BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

REVIEW OF FLORIDA POWER DOCKET NO. 000824-EI CORPORATION'S EARNINGS, INCLUDING EFFECTS OF PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION BY CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT.

REVIEW OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT DOCKET NO. 001148-EI COMPANY'S PROPOSED MERGER WITH ENTERGY CORPORATION, THE FORMATION OF A FLORIDA TRANSCO, AND THEIR EFFECT ON FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT'S RETAIL RATES.

REVIEW OF TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 010577-EI AND IMPACT OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN GRIDFLORIDA, A FLORIDA TRANSMISSION COMPANY, ON TECO'S RETAIL RATEPAYERS.

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> VOLUME 3 Pages 382 through 507

PROCEEDINGS: **HEARING**

BEFORE: COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS

COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON

COMMISSIONER LILA JABER COMMISSIONER BRAULIO BAEZ

COMMISSIONER MICHAEL A. PALECKI

Thursday, October 4, 2001 DATE:

Recommenced at 8:40 a.m. TIME:

Betty Easley Conference Center PLACE:

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

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MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

REPORTED BY:

FPSC-COMMISSION CLERM

APPEARANCES: As heretofore stated.

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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Transcript continues in sequence from 3 Volume 2.) CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Good morning. We'll go 4 5 back on the record. And I believe we were in the 6 process of cross-examination for the panel, and I 7 believe, staff, you're up. 8 MR. KEATING: Thank you. 9 Thereupon, 10 MIKE NAEVE, C. MARTIN MENNES, HENRY I. 11 SOUTHWICK, and GREG RAMON 12 continued their testimony under oath from Volume 2 as 13 follows: 14 CONTINUED CROSS-EXAMINATION 15 BY MR. KEATING: 16 Good morning, panelists. I think we left Q 17 off last night on the line of questioning concerning 18 the market monitor in the GridFlorida proposal. I have a few more questions on that line before I move 19 20 on. 21 I believe Mr. Naeve had made a statement 22 concerning how the market monitor is funded and 23 indicated there's some -- that the Commission has some 24 role in the budget. I guess to be direct, how is the

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market monitor funded?

A (By Mr. Naeve) The market monitor has the authority to propose its own budget to the FERC. There's the process by which the market monitor submits its budget to be reviewed ahead of time to the Public Service Commission as well as to the RTO and the Advisory Committee. But once they file their budget with the FERC, it's filed as a rate schedule, and FERC has to approve the budget or the rate schedule. It's collected by the RTO as an adder on the RTO transmission rate.

Q What staff or resources will the market monitor have?

A The market monitor is free to hire whatever staff and whatever resources that it -- and acquire whatever resources that it believes that it needs to carry out its functions, and that will be determined, of course, in its budget.

Q So that hasn't been -- that's not decided at this point?

A No. And in fact, again, we didn't want -we thought the market monitor was a very important
part of this filing, and in the collaborative process
there was a tremendous amount of support for a very
strong, well-functioning market monitor. None of us
felt we were expert enough to know what level of

funding they would need, how many resources they would need and so forth, so we left it entirely to the discretion of the market monitor and the board of directors of the market monitor to ascertain what resources they needed and what level of staffing and what facilities they would need.

We were a little concerned about the potential for overspending and building an empire without any direct control, because this was an entity that didn't have to file and collect the rates itself, and so we did try to provide for some review of its budget function. But we leave it entirely up to them to determine the level of resources needed to carry out their function, subject to FERC review.

Q I had also asked a question yesterday about what type of market power measuring methodology the market monitor might apply, and I believe you stated or the panel indicated that there hasn't been one chosen yet.

A Well, the market monitor itself will propose its own methodologies.

Q Is the panel aware of any initial discussions as to what type of methodology may be applied?

A No, there has been no such discussion,

because the market monitor hasn't been selected. The board hasn't been selected, and the market monitor hasn't been selected. That will be entirely up to them.

I suspect they will look to some of the existing RTOs and the methodologies that are being applied in New England and PJM and New York and elsewhere for measuring market power and for mitigating market power, and they'll draw some guidance from those methodologies. They will also have the flexibility, though, to adopt different methodologies of their own.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: What will be the protocol for access to information for the market monitor?

WITNESS NAEVE: What will -- I'm sorry?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: How will the market monitor gain access to the information that it needs to carry out its function?

WITNESS NAEVE: In the market monitor filing, we provide substantial powers to the market monitor to acquire information. We also have an information policy for the RTO that obligates them to provide information to the market monitor about the functionings of the market.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'm sorry. Who will

1 provide the information to the RTO? 2 WITNESS NAEVE: Well, the RTO will provide 3 information. Also, the market monitor will have the 4 opportunity to get information directly from 5 generators and market participants. 6 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So independent power 7 producers as well as participants in GridFlorida will 8 have to provide this information to the market monitor? 9 10 WITNESS NAEVE: That's correct. 11 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And are there provisions 12 in that agreement also for enforcement of that duty or 13 obligation? 14 WITNESS NAEVE: Yes, they'll have ample 15 enforcement authority. 16 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. Thank you. 17 BY MR. KEATING: 18 Also, yesterday we discussed that the Q 19 market monitor is required to provide reports and 20 share data with the Florida Public Service Commission. 21 Is that correct? 22 (By Mr. Naeve) That's correct. 23 To date has that requirement been approved O 24 by the FERC? 25 Α Yes, it has.

1 Q What markets will the market monitor 2 monitor?

A It will monitor the wholesale markets served by GridFlorida.

Q Will it be involved at all in evaluating retail markets?

A I don't think that it will.

Q I've asked a few questions so far about specific pieces of the GridFlorida proposal and whether or not they've been approved by FERC to date. What parts of the GridFlorida proposal have been approved by FERC, and which remain for approval?

A well, there are so many components to this proposal, it's -- I'm not sure I could give you a comprehensive inventory off the top of my head. I think, suffice it to say, that FERC has approved the blueprint for GridFlorida that was filed initially, the transmission tariff, the planning protocols, the market design as it has been filed so far, although additional work has been done on that. They've approved essentially everything that has been filed thus far, with a requirement that we make a compliance filing. We have made that compliance filing as directed by FERC, and the compliance filing is still pending before them.

There are still some features that have not been developed that will be developed and filed down the road. For example, the contract under which assets will be transferred will be filed someday and approved by FERC. That has not been developed yet.

Q Are there any other portions of GridFlorida that would require further -- or would still require some FERC approval?

A Offhand, there very well could be, but that's all that comes to mind.

Q You mentioned that the asset transfer contract would require FERC approval. When does GridFlorida anticipate seeking that approval?

A well, it would have to be approved before the assets are transferred, and we propose to transfer the assets essentially the day commercial operations begin. We would leave them in the hands of the utilities the day before commercial operations begin, and the day of commercial operations, control would be transferred. So they would have to be —— those agreements would have to be developed, filed, and approved before that could happen. So if one backs up, it would probably have to be at least four or five months before startup.

Q When does GridFlorida anticipate the

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commercial operation date to begin?

A well, at this stage that's hard to say. We were on a track to begin phased commercial operations beginning December 15th, and we have temporarily suspended development of GridFlorida and the board selection process and so forth pending this process. And I think the timing on the commencement of operations again depends a lot on the outcome of this proceeding.

Q Did GridFlorida suspend its -- suspend the process as a result of this Commission deciding to have a review of GridFlorida, deciding to conduct this review?

A That's correct.

Q If the Commission were to state that the utilities' -- were to find as a result of this hearing that the utilities' participation in GridFlorida was prudent, how long would you expect before GridFlorida would become operational? And I realize I'm looking for a ballpark figure here at best.

A We haven't discussed how long it would take to restart all of this. We did lose a little bit of momentum. We were very near the end of the board selection process. We'll have to start all over again on that.

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But one thing I will say, though, there is also this issue of the Southeast RTO, and I think we would be looking to some guidance from this Commission perhaps as to whether we should start up and commence spending significant sums to begin GridFlorida, knowing that we very well could be forced into the Southeast RTO or not. So that's another issue as well.

Q Right. And my question assumed that the Commission would approve the utilities' participation in GridFlorida as prudent, and I was trying to get a feel for how far from the original December 2001 operational date the commercial operation date would be pushed back.

A (By Mr. Southwick) Let me jump in for a second. In my testimony in a different piece of the docket here, in my direct testimony on behalf of the GridFlorida companies, the Q and A is in there on page 11, and the answer states that currently all project development activities have been suspended. If and when the project is restarted, it is anticipated that it will take at least nine months for GridFlorida to become operational on a limited basis.

Q On page 14 of the panel's testimony, the question beginning at line 8 asks, "What kinds of

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operational control will GridFlorida exercise over transmission facilities?" And the response indicates three types of control, direct control, indirect control, and security coordinator authority. Who currently has direct control over the transmission facilities that would become part of GridFlorida?

(By Mr. Mennes) The existing transmission owners.

Does any entity have indirect control over Q transmission facilities in the state other than the transmission owner?

Right now the security coordinator in the process that we have set up in Florida gives the security coordinator indirect control. And by that I mean that the security coordinator does have the authorization to request that lines be switched or breakers be closed for reliability purposes.

Who performs the security coordination Q function?

The security coordination function is an FRCC process, and it is performed by agents. And there's a couple of processes that are involved, but Florida Power & Light does the real-time operation. and Florida Power Corporation also has responsibilities in reviewing next-day coordination.

A (By Mr. Southwick) Excuse me. Could I interrupt? Was the question in the future was this the proposal or as it exists today?

Q As it exists today. And that was -- and to be clear for the record, that was your understanding when you answered the question?

A (By Mr. Mennes) That was today's -- that's today's process, yes.

Q What operation control services will GridFlorida perform that are not currently being performed today?

A I can't think of any operational type of services that are not being performed today, so it would just be a different entity performing these services.

Q Do you believe that GridFlorida will better perform those services than they are currently performed today?

A That's -- you know, I guess if you're asking -- if the question is will GridFlorida do a better job of performing operational and reliability type services than what's being performed today, today I think we're doing a good job. We've got good communications. There's no guarantee going forward in the way that the requirements and activities of the

various players will be. Right now the FRCC working with the two agents I think does a very good job.

Going forward in this area, if a single RTO has more authority and has more requirements based upon the voluntary type process we have right now, it would be able to do at least as good a job was what's going on right now.

A (By Mr. Ramon) I would like to add something to that. When you -- you need to be careful when we talk about operations in the context of an RTO. The security coordination activities that Marty just talked about, if you look at the short-term reliability, you know, the four characteristics of Rule 2000, short-term reliability is a security coordination aspect.

But today we don't do market-based congestion management or ancillary services. Those are going to be operations elements too that are not done today that will be done by the RTO.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Naeve, can I ask you a question on something you said earlier? Since the IOUs have a concern with regard to making the investment on GridFlorida because of the fear that the regional approach will come to fruition, what is the overwhelming compelling public policy concern that

would require me to allow the going forward of GridFlorida?

WITNESS NAEVE: I think there are many good reasons to have a GridFlorida and not a GridSouth. It is quite possible, as I said earlier, that once the Southeast RTO is designed and completed, we would look at the Southeast RTO and we would look at the GridFlorida proposal, and we would conclude that GridFlorida is the better approach, and I think we should preserve the option of being able to choose between those two.

There is some risk that FERC would try to compel us to just not go forward with GridFlorida and to join the Southeast RTO. I think in part the willingness of FERC to allow us to continue to have GridFlorida would depend in large part on how strongly all the Florida participants feel about GridFlorida. You know, if each of the Florida participants and the Florida Commission strongly believe that there should be a separate Florida RTO, that's our best chance of having it, and maybe under those circumstances, with that sort of uniform approach, we would have a good chance of retaining it and getting FERC to go along with it. If there was division among the GridFlorida companies, and in particular, if the Florida

Commission didn't express strong feelings for GridFlorida, then I think the chance of us being able to go forward with GridFlorida is not very good.

COMMISSIONER JABER: I guess what I've struggled with the last couple of days is this fear you have. I don't really know what to do with that information. If you want the Commission to give you some sort of approval on GridFlorida, but you tell me that FERC may not let you do it anyway, first, and two, it's going to take you at least nine months to get back into the momentum, I don't really know how to reconcile all that information. You guys are going to have to help me out a little bit more.

WITNESS NAEVE: Well, I think it's a difficult choice for all of us, quite frankly. We developed the GridFlorida approach, and we think it's a very good approach. We like that approach. We also recognize that we have this other process going on simultaneously, and it's worthwhile to look at that process and decide is it as beneficial or more beneficial than what we have. But, you know --

COMMISSIONER JABER: Would a deadline from this Commission give you that momentum that you need to get back?

WITNESS NAEVE: Well, I think what would

probably be helpful for us is strong support from this Commission for GridFlorida so that we don't foreclose the option with FERC. And I certainly think this Commission -- I'm sorry, that if this Commission were to say, "We find GridFlorida prudent. It's a good program, and we encourage you to go forward with GridFlorida. At the same time, we think it may be appropriate for you to evaluate the Southeast RTO in light of GridFlorida to determine which is better for Florida," under those circumstances, I think you preserve the GridFlorida option, or you have the best chance of preserving the GridFlorida option.

Another approach we're --

COMMISSIONER JABER: How is that any different from where we are today? You've gotten some sort of conditional approval from FERC on GridFlorida. You are participating and weighing the option of the regional approach. So --

WITNESS NAEVE: I think the primary -COMMISSIONER JABER: This is your
opportunity to tell me exactly what it is you need
this Commission to do, assuming we agree that some
form of RTO is appropriate.

WITNESS NAEVE: I think the primary difference in where we are today is we don't have the

support of the Florida Commission for GridFlorida in dealing with FERC. We have the Florida companies who have developed GridFlorida. We are also -- we accepted the invitation from FERC to participate in the Southeast process. And largely we did that because we recognize that there is some probability we would be forced into that, and we wanted it to be as good a proposal as we could make it if we were to be forced into it.

I think if this Commission says, "We like GridFlorida. We encourage you to go forward with GridFlorida. We understand it may be prudent to look at the Southeast RTO, but upon doing a comparison of the two, we want you to do GridFlorida," I think there's a good chance, our best chance that FERC would support it.

related question. And I touched on this yesterday with Chairman Hoecker. We have very limited transmission capability from the North. As a matter of fact, it's my understanding that we're maxed out insofar as our import capability. And I'm wondering whether there are any significant benefits to Florida from the GridSoutheast proposal over the GridFlorida proposal, considering this limited transmission

capable, and wouldn't we be better off operating under the GridFlorida proposal until we actually have additional transmission ties to the north that would make the Southeast proposal beneficial in some manner?

WITNESS MENNES: Let me try that one.

Basically -- and I think Chairman Hoecker stated that

-- I think he said 3,500. We basically have 3,600

megawatts worth of import capability in the state and
quite a bit of export capability. There have been

times when the State of Florida, for example, has sold
over 4,000 megawatts outside of the State of Florida.

Not this past winter, but severe winters before, we've
done quite a good job of helping, if you would, the
whole Northeast.

There is room on the import, and I think that's one of the things that we really need to face. We have the room, and I just want to, you know, just kind of incite comment on the import. Just because you want to go ahead and do and change stuff in the State of Florida -- you know, let's just say you want to increase the size of the pipe in the State of Florida to bring more electricity in. That doesn't mean that you can go ahead and get it, because the other side also has their own problems. As a matter

of fact, they probably have more infrastructure -- I know they have more infrastructure problems on their side to deliver the power than we would have infrastructure problems on our side to receive more.

So it's one of those "what do you do to expand it?" It would be a seams issue, and it would be a lot of coordination. To get back to the RTO issue, those type of things, and I think the Chairman was correct, could be handled in seams related type of matters, or it could be handled under one RTO. The results would probably or maybe be the same.

what we're facing is we really don't know how the Southeast RTO is going to function. We feel very strongly that we couldn't and cannot stick our heads in the sand and pretend it doesn't exist, because sooner or later, you don't know what the Federal Government is going to do. So we need to continue to monitor. We need to continue to go ahead and give our input to the Southeast RTO to see how its markets do develop.

But there is, especially going from south to north, depending on our exports out of the state -- I don't want to say it's unlimited, but there are certainly -- there's quite a bit of power that can go that way. And there is over a thousand megawatts

worth of noncommitted power into the state, and a thousand megawatts is still a pretty big chunk.

So we just need to -- before we can make a decision, we need to figure out how their markets are going to work, how their congestion systems work, and that type of thing.

wITNESS RAMON: Commissioner, I would like to add, I think I know where you're going. If you had a Southeast -- one RTO, by virtue of the constraints, you really have a somewhat isolated market here in Florida, regardless of having a single Southeast RTO, because of the constraints. And I agree that -- I think we all agree that starting with GridFlorida makes sense.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Even if we had a Southeast RTO effectively, and even if we had one entity that was operating it effectively, the Florida section of that RTO would need to be operated -- I don't want to use the word "independently," but it would be like operating a separate system almost, wouldn't it, except for those ties that we've already discussed?

WITNESS RAMON: You would have to have the equivalent of the GridFlorida model that we've put forward. You would have to have the operations center

down here and all of those sorts of things. I agree.

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COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I think one of the things we're all worried about is, if we give approval to GridFlorida, that, you know, a couple of years down the line we'll just end up having to spend a whole lot of money for startup costs to switch over to GridSoutheast. But from what I'm hearing you say, they would have to have a separate operations center in Florida anyway.

WITNESS RAMON: Well, in the Southeast process, as Mike Naeve was saying earlier, we would have to participate in that. But if there was to be a Southeast with Florida in it, we would insist, and I hope we would prevail, that we would have to have the equivalent of what we've proposed to the FERC here in terms of an operations center close to load-serving entities and generators that are needing service and a strong relationship with the Commission for siting purposes.

WITNESS NAEVE: Yours I think is a good question, and that is, if we were to go forward with GridFlorida first and incur the startup costs, are those startup costs which would have been spent and wouldn't be necessary later on if we were to join the Southeast RTO, or are these costs we would have to

spend anyway if we were to join the Southeast RTO.

If they're costs we could incur anyway, then that would argue for going forward with GridFlorida notwithstanding what they're doing in the Southeast. And I'm not the technical expert on that. I would assume that there are certain startup costs if you had a Southeast RTO that we wouldn't be able to avoid if we did that, but I don't know how large those are as a percentage of the total amount.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I guess we would like to have a "buy one, get one free," but I don't think --

WITNESS NAEVE: There you go.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: -- that's really going to happen.

WITNESS MENNES: Commissioner, just let me

-- I think you've touched upon something. I'm an

operating type of person, so you've touched upon a

real sensitive thing as far as I'm concerned. And, of

course, Florida Power & Light is going to end up being

the largest customer of GridFlorida if there's a

GridFlorida, or if we're in the Southeast RTO, one of

the bigger customers for sure.

And reliability, to me, when it comes into the transmission grid, when we sit down here and look

at our ties to the South, which we don't have, and East and West, which we don't have, it is a state that we think we've run pretty good from a reliability standpoint. We keep learning every year. And there should be and there is a real concern about maintaining the reliability here. And we need to bring that real strong into the different FERC forms, whether it's a Southeast RTO form, no matter what happens to us. And I think the three of us all really very strongly agree with it.

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What Greg was kind of going through was, if they did have something in the Southeast, I just do not see them controlling and worrying about what they call loop flows. You know, with all this, loop flow has been the big issue. And we basically say, look, we do not have loop flows. We're almost like a DC tied to the rest of the world with other folks.

Now, we have bought power actually I think from California, a municipality in the state has. And we buy quite a bit of coal power from Ohio and everything else when it's economical, and our marketers get out there and do that type of thing. That creates loop flows in the rest of the universe. It doesn't create loop flows in the State of Florida.

But when you do get into the State of

Florida, it is a grid, and it is -- I don't think it's extremely complex, but it's not simple, and it needs to be understood.

So our push would be to make sure that we had, no matter what kind of an RTO, at least satellite reliability offices or something. I don't know what it would look like or what it would be, but certainly I think the whole Southeast would be too big to operate from one center. They would probably have to take certain orders from this main center, but the reliability and responsibility of keeping the lights on and how it all works I would hope would stay here. I think that's what Greg was talking about.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And if we instead of looking at it from a Southeast RTO perspective, we look at it from a GridFlorida perspective, would you expect that we would have a great deal of cooperation between the GridFlorida and GridSoutheast in order to maximize the efficiency of the ties that we do have, and do you see any -- I'm not sure I see any negatives really to operating as two separate RTOs.

WITNESS MENNES: No, and I don't see any negatives to operating as two separate RTOs right now, and I think that's what -- we need to step back and see what the other one really looks like.

And certainly right now when we talk about maximizing the ties, I think we do that. I think we do a pretty good job of maximizing and coordinating the import capability ever since we built the 500 kV ties and other ties into Southern. It's just how the RTO in the Southeast would be structured and what its market design and some other functions would look like.

And certainly you could probably build one big market. There would be certain limitations. There's always limitations, whether it be between Florida and Georgia or whether it be between the Carolinas and Georgia, or on the other side going into Entergy, because Entergy would be a player here, and they've got some weaker ties actually coming over into the East than we have here in the South.

So there's always going to be a weakest link somewhere, and you'll have some kind of market design, and this is, I think, the big issue, is what does that market design look like, how does it work, how does it treat constraints. And probably -- if it works and it can be designed right, you probably would not put that tie -- and Greg is probably better at this than I am, but I don't think you would put that duplicative type of design in for the State of

Florida. You may or may not. And that's kind of what we're faced with. We really don't know.

WITNESS NAEVE: It strikes me that there are several issues here, and one set of issues relate to costs. How significant are the avoided costs? How significant are the costs we could save by going into the Southeast RTO with respect to startup costs and infrastructure costs? And you need not only to look at total cost, but cost per customer, because you would be spreading those costs over a much larger base. So we have to ascertain which is the more economical and efficient way to go, considering the fact that we'll probably need special equipment and resources here in Florida because of the uniqueness of Florida market.

The other issue would be structure, is it structured in a way that we would find satisfactory, market design, is it compatible with the market design that we would propose for Florida, and so forth.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I know the four of you have already done a great deal of work in the organization of GridFlorida. Would it be possible to make some changes to GridFlorida in order to design a more or less seamless incorporation into GridSoutheast in the future with that in mind, and if so, what would

those changes be?

assuming we got this Commission's affirmative backing of GridFlorida -- and I know we'll have to talk about this later, what that means, some of the questions that Commissioner Jaber has brought up. Assuming we have that backing, then we have the Southeast process that we still have to actively participate in. And with the FERC's predisposition on the core function and the pro forma RTO, we would have to negotiate, if you will, on the design of GridFlorida being compatible with the Southeast. I don't think it's a shoe-in that what we've got filed with the FERC would prevail.

witness naeve: As I think about it, there are a couple of issues here. One is, if you want to commence GridFlorida early on and then later merge it into the Southeast, you want to first make certain that the two have compatible structures, market designs, rates, and so forth. If the rates are incompatible and the market designs are incompatible, the structures of the corporations are different, that integration becomes very hard.

Another problem you would have is we would create GridFlorida and turn over control of

GridFlorida to an independent board. Once that has happened, the companies here have no control over GridFlorida. The board has control over GridFlorida. Likewise, FERC requires that the Southeast RTO be independent and have its independent board. And as much as we would like to try to dictate the terms under which they might combine, it's going to be up to the independent boards themselves to decide if they want to combine and under what terms and conditions.

So, frankly, if you want to have that combined operation, you would be better off designing it from the start as opposed to kind of turning it over to independent parties and letting them have to deal with all the differences. You would hopefully minimize those differences if it were designed from the start that way, but it could be somewhat complicated.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Well, what I'm thinking in terms of it operating as GridFlorida for five or seven years, some indeterminate time, but melding or joining GridSoutheast at some future date, but avoiding all of the startup costs and avoiding having to duplicate a lot of the same expenditures that we would have already made. Is that something that we should be thinking in terms of?

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WITNESS NAEVE: That's a distinct possibility. I think, for example, if this Commission were to say, "We would like you to go forward with GridFlorida. We believe that GridFlorida should be operated as a separate entity for at least seven or eight years before there's any combination with a Southeast RTO," that would, I think, have persuasive effect with FERC.

Now, having said that, you still might have significant differences in the two structures that would make it difficult to combine those operations.

Another alternative -- it strikes me there are a couple of alternatives. Another alternative would be to have the GridFlorida companies work with the Southeast RTO at the outset so that the Southeast RTO -- so that Florida has lot of input into the design and structure of the Southeast RTO.

The report from the judge in the mediation, you'll notice it has a lot of elements in it that look like GridFlorida, because GridFlorida is a well-designed entity. Now, if the Florida companies don't participate on a going-forward basis, it may not continue to look much like GridFlorida. But having the two look a lot alike is useful to us.

But another option might be to have the

process and to see if in that Southeast process we could have GridFlorida a part of the Southeast RTO, but with special controls or special operations for Florida alone ceded to a Florida division of the Southeast RTO or something like that, but where there's compatibility then between the designs of the companies and the rates of the RTOs and the divisions of the RTOs and so forth. I mean, it just strikes me we have lot of options at this stage.

witness ramon: The bottom line of all this is that we need the equivalent of a GridFlorida, even if there's a regional Southeast, from just an operational and reliability -- being close to your customers, grant access, and being close to the Commission for siting purposes.

So it's just something -- we have a complication with the Southeast, and as Mike said, we have to be in there early and be able to effectuate what we need here in Florida.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Mennes, as an operations person, you reminded me of something I asked Chairman Hoecker yesterday. From a storm, natural disaster standpoint, are there problems in

terms of dealing with those disasters if you are in a regional RTO versus a GridFlorida RTO?

WITNESS MENNES: I think for what we'll call a hurricane -- and certainly Andrew was a major disaster. I think the processes that we have in place to deal with disasters, to coordinate and to help each other's utilities, I think are good today, and they would be just about the same tomorrow. The RTO would be able to respond to them. I think where Greg and I come from, major storms and stuff like that are fine. We see them. We know what's going on. We can assemble people. We can attack them.

when you get into the operational mode, what you've got to -- what always -- maybe I'll kick myself for bringing this up. What always scares an operator is the so-called shoulder periods. And what happens in the shoulder periods is the loads go down, and all the generators want to take a holiday and get fixed, and all the transmission people want to take their lines out and work on them. And that's when people need to be very, very alert, especially when you have a spike in the weather. And usually it will be a spike with hot weather early for us in the State of Florida and in the South, which would be sometime around April or May.

1 So those are the type of conditions that you need really good coordination, and you need someone that understands the diversity of the load, whether it's in the Southeast or whether it's just in Florida, to stay on top of those type of things. And 6 that's why we really -- if they go to some kind of Southeast RTO, we need to make our point real strongly that you need some kind of operational center or something like that in the State of Florida. I feel 10 very strongly for that.

And, you know, you can say that, and the Southeast RTO can be developed and just say, "Okay. We're just going to have one center, and we're going to put that center" -- wherever it is. It probably won't be south of Tallahassee, and this is the way the Southeast is going to go. And that, I think, would be unacceptable to us in the State of Florida from a reliability standpoint. But we don't know. We don't know how any of that stuff will work.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Just to complete the record then, assuming we kind of give some direction or guidance in our ultimate decision if we think an RTO is appropriate, where would you recommend that the Florida operations center be located?

WITNESS MENNES: A little bit on the

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2 | WITNESS RAMON: Say in Florida.

WITNESS MENNES: In Florida. Thank you. I got help on that one.

We did our best when we started up
GridFlorida to make it a smooth transition. And
Florida Power & Light, being the largest customer, was
very concerned about the costs and all and basically
decided that we would move out of our control center.
Since it already has a large board, you can develop
the transmission maps. The transmission maps and
stuff are very important when you have a large storm
to see what's in and out, and we thought the Miami
area was a pretty good place to do all that. We
already had all the infrastructure in place.

Now, certainly that type of infrastructure could be relocated somewhere else at a future date. We didn't tie GridFlorida's hands down for any specific period of time. But just the overall way we communicate with the various municipalities and co-ops and the IOUs with our hot lines and everything else, we have that infrastructure in place. If you tried to take that whole thing, the way we operate, and have it done somewhere else, it just -- to me, it's just too big. It's too much.

of is we have operators on shift, and we actually operate a power company 24 hours a day, seven days a week. And when something goes wrong, we cannot tell the transmission grid that they're only allowed to have problems at the times when management is there. So we need to make sure we've got the operators trained. And it's a mind-boggling job for them just to take care of the State of Florida, and we do a good job doing that.

back to your question, the way we left it was that we're going to use the FP&L control center just to get started. Using the existing infrastructure would save us a lot of money, but we were going to leave it to the board on where the headquarters should be and where any future permanent facilities should be. We were going to leave that up to the board.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q I just have a couple of questions to follow up on the discussion that you had with the Commissioners just now.

Besides GridFlorida, are there any RTO proposals from within the Southeastern region that was defined by FERC in July that are pending before FERC?

A (By Mr. Naeve) There's GridSouth pending. There is GridFlorida, which is still pending on the compliance filing. The SPP Entergy filing is pending. And then Southern Company made a filing, the so-called SETrans, I believe, which I believe is still pending too.

Q So each of those entities have incurred some startup costs to date, or some costs --

A To different degrees, yes.

Q -- to get the ball rolling.

A Yes, to different degrees.

 Q Would you expect that if FERC were to order a Southeast RTO that included all of these entities that all those startup costs would be recovered in the charge of the Southeast RTO to each of the utilities

charge of the Southeast RTO to each of the utilities
that took service from it?

A I would think so, yes. I would also say

that the costs that have been incurred so far would be a relatively small fraction of the total startup costs once you start making investment in infrastructure and

And one other follow-up. There was some

facilities.

Q

23 talk about how to -- I guess how GridFlorida could fit

into the Southeastern RTO with minimal -- you know,

possible. From your understanding of what the ALJ has recommended to FERC as the form of an RTO for the Southeast region, is there much difference between that form and what's proposed as GridFlorida?

A Not significant differences. There are two primary differences, and I in response to the same question yesterday gave them to you.

- Q So I asked that question yesterday?
- A Yes, you did.

Q I told you yesterday also that my short-term memory was two hours.

I left off with some questions about the differences between how GridFlorida would perform operational control services as compared to how it's currently done. Could the same operational control services that will be performed by GridFlorida be performed as effectively by a not-for-profit RTO?

A (By Mr. Mennes) For the operational control and reliability of services, I would assume they would be -- you know, the end result would probably be about the same, would be the same.

A (By Mr. Ramon) Well, I think it has -Marty, I think the transco has the potential to be
better on the operations end, because right now we
have -- as you all well know, we have coordinated

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utility operations in Florida. And even if you went to a not-for-profit RTO, it would still be coordinated. There would be a high degree of coordinated operations. But with a transco owning a lot of transmission and owning those very facilities that it operates, it's a less coordinated operation, so I would think it would have the potential to be more efficient.

A (By Mr. Mennes) Yes, I think -- I looked at the question just from a "keep the lights on" standpoint. I think the end result of keeping on the lights on, the result would be the same. If you looked at the transco, which would be the owner-operator of the facilities, versus the ISO, I think there would be more efficiencies in the transco model. The ISO model brings in some duplicacies, if you would, and probably inefficiencies.

A (By Mr. Naeve) I think we've always felt, and one of the reasons we like the transco model is that there needs to be an alignment between owning assets and operating and maintaining those assets, that companies or individuals naturally will be more thoughtful and careful in establishing operating policies and maintenance policies for assets they have an economic interest in or a stake in than otherwise.

In this case, you'll have a for-profit transco that also owns significant assets, and it will therefore, we think, have a strong incentive to develop wise and prudent operating protocols. Those operating and maintenance protocols that they develop will apply to assets not only that they own, but the assets that they manage under contracts. But we think having that alignment between ownership and operation is a good one.

Q Okay. And are those -- would those be the efficiencies that you were talking about, Mr. Mennes?

A (By Mr. Mennes) Yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that -- in your opinion, Mr. Naeve, is that a shortcoming in the Southeast proposal in the sense that there is a contractual relationship between the transco and the independent market administrator? Is that a problem in your viewpoint or not?

WITNESS NAEVE: No. In the Southeast model, the transco still has the responsibility for O&M. So we wanted -- you know, it's important to maintain that alignment between ownership and O&M responsibility, which was preserved in that Southeast model.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So the

responsibility -- even in the Southeast model, the responsibility still rests with the independent transco, whether they contract part of that responsibility away -- not the responsibility, but they contract some of that away, they're still -- the entity which owns is still responsible.

WITNESS NAEVE: Yes. They would actually not be contracting that away to the market administrator. They would retain that responsibility.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: They would retain the responsibility to operate and maintain?

WITNESS NAEVE: That's right. Now, they may contract with some of the transmission owners and the utilities that are under the RTO for some of those O&M services, but they will maintain responsibility.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: There was some concern on this issue with the idea of basing the standards for maintenance on the prior three years' measures. And you came back, and -- well, I understand that there's going to be a continuing discussion on that. Would you care to elaborate on that?

WITNESS MENNES: Well, what you're referring to correctly is that in our tariff that we filed -- and we call it Attachment O, which is Exhibit

1, Volume 6. We have a protocol in there that talks about the responsibilities that GridFlorida would have to maintain the transmission reliability standards. We did a lot of discussion on this matter in the collaborative process and took a lot of input from the municipalities and co-ops in there and tried to look at some realistic things that we thought GridFlorida could be able to do.

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And the first thing that we asked them to do is -- what we told them they had to do in the long term was to make sure that reliability is no worse for the load-serving entities than it is today, or averaged over the last three years is actually what it says. And we also put a responsibility for GridFlorida on a yearly basis to evaluate systems that had low, if you would, reliability or the worst reliability. And we also looked at different delivery points, and we also said that GridFlorida would have responsibility to go in there and evaluate those with the worst responsibility, get with the load-serving entities and address improvements, transmission improvements to bring this up to date or to bring them so that their problems or whatever they had would be minimized.

So we were very concerned, and we took

input. We think that what is in here does make

GridFlorida responsible to maintain reliability and

actually to improve it. What it was was just the

load-serving entities that are going to be the

customers of GridFlorida to have an assurance that

there is a tariff out there that requires GridFlorida

to do this work and to get with them and to review the

reliability and to track the reliability.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And if they want to pursue a higher level of reliability, they can, but as I understand it, they would have to incur those costs; is that correct?

WITNESS MENNES: That is correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And this goes a little bit beyond me, but let me try it at least. As I understand this idea of looping, there can be some looping done in the system, which I understand enhances reliability for a particular user. Do we -- am I to understand then that whatever is done now would stay in place, and anybody who wants to conduct that in the future, anybody, any user of the system, whether they're a load-serving entity or not, they incur the cost of adding that kind of a facility to their --

WITNESS MENNES: Well, basically, when you

talk about looping, you're --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And correct me if I'm talking out of turn.

WITNESS MENNES: No, you're doing good.

When you talk about looping the various stations and how all that works, the way we plan things today and coordinate today to serve load and to bring the transmission into it and to make sure the transmission is coordinated with the generation, those same processes will also continue to take place in a planning process that the GridFlorida is required to do, required by the tariff to do.

When GridFlorida -- and I think it's important to note that one thing that we do not have today that GridFlorida does have is, GridFlorida will have an independent -- well, it's not independent. They have a market participant type planning committee that will be able to come back and work with the various planners that GridFlorida has.

So GridFlorida is not going to be able to, and I don't think we want it to be able to go out there and do what we call a gold-plated system.

They've got to do what's reasonable. They look at long-term plans. A lot of times what you would do, you would build a substation, and you could serve it

radially with the long-term plans of as load continues to grow, as your transmission requirements, maybe three years later you would loop it through. That's what Florida Power & Light does now. So all these type of practices would be carefully reviewed by GridFlorida.

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: I would add to that, through that normal process, lines will be looped in when the load growth requires it, and that will be picked up through the normal planning process, and that would not be a directly assigned cost to that particular LSE.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So as I understand it, the concern was that -- the consistency. So your evaluation of load growth and those sorts of issues would occur through this planning process, and consistent standards would apply throughout.

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: Yes.

WITNESS MENNES: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question.

Mr. Mennes, I believe you made reference to Attachment

O, which is the operating protocol, which is part of

Volume 6.

WITNESS MENNES: Yes, sir. It's actually

Volume 6-B.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Well, I'm looking at page 4074. And you also made reference to the fact, and maybe Mr. Naeve also, that there could be a contractual relationship with a divesting owner, for example, to provide operations and maintenance services. Do you expect that to take place in the case of Florida Power & Light?

WITNESS MENNES: Yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, the personnel that would be actually doing those -- providing those services, conducting the maintenance, for example, those are currently Florida Power & Light employees and would continue to be Florida Power & Light employees?

WITNESS MENNES: Yes, to the same -- we do use contractors here and there for, for example, tree clearing and maybe some other things. I'm not sure. But whoever is doing it today, however Florida Power & Light operates the -- really, the maintenance of the transmission facilities would be the same as it is today, and we're going to build that in.

It just didn't make -- it was impractical to turn over facilities and turn over those requirements to GridFlorida, so we'll have a contract

in place with them which is yet to be developed, but it will have Florida Power & Light maintaining those facilities 24 hours a day, seven days a week, renewable notices type of thing.

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And we worked real closely with -- and we're planning on working real closely with TECO, because it is a large concern, and we definitely wouldn't turn all that over until we got a warm feeling that GridFlorida could take over those maintenance facilities. Whether GridFlorida would take over the employees or not, we never really got there. So we anticipate, I think, Greg, for five years that we will have that contract in place.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, how will you be -- I say you, Florida Power & Light. How will Florida Power & Light be compensated for the use of its employees and the expenditures that you incur in maintaining assets which you have actually turned over to a different entity?

WITNESS MENNES: The costs would be identical to the costs it would be today. When we maintain those facilities today, we gather those maintenance costs. And as opposed to being a Florida Power & Light cost, what we would do, we would gather those costs, and we would just send that bill to

GridFlorida for cost.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And it's on a cost-based arrangement? Is that what the contract calls for with GridFlorida?

WITNESS MENNES: That's what it would call for. We never really finished that contract. That's one of the things we had. We wanted to make sure of a couple things. We didn't want to -- of course, obviously, we didn't want to see any profit involved in here. We wanted to make it look like for the customers, for the ratepayers, that it was the same type of business and the same cost that was being executed today, and we wanted to make sure the service was the same with the same expectations and the same results as today.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, you characterize yourself as an operations person, and I respect that. So I'm going to ask you a question, and if you're not comfortable answering it, that's fine.

From a cost reporting perspective, can these costs readily be identified and accounted for so that we're sure that those costs are correctly allocated out of Florida Power & Light's retail regulated operations and are properly accounted for by GridFlorida?

Q On page 23 of the panel testimony, there's a discussion of how transmission system planning will take place under GridFlorida, including expansion.

Who currently performs the planning function?

A (By Mr. Southwick) Each of the utilities performs the planning function, and it's coordinated through the FRCC.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me back up for just a moment. I guess the other panelists heard Mr. Mennes answer my question in terms of Florida Power & Light. Do you also agree for your respective companies that it would be the same answer, or do you have anything you wish to add or change as it relates to your companies?

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: In the case of Florida Power Corporation, we're not going to be a divesting owner, so that wouldn't apply to us.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I understand that, but the assets still have to be maintained, and you'll just be maintaining them yourself.

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: Yes.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do you -- well, then how do you look for recovery of your maintenance costs? Is it going to be from -- continue to be part of your retail operations?

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: No. Actually, all of our transmission revenue requirements will become -- will be collected through the FERC-approved revenue requirement, but the actual accounting for it will be exactly same way we do it today.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. So those costs can be identified, but you'll be looking for recovery of those costs from the RTO?

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And then it will be
-- in turn, the rate that is established by FERC would
include the maintenance costs as part of the costs
which have to be recovered in the rate.

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Mr. Ramon, is that your understanding as well?

WITNESS RAMON: We're in the --

MR. CHILDS: Commissioner, he can go ahead and answer, but I want to make sure that you're satisfied. I don't know -- this is a little bit beyond his testimony here, and it's an accounting

area. I don't know whether the witnesses know, and I want to make sure when they answer you that --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I prefaced the question. I put that question out there and qualified that only if the witnesses were comfortable answering it.

MR. CHILDS: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you're not under any pressure to answer if you're not comfortable answering. I want to make that clear.

witness RAMON: well, I'm real comfortable in having you ask Bill Ashburn later.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Very well.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Southwick, there has been some conflicting testimony as to whether Florida Power Corporation would do its own maintenance, so once and for all, could you tell us what it was you envisioned Florida Power Corporation maintaining and what services you would be paying the RTO for?

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: We would maintain our system as we do today, and the cost of that would go in with all of our other transmission revenue requirements. It in total becomes our transmission revenue requirements. We would file that with FERC,

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and FERC would approve it, hopefully, and that would be collected for us and paid to us by GridFlorida. Simultaneously, we will be buying from GridFlorida our transmission services for our retail customers, and we'll send a check to GridFlorida for that service, and that's what our retail costs would be. BY MR. KEATING:

How will the transmission planning function 0 process be different under GridFlorida than it is under the current state of affairs?

(By Mr. Southwick) Well, it will be quite different in the way the process unfolds. GridFlorida itself will be responsible for the planning, and they'll be responsible for the final decisions that get made.

To effect those plans, there will be an open and participatory process, which is defined in the planning protocol which is part of our tariff, in which all the stakeholders will participate if they choose to, and I assume they will, including the Florida Public Service Commission. And they will work together through this process, which has a formalized structure with milestones on an annual basis, and the result of that will be the plan.

The final decisions will be made by

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GridFlorida with the input from the stakeholders. Ιf there are disputes about the final plans, there's procedures to handle disputes. But the ultimate difference, in my mind, is that GridFlorida will have the final authority, whereas today the utilities have the final authority.

So the stakeholders, are those the market 0 participants?

> Α Yes.

0 Okay. How do they currently participate in the transmission planning process?

well, we probably vary from utility to utility, I would think. I know in the case of Florida Power Corporation, we work with our TDUs periodically to work with them to find out what their needs and satisfaction, et cetera, is with the process. At the FRCC, where today all the plans come together for coordination and to ensure that the overall grid is adequate, the stakeholders all sit around that table and take part in those studies.

And just for clarification, for the record, Q what is a TDU?

A transmission-dependent utility. referring specifically to FMPA and Seminole.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Could I jump in with

a question here? I think one of the things that's troubling both to our staff as well as to the Commission is our loss of control when we -- if we go ahead and approve an RTO. And we've heard that all of our jurisdiction will go to the federal level and that there will be very little control that this Commission will have. And you've talked about the stakeholders having a voice in the RTO, and I understand that this Commission will not be a stakeholder.

Is there something -- other than just saying that we'll give due deference to this Commission, is there some formal role that this Commission could be given as an advisor or as an entity providing some input to the transco that would give us perhaps a little more comfort level than we have right now, that will give us a true voice if we do have concerns on how the operation of the transco is going, that we can not only voice them, but we're confident that they will be heard and given due consideration?

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: Commissioner, we've given that a lot of consideration, and today -- and I don't want to get into a legal thing, because I can't -- today the Commission has the authority, as I understand it, to order a utility to build a

transmission facility, or anything else, actually, if they decide that that's necessary. And I know there has been a lot of debate, well, they have the authority to order GridFlorida to do that. And I don't know the answer to that, but to protect against the event that maybe it doesn't, we provided for that possibility.

And on page 28 of our panel testimony, we address that specifically, and the Q and A starts on page 4. And this refers to Attachment N, the planning protocol of our tariff, where GridFlorida is obligated to act as the agent for the utilities and construct facilities if the PSC orders it. What we did here is, the PSC can still order a utility to build a facility, and if the utility is not in a position to do so, for example, if they have divested, GridFlorida is obligated to step up and perform that role. So our intention is that the same authority the Commission has today they'll still have.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: I was thinking more in terms of some sort of formal liaison between this Commission and GridFlorida, you know, that might allow this Commission to act in some role as an advisor to GridFlorida.

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: Well, we provided a

1	seat at the table for the Florida Commission, which in
2	my mind again is the same seat at the table they have
3	today at the FRCC.
4	COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.
5	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: That's the position on
6	the Advisory Committee; right?
7	WITNESS SOUTHWICK: Yes, and also through
8	the planning process, sir.
9	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'm sorry?
10	WITNESS SOUTHWICK: And also through the
11	planning process.
12	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.
13	WITNESS SOUTHWICK: We encourage Commission
14	participation.
15	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Are you familiar it's
16	my understanding that in PJM, there is an MOU with the
17	board of directors of PJM, between the board and the
18	jurisdictional commissions in which PJM offers
19	service. Are you familiar with that?
20	WITNESS SOUTHWICK: No, sir, I'm not.
21	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Is anyone else?
22	WITNESS RAMON: No.
23	CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. One of the other
24	avenues that is pub I should say announced as a way
25	for out interaction, the Commission's interaction with

GridFlorida is through the market monitoring function; is that correct?

WITNESS NAEVE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I want to kind of get a little bit clearer application on that. And what I'm looking at is the tariff, and this is in Volume 3.

WITNESS RAMON: Volume 3?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I'll tell you what.

While we get that, why don't we go ahead and take a break for the court reporter. She has been going for a little bit. We'll take a break and come back in ten minutes.

(Short recess.)

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We're back on the record, and I was going to ask a question on the market monitoring tariff. Specifically, I want to speak to how the market monitor will interact with other governmental agencies and how that -- I kind of want to get a logical view of how this process is anticipated to work.

First of all, as a general idea, the interaction is certainly not going to be real-time. We would be dealing -- we, this Commission, will be dealing with any market monitoring activity ex post facto. Is that a fair statement?

WITNESS NAEVE: I'm not so sure I would describe it as ex post facto. I do think there will be circumstances where you'll receive from the market monitor reports of market conditions and reports about proposed changes to the market and that sort of stuff. I mean, I guess to the extent that the reports have been prepared, it's not real-time. There's some lag in time in that.

I don't know if there's anything that necessarily precludes this Commission from trying to arrange with the market monitor some more real-time access to information. There's nothing in the proposal that precludes that, nor is it required either. They are required to share information with you and share reports with you, but there's no specificity as to manner in which that's done.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Now, specifically I'm looking at Section 3.45 of the tariff, and this is on page 2079. And here's how I would anticipate this coming up.

WITNESS NAEVE: This is Section 3.4.5?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Correct. You're

absolutely right.

WITNESS NAEVE: And it's page 3739?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Oh, I guess that's right.

There's two statements of it. I have it on 2079, but you're right, it is on another page.

WITNESS NAEVE: Okay. I just wanted to make sure I was looking at the same section.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I wasn't sure which one was the most current. There's one on 2088, and then one on 2079 in my exhibit package. I assumed the first one is the most current.

MR. FAMA: Mr. Chairman, Volume 6 of Exhibit 1, which is attached to Mr. Naeve's testimony, is the most recent FERC filing, and I believe that's got the market monitoring tariff in it, and probably that would be the best one to look at.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. The page number on that one was --

WITNESS NAEVE: Okay. So this is -- the 2079 is the most updated filing, so we can work from that.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.

WITNESS NAEVE: Oh, I'm sorry. This is August? Okay. Then let's go to 3739. That is the most recent.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. This seems to be essentially the same language. Well -- okay. Now, it appears here that in some -- there will be the

opportunity for this Commission to receive information on market monitoring activity that had to do with market abuses. Is that what this section is intended to do?

WITNESS NAEVE: 3.4.5?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Right. I'm specifically looking at the end of the first sentence that says the market monitor may submit a complaint regarding a specific violation of market rules, excessive market power, or otherwise anticompetitive behavior directly to the Commission, and in parentheses, and as appropriate, to other authorized government agencies to the extent appropriate, or relevant, I should say.

that authorizes the market monitor to file complaints against parties that may be exercising market power or abusing — or violating tariffs or abusing market rules. It, in effect, authorizes them to file a complaint regarding these violations to the Commission or, as appropriate, other agencies. And the only other agencies are agencies that have the power to remedy that complaint. So, in effect, what it says is if you identify a problem in the marketplace, you're authorized to file a complaint with the agency that has jurisdiction over that particular type of behavior

asking -- petitioning that agency to issue a remedy.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: On the prior page, 3738, Section 3.2.3, that says that we can get market performance reports and recommendations if appropriate or required. Do you agree with that?

WITNESS NAEVE: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And then in the last sentence there, it says that the market monitor will be obligated to file reports requested by the Commission or the Florida PSC.

WITNESS NAEVE: That's right.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Was that intended to include the information here that's in the other section, 3.4.5, so that -- could we -- my question then is: Could we request a copy of any reports on market abuse or market monitoring activity at all pursuant to 3.4.5 under the authorization here in this prior paragraph?

WITNESS NAEVE: I would expect you could.

Certainly complaints filed at FERC are public

complaints. The only caveat -- and I'm not aware of

where this might arise, but there could be

circumstances in which if you file a complaint, for

example, sometimes complaints filed with the

Department of Justice are confidential, and I'm not

sure they would necessarily make those available to
everybody if they were to do that. But as a general
rule, you would have access certainly to any FERC
complaint they would file. It would be a publicly
filed complaint.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And here's -- rather than going so much through the technical details, here's kind of how my view of the world is if a transco or a GridFlorida were to exist. This would probably come up in my mind when somebody comes to us when we're looking at the posture of -- because ultimately I think that's what we'll be looking at. We're looking at how retail rates or retail ratepayers should be looking at the recovery of transmission costs.

And in my mind, a likely scenario will be that somebody will come in and say that there was some imperfection in the transmission marketplace at the time this transaction occurred, and you should review whether or not those costs are prudent. Then we have to figure out how to investigate that when we're talking about recovery at the retail side. And my thought is that the only way we're going to be able to do that is to go back and assess information of this ilk or this caliber. And so what I --

WITNESS NAEVE: I think you can get that

information through Section 3.2.3.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.

WITNESS NAEVE: Or -- yes, 3.2.3.

and I got off on this whole tangent from some of the questions that Commissioner Palecki had raised. In the tenor of really facilitating a more active, or I should say a more efficient — let me put it that way, a more efficient interaction and operation with GridFlorida, it would occur to me that as much preemptive work in this kind of a role would be useful as possible.

In other words, we don't want to have to go back and deny costs. We don't want to be in that role. In that kind of a scenario, in my mind, it would be counterproductive and probably hurtful to the companies.

How would we, how could we work to ensure that we could do it in a planning process or in a preemptive process more so than an ex post facto kind of review process? Any thoughts on that?

WITNESS NAEVE: Well, I have one suggestion. As I mentioned earlier, the market monitors typically have two responsibilities, and one responsibility is monitoring, as one would expect with

that name, market monitor. They gather data, they do studies, they evaluate whether the market is functioning well, and if it's not functioning well, why isn't it functioning well, and so forth.

And with respect to that function, they have an obligation in their tariff to prepare for you any reports you might request, which, in effect, says you have access to their staff to do studies for you, to do analysis for you. In some ways, they're almost an extension of your staff. They're going to be preparing studies and analysis for you. If you chose to, you could develop an internal staff as well with this function. But they're monitoring the wholesale markets.

The second responsibility they have, or at least they have the ability to acquire, they can ask FERC to delegate to them FERC's authority to regulate wholesale markets. And FERC is properly reluctant to delegate its authority to other parties, but in the case of each of the ISOs today, they have delegated to them under very defined circumstances the ability to mitigate market power, to mitigate bids to sell electricity and so forth.

And I'm quite confident that this market monitor will ask of FERC to give it similar powers so

that when it determines that a particular generator located in, let's say, a load pocket, or a generator located in a situation where because of transmission constraints in a given hour, it may have the authority or the market power, the ability to charge excessive prices. And in those circumstances, they will ask for the authority to mitigate those prices. That is a -- you know, a special delegation of power to them.

I think by virtue of your working closely with the market monitor on the first half of their responsibilities, that is, gathering information, learning about the market, knowing when things are going wrong and when things are going well, you would be in a position to also work with them and bring to their attention situations where things do not appear to be going well and ask them to use their remedial power under those circumstances to try to mitigate prices so that you don't have a circumstance where after the fact you're looking at prices that were too high, and at that stage you have a difficult question of what do you do with those prices that are too high.

This frankly is kind of the trend in general. I think FERC -- one of the reasons FERC wants RTOs is because they would like to have in place

institutions like this that can be on-site in the region and monitor the markets real-time and have some real-time ability to intervene in the market when they detect problems.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Have you ever considered assigning the role of market monitor to this Commission, and if not, why not?

that. It was proposed in the stakeholder process, I think, in fact, by the Commission staff, and we thought about it. We frankly didn't think FERC would approve it is why we did not do it. At the time that we were going through the stakeholder process, FERC issued an order in the California case. California had a requirement that all the board members of the RTO be California residents, and FERC struck that down saying this is an interstate function, and you cannot delegate to the residents or the institutions of a single state this responsibility. And we felt that the result of that case was such that if we had proposed that, we wouldn't get it accepted.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Excuse me. That's interesting, but I don't think there's any requirement

that members of this Commission be Florida residents. I think we all are, but we're selected because of expertise within related fields, not because of our residency. How does that relate to that? I mean, I don't understand why that was the decision to exclude -- I'm not saying that we should fill that role. I just don't understand the nexus between that ruling and why this agency was excluded from consideration.

WITNESS NAEVE: I think for the same reason that the Commission excluded a requirement that all residents be -- I'm sorry, that all board members be California residents, we felt they would also have excluded a requirement that all market monitor board members be Florida Commissioners. Yet in each case they said that -- in each case, it would be an interstate function from their perspective, being directed to, you know, a state-driven control.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q As a result of the collaborative process, what is each of the panelists' understanding of whether this Commission would have any direct jurisdiction over GridFlorida?

MR. CHILDS: I think that calls for a legal view which is not only beyond the scope of the panel,

but calls for a legal view, and I would object.

MR. KEATING: I guess what I'm trying to get a feel for is, to follow along the lines of the Chairman's questions, could the Commission demand and receive information from GridFlorida or from the market monitor under its grid bill authority. And I realize that it's essentially a legal question, and my question is simply trying to ask what the parties' understanding of that authority might be as they participated in the collaborative process to reach the result that they did.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: There were two points that I considered that we may want to have briefed, if they're not already going to be briefed. One was -- and we may not need it, because I think there was pretty sufficient testimony given after I thought about it initially, but how the Federal Power Act authorizes or gives FERC authority to mandate companies to participate in or comply with Order 2000. And then the other was that issue, was this issue, and I'm thinking we may just want to have that done.

And if you would, do this. Let's draft up -- let me get with you and draft up the wording on those so they're clearer for parties, and then we'll

announce what those issues will be so that you'll have a clear understanding what they will be, and then we can get around this problem.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q I'll go on. Earlier we were discussing the differences in the planning process under GridFlorida versus how it's currently being done. Do you believe that the planning process could be accomplished any more or less effectively under a transco structure that GridFlorida has proposed as opposed to a not-for-profit RTO?

MR. CHILDS: I'm sorry. Would you please repeat that?

BY MR. KEATING:

Q Does the panel believe that the planning process could be accomplished any more or less effectively under GridFlorida as compared to how it's currently being handled?

A (By Mr. Naeve) I think -- your first question I thought went to comparing a for-profit transco as opposed to comparing -- as opposed to a not-for-profit ISO. Is that the question, or is the question compared to today?

Q I'm sorry. You're correct. I misstated it the second time. The comparison is a not-for-profit

RTO versus a transco like GridFlorida.

A Let me make a generic statement, and then I think Henry can speak to the specifics. As a generic matter, we felt that there are several advantages to a transco. One advantage, of course, I previously discussed, and that is creating an alignment between the ownership of assets and the responsibility for maintaining and operating those assets. With an ISO you don't have that; with a transco you do.

A second advantage is -- I'm going to mention the second, and then I'll get to the planning issue. A second one is creating an alignment between the obligation -- or between investment of capital and establishing rates to recover that capital. And again, with an ISO you don't have that, and with a transco you do.

And then a third advantage goes to the planning area, and that is, we think there should be an alignment between planning for expansion and the obligation to invest capital to finance that expansion. So for that reason, we feel where an ISO is running the planning process and it has no obligation to invest its capital in the plans, that an important connection is missing.

Henry, do you want to speak more

specifically to the planning?

A (By Mr. Southwick) No, not really.

Number one, I learned during the break that my other mike didn't work, so I apologize for that.

No, I think the generic answer is the right answer. As far as the actual process, it could be set up under either organization.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Naeve, then how about the second question that Mr. Keating asked? Since one of the foundation rulings we need to make relates to whether any RTO should be formed, how would planning be improved by any RTO?

A (By Mr. Naeve) Well, let me give a generic answer, but again, I should let the planning experts speak to this. On a generic basis, to the extent that you have a single entity evaluating expansion plans and they're looking at it on a statewide basis as opposed to an individual utility basis, one would hope that there would be some economies there looking at which, because expansions in one system have an effect on another system. And if you look at that on an integrated basis, one would expect there would be some economies there.

COMMISSIONER JABER: And is that also -- are those efficiencies realized regardless of whether

the municipalities and the co-ops become part of the RTO?

WITNESS RAMON: Yes. No matter where the generators are located or who they belong to, they impact the entire grid.

The other point I wanted to make, if you look on page 41 of our testimony, there's a table of non-utility generation. Of course, that's in the OASIS queues and will not all be built, but each of us right now are under Order 888. We have separate pro forma tariffs, and in strict adherence to the pro forma tariffs, those generators would have to go to each of us separately, because each generator interconnected to any one of our systems impacts the other two systems. And so there are some real inefficiencies there, and we try to work through that today through a coordinated approach. But an RTO would be a lot cleaner single-stop shopping for that.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Let's say the municipalities and the co-ops do not join GridFlorida. How is it you envisioned GridFlorida would communicate and coordinate with the municipalities and the co-ops? Had you reached that point yet?

WITNESS RAMON: Whether they -- let's say

they don't join. Their load and their generation is embedded in each of our transmission systems, and so they have to come to the RTO to get service to those points of delivery and have those generators interconnected and studied properly and those sort of things. So whether their transmission is in or out doesn't mean that they're not coming and participating in the planning process particularly.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q That leads me to another question. What percentage of the total transmission system in the State of Florida, not just peninsular Florida, would be under GridFlorida's control?

A (By Mr. Southwick) I don't believe we have that information on hand.

COMMISSIONER JABER: You don't know what your collective contribution will be to GridFlorida? You know that; right?

BY MR. KEATING:

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Q Well, maybe if I rephrase the question in terms of the total percentage of peninsular Florida rather than the entire state. Does that help?

A (By Mr. Southwick) Well, to give an exact answer, I couldn't do that. I mean, the three utilities collectively are the vast majority of the

transmission in the peninsula, but exactly a 1 2 percentage I don't know. But we're clearly the vast 3 majority. 4 Can any of the panelists provide perhaps an Q 5 estimate of that percentage? 6 (By Mr. Ramon) We may have to follow up 7 with you. The pricing groups in the past when we were 8 looking at the rate structure for GridFlorida had 9 compiled, I believe, some of that information if you 10 want an exact figure on that. 11 Is that something that could be provided as Q 12 a late-filed hearing exhibit? 13 Α Yes. 14 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Do you want to mark that 15 as a late-filed? 16 MR. KEATING: Yes. I believe that would 17 be -- are we on Exhibit 8? 18 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Yes. 19 MR. KEATING: Okay. And that would be 20 percentage of total transmission system in peninsular 21 Florida that would be under GridFlorida's control, 22 under its operational control. 23 WITNESS NAEVE: We have to ask you at least 24 one question. You mean if only the three IOUs joined

25

GridFlorida? I mean, it could be 100 percent if

everybody joined.

MR. KEATING: Based on the three current participants in GridFlorida.

WITNESS RAMON: Cochran, I would like to clarify one thing, though. In terms of short-term reliability, FRCC will be contracting with GridFlorida to perform the security coordination function, and that security coordination has authority over all of the bulk system in peninsular Florida, all facilities, for short-term reliability. But in terms of getting transmission service, et cetera, you know, at this moment in time it's just the three utilities that would be putting in their assets either by divesting or transferring control. But in terms of operations, GridFlorida will be operating the entire facilities of peninsular Florida.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Ramon, let me tell you why I would be interested in this exhibit so that to the degree you could incorporate a response to my question in this exhibit, you can.

Yesterday Chairman Hoecker acknowledged that to achieve the benefits that you all have articulated in your testimony, the four primary benefits regarding planning and operation efficiencies and eventually lower prices to the end user, that

maximum participation in any RTO is critical. And he said from a national perspective he has heard, you know, 67 percent participation in an RTO might be adequate, but he didn't know what Florida would need.

So what I would be looking to try to attain from an exhibit like this would be currently what percentage of transmission facilities will be dedicated to this RTO.

WITNESS RAMON: Okay. I understand.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: On both tiers, because one is ownership and the other is operation; correct? You want it on both tiers, not just what they own, but what they operate.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Well, let's ask the panelists. I don't think you need that, but correct us if we're wrong. I think what I'm looking for is how much participation will be in the RTO to effectively ensure a true competitive market, and I don't know that that needs a separation between ownership and control.

WITNESS NAEVE: Let me just add one thing. We will give you the information pertaining to these three companies. We can't give you the information with respect to other parties that may very well participate, but they haven't committed yet. And

quite frankly, as I stated yesterday, it's in their interest to not commit right now, because they still want to bargain for more benefits to participate. But I personally think there will be other participants. I think it's to their economic interest to participate, but I also think it's not in their interest to declare that right now, so they haven't.

can. But candidly, let me tell you, if we go down this road of creating an RTO for Florida, I want to make sure that some sort of change in the transmission facilities in the state have a positive effect at the tail end of the formation and implementation. You know, if it's not going to be a true competitive market because you only have 50 percent of the transmission participating in this, well, why do it?

witness naeve: I would just add a couple other thoughts. One is, in deciding what incentives you offer to bring those other parties into the system, there's a tradeoff between the costs that you incur for providing those incentives and the additional benefit you get from adding those facilities.

And sometimes those facilities are important to wholesale transmission service, and

sometimes they're much less important to wholesale transmission service. So it's not just a question of total dollar value of facilities, but where they're located, and how critical they are, and whether they really are necessary for wholesale service or not necessary for wholesale service.

So there's a cost tradeoff. You could get them all in if you were willing to put enough money on the table to put them in, but you may have put so much money on the table that you lose all your benefits.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Is there also a -- I got the impression that there was some additive efficiency to the market design to add more of these facilities. Is that -- was that a part of the analysis that the Chairman gave to this? To the extent that you have 33 percent outside of the scope of the design of the market, you lose some level of efficiency for the market; is that an accurate statement?

want -- for a competitive market, you want as many buyers and sellers to reach each other.

And I know what Commissioner Jaber wants, and I believe we can get the total transmission in Florida and what percentage the IOU utilities represent of that. I'm sorry we don't have the exact

number, but it's large. It's much more than 50 percent, and most, if not all, of the market is in the three utilities' systems, predominantly in Power & Light and Power Corp.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay. So we'll mark this as Exhibit 8, late-filed. It will be GridFlorida transmission operation and control in peninsular Florida.

(Late-Filed Exhibit 8 identified.)
CHAIRMAN JACOBS: You may proceed, staff.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask a follow-up question. If an entity has transmission and chooses not to join the RTO, for short-term reliability, that doesn't matter. I understand that.

But if there's an entity that has a particular transmission facility that, for example, a generator wants to utilize to sign a particular or make a certain transaction with another entity, then it is incumbent upon that particular generator to go to that transmission owner and coordinate with them outside of the purview of the RTO, or how would that happen?

WITNESS RAMON: Well, there's where you would get into some inefficiencies. If there's a large amount of generation that's going to be

interconnected to transmission providers who are not a part of GridFlorida, then you're dealing with pancaked rates and those sorts of things. But I would think in the peninsular Florida situation that the predominance of even municipal and co-op generation would be added. But still the location of those sites, their points of delivery and points of where the generators would be injecting would be in the Power Corp. and Power & Light system.

There may be some, of course, like Jacksonville that wouldn't be, and you would be dealing with pancaked rates there. But other than Jacksonville, I think most buyers and sellers can reach each other just through the three combined systems.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you think that --well, you just indicated that given the diversity of the assets and the location of the assets that are controlled by the three IOUs, that the vast majority of conceivable transactions that could take place would utilize RTO facilities to facilitate that transaction.

WITNESS RAMON: Yes. It won't be 100 percent, but I think it would be above the number that Mr. Hoecker or Chairman Hoecker was suggesting. It

would be better if they were all in, but I think
there's more than enough efficiencies with just -- you
know, at least getting started, with the three
utilities here.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, say there's an entity that has generation and transmission assets in Florida right now that chooses not to join the RTO. They have generation, and they want to sell some of that generation to another entity. How do they go about doing that? Can they go to the RTO and schedule that transaction, or can they try to circumvent the RTO, and what are the economics involved as to why they would choose one or the other?

witness mennes: Okay. If they needed to get out -- let's just say you've got this entity that has the generation and transmission, and they want to go ahead and sell. If they need to flow power across the lines that belong to the RTO, they would then have to go to the RTO to request service, the transmission service -- all that's covered in the tariff; that's the OASIS system -- the same way we do today and pay for that through-flow across the transmission system.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But what rate would

WITNESS MENNES: Whatever the FERC-filed

they pay?

rate would be at the time.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But that would be the same rate for anyone; correct? For example, Florida Power & Light is a generator, and you want to make a transaction. You would be paying the same rate as a entity which is not a member of the RTO?

witness mennes: Well, do you want to get into -- Florida Power --

MR. WILLIS: Excuse me just a minute. I believe that question may be able to be best addressed to Mr. Ashburn. You're starting to get into --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I don't mind delaying the question. That's fine. Is that okay? It's fine with me, whoever --

witness mennes: Well, it's basically -you have network customers, and Florida Power & Light
and Tampa, for example, would be network customers.
So anytime that they would buy electricity, they would
not have to pay for transmission.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You don't have the incremental, because you're just paying -- it's kind of like a flat rate, except that the more -- I'm going to describe it as a flat rate, but I understand that it's based upon the load that you put on the system in relation to the other network customers and the load

they put on the system; correct?

WITNESS MENNES: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.

WITNESS MENNES: But sales made out of the State of Florida would still pay the RTO for out-of-state type sales, if you would. So any generator, even though they're in the RTO, would have to pay for out of the RTO.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, what are the advantages of an entity -- you don't have to be specific, but what -- an entity that is considering joining the RTO, what do they consider as to what are the benefits versus the detriments? What are they weighing in making that decision?

WITNESS MENNES: Okay. I think that if the entity is sitting there, they, of course, would have to weigh their transmission costs and expenses in what they have right now and the way that we would credit them and roll in their costs over this ten-year plan.

They would also have to take into consideration that now that they would be a network customer, if you would, of the RTO, they would pay to use the RTO's transmission on a load ratio share, so that as generation came in that was with the RTO, they would be able to go ahead and receive that generation

as a network resource. So they would start paying for it on their load ratio share and have the opportunities to use the grid on the same playing field as everyone else.

WITNESS NAEVE: I think you should direct this to the rate panel, because I was trying to remember precisely what we did. Maybe Greg or Henry remember. But there are a couple of advantages. One advantage is that a muni or a co-op that has facilities that they do not receive credit for today, transmission facilities, because those facilities are more radial in nature, if they join the RTO, over a five-year period, those facilities will be transferred to the RTO, and the cost responsibility of those facilities, and that will lower their transmission costs.

And a second advantage is that when they use the facilities of the RTO to move power, if they're a member of the RTO, they get the advantage of the depancaking of rates, and if they do not join the RTO, there will be some pancaking of rates. But Mr. Ashburn can better describe how that works.

WITNESS RAMON: But I will tell you one of the obvious benefits to a municipal or a co-op would be that their load and generation is geographically separate. Their generation is not located in the general area of their load, so they have to deal with several transmission providers, and so there's a natural incentive to put their facilities in to avoid pancaked rates. I mean, that's one obvious benefit.

COMMISSIONER JABER: With regard to the incentives, Mr. Naeve, you said earlier that the municipalities and the co-ops and companies that have not decided to join so far would need incentives. What would those incentives be, and who would give those incentives?

WITNESS NAEVE: Well, first I would just point out as a general rule, because FERC does not have jurisdiction over these entities, they can't force them in. So these entities are not going to join an RTO unless they step back and determine that it's in their financial best interests and operational best interests to join. If they could get the benefit of the RTO without putting their facilities into the RTO, they would probably do that. So consequently, one set of incentives to participate would be the incentive to take advantage of the pancaked rates.

And again, Mr. Ashburn can speak with more specificity as to how the pancaked proposals work -- I mean how the rate proposals work if you are a member

or are not a member, but that creates an incentive to want to participate.

And FERC has allowed RTOs to have those types of incentives, because they recognize -- because they too want to encourage what they call nonjurisdictional entities, nonjurisdictional to FERC, to participate, and they can't force them to do it, but they can with financial incentives, both sticks and carrots, to get them to participate. So in terms of a carrot, if you join, you get the advantage of elimination of pancaked rates. That's one of the benefits.

Another benefit pertains to this question of crediting for facilities they have. And under the GridFlorida proposal, the facilities currently owned by many of the municipalities that would be at the same voltage level as the facilities contributed by the investor-owned utilities would also be facilities that would be operated by the RTO, and the rate recovery of those facilities would be recovered through the RTO. In the case of the municipalities and co-ops, they would get that in a phased-in five-year period, so that would also be a financial benefit to them.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q Under the form recommended by the ALJ for a Southeastern Regional RTO, who would order construction of facilities, or who would be able to order construction of facilities?

A (By Mr. Southwick) From a regulatory perspective, I don't believe that was discussed in the ALJ's report.

A (By Mr. Naeve) I didn't think it went into that level of detail.

Q It didn't go into that detail?

A Certainly the RTO would, but with respect to governmental agencies, it didn't go into that level of detail.

Q Right. So it didn't go into the level of detail to say GridFlorida has -- where, as you mentioned earlier, if this Commission were to order construction, GridFlorida would see that it was constructed?

A Right. But issues like that represent why we thought it was important to be a part of that process, to make sure that we can cover issues like that in the process if it goes forward.

Q In your testimony at page 30, you discuss congestion management under GridFlorida. Now, it's correct that congestion, transmission congestion

currently occurs over the transmission system in 1 2 Florida: correct? 3 (By Mr. Ramon) Please repeat the 4 question. 5 Is it correct that congestion 0 Yes. 6 currently -- transmission congestion currently occurs 7 over the system in Florida? 8 At times, yes. 9 0 At times. How is congestion on the 10 transmission system currently managed? 11 It's handled or managed administratively 12 through back-down procedures that are spelled out in Florida's operating specific procedures and FRCC and 13 NERC on transmission line load relief reductions. 14 15 When congestion occurs, there's a process by which we 16 back down first non-firm until the loading gets to 17 acceptable levels. Who decides when -- who coordinates the 18 0 19 process? 20 The security coordinator. Α 21 The security coordinator. And the security Q 22 coordinator answers to the FRCC? 23 Α Right. 24 Is that correct? Q 25 Α Correct.

Q How will the way GridFlorida manages congestion differ from the way congestion is currently managed?

A GridFlorida will be using a -- it will be managed through a market-based mechanism in the GridFlorida world, the scheduling coordinators, which can be a number of entities, but predominantly would be load-serving entities that would be scheduling on a day-ahead basis and submitting what's called balanced schedules. As a part of those balanced schedules, those resources that make up that schedule and will be injecting power into the grid will be submitting mandatory incremental and decremental bids. And GridFlorida on a region-wide basis will be doing a security constrained dispatch with those incs and decs and will be using that to handle congestion in a market-based method through market clearing price.

Q So it will be handled on a market-based -using a market-based method. Under the current
process, how is it managed? How is the decision made
whether to -- who has the rights to the line when
there's congestion?

- A You're saying today?
- Q Yes.
- A When congestion occurs, it's not a

market-based methodology like I just described for GridFlorida. It's handled, as I said before, administratively by the security coordinator through back-down procedures.

Q And those procedures are spelled out?

A Yes.

Q Those procedures that the security coordinator follows. Do you have -- and I'm not looking for a great amount of detail, but I'm just trying to understand the difference between when the security coordinator follows those procedures, how that's different from the market-based mechanism that's being used, and what guides his decision.

A Well, the security coordinator -- when congestion occurs, under the current back-down procedures, there's not an automatic redispatch, if you will, like under GridFlorida. They will simply be looking at and identifying those transactions that are contributing to the congestion, and those particular transactions will be curtailed, whereas in GridFlorida, if there are generators above and below the constraints that could be redispatched to allow those transactions, economical transaction to flow, that will be done automatically, because day ahead, those incs and decs will be submitted up until real

time, so there will be real-time security constrained dispatch in setting up least cost redispatch to eliminate those congestion corridors to allow those economical transactions to flow.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Can I understand a little bit more about those incs and the decs? As I understand it, one is somebody is bidding capacity -- well, actually, all they are is just somebody is bidding on either side of the flowgate; is that correct?

witness ramon: There was some noise. I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: The incs and the decs are basically the bidding in of generation on either side of the flowgate. Is that --

WITNESS RAMON: No. The balancing markets and congestion management is more or less one and the same. All generators that will be a part of everyone's balanced schedule for the next day will be submitting incremental and decremental bids for the balancing markets.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I see.

WITNESS RAMON: And when there is no congestion on the system, the market clearing price will be the same throughout the region. But when

there is congestion, there will be a locational difference in the balancing price.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So essentially what will happen is that somebody who is in a -- I think it's a zone; right? -- that is experiencing greater congestion, they'll pay a higher price to get into the marketplace at that time. Is that a fair statement?

WITNESS RAMON: Under the physical model that we've put together, you know, we've tried to pre-identify where congestion will occur. And to the extent that we've done that well, then congestion, if it does occur across those flowgates, is socialized.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.

WITNESS RAMON: But when congestion occurs on a corridor that has not been pre-identified as a flowgate, then in that zone -- I'm trying to answer your question here -- that settlement zone, that particular zone would have to pay that congestion cost for congestion that occurs on non-flowgate facilities.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I don't want to go much further down that road. Let me stick to somewhat safe ground. If I'm in one of those zones and I know that probably there's a reasonable likelihood that I'm going to be incurring that cost, what do I do in GridFlorida? How do I approach that on a

going-forward basis to say, "Wait a minute. I know I'm that I'm probably incurring a premium at the time of congestion to participate in the marketplace"? So how do I engage the GridFlorida process to address that?

WITNESS RAMON: Well, real-time, knowing that you're going to have congestion on a non-flowgate facility, we've put in a provision that's called next-day buy-through allowing you, recognizing there will be congestion, to buy through it, to actually pay the prevailing price for that --

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So I just pay the premium at that point?

WITNESS RAMON: Yes, sir. But on a longer term basis, those congested corridors that weren't previously identified as a flowgate would have to be picked up in the planning process and hopefully corrected through expansion.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: So I need to go then to the planning committee, the planning function of GridFlorida and say -- and what do I say then? Do I say -- would I offer to provide enhancements that would remove, or do I go seek to provide some transmission options, or do I --

WITNESS RAMON: We have that provision that

1 | that can happen.

2 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.

WITNESS RAMON: And it may be solved by just the annual expansion plan process of the RTO. But if it's a corridor that the economics are such that the redispatch option may be more economical and you don't like that, you can come to GridFlorida and pay for the facility to be built and get transmission rights across that corridor.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: And the return on that investment is -- it's a long-term investment to reduce my price, my premium that I pay at congestion?

WITNESS RAMON: Right.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Okay.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask a question. Go back to the flowgate situation. How is congestion managed through the flowgate situation?

WITNESS RAMON: Could we be a little bit

more --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, is there a bidding process for that?

WITNESS RAMON: Part of the construct for the flowgate process is that we have identified or are in the process of identifying flowgates for the peninsular Florida system. All load-serving entities

1 will be allocated physical transmission rights for 2 purposes of being able to have their native load 3 served. And so on a scheduling forward basis, the 4 submittal of your balanced schedule, you also submit 5 your PTRs that you have been allocated, and that is 6 your hedge. If congestion occurs, you're hedged 7 against that. 8 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But those can be 9 sold, can they not? 10 WITNESS RAMON: Yes. 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Is there a 12 market for that, or is that just between the two 13 entities involved? 14 WITNESS RAMON: On a day-ahead basis, if 15 there are PTRs that are -- if they're all not used 16 up, then they automatically go to auction. 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okav. Who auctions 18 them? 19 WITNESS RAMON: The RTO. 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. And who gets 21 the revenue when they auction those? 22 WITNESS RAMON: They're credited against 23 the transmission charges. 24 COMMISSIONER DEASON: So they just --

WITNESS RAMON: The base rates.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: They go against the revenue requirements, in the terminology that I'm accustomed to.

WITNESS RAMON: Right.

commissioner deason: So those are not enhanced earnings. It's just -- they go against the revenue requirements. There's not an incentive for GridFlorida to maintain a lot of congestion, because it enhances their revenues.

WITNESS RAMON: No. That's correct.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q Under the current process for congestion management, how is the cost -- I'm sorry. Let me go back. Under the current system for congestion management, is there a priority system for how and which transactions are curtailed?

A (By Mr. Ramon) Well, what will happen and hopefully relieve the congestion is this use of incs and decs and the redispatching in the most economical way. But to the extent that redispatch does not eliminate the congestion, then we'll be back to the NERC back-down procedures using TLR.

Q My question went towards the way that congestion management is currently handled --

A Oh, today?

Q -- rather than under the GridFlorida proposal. Is it correct that there's a priority system for which transactions would get curtailed in the event of --

A (By Mr. Mennes) I'll give Greg a rest.

Yes. Basically, the way congestion is handled right now, the transmission is sold, and it's sold with a certain priority. And if there is congestion, the transmission provider has in his tariff how they prioritize the cutting or the discontinuation of those transactions that were using that transmission provider's system.

There's also another procedure that -usually what we do is that because of the flows and
the way the transmission is, we'll turn that
responsibility over to the security coordinator to
maintain the reliability. And the security
coordinator will see that there is a problem on the
system, and there is a process just like you said that
looks at the priority of the transmission reservations
that were made to use the system, and it steps in and
cuts the transactions based upon those priorities,
also based upon the flows that the transactions are
contributing across the flowgate or the system that is
having problems.

And that's basically -- you've heard the expression, the transmission line loading relief procedure, TLR procedure that is a filed procedure. It was written by a NERC committee and approved by the FERC. And we've adopted that procedure, and we do use that procedure in the State of Florida.

Q So essentially the first transaction to go would be the -- perhaps the non-firm or short-term period type transaction?

A Yes. For example, non-firm hourly would go before non-firm daily, which would go before non-firm monthly.

I think the big key is that -- what I'm telling you now is that we sell the transaction, or we sell the transmission, and we would cut that transaction from a seller to a buyer. We really have no procedures in place formally that can allow the seller and buyer that want to use the transmission system to continue with the transaction. The transaction is curtailed. It is cut.

Under the system as Greg explained, we will

-- if we see the congestion, we will have generating
units that will submit hourly what their price to
increase the generation, the inc, and what the price
to decrease their generation, the dec. And now the

security coordination procedure will have it in a congestion management tool that will allow -- instead of cutting the transaction, will allow those transactions to continue to flow by using the incs and decs provided by the generator under the GridFlorida procedure.

Q Under GridFlorida, how is the cost of redispatch handled?

A Under GridFlorida?

Q Yes.

A If the dispatch is across a flowgate, those expenses -- we use the term -- the terminology is "peanut-buttered." It's paid for by all the users. And let me explain why, because it's something the Chairman kind of alluded to, that basically if you have a problem on a flowgate and you're the user, the way to correct that problem is to go out and build. And when you go out and build and you're part of the RTO, the customers will pay for that overall building, if you would, so that you will remove that congestion.

Now, you're not going to go out and build for something that maybe only happens a couple of hours or maybe happened because of a transmission line going out. But since all that building is paid for by all the customers, when there is congestion across

these flowgates and there is -- if there is a problem, basically it is paid for by all the customers.

Q So does that result in cost shifts as compared to the current system?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

You would have to take each situation and stand back

and look at it. It's the way of doing business. What

we're looking at is having more transactions.

We talked a little bit before of why would an entity want to go ahead and join the RTO, and the reason is so they can go out and have more options to select where to buy their power and not have to worry about paying for the transmission. So when it comes to the question does this result in cost shifts, I think you need to look at the whole big picture, and I don't know that you can answer that easily, or could ever answer it.

Q Is it fair to say that under the system that operates today, that only the buyer and the seller are affected and that the retail customer doesn't see an impact?

A (By Mr. Naeve) Well, the buyer may be a utility that passes its higher costs on to the retail customer. In almost all circumstances, it ultimately will be.

So I think if you look at this on a transaction-by-transaction basis, you may find that the costs are shared differently under the new proposal than under the old proposal. But if you look at it in the aggregate, recognizing that there are a lot of buyers out there and a lot of sellers, at one time or another, each of them will be interrupted if there's some event that causes a disruption. aggregate, I think there probably should be no overall cost shifts.

Q I think I perhaps didn't ask the question as clearly as I could have. Right now, say if TECO is a buyer and FPL is a seller and the transaction is curtailed, only TECO and Florida Power & Light are affected. And under the GridFlorida approach, if the cost of redispatch is socialized among the participants, all three utilities would be affected; correct?

A In this example, yes. In another example, it could be only TECO and Corp. are affected, and FP&L picks up a piece. And in another example, it could be Corp. and TECO -- I mean Corp and FP&L. But the net effect is, overall, with hundreds of transactions, one would expect that the cost on an annualized basis would be roughly the same.

Q Do you believe that a not-for-profit RTO could perform the congestion management function as effectively as a transco?

A (By Mr. Mennes) I think when it comes to performing the function of congestion management, if you look at it in real time, you know, the tools would be there. If you looked at performing -- when you use congestion management over a long-term period of time, as the Chair brought up, I think that the solutions to congestion, the ability to build would be handled much better by the owning and operating transco as opposed to the not-for-profit ISO.

Q But in terms of short-term reaction to congestion and handling congestion, do you see any difference?

A (By Mr. Ramon) No.

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Do you have much more, Counsel?

MR. KEATING: Excuse me?

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: Do you have much more?

MR. KEATING: I do have more for the panel.

And I think there may have been some confusion last night when I said I had 10 to 15 minutes more.

witness naeve: we would like to answer yes or no, but it just isn't working.

1 MR. KEATING: And I had hoped that I was 2 clear that that was on that particular line of 3 questions, and we have gotten through those. I do have a bit more for the panel. 4 5 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: All right. I'm sorry. Mr. Childs? 6 7 MR. CHILDS: Pardon? 8 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: You had a --9 MR. CHILDS: Did he say he was finished? 10 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: No, no, no. 11 I thought maybe he had a half MR. CHILDS: 12 an hour, but he's been writing more questions. 13 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: He miscalculated his 15 14 minutes, that's all. 15 MR. KEATING: No, no. The 15 was just 16 perhaps not properly clarified that that was on that 17 one particular line of questions. 18 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: I was going to go 19 further. 20 COMMISSIONER JABER: Can we take a 21 ten-minute break? 22 CHAIRMAN JACOBS: A ten-minute break. 23 Before we break, though, let me welcome the former 24 Chairman of FERC, Mr. Curt Hebert, who has joined us. 25 Thank you. We'll come back in ten minutes.

(Short recess.)

CHAIRMAN JACOBS: We'll go back on the record. And, Mr. Cochran -- Mr. Keating. I've said that twice now. Mr. Keating, you may continue. BY MR. KEATING:

Q I'm going to pick back up on the discussion of some of the differences between how GridFlorida will operate compared with the way things currently operate.

In particular, how will the way that the companies currently provide ancillary services change under GridFlorida?

A (By Mr. Ramon) As it turns out, there will be some similarities on that aspect, but there will be some other significant differences.

In the original filings of GridFlorida before FERC, we were going to propose a bid-based market, if you will, for ancillary services. But with some concerns on lack of market data, those sorts of things, we have filed a different approach for a day one start. Some of this we've talked about before. But on day one, it will be set up where GridFlorida is what we call a default provider of ancillary services, and the applicants will be taking care of ancillary services for its native load and for any existing

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bilateral arrangements on day one of GridFlorida. And the RTO as the default provider would then be providing ancillary services for those who choose to go to the RTO for ancillary services.

Today the utilities provide ancillary services for their own native load and for bilateral transactions, and they will be doing that also for the initial operation of GridFlorida. But they will be -- the RTO will be the default provider for ancillary services for those parties that want to contract with GridFlorida for those services.

Q And is it anticipated that the RTO would ultimately or eventually be the provider of those services?

A Eventually, once the market is established and evolving into the Advisory Committee, the board would probably move us to a bid-based market for ancillary services.

Q I guess technically GridFlorida wouldn't provide them, but the market participants?

A They would administer a bid-based market for those services, where generation would bid in to provide regulation or operating reserves and the other ancillary services.

Q Do you believe that the cost of ancillary

services will be higher under the GridFlorida proposal compared to the way it's currently handled?

A I think conceptually, the potential is that they would be lower.

Q And how would they be lowered?

A Well, let's just take one of the services, say, regulation or AGC. Today Tampa Electric provides regulation for its native load. Just using the principles of diversity, when you look at the total load that would be served by GridFlorida, the regulation requirements would probably be less than looking at the regulation requirements separately for each of the control areas.

Q Would there be any difference in the provision of ancillary services if a not-for-profit RTO form had been used rather than the transco form?

A I don't think so. I think there wouldn't be any difference.

Q Do any of the other panel members have an opinion on that?

A (By Mr. Southwick) I agree with Greg.

Q In your testimony you state that utilities will be compensated if maintenance schedules need to be modified under the GridFlorida proposal; is that correct?

A (By Mr. Mennes) That is correct, but I'm trying to --

A (By Mr. Southwick) Where is that?

Q That's page 16, lines 7 through 9. And the response to the question, "What authority does GridFlorida have with respect to maintenance of transmission facilities," and on lines 7 through 9, the answer is, "Such participating" — or part of the answer is, "Such participating owners also must change previously approved schedules if so directed by GridFlorida, provided that they are reimbursed for the direct costs incurred as a result of such change."

A (By Mr. Mennes) Correct.

Q And that hasn't changed since filing your testimony?

A Correct.

Q In the past, under the current system, did utilities -- didn't utilities voluntarily reschedule maintenance in order to maintain reliability without being reimbursed for the costs?

A It seldom happens, but if it did, yes, the utilities -- with some of the coordination procedures we had looking at the next day, or if we have outages that are not planned, we've asked people to either get off their facilities early or to, you know, curtail

their maintenance, and that cost is not paid for by --

A (By Mr. Naeve) I would add one caveat to that, and that is I don't think it's correct to say that they do this without including these costs in their rates, because to the extent that they incur additional maintenance costs and these additional maintenance costs — or to the extent they incur additional maintenance costs, it affects their total operating costs, and when they file rates, they file rates to recover those total costs. So I think they are recovered today as they would be in the future.

Q So they would be recovered -- those costs would be recovered in the current rates today?

A That's right.

Q Under current practice, do the utilities voluntarily reschedule maintenance of generation in order to maintain reliability?

A (By Mr. Mennes) I think if it became an issue we would. It hasn't been. We have a procedure in place with the FRCC. And as a matter of fact, the generation maintenance standards that we have and the way that's done will really not change between what we're doing today and the way the FRCC and their role in the future as far as generation maintenance goes.

But to answer your question, if we ever got

into -- we have a coordinated plan, let's start with that. And we've never asked a generator to defer maintenance or something like that. We've just never hit it. But it could be done. It could be asked for by the FRCC working with the other people to try to make sure we have enough reserves.

Q How will compensation for rescheduling maintenance be collected from GridFlorida customers?

A (By Mr. Southwick) Would that be better asked of the rate witness?

A (By Mr. Mennes) I think so.

O To which witness?

A (By Mr. Southwick) The rate witness. I can say this. It would be a cost of doing business to GridFlorida, and they'll have to recover it through their tariff structure. Exactly how that would happen I think we should ask Mr. Ashburn.

Q But presumably it would be included in the costs of GridFlorida that would be paid through charges by the utilities that participate or receive services from it?

A I would think so.

Q And the way that -- you've indicated that there are costs involved in rescheduling maintenance now, although it may be voluntary, and that those

costs are just recovered in the current rates; correct?

A (By Mr. Naeve) I would say those costs make up part of the revenue requirement of the utility, and when they file for rates, they would probably include those costs in their rates.

Q And absent a rate case, though, the ratepayers -- at least the ratepayers wouldn't see any additional costs on the bill?

A well, I assume these types of costs have been incurred for some time, as long as the utility has been operating, so I would think historically they're always in rates.

Q Let me refer to pages 27 and 28 of the testimony. There's a question starting at page 9, "What happens if one of the GridFlorida companies or another transmission customer wants to build facilities that GridFlorida does not believe are necessary?" Could you explain -- without me going back through and reading it, could you just briefly explain what would happen in that circumstance?

A (By Mr. Southwick) Well, briefly, without going back to read it, the intention is to allow utilities who want to build what we call enhanced facilities to be able to do so. The only caveat is

that GridFlorida has the right to say no if there's a reliability reason why they should not build it, which isn't likely, but they have that right. And other than that, the utility can proceed to build it at their own expense.

Q They would build it at their own expense?

A Yes.

Q And those costs would not be rolled into the GridFlorida costs, into the GridFlorida tariff?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. In the testimony at page 34, the panel indicates that market participants are required to submit balanced schedules for the day-ahead market. Could you just briefly explain what is meant by a balanced schedule?

A (By Mr. Ramon) Let's take a simple example of your load-serving entity, your scheduling coordinator, and you have a thousand megawatts of load that need to be served on a day-ahead basis. On a day-ahead basis, as scheduling coordinator, you submit what's called a balanced schedule. You must demonstrate a thousand megawatts of resources to match the thousand megawatts of load on a day-ahead basis. That's the so-called balanced schedule.

A number of other things will be submitted

1 with that balanced schedule. As we mentioned earlier, 2 for the balancing market purposes, those resources 3 that are part of your balanced schedule, you must 4 submit an incremental and decremental bid for all of 5 those generation resources that make up your schedule, 6 and you must address the necessary ancillary services 7 associated with that load, whether you self-provide 8 the generation for that or you go to the RTO as the 9 default provider to secure those ancillary services. 10 And in the event that there's not balance, Q 11 that's what the balancing energy market is designed to 12 cover? 13 14 15

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You need to submit a balanced schedule, period. To the extent the actual turns out to be different than the schedule, you'll be settling for those imbalances through the balancing market.

Q Okay. So should the balancing energy market represent a relatively small amount of the total energy transactions?

I can't give you a number, but it Yes. would be small compared to, let's say, a full spot market.

If GridFlorida were to use, rather than a Q balanced -- rather than to require submission of balanced schedules for the day-ahead market, if it

allowed an unbalanced schedule, is it correct that that means the resources are not fully committed or reserved to meet all the expected loads?

A What's the question?

Q With an unbalanced schedule, is it correct that the resources are not fully committed or reserved to meet all expected loads?

A No. But, you know, GridFlorida's position is that, you know, we're dealing with balanced schedules, not unbalanced schedules. Other RTOs, you know, provide for submittal of unbalanced schedules, and they deal with the reliability aspect of that in different ways, through balanced resources and those sorts of things, but the model for GridFlorida is balanced schedules.

Q And I guess to get to my point, could GridFlorida move to an unbalanced schedule?

A Only through a process that involves the board, the advisory committee, the market monitor, and a filing with the FERC.

Q Okay. So it would require a decision of the board and then approval by FERC?

A Yes.

Q And it wouldn't require any approvals from this Commission?

A Only through the market monitoring discussion that we had earlier. You know, there's provisions for working with the Florida Public Service Commission through the market monitor.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Keating, are you about to leave that point?

MR. KEATING: I am.

COMMISSIONER JABER: Mr. Ramon, back on page 27 of your testimony when you were talking about how a company could construct facilities even if GridFlorida did not agree to construct the facilities on behalf of the company's need, it seems to me that that's inefficient. And as -- I would imagine that it would be the load-serving entity that would construct the facilities, and that would be in the IOU's rate base, so you would have new facilities that are added into the rate base, and you would have the GridFlorida part in the rate base. It seems to me that we would want to put in some sort of structure that does not make it easy for the load-serving entity to do that when it's inefficient. Have you thought about that?

WITNESS RAMON: Yes. The intent of the ability for load-serving entities to do this -- a simple example might be helpful. Let's say Tampa Electric wants to put in added reliability for a

substation in the downtown area, that the consequences of that substation going out are quite dramatic, you have high-rise buildings and elevators and those sorts of things. And so the standard for GridFlorida would be using the FRCC and the NERC planning standards criteria, the so-called N minus 1. I don't want to get too complicated, but that single contingency planning.

If we wanted a second looped circuit in the downtown area for what we believe is needed because of the consequences of losing that much of a dense load, then this is a provision that would allow Tampa Electric or Orlando or any load-serving entity to be able to do that. It would be at our own nickel. And as long as those are transmission facilities, you know, they would be most likely given over to GridFlorida.

COMMISSIONER JABER: It seems to me, though, in a prudency review, if it came back to the Commission as it relates to that load-serving entity, it puts us in a position of seeking from GridFlorida its opinion as to whether those facilities were prudently constructed. It strikes me that if there's a need for additional facilities, whether it be something as simple as a loop or more than that, that

GridFlorida would do it.

WITNESS RAMON: Well, GridFlorida is trying to, you know, do things at least cost and a standard way. They will have to develop standards. I think we would all appreciate that it would have to be carried out in an equitable manner in terms of the transmission additions that are put in place that all load under GridFlorida has to pay for. So if there's additional transmission that a particular load-serving entity wants, like the example that I just provided, we need to somehow make a provision for that.

I understand where you're coming from, though, you know, if that's something that GridFlorida wouldn't do on their own, and the load-serving entity, Tampa Electric, you know, feels it's necessary, so it would involve this Commission on that expense, because it would be an expense that Tampa Electric would be paying for additional transmission service more than what GridFlorida would provide.

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: And under our current statutory scheme, I think that this Commission would still have some say as to whether either GridFlorida or the individual utility made that transmission addition. Wouldn't that be correct?

WITNESS RAMON: I believe so.

WITNESS NAEVE: No, they would have to

come to you for -- I'm not an expert on your siting

statute, so I probably shouldn't opine on this, but I

expect they would have to come to you for siting

COMMISSIONER PALECKI: What I'm thinking is that if we saw that it wasn't in the public's best interests, we could see to it that it was built by the entity that could do it in the most cost-effective manner. And if we saw it was not something that needed to be built, I think we could deny a determination of need for that facility.

authority to make that addition, and --

WITNESS NAEVE: I think in some ways this standard was put in there to actually achieve efficient results, because the expectation is not that GridFlorida will have low standards; the expectation is that they'll have very high standards, high standards and uniformly applied to everybody.

But hypothetically, you may have one entity out there that says, "Notwithstanding those high standards, I want to have reliability that's even better than that, and consequently, I want to add in facilities that exceed the GridFlorida standards."

And if they had the ability to do that and force everybody else in the state to pay for it, it would be

an easy decision, because they don't have to pay for it themselves. But if they have to pay for it themselves, then they're going to make a more economic decision as to whether it's really worth it. So I think it probably does produce more economic choices.

WITNESS SOUTHWICK: Another example of what we were intending to cover here would be, for example, a beautification project, or if a line could be built overhead perfectly adequately, but for some reason the LSE wanted to build it underground with a cost differential, the intention here was that we could do that, but they would have to pay the differential. That's just another example of how this could apply.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q Starting at page 35 of the panel testimony, you discuss how market power will be addressed and the pricing of balancing energy, and in your testimony you state that there are two alternatives that GridFlorida has put before FERC as proposals to address that issue. Is it correct under Alternative A that utilities — that Florida Power & Light — I'm sorry. That utilities that do not currently have market-based rate authority would bid and receive no more than their costs for balancing services?

A (By Mr. Mennes) That's correct.

Q Okay. And those two utilities of the three that are participating in GridFlorida are Florida

Power & Light and Florida Power Corporation; is that correct?

A (By Mr. Ramon) Are they the -- I'm sorry. I didn't hear.

Q The two utilities that currently do not have market-based rate authority, that is, in-state, in the State of Florida, are Florida Power & Light and Florida Power Corporation?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Under Alternative A, though, TECO, because it has market-based rate authority within the state, could bid a market-based rate for energy and receive the market clearing price; correct?

A Today we have market-based rate authority. You have to realize that the balancing energy, the balancing market, which is what Alternative A and B addresses, are under what FERC calls ancillary services, so we would have to file for market-based rate authority for providing this service.

Q Do any of the three participants currently have -- have they currently received market-based rate authority for these types of balancing energy services?

1	A (By Mr. Mennes) Not in the State of
2	Florida.
3	A (By Mr. Ramon) And again, we have it in
4	general for power sales. But for this ancillary
5	service, we would have to file for it.
6	Q With respect to Florida Power Corporation,
7	are you in the same situation as Florida Power & Light
8	on that issue?
9	A (By Mr. Southwick) Yes.
10	Q Would it be correct to say that the energy
11	balancing market is typically an hour-by-hour market?
12	A (By Mr. Ramon) Yes.
13	Q And is that similar to the economy and the
14	emergency energy markets in that respect?
15	A No. You know, the balancing market is
16	intrahour, and I would think the I think what
17	you're moving to is the so-called Schedule A and B,
18	and those are typically interhour.
19	Q And by interhour you mean less than an
20	hour?
21	A No.
22	Q Hourly?
23	A Hourly.
24	Q Specifically hourly, and economy and
25	emergency would not necessarily be hourly?

1	A (By Mr. Ramon) No, emergency would be
2	hourly.
3	A (By Mr. Mennes) Emergency would be?
4	A (By Mr. Ramon) Yes.
5	A (By Mr. Mennes) The balancing would be
6	done just within the hour, where the others would be
7	more of a schedule that would last a longer period of
8	time as opposed to a
9	Q Under Alternative A, would Florida Power &
10	Light and Florida Power Corporation be able to file
11	for approval of a new rate for energy balancing that
12	recovers some fixed costs as well as variable costs?
13	A (By Mr. Southwick) Did you say would we
14	have to?
15	Q Would you be able to?
16	A (By Mr. Naeve) We would be able to file;
17	that's correct.
18	Q If Florida Power & Light and Florida Power
19	Corporation did make such a filing, would it be their
20	intent to seek recovery of some fixed costs?
21	A (By Mr. Southwick) I would say so, yes.
22	Q Is it correct that under Alternative A, all
23	suppliers with market-based rate authority would be
24	paid the market clearing price, while suppliers
25	without market-based rate authority would be capped at

the new cost-based rate? 1 2 (By Mr. Ramon) Yes. 3 Would the buyer of balancing energy pay an Q 4 average price? 5 (By Mr. Southwick) Yes. 6 (By Mr. Ramon) Yes. 7 So to provide an example, if Florida Power 0 8 & Light's price is capped at \$50 per megawatt-hour 9 under Alternative A, and TECO bid \$60 per 10 megawatt-hour, and the clearing price is \$100 per 11 megawatt-hour, TECO would get the clearing price, \$100 12 per megawatt-hour, but Florida Power & Light would 13 only get \$50 per megawatt-hour; is that correct? 14 (By Mr. Naeve) I think you've assumed that 15 they've applied for and received market-based rate 16 authority, TECO has. 17 Yes, that is an assumption in the question. 18 If that assumption were correct, then your 19 response is correct. 20 Okay. But regardless of that differential, Q 21 the buyer receives some sort of average price? 22 Α That's right. 23 (By Mr. Ramon) Remember, imbalance is a 24 settlement after the fact, so it's based on the

average of those clearing prices.

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Q Under Alternative B, which starts on page 36, each participant would be paid what they bid; correct?

A (By Mr. Mennes) No. Just the participants that have market-based power, I mean, that are not --

Q I'm just going to ask, instead of trying to sit here and sort this out myself --

A we're talking here to see if we need to clarify that. The entities without market power, I answered no, would everybody, you know, receive what they bid, and the answer is no. The entities without market-based power would. Any other entity that is participating in the market would receive the cap price.

A (By Mr. Ramon) You're paid what you bid, but those who do not have market-based rate authority are subject to a cap.

MR. CHILDS: Isn't that on lines 2 and 3 of page 37?

MR. KEATING: I believe so. And that's part of my confusion, and I'm not sure if the answer is consistent with that line.

witness mennes: So, in other words, no market clearing price is calculated.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: They get paid what

they bid unless they're subject to a cap, and then

they can't charge more than the cap. Is that correct?

WITNESS NAEVE: Well. I think the correct

WITNESS NAEVE: Well, I think the correct way to phrase this is, everybody gets paid what they bid. However, entities that do not have authorization to collect market clearing prices are capped in what they can bid. So if their cap is \$40 and they bid \$40, that's what they get. If their cap is \$40 and they bid \$30, they only get \$30. So they pay what they bid, but some people are restrained in what they can bid.

BY MR. KEATING:

Q Okay. So there's just no market clearing price? Is that the distinction with Alternatives A and B?

A (By Mr. Mennes) Correct.

Q Does the method of determining the balancing price of energy require any further approval by FERC once GridFlorida has been approved?

A (By Mr. Naeve) Yes. We've submitted two alternatives, and the Commission is going to have to approve one of those alternatives.

Q Once one of those is approved, if GridFlorida wished to use a different method, would it require FERC approval?

A Yes, it would.

Q Okay. And would that first require approval of the board of GridFlorida?

A Well, again, under the independence requirement of Order 2000, an RTO has to have control over its tariffs. So consequently, before the RTO were to make a tariff change, it would have to have consent of its management. And if the management consented to that, then they would make the filing, and then FERC would have to agree to it.

Q Would a change in that approach require any approval by this Commission?

A I don't think so.

Q Do you agree that there can be instances of localized market power? In other words, could market power crop up essentially at any time.

A I think you may have mixed your metaphors there. One went to place, and one went to time.

Localized market power goes to location. And in most markets, and I suspect in Florida, there are situations where you can have localized market power.

Q And could both take place at the same time? I'm sorry. Could you have both -- strike that. Lunch will go a long way towards getting the blood going back through --

1	COMMISSIONER DEASON: We were hoping to
2	finish your cross-examination before lunch.
3	MR. KEATING: I understand. That's the
4	downside. I am getting very close.
5	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Good.
6	BY MR. KEATING:
7	Q I referenced a FERC order in the deposition
8	of the panel, and I don't know if you all have had a
9	chance to look at that since the deposition. I think
10	we didn't go into much detail in the order. I have it
11	available to hand out as an exhibit, but if you would
12	like to
13	A (By Mr. Ramon) I have a copy.
14	A (By Mr. Naeve) I've read the order, but I
1 5	don't have a copy with me, so if you wouldn't mind
16	giving me a copy, I would appreciate it.
17	MR. KEATING: Okay. Let me go ahead and
18	have that distributed. And we would like to have that
19	marked as the next exhibit number, which I believe may
20	be 9.
21	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Exhibit 9.
22	(Exhibit 9 was marked for identification
23	and received into evidence.)
24	(Transcript continues in sequence in
25	Volume 4.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

4 | STATE OF FLORIDA)

5 | COUNTY OF LEON)

I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein designated; that my shorthand notes were thereafter transcribed under my supervision; and that the foregoing pages numbered 382 through 506 are a true and correct transcription of my stenographic notes.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 4th day of October, 2001.

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

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