, you did make some affiliate adjustments for Data Services Company, and there were a couple of others. Directories may have been one of them. Those were reversed on appeal.

But the fact is that that's a ratemaking function. The only reason why directories I think persists is that it was codified in the statute that you could make, in effect, this

imputation on an ongoing basis without a rate case because it was statutory. But it was a ratemaking function. It's anachronistic now because we are no longer a rate regulated company, and the Legislature has spoken and said, "Look, this is what you do under a rate based regulation scheme. It's not what you do under a price cap scheme."

In all the states I know of, we are never treated -- we have no imputation issues where we are a price capped carrier. We do have them where we're a rate of return carrier.

Commissions typically want to take some of these revenues in rate cases and impute them to the company, just as they make other affiliate adjustments. You know, it's not unusual certainly to see these kinds of things in rate cases, with directories as well as with, you know, lots of other affiliates.

And Commissioner Baez, you know, taking it to its logical conclusion, staff's argument would mean that you could impute any of the revenues from any of these affiliates anytime you felt that perhaps there was not an arm's-length relationship.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm seeing -- based on Commissioner Deason's comments, I'm seeing some distinction. I mean, if -- and I think you brought it up yourself. If it was an affiliate that was providing a telecommunications service, then I think there would be an issue as to what -- you know, there would be an imputation issue, because that would go directly to Commissioner Deason's inference that if we say, "All right, no affiliate imputation," then you can just by way of corporate restructuring take all the gross revenues out, take all of your revenues out, or at least the door is open for that.

MS. CASWELL: Yes, but I would --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And that would -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MS. CASWELL: Yes. I would just suggest that a corporation is not going to make a decision on, you know, how it's structured on the basis of regulatory --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Of regulatory assessment fees. I agree.

MS. CASWELL: But all of the ILECs have separate directories affiliates here. So, I mean, staff raises in its recommendation the

point about it being unfair that we can, quote,
get around the regulatory assessment fee statute
by doing this. I don't see that point, because
all the ILECs have separate directories
affiliates.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: You would agree, though,

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: You would agree, though, that a valid factor to scrutinize here is the level to which this is an arm's-length transaction?

MS. CASWELL: Absolutely not. That is absolutely not relevant.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Why not?

MS. CASWELL: Because this is not a rate case, and my relationship with that affiliate is not relevant to looking at the statute and seeing what revenues you can consider for calculating the regulatory --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So we should look to determine how your directory affiliate got its mailing list?

MS. CASWELL: No. I mean, what you should look at is the contract. The relevant fact is that the ILEC gets revenues from billing and collections and perhaps some other things under the contract. It gets nothing else. It books

1 nothing else.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So if in your contract with your directory publishing affiliate there is no value exchanged for the marketing or the mailing list that they get to go out and solicit advertising, is that something that we should not look at?

MS. CASWELL: I'm not sure if that's an element of the contract, what you're referring to as the mailing list. I don't know if it's in the contract.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Lets look -- let's take another aspect of it. In your contract between the affiliate, the publishing affiliate and the ILEC, should we look at the extent to which those customers advertise in that affiliate because of some value from the Verizon name?

MS. CASWELL: No. No. You should look at the --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Why not?

MS. CASWELL: -- statute and what the statute allows you to do. If that were true, Chairman, you could go to the data services affiliate, and you could see what sort of value you think they derive from being associated with

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the ILEC. You could go to our CLECs. You could go to, you know, any one of our affiliates and do the same kind of analysis.

And you're going to have to do it every six months when the fee is to be submitted. You're going to have to engage in this sort of ratemaking analysis every six months to see if you think all these affiliates have arm's-length transactions with the ILEC. That's the logical conclusion of the staff's argument. You're going to have to do these mini rate cases over and over and over.

commissioner BAEZ: Mr. Chairman, I have another question for staff. Ms. Moore, I'm reading .051(c), where it says that a price regulated company is exempt from 364.037. That's the directory advertising revenue statute. By being exempt from that, what's the functional effect of that exemption?

MS. MOORE: Simply that the revenues are no longer considered for rate regulating purposes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And how -- well, to me it seems that they're not part of a definition any more. I mean, is that fair to say?

MS. MOORE: Not part of --

1 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: The directory -- the revenues from directory advertising are no 2 longer part of the definition of something, part 3 of a basis for something. 4 MS. MOORE: For determining rates, yes, and 5 any of the obligations imposed by .037 --6 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And that's the only 7 thing that it's exempt from, from --8 9 MS. MOORE: Yes. They're not exempt from 10 the regulatory assessment fee statute, .336 or 11 350.113. COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, but if -- okay. 12 13 If now in clear terms, a statute that said, you 14 know, revenues with a capital R consist of A, B, 15 C, and D -- do you follow me? Let's take this 16 statute. Now all of a sudden a company is 17 exempt from what this revenues with a big R is 18 defined as, or a statute says, okay, D no longer applies. Would you still define revenues with a 19 20 big R as A, B, C, and D? Do you follow what --MS. MOORE: If the statute says revenues 21 are now defined as this and they don't include 22 23 yellow page advertising --24 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Right.

MS. MOORE: And that statute was not just

-- that definition wasn't just tied to the rate regulation, for instance, if it was much broader, so that the regulatory assessment fee statute said the fee is paid on the revenues, then I would say, no, they wouldn't have to --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: So you're just going on the fact that there isn't an explicit exemption from the regulatory assessment fees, from the counting of directory revenues when you're calculating regulatory assessment fees, that they're two different things, ratemaking and calculating the fees, that they're two different bases?

MS. MOORE: Yes, yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Was there ever a time when they coincided, I mean, when the bases are the same, what you calculate your RAFs and what you -- what were under your jurisdiction for ratemaking purposes?

MS. MOORE: Yes, I believe that's the case. Maybe Mr. Mailhot can add to that, but I think typically regulated revenues were regulated revenues for, you know, all purposes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: For everything, for all purposes.

MS. MOORE: I believe so. 1 2 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And wouldn't it make 3 sense to say when it's taken out of regulated revenues for one purpose, it's taken out for 4 5 a11? 6 MS. MOORE: No, because we still regulate 7 the service. And if you only based it on what 8 revenues were subject to rate regulation --9 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And you said something 10 interesting there, because I'm having trouble understanding. Exactly what is the service that 11 12 we regulate? Based on our requirement that the company puts out directory listings? 13 14 MS. MOORE: That's correct, and furnishes 15 directories. 16 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Not yellow pages. 17 MS. MOORE: Right. 18 COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Just the directory listings. And I'm having -- I'm not 19 20 understanding where the revenue part of it comes 21 in from them performing this particular 22 requirement. MS. MOORE: We don't regulate -- you're 23 right. We don't regulate the rates or anything 24 having to do with the yellow page advertising. 25

Now, I know the business rate entitles a business customer -- the business rate that they pay for service entitles them to a yellow page listing. So if that was an error, I think we could --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: would there be a way for a company to live up to its requirement, to comply with the requirement to provide directory listings and not make any revenue at all, that it was just a straight, you know, complying with this requirement, and then, oh, here's this other thing that we make business on. I mean, can --

MS. MOORE: Could they separate --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: -- you conceive of the two being separate, the two functions or the two services being separate?

MS. MOORE: Separating the white page directory from the yellow page and --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, separating the statutory requirements, separating the Commission's requirement from anything over and above that that the company would decide to do on a business basis, as a business decision, that they would actually make revenue on.

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I mean, the fact is that what we're requiring the company to do doesn't produce any revenues for them. Or is that not --

MS. MOORE: To the extent they don't sell the white page directory?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Well, I don't think --MS. MOORE: I would say your observation is
probably true.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I think, you know, if you're requiring me to put out directories and I did that, I would make no -- you know, conceivably I wouldn't make any revenue for it, and I would be complying with the requirement that this Commission has placed that I provide all my customers with a directory listing and a directory for free and make no revenue out of it. And I can just as well turn around tomorrow and say, "You know what? I'm going to put out this book that has advertising in it." We couldn't touch that. We're not requiring it. It's not within our jurisdiction to require them to provide it, and it's certainly not within our jurisdiction to attach to those revenues; is that right?

MS. MOORE: I would say yes.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Because that's unregulated. That's not required, and that's not --

MS. MOORE: Right.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: What is it about this scenario as it exists now that's any different?

MS. MOORE: I think that the revenues from the advertising, I think the Commission has said, and I agree, that the basis for those revenues and those great profits are because of its position as the local exchange company, and it's the Commission's requirement that they do publish a directory, or the statute requires furnishing a directory and a white page listing. So it is integrally related, and the ratepayers benefit from that, not solely —

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Related --

MS. MOORE: -- the shareholders.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: I'm sorry. Related in what way? Their branding, their positioning?

MS. MOORE: They can assure the advertisers that the directory will be distributed to every telecommunications customer, every person receiving service in that --

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: For a fee.

MS. MOORE: Right.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Which that fee is part of jurisdictional revenues.

MS. MOORE: Yes.

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COMMISSIONER BAEZ: All right.

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MS. MOORE: And they maintain that dominance because of the requirement that they furnish that directory, the white page part of

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it. COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I would like to ask

staff to address the Company's argument with regard to Section .336. Their argument is that it specifically applies to certificated telecommunications companies and not non-utility affiliates. How do you address that argument?

MS. MOORE: I think it depends on whether the business of the affiliate is integral -- is directly related to their regulated service. There are no facts in the petition, no circumstances specifying the different services that they allege ALECs may provide that are provided by affiliates and whether those would be considered.

Staff's opinion is that if they were doing directory publication and revenues were related

to that, then they should be attributed to the company itself. I think it depends on the nature of the business that the affiliate is doing.

COMMISSIONER JABER: where do you get that language from, Chris? What can you point to that gives you that guidance that it depends on whether the nature of the service is directly related to their regulated service?

MS. MOORE: There is not language in the statute. It does say telecommunications service; that's correct. The Commission has interpreted that in the past to include the revenues that are related to the provision of telecommunications service, regardless of the corporate structure.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And that interpretation was in the United order?

MS. MOORE: United, and I think in various rate cases also, in the Southern Bell rate case that's cited.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And then those decisions came before the implementation of the '96 act; correct?

MS. MOORE: Yes. But I don't think it's

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dependent on whether the Commission can regulate the rates. I think the principle is the same.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Now, under Section 364.336, if the utility took a clearly utility function and they went ahead and contracted with a completely independent subcontractor in no way related to the company, not an affiliate, clearly, there would be some profit made, but the profit would not be in any way associated with the telecommunications company.

I guess what you're saying is that because revenue is being derived, whether it's for a telecommunications or a non-regulated function, it stays with the company rather than going outside? Is that the rationale?

MR. MAILHOT: Yes. If you look a number of the small ILECs, they have contracts with an independent publisher, and in those cases, 100% of the revenue from the directory advertising is recorded on the ILEC's books. And then what they do is, they pay the publisher a commission. say, 30%, 40% of the gross revenue may end up as a commission to the publisher. But 100% of the revenue ends up on their books, and they end up paying directory — paying a regulatory

assessment fee on all of that directory revenue.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: How about expenses? What kind of expenses are they incurring to do this?

MR. MAILHOT: Most of their expenses involve the commission that they pay to the directory publisher, which is, like I say, around 30 to 40% of the gross revenue. And that's recorded as an expense, so it's not even a reduction to the revenue. I mean, they record 100% of the revenue on their books.

And if you go back, you know, maybe 20 years ago, that was the same situation for most of the companies, most of the ILECs. They recorded all of the revenue on their own books, and they paid a regulatory assessment fee on all of that revenue.

And what has happened over time is, several of the -- especially the large ILECs have set up affiliates to do this, you know, to do the directory publishing. And based on their contracts, they've essentially said, well, most of the revenue belongs to the affiliate, and the affiliate will simply pay the ILEC some percentage, you know, for doing work. And that can range from anywhere from only 10% of the

gross revenue to maybe 40 or 50% of the gross revenue. It varies considerably. But they've simply set up affiliates and recorded the revenue on the affiliate's books instead of on their own books.

And that's -- I mean, our position really has nothing to do with the ratemaking treatment. It's really just the regulatory assessment fee issue.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And that's an important point. And, of course, we're arguing that while the statute -- the exemption may apply for ratemaking purposes, we're saying that it doesn't apply for purposes of calculating the regulatory assessment fee.

The counterargument is that it all speaks to gross operating revenue, and that's all we're talking about. How do you address that?

MR. MAILHOT: Well, what we have is a situation where they've signed contracts which simply, in effect, transfer a significant amount of gross revenue to the affiliate. They're quite willing to do this because it's not an arm's-length transaction. It's an affiliate. In the cases where you still have companies that

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have signed contracts with independent publishers, there you'll see that 100% of the revenue is still recorded on the ILEC's books.

In the case of Donnelley CHAIRMAN JACOBS: -- I think that's the name of one of the outfits that does these; right? Have we -- it occurs to me that if I wanted to look at this and determine to what extent the ILEC affiliate is in a really independent position, I would look at someone like Donnelley and determine to what extent their expenses correlate to the expenses of this affiliate and the extent to which their market value -- I'm sorry, their name recognition value has garnered them a certain advertising rate as opposed to the name value of Verizon has garnered this affiliate a particular advertising rate. Have you ever done something of this sort, looked at this in those terms?

MR. MAILHOT: No. I mean, years ago there was, you know, some effort to do that, and that's when you get back into the ratemaking statute, because then you get into the relative amount of gross profit, which is the revenues minus the expenses.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Right.

revenues, because we're not in a ratemaking issue here. So, I mean, we're not really concerned about the value or the expenses involved.

MR. MAILHOT: This issue here is simply the

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Well, from the regulated companies' standpoint, I can agree. My interest here is, if that argument wins, if the Company's argument wins, that gross revenues no longer includes these revenues from advertising, then I'm at a point where I want to understand, okay, how is it that we ensure that the revenue they're getting from their affiliate equates to proper value, because I want to make sure that that ILEC is getting proper value.

If it's truly a reasonable contract, then that affiliate ought to be giving back value that represents that contract to the ILEC, and then that will be where the imputation occurs. The imputation will occur to make sure that if it does not represent value coming back from the affiliate, then we want to impute what that value would be as revenue to the ILEC. You understand?

And my concern here is, we don't even have

a measurement to go on with that, it doesn't sound like. We wouldn't know what the proper value should be for a contract between an ILEC with a non-affiliated company to do its publishing business, its directory publishing business, do we?

MR. MAILHOT: Well, we do if you look at the contracts with the independents. The publisher in those cases essentially retains somewhere around 35 to maybe 40% of the revenue for their services, so actually the other 60 to 65% belongs to the ILEC.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So the argument -MR. MAILHOT: That's an arm's-length

transaction.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And the argument being that the value that should have been exchanged was somewhere on the order of 35% to that affiliate; is that correct? It's not the whole 100%.

MR. MAILHOT: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And this is where the tricky part comes, because to expand on that argument, what we have to say is that the affiliate gained its market status, its market

position and the level of revenues because of the relationship it has with that parent. I mean, if that affiliate were to go out and set up shop to do business as simply XYZ Directory Distribution Company, would they be able to garner the level of advertising rates that they do, would they be able to get the level of distribution that they do, and would they be able to attract that level of revenue that they're able to attract now?

And in my mind, that sounds like some kind of a scrutiny that you would want to put on that, on whether or not there's value, true value being exchanged between those two companies. Is that a reasonable approach?

MR. MAILHOT: It could be. As I say, in the past we've just looked at 100% of the gross revenue as belonging to the ILEC.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Here's my point.

MR. MAILHOT: Because that's the way it is in the contracts, even with the independents. You know, the revenue belongs to the ILEC, and then the ILEC also has an expense.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Here's the point. The Company raises I think an interesting point by

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raising the enactment of this statute after that 1 2 decision, although I think there's a 3 double-edged sword there, because if indeed that statute was enacted after this decision, and 4 5 indeed that decision was on the books, you could argue that there should have been an express 6 7 exemption in the statute to deal with this imputation issue. So there not being some 8 9 express exemption in the statute, we now have to 10 go to interpreting what gross operating revenues is. And you could argue that the Legislature 11 12 wouldn't have left that up -- that important an 13 issue up in the air. 14 But let's buy that argument for a moment 15 that by enacting a statute having to do with

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But let's buy that argument for a moment that by enacting a statute having to do with price regulation, the Legislature intended to affect what ties the company's gross operating revenue. Okay? In my mind, then don't we have to figure out how to distinguish this from gross operating revenue into some other kind of revenue? Do you follow my point?

MR. MAILHOT: I'm not sure. I mean, in our view, the change in the statute in 1995 really had nothing to do with the regulatory assessment fee.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That's your story, and you're sticking to it?

MR. MAILHOT: Yes. I mean, basically, it really didn't have anything to do with it.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Can I ask Mr. McLean a question to give me just a little bit of guidance?

Mr. McLean, I see the regulatory assessment issue separate from the traditional ratemaking concepts. I'm looking at 364.336, and I'm concentrating on this language for several things. One is the point that Chairman Jacobs just made with respect to there is no specific exemption for the collection of directory revenues. But second, I'm looking at the words, "each telecommunications company," and then "intrastate business."

Ms. Caswell makes the point that the affiliate is not a telecommunications company, or the argument at least, and that even if you look at the nature of the service, it doesn't constitute an intrastate business. Can you give me some guidance on all of those things?

MR. MCLEAN: Maybe I can help. First of all, I think the Chairman put his finger

directly on a point which has not been mentioned 1 thus far, and that is, that was not timid 2 legislation that came out in those years, 1995, 3 1996. The Legislature must be presumed to know 4 that you were taxing this entity, and it would 5 have been a very simple stroke of the pen to 6 throw that section in as well. The Legislature 7 may have also been aware that you regulate many 8 other aspects of this enterprise, not just the 9 rate base, and not just the rate of return and 10 so forth, and perhaps they wanted to collect 11 money to compensate the government for 12 performing that function. 13

with respect to your question about the statute, I can't help but notice what that statute says to begin with. It says, "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary," which seems to me to suggest to you that you ought to resolve doubt in favor of the taxing authority.

And let me go just a little bit more into that. You all are cast into the unfamiliar and perhaps unwelcome role of tax collector here. I don't think these traditional notions that you've discussed a lot this morning about

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regulatory ratemaking and so on are going to help you a whole lot. I think that you ought to be looking at more tradition notions of taxing authority and how that taxing authority is construed in the State of Florida.

And to the extent that your questions regarding regulatory concepts have addressed the notion of the nexus between this affiliate and the company in general, they're very relevant to the issue of whether they should be taxed. But let me point this out. You've taxed them for years. The Legislature has known you've taxed them for years, and they have not relieved you of the responsibility in that legislation that came out in 1995 and 1996.

There is a potential -- I think that I'm persuaded by Ms. Caswell's argument that says, if I can paraphrase it, "Well, if you tax our yellow page revenues, what will you tax next?" There's a flip side to that, of course, and that is that if we don't tax this affiliate, what affiliate will you reform next?

There is a general notion in tax law I
think that says the taxing authority must look
to substance as opposed to form. We look to --

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the taxing authority looks to the actual substance of the transaction and relationship as opposed to its form.

Nonetheless, and to the extent that I oppose delay -- I generally don't think it's a good idea -- I think it would be very wise of the Commission to accept legal briefs on this issue, because I think the parties ought to take you into the area of taxing law as opposed to so much regulatory law; and particularly to the notion that whether and to what extent perhaps the nexus between the affiliate and the traditionally taxed corporation is important to the issue of whether you should continue the tax; and what happens when the Legislature has permitted, if not ordered you to tax for years, and there is some cloud cast upon that authority. I believe that you're entitled to a legal brief on the issue. As much as I hate to see the delay, that's what I would recommend.

Failing in that, let me say my inclination would be to advise you that you have taxed it for years, that the Legislature had a golden opportunity to relieve you of that responsibility, if it is a responsibility, and

it didn't do it, and they must be presumed to know that you are levying that tax at their order. They must be presumed to know that. They had an opportunity to relieve you of that obligation, and to my eye, they did not do it.

I don't think that an analysis of whether and to what extent they are regulated helps you very much at all except to address the rather narrow question of the nexus between the affiliate and the taxing authority.

make one point. I have reviewed the various sections of the Florida Statutes in Chapter 364 in which companies are exempt when they choose to become price cap regulated. And, of course, 364.037 is the only one that deals with the question of directory advertising and that sort of thing. The others are more general areas which refer to the basis of setting rates, and interim rate procedure, and things of that nature, which, if a company is no longer subject to rate base regulation, surely they should be exempted from.

The problem I'm having is, we have a very clear statute that tells us to collect

regulatory assessment fees on gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business. It doesn't say "as the Commission defines in a rate proceeding" or anything like that. It just says if it's gross operating revenue and it's from intrastate business, you calculate the regulatory assessment fee. I don't see how the exemption changes that definition.

And I agree with Mr. McLean. If it was the intent of the Legislature to have this agency cease to collect regulatory assessment fees on revenues derived from yellow page advertising, it would have been a simple matter to have defined it as such, but they did not.

I just don't see where the exemption changes the definition of gross operating revenues derived from intrastate business. An extreme interpretation would be that this company no longer has any revenue derived from intrastate business, because we're no longer in the business of defining the revenue for purposes of setting rates. And that's the argument that I hear Ms. Caswell saying, is because they're exempt from the requirement to impute yellow page advertising in their rates,

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they're exempt from calculating regulatory assessment fees.

well, it would be just as logical to say
that since you don't set our rates at all, you
don't consider any revenue we derive in
determining rates, and we're exempt from that;
therefore, we owe you zero regulatory assessment
fees. And I don't think that's logical.

I'm not against the recommendation that we receive legal briefs on the question, but my point of view is that it's really not required.

agree with you completely that the exemption really has nothing to do with the regulatory assessment fee. What I'm more troubled with is the argument regarding Section 364.336, in that these are not revenues of the licensed or operating telecommunications company. I think if you look at a strict reading of that chapter, the affiliate, and it's very arguable, does not fall under that definition.

I guess I'm even more troubled, because I think under the statute it would be arguable that if a utility function had been subbed out to the affiliate, that you could still make that

argument that even though it's a utility function, that it's not actually the telecommunications company's revenues. And I'm troubled that that would allow any telecommunications company to completely avoid any regulatory assessment fee.

I'm leaning towards wanting to have the legal briefs on this issue, but I would like to at least ask the company that if you take your argument to its logical conclusion, wouldn't you be able to avoid regulatory assessment fees completely just by subbing or contracting out even your utility functions to your affiliate?

MS. CASWELL: No, because then that company will pay regulatory assessment fees.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, not under the statute if they're not a licensed telecommunications company.

MS. CASWELL: If it's performing -- you're saying utility function. If it's performing -- if it's performing a function like that, I'm assuming it's going to be a telecommunications function.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, under a contract, you could take, I would think,

regulated functions and subcontract them out to either an affiliate or an independent company who would be working for the licensed telecommunications company. I would think you probably sub out many functions that are telecommunications related.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I think, Ms. Caswell, if
I'm not mistaken, you're saying that even if
that were to occur that that subcontractor would
have to then come and get a certificate; is that
correct?

MS. CASWELL: I believe so, if it were performing these, quote, utility services. And depending on the nature of the subcontract, you would have to look at whose books the revenues would hit, I guess. But you're not going to be deriving revenues from telecommunications services, because only telecommunications companies can provide those, and you get the regulatory assessment fee on those services provided by telecommunications companies.

So we can't get around by that simply, you know, creating affiliates all over the place to avoid the fee. You know, even if we were so inclined, I don't think that would work.

commissioner palecki: well, if you're making a profit on some function and you went ahead and subbed it out to a completely non-related subcontractor, obviously, you would not make a profit. There would be no revenues from that function anymore, and the non-regulated subcontractor or non-affiliated in any manner would just do the work for the licensed utility.

Now, arguably, it seems that you could do the same thing with an affiliate. And let's talk about it being an arm's-length transaction, and you have a fair contract. Under your argument, it would take those revenues which still would be derived by the larger company. The profits would be earned by the affiliate, and it would mean you could avoid the regulatory assessment fee, I think, taking your argument to its logical conclusion.

MS. CASWELL: If you have an affiliate that's performing non-telecommunications services, just like the directories affiliate is --

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I want to talk about telecommunications services. You're subbing out

1 a function.

MS. CASWELL: Oh, yes. If you're talking about that, I don't see a way that you can avoid the fees, because you're going to have to be certificated as a telecommunications company.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: You're saying that all of the subs that you use to perform any functions related to the telecommunications company needs to be another certificated subcontractor? I don't think so.

MS. CASWELL: No, what I'm saying is, if they're providing telecommunications services, they need to be a certificated company.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: No, I'm talking a function related to you providing telecommunications services. See, your argument has --

MS. CASWELL: I guess maybe I'm not understanding because I don't see any sort of concrete example.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Commissioner, if I can stick my foot in this for a second, it seems to me -- and I have the same concerns, that you open the door, and now out of a sudden everything falls through.

A company providing telecommunications services, whether it's an affiliate or not, is going to be one of two things: They're either going to have to come in and get certificated, or they're providing that service as a sub exclusively to the company, which is then making revenue off it, and then they wouldn't have to be certificated.

But it doesn't seem to me, I think in the example that we're all trying to get our hands around, where the company would have to -- would be able to say, "Well, we're not getting any revenue. The revenue is going directly -- you know, we're not booking the revenue for providing that service." In the case where there's a subcontractor providing this utility function to the company, I don't see how they avoid that. I don't see how they avoid getting those revenues imputed to them.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I agree.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And if somebody wants to jump in and say how it can, you know, please. Maybe I'm just missing something here.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Commissioner, I quess what I'm troubled by is the clear language

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of 364.336 that talks about a licensed telecommunications company. And I think the argument is that we're dealing with an affiliate that is not a licensed telecommunications company, and that in reading the language of the statute, we have no regulatory assessment fee because the affiliate is simply not a licensed telecommunications company.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: And here is where my whole difficulty in understanding this comes To me, directory -- publishing a directory, to call that a telecommunications service, you can't define it as one, strictly speaking. Because the company has a statutory responsibility to provide a directory, and now all of a sudden that's lumped into everything else and it's a telecommunications service, to me that's a fiction. Now, it's a useful fiction, and it's a practical fiction, but it is a fiction nonetheless. You cannot look at it standing alone and say, "This is a telecommunications service. This is like providing dial tone. This is like providing anything else that would fall within the definition."

So where I break off is this: If now all of a sudden this fiction that was created as a telecommunications service is no longer subject to regulation -- and to me, that's what the exemption did. It frees it from regulation, because it's no longer lumped into this telecommunications revenue definition for telecommunications service so that we can calculate rates and so that we can set rates, and furthermore, so that we can get our RAFs, so we can calculate the assessment fees. If all a sudden that fiction doesn't exist anymore, then how can we continue to hang onto it?

And I think Mr. McLean's comments are well taken, but it just doesn't -- it doesn't fit in my mind how the Legislature could have said, "All right. This situation doesn't exist anymore, oh, except for the Commission so that you can get your -- you know, so that you can wet your beak." That doesn't compute.

So I don't see -- well, I do see the opportunity or the possibility that the door is open wide, and now all of a sudden because -- you know, because it's an affiliate involved and not the company, that there would be some issues

as to whether revenues for telecommunications services are imputed. I'm not that concerned over that, because I think there's two ways that you can go. You're either providing it for the company and they're deriving it, they're creating the revenues, or a company itself is providing that service to the public for hire, which makes it a telecommunications company, and somebody is going to owe an assessment fee.

Directory publishing to me was a fictional service that existed or that was created one day because of the nexus to the company, and because it was something that we were requiring to some extent. But that condition doesn't exist anymore, not in my mind.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let me take a stab at a motion. I don't know if it will satisfy you, Commissioner Baez, or you, Commissioner Palecki, but just in an effort to change the discussion a little bit to a motion.

I keep focusing on 364.336 and what it says literally about regulatory assessment fees, and what Mr. McLean has confirmed for me that it doesn't -- what it doesn't say, for example, the specific exemption that would deal with the

1 situation.

You know, we implement the law that has been created for us, and we are supposed to look at the plain meaning of the statute, and we're not supposed to read into the statute. The exemption found under the price regulation statute could have included an exemption for .336, and they do not. The regulatory assessment fee statute could have been changed, and it wasn't. That was a critical point, and I needed to hear that from Mr. McLean.

And with that, I've got a comfort level that I can move staff's recommendation for those reasons, that the statute I think is clear with respect to collecting revenues associated with all functions by GTE, or in this case its affiliate, because the statute does not contain an exemption to address the directory revenues.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Second.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Moved and second to approve staff. All in favor say "aye."

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Aye.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: All opposed?

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Nay.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Show a four-to-one vote.

I did not vote. I should say "aye." Show it approved by a four-to-one vote. That takes care of Item 3, and I believe also the agenda. (Conclusion of consideration of Item 3.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER

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I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing was transcribed by me from an audiotape, and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 59 are a true and correct transcription of the aforesaid proceedings to the best of my ability.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the foregoing matter.

DATED THIS 10th day of January, 2001.

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

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